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
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
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ART. I.—*New England Theology: The Edwardean Period.**

THE Edwardean Period in the history of New England Theology, forms its negative character in a practical and doctrinal protest against the three great mistakes or errors of the preceding period. The first is the Half-way Covenant, sanctioned by the Synod of 1662. The second is the converting efficacy of the Lord's Supper, as maintained by Mr Stoddard in his sermon published in 1707. "In this sermon," says the biographer of Edwards, "he attempted to prove that the Lord's Supper is a converting ordinance." This is what President Edwards called Mr Stoddard's "particular tenet about the Lord's Supper." The third error is, what was termed the "acceptableness of unregenerate doings." The first led to the second, as the second did to the third. The three were in part the cause, and in part the effect of that decline in practical godliness to which the "Great Awakening" under Edwards and Whitefield was a salutary check. When the life of piety begins to fail in the churches, they will naturally begin, first to question the truth of the doctrines, and then to discard them. Christian doctrine and an unchristian life are moral opposites, of which each seeks to exclude the other. The Edwardean theology places itself fully on the Christian side.

The movement, both in its practical and polemical bearing, stands in our history as a check to these lapsing and sublapsarian tendencies of the time. It was *the reaction of the pure old New England theology against an enfeebling amalgam*

* This article, extracted from the *American Theological Review*, is from the pen of Dr Lawrence, Professor in East Windsor Theological Seminary, Ct.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

of *Pelagian, Socinian, and Arminian elements*. This will appear from a cursory view of the external history of the period, and a brief analysis of the chief productions of its master-mind. The representative men were President Edwards, and Drs Bellamy and Hopkins. Edwards was the oldest. He had been thirteen years in the pastoral office when Bellamy entered it, and sixteen when Hopkins was ordained. Both were the pupils of Edwards. Their views and character were shaped not a little by the moulding influence of the Northampton pastor and his excellent wife. Mr Edwards's mind, strong in native endowments, had come to its maturing point, and his influence was growing into a powerful provincial force, just as these youthful coadjutors came into circumstances to be guided by it. Mr Edwards entered the pastoral office at Northampton, in 1727, at the age of twenty-four, as a colleague with his grandfather, Mr Stoddard. He had no prearranged dialectic or scholastic system to unfold, no favourite "five points" of any theology to repeat. "He had studied theology," says his biographer, "not chiefly in systems and commentaries, but in the Bible, and in the character and mutual relations of God and his creatures." One of his resolves made during his preparation for the ministry was: "To study the Scriptures so steadily, constantly, and frequently as that I may find and plainly perceive myself to grow in the knowledge of the same." This study was coupled with an abiding abnegation of self, and an entire consecration to God, which, in a mind like his, are the never-failing conditions of success. "I have been before God, and have given myself, all that I am and have, to God, so that I am not in any respect my own. I can challenge no right in this understanding, this will, these affections which are in me. Neither have I any right in this body, or any of its members, no right in this tongue, these hands, these feet; no right in these senses, these eyes, these ears, this smell, or this taste. I have given myself clean away, and have not retained anything of my own."

With these primary elements of a sound theology and a practical minister, we are not surprised to find the downward course of things in his parish first checked and then turned back. This counter-scene opened in the remarkable revival of 1734. An account of this work of grace, then so unusual, was given by Mr Edwards, under the title of "*A Narrative of Surprising Conversions*." This publication was followed by two others on the same general subject, which grew out of the second awakening, which commenced in Northampton in 1740, and extended into many parts of New England. One was "*Thoughts on the Revival of Religion*," which, like the first, was eminently practical. The other was the "*Treatise on Religious Affections*."

The object is to distinguish a genuine from a spurious conversion. It is Biblical, though it draws largely on consciousness and Christian experience. It impresses men with the necessity of being thoroughly honest with themselves, and teaches them how to be so. If it has strong meat for men, it has also milk for babes. It is not perfect, as is no work of erring men; but in those moral eddies, and even whirlpools, occasioned by the bold reaffirmations of the purely gospel doctrines, it was what the condition of the churches required. Perhaps, like the Epistle to the Romans, for a certain few, it may need some previous culturing influences, as sedatives in the medical art must in some diseases precede the remedial agencies. But with the "Pilgrim's Progress," and the "Saint's Rest," this Treatise has been hallowed in the experience of the regenerate of all denominations, for more than a century.

These three treatises are the exponents of a powerful reactionary movement, of which, in the providence of God, Edwards was made the instrument. They are the work of an eye-witness. Hence they are life-like and exact. They were produced in the glow of a bold and stalwart heart, kindled into what he calls "a sweet burning." Hence, though just, sometimes rigorously so to the proud and luxurious lovers of themselves, he is also gentle, tender, even as a mother, to all the consciously sin-worn and suffering of his kind. The work of God, of which they treat, makes an epoch in the church history of New England, not unlike that recorded in the second chapter of the Acts, and makes up largely the first chapter of the Edwardean period of our history. The scenes which marked the early history of Mr Edwards, and the subjects that he was led to examine, increased his misgivings respecting the Half-way Covenant, particularly "with regard to the admission of those into the church who made no pretence to real godliness." His difficulties led to examination, examination resulted in conviction, and this in action, when a new scene opens in his history, which was closed by the dissolution of his pastoral relations.

The removal of Mr Edwards from Northampton to Stockbridge opens the second, and in some respects, the most important chapter in his history. The first marked movement in this period was, as we have seen, practical—a reactionary life-movement against the chills of death, that were stiffening the faith and worship of the churches into lifeless forms and fossils. How extensive the defection had become Mr Edwards did not know until he found himself, by divine providence, engaged in arresting it. He knew that opening the door of the church to the world was the way to corrupt and debase it. But he was not aware, when all the churches in the county but two had thus opened their doors, that all the ministers in it but three

had become correspondingly lax in doctrine, until he tried to restore the old principle that "the matter of a church are saints by calling." Up to this time his publications had been of a practical character. He now entered on the discussion of questions relating more directly to fundamental doctrines. The age was beginning to drift from those great truths which had fed the life of the church in its seasons of greatest activity and purity. In France, monkish superstition was already goading the populace onward towards atheistic madness. A dead orthodoxy was opening the way in Germany for a deader rationalism. The evangelical faith in England was ebbing before the flood-tide of deism and naturalism, while in this country, the school of infidels, a little later called Jeffersonian, was concentrating its forces, and beginning "to let slip the dogs of war." The works of such men as Dr Turnbull, and Dr John Taylor, of England, thoroughly Pelagian in their principles, were extensively circulated.

Edwards saw the necessity for discussion—original, calm philosophical discussion. The faith was assailed from the side of reason. Not that infinite mind to which Fenelon exclaimed: "O Reason! Reason! art thou not he whom I seek?" No; but a mere *rationalismus vulgaris*, an ethical all-sufficiency of the human for itself. An original defence of the old faith from the divine philosophical side was needed, and Providence had prepared him for this new work. "The honour of being the most effective defender of Christianity," says Dr Chalmers, "we should ascribe to Jonathan Edwards." Sir James Mackintosh, by no means a partial witness, regarded his "power of subtle argument as, perhaps, unmatched, certainly unsurpassed, among men." Mr Edwards now entered on that series of polemical papers which distinguished him as the greatest thinker and most profound theologian of the age. It consists of the "Treatises on the Will," on "The End of God in the Creation of the World," on "The Nature of True Virtue," and on "Original Sin." Before he left Northampton, he had projected a plan for these defensive treatises, and had been collecting materials for its execution. In 1748, he received from Rev. John Erskine of Scotland, John Taylor's works "On Original sin," and his "Key to the Apostolic Writings," with a "Paraphrase on the Epistle to the Romans." In his letter of acknowledgment, he says: "I am exceedingly glad of those two books of Taylor's. I had before borrowed and read Taylor 'On Original Sin.' . . . The other book, his 'Paraphrase,' &c., I had not heard of—if I had, I should not have been easy till I had seen it, and been possessed of it. *These books, if I should live, may probably be of great service to me.*" The intent and bearing of this defensive scheme are made evident by a letter to the same man,

written in 1752, one year before the "Treatise on the Will" was produced :—

"I hope now, in a short time, to be at leisure to resume my design of writing something on the Arminian controversy. I have no thought of going through with all parts of the controversy at once ; but the subject which I intended, God willing, first to write something upon, was Free Will and Moral Agency, endeavouring with as much exactness as I am able, to consider the nature of that freedom of moral agents which makes them the subjects of moral government, moral precepts, counsels, calls, motives, persuasions, promises and threatenings, praise and blame, rewards and punishments, strictly examining the modern notions of those things, endeavouring to demonstrate their most palpable inconsistency and absurdity ; endeavouring, also, to bring the late great objections and outcries against Calvinistic divinity, from these topics, to the test of the strictest reasoning ; and particularly that great objection, in which the modern writers have so much gloried, so long triumphed, with so great a degree of insult towards the most excellent divines, and in effect, against the gospel of Jesus Christ, namely, that the Calvinistic notions of God's moral government are contrary to the common-sense of mankind."

It is thus evident that Edwards did not come rashly to these later labours. He carefully surveyed the whole field. He made himself acquainted with the strongest points of the opposite side, and grappled with its chief defenders. They had impeached the old Calvinistic divinity, and appealed to the bar of reason and common-sense. He willingly followed them there, and then carried the appellants to the higher tribunal of the divine Word. We are aware of the difficulty in securing an exact analysis and summary of these treatises. But without something of this internal history we should fail to bring out fairly that in Edwards which has given his name to the period. The *genuine* Edwardean theology lies in these treatises. The logical order would lead us to speak first of the End of God in the Creation of the World as the *starting-point*, and then of the treatise on Original Sin, or the *Fall of Man*. Next, the Freedom of the Will, or man's condition in his *abnormal* state, and finally, the Nature of True Virtue in the *regenerate*.

But the chronological order will comport better with our object, which is rather historical than logical or theological. This brings us first to the Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, which was produced, according to his biographer, in four months and a half. Whatever may be thought of the conclusions, it is by general admission a masterpiece of close reasoning. It is often studied by the best thinkers as a mental discipline. The diverse Anti-Calvinists, the Pelagian, Semi-Pelagian, and Socinian schools, have, for a hundred years, directed their most

powerful batteries against it. They have been debating and dissertating upon it. They have viewed it, reviewed it, and re-reviewed it, with a kind of success that ever leaves the same work to be repeated. A joint in the harness of the matchless chieftain, or a vulnerable spot in his heel, has been sedulously sought for, through which he could be made to "bite the dust," and is still sought for, but in vain.

We freely allow that these reviews and dissertations have an important historical value. They have generally been the product of honest and earnest minds, which have brought to the great subject whatever light may have been elicited by the later studies in mental and moral science. Nicer discriminations, new shades of thought, and a more exact terminology, have evolved more fully the main ideas of the author, and harmonized them more perfectly with the aggressive forces of the church catholic in its conflicts with error.

I. In this Inquiry, the will is defined as that by which the mind chooses any thing, or which is the same, that by which the soul either chooses or refuses. It includes the desires, inclinations, and affections.* The will is determined when, by some influence, its choice is fixed upon a particular object; and this influence is that *motive* which, in the view of the mind, is the strongest. Motive, which is both objective and subjective, is the whole of that which moves the mind to volition, or in view of which it acts. By the formula, "the will is as the greatest apparent good," is meant that the mind chooses according to what seems immediately most agreeable.

Moral necessity is simply the *certainly* of things, in themselves, which is the ground of the knowledge of them, and of the proposition that affirms them. It excludes constraint, and natural necessity; and when it relates to the actions of moral agents it involves choice, and the influence of motives, and is improperly called *necessity*. It is therefore consistent with liberty or freedom, which is the power of choosing as one pleases, and of acting as one chooses, with no compulsion or restraint. In brief, it is the power of choice, or the election of *one* of two or more objects of choice. An inability to choose *either* of two objects is the negation of choice, and therefore not an element of freedom. Nor is the power of choosing *and refusing* an object, at the same time, such an element. One can no more choose and refuse a thing at the same instant, than he can *do* and *not do* it. Neither is the simultaneous choice of a thing and its opposite, or *both* of two objects, a possible volition. It is therefore evident that an absolute self-determining power of the will, or the power of a contrary

* Edwards's Works, vol. ii. pp. 15-280.

choice, is not essential to the Edwardean idea of freedom, and, if he be correct, to any just idea of it. The will *has* no power. It is not an agent, and has no consciousness or personality. The *mind* is the agent, and, in its unity and totality, the only agent. It *has* the will as *its* power, by which it acts volitionally—thus *or* the contrary, but not thus *and* the contrary—neither without motives, nor against the prevailing ones. Consequently, the liberty of indifference, or of choice, with no antecedent, leaning, or disposition, is neither necessary to freedom nor compatible with it. Nor does it allow as essential that contingency or fortuitousness which excludes the moral certainty of things.

Natural *Ability* in the Edwardean theology, and as implied in the Inquiry, consists in the *powers* or *faculties* of the mind, which are the condition and instruments of moral agency, and the basis and measure of responsibility—a capacity for acting as one chooses, and choosing as one pleases. Natural *Inability* is the absence of this capacity. *Moral Inability* is the want of *inclination*, or the prevalence of an opposite inclination. The inability to good in man's fallen state is his "desperate depravity." A man is morally unable to do a thing when he can do it if he will, but from a want of inclination *will* not. He has a thing in his power if he has it in his *choice*, that is, if he can choose that, *or* something else. But, while, from prevailing bent, he chooses one, he is morally unable to choose the other. One can perform the external acts that depend on the will, and the acts of the will themselves, *if he will*. To say otherwise is to say that he can not will if he *does* will. Yet, while a man can act *if* he will, and can will if he *does*, and *as* he does, he is morally unable to perform an act if he does *not will it*; and unable to will it if he *will* not, and unable to will otherwise than he pleases, or, otherwise than he does will. Moral Ability is the natural faculties and the inclination; that is, plenary ability or *power* in the proper sense.

From this imperfect statement of the ground principles of the Inquiry, its practical bearings are evident upon the following principles of the New England Theology: 1. A valid divine sovereignty and moral government. 2. The freedom of the subjects of that government, even when morally disordered, and dependent on the sovereign for restoration. 3. Hence the entire accountability of the subject, in the abnormal as in the normal state. 4. All moral beings will and act as on the whole is most agreeable, or according to their underlying and *ruling love*. Its main antagonistic force is directed against that autonomy of the human will by which, through its self-determining power, it is raised to a co-efficient with the divine

will ; in which, as Bledsoe, an extreme libertarian, teaches, even God can not cause virtue without a contradiction.

This medium doctrine of the will, standing between the extremes of Necessitarianism and Libertarianism, conciliates and harmonizes elements of theology, which otherwise appear incongruous if not contradictory. According to it, God is a sovereign and man is free. All things in the universe are connected and certain, but no moral being is forced. It avoids fatalism, and is equally remote from fanaticism and a nebulistic mysticism. Evil came into the world by man's *free* will, through God's non-prevention or *permissive* will. God is its sovereign, but no whit its author. And He will subject it to his fore-ordination and eternal purpose of good. The divine will touches directly the fallen human will in man's recovery, and moves it to good, not as a machine, by mechanical force, but as the Infinite free spirit moves and mends the finite free spirit. Regeneration is more than moral suasion, and lies deeper than any self-determination. It can be explained by no mere autonomy of the will, or "spontaneous activity, self-directed." "Say what we may of the will, as a strictly self-determining power," says Dr Bushnell, a moderate representative of the libertarian scheme, "raise what distinctions we may as regards the kinds of ability, such as natural and moral, antecedent and subsequent, we have no ability at all, of any kind, to regenerate our states or restore our own disorders."*

"Hereby," says Edwards, "it becomes manifest that God's moral government over mankind, his treating them as moral agents, making them the objects of his commands, counsels, warnings, exhortations, promises, threatenings, rewards and punishments, is not inconsistent with a *determining disposal* of all events, of every kind, through the universe, in his providence, either by positive efficiency or permission."†

This is the Edwardean doctrine of God's government as found in the Inquiry. It is the doctrine of the chief fathers of the New England churches. We think it is shewn in this essay, as Sir William Hamilton says a hundred years later it is by the Philosophy of the Conditioned, "to be as irrational as irreligious, on the ground of human understanding, to deny, either, on the one hand, the foreknowledge, predestination, and free grace of God, or, on the other, the free will of man ; that we should believe both, and both in unison, though unable to comprehend either, even, apart. 'This philosophy proclaims with Augustine, and with Augustine in his maturest writings : If there be not free grace in God, how can he save the world ; and if there be not free will in man, how can the

* Nature and Supernaturalism, p. 284.

† Works, ii. 281-2.

world, by God, be judged? This doctrine, says the same acute author, "brings us back from the observations of modern theology, to the truth and simplicity of the more ancient church."

The year after the Inquiry was published, 1754, Pres. Edwards, in continuance of his plan, prepared the dissertations "On the End for which God created the World," and also on "The Nature of True Virtue." Seven years after the death of their author, 1765, they were published with a preface by Dr Hopkins. Both were carefully prepared "for the public view," says the editor, and were "more especially designed for the learned and inquisitive."

II. In the former, the End of God in Creation, the author distinguishes clearly,* 1, Between the chief end and the *ultimate*; 2, Between the chief end and the *inferior*; 3, Between the ultimate and the *subordinate*. An ultimate end is what one seeks on its *own* account, and a subordinate one is what is sought as a *means* to some higher end. The chief end is that which is most valued and sought, and is always ultimate; an inferior, that which is less desired. Whatever that be which is in itself *most valuable*, and was so originally, prior to the creation of the world, and which is *attainable* by the creation, that must be worthy to be God's last end in the creation, and also worthy to be his highest end. Whatsoever thing is actually the *effect* of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world. We see that it is a good which He aimed at by the creation of the world, because He has actually attained it by that means.

The moral rectitude of God must consist in a due respect to things that are objects of moral respect. . . . And, therefore, it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being to whom the *most* is due, that is, God, for he is infinitely the most worthy of regard. And if it is fit and holy that God should *have* a supreme regard to himself, it is fit that he should act in such a manner as to *shew* that he has. That this regard to the infinite excellence of his own nature should be his last end in creation, is evident—Because it is fit and desirable that his attributes should be *exerted*, that they should be *known* by other beings than himself, that they might be the objects of *joyous* affection.

To the objection that this makes God a *selfish* Being, acting for his own glory, Mr Edwards replies, If God be the Infinite Good, and all other excellence less than nothing in comparison, it is fit that he should value himself accordingly, and,

* Works, iii. p. 5-89.

therefore, it is not selfishness but *moral rectitude*. Selfishness is opposition of one's self to the public good. But this supreme regard of God to himself is just the identification of himself with that good which *secures* it in the *highest degree*. If his excellence and glory are worthy to be made the end of his *creatures*, certainly they must be worthy to be made *his* end. Thus God's regard to himself as supremely good, is the opposite of selfishness. The perfection of his government depends upon it. Should he turn from it, the good of the universe would fail. The objection is based on misapprehension, and is therefore sciolistic and nugatory.

III. The dissertation on The Nature of True Virtue is constructed on the same ground-principle as that on the End of God in the Creation. Edwards uses the term virtue in the sense of holiness.* Virtue he defines as something beautiful or excellent, belonging to beings that have perception and will; and as consisting in benevolence to being in general. The first object of a virtuous benevolence is *being*, simply considered, and its ultimate propensity is to the highest good of being in general. The second, is *benevolent* being. The benevolence of a being, and the qualities and exercises of mind which proceed from it, constitute that spiritual and moral beauty wherein all true virtue consists, and is the primary ground of the love of complacency. The divine virtue consists primarily in love to himself as both the infinite Being and the infinite Beauty, and secondarily in a regard to his creatures, which is proportional to their being and beauty. Their virtue consists in a similar supremacy of love of him, and a proportional love to their fellow-creatures. This *love* is the sum of creaturely excellence, and the fulfilling of the whole law. Self-love, or benevolence to a particular person or private system, is not of the nature of true virtue, because the good will is confined to a single person, or a small part of universal being. It is *against* general benevolence, and will set a person against general existence and make him an *enemy* to it.

The following are some points in what Edwards regarded as the New Divinity, against which he reaffirmed these general principles of the old.

1. That God's chief end in creation is *happiness*. Rev. Mr Dwight, the able editor of the New York edition of his works, says, the point demonstrated by Edwards is, that this end was "the manifestation of his own glory in the highest happiness of his creatures." This we think is a misconception. For the highest happiness of *all* his creatures is not the effect of creation. But Edwards says, "Whatsoever thing is *actually* the

effect of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely *valuable in itself*, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world." The doctrine of both these dissertations looks for God's end in creation to something higher than happiness, as the "absolutely valuable," namely, to the illustration of infinite *excellence*, in the production of a similar finite excellence. This bars out the Universalist dogma, which is the logical sequence from the happiness theory, and also the Divine Impotence scheme, that God fails of his end, the happiness of his creatures, only because he is not able to accomplish it.

2. That happiness is the chief end in the *virtuous affections* of created beings. Some writers have claimed the dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue in support of this view. But a careful examination will shew that this is one of the errors especially *assailed* in it. It is a cardinal principle of both the essays, that the chief end of the creatures in a virtuous affection, is the same as God's chief end in his creation—the excellence and glory of the Creator. The author expressly teaches that "a truly virtuous mind, being under the sovereign dominion of love to God, above all things seeks the *glory* of God, and makes this his supreme, governing, and ultimate end."

3. The *Utilitarian* dogma, which makes virtue not a good in itself, but a means to happiness. The Biblical Repertory,* in an able article on Dr Alexander's Outlines of Moral Science, appears to impeach Edwards on this point. It is true, a repulsive Utilitarianism is taught in the elaborate note by Dr Williams, the editor of the English edition. He defines virtue as "a laudable mean of real happiness."† But the editor should not be confounded with the author. If we do not mistake, the text confutes the commentary.

Upon this point, Mr Dwight seems to have misconceived the animus of the essay, when he says Edwards represents "virtue as founded in happiness, and as being love to the greatest happiness."‡ Edwards, on the contrary, says that virtue is founded in *being* and in *benevolence*. The first objective ground of it "is being, simply considered," and of course, exclusive of the happiness and misery of that being. The second ground is "benevolent being," neither as happy nor otherwise, but as *holy*.§ And as God is the chief of all greatness and excellence, of all being and beauty, true holiness is founded objectively on this double element in him, and consists in love to him.

The connection between holiness and happiness in the Edwardean scheme is inviolate, as it must be in a moral govern-

* Vol. xxv. p. 19. † Ed. Works, iii. p. 100. ‡ Vol. i. p. 548. § iii. p. 97, 98.

ment ; but virtue is made a good *in itself*, and is sought as the chief and ultimate end, as it must be, that the government may be one of moral rectitude ; and happiness is a good, but not the highest, and hence neither God's nor a holy man's chief end.

The divine excellency of God and of Jesus Christ, says Edwards, in the *Essay on Religious Affections*, "the Word of God, his Works and Ways, . . . is the primary reason why a true saint loves these things, and not any supposed interest that he has in them, or any conceived benefit that he has received or shall receive from them." This antagonism of the Edwardean theology to the Utilitarian dogma, is still further evident from its repugnance to a kindred proposition :

4. That all love arises from *self-love*. If self-love be taken in the sense of a man's loving whatsoever is pleasing to him, which is the truism of his "loving what he loves," it is no wonder that "all love may be resolved into self-love." But "this is calling that self-love which is only a general capacity of loving or hating ; or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased, which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will." Self-love "most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined private self," or that interest which most immediately consists in those pleasures or pains which are personal.* It is confined to a private system, and will set a person against general existence and make him an enemy to it.† There is an apparent conflict between this view and another presented in "Charity and its Fruits," where he says that "charity, or the spirit of Christian love, is not contrary to all self-love."‡ It is not contrary to Christianity that a man should love himself, or, which is the same thing, his own happiness.

There are three senses in which Edwards employs the term self-love. 1. As a regard for one's self, which is a part of benevolence to being in general ; then it is legitimate and Christian, in accordance with the duty of love to one's self implied in the command, "Love thy neighbour *as thyself*." 2. A love of one's happiness, which belongs to the *nature of all* intelligent beings, and is as necessary to man's nature as the faculty of the will. In this sense Edwards employs the term, when he speaks of it as "a capacity of being either pleased or displeased, which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will," and of "loving what he loves." 3. The most common and only proper sense of the term, is, a man's regard to his private interest, which sets him against the general good. A careful examination of all President Edwards has said on the subject, and of the different senses and relations in which he employs

* Works, iii. pp. 118, 119. † P. 119. ‡ Charity and its Fruits, p. 229.

the term, will disclose his essential consistency. The Treatise on the Religious Affections presents the same dislike to self-love, or desire of happiness, as the source of all love.

"Some say that it is impossible in the nature of things for any man to love God, or any other being, but that love to himself must be the foundation of it. But I humbly suppose it is for want of consideration they say so. They argue that whoever loves God and so desires his glory, or the enjoyment of him, desires these things as his own happiness. . . . But how *came* these things to be so agreeable to him that he esteemed it his highest happiness to glorify God? Is not this the *fruit* of love? Must not a man *first* love God, or have his heart united to him, before he will esteem *God's* good his *own*, and before he will desire the glorifying of God as his happiness? It is not strong arguing because *after* a man has his heart united to God in love, and as a *fruit of this*, he desires His glory and enjoyment as his own happiness, that therefore a desire of this happiness must needs be the *cause* and *foundation* of this love; unless it is strong arguing that because a father begat a son, therefore the son certainly begat him. . . . Something else *entirely distinct* from self-love might be the cause of this, namely, a *change* made in the views of the mind and *relish* of his heart, whereby he apprehends a beauty, and a glory, and a supreme good, in God's nature as it is in itself. This may be the thing that *first draws* his heart to him and causes his heart to be united to him, *prior* to all considerations of his own interest or happiness, although *after* this, and as a *fruit* of it, he necessarily seeks his interest and happiness *in God*." "The first foundation of a true love to God is that whereby he is in himself lovely, or worthy to be loved, or the supreme loveliness of his nature."*

Thus, against all forms of the self-love scheme, Edwards reaffirms the old doctrine of the Cambridge Platform, that, "because the works of self-love proceed not from a heart purified by faith, nor are done in a right manner, according to the word of God, nor to a right end, the glory of God, they are therefore sinful and cannot please God."

The Edwardean theology is free from the slightest taint of the Utilitarian philosophy. There is nothing mercenary about it. While it takes in the individual interests, it carries each one to what is far above and beyond individualism. It *includes* happiness, and makes that secure to the holy, as holiness always draws this after it. But its last chief end is God, the infinite personal excellence, indescribable moral beauty, the beauty of truth, of wisdom, and of love. It enfolds these, and a conscious communion with them as its central and centralizing force—the dynamics of the system.

* Works, v. pp. 129-181.

5. Another principle to which these Essays oppose themselves, is, that the mere *will* of God is the foundation of absolute right and obligation. The opposition to this is rather in the drift of the dissertations, than in any specific expression. The will of God, as in all biblical theology, is taken as the infallible rule of duty, the synonym of right and exponent of wrong. But it does not *create* these principles. Their foundation is not either *ab extra*, or anterior, to the divine nature, but *intrinsic* and eternal in that nature. Right is in God as wisdom is. But his will is no more the cause of the one than the other, though it is the exponent of both. God's *nature* is the concrete of absolute right, as it is of truth, justice, and love. This is what Edwards means by the "supremely excellent nature of divine things," "the infinite excellence of the divine nature," with which the divine will and administration are always in exact accordance. Hence God's sovereignty is simply the regnancy of right, wisdom, and love. It is not *arbitrary*, in the obnoxious sense of reasonless, but it is absolute. Yet not absolute, as a human tyrant, from the seizure and abuse of unlawful power, but as having no equal or coefficient, the source of all things, and the supreme,—competent to an administration resulting in the highest good of the universe, both in what it does and what it *permits*. The sovereignty of his *will* rests on his wisdom, equity, and love. The executive in the divine government, so to speak, falls back on the legislative, and the legislative upon the judiciary or court of equity in the divine nature. God must be *sovereign*, or nothing. He must rule in the world, and in our theologies, or evil will, and death and hell. Hence his sovereignty is a primary belief, a regulative idea in all generally sound theology. Hence too all good men, rightly conceiving of it, have grasped it as a first truth, and loved it. "Absolute sovereignty," says Edwards, "is what I love to ascribe to God." And of this, Mills exclaimed in God's early disclosures to him of his love, "Glorious sovereignty! Glorious sovereignty."

IV. The last great work of President Edwards is the Treatise on Original Sin. And as this is the last, so, as an index of his theology, it is the most valuable. It embraces a wider range of thought, and contains his views on a greater variety of theological topics.

The Treatise is divided into four parts. Our limits will allow us only a brief summary of each. The caption makes evident the design: "The great Christian doctrine of Original Sin defended."* In part first, he defines original sin as "the innate sinful depravity of heart," understood as including the imputa-

* Works, i. 303-583.

tion of Adam's first sin. As the qualities and principles of virtue and vice lie in the disposition of the heart, which precedes choice, and gives it its quality, this part is occupied with the evidence that the heart of man is naturally of a corrupt and evil disposition.

In the second part the argument is continued from man's normal state, by considering whether he was *created* with original righteousness. In the outset, he meets the grand objection, both to original righteousness and original sin, that it is inconsistent with the nature of virtue that it should be con-created—that “a necessary holiness is no holiness,” that Adam “must exercise thought and reflection before he could be righteous.” To this he answers: “It is agreeable to common-sense, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that the good choice itself from whence that effect proceeds, is so; yea, also, the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind from whence proceeds that good choice is virtuous. This is according to the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed. Therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it.” Therefore there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions and affections should be the effect of choice. And so no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition being natural.

Having disposed of the objection, the negative form of the argument, the author proceeds to the positive. Pres. Edwards regards it as an axiom that “in a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly innocent as to be perfectly righteous.” There can no more be a medium between being right and being wrong in a moral sense than between straight and crooked. Here he is steadfast with Augustine and the church anthropology against the Pelagian *characterless, middle ground*—“*Ut sine virtute, ita et vitio procreamur.*” Adam's sin, with relation to the forbidden fruit, was his *first* sin. Hence he must have been till then, from the first moment of his existence, perfectly righteous, and consequently must have been *created* righteous. The supposition of a disposition to right action being obtained by *repeated* right action is inconsistent with itself. For it supposes a *course* of right action before there is any *disposition* to right action. As all Adam's holy acts are traceable to his original righteousness, so the want of original righteousness in his posterity, and the corruption of their moral nature, are historically traceable to his *transgression*. Thus it is evident that God dealt with

Adam as a public person, both as the natural and federal head of the race, and had respect to his posterity as *representatively* included in him.

The third part adduces the evidence of original sin from the work of *redemption*. All whom Christ came to redeem are sinners—the evil in all is sin and its deserved punishment. If there are any who at any period of their being have no sin, they at that period need no Saviour, and are not capable of salvation. If infants are *born* sinless, and die as they are born, they are incapable of pardon, for they are not guilty, and need no atonement. They are equally incapable of regeneration, for they have no sinful nature to be changed, no wrong volitions to be corrected, and no moral pollution to be washed away. But Christ's work of redemption does include the provision of salvation for infants. Therefore they are *de facto* among the "lost," for the grace which provides a deliverer from any state, supposes the subject to be in that state *prior* to his deliverance. This cuts off the evasion that infants are saved from a *future* sin, for the sin that was never present, and never will be, never could be future. It could exist only in imagination; and therefore salvation from it could be only an *imaginary*, hypothetical salvation. But the salvation of infants is a reality. There is a wrong in the status of will, the core of their infant being, from their Adamic origin, which is both rectified and remitted—a something *polluted*, which is made pure. Hence what the Scripture teaches of the application of Christ's redemption, and the change of state and nature necessary to true and final happiness, affords clear and abundant evidence to the truth of the doctrine of original sin.

Part fourth answers *objections*.

1. The first is based on the *supposed integrity* of the will, and its freedom from all natural bias, inclination, or disposition as motives to evil. If we come into the world infected with sinful and depraved dispositions, sin must be natural; and if natural, then necessary; and if necessary, no sin. The objection is founded on a false idea of the freedom of the will. No such freedom from natural inclination and the power of motive is either necessary to sinful action, or, in man's fallen state, possible. Sinful choice does not make a sinful disposition or tendency; but a tendency to sin precedes a sinful choice.

2. The doctrine of original sin makes God the *author of sin*, or of a sinful corruption of nature. The objection supposes what the doctrine neither implies nor allows—that "the nature must be corrupted by some positive influence," like a taint or infection altering the natural constitution and faculties of the soul. When man sinned, the superior spiritual principles, in which consisted God's image and man's original righteousness,

left his heart, and the communion with God, on which these depended, entirely ceased. Man was thus *left in a state of corruption* and ruin, without God's putting any evil into his heart, or implanting any bad principle. God's *withdrawing*, as it was necessary he should, from rebel man, and the natural principles of self-love, appetite, and passion being left to themselves, is sufficient to account for Adam's becoming entirely corrupt. And as the nature was corrupted in the first man, the members received it from the head. That the posterity of Adam should be *born* with a depraved nature is as much by the established course of nature as Adam's *continuing* unholy after he had become so. For Adam's posterity are from him as the natural head, and, as it were, in him, and belonging to him, according to the established course of nature, as the branches of a tree are of the tree, in the tree, and belonging to the tree. Thus, the objection has no force. If, by a course of nature, men continue wicked after they have made themselves so, they cannot therefore make Him who is the cause of their continuance *in being*, and of the *course of nature*, the cause of their continuance *in wickedness*.

3. Third objection. It is unreasonable and unjust to impute Adam's sin to his posterity, inasmuch as they are not one person. Answer: Though personally distinct, Adam and his posterity are one identical human *family* or *nature*. But unless this unity of race be unreasonable and unjust, it was not so for God to regard it in this light, and allow Adam a posterity like himself. But this is the natural basis of the imputation of Adam's sin.

"The imputation of Adam's first sin," says our author, "is nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed *as in the same place with their father, and are like him*. But seeing, agreeable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous judgment, which was founded on his most righteous law, give Adam a posterity that were like himself—and indeed it could not be otherwise according to the very laws of nature—therefore he might also, in righteous judgment, impute Adam's sin to them, inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity like himself, and to impute his sin to them, *is one and the same thing*. And therefore, if the former be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter."

"The derived evil disposition in Adam's posterity, amounting to a full consent to his sin, is not properly a *consequence* of the imputation of that sin, for it is *antecedent* to it *in them*, as it was in *him*. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of Adam's sin, are both the consequences of the *union which God has established between Adam and his posterity*—a union depending on the divine will, which will depends on the divine wisdom. The evil disposition in them, as in him, is first, and the charge of guilt after and consequent. Therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs *merely* because God imputes it to them, but it is truly and properly theirs by heredi-

tary anticipation in its extended pollution; and on that ground God imputes it to them."

These are Edwards's most definite statements respecting the imputation of Adam's sin. They do not involve the idea of a unity of him and his posterity in the sense of one will, being, or agent. *They* did not actually commit his *first* sin, or any of his sins. They did not act in him volitionally, but representatively, as Levi paid tithes in Abraham; yet there was a constituted oneness between the head and its members. They were "one blood," one physical, intellectual, and moral human race, by creative constitution, according to which the qualities and attributes of the fallen head were derived to, and repeated in, each of the members. This is the basis of native depravity, of hereditary or propagated sinfulness. On this ground, Adam was regarded in the covenant transaction as "a public person," like a corporation in law, as the moral head of his posterity, and their federal representative. They act in him as the represented do in the representative, and are therefore one with him in the covenant and in the consequences of his first sin. This is the *covenant* part of imputation, which rests on the natural or realistic as the basis. The continuance of a sinful disposition in Adam as a confirmed principle, from the loss of communion with God, was the penalty of his first transgression. God withdrew from him because he had sinned. The propagation of the same disposition in the race was from the same loss of communion with God, and a punishment upon Adam for the same sin. Thus the race became subject to penal evil through the transgression of the first man. Yet no one is actually *punished* who is innocent, or held as *blameworthy* directly for any sinfulness but *his own*.

Thus Edwards avoids the purely "immediate" view which makes the imputation of Adam's sin the ground of the derived evil disposition in his posterity, which charges guilt upon them primarily for his transgression. The evil disposition in them, he says, as it was in him, is first, and the imputation or charge of guilt is after it; and on that ground he also avoids the other extreme, which excludes the representative relation, and explains the moral status of the posterity of Adam solely by their natural connection with him. He combines what is true in both, and thinks the two views should not be separated.

He eschews also that kind of realism which resolves the race into one mystic but real *person*—a species of *monothelitism*, in which one generic will serves the purposes alike of Adam and his descendants. The Edwardean theology preserves the broadest distinction of agents. No one performs the acts of another, though Adam acted representatively for all. No one is condemned for another's sin, being innocent. Yet all be-

came sinful, and hence guilty, and hence come under condemnation, forensically and really, on account of the evil disposition and sin of the first man.

It may be a question whether the natural in this scheme does not occupy the whole ground, and leave no room for imputation. In strictness of language, mediate and immediate imputation mutually exclude each other, as what is the one cannot be the other.* But it is not so plain that the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity as a *judicial* transaction may not be as real on the ground, and through means of their natural connection with him, as on the ground of the covenant alone. If the transmission of his sinful disposition or *nature* is incompatible with the imputation of his *sin*—if men are born innocent, save as Adam's personal sin is charged to them, and by this *alone* they are made guilty—doubtless Edwards discards imputation. But in the sense of a natural and a legal transaction, of a real and a representative relation—of an *impartation* and an *imputation*—the former being the ground of the latter, and both the penal consequence of Adam's sin, that is, a just punishment upon him, Edwards, we think, held steadfastly to the doctrine of imputation, both of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness—to "the two federal heads." In this sense, Edwards was no more a realist than John Calvin, the Westminster Assembly, and the early New England divines. These all believed that the human race was more than an *idea*, a *name*, and that the first of the race was its "root," and that "all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression." And he was also as much of a nominalist as they, when they say that original sin, in its common acceptation, "consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature." Indeed, he seems not to have been purely a realist, nor wholly a nominalist. He did not confound the abstract and the concrete, nor one man's act with another's. He held to a real oneness of the human *race*, of which Adam was the head, the veritable unity of that "whole nature" which was corrupted by Adam's first sin. Thus he aimed to place the doctrine of original sin on a solid basis of reason and Scripture, without confining himself to any of the schools in philosophy.

With this view, Woods and Dwight, Backus and Bellamy,

* This pleading for *MEDIATE* imputation is more than Edwards would have himself allowed. That he *excluded* immediate imputation has never been proved. It may be added, that the one of these *does not necessarily exclude the other*. So much did all the great Lutheran divines feel that the one *presupposes* always the other, that they maintain the "*imputatio mediata et immediata*."—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

were in substantial agreement. Hopkins, who first gave this treatise on original sin to the public, expressed no dissent from it, and regarded President Edwards as having entirely baffled his opponent. At a later period, he dropped the distinction between original sin and actual transgression, which Edwards and the New England theologians have generally held, and resolved all sin into action.

Edwards also stood on the true Calvinistic ground. "Original sin," says the Genevan divine, "appears to be an hereditary pravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through all the parts of the soul." Adam's transgression "not only procured misery and ruin for himself, but also precipitated our *nature* into similar destruction. And that, not by his *personal guilt*, as an individual, which pertains not to us, but because he *infected* all his descendants with the corruption into which he had fallen." "And this liableness to punishment arises not from the delinquency of *another*; for when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we, though *innocent*, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of *his* sin, but because we are all subject to a curse on account of his transgression, he is therefore said to have involved us in guilt. Nevertheless we derive from him not only the punishment, but also the *pollution* to which the punishment is *justly due*." * Anselm, before Edwards or Calvin, had taken the same view: "When an infant is condemned for original sin, he is not condemned for Adam's sin, but for his *own*; for if he had not his own sin, he could not be condemned." Augustine held that "*vitium originale*" is "*vitium hereditarium*." And of Tertullian's traducianism, the transmission of a sinful nature was the very essence.

Upon this ancient and honourable platform, the Methodist theology upon this subject fairly and fully places itself. It is an interesting fact, that Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley were occupied at the same time in elaborate replies to Dr Taylor. Edwards finished his treatise in May 1757, and Wesley his in August of the same year. On the main questions at issue—the moral corruption of man's nature, and the imputation of Adam's sin—the total fall of the race in the first man, and inability to do good in that state except by grace—they were in essential agreement, and substantially Calvinistic. Their illustrations of the subject and modes of vindicating the divine government, though original, are, in some cases, strikingly similar. The Congregationalist is the more philosophical and profound, the Methodist the more laconic, pithy, and practical. Both wrote from a deep Christian experience, from

* Institutes, b. ii. chap. i. sect. 6-8.

spiritual conflicts, and a breadth of religious consciousness, which carried them far above cold speculation into the warm life of things.

"Original sin," says Wesley, "is that sinful impurity which every man brings into the world," a "nature tinted with sin." "We came into the world with sinful propensities, sinful dispositions derived from Adam." "God does not look upon infants as innocent, but as involved in the guilt of Adam's sin, otherwise death, the punishment denounced against that sin, could not be inflicted upon them." Wesley's treatise contains a minute defence of the Westminster propositions respecting original sin. His letter to Dr Taylor, a year or two after he published his reply, is graphic and characteristic:—"REVEREND SIR,—I esteem you as a person of uncommon sense and learning; but your doctrine I cannot esteem. . . . Either you or I mistake the whole of Christianity from the beginning to the end! Either my scheme or yours is as contrary to the Scripture as the Koran is. Is it mine or yours? Yours has gone through all England, and made numerous converts. I attack it from end to end. Let England judge whether it can be defended or not."* In this view of the derivative character of the Edwardean theology, it is something more than a provincialism. Nor can it properly be regarded as an improvement, except in its modes of statement and defence. Its affiliations are clearly with the genuine Calvinistic school. It brings nothing essentially new to that school, and excludes from it nothing of substantial doctrine that is old. If we do not mistake, it is in substance identical with it, and with it the Augustinian and Pauline theology which preceded it.

Prof. Fisher, in a compact and instructive article in the *New Englander*,† appears to class Edwards and Calvin with the immediate imputationists. But these men, on the subject of original sin, we believe do not admit this classification. In respect to President Edwards, they regard it as one of his very few mistakes that he held the *mediate* doctrine. Historic fairness is leading them to relinquish Calvin also, and to place him in the same category with Edwards. The history of the immediate imputation doctrine, which includes the workings of some of the noblest minds of the Reformed Church, is for the most part *post*-Calvinistic, and seems to have been brought forward against the Arminian movement. We submit that both Calvin and Edwards belong more exactly to Prof. Fisher's second class than to the fourth—to those whose doctrine rests on the assumption "that moral evil, like physical evil, is hereditary." Both adopt the doctrine of an "inherited corruption of cha-

* Wesley's Works, vol. v. p. 669.

† Vol. xviii., No. 8, p. 698.

racter which is culpable." Both deny that the descendants of Adam, being *innocent*, are accounted guilty for his transgression, and teach that, inheriting an evil disposition from him as a penal consequence of his sin, they are accountable for their own sin.

It is not our object to inquire whether this Edwards-Calvinian doctrine of imputation and original sin is true or false, but to indicate our belief that it is much older and has a more honourable progenitor than Joshua Placæus, or any theologian of the seventeenth century. As the radix of New England theology it is not an exotic. It has struck deep into the native soil of the church, and borne in all climes branches of the tree of life, as they have been grafted into it and made fruitful by the supernatural culture of the divine husbandman. It may not furnish a solution of the difficult problem satisfactory to all. Nor does any other theory. But it has the advantage of a solid basis in the following generally admitted facts.

1st. The unity of the human family in one common human nature. 2d. The present abnormal condition of the race in a state of hereditary moral evil. 3d. This evil in the race is traceable through successive generations, up to the first sin of the first man. 4th. A federal or covenant transaction with Adam as the representative of the race, in accordance with which they were to stand or fall with him, as he obeyed or transgressed the law. It accounts for these facts by saying—as all reasonable theories must do—it pleased God, as a wise *Creator*, to constitute men on the plan of unity, as a race. It pleased him, as a wise moral *governor*, to make Adam the representative head under law for the whole. When he transgressed it pleased God, as a just *Judge*, to withdraw communion from him as a penalty for his sin, through which his sinful disposition became a confirmed principle in him and in his posterity.

We have aimed in this *expose* of the theology of President Edwards, to act the part of the historical interpreter—not to put our thoughts into his words, but to let him speak out his own. Our object has been not *eisegesis*, but *exegesis*, to unfold the ground-work of the system—its self-consistency in the harmony of the internal and external, the *pistis* and *gnosis*. Some will dissent from our construction on this hand, and some on that, as they fall into the right or left wing of this central body of New England theology. Some take the prestige of Edwards's name for the New Divinity, and some for the Old. Some claim him as an Old Calvinist, and some as a Hopkinsian or New Calvinist. One party says he was the founder of a new school, another that he was only an original and most successful teacher in the old. His son wrote an essay on half a score of

"Improvements made in Theology" by his father. But the honour of several of these improvements he gave to certain "followers" of his father, who, by a metaphor, called their aberrations from their master *his* improvements. By the same figure of speech, theories which the elder Edwards never taught, and some of which he repudiated, are sometimes called *Edwardean*, simply because held by the younger Edwards, or some other reputed follower of Edwards.

Hopkins, the pupil, the fireside friend and biographer of the father, says he was a Calvinist, "on the maturest examination of the different schemes, and the comparison of them with the oracles of God." He also represents the younger Edwards, when a student in theology, as in positive and self-confident opposition to several of the main positions of the father, and it is evident that to some of them he never became reconciled. President Edwards himself says he should not take it amiss to be called a Calvinist, though he disclaimed believing the doctrines he held *because* Calvin taught them, and also believing in everything *JUST as* he taught. If by the old theology is meant that Adam's sin is immediately imputed to his posterity antecedently to their real sinfulness, so that they, being innocent, are held as personally guilty of his act, and by the new, that imputation is mediate, through the transmission of a sinful nature, which is the antecedent and ground of imputation, President Edwards was doubtless with the new. But if by the new theology is meant that happiness is the chief end of God in creation, and that self-love is the primal motive in virtuous affections—that God would have prevented sin, but could not, and therefore permitted it; and by the old, that holiness and God's excellence and glory are the chief end, both of God and good men, and that God was able to prevent moral evil, but saw it best to permit and overrule it, to something higher than prevention;—if the new holds that depravity comes by each one's own intelligent voluntary act, in a nature that tends to sin, but which we stigmatize when we call it sinful, from disordered sensibilities and bodily appetites, and that the fall was of the *animal* rather than of the *man*; that original sin is each one's first transgression of known law, and that each has plenary *power*, as well as faculties, for all duty;—if this be the new, Edwards, in the elaborate and masterly defence of the "Calvinistic Divinity," was unquestionably with the old, and against the new. And in no one of his treatises is he more explicitly and fully so than in the last on original sin. Hence the difficulty in conciliating its teachings with those anti-Edwardean schemes, called by his name simply because taught by his son or son's followers.

This treatise has been pronounced by Dr Park, one of the

acutest dialecticians and theological writers of our time, the "enigmatical treatise," and for the explanation of one of its dark phrases, the following "key" is proposed: "When we read in it of our evil propensities, we are to understand, first, that these are real *choices* and thus real sins; or, secondly, that they are the *effects* of our having transgressed the law in Adam, and are thus metaphorical sins, just as our wrong actions, implying a wicked motive, are sins by a figure of speech; or, thirdly, that they are sinful by a like metaphor, as they are *occasions* of our personal disobedience to law; or, fourthly, that they are sinful by a double monotony of cause for effect, or effect for cause."*

This method of interpretation is original and peculiar. It must find something in the treatise to build itself upon, or it would not have been suggested to a mind so acute and discriminating. But the key is elaborate, and to tyros in theology will be perplexing. And if one such key is necessary to explain the riddle in two words of the treatise, how many would be required to unlock the whole of it? In the result of this exegesis, too, the sins, "by figure of speech," are vastly out of proportion to the "real sins." Besides, the turning of this key seems to lock out of the essay a somewhat fundamental idea which the author had carefully wrought into it,—that original sin is a real sinfulness which does not consist in choices. As it is, by his definition, "*innate*," it cannot be a choice, and yet it is "a *sinful* depravity of heart." It is a corrupt STATE in a MORAL sense, "which is opposite to what the law of God requires." But, notwithstanding this method of interpretation, the treatise is virtually yielded, as a piece of old-fashioned Calvinism,—too tight-ribbed and iron-bound to be made over into New Divinity. Hence it is frankly admitted that it "is not a perfect exponent of what is *now* termed the Edwardean faith."†

But where shall we look for such an exponent, if not to his own works? And if the last, maturest, richest fruits of his life and labours cannot be taken as such, on what can we rely? Is it quite just to make him responsible for a faith which was not his, and give the honour of his name to views which he discarded as erroneous? Further, this mode of construing the essay involves a logical necessity for *discrediting*, as well as disowning it.

"It was written amidst the constant alarms of an Indian war, and under many embarrassing influences of its author's frontier parish, and with a constitution shattered by fever and ague. Ill health prevented his revising it as faithfully as he had revised his other

* Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. ix. p. 207.

† P. 208.

works, and when he published only a few sheets of it, death ended his labours. . . . The principal regret which he is said to have felt in prospect of his untimely death, arose from his inability to modify some things which he had written, and there are several reasons to believe that he meant to remove some verbal incongruities from the work which he had not finished with his wonted care, and which he had deemed it needful to publish with more than his usual haste."*

The obvious intent of this apologetic treatment is to break the force of a certain something in this treatise which bears against the modern doctrine that "all sin consists in sinning," and in favour of the ancient one, that some sin consists in an "innate depravity of heart," which is sinful. With the partisan aspects of the subject, we have nothing to do. Our present inquiry relates to what is historical and equitable. We are not able to see on what principles the complexion of Old Theology which the treatise bears, can be either accounted for or explained away by "the alarms of an Indian war," or by the effects of "fever and ague." The usual influence of such providential dispensations upon such men as Jonathan Edwards, is to clear the mind of prejudice and error, not to darken it by them. The sickness, thus apologetically alleged, occurred nearly two years before he commenced this work. Nor was his constitution so shattered by it, but that in the year following it, he produced those remarkable dissertations on the End of God in Creation, and on the Nature of True Virtue. Three years later, and five months after he had finished the treatise on Original Sin, in assigning several reasons adverse to his accepting the presidency of Nassau Hall College, he makes no reference to ill health. And the plans of Herculean labour with which he entered on his new field, quite preclude the idea of a shattered constitution.

Nor, so far as we can learn, can this strong leaning of the work be accounted for by any unusual haste in finishing, revising, or in publishing it. The general plan of which this Essay constituted an important part, had been maturing in his mind for ten years. He was employed in its production nearly a year, and finished it, according to the date of the preface, May 27. 1757. Nine months after, having it in hand meantime for any revision or alteration he might wish, he had printed only a few sheets, when death closed his earthly labours. The essay on the Will, which is a little longer than the one on Original Sin, was produced in the short period of four months and a half, and went to press in six or eight months after, shewing that he took *more* "than his wonted care" and time

* Bibliotheca Sacra, vol ix. p. 208.

for finishing, revising, and publishing this last work, rather than less.

We are not called to consider the question, whether or not it is an "enigmatical treatise?" nor how far it may be regarded as an "exponent of what is *now* termed the Edwardean faith?" But that it is fairly entitled to be taken as the author's last great work, deliberately matured, elaborately wrought out, carefully revised, and given to the world as an exponent of *his own* belief—of the *genuine* "Edwardean faith," a fair rendering of the facts in the case leaves no reason to doubt. It may have in it more or less of human imperfection and error. But for its strong leanings to the ancient and catholic faith, it admits of no *apology* from ill health, the alarms of an Indian war, or any other cause. Jonathan Edwards, the disciple of Moses-like meekness and Johannic love, the matchless metaphysician, the man of massive grandeur, and granite stability of Christian character, in his later utterances, gave himself to the church and the world with a deliberation and explicitness which perfectly define his theological position, and entitle his words to be taken without attenuation or apology, as the exponents of that position.

ART. II.—*Evangelism of the Eighteenth Century.**

1. *Wesley and Methodism.* By ISAAC TAYLOR.
2. *Life and Times of the Countess of Huntingdon.*
3. *Lady Huntingdon and her Friends.* By Rev. JOSEPH BELCHER, D.D.
4. *Life of Whitefield.* By J. GILLIES.
5. *Historical Collections.* By J. GILLIES.
6. *Observations on the Life of John Wesley by Robert Southey.* By RICHARD WATSON.
7. *The History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century called Methodism.* By ABEL STEVENS, LL.D.
8. *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion.* By JONATHAN EDWARDS.
9. *The Great Awakening.* By JOSEPH TRACY.

THEY who can regard the great religious and reformatory movements of the world without profound interest, are not to be envied either for their reverence for the principles of the divine government, or their sympathy with their race. Every age has peculiarities of its own, and characters adjusted to it, fitted to work in its spirit and form its temper. History now busies itself much with tracing the causes and occasions of individual prowess, and the influence of such heroes upon their

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age. For, if it is certain that occasions of time and circumstance give birth to great characters, it is not less certain that persons thus raised above the plane of their age, repay the gift by distinguishing their age from all others. The magnates of the Reformation are spoken of as the creation of the time, but who will deny that they committed the fame of that stirring period to succeeding ages? The Puritan leaders, the Hoopers and Howes, the Charnocks and Baxters, were doubtless called forth by the exigencies of their times. The griping of despotism and the restraints of tyranny, were too severe to be endured, and these nobles and heroes stepped forward to do battle for the cause of God and humanity; but by the strength of their faith and the fire of their zeal, with the matchless energy and vigour of their intellect, these men made their age famous for all future time. This is called *the Puritan age*, and rightly, since while they were summoned to action by the demand of God's holy providence, they moved with mighty and resistless power, to mould and stamp their impress upon the life of the world.

Who speaks of the reign of religious toleration and true liberty of spirit, before whose eyes the majestic forms of Milton and Owen, of Leighton and Baxter, do not pass in their heroic grandeur? So of the Reformation. We cannot dissociate the names of Wickliffe and Huss, of Melancthon, Luther, and Calvin, from our thoughts, of the great reawakening of the church of God, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

It is not essential that we should attempt to draw the line, and shew just how far the exigencies of any given period go towards making character, and how far the leading and controlling minds of such period, influence and fashion the age. This is legitimately within the province of the philosophy of history.

There is another thought intimately associated with this. As in the workings of our minds, it always influences to a greater or less extent other minds, so one age or period operates to control and modify succeeding ones. This view, though by no means new, is one to which, in our estimate of our own times, we are slow to give its proper weight and force. The pure running stream, starting from its healthful source far up in the wild regions of the mountains, is variously affected as it glides along, by the soil through and over which it passes, and he who sees the vitiated, streaked, and speckled stream as it flows at his feet, cannot tell why it is thus impure, until he knows something of the substances through which it has made its way; so he alone can properly estimate the period in which he lives, by a careful study of the various phenomena occurring in the

world of principles, of forces and of moral life, of the times which have immediately preceded it.

A careful survey of history shows that there have been but few leading epochs, few marked and forming periods. In philosophy there have been but two or three leading eras. In the science of government there have been but few commanding theories or schools. So, also, in the spiritual history of our race, there have been but three or four distinct and controlling eras, and around these points may be arranged all theories and creeds. Whoso would read human history correctly, has only to define these leading periods, and fix them clearly in his mind, and from them proceed to the investigation and classification of all that grows out of and relates to them.

And we must remember, too, that the only true history of man is that which gives Christ and the Church their rightful place in it. Von Muller said of Herder's "Philosophy of History," "I find everything here but Christ, and what is the history of the world without Jesus Christ?"

It is upon the principles here indicated, that the author of the volume first named at the head of this article proceeds. There are few writers of the age whose thoughts are so suggestive, and whose analysis is so philosophically just. We have placed the work of Mr Taylor at the head of our list for another reason. It is because it gives the clue to the most we wish to say. The other works, especially the "Life and Times of Lady Huntingdon," are all valuable as sources of information touching this great religious awakening. But in his "Wesley and Methodism," the object of the writer is to fix the latitude and longitude of that great system of religious policy called *Methodism*, among the spiritual and ecclesiastical movements of the world; to shew that, as a grand evangelical movement, it did "immediately or remotely, so give an influence to Christian feeling and profession on all sides, that it has come to present itself as the starting-point of our modern religious history. The field preaching of Wesley and Whitefield in 1739, was the event whence the religious epoch now current, must date its commencement. Back to the events of that time must we look necessarily, as often as we would trace to its source, what is most characteristic of the present times. And this is not all, for the Methodism of the past age points forward to the next coming development of the powers of the gospel." Here we have the keynote of almost all that is important in reference to Methodism as related to the past, the present, and the future, of religious thought, life, and action.

But it must be remarked that this use of the word *Methodism* is very general and comprehensive. It is used as inclusive of the policy adopted by Wesley, Whitefield, Harris, and their

coadjutors. It is singularly unfortunate that the word has been appropriated as simply expressive of the distinguishing features of a single religious sect, and always associated with their history. It belongs, in so far as it has any special signification, to the whole church of Christ as reawakened and summoned to a new and ever brightening mission, from the slumbers and stupor of two centuries. Mr Taylor does not regard the system now called Methodism as holding any relation to that of the last century. Indeed, he expressly tells us that "the Methodism of the eighteenth century has ceased to have any extant representative among us. None are there now, who with an entire congeniality of feeling can interpret to us its phases, or can warmly and forcibly speak of it, and plead for it as a reality with which they themselves are conversant." We are somewhat inclined to question whether this vigorous writer has not expressed his opinion too strongly upon this point. To say that Methodism has undergone a very radical change both in its form and spirit, is simply to affirm a self-evident position to any who are at all familiar with its history for the last half century. But we doubt if it be true that it has "ceased to have any extant representative among us."

The record of the great evangelic movement which we have in these several volumes, and others of a kindred character, most clearly mark it as quite out of the ordinary course of things. The true principle on which we are to estimate this great work is thus set forth. "Christianity being true without abatement in its own sense, Methodism as a genuine development of its principal elements, must be religiously regarded as such, while yet it may be open to exceptions on many grounds, as the product of minds more good and fervent than always well ordered."

Methodism in this wide sense, as the veritable exponent of deep and mighty spiritual convictions, is to be regarded as one of the great impulses in Divine providence for the emancipation of our race from the bondage of corruption, and it holds a most important relation to all men in all time. It was "one of the marked utterances of the gospel." Its relation to the Reformation is very apparent. The first Reformation was more especially of doctrine, while the last was the reawakening of the spiritual life. The Calvinistic Reformation was most prominently a re-proclamation of the great fundamental doctrines and principles of our faith—the resurrection, as from a protracted burial of the distinguishing truths of the gospel, though not without its immediate practical results; Methodism was the infusion of a new religious life into the very heart of the church and the world—the trumpet sound of vital piety in the leaden ears of stupor and death. In the order of time,

the doctrinal reform is to be reckoned first, but in degree of importance it is difficult to say which is to have precedence; for doctrine without spiritual life and fervent practice, is like faith without works; and, on the other hand, a fervid zeal without doctrinal basis could by no possibility be permanent.

The primitive Methodists entertained not the remotest idea of reforming the doctrines of Christendom, nor of making their mark on the creed of the church future. They dealt with interests far more tangible, and more speedily realised to their hearts — the spiritual renovation and rescue of millions of souls, “dead in Adam” but “alive in Christ,” from sin and hell. And from this mighty work, they thought not to come down to break lances with theological combatants, nor spend their strength in metaphysical and scholastic discussions. However much the professed successors of the primitive Methodist company have set themselves in array against the doctrines of Calvinism, and cried “*bigotry!*” in the ears of the disciples of the champion of Geneva, they will find but poor comfort in a reference to the true history of primitive Wesleyan Methodism. Neither John Wesley nor any of his associates in that great and glorious reign of grace, was capable of reforming the creed of Calvin. Fletcher of Madely, who is reckoned as the conservator of Methodist theology, was very far below the standard for one who should take upon himself to reform or reconstruct a system of doctrines so thoroughly compacted and so impreguably fortified from the word of God. So far as we can see, not one of all those heroic souls who commenced that wonderful evangelistic movement, was mentally fitted to lay broad and deep a theological and philosophical basis for the future church. When God wants men for a special exigency or a particular field, he brings them forward amply qualified for the work committed to their charge. These men, as we have said, were not fitted either by nature or culture, or experience, for doctrinal reformers. And hence, we believe, that Methodism was never commissioned for this specific work. We must be pardoned for any seeming want of charity, in declaring our belief that it travelled out of its legitimate sphere, when it undertook the work of reforming the creed of Christendom. Vast, far-reaching, and glorious, as have been the results of the Methodist movement, who shall tell us that they would not have been far greater and more glorious, had there been a strict and unwavering adherence to the doctrines so glowingly sounded forth by Whitefield, and others of their most distinguished founders? Methodism, considered as a system of doctrines, has never taken, can never take, high rank. Its genius leads not in that direction; its heavenly mission, though by no means less important, was not distinctively doctrinal. In this opinion, we

are conscious of no prejudice, and we cannot but believe that those will agree with us who carefully and impartially study the intellectual and religious character of the early "Methodistic Company." Of this company, Mr Taylor says :—

" But with what order of men is it that we have to do ? Let it be confessed that this company does not include one mind of that amplitude and grandeur, the contemplation of which, as a natural object—a sample of humanity—excites a pleasurable awe and swells the bosom with a vague ambition, or with a noble emulation. Not one of the founders of Methodism can claim to stand on any such high level ; nor was one of them gifted with the philosophical faculty, the abstractive, analytic power. More than one was a shrewd and exact logician, but none a master of the higher reason. Not one was erudite in more than an ordinary degree ; not one was an accomplished scholar. Yet while several were fairly learned, few were illiterate, and none shewed themselves to be imbued with fanaticism and ignorance."

The prominent actors in this grand religious awakening, were John and Charles Wesley, Whitefield, Fletcher, Coke, and Lady Selina, Countess of Huntingdon. Clustering about the lives of these persons will be found all there is of interest in connection with the greatest religious awakening since the days of Pentecost. We are glad to know that Lady Huntingdon is coming to take, as she has not hitherto done, her true place in history as one of the noble and leading spirits in the founding of Methodism and giving type to modern evangelical Christianity. No one can adequately value the service rendered to religion by this noble lady, who does not thoroughly acquaint himself with the history of her private relations, as given in these noble volumes of her "Life and Times." We know not any volumes of biography so calculated to set the heart all aglow with the fervour of Christian piety and zeal. She was eminently fitted by her superior mental endowments and personal qualities, to exert a controlling influence in whatever direction she should turn her attention, and added to this, she was the centre of a large and powerful circle of English nobility. And when at length, under the preaching of Whitefield, her heart was filled with the divine love, and all her powers were consecrated to the undivided service of her God, she bent herself with an invincible energy of purpose to the evangelical Methodistic movement. It seems clear that this grand, heroic woman was brought forward for the special purpose of becoming a munificent and devoted patron of those holy men, to whom had been committed so sublime and glorious a work. "Much," says Mr Taylor, "of what has become characteristic of modern evangelical piety had its origin in Lady Huntingdon's drawing-

room—that is to say, in the circles of which she was the centre, and her drawing-room the gathering point.”

In a perfect daguerreotype of the early Methodists, there are several others which should appear. The first Society was formed in 1738, in a chapel, a plain, but venerable building, in Neville's Court, Fetter Lane, London. Here, in addition to those already named, met from time to time, Ingham, Howell, Harris, Cennick, Hall, Oakley, Hutchins, Sir John Phillips, and Sir John Thorold, all of whom contributed very largely to the strengthening and perfecting the Methodist interests. And here we are not to forget the important part acted by the mother of John Wesley. We cannot doubt that the system of lay preaching, which formed so distinct and characteristic an element in the great religious undertaking of that day, in its origin was attributable, in no inconsiderable a degree, to her influence, through her illustrious son. When Mr Maxfield, the first regular lay preacher, commenced his career, many of the leaders thought he had usurped the sacred office. On Mr Wesley's return to London from a preaching tour, the case was laid before him, and those who had been scandalized represented the matter as a great and grave irregularity and grievance, that should be immediately corrected. Wesley was at once indignant at their breach of order, and being at the house of his mother, manifested great displeasure in her presence, who, on seeing it, inquired the cause, to which he replied, “Thomas Maxfield has, I understand, turned preacher!” Looking him seriously in the face, she said, “John, you know what my sentiments have been, you cannot suspect me of readily favouring anything of this kind; but,” she added, “take care what you do with that young man, for he is as surely called of God to preach as you are. Examine what have been the fruits of his preaching, and learn yourself.” He heard Mr Maxfield, and at once expressed both his satisfaction and his sanction, by saying, “It is the Lord, let him do what seemeth him good!”

Here it may be interesting to note a letter written about this time, by the Countess to Mr Wesley. She had heard Mr Maxfield several times in their gatherings at the “Foundry,” as also in her own mansion, and thus expressed her opinion of him: “I never mentioned to you that I have seen Mr Maxfield. He is one of the greatest instances of God's peculiar favour that I know. He is raised from the stones to sit among the princes of his people. He is my astonishment. How is God's power shewn in weakness! You can have no idea what an attachment I have to him. He is highly favoured of the Lord. The first time *I made him expound*, expecting little from him, I sat over against him and thought what a power of God is with him, to make *me* give attention to him. But

before he had gone over one-fifth part, any one that had seen me would have thought that I had been made of wood or stone, so quite immovable I both felt and looked. His power in prayer is quite extraordinary. To deal plainly, I could either talk or write for an hour about him."

By Mr Wesley's order, Maxfield was soon translated from the office of expounder to that of regular preacher.

The portraiture of this Methodistic band is exceedingly attractive. They are always painted as a noble-hearted company of men and women, most thoroughly awake to the exalted destiny of human souls. They could not, as they did not, boast of towering intellect. Placed beside such men as John Howe, John Owen, Richard Baxter, John Flavel, John Knox, Philip Melancthon, Martin Luther, and John Calvin, they fall far below them, "in comparison of learning, in theological attainment, in intellectuality and discursive power as preachers and writers, as well as in the depth and elevation of their devotional style.

They have not the grand, stately, and solemn tread of those great masters of scholastic and patristic lore, but when they marshalled their forces on the battle-field against the invisible hosts of darkness, against spiritual wickedness in high places, there was a determination and energy, and dauntlessness of purpose and chivalric daring, that gave them place in the very front rank of God's chosen instruments of righteousness. Mr Wesley's ideal of Methodism as a religious institution seemed to be measured by his estimate of conversion. He and his companions went with hearts all aflame, and sentences tipped with celestial fire, to preach Jesus crucified, and save perishing souls of men, "pulling them out of the fire," and then looking with compassionate eye upon these "babes in Christ" scattered abroad as lambs in the midst of ravening wolves, his first care was to gather them into one organisation, mainly for the purpose of reproducing the same glorious results.

The great revival of the last century, as well in our own country as through the British Isles, was characterised by some features which were entirely new, or which at least had never before been brought so distinctly to view. One of these peculiarities was the awakening of the religious sense. There was not, properly speaking, any discovery of new doctrines, nor a modification of the old, but a taking of the evangelical and well established truths of the gospel and reproducing them as true to the quickened hearts of men. And here, in passing, would we record our belief that the preacher of the word is instrumental in the conversion of the largest number of souls who preaches the doctrines of the cross, *assuming them all to be true*. The world does not so much require logic, and rea-

soning, and argumentation, as the direct and pungent appeals of truth, "in demonstration of the Spirit and of power." This always commands the attention of the human conscience and makes a lodgment in the sensitive heart. And this was precisely what the Methodist preachers set themselves to do. What in this connection is termed the *religious sense*, is the susceptibility to religious impressions that every man finds deep in his nature. At the time when this great evangelical movement began, this religious sense had been slumbering for ages. For a long period the intellect had been the theatre of action, while the dominion of the heart had very much run to waste.

Religion as it existed in the English Church, in the midst of wars and rumours of wars, was a speculative, frigid, and formal matter. A dead, yet rigid formalism was seen on every hand among the nominal people of God, and when he kindled within their bosoms the genial glow of a higher and more vigorous Christian life, the early revival preachers could no longer content themselves while living in the midst of such dreadful stagnation. This state of things may be said to have given rise to Methodism. Hence we are not surprised when we find the mighty preacher aiming his heaviest blows against this heartless religionism. These earnest men could not endure this spiritual sleep so near to death, this torpor of the highest and noblest nature. Hence we find them aiming at the outset to awaken and bring into more vigorous play, a vivid sense of eternity, and the reality of future and eternal retribution. The primitive Methodist preacher dwelt with his hearers as if he truly believed that the time is coming, "in the which the heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat." To him the scenes of the final judgment were a startling and awful reality, which he never thought of doubting. This full conviction gave to him great plainness of speech. The very same essential truths, proclaimed by the staid, godly, and sober Puritan, or the polished and scholarly Churchman, would awaken no such emotions, would stir no such thoughts in the hearer's heart or mind. They might, indeed, be received as true; challenge the reason, and lead captive the intellectual man, but there would be the end of their work. The congregation of worshippers would pass from the sanctuary as unaffected as they entered it. When the truths of the word of God fall simply upon the intellect, the conscience unimpressed, the religious sensibilities unaroused, and the heart unaffected, the multitude of respectful hearers may, indeed, be *orthodox*; they may, through a long course of years, be instructed and soundly indoctrinated; but, resting there, they are still far from *Christians*. The preacher who

only succeeds in convincing the intellect of his hearers, while the religious sense remains in a torpid, dormant state, will be compelled, at last, to mourn over a barren ministry. His congregation will go unprepared to judgment. Not so, however, when the primitive preacher of the last century entered the sacred place and delivered the message from heaven. The word is now very "quick and powerful," and the multitude are swayed by it as the forest trees by the blast of a tornado. Heaven and hell are no longer fictions, but they are awful realities to be not only believed but *felt*. Sin is made to "appear exceeding sinful." The law transgressed clamours for satisfaction, and violated justice lifts the rod to smite the guilty in vengeance, the sound of the final trumpet is heard, and, in a twinkling, the awe-stricken hearer is borne before the great white throne, the books are opened, the sentence is passed, the ungodly are driven "into outer darkness," and the righteous are welcomed by choirs of cherubim and seraphim "into life eternal." Under the full power of such amazing truths so vividly presented, the people are transfixed, groans and sighs and sobs fill the sanctuary, from which, in speechless astonishment, the congregation proceed, many to become henceforth the willing and obedient subjects of the "King of kings, and the Lord of lords."

Mr Taylor has given so graphic a picture of the style of preaching of which we speak, that we cannot forbear to quote it:—

"We can, many of us, recall the recollection of those overcrowding times, when a preacher of unmatched power and grace—a perfect orator—used to fix every eye upon himself through his hour of fluent and affluent sublimities. How did all faces gleam with an intensity of intellectual enjoyment, longing to vent itself in loud acclamations at every pause; and when the hour of fascination was over, what looks of gratulation were exchanged among friends from pew to pew! what shaking of hands, and how many smiles and nods passed to and fro among the delighted people! But now all these pleasurable indications must be dismissed, for it is a Methodist, of Wesley's or Whitefield's order, that is in this same pulpit. As a preacher, he is not more sincere or right-minded than the last; and as an orator, he is far less highly gifted; he is not so accomplished a theologian, nor in any sense is he rather to be chosen than the other, as to his disposition or endowments, or as to his creed; but he is a Methodist, and his words sink into the hearts of those that hear. While he speaks, a suppressed anxiety rules the spirit of the crowd, and this feeling breaks forth into sighs on every side. The preacher's style is not, in itself, oratorically affecting, and yet many weep, and an expression not to be stimulated, of dread and of anguish, marks many faces. What is it then that has taken place? It is this—that a sense deep-seated in the structure of human nature,

but which has hitherto slumbered, has suddenly woke up. There is a tumult in the soul, while a power irresistible is claiming its rights over both body and soul. Instead of that interchange of smiles which lately had pervaded the congregation, while the orator was doing his part, now every man feels himself alone in that crowd. Even the preacher himself is almost forgotten; for an immortal, guilty spirit has come into the presence of Eternal Justice. Within the dismayed heart, it is as if the moral condition, hitherto unheeded, were spread abroad for strictest scrutiny. Quite gone from the thoughts are all those accessories of religious feeling which so often, in times past, had been the source of agreeable, devout excitement. It is a dread of the supreme rectitude that now holds the mind and heart."

This was undoubtedly one of the most prominently characteristic features of the preaching of those times, that it aroused the religious sensibilities and brought vividly before the mind a sense of eternal verities. The holy men in this country who stood on the high places of Zion, and gave direction to the sentiments of the multitude, were of the same kind, and in all that gave Methodism its name and place in history, they were as truly Methodist as Wesley or Whitefield, Howell Harris, or John Berridge. Edwards, the Tennents, Blair, Parkman, and Parsons, who conducted the host of God's people in the "great awakening," were wonderfully effective in the pulpit, and for graphic power, for pungent appeals to the conscience, and overwhelming exhibitions of the great truths of the word of God, these men probably were not a whit behind their brethren across the sea.

We are to notice that as these revival preachers were largely successful in calling the attention of the careless to the concerns of the soul; that they were in their turn, greatly stimulated in their work by what seems to have been a characteristic element of that religious awakening—we mean a prevalence of the Holy Spirit among the masses of the people, calling them to prayer, confession, and repentance. This awful sense of the realities of life, death, judgment, eternity, heaven, and hell, seen in the case of the individual sinner, awakened by divine power under the preaching of some faithful man of God, came at length to be a settled conviction among the godless multitude. The attention of the people every where was turned to matters of religion. Many of the letters of Lady Huntingdon to Wesley, Whitefield, and others, reveal this state of things in the most glowing and exultant language of a saint, whose heart could scarce contain its great joy at the wonderful triumphs of grace. President Edwards also gives us a picture of this state of things in our own land. He tells us that—

"The minds of the people were wonderfully taken off from the

world ; it was treated amongst us as a thing of very little consequence ; they seemed to follow their worldly business more as a part of their duty than from any disposition they had to it ; religion was with all sorts the great concern, and the world was a thing only by the by. The only thing in their view was to get the Kingdom of Heaven, and every one appeared pressing into it. The engagedness of their hearts in this great concern could not be hid—it appeared in their very countenances. It was then a dreadful thing among us to lie out of Christ, in danger every day of dropping into hell ; and what persons' minds were intent upon was to escape for their lives, and fly from the wrath to come. All would eagerly lay hold of opportunities for their souls, and were wont very often to meet together in private houses for religious purposes—which meetings, when appointed, were wont greatly to be thronged."

Such was the pervading influence of the divine Spirit among the people, and their vivid realisation of the sublime truths of religion settled as a pall upon all communities of men, leading them to believe that the sovereign Majesty of heaven had, indeed, come to claim his rightful supremacy on earth. With all this, there was a prevalent sense of personal responsibility, which was quite in advance of anything that had been seen before. The soul's consciousness seemed vastly stimulated, and it felt itself brought into more immediate and personal contact with a being of supreme power and inflexible justice. The constant tendency of the individual is to lose himself in the great human crowd. To sink personal identity, and neutralise his personal obligations and accountability, is counted as a facile and pleasant method of relieving ourselves of some of the most grievous burdens of an irreligious life. One of the prominent features of the great awakening, was that this disposition, or tendency, was reproved, and the gospel was armed by the Holy Ghost with a tremendous and irresistible *individualising* power. Man was made to come forth into the light and take his appropriate place before God as guilty and accountable. As he listened to the flaming message from the pulpit, he became conscious of his individual ill-desert and condemnation. For the time he was made to feel that he stood alone—all human supports and sympathies removed, and he in the august presence of the Supreme arbiter as really alone as if no other being had ever been created.

The preacher arose in his place to announce "a message from God" to men, and such was his vivid, overflowing sense of its truth and importance, that he felt as if he must talk directly to the hearts and consciences of his hearers, and so he called upon each one *apart from all the rest*, to give heed to his words. The very fervour and depth of his own spiritual convictions, irresistibly led him to this course ; and in this, the

great religious movement lifted the ministry and the church far above any position they had ever held since apostolic times. The pulpit of to-day is feeling the impetus given to it a hundred years ago in the augmented power it possesses to awaken the slumbering souls of men.

Another very marked feature of the Methodistic age and work, was the reawakening of the *missionary spirit* of the church. After the missionary zeal and energy of the apostolic period had died away, the church for ages was content to rest in a more formal service; to worship by torchlight in the subterranean abodes of superstition and Romish darkness. The recluse became the representative type of church piety, zeal, and devotion. With the decay of the missionary spirit, we must couple the decline of evangelical doctrines, until at length the creed of Christendom became a mere form of hollow-sounding words. *For we may settle this in our minds, that just in proportion as a church ceases to be evangelistic will it cease to be evangelical.* The one state is usually a true measure of the other. It was essential that the early reformers, the men of gigantic intellect, of profound conceptions of the truth of God's word, should stand forth as the expounders and defenders of that word with its precious freight of saving truth for mankind against the usurpations of the man of sin; but their work being accomplished, it was quite as necessary that another class of men should be raised up, who, in their turn, should summon into a new and more vigorous life the too long dormant *heart* of the church, and let it flame with a divine love and compassion for a ruined race. Such a class of Christian heroes were the men who led forward the elect hosts in the great revival of the last century. They knew no limits to Christ-like zeal and effort, but the limit of the race. Shores then unreached, seas yet uncrossed, people yet unknown, continents and islands unimagined, have received the Scriptures; regions of the earth, literally a new and greater world, have hailed the advent of the Messiah's kingdom, and wished good luck, in the name of the Lord, to those who came to them with knowledge and with power to reveal the secrets of heaven, and to win souls predestined to an immortality of glory. "The educational and missionary zeal of this day may well inspire faith, may well excite imagination, and encourage the expectation of an immeasurable extent of unimaginable good." But to whom is chiefly due this present energy? To the Whitefields, the Wesleys, the Edwardses, and the Tennents of the last century, The modern missionary spirit was born in the great awakening. The divine and holy impulse then given to the church of God has not ceased to be felt, and it never will. Spiritual, active, practical Christianity

then asserted its sway over a heavy, leaden-eyed, and almost fruitless orthodoxy. Whitefield on Moorfields among the twenty thousand of the famishing for the bread of life; Wesley among the swarming, sooty colliers of Kingswood; Gilbert Tennent travelling through our land, preaching day and night to the clustering multitude; and David Brainerd with the poor Indians at Crossweeksung; these men were the true representatives of the quickened missionary, aggressive piety of the church. These flaming ministers of God took their places on the highways of the world, and with clear, ringing voices, cried out: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor. He hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted; to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovery of sight to the blind; to set at liberty them that are bruised; to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord."

No one who is at all familiar with the history of the great revival of the evangelical piety of the church in the last century, can for a moment question that there was an amazing impulse given to the missionary spirit,—a spirit heroic, daring, persistent, because having its spring and foundation in the love of souls. The philosophy of this is simple, if indeed any are disposed to ask for it. It is in the very nature of the gospel to awaken and stimulate all the humane and benevolent impulses, sentiments, and sympathies of the regenerated heart, and just in proportion to the fervour of the evangelical spirit, will be the missionary zeal and earnestness of the militant church. "The gospel," says the author of "Spiritual Christianity," "if it be warmly embraced, as a motive of conduct, does contain a reason and an impulse tending directly to carry forth Christianity and all its present blessings from land to land, until the human family is everywhere happy. And it does this by the solemn challenge of every human being *as its own*; how vile soever by actual condition, every human being is yet valuable, precious, and honourable *as redeemed*." In virtue of this great truth, however loathsome we may find man, we yet may not despise, nor abhor, nor neglect him. As a member of the family, he is indeed "dead in Adam," but yet is he "alive in Christ." In respect of every child of man, lost as he may seem, and visibly despicable, the Redeemer stretching forth his hand in caution, says, "Take heed that ye despise him not." Whoso reads the "life and times" of those who figured in the "great awakening" must be persuaded that this sentiment entered largely into their experience. The Methodist preacher's heart flamed with unquenchable zeal for the salvation of his race. His love made him bold and confident of success. He could cross oceans and continents, he

could "endure hardness as a good soldier," he could scale mountains, and take his weary way through forests and jungles and miasmatic champaigns, if so be he might proclaim the "unsearchable riches" to those for whom Christ died. And thus, as we think, was a new era marked in the history of the church on earth. The great body of believers in all lands were baptized with a new spirit, that not only made its deep and holy impression upon that age, but upon all future ages of the world. Whether we regard the holy men, who were the chief actors; the means by which the work was moved forward; the spirit which seemed pervasive in the mind of Christians, or the glorious results secured to the human family; the Methodist revival, spreading over both continents, was unquestionably the most wonderful and important evangelic movement in the church in modern times. It commenced in a sovereign manner, and was clearly the work of the Holy Ghost. It could be gauged by no rules or principles familiar to the church. It reached all classes of society, and seemed permanently to impress itself upon the intellect and heart of nations. When shall we have again such a divine visitation? When will the church and its ministry be quickened into such a glow of spiritual life? When will Zion once again put on such "beautiful garments," and go forth with such conquering power? "Come from the four winds, O Breath."

ART. III.—*The Old Testament in the New.**

"THE Old Testament is done away in the New." Indeed! By absorption, transfer, or reproduction? Done away, as are the foundations of a temple by the glorious edifice set upon them; in a sense, growing out of them?

The notion above set down, is not alone that of an uneasy and illogical ignorance, but some honest and well-read people think so, and say so; do it, we are sorry to know, to rescue their bigoted and petted *ism* from scriptural demolition. Others, with an economic faith, hold to it as a convenient way of having the divine word epitomised; as if all the essential virtue of the Old was held in extract in the New Testament. Others still say so, as a pious way of exalting the gospel to a revered supremacy of grace as against the law. It seems to these, that the gospel Scripture is endowed with more glory, by esteeming the law and the prophets as a vesture that has waxed old, and

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is fit only to be folded away. Some ministers even take a secret unction to themselves that *their* texts are New Testament texts. Preach from the "old dispensation!" Not they. And some disciples encourage their hopes of growth "in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour," by an exclusive reading in the gospels and in the epistles, treating "Moses and the prophets" as "things behind;" forgetting that, beginning with them, our blessed Lord "expounded unto them in all the Scriptures *the things concerning himself*," and that "*all* Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and *is* profitable."

We feel no special alarm at these things, discern no signs as of an east wind to spread a blight on the graces of the whole church in them; but we do think that, knowing the way of God in Scripture more perfectly, would perfect the affections of many, and help all to hearken more reverently to Christ saying, "*Search the Scriptures*," &c., while no Scriptures existed but those known to us as the Old Testament. Unless that command has been recalled, our divine Lord is yet saying to us, "Search the Scriptures of the first Testament, for in them ye have eternal life."

Now, if the body of Scriptures which we term the New Testament can be shewn to hold, as the setting holds the gem, multitudes of sentences, words, and ideas which were first uttered by "holy men of old, as moved by the Holy Ghost," that through all the fabric of the latter covenant run lines of thought and utterance, charged with the double vitality of the original inspiration and of the selecting inspiration, that the former claims to be fundamental to the latter, and the latter meets the claim by hundreds of consenting recognitions, then will not the reproach of superannuation and of displacement be at least rebuked and shamed? Christ's prayer, "Sanctify them through thy truth," is of none effect through this tradition of ignorant unbelief upon those deluded by it. Rejecting a portion of God's word, proverbially plunders from all the rest its sanctifying force. Disowning a section, book, or chapter of the eternal word, is just thrusting a line of ice in among the flowers and fruits of paradise. A silent frost-stroke benumbs all that is growing there. Let us rather testify to the grand organic oneness "vital in every part."

In a somewhat homely, but we hope convincing, form, we will plead this case; do it by a careful numerical summary of passages chosen by New Testament writers out of the Old Testament.

One of the incomparable helps to Bible study furnished by the Bagsters, London, is a tabulated summary of "passages in the Old Testament quoted or alluded to in the New Testament."

As the title shews, these extracts are placed in two classes.

The tables name and classify the passages. The counting, comparing, and arranging, as found hereafter, are ours.

To begin with their sum total, viz., *eight hundred and fifty*, which is about the number specified, we have at once the numerical argument in outline. Very few of these occur twice; i. e., no author repeats his reference to the same passage, nor do two or more authors select the same; so that the above number fairly represents the intimacy of the two authorships.

The distinction between the two classes of quotations will be seen by examples. The first return to the Old Testament by the New is in Matt. i. 23, the acts recounted as "done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying, 'Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son,'" &c. In Isaiah vii. 14, the original is found, not in the same words, but in the same thought and order. The first example of allusion is in the 5th chapter, 5th verse: the words, "Blessed are the meek," are an allusion to Psa. xxxvii. 11, "but the meek shall inherit the earth," &c. These shew the mode of classification. Where the transcript claims to be the words or sentiment of the first Testament, it is rated as a quotation. Where there is resemblance in phrase or thought, reference to fact or ordinance, ceremony or locality, it is classed as an allusion; both alike shewing that the spirit of inspiration in the latter, adopted and perpetuated by actual transference the former Scripture. A field of most engaging study at once opens through these singularly impressive and sympathetic transcripts. The *personalities* of evangelists and apostles are acutely etched by the former Scriptures which they transfer to their pages. Each one carves his spiritual picture into the elder Scripture,—sinks it, by extracts which he takes out of it.

Of the evangelists, Matthew is the most frequent and varied gleaner from preceding revelation. *Eighty-eight* instances are ascribed to him, and of these *forty-five* are quotations—literal transcripts. His range of contact with the previous Scriptures is remarkable. About twenty of the older writers reappear in his chapters. All classes of Old Testament authorship are appropriated by him. All portions of the Pentateuch, the Psalms, Proverbs, the prophets—Isaiah chiefest (fourteen instances), Daniel and Malachi next. He plainly was minutely attentive to the Christology of the prophecies.

In the 5th chapter alone are twelve recurrences, and these to four books, and in the 21st chapter ten like examples are found. Only four chapters of the entire gospel are without one or more returns to the great storehouse to which it suggestively stands adjacent, and the average through is more than three to each chapter.

We are thus particular with this first gospel, as, by its more

frequent return to the former canon, it discloses the "mind of the Spirit" about the entire new record it inaugurates, and, since it indicates the mind of this writer, followed by all the others, as to the perpetuity and character of the Scripture made old by the writing which they made new—only or mainly by relations of time.

Mark is less frequent in extracts, shewing but *thirty-four*; though his gospel is much shorter than Matthew's—a difference of twelve chapters. He however uses more direct quotations or entire sentences, having in the 7th chapter alone, five; one from Isaiah, one from Proverbs, and two from Exodus; and in his 12th chapter are found seven transcriptions from history, poetry, and prophecy. He shews less fondness for the prophets than Matthew; is less imaginative, more prone to compend and facts.

Luke is profuse, but partial; *fifty-eight* recognitions are found in his gospel, thirty-four of them quotations, and only seven of these reaching the hagiographa of the canon. Twenty-one of his extracts recall passages in the Pentateuch, and twenty are from the prophets. The "law and the prophets" seemed literally to engage his affections to the prior Scripture.

In the twenty-one chapters of John, *forty* passages are set among his sentences, but more than half of them are allusions. His intense spirituality often appears in an apparent extraction of the spiritual essence of a former Scripture, and transferring it in his own divinely select phrase to the new record. His exquisitely creative genius shews itself in his remarkable preference for the poetry and visions of past inspiration. *Thirty* of his forty returns to it, are to the poets and prophets. He was an admirable annalist of spiritual acts, a very indifferent one of physical deeds. What other disciple *could* have drawn those inimitable four chapters (14–18 inclusive) with scarce a *visible* act in them, but *packed* with the summaries of the glorious gospel. His *seventh* chapter is a specimen of his exquisite skill in promoting the great aim of his gospel. It exceeds any other equal portion in recognitions of the former covenant. In it occurs our Lord's great combat with the Jews at the Feast of the Tabernacles, and nearly all of the *nine* references found in it, are set down in the words of Christ himself. This, the reader perceives, gives a threefold sanctity to those words; that which they had in their original position as written by "holy men of old," that which Christ's selection and use of them gave, and that which the insertion of them by this inspired disciple superadded. What a token against the "lying delusion," that the Old Testament is done away by the New, such passages are.

The Acts of the Apostles, in the varied voices mingling in the thrilling annals therein, keep fully up to the pattern set

in the gospels. *Fifty-seven* times the reader's eye is turned to the great first covenant in these victorious chapters. Entire narrations, indeed, are taken and used as chains held at one end by the popular faith, through which to shoot the electric fire of the gospel from inspired lips at the other end. The 7th chapter is a remarkable enforcement of our argument. It contains the awful plea of the martyr Stephen—that terrible last word which “cut to the heart” his murderers. This chapter alone shews twenty-two instances of return to the former Testament; and the portions thus taken were the very barbs to his arrows, the edges to his lances. If those words were “done away,” the heroic saint, inspired too at the time, greatly erred in so profuse election from them.

With the close of these New Testament chronicles, a new class of Scriptures are reached. The narrative of the gospel is ended. The magnificent task of exposition and organisation of its blessed truths begins. The first generation of Scripture authors have finished their work. One part of it was to put down a foundation for those coming after to stand upon.

More remote from prophets and “holy men of old,” the life and words of Christ variously written out, the religious life lifted to a more intellectual and doctrinal form, we shall expect now, if ever, that the marked disuse of the first Testament will begin. Shall we find any longer this incessant reminiscence by the spirit of inspiration? Will not the past give place to the now triumphant present and splendored future? This “great apostle” Paul, having “the care of all the churches,” and the visibly “chosen vessel” in which to convey the remaining messages of inspiration to men, is Roman born and bred, and not bound by any Judaistic sympathies or modes of thought. He will be able to speak out of his great impulse, his mastership in all the knowledges the world then had, and genius for logical, philosophical penetration, for ever unmatched. Surely this convert by miracle, this commissioner to the extra-Judean world, is the man to begin a new style of New Testament writing, “forgetting the things which are behind,” and shewing that the old is done away by the new.

We open the great epistle of the canon, first in order though fourth in time, that to the Romans. It is really a grand spiritual summary. It depicts man's moral character, the apostasy, universal sinfulness, and utter hopelessness before a holy God. Then comes the work of sovereign love: its executor Christ; man's access to it by faith; and thus, in a sense, law, prophets, and gospel yield their vitalities to form this matchless creed for the world. But, granting this, is there any reaching back to past oracles, such as shews he is not, by this very doctrino-spiritual manifesto, just meaning to emancipate the world from

any bondage to former testimony? Let us look. Sixteen brief chapters, with four hundred and thirty-three verses, make the epistle; and among these are *seventy-four* inspired recognitions of the ancient books, an as yet unprecedented average of nearly five to each chapter; and what is most noticeable, only thirteen of the number are not direct, full quotations. Mere allusion was not enough; the literal phrase must come out from the Law, Psalms, and prophets, and swollen with mightier meaning, serve in his gigantic argument.

Nearly every book is under tribute in this single epistle, as the author arrays his stupendous witness against man the apostate, and for Jesus Christ the propitiation.

If anywhere, the former Scriptures have, in the latter, peculiar honour, surely it is here. The missive throbs with pulsations driven through it, from the "lively oracles" which came from men moved with the "Holy Ghost."

The two letters to the Church at Corinth, with *fifty-three* transfers from the "former treatise" or testament, Galatians with *sixteen*, Ephesians with *ten*, and the minor epistles in about that proportion, extend the evidence that later inspiration was as an outgrowth or complement to the earlier. Then comes the grand Messiah epistle—the final argument of inspiration against legality, Judaism, and all antichrist forms of faith. In the epistle to the Hebrews, of only thirteen brief chapters (and three hundred and three verses), we count with surprise *eighty-five* returns to the former covenant, and in the famed eleventh chapter *twenty-seven* of these are traced. As signatures to bank notes create their value, so this epistle is a species of credit signature to the exemplars of the people of God; it certifies them to the posterity of faith. No single section of the New Testament yet met, is so infused and fabricated from the Old as this. Its great thought, salvation by faith in Christ our sacrifice—*i. e.*, the atonement, the very life-germ of all the word of God,—is made most dependent upon the old covenant. So that if the atonement is *the* vitality of the Christian faith; that faith has the springs to its life in that covenant.

With little variation from these enumerations, James, Peter, John, and Jude fill out the sacred volume to the Apocalypse. But this coronal scroll, this jewelled band upon the awful and glorious "volume of the book," glows in singular profusion with gems and hues from former authors. Written seven or eight years after all the other parts of the New Testament, except the gospel of John, which was a few months or a year later in date, it largely exceeds all of them in quotation usage. *Two hundred and forty-five* Old Testament recognitions gleam on the reader from its twenty-two chapters. The book might be termed the chromatic lens of Scripture, gathering rays and hues from all

gone before ; projecting them in an image of inexplicable form and beauty upon the future. We doubt if any composition is known to man, drawn in such exquisite filaments and tintings from other and long-prior composition. The Holy Ghost, in that authorship, is bidding farewell to the world ; taking leave of a ransomed race through inspired words, and seems to traverse the whole field of past communications, recalling and so confirming as its own message, each separate portion. Above one-fourth of all the numerous confirmations of the Old Testament Scriptures found in the New, singularly enrich this parting message to man. If it is inspired, it confirms the inspiration of all that went before.

What now shall we think of a faith, or of ordinances which find the whole word of God troublesome, and so much so, that it is easier to reject that wholeness of the word than the favourite opinion ? What shall we think of a piety that boasts its rejection of Moses and the prophets, or that finds in the gospel that which makes the law useless ? Can any man truly love one part of the divine word while rejecting or even dishonouring any other part ? "The song of Moses and the Lamb," sung before the throne, is the song of the law and the gospel. If disjoined by our faith here, how shall they be united there ? The Apocalypse, as shewn, reaches in singular carefulness its inspired recognitions to each portion of the divine word, and so makes it all a part of itself, blending all the parts into one message, and then underwrites the whole with the dread adjuration, "If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book. And if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book." (Rev. xxii. 18, 19.) With St Augustine we respond : *Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet : Vetus in Novo patet.*

ART. IV.—*That which may be known of God—Mansel, Maurice, Young, and Calderwood.*

What is Revelation? With Letters on Mr Mansel's Bampton Lectures. By F. D. MAURICE, M.A. Macmillan & Co.

The Province of Reason. A Criticism of the Bampton Lecture on "The Limits of Religious Thought." By JOHN YOUNG, LL.D. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1860.

Philosophy of the Infinite. A Treatise on Man's Knowledge of the Infinite Being, in answer to Sir William Hamilton and Dr Mansel. By the Rev. HENRY CALDERWOOD, Greyfriars United Presbyterian Church, Glasgow. Second Edition, greatly enlarged. Macmillan & Co., Cambridge.

A VERY apt illustration of the genuine spirit of philosophising may be found in the discussions that have arisen on the subject of this paper. Two paths are generally open to man in all his enterprises—the direct or the circuitous, the right or the erroneous. In speculative inquiry, we may fall into the mistake of making a wrong start. The aim of the philosopher is to reconcile theory and practice, principles and facts. When this arduous work is attempted, and some inaccessible height towers above the student's aching head, or some fathomless depth yawns before his bewildered eye, he may try to escape from his painful perplexity in one of two methods. He may either pertinaciously adhere to his assumed principles and pet theory, and then mangle, and distort, and deny the facts of God's creation, and the common-sense maxims of humanity, in order to bring about a wretched consistency between his speculations and the outstanding and undoubted phenomena of the universe. Or he may follow a wiser method. He may reverently maintain the integrity of every observed event and existence around him, and still more devoutly yield unqualified homage to every pure mandate of conscience and every calm religious conviction, resolving that any recondite theory that does not quadrate with these and lend them support, shall be, without hesitation, remodelled or entirely abandoned.

The philosophy of any individual will acquire much of its real character, according as he is habitually under the influence of one or other of these two diverse dispositions of mind. It is our painful impression, that many of our professed metaphysicians have spent much of their energies in an inauspicious temper of heart, and that to this not a few of their errors may be traced. They have formed or assumed a principle, somewhat rashly; and without looking or seeming to care whither it led them, they have with a fiendish logic driven it like a whetted ploughshare over the green field of man's moral

sustenance, and the blooming garden of our religious affections. We exempt not entirely from this censure Sir W. Hamilton, who has exposed himself to it, by so elaborately and eloquently pleading for a virtual divorce between the *pursuit* of truth and its *possession*, in his mischievous laudation of the former over the latter. We cannot conceal our conviction, that if Hamilton, and Mansel too, had been more sensitively alive to some of the plain practical lessons of Christianity, they would have felt constrained to modify very considerably some of their speculative dogmas. Nothing can be more ominous, in whomsoever it appears, than to allow any of the elementary truths in morals or religion to be overborne and nullified by the abstractions of an unbridled philosophy. No healthy and intelligent mind can read the writings of the celebrated authors now named, without keenly feeling that such is occasionally the case, even to a dangerous extent, with them.

But an opponent like Maurice is not able to contend successfully with these giants. He has wrought himself into a less tenable and more perilous position than the one which they occupy. He can easily, no doubt, discharge light and heavy missiles, as he has been doing, against their fortress, and with great effect. His cannon may have shaken, perchance, their very foundations, and his arrows have entered between the joints of their armour. But what then? Retort upon him is easy; his battlements are tottering; his stronghold is all but a ruin. His own principles and conclusions, both in a philosophical and religious aspect, are weaker and more alarming than those which he has assailed by many a hard argument and many an effective objection.

The weak points in Mansel's argument are numerous enough to afford scope to several vigilant opponents, without interfering with each other. Accordingly, Dr Young has entered the lists, and done very good service in exposing many fallacies in the Bampton Lectures. But after perusing "The Province of Reason," we felt that the author's proper work was less than half done. There are certain grave difficulties, certain pertinent, unavoidable, and solemn questions, which are pressing themselves upon the attention of every reflecting and religious mind. Mr Mansel addressed himself to the labour of solving these questions, of removing these difficulties. He has acquitted himself of his task by producing a most elaborate volume, composed in a most serious frame of mind, and filled with acutest arguments, and rare and valuable information. But he has failed in his chief design. Dr Young has adduced much to substantiate this conclusion. But then Dr Young has done very little to meet the want, which Mansel set himself to supply. "The Province of Reason" is entitled to all

the praise of a powerful and successful battering-ram. We know not if its author intended it to be anything else; and every volume should be judged by the projected aim of the writer. But this we do feel, that, since demolishing the unsubstantial and unwholesome logic, of which there is much in "The Limits of Religious Thought," although not altogether an unprofitable, is not the most difficult, achievement, the work which is really called for is to substitute the true for the erroneous. There is not a great deal of room for congratulation that we have exposed the emptiness of another's theory, while we have no positive theory of our own. It is surely a trivial triumph to taunt our neighbour with his failure in answering a weighty and urgent question, while we have no satisfactory or even plausible answer to propose. There is too much of what is merely negative, both philosophically and religiously, in Dr Young's able volume.

We shall give an extract from "The Province of Reason," to shew how needful it is to turn the flank of the Bampton Lectures.

"From intelligence within we rise to intelligence above us; from moral attributes within we rise to supreme moral excellence above us. In these two last respects, the principles of the Bampton Lectures, as to the inconceivability of the idea of God, are in directest contradiction to the ordinary convictions of men. We *certainly* know what an intelligent, what a moral, nature means. The intelligence and moral perfection of the Supreme may be immeasurably beyond our highest conceptions. But knowledge, and rectitude, and purity, and love, are real qualities, independent of quantity. Wisdom is wisdom, rectitude is rectitude, love is love, whatever be the sphere over which they extend. Wisdom on which no limit can be put, I cannot comprehend in my thought. But what wisdom is, I clearly understand, and am able to form a higher and still higher idea of its extent; and if still far above my highest idea it stretches out, it is all the while distinctly in my thought, though to its full sweep I cannot reach. Infinity is for ever beyond the grasp of my conceptive faculty, but wisdom is not, moral attributes are not, and a spiritual nature, in which wisdom and moral attributes dwell, is not. Even to say that the attributes, intellectual or moral, are of an extent which I can never fully comprehend, makes only a new and grand addition to my idea of the nature in which they dwell; instead of destroying my conception (as Mr Mansel's argument implies, or as he plainly affirms), this makes it only more real and more lofty."—(Pp. 176, 177.)

When we reflect how many soft and smooth things have been said of Mr Mansel's Lectures by enlightened and evangelical men, we think that Dr Young is entitled to the best thanks of the Christian community, for lifting up a protest, so

emphatic, and intelligent, and well-aimed, against not a few of his bewitching fallacies.

In turning now to the "Philosophy of the Infinite," we find that Mr Calderwood is not less acute and successful than Dr Young or Mr Maurice, in seizing and exposing the paralogisms of Mansel. His thrusts are sometimes so well directed, and so powerful, as to be, logically, fatal. We shall adduce one illustration; and we select the following to support our previous assertion, that plain and precious truths have been set aside at the behest of a vaunting theory:—

"Both Sir W. Hamilton and Dr Mansel admit that we must believe in the Infinite Being as existing in relation with his finite creatures, and yet both affirm that the Infinite cannot exist in relation. The contradiction is a glaring one; and there can be no doubt which of the two contradictory opposites is to be cast aside as false. The authority of our faith cannot be gainsayed, and all these passages in which it is affirmed, or implied, that the Infinite cannot exist in relation must be set aside. Thus, when Sir W. Hamilton says, 'that the Absolute, as absolutely universal, is absolutely one; absolute unity is convertible with the absolute negation of plurality and difference' (Discussions, p. 38),* the latter part of his statement applies (logically) to nothing whatever, and is to be set aside as essentially inconsistent with that necessary belief in one Infinite and Absolute Being, which he admits. So, in like manner, many passages in the Bampton Lectures, on 'The Limits of Religious Thought,' must receive the same treatment at the hands of justice, as manifest violations of the authority of our fundamental belief. Dr Mansel is found saying that the Absolute 'can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma' (Limits of Religious Thought, p. 50). The author may in this be carrying out a course of abstract reasoning, valid enough as based on certain definitions, but this seems a wonderfully odd way of getting into a dilemma, and it is much to be feared that our author is the only one who is likely to experience, in this case, the peculiar sensations connected with such a position. If others escape, however, there is little cause for regret on his account, as he clearly has a certain delight in presenting the horns of a dilemma, and then writing 'inextricable' between them. Dr Mansel must admit that, in the words just quoted, he is writing about the divine Being, or he is writing about nothing. If he be writing about nothing, then his words have no meaning whatever; if he be writing about God, he is contradicting his own acknowledgment of the deliverance of our primary belief (Limits of Religious Thought, p. 120), by which the 'inextricable dilemma' is

* To attribute to God himself, as this argument plainly implies, and as Hamilton has sometimes done, "the absolute negation of plurality and difference," is fatal to all religion.

made to disappear in the certainty that the Absolute Being is 'distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings.'" (Pp. 89, 90.)

The preceding extract is amply sufficient to shew how the alternative was, or might have been, clearly before the minds both of Mansel and Hamilton, that either their theory regarding the Infinite and Absolute must be recast, or the most fundamental and valuable conviction of humanity must be thereby seriously imperilled. A man ought not to undertake to navigate a powerful steam-ship, if either he cannot notice the breakers ahead of him, or, noticing them, is resolved to rush recklessly into the danger. We are pleased with Mr Calderwood's volume, because we feel, in reading it, that he is a philosopher who is speculating in a legitimate way. He has both a chart and a compass; he listens to the voice within, and observes the record without. He seems to have a clear view, and a firm hold, of the great practical truths revealed by God to man in the pages of holy Scripture, and on the fleshly table of the heart. While he is resolved boldly and firmly to philosophise, these precious facts and principles form the landmarks and beacons of his course. There are some things which, if our philosophy contraverte, that philosophy must be wrong. This preliminary ought not only to be acknowledged in words, as all do, but should also be recognised in deeds. We like the guidance of an author who makes us feel at ease on this momentous point.

There is reason to dislike intensely those speeches and writings which abuse the principle that has just been expressed. The more precious anything is, the more shameful and mischievous is its abuse. Hence, any one may feel indignant, when men scout philosophy entirely, because, forsooth, it has been the occasion of leading many astray; or when others, whose position is some narrow sectarian stronghold, in a spirit altogether unphilosophical, plume themselves on being the philosophical defenders of the bulwarks of religion and morality. Nothing will so effectually save the Christianity of our age from the strong and subtle attacks of a determined intellectual scepticism; or, at least, nothing will so much conduce to the exposure and extirpation of that root of evil, as the elucidation of a true system of philosophy. When a false and pestilent speculative system is obtruded on the public notice, it is so far well that common sense and Scripture can send it back summarily to its dingy den, and, in some measure, neutralise its poison. But if one sinister system is to succeed another in endless succession, and these incorrigible ghosts are never to be laid, there is but a sorry prospect of our intellectual advancement.

Besides, to reject a philosophy on its first appearance, because it has a falsehood on its front, while sufficient for practical purposes, is not all that is demanded. Its latent error ought to be investigated and pilloried. In hunting out the deepest errors of speculation, the truth will be found and appreciated, and thus a valid system will ere long be wrought out and established, and its establishment will not only be a final blow to every preceding fallacy, but also an extinguisher on every possible paralogism. We do not expect that even then speculative error will entirely disappear; but certainly none will, after that consummation, attain the power, or secure the prominence, or flaunt with the plausibility, of some bygone and effete systems.

We value Mr Calderwood's work, because it is a bold and vigorous effort to elucidate the philosophical truth which Mansel and Hamilton have missed. It is a well-sustained attempt to construct a legitimate system, in room of those theories which he opposes and would set aside. Even to throw out a new and plausible hypothesis on such an abstruse and vital question, so as to assist the minds of the studious to get out of some of the old ruts of thought, is performing no mean service. Every hypothesis that is carefully elaborated, and held *only* as a hypothesis, even though ultimately found to be defective or erroneous, is a step in advance. The question is thereby narrowed; the probability of success is increased; the way is prepared for a right and complete solution. When an author casts some additional light upon a great theme, by not only dispelling mists of confusion that have gathered around it, but also by uncovering some of its hidden depths, he may well rejoice in his achievement. We congratulate Mr Calderwood, therefore, not only on his clear exposure and powerful refutation of many a seductive error, not only on the manifestation of the genuine Baconian spirit of philosophy which he displays in making theory bend to fact; but also on the ground of his having wrought out, and presented to the public, an able and independent proposal to solve the most difficult and most important question of the age.

What is the question? Granting, or assuming, that we have a *necessary belief* in the *existence* of the one Infinite God, it is asked, Have we any *knowledge* of the *Infinite Being*? Any one sees at a glance, that the discussion will turn on the meaning of the word *Infinite*, and on the relation between *knowledge* and *belief*.

The first thing, then, is to fix the meaning of the word *Infinite*. Hamilton's answer amounts to this, that *to us* the word has no meaning. Mansel follows his opinion; and hence has arisen much recent conflict of sentiment. This negation of

meaning seems to us, on the face of it, to be inadmissible ; it is perfectly and obviously suicidal. What says Mr Calderwood ? The meaning is *indefinite*. We would submit that this will scarcely do ; we question if it be scientific. "*The term Infinite,*" he says, "*is exclusively applicable to one great Being, whom we adore as supreme,*" (Pp. 76, 77). Then, of course, we shall not be able to speak of infinite time, or infinite space. This limitation of the meaning of the word infinite, is expressly conceded by our author, and, in conceding it, he seems to us to have allowed himself to be entangled in the meshes of Hamilton's philosophy. He says again, "*The Infinite Being in whom we believe is not a Being of infinite extension,*" (p. 87). The italics are not ours. We do not understand how Mr Calderwood can speak of *infinite extension*, for we were just told that the term infinite applies only to God. To be consistent, he should abandon that phrase and provide a synonym, if he admits that there is a reality improperly designated by that phrase. If we would settle a question like this, our positions must be laid down accurately, and beyond the possibility of reasonable challenge. The above quotations are not casual expressions, but contain the formal announcement of fundamental principles.

Again, it is affirmed, "*It is possible for the Infinite Being to put forth power, and to act, while he continues unchanged,*" (p. 91). Elsewhere, it is contended that "He is above the law of succession, because free from all mutation," (p. 328). If the Infinite One be *above the law of succession*, while yet he *puts forth power and acts*, then his existence can be only one everlasting act. We regret that in this connection it is conceded, that "succession is only a condition of our thought, and not necessarily a condition of the object of thought," (p. 322) ; that "time is only a certain correlation of existences," (p. 319). This concession is exacted from our author by the exigencies of his argument ; but it is a concession which lays him at the mercy of Hamilton and Mansel, and drags him into all the absurdities of idealism.

The matter may be reasoned thus : Time is a condition of the *existence* of things, as well as of *our knowledge* of them, or it is not. If Time be *not* a condition of the existence of things themselves, but only a *necessary* condition of our knowledge of them, then our knowledge of them is a delusion. On this supposition, so far as we do know them, or *think* we know them, we do not know them as they are. But if Time be a condition of the existence of things themselves, then is it also a condition of their being known, whether by God or by any intelligent being. We beg Mr Calderwood will not suppose that, because we have thus *briefly* indicated what appear to us

to be plain and valid objections to his views, that we have given but a partial consideration to his argument, or are not prepared to discuss every detail. We pursue this method simply because we are so averse to mere fault finding, and are resolved, even in an article of this sort, not to stop with a bare antagonistic criticism, but to endeavour, according to our ability, to point at the same time to the truth involved in the discussion.

But what is the meaning of these vexed words, the infinite, the unlimited, the unconditioned? Knowledge plainly enough implies the existence of certain *relations* between our minds and the varied objects of our cognition. These relations are, doubtless, *conditions* of our knowledge. If they did not exist, we could know nothing; though they may exist and we be nothing the wiser, unless we improve our opportunities. Since man can have no knowledge, but on the supposition of such relations existing, and *since these relations might be far more numerous than they are*, his knowledge, in being thus *conditioned*, is obviously limited. But it is plain that the limitation of our knowledge is by no means identical with the fact of its being conditioned. It is limited, not precisely because it is under conditions, but because the conditions under which it is placed are limited in their nature and their number. The two facts, that our knowledge is conditioned and that it is limited, are not the same, though the one be a necessary inference from the other.

It is not unlikely that there are other classes of intelligent beings beside mankind, who live and think and know under conditions somewhat different from those under which we exist. But the conditions of their knowledge, however diverse they may be, cannot be supposed to be opposite or conflicting as compared with those of ours. The relations between intelligent beings and the realities of which they are cognisant may be very multitudinous and varied, and admit of ceaseless modes of interlacing and combination. There may be countless intelligences who, though, like ourselves, they know nothing, and can know nothing, but by means of such relations, may yet know vastly more than we do, while, at the same time, they may be unacquainted with much of what is known to us. Whatever is known to those intelligent beings and to us in common, is obviously the same knowledge. There can be no antagonism or contradiction between their knowledge and ours. What belongs to both is really the same, and what is peculiar to each is simply unknown to the other.

The unconditioned, therefore, is certainly not the same as the unlimited. Unconditioned, or unrelated, knowledge, as thus explained, is plainly no knowledge; so far is it from

being unlimited knowledge. The more knowledge is conditioned, or the more relations there are within the ken of an intelligent being, the larger is the sphere of his possible acquirements. The fewer the conditions or relations of his understanding, the more contracted is his range of intellect.

As to infinite time. Time is limited when it has two limits, both a beginning and an end. Consequently, unlimited time may mean either time with no limits, or time with one limit only. Unlimited or unconditioned time, which has no limit, or boundary, or relation whatever, is *no* time. Time which has *only one* limit, a beginning without an end, or an end without a beginning, is infinite or endless time. In common language it is said, Time has neither beginning nor end; but it is understood in that case to have a middle. The past, we think, is not known by the future, nor the future by the past, but both are known in their relation to, or by means of, the present. Present time is the object of immediate knowledge; if time be measured backwards from the present it has no commencement, and if time be measured forwards from the present it has no termination. Unlimited time, then, if it be time without even one limit, such as beginning, end, or middle, is unconditioned, it is nothing. But time with one limit, and only one, as a beginning without an end, or an end without a beginning, or a middle with neither beginning nor end, is clearly an object of knowledge, and as such is called infinite time. *Indefinite* time has *two* limits, but one of them is *unknown*. Infinite time has one limit, the present hour, and has no second limit either in the past or in the future.

In the same way, any one sees what is meant by infinite number or infinite space. Infinite power is power that can create world after world without limitation. We have thus found a distinct and important meaning attaching to the word *infinite*. It now appears what is meant when we speak of infinite time and infinite power. And when we style God Infinite, we know this much *at least*, that he is a Being of infinite duration and of infinite might.

At this point we are confronted by the philosophy of the conditioned as by some grim apparition, which has bewitched Sir W. Hamilton, and curdled and soured Mr Mansel's theology, and under the influence of whose misty subtlety Mr Calderwood, we fear, has "surrendered at discretion" the key of his position, notwithstanding all his earnest and skilful efforts to escape the cunning delusion. There is one consideration which seems to us a sufficient charm to lay this mischievous spectre. Sir W. Hamilton, in his celebrated review of M. Cousin, fell himself into the very fallacy which he exposed in the theory of the French philosopher. Like Samson;

he inflicted on himself a fatal wound by the very stroke that laid his opponent low. The weapon by which he vanquished Cousin's doctrine, that man has an immediate knowledge of the unconditioned, or an intuition of the absolute, was the assertion that "the mind can conceive; and consequently can know, only the conditioned," "that philosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible." He has no sooner announced this law, and by it triumphed over M. Cousin, than he disregards and transgresses it by dividing the unconditioned, the unknown, the inconceivable, into two parts. What is his argument against a direct knowledge of the infinite? It is this, that the Infinite, being unlimited, unconditioned, cannot be known by the finite mind; for the mind cannot overleap its own boundaries. What is his own vaunted scheme of philosophy? It is this, that the unconditioned is twofold, to each of which he assigns names and reasons on their properties. Having outlawed Cousin for asserting that we *know* the Infinite, he himself immediately commences to *philosophise* upon the infinite. His whole argument, therefore, on the two unconditionates is, on his own principles, entirely irrelevant; and, as admitting a virtual conflict between the deliverances of reason, is fatal to philosophy in every form. We are thus justified in sweeping completely away, as logical rubbish, all the ingeniously contrived collisions between the absolute and infinite, as unconditioned contradictions, along with all the mystifications that have thence emerged on the domains of metaphysics, morals, and religion.

We come now to the second point involved in this controversy. What is the nature of our *knowledge* of the infinite, and what is the relation between knowledge and belief. The position of Hamilton and Mansel, which is assailed by Calderwood, is this: "Nothing can be more self-repugnant than the assertion, that we have a finite knowledge of an infinite object of knowledge." To support his view, that we have a finite knowledge of an infinite object, Mr Calderwood lays down such positions as the following:—"It is possible to have a knowledge of an object that far outstretches the boundaries of that knowledge." "Knowledge, so far from being always complete, may be of various degrees." "The knowledge which the mind possesses of the Infinite Being is a partial knowledge." "The knowledge which the mind possesses of the Infinite Being is an indefinite knowledge." "Our knowledge of the Infinite Being, while limited and indefinite, is capable of continuous expansion."

There seems to us to be an obvious distinction which is here

overlooked—the distinction, namely, between a *single* cognition and a complement of cognitions, such as belong to any one individual, or such as any individual may possess in regard to a complex object. There can be no question that the amount of my knowledge of any existence may only be partial knowledge of that existence, and that, in reference to God, I may be adding cognition to cognition in endless succession. To the expression, *indefinite knowledge*, we take strong exception; it is unscientific, it is misleading, if not untrue. For, let us take one cognition, one act of knowledge, which must be supposed capable of being embodied in one single and unambiguous proposition. If the meaning of that proposition be indefinite, or its truth doubtful, there is no knowledge in the only proper sense of the word. We have already spoken of an *indefinite object*, but it does not follow that the *knowledge* of such an object is indefinite. And we shall presently see that our knowledge of an infinite object is not infinite. When we affirm that the term of human life is seventy or eighty years, the object of knowledge is indefinite, but the knowledge of that object is definite. Neither can one cognition be supposed to be partial, for the determinate proposition expressing it is either wholly true or wholly untrue. Neither can it be expansive, for the single true assertion of the proposition cannot grow.

Do we then admit that we cannot know the infinite as infinite? Let us see. When we compare truth and error, we feel that we grasp both sides of the antithesis. A true proposition agrees with the reality to which it relates, and an erroneous proposition disagrees with that reality. Both correlates, truth, error, are positive and embraced by the mind, and we only understand the one through the other. The same remarks apply to the following correlates—matter, mind; divisible substance, indivisible substance; inert existence, self-moving existence. But in distinguishing the limited and the unlimited, we affirm that the limited has *at least two* boundaries, while the unlimited has *only one*. The limited involves two correlates, beginning, end; we obtain the unlimited by the negation of one of these correlates and the affirmation of the other. While the limited therefore, as has been often remarked, is *comprehended* by the mind of man, the unlimited is *only apprehended*. *While every ordinary concept has two positive correlates, the concept of the infinite has a positive and a negative correlate.*

Apprehension is well known as a technical logical term. It is unfortunate that *to apprehend* should be used in logic in the very sense in which *to comprehend* is used above, in our attempt to discriminate between the two. If to avoid

this manifest ambiguity we be driven to adopt another word, we might say that we can *contemplate*, while we cannot *comprehend*, the infinite.

Our concept, infinity, being thus isolated and peculiar in the manner pointed out, seems to account for the fact, that it can never enter legitimately into any argument or process of reasoning. We can only reason from, or to, that which we comprehend. The moment we allow infinity to enter into any syllogism, the reasoning becomes deceptive and invalid. This can be proved to be the case in algebra,* and for the same reason holds good in every other science.

Here again we are constrained to differ from our author. He says, "*All the facts of knowledge are capable of being used as the materials of thought.* . . . It is impossible for any one to shew that some objects of knowledge are necessarily restricted from becoming objects of thought or of reasoning" (pp. 262, 263). We may concede to Mansel and Hamilton that we cannot know any object *as infinite*. But we have endeavoured to shew articulately, and by a philosophical analysis, that we know *that* time is infinite, and *that* God is infinite, in the sense of being a Person of infinite duration and of infinite power. There is perhaps a valid and important difference between knowing the infinite *as infinite*, and simply knowing *that* a thing is infinite. This latter knowledge even is of such a peculiar character, that it cannot enter fairly into any of our reasonings. To know the infinite *as infinite*, we must comprehend it; to know that an object is infinite, it is enough to apprehend it.

We cannot prove that God is infinite. This truth is among our primary and fundamental beliefs. It does not admit of demonstration—it is self-evident, that is, to those who will allow its inherent evidence to shine upon their minds. As we cannot prove that God is infinite, or that time is infinite, by appealing to any other truth, neither can we prove any other truth by appealing to them. When the affirmation is truly made of any object that it is infinite, the limit of legitimate thought or reasoning is reached, but not transgressed. This peculiar conception forms a natural period to our progress. To assert that time is infinite, or that God is infinite, is to stand on the frontier line. We know what time is; we know the Creator as distinguished from the creature; we know that time is infinite; we know that the

* Let $x=y$. By squaring both sides, $x^2=y^2$, $x^2-y^2=0$. By multiplying by x , we have $x^3=xy$, or $x^3-xy=0$. Hence we may say, $x^3-y^3=x^2-xy$. If now both sides be divided by $x-y$, we have the absurd conclusion, $x=x+y$, or $1=2$. The explanation of this paradox is, that in the process the symbol of infinity, ∞ , is admitted; and the admission is illegitimate.

Creator is a Being of infinite duration. We can reason about a portion of time, but we cannot reason about infinite time. We can reason about God as Creator, but we cannot reason about God as infinite. We can draw no conclusions from the infinity of time, nor from the infinitude of God. These are the grounds on which we affirm that some objects of knowledge are not objects of reasoning.

Having gone over a long road somewhat rapidly, it may be desirable to recapitulate the points of our progress. Hamilton and Mansel affirm that the infinite has no import in the language of humanity, and that man consequently is denied all *knowledge* of it. To meet this tide of scepticism, Mr Calderwood restricts the application of the epithet "infinite" to the Deity himself, denying that there is any such thing as infinite time or infinite space, and virtually denying also the objectivity of space and time. He then asserts that our knowledge of the infinite God is indefinite, partial, and progressive; and that this knowledge may become a legitimate element in thought or reasoning.

In reply it has been affirmed, 1st, that to concede the non-objectivity of space and time is to fall into the very slough of Idealism in which Hamilton and Mansel are frequently bemired. 2d, That infinite time means time with one limit only, or time that has one extremity, namely, the present, but not a second either in the past or in the future;* finite time being time with two limits. 3d, That, by means of infinite time, we can speak intelligently of the infinite God—that is, of God as a Being of infinite duration—and in like manner of some other attributes. 4th, That the concept of the infinite has a positive and a negative correlate; and therefore, while it is a genuine element of knowledge, it is an illegitimate element in reasoning. 5th, That no single act of knowledge or cognition can possibly be regarded as indefinite, partial, or progressive. 6th, That our knowledge of infinite time, as embodied in the proposition, *Time is infinite*, as well as our knowledge of the infinite God, as embodied in the proposition, *God is a Being of infinite duration*, is definite, complete, and final. 7th, That no syllogism or reasoning is legitimate in which the term "infinite" is admitted. We can reason about a portion of time (a year, &c.), or a portion of space (a square, &c.), though we cannot reason about *infinite* space or time. We can reason about God's power as the Creator

* Hence there is more than one infinite object. Nor is it correct to say that two infinities are equal to one infinity. For time past is not time future, nor any part of it. Time past is infinite, and time future is infinite.

of this world, though we cannot reason about his *omnipotence*.

Our object heretofore has been not to unfold or illustrate all, or even a ten thousandth part of that, which may be known of the Almighty; but to attempt to trace the outlines of an argument, by means of which, on philosophical grounds, and in opposition to rash and dangerous speculations, the position may be successfully vindicated, that there is something, which by us may be known of God. The views which we have ventured to throw out require, we deeply feel, exposition and vindication at much greater length. This work must be reserved for whatever opportunity shall offer. Meanwhile our present purpose is accomplished, if enough has been said to strike the understanding of those who cherish an intelligent concern on this great theme, whether it has been the subject of their meditation for years, or whether it be only opening up a new and entrancing vista to their awakening minds.

Our limits will scarcely permit us to enter upon the relation between knowledge and belief. Hamilton and Mansel, to save themselves from extremest scepticism and utter profanity, maintain that they *believe* in *that* of which they are *entirely ignorant*. It is very hard to say whether rationalistic superstition or blind superstition be the more perilous and perplexing. When thus at the very outset knowledge is severed from faith, we need not be surprised at any extravagance that may occur in the sequel. Intelligence and faith being thus unblushingly divorced, the way is prepared for any enormity making its appearance in morals and religion. That we may—nay, that we *must*—believe in what we do not know, has been taught, as a fundamental truth, by our ripest theologians and our most accomplished philosophers, till it is received as an unquestioned and unquestionable axiom through all the grades of our scholars and divines. We are not sure but the prevalence of this primary fallacy has something to do with the abounding dissimulations and inconsistencies of the present age. How many call themselves Christians, believe in Christianity forsooth, whose knowledge of religion is next to naught! How many are there of a more intelligent class, who feel a growing chasm between the convictions of their understanding and what they believe, or profess to believe! If belief be one thing and knowledge another, why should not a believer in Popery read lectures at Oxford? The recent “Essays and Reviews” are a double manifestation of the same evil. In the first place, their actual and avowed infidelity is in many respects the full and logical development of a false philosophy, whose sophistries are deeply seated and widely

spread in the community, and one of which is the opinion now under review. In the second place, that men holding the public positions of the authors of the volume referred to, should boldly proclaim their faith in such undisguised forms of Atheism and Deism, is only the aspect of a most common and extensive sin, where its criminality is seen to reach its culminating point.

How does Mr Calderwood confront, and confute, and coerce this destructive error? Hamilton and Mansel contend that faith transcends knowledge; and for some time we could not see the difference between their position and his. The difference is this, he "does not admit that faith embraces, within wider sphere, objects which are not in any measure within the sphere of knowledge." But he contends that "Our faith may have a much wider application to *an object*, than the measure of our knowledge of *that object*" (p. 499). We do not see any reason for instituting this limitation, nor can we perceive any advantage to be derived from adhering to it. Mr Calderwood, in illustrating his position, "*Faith leads the mind outwards to what is beyond knowledge*" (p. 118), remarks, "In this respect faith is essentially a revelation of truth, which it is beyond the power of experience and reflection to discover." But is it not obvious that a revelation of truth implies the embodiment of that truth in a proposition whose meaning shall be *understood*, and which shall be *known* to be true, and *therefore* believed?*

What now is the conclusion of our argument on this point? It is contained in the simple statement, that it is wrong to *believe* anything that we do not *know* to be *true*. It is of great consequence to remember, in this connection, that we ought often to believe statements, embodying a fact or an undoubted principle, because we know them to be true, although we are entirely ignorant of the *manner* or *mode* of the fact, and utterly incapable of understanding *how* or *why* the principle which we believe is true. With this obvious explanation, what we contend for is neither more nor less than this truism, that every proposition expressing a man's belief shall be understood by him as to what it means, and shall be perceived by him to be true and not erroneous. Mystery often attaches itself to our belief, or is involved in it. It is not the mystery which we believe, properly speaking, but the truth in which the mystery is implied. The Trinity is an object of

* For a fuller vindication of the principle that belief should be *always* based upon knowledge, the reader is referred to a volume recently published, entitled "Christian Errors Infidel Arguments." Elliot, Edinburgh.

It is only justice to Dr Young to say, that the same principle is very ably expounded by him in the last section of the "Province of Reason."

our faith; the fact is the truth which we know, and therefore believe; the explanation of the fact is the mystery.

To reach this point we must travel, it would seem, over a very dusty and dreary road, scaling mountains of speculation, and fording deep currents of thought! To gain this position, we must combat hoary and gigantic systems of philosophy, and contend with those who are acknowledged to be the ablest and most enlightened men of the day! And yet if this same assertion, which we can get hold of only by such herculean toil, and retain in our grasp only against such a preponderating force, be denied, what is left to us? If men may place faith on that which they do not so understand as to perceive it to be a matter of truth or of fact, then every philosopher is a sophist, and every theologian an enthusiast, and every moralist a knave, and human life is only a deep and desperate game of hazard.

This conclusion is self-evident and incontrovertible. Every specious theory that obtrudes itself into notice, and is at variance with this clear and irrefragable maxim, must in the very act of collision be broken into pieces. And as false theory after theory is shattered into atoms on the rock of reality, the curious and careful observer will be able to pick up fragments of truth; till at last, our practical convictions and our abstract contemplations being completely harmonized—mysteries being admitted, but contradictions excluded—the wearied student will find repose and satisfaction for his fevered mind, many pestilent errors will be banished from human society, and our race shall make rapid advances in a bright career of holy intelligence.

We cannot part from Mr Calderwood here without introducing an extract from his superior and excellent volume, to give our readers some means of judging for themselves of the clearness of his style, the soundness of his argumentation, and the power of his eloquence. In defending the vital position that we have some knowledge of God, he thus writes:—

“Inconsistent as is the description given of ‘negative thinking,’ it is to this alone that Sir W. Hamilton and Dr Mansel refer, as all that is within the reach of the human mind in seeking to form a notion of the Infinite Being. They affirm that we can have no positive conception of such a Being, but can only attempt to think about him, and fail in the attempt. . . . If the philosophy which maintains only a ‘negative notion’ of the Infinite Being, and denies that anything more is possible, find acceptance among the thinking men of our country, I cannot hesitate to avow the conviction that a heavy blow is struck against philosophy and theology too. But I believe that the majority of those who study this matter will repudiate entirely what has been called ‘negative thinking,’ as

inconsistent with the facts of a sound philosophy, and will set aside the lengthened discussion in its support as an obstruction to patient inquiry. No one will deny that what is 'impossible to thought' may be quite possible in existence, but it cannot be admitted that 'the impossible to thought' is to be designated, a form of thought under which certain facts of consciousness are to be embraced. . . . The central doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, as it has been accepted and applied by Dr Mansel, is before the reader in these unqualified terms :—'The finite is the only object of real or positive thought.' In this way the infinite is completely shut out from the sphere of human thought. The result of the theory is this, that neither knowledge, nor thought, nor reasoning bear any testimony to the existence of an Infinite Being; and though *faith* assures us beyond all doubt that such a Being does exist, we can neither know, think, nor reason in the least degree concerning his existence. To our *faith*, he is the supreme object in existence; to our *intelligence*, he is 'nothing;' and, according to this philosophy, *faith* and *intelligence* are necessarily and for ever divorced. Such a doctrine as this may have a short season of popularity, but the doctrine itself has no vitality in it, and must soon disappear. . . .

"When, therefore, Sir W. Hamilton says, that 'the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar—' *Ἀγῶνισμα Θεῷ*, To the unknown and unknowable God,' I reject the statement with a thorough conviction of its falsehood, and abhorrence of its consequences both to philosophy and theology. That a full knowledge of the transcendent glory of the Deity is now, and ever must be, completely beyond the reach of every created mind, I admit with the most thorough assent of understanding and awe of heart; but when Hamilton says that God is 'unknown and unknowable,' and Dr Mansel says, that 'religion is not a function of thought,' I deny both assertions with the concentrated earnestness of my whole being. I prefer to feel some share of the emotion experienced by the apostle Paul at Athens, when he witnessed that altar 'to the unknown God,' and felt his 'spirit stirred within him,' rather than to bow to the authority of the men who now proclaim that altar 'the last and highest consecration of all true religion.' With all my admiration and esteem for the men of distinguished ability who, in our day, have attempted to vindicate this dogma on philosophical grounds, I cannot consider it as anything else but 'philosophy falsely so called;' and that religion which is 'not a function of thought,' I prefer to denominate 'superstition,' and not devotion." (Pp. 285–290.)

There are two great and serious errors in the Bampton Lectures of Mansel, to which none of his critics, so far as we are aware, have given that prominence which their deleterious influence deserves. The first is his theory of morality, especially in connection with his professed deference to Bishop Butler; and the second is his doctrine on the Atonement.

As to the first point, it seems to us that the question of infinity has been dragged into morals in a very strange way. We can attach no meaning to the phrase, "infinite justice," except in a loose popular sense. An ethical being is just, or he is unjust. He who is not *perfectly* just, is really unjust. Though the creature be not, like God, *necessarily* righteous, nor, in some cases, *unchangeably* righteous, yet in so far, and so long, as he is righteous, his righteousness is perfect. Neither can we see any precise, scientific meaning in the words, Infinite Person. That God is a person, we believe. That God is infinite, we also know and believe. But *how* God is at once possessed of personality and infinity, we do not understand, and cannot pretend to explain. In affirming that God is moral governor, and that God is infinite, it is not necessary always to conjoin these two propositions; and, in *reasoning about the former*, they need not, and they ought not, to be united. Even though we can speak of infinite wisdom and infinite power, we ought not, as was formerly explained, to attempt to argue and discuss about these attributes as infinite. In all moral and practical questions, it is quite enough to hang our arguments upon the divine attributes which are manifested in the creation and government of this world.

Let us here enter somewhat minutely into Mr Mansel's ethical theory, for the twofold purpose of exposing its erroneousness, and contrasting it with the mature and satisfactory views of Butler, whom, we regret to think, he has egregiously misrepresented. We would much rather set forth the truth on this vital topic in the words of Butler than in our own language. And if the truth has been already expounded and vindicated by a writer so well known as the Bishop of Durham, it is the more surprising, not only that Mansel should himself have missed and mystified it, but that so many of his critics should have failed to call attention to this grave transgression.

We should not have occupied so much space with this aspect of the question had Mr Mansel not expressed himself as follows, in the closing paragraph of the preface to the first edition:—

"But if the best theoretical exposition of the limits of human thought is to be found in the writings of a philosopher but recently removed from among us (Sir W. Hamilton); it is in a work of more than a century old that we find the best instance of the acknowledgment of those limits in practice. 'The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature,' furnishes an example of a profound and searching philosophical spirit, combined with a just perception of the bounds within

which all human philosophy must be confined, to which, in the whole range of similar investigations, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a parallel. The author of that work has been justly described as 'one to whose deep sayings no thoughtful mind was ever yet introduced for the first time, without acknowledging the period an epoch in its intellectual history' (W. A. Butler); and it may be added that the feeling of admiration thus excited, will only be increased by a comparison of his writings with the pretentious failures of more ambitious thinkers. Connected as the present author has been for many years with the studies of Oxford, of which those writings have long formed an important part, he feels that he would be wanting in his duty to the university to which he owes so much, were he to hesitate to declare, at this time, his deep-rooted and increasing conviction, that sound religious philosophy will flourish or fade within her walls, according as she perseveres or neglects to study the works and cultivate the spirit of her great son and teacher, Bishop Butler."

In the seventh lecture we have the moral development of the theory espoused by Mr Mansel. He shrinks not from embracing those ethical consequences, from which Kant himself recoiled; and thus merits the honour of maintaining an iron consistency in his speculations.

"The three sciences of numbers, of magnitudes, and of morals," he says, "rest on similar bases, and are confined within the same limits; all being equally necessary and valid within the legitimate bounds of human intelligence; and all equally negative and self-contradictory, when we attempt to pass beyond those bounds."—(The Limits, &c., p. 204.)

It is freely conceded, that we cannot reason about, or discuss, any *infinite* object whatever, without falling into absurdity. But we have endeavoured to shew what sort of a *knowledge* we have of an infinite object; and, moreover, that the knowledge of finite numbers, and of finite magnitudes, must be the same to every intelligent being. And now, it remains to examine, whether a knowledge of finite morals be not also the same in heaven and on earth. If, because time and space are infinite, we have *no* knowledge of them, the inference is unavoidable, that what we call years and centuries, and circles and squares, are nonentities,—only the day dreams of human childishness. So also if, because God is infinite, we have *no* knowledge of him, then we know nothing of divine morality; and, consequently, human ethics and duty are only the appurtenances of this earthly pantomime. But if the lapse of time be not a myth peculiar to human frailty, and the spheres and triangles of the firmament be not a fiction or a phantom of the human imagination, then, also, the moral principles of mankind, fairly inter-

puted, are not the conventional customs of a province, but the eternal and immutable laws of God's universal empire.

"That there is an absolute morality," Mr Mansel argues, "based upon, or rather identical with, the eternal nature of God, is indeed a conviction forced upon us by the same evidence as that on which we believe that God exists at all. But *what* that absolute morality is, we are unable to fix in any human conception, as we are to define the other attributes of the same divine nature. To human conception it seems impossible that absolute morality should be manifested in the form of a *law of obligation*; for such a law implies relation and subjection to the authority of a lawgiver. And, as all human morality is manifested in this form, the conclusion seems unavoidable, that human morality, even in its highest elevation, is not identical with, nor adequate to measure, the absolute morality of God." (The Limits, &c., p. 206.)

The argument is, because we do not know infinite time, therefore we cannot know any time. No, not exactly; man knows time, but other beings do not; at least, we do not know that they do. In like manner, because man does not know absolute morality, therefore, he knows nothing about morality. No, not precisely; but the morality of man is something quite peculiar to himself, of which other intelligences are perfectly ignorant; at least, for anything we know to the contrary.

In reply to these philosophical vagaries, the argument already used has only to be repeated in another form. *What is right on earth* is right in heaven, or it is not. If what is reckoned virtue among men, is also reckoned virtue before God, then human virtue and divine holiness *are identical*, so far as they coextend. If what is justly esteemed righteous in human society be not also esteemed righteous among the angelic hosts, then is there a moral schism among created intelligences,—the very thought of which is enough to thrill the stoutest heart with fear.

But our author is not only led to this startling conclusion by the first principles of his philosophy, he attempts to vindicate it by an independent argument. He asserts, that "all human morality is manifested in the form of a *law of obligation*, implying relation and subjection to the authority of a lawgiver," and of course divine morality cannot be manifested in this form. Here, then, the fundamental conception of virtue is resolved into subjection to authority. Vice is nothing but opposition to a more powerful will. If this be Mr Mansel's theory of morals, it is easy to prove its substantial identity with that of William of Ockham; and the issue of that theory no good logician can refuse, namely, that if God were to command us to hate him, it would be our duty to do so.

But Mr Mansel is a professed disciple of Bishop Butler; and

it is very easy to shew that in this vital and fundamental position he is not only not supported, but directly opposed and condemned, by the sagacious Bishop of Durham. Let the reader peruse his brief but pithy dissertation, "Of the Nature of Virtue," and there will not be found throughout the whole of it, a single reference to *authority*, human or divine; for it is not there that he finds the original and proper foundation of virtue, or law of obligation. For example, he says:—

"Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree vicious. And this determination must arise from such comparison, and be the result of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and capacities as brutes."

In these words Butler lays the only true foundation of morals.

Any individual may, and has a right to, propose the question, Why ought I to obey God? Mr Mansel's principle now under discussion expressly precludes the possibility of answering that question, and condemns every attempt to do so. We do not need to go to Bishop Butler for an answer to a query, which would not puzzle the pupils of an infant or a ragged school. But the wise Bishop endorses the answer, and embodies it in his philosophy. After a brief enunciation of his principle, Butler adds, "This matter seems to require to be more fully stated." From this fuller statement, we shall make a selection.

"When religion is considered as an inward principle, . . . the essence of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to *God the Father Almighty*; and the essence of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards to *the Son*, and to *the Holy Ghost*. And the obligation we are under of paying these religious regards to each of these divine persons respectively, arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us. How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration in the case; because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great dispensation of providence, the redemption of the world; the one our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not, then, the duty of religious regards to both these divine persons, as immediately arise to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations; as the inward goodwill and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures, arises out of the common relations between us and them? But it will be asked, 'What are the inward religious regards, appearingly thus obviously due to the Son and Holy Spirit; as arising, not merely

from command in Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which they stand in to us?' I answer, the religious regards of reverence, honour, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope." (Analogy, Part II., ch. I. p. 173, 174.)

In contrast and opposition to these distinct and accurate principles, Mr Mansel is careful to trace the origin of religion to something entirely *subjective*, to the *feeling of dependence* and the *conviction of moral obligation*.* He expressly excludes the idea of our perception of an actual relation between us and God, on which Butler insists so much. "Facts of the inner consciousness," to the exclusion of facts of the outer world, are the only sources of his philosophy and religion. He reasons justly from his fundamental principle, "that the infinite is not an object of human thought at all," when he says, "There can be no consciousness of a relation, whether of agreement or of opposition, where there is not a consciousness of both the objects related."† And he reiterates the sentiment, which reduces the Analogy of Butler to a bundle of contradictions; as when he declares, "The moral reason, or will, or conscience, of man, call it by what name we please, can have no authority, save as implanted in him by some higher spiritual being, as a law emanating from a lawgiver."‡

It is not affirmed that Mr Mansel speaks in invariable consistency with these principles and their consequences. This, we believe, it is impossible for him to do; but these principles are the logical results of his philosophy, and they are frequently avowed and enforced by him. How, in the circumstances which we have pointed out, he could eulogise Butler as he has done, is beyond our power of explanation.

Mr Mansel endeavours to vindicate his position, and to distinguish between his own principles and those of Ockham. He says:—

"Man can be a law unto himself only on the supposition that he reflects in himself the law of God; that he shews, as the apostle tells us, the works of that law written in his heart. If he is absolutely a law unto himself, his duty and his pleasure are undistinguishable from each other; for he is subject to no one, and accountable to no one. Duty, in this case, becomes only a higher kind of pleasure—a balance between the present and the future—between the larger and the smaller gratification. We are thus compelled, by the consciousness of moral obligation, to assume the existence of a moral deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong as constituted by the nature of that deity." (The Limits, &c., pp. 111, 112.)

* Lecture iv.

† The Limits, &c., p. 218.

‡ Ibid., p. 111.

"Man," it is argued, "can be a law unto himself, only on the supposition that he reflects in himself the law of God." Now the divine law is founded on the divine *will*, as distinguished from the divine *nature*, or the reverse. If the law of God be founded on *his will*, then the reflection of it in man can be nothing else than a special *revelation* of that will; and, consequently, on this assumption, man is *not* a law unto himself. But if the law of God be based upon the *divine nature* and upon the nature of things, then there may be a reflection of it in man, who is made after the image of God, without any special or written revelation of his will. But obviously, on this supposition, the whole of Mr Mansel's philosophy vanishes into vapour.

For a further exposure of the fallacies of the preceding quotation, we shall adduce the words of Butler:—

"There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly; and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always, of course, goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own." (Sermon ii.; see Sermon iii., and Analogy, p. 156.)

Without adducing more passages from Butler to the same effect, which could be easily done, we would request the reader to note the phrases and epithets of the above extract, forming as they do such a telling contrast with those of the Bampton Lectures. "Conscience pronounces *determinately*;" "magisterially exerts itself;" "actions in themselves just;" "actions in themselves evil." And instead of severing, or identifying, or opposing, the judgment of God, and the judgment of conscience, Butler, with rare philosophic piety, represents the latter as prior in time, and as true and unalterable in equity; while it "naturally and always, of course, goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter *second* and affirm its own." It is scarcely possible to conceive a more complete diversity between two systems of morality than between those of the Bishop of Durham and of this Bampton Lecture. For the questions on which this diversity has been proved to exist are fundamental, vital, pervading.

The theory of morals is still further expounded in the following manner. After stating that, "as principles in the abstract, the laws of morality are as unchangeable as the axioms of geometry," he goes on thus:—

"It is in their concrete form that moral principles are adopted as guides of conduct and canons of judgment; and, in this form, they admit of various degrees of uncertainty, or of positive error. But the difference between the highest and lowest conception of moral duty is one of degree, not of kind; the interval between them is occupied by intermediate stages, separated from each other by minute and scarcely appreciable differences; and the very conception of a gradual progress in moral enlightenment implies the possibility of a further advance of a more exalted intellect, and a more enlightened conscience." (*The Limits, &c.*, pp. 207, 208.)

The confusion here is very intense. In the first place, the axioms of geometry have a concrete form, as well as the laws of morality. There must be a reason, therefore, for the strange anomaly, that while to talk of "the highest and lowest conception of a *triangle* being one of degree, not of kind" is nonsense, it should be a stretch of wisdom to make the same affirmation of "moral duty." No adequate, or even plausible, reason is assigned.

In the second place, the objective and immutable standard of virtue is grossly confounded with the various degrees in which different individuals approach to that standard. And, in the third place, this lax and shifting representation of human duty—as when it is affirmed, that "moral principles in their concrete form admit of various degrees of uncertainty, or of *positive error*"—is pregnant with all practical evil. If, by this last phrase, it was only meant that men often culpably transgress these principles, the sentiment is both awkwardly expressed and irrelevantly introduced.

The following remarks of Butler are to the point here, and are utterly subversive of Mr Mansel's scheme of philosophy and religion:—

"I am far from intending to deny that the will of God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that it is *fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness*, then *fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case*, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it to be the ground of the discernment."

Let the reader mark and weigh the conclusion of this argument:—

"It doth not, therefore, appear that moral right is any more rela-

tive to perception than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth as thus founded." (Analogy, Part I., chap. vi., note p. 143. See also p. 285, and 145, and 303.)

Hence it appears that Butler's theory is plainly this: Moral law and abstract truth are founded in the nature of things, and are not merely relative to perception, and consequently are the same to all intelligent beings. Mr Mansel's theory is as plainly the reverse, namely: Moral law and abstract truth are founded, not on the nature of things, but are only relative to perception, and are, consequently, liable to all sorts of vicissitude among various orders of intelligent and responsible beings.

Having abandoned the principle that human morality can teach us divine morality so far, Mansel is constrained to seek for some footing for religion. Let us see what it is:—

"In so far, then, as morality, in its human character, depends upon conditions not co-eternal with God, but created along with man, in so far we are not justified in regarding the occasional suspension of human duties, by the same authority which enacted them, as a violation of the immutable principles of morality itself. That there are limits indeed within which alone this rule can be safely applied; that there are doctrines and practices which carry on their front convincing proof that they cannot have been revealed or commanded by God; that there are systems of religion which, by this criterion, may be shewn to have sprung, not from divine appointment, but from human corruption; is not for an instant denied. In my concluding lecture, I shall endeavour to point out some of the conditions under which this kind of evidence is admissible." (P. 210, 211.)

These conditions are the hinge of the whole discussion, and *some* of them are not enough; we must have them all, or the very attempt to find the limits of our knowledge is an admitted failure. But before passing on to the consideration of these conditions, it may be remarked that, even admitting that human morality "depends upon conditions not co-eternal with God, but created along with man," it might still be true that God's morality was the same as ours in principle; and so far as they relate to the same things. For God to appoint man a morality different from his own, seems an outrageous supposition. And if it be not different, the whole argument is irrelevant. So far are these views from coinciding with the sentiments of Butler, that they may be shewn to be the reverse of his. The opinions of the lecturer would represent the moral law as somewhat of the same kind as what has been supposed to be the nature of *positive* enactments. A

positive precept may be suspended or cancelled, it is thought, without damaging moral principles. In the same way, it is affirmed, that the whole moral code may be annulled, and the eternal principles of morality be unchanged.

Dr Butler is at pains to prove, what is too seldom attended to, that the real difference between a *moral* and *positive* command, is not what it is often taken to be—that the one has reasons, while the other has none.

“Moral *precepts*,” says he, “are precepts, the reasons of which we see; positive *precepts*, are precepts the reasons of which we do not see. Moral *duties* arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive *duties* do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command. Nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command, received from him whose creatures and subjects we are.”

In the next page, it is expressly noticed, that we are not, in *positive* duties, acquainted with the *reasons* of the external command.*

Now this language plainly supposes, that for every command or duty, both positive and moral, there are reasons; that these *reasons* are approved of by God, and by man so far as he knows them; that these reasons are as immutable as man's constitution and the divine nature, however diverse or various may be their application in changing circumstances. Butler is innocent of teaching any divergence or discrepancy between celestial and terrestrial ethics. In every positive precept there is a hidden reason; in every moral law there is an obvious reason; in both there may be several *circumstantials*. The *circumstantials*, which man can always distinguish from the reasons, may change or perish; but the reasons, or *principles of morality*, must be the same in supernal and terrestrial regions, in all time and in all space.

Let us now attend to the conditions, under which man may pronounce a pretended revelation not to be from God. Since reason is now supposed to be utterly incompetent to criticise or sit in judgment upon the *contents* of a professed revelation, reason must be non-suited altogether, or another field found for its exercise. That other field is declared to be the *evidences* of revealed religion.

Here, however, at the very outset, a difficulty presents itself. Is not the nature of the *contents* of what claims to be a divine message, an essential portion of its evidences? This difficulty is not evaded, but is professedly met. There are two reasons assigned for disregarding it, or setting it aside. The first is, that, when the contents of a religion are made the basis of a

* Analogy, Part II. c. i.

philosophical criticism, "they are judged by their conformity to the supposed nature and purposes of God;" but when they are treated as evidences, "they are judged by their adaptation to the actual circumstances and wants of man" (p. 234). And the second reason is, that "in the one case they are regarded as furnishing a single and a certain criterion;" and, "in the other case, they are regarded as furnishing only one probable presumption out of many."

As to the first, it has appeared to many that to prove a religion to be "adapted to the actual circumstances and wants of man," is a good argument to prove that "it is in conformity with the nature and purposes of God," the Creator of man. If this be denied, the "Analogy" of Butler is not unlike a parallogism throughout. Butler argues thus: Supposing that God is allowed to be the Author of nature, it is vain to raise objections against an alleged divine religion, when the same objections lie against God's natural government. The converse of which argument is not far from this—Admitting that God is the Maker and Ruler of man, a professed religion, admirably adapted to man's wants and necessities, has a *prima facie* evidence of being divine in its origin.

If the fact that a religion adapted for man be of no manner of use to shew its conformity to the counsels of God, what may its use be? "It may," we are informed, "prove, in certain cases (though even here the argument requires much caution in its employment), that a religion *has not* come from God; but it is in no case sufficient to prove that it *has* come from him" (p. 238). If we are capable of deciding that any religion is so bad that God cannot have sanctioned it, why may not a religion be so good as to justify us in declaring that sinful men like ourselves could not have been its author? This ultimatum, therefore, is a gratuitous assumption; and, besides, it is inherently worthless; for, after all, it is of avail only "in certain cases," which are not specified.

But Mr Mansel has not only degraded both moral right and abstract truth conjointly to a low and unsteady platform, he has also sunk moral law into the mire beneath. In further proof of this charge, we adduce the following. In the preface to the third edition he maintains, "that a divine command may, under certain circumstances, justify an act which would not be justifiable without it." In support of this doctrine, he refers to a long extract from Butler's "Analogy," quoted at p. 243 of his Lectures.* In looking to the extract itself, we notice a marked difference between the language of the two authors. Instead of saying, as above, the divine command

* Analogy, Part II. c. i.

"justifies an act which would not be justifiable without it," Butler says, the divine command "*changes the whole nature of the case and of the action.*" To justify an action is scarcely equivalent to changing its nature. But again, in the extract there is a *hiatus* marked, which is filled up in the original thus, "I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts which require, not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them." Here again the phrase, "actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts," is very different from the expressions of the Bampton Lectures. This slight diversity of language is indicative, as we shall now shew, of a substantial difference of sentiment.

Mr Mansel's argument is as follows:—

"The question, so far as moral philosophy is concerned, is simply this: Is the moral quality of right or wrong an attribute so essentially adhering to acts as acts, that the same act can never vary in its character, according to the motives by which it is prompted, or the circumstances under which it is committed? If we are compelled, as every moralist is compelled, to answer this question in the negative, we must then ask, in the second place, whether the existence of a direct command from the supreme Governor of the world, supposing such a command ever to have been given, is one of the circumstances which can in any degree affect the character of an act. On this question, to judge merely by the conflicting statements on opposite sides, men, whose moral judgments are equally trustworthy, may differ one from another; but that very difference is enough to shew that the moral reason is not, by itself, a sufficient and infallible oracle on such questions." (Preface, p. xvii.)

In the first place, the last sentence of this quotation may be noticed. The sentiment expressed in it is found oftener than once in the "*Limits of Religious Thought.*" It is redolent of the rankest scepticism; and is, as such, condemned by Butler in the following passage:—

"Objections from the perversion of Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had but little good influence, however innocently they may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, upon any principles but such as lead to downright Atheism; because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, upon all principles of Theism, must have been from God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same manner. . . . For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not to

be judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies; not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if mankind did their part,—that part which is justly put and left upon them.” (“Analogy,” Part II. c. i.; see also p. 253.)

Hence it is obvious that, to throw discredit or dishonour upon “the moral reason,” because it has been so often abused and perverted by the conflicting sentiments even of apparently good men, is to abandon the “first principle” of all reasoning.

In the second place, as to the merits of the question more immediately before us, it is easy to prove that the question which, Mr Mansel says, every moralist is compelled to answer in the negative, must be answered in the affirmative. The question is thus stated by himself: “Is the moral quality of right or wrong an attribute so essentially adhering to acts as acts, that the same act can never vary in its character, according to the motives by which it is prompted, or the circumstances under which it is committed?” This statement of the question is inaccurate; because the fitness or unfitness of the action in itself is distinct from the moral quality of the agent who performs it. A man may do a good action from a bad motive. But the fitness or unfitness of an action in itself can never be separated from “the circumstances under which it is committed.” The moral quality of the act of taking away life depends entirely upon the circumstances under which it is done. It is plain, therefore, that “the same (ethical) act can never vary in its character;” while yet it is obvious that, since the character of any special *outward* act depends upon the circumstances under which it is performed, a change in these circumstances may, in the words of Butler, “change the whole nature of the case and of the action.” The difference between “changing” an action and “justifying” an action, may appear to some to be very slender and insignificant; but it really amounts to this—Is it the same thing for a man to justify theft, and to prove that he did not steal? This is to attempt in morals, what would be done in mathematics, if the *same figure* were sometimes a circle and sometimes a square.

In another place, the moral laws are spoken of as if they were of the same nature as the physical laws, and a suspension of the one likened to a suspension of the other (p. 244, 245). Who could endure the comparison between a suspension of mathematical laws and a suspension of material laws? A suspension of moral laws is as great an extravagance as a suspension of mathematical laws. Mr Mansel had surely forgotten that Sir W. Hamilton could find a fulcrum for his

argument to prove the existence of "the moral Governor of a moral world,"* only in the marked and indisputable difference between physical and moral law. We are not sure that a miracle is correctly described as "the suspension of a physical law." But of this we feel assured, that to speak of suspending a law of morality is quite the same as attempting to justify its transgression. This sentiment is fully confirmed by the following language of Butler, "Moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind; for it carries in it authority and a right of direction—authority in such a sense as that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned."† Hence we cannot see another, it matters not who he may be, departing from a moral rule, without condemning him.

From this somewhat lengthened review, which, in the circumstances, could not be shortened, it appears that Butler distinctly enunciates the following principles:—1. "Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent." 2. That our duties to God arise out of the relations in which we stand to God, and do not depend on the manner in which we become acquainted with these relations. 3. That the judgment of a man's conscience is prior to, and independent of, any expression of the divine will, which afterwards seconds and affirms the sentence of conscience. 4. That both moral law and abstract truth are founded in the nature of things. 5. That *positive* duties, no less than *moral* duties, are founded upon *reasons* which we know in the latter case, and do not know in the former case. 6. That the adaptation of the Bible to the experienced wants of man is evidence in favour of its divine original. 7. That the abuse of reason is no argument against its legitimate use. 8. That a moral rule is never suspended.

These are vital principles which distinguish Butler's Analogy, and have contributed to give it its world-wide celebrity. Every one of these principles Mr Mansel has distinctly denied and rejected, while boasting that he was following in the footsteps of the philosophic bishop. These are the principles on which alone any satisfactory system of ethics is likely to be constructed. And many of Mr Mansel's critics seem to be as strangely unacquainted with them as himself.

We are now prepared to discuss Mr Mansel's treatment of the great doctrine of the atonement, and thus illustrate the principles which we are endeavouring to elucidate and defend. It is maintained that the human mind has no power or qualifi-

* Lecture II.

† Analogy, Part I. s. vi.

cation to understand and appreciate the procedure of God in the scheme of redemption, as it has none to criticise and condemn. The daring impugner of the wisdom or justice of the atonement is put out of court; his every argument is held to be irrelevant; while the same law is imposed on the humble inquirer, who is warned to beware of any thing pretending to be an intelligent exposition or vindication of the divine plan of saving-mercy. This theory is perfectly consistent with the idea which pervades the lectures,—that man has no means of attaining a valid or intelligent knowledge of God at all. As, for example, when he says, “The coexistence of the infinite and the finite, in any manner whatever, is inconceivable by reason; and the only ground that can be taken for accepting one representation of it rather than another is, that one is revealed and another is not revealed,” (p. 183). Let the reader ponder what we have put in italics. Admitting that the infinite, *as infinite*, is unknown, if no *representation* of God be, *in itself*, more intelligible and estimable than another to man, then are we shut up to utter darkness.

In full consistency with these views, man’s moral reason is unsparingly cashiered. “Verily,” he says, “this vaunted moral reason is a Lesbian rule. It may be applied with equal facility to the criticism of every possible scheme of divine providence; and therefore we may be permitted to suspect that it is not entitled to implicit confidence against any,” (p. 216). As little, of course, can it be entitled to confidence in favour of any. This conclusion seems to us to be all but distinctly avowed in the following sentence, *especially when it is taken in connection with what comes immediately before it, and what is said on pp. 240, 241.* “We may not say, for example, that certain parts of the Christian scheme are unwise and unrighteous, though outweighed by greater acts of righteousness and wisdom; we are bound to believe that we were mistaken from the first in supposing them to be unwise or unrighteous at all,” (p. 247). That is, we have no means nor capacity for judging between right and wrong, but the word of our Maker. Whatever is done or spoken by God is, *ipso facto*, to be esteemed by us righteous and wise. And when we meet with anything that is attributed to God, and *that seems to us unworthy of his character, having, of course, done our best to form a correct verdict*, even though nothing is produced to alter that verdict in itself; the fact that the matter in question is truly attributed to God is sufficient, not merely to demand another investigation, but to convince us that what we thought, and still think, is wrong, is really right. This theory might do if man had no moral judgment at all. But since man has a moral sense, and does exercise it, such views make our moral consciousness falla-

cious, or, at least, set the morality of earth at variance with the morality of heaven. We are fully aware that the author disavows explicitly such a conclusion in some places of his volume. But these disavowals are only incidental, while the whole strain of his argument and tendency of his language are in favour of man's moral impotence and incapacity.

The whole confusion may perhaps be traced to the double fallacy involved in the following passage:—

"The doctrines revealed must either be such as are within the power of man's natural reason to verify, or such as are beyond it. In the former case, the reason which is competent to verify may also be competent to discover. The doctrine is tested by its conformity to the conclusions of human philosophy; and the wisdom which sits in judgment on the truth of a doctrine, must itself be presumed to have an equal power of discovering the truth. In the latter case, where the doctrine is beyond the power of human reason to discover, it can be accepted only as resting on the authority of the teacher who proclaims it; and that authority itself must then be guaranteed by the external evidence of a super-human mission." (Pp. 238, 239.)

The first fallacy consists in the assertion, that whatever truth reason can verify it can also discover; and the second lies in virtually assuming that in the Bible there are no truths which reason can discover.

As to the latter of these, it surely does not need proof that the word of God again and again appeals to men on the ground of what they already acknowledge. The Bible reproves, rebukes, and warns mankind, on the principles which it finds recognised even in corrupt society. It is said of the prodigal, "he came to himself." Our Saviour is recorded to have addressed the *people* thus, "Yea, and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right" (Luke xii. 54-57)? There is a very great deal of moral truth which is common to the Bible and the natural conscience, and which the Bible is constantly assuming to be common to both; and except there were such common ground, there could be no intelligent intercourse between God and man. The existence of this intermediate sphere is entirely overlooked by the lecturer, or man's power to deal with it is completely excluded. He does indeed refer to "the vast moral superiority of Christianity to all heathen systems of ethics," as a "legitimate and powerful" argument; but, besides undermining this argument in the way which we have already pointed out, he adds, "Its positive force depends not merely on the internal character of the doctrine, but principally on its relation to certain external facts" (miracles), p. 239. So that, after all, this legitimate and powerful argument leans upon another argument; and

how much force it inherently possesses, the reader is allowed to guess. Verily, confusion is worse than error.

Secondly, as to those doctrines, which, strictly speaking, are *revealed*, and which our reason could not discover, if we cannot verify them, it is too much to say that we can never understand and appreciate any of them. A common understanding can surely *verify* some at least of the truths, which only the genius of a Newton or a La Place could *discover*. To affirm that we can receive only on authority, implicitly, blindly, all such truths as we could not ourselves have found out by our unaided efforts, is pure extravagance. What is education? Is it not teaching our youth truths, many of which they would never, if left to themselves, have dreamed of; and teaching them both the meaning and the evidence and the relations of these truths? In like manner, when our heavenly Father condescends to instruct mankind, it would certainly be preposterous to expect to understand fully everything which he sees fit to communicate, and be disappointed if we found *mysteries* in the message; but it is scarcely less preposterous to affirm, that every new revelation of truth shall be nothing but an impenetrable opaque, having no beauty to the eye, and no form to the perceptions, of reason.

The atonement made for sin by the sacrificial death of the Lord Jesus Christ, although a doctrine most strictly beyond the discovery of the human understanding, and only revealed to us by those who "wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," is nevertheless any thing but a dark tenet, a mysterious dogma of our creed. If those who assail it as immoral, can only be repulsed by the plea that it is incomprehensible, then, verily is the very citadel of our faith in danger. When it is charged with being *against* reason, if the charge can be met only by admitting that it is *above* reason, not only in its origin and authorship, but also in its very structure and substance, then we see not how Christ crucified can be the wisdom of God, nor consequently the power of God, to any sinner.

The New Testament leaves this fundamental and vital question in no ambiguity. The vicarious sufferings of Emmanuel are not only represented as the alone ground on which the Almighty proceeds in offering pardon to the guilty; but the intelligent appreciation and hearty approval of what God thus does, is also made the turning point of the sinner's subjective condition in passing from unbelief to faith. The expiation achieved on Calvary, is not only the means of manifesting the manifold wisdom of God to the hosts and hierarchies of other worlds, but is also the means of subduing the enmity, and enlightening the mind, and winning the affections, of the lost and rebellious children of men.

In this respect, the atonement through the blood of Jesus Christ, seems to us to be very different from either the doctrine of the Trinity, or that of the Incarnation. These we would reverentially receive as simple facts, without daring to intrude into the Arcana of the Divine nature, or venturing to attempt to pass within the veil, "that is to say, his flesh," who is the God-man, to pry into the secret constitution of his person, or even hoping that such mysteries shall ever be uncovered to our vision. But the atonement we would embrace not only as a fact, but as a fact explained,—explained by God himself,—and explained in a manner suited to our comprehension.

It were folly to deny that to set forth this explanation in a scriptural and intelligible form, grappling with all the difficulties that beset the question, is an arduous undertaking. But it is not necessary to maintain that this work has been already successfully and satisfactorily performed in a scientific manner. It is enough to know that theologians are labouring at it, and their hope of ultimate triumph is based on the amplest and surest ground. Neither morals nor theology have, as yet, we apprehend, been reduced to that strictly philosophical shape which they are destined to attain. Consequently every question within their range, when dealt with in a very rigorous manner, is felt to be encompassed with more or less dimness and uncertainty. To contend that this state of things must always continue, and that there is no hope of decided improvement in ethical science, is to say the least altogether unwarranted; nay more, it is to arrest the progress of society by ignoring the deepest convictions of human nature, and denying some of the plainest intimations of the holy Scriptures.

And in the mean time, the doctrine of Christ's atoning work, in a broad and practical sense, commends itself as wise and righteous to the conscience of every honest inquirer. The doctrine may perhaps be summed up in these three facts: that God the Son, in the likeness of man, offered and gave himself to suffer and die for the guilty; that God the Father appointed, sanctioned, and accepted this offer and sacrifice of love; and that, in virtue of this arrangement, a free and full forgiveness is held out to every penitent, believing, and obedient sinner. These three facts cohere in beautiful symmetry one with the other; and there is nothing in any of them singly, or in all of them combined, to shock the sensibilities or stagger the reason of any unprejudiced mind. On the contrary, while these facts are doubtless close upon the margin of the mysteriously profound, yet no one can think of them, practically and dispassionately, without feeling unusually impressed with the far-seeing wisdom that pervades the scheme, with the love of Immanuel for the sinner, as well as his respect for his Father's law, and

also with the mingled rectitude and mercy of the Great Supreme in not sparing his own Son, but delivering him up for us all.

Moreover, if there be any truth in Christian experience, or any thing intelligible in the New Testament, we are fully persuaded that, without a clear comprehension of these facts, in their relation to the character of God, there is nothing worthy of the name of Christian discipleship. It is only in so far as an individual appreciates and approves the *wisdom* of this plan, by which he is reconciled to God, that his profession of Christianity can be redeemed from the charge of superstition. It is only in so far as we perceive and esteem the *righteousness* of the scheme, or the respect shewn both by the Father and the Son in carrying it out for the rectitude of the divine government, that we can be regarded as partakers of genuine evangelical repentance. And it is only in so far as any one discerns and comprehends the wondrous *mercy* of God in Christ, not simply as not conflicting with justice, but really as based upon, and supported by, unerring and inflexible justice, that his heart will be won to a cheerful and unreserved surrender of himself to the invitations and claims of his Redeemer. It thus appears, unless we greatly mistake, that the doctrine of the atonement, far from being a topic to be left untouched by reason, or unexamined by the intellect, demands and challenges the most thorough sifting. Far from being an item in our creed, which is to be left in cold, dark isolation, unscrutinised by our understanding, and remote from our sympathies, it speaks, and speaks loudly and distinctly, as if every organ of our moral nature were an ear to hear. Its profound judiciousness satisfies the severest judgment; its rigorous and unbending rectitude meets and quells the fears of the tenderest and most scrupulous conscientiousness; while the yearning affection and unutterable love, which glow and burn as we watch every turn that unfolds this *mystery** of godliness, have melted, and they only can melt, the hard icy heart of the guilty, when remorse is growing into despair. Hence we conclude that a full and accurate acquaintance with Christ's unparalleled work of redemption, and a cordial recognition and acceptance of its provisions and principles, as forming a signal manifestation of Jehovah's character in wisdom, righteousness, and mercy, is to be expected from every man, as an essential condition of genuine discipleship. An intelligent and heartfelt apprehension and admiration of the scheme is indispensable to the enjoyment of peace with God, and thus lies at the very core of vital godliness or Christian piety.

* The word *mystery* is used above with the meaning which it often bears in Scripture, namely, something which was once hid but is now revealed.

V.—*The Later Religious History of Scotland.*

The Life and Times of George Lawson, D.D., Selkirk, Professor of Theology to the Associate Synod. By REV. DR MACFARLANE. Edinburgh: William Oliphant & Co.

My Own Life and Times, 1714–1814. By THOMAS SONERVILLE, D.D., Minister of Jedburgh. Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas.

Biographical Notices of the Late Rev. William Taylor, Minister at Levenside and at Perth. By REV. J. W. TAYLOR, Flisk and Crieich. Cupar Fife: Whitehead & Burns.

The Pastor of Kilsyth; or, Memorials of the Life and Times of the Rev. W. H. Burns, D.D. By REV. ISLAY BURNS, Dundee. London: T. Nelson & Sons.

"THE literature of the eighteenth century," says Mr Buckle,* "offered a striking and most exhilarating contrast [to that of the seventeenth]. It seemed as if, in a moment, all was changed. The Baillies, the Binnings, the Dicksons, the Durhams, the Flemings, the Frasers, the Gillespies, the Guthries, the Halyburtons, the Hendersons, the Rutherfords, and the rest of that monkish rabble, were succeeded by eminent and enterprising thinkers, whose genius lighted up every department of knowledge, and whose minds, fresh and vigorous as the morning, opened for themselves a new career, and secured for their country a high place in the annals of European intellect." The chief reason, the same writer tells us, why the eighteenth century was in this respect so superior to the seventeenth, was, that in the latter "the ablest Scotchmen wasted their energies on theological subjects."

The ablest Scotchmen of the eighteenth century did not certainly "waste their energies on theological subjects." They devoted themselves to pursuits, of what Mr Buckle would call a more wholesome character—such as mental and moral philosophy, poetry, history, political economy, and *Belles Lettres*; and, in place of the "monkish rabble" of divines which overshadowed a former age, we have during this later era the intellectual heaven bright with such stars and constellations as Hutcheson, Reid, and Hume; Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart; John Home, Principal Robertson, and Dr Hugh Blair. The extraordinary ability of these men no one will dispute. They made, as all will allow, the Augustan age of Scottish literature; and some, at least, of the books which they wrote produced effects which are still visible at the present day. Mr Buckle may exaggerate, when he speaks, for example, of the "Wealth of Nations" as "probably the most important book which has ever been written," but even Sir James Mackintosh uses language almost as strong, when he

* History of Civilization in England, vol. ii. pp. 577-9.

calls it "perhaps the only book which produced an immediate, general, and *irrevocable* change in some of the most important parts of the legislation of all civilised states." And although there is no other name in the list of which anything like this could be said—yet there can be no question that Hume performed an important service in awakening intellectual life in Scotland, that Reid laid a stable basis for the establishment of a sound philosophy, that Robertson did his part as a historian so well as to be worthily chosen as a model by Gibbon himself, and that though Blair did not make in his "Sermons" any very substantial contributions to theology, even he has been of some use to succeeding generations as a graceful writer and rhetorician. The fact, however, that the mind of the century, even when it appeared in the clergy, at least of the Established Church, went so naturally, so instinctively, to other than theological subjects, is a significant one—quite as much so as Mr Buckle makes it out to be, though we shall probably not be able to regard it with the same satisfaction that he does. Contemporaneously with some of the writers we have mentioned, and, though separated from it by the broad Atlantic, taking the deepest possible interest in their country, there lived another, who for grasp, and strength, and subtlety of intellect, was inferior to none of them; but he (we refer to President Edwards) devoted his transcendent powers, and that with all his heart, to the defence and illustration of evangelical truth; and a correspondent of his in Scotland, Dr John Erskine of the Old Greyfriars, whom even the scornful Warburton deigned to denominate "a deep divine," was thus far like-minded with him, that, instead of expending his literary capacities in the barren speculations of the period, he too used his pen only in the interest of the gospel. But the abler Scottish clergy of this time manifested in general very different tastes (because they were men of a very different character), and the inferior orders, of course, followed the lead. There was, however, perhaps this excuse for them, that not merely the ministry, but the age, had changed. Theology was, as they at any rate thought, at a discount. There was no demand for such religious books as they were able, or felt inclined, to write. This is the account which Dr Thomas Somerville of Jedburgh gives why he took to history rather than to divinity. "*Theology would have been most consonant to my taste and habitual course of study, BUT WAS NOT LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE EITHER TO MY PROFIT OR POPULARITY;*"* and the result was, that he addressed himself to write the story of the reign of William the Third.

* My Own Life and Times, p. 205.

The throwing up of a straw may shew how the wind blows. We do not need to discuss the question of whether or not an individual minister is in the way of his duty in writing a history, a tragedy, or a metaphysical treatise, in order to be in a condition to judge of the prevailing tendencies of a time in which the fame of the Church leaders is based chiefly on their achievements in secular literature, and the study of theology leads to no profit or popularity.—“Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.” The literature of a period is nothing else than the outcoming of its life. And the reason why the best known ministers of the Church of Scotland in the eighteenth century are its Robertsons and Homes, instead of such men as the Halyburtons and Rutherfords of a previous age, is just because spiritual religion had at that time lost somewhat of its hold upon the educated Scottish mind, and had been succeeded, to a considerable extent, by a spirit of indifference, and even of infidelity. Warburton, in his correspondence with Dr John Erskine in 1744, refers to the existence of such a spirit at that date, and to its effects, and Sir Henry Moncreiff, in commenting on the letter of the English divine, gives us some additional information as to its operation. It would appear that, as we might have expected, the fashion being set by the leading men of the Church, the younger and humbler men got into the habit of speaking flippantly of sacred things, and sometimes affected more latitudinarianism than they felt. “There was certainly in Scotland, at this time,” says Sir Harry,* “a class of preachers who, besides the absurd affectation of bringing their public instructions from Socrates, Plato, or Seneca, rather than from the morality of the gospel, distinguished themselves by an ostentatious imitation of the doctrines and phraseology of Francis Hutcheson† and the Earl of Shaftesbury. . . . These divines, who were more solicitous to be distinguished as philosophers than as ministers of the gospel, certainly deserved both reprehension and contempt for the prostitution of the pulpit to the useless and unnatural semblance of philosophy, which they substituted for Christian doctrine. But it would have been unjust to accuse them of heresies. Their peculiarities were adopted rather than they might

* Account of the Life and Writings of John Erskine, D.D., pp. 59-62.

† Dr Alexander Carlyle gives much the same account. Speaking of Professor Leechman of Glasgow, he says (p. 84 of his “Autobiography”) — “It was owing to Hutcheson and him that a new school was formed in the western provinces of Scotland, where the clergy, till that period, were narrow and bigoted, and had never ventured to range in their mind beyond the bounds of strict orthodoxy. For, though neither of these professors taught any heresy, yet they opened and enlarged the minds of the students, which soon gave them a turn for free inquiry, the result of which was candour and liberality of sentiment.” What this liberality of sentiment meant, we may learn not merely from Sir Harry Moncreiff, but from Dr Carlyle himself, in a *naïve* anecdote he tells of his

be believed to be, if not original and profound, *at least ingenious or fashionable thinkers*, than from any systematic hostility to Christian doctrine. They preached for fame more than for usefulness; though, among their parishioners, they were commonly as far from reaching the one as the other."

The quiet sarcasm contained in the last sentence of this extract, explains in part why the eighteenth century became not merely the Scottish Augustan age, but the era of the Secession.

Indifference in the pulpit led naturally to indifference in the pews; and at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, the leaven had so thoroughly spread through the mass, that the Church of Scotland, in spite of the efforts of a faithful few, was, upon the whole, one of the deadest churches in Christendom.

And yet, while we say this, we ought not to forget how full the desert was, even at its worst, of isolated palms, relieving the waste with their greenness, and even bright oases within which the character of the surrounding desolation is lost sight of altogether. The story of the Cambuslang revival belongs to the times of the Robertsons and the Blairs; and Mr Kennedy of Dingwall tells us,* "it was after the first quarter of the century was passed that the best days of Ross-shire began. A few good ministers were then scattered over the province of the Synod. In 1725, Mr James Fraser was ordained minister of Alness, and his labours were early and greatly blessed. Seven years thereafter, Mr Porteous came to Kilmuir, and few ministers had been more successful than he. Mr Balfour of Nigg, Mr M'Phail of Resolis, Mr Beaton of Rosekeen, and Mr Ward of Rosemarkie, all famous men of God, were his cotemporaries. Before the middle of the century, the great revival of religion began, which spread its blessed influence alike over Highlands and Lowlands. At Nigg, Kilmuir, and Rosemarkie especially, the Lord's right hand wrought wonders of grace in turning many from darkness to light; but in other places throughout the country many souls were then gathered to the Lord. Under the ministry of such men as Fraser, Porteous, Beaton, Balfour, M'Phail, and Ward, the good work continued to advance and to spread, till the

friend David Hume. The free-thinking philosopher was on a visit to Gilmerton, and his host, Sir David Kinloch, took him on the Sabbath to Athelstaneford Church. That day John Home, and his neighbour, the minister of Inveresk, had exchanged, so that Hume heard, not the author of *Douglas*, but the autobiographer himself. The preacher for the day dined at Gilmerton, and Carlyle records the compliment which on that occasion was paid to him: "What did you mean," said the philosopher, "by treating John's congregation to-day with one of Cicero's Academics? I did not think that such heathen morality would have passed in East Lothian." The story is told to illustrate Hume's good-natured pleasantry, but it may be taken also as illustrating something else.

* The Days of the Fathers in Ross-shire, pp. 13, 14.

desert began, indeed, to rejoice and blossom as the rose." So favourable an account as this cannot be given of the Church in the Lowlands. There was no such general movement in any other county in Scotland, as appears to have taken place in the counties of Ross and Sutherland; and it is well understood that it was because there was life enough there within the pale of the Establishment, that the Secession found no room or encouragement to fix its roots in their soil. But though the north was more extensively blessed, there were in the south all through the eighteenth century, and at the beginning of the nineteenth, very many individual witnesses for the truth who kept the temple lamp alight when it was threatened with extinction. Boston, Willison, Maclaurin, and John Gillies, all belong to this period; and there are few men of any age whose works have exercised a wider or more beneficial influence. During parts of the same era, also, Glasgow enjoyed the ministrations of such men as Dr Balfour and Dr Love, and Edinburgh the no less acceptable services of John Erskine, Dr Jones of Lady Glenorchy's, Dr Buchanan of the Canongate, Dr Black of Lady Yester's, and Dr Davidson of the Tolbooth; while up and down the country might be found men breathing an equally evangelical spirit, as Bryce Johnston of Holywell, and James Burns of Forgan.* With all this, however, the iron yoke of patronage lay a terrible incubus on the Church's neck. Ministers were being constantly appointed to parishes, whose ordination to situations for which they were unfit, was bitterly lamented by those of the superintending presbytery, who were themselves acquainted with the gospel; but Dr Hill, Principal Robertson's successor in the leadership of the Assembly, had done what he could to encourage the belief that had been previously formed, that the grievance was irremediable; and the chief ground of comfort we have in thinking of the existence of an evangelical party at that time is simply this, that it was a sign that God had not wholly forsaken the Church of Scotland, and that it contained the promise and suggested the hope of better days.

Hitherto, we have been speaking mainly of the decline of religion in Scotland, and of the causes which contributed to bring it about. We propose now, in what remains of this paper, to review rapidly the history of the revival which it has since undergone, and the operation of the various agencies by which that happy result has been effected.

In the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the Church of Scotland was sadly wanting in that worldly wisdom which

* One of the most interesting portions of "The Pastor of Kilsyth" is that which contains Dr Burns's reminiscences of such ministers as we have named.

has so often, in similar circumstances, distinguished the Church of Rome. An able and earnest reforming party had arisen within her borders, and their activity, if fair channels had been left for its display, and some allowance made for its alleged extravagances, might very easily have been directed to the strengthening instead of the weakening of her resources. But while Rome made room for, instead of expelling, her Franciscans and Dominicans, though the spirit of both at the first seemed to run counter to her own, the infatuated ecclesiastical leaders of those days, with greater intolerance and shortsightedness, insisted on driving beyond the pale, men, of whom it is no great praise to say, that they were better churchmen than themselves. The formation of the first Secession Presbytery in 1733, and of the first Relief Presbytery in 1761, are important events in the history of Scottish religious life. From these dates we have two streams to follow parallel to that of the National Church, and few now-a-days will have any difficulty in admitting that both were for many years greatly purer than the central current, and that to their influence Scotland is largely indebted for the preservation of her Reformation principles, and the maintenance of her primitive faith. What rendered Dissent so much more influential in Scotland than it has generally been elsewhere, is, on the whole, well stated by Mr Hill Burton, who, though no authority, certainly, on ecclesiastical matters, has been a shrewd observer of the characteristics of this period. "Dissent in England," says he,* for example, "had generally been gentle, or, at least, humble—its adherents, conscious of the strength and splendour of the great Establishment from which they departed, quietly seeking relief for tender consciences. In Scotland every cluster separating from the Establishment at once assumed the position of the Church, became an ecclesiastical power, and passed sentence on the body from which it had separated, as heretical and schismatic. There was a reason for the distinction in the relative character of Dissent in the two Churches. In England, it was not only that in looking from the Church to Dissent, men of social rank and high scholarship were put in comparison with flighty attorney's clerks and serious weavers who had a call, but that the great Establishment to which, with a mere scattering of exceptions, the main bulk of the nation was attached, kept to its principles, while the dissenters struck out innovations. Hence, by a natural law of English feeling which abhors novelties,

* *History of Scotland*, pp. 328-329. Another sentence from this history will shew its character:—"In a southern parish called Cambuslang, there had arisen one of those strange and melancholy exhibitions called religious revivals, with which, fortunately, Scotland has been but rarely and casually visited," p. 339.

they were condemned to content themselves with the mere outskirts of the population. On the other hand, Scottish dissent always tended to preserve the old principles of the Church, whence the Establishment, by the progress of enlightenment, as some said—by deterioration, according to others—was lapsing." In other words, for this is what Mr Burton's somewhat too strongly put statement amounts to, Scottish Dissent assumed at once a position of comparatively great influence, in consequence of the first Seceders being men of social standing and superior intelligence (Mr Ebenezer Erskine was, as Mr Burton himself admits, "a scholar and a gentleman"), and because, being unquestionably not the friends, but the enemies, of innovation, they felt themselves entitled to take up high ground, as the ecclesiastical conservatives of the time, and, in some sense, the true representatives of the ancient Church of Scotland. The ways in which this movement worked for good were various. The standard of orthodoxy was upheld more freely—the blessing of evangelical preaching was more widely diffused. A refuge was offered for the relief of the inhabitants of any parish into which a minister of the "heathen morality" school was intruded, and by the admission of the Moderate clergy themselves, the existence in the country of a rival religious community had a wholesome effect in increasing the activity of the Establishment. "So far from believing secession and schism to be evils," says Dr Somerville,* "I am inclined to think that they have been productive of beneficial effects with respect to the ecclesiastical establishment, as well as the more important interests of religion. It will not be denied that the influence of religion upon the great body of the people must, in no small degree, depend upon the fidelity, the diligence, and exemplary conduct of its officiating ministers. The first and most obvious effect of secession is to excite, if I may so express it, a competition for character between the Established clergy and their Dissenting brethren. . . And I have no doubt of its being found, upon inquiry, that the ministerial duties of preaching, examining, visiting the sick, &c., are generally performed with more exemplary diligence and regularity in parishes where the dissenting interest has got footing, and the parishioners enjoy the opportunity of choosing between the Church and the Secession."

Real, however, as was the influence for good exerted by the Dissenters of the eighteenth century, it was rendered far less than it might have been by their own narrow-mindedness and divisions. We take the most favourable view possible of their behaviour in connection with the visits of Whitefield to

* *My Own Life and Times*, p. 86.

Scotland. The story to which Sir Harry Moncrieff gives currency in his "Life of Erskine," and which is copied (nothing loth, we dare say) by Dr Cunningham of Crieff into his "Church History of Scotland," and which represents Ralph Erskine, the best and most genial of the set, as saying to the English evangelist, in so many words, "We are the Lord's people," and on that ground claiming a monopoly of his services; this story seems to us to be in itself so improbable, that we are quite ready to discredit it. And more than that, we think there is a very great deal of force in the excuse which Dr A. Thomson* gives for the much-ridiculed attempt which the Associate Presbytery made to convince the erratic preacher of the importance of a right form of church government, and that their own denomination held a more scriptural position in reference to that point than any other body in Scotland. There was, as he justly remarks, not merely speculative but practical consequences depending upon the endeavour. "He [Whitefield] was gathering around him thousands of converts. It was necessary for the permanent success of his labours that these converts should be cared for, and formed into churches. The question therefore seemed one that did not admit of long delay, What was the form of church government sanctioned by Scripture?" Making every allowance, however, for what may seem at first sight unreasonable in their demands upon Whitefield, and for the natural irritation excited by his after conduct in fraternising so entirely with the ministers of what they considered to be a thoroughly corrupt establishment, it is impossible to read without pain and regret the denunciatory language which they subsequently used, both toward himself and toward the good work in which he took a part at Cambuslang and elsewhere. The purely spiritual momentum of the Secession must have been sensibly diminished by its procedure on this occasion. The spirit which it displayed could not but strike its well-wishers within the national Church as selfish, illiberal, and in the worst sense sectarian; and though there may be no positive statistics producible to establish it, we do not doubt that, but for the false step it took in this connection, Scottish dissent would have taken a much more influential part than it did in the awakening of religious earnestness throughout the country generally. In saying this, now-a-days, we do not, of course, take any special credit to ourselves; and there is no need for trying to shut the mouths of critics, as Dr Thomson seems a little disposed to do, by an appeal to the "tu quoque" argument, "Let him that is without guilt among you throw the first stone." We

* Historical Sketch of the Secession Church, p. 134.

are simply noticing, in a friendly review, and by the help of the light of the latter half of the nineteenth century, the religious agencies that were in operation in the eighteenth, and we give the opinion for what it is worth, that the unfriendly attitude assumed by the Seceders towards the religious movement in the west of Scotland, and the leaders in it, reacted unfavourably upon themselves, and exposed them to the charge of forgetting one part of their mission, which was not merely to "testify" to the truth, but to propagate throughout the land a pure gospel, and impart a new life to a dead church.

Their dissensions among themselves were equally unfortunate. So early as 1747, the Associate Synod split into two, on a point regarding which there might very well have been a difference of opinion, but which certainly appears to us now by no means of such vital importance as to justify the extreme steps that were taken on its account. Before the century closed another subdivision took place. The Burgher Synod was found to be far from being at one on the subject of the relation of the civil magistrate to religion, and after much discussion it too broke up, the majority being afterwards popularly known as New Light Burghers, while the minority, being the conservative party, either claimed or had conceded to them the venerable title of Old Lights. A disruption on similar grounds occurred afterwards in the Anti-Burgher Synod, so that when the new century, with its new hopes, came in, the original planet, which, with the moon eclipsed, was to do so much towards supplying its lack of service, was found shattered into four separate fragments, each rolling under centrifugal, rather than under centripetal, influences. That each of these bodies produced eminently good and able men is a simple historical fact, and we believe it to be equally undeniable that they all, in their own way, have been in a high degree serviceable to the cause of Christianity in Scotland. But a moment's reflection is enough to satisfy any man that in this disunion there could not but have been weakness, that the expenditure of so much time and mind in controversy must have involved the withdrawal of energy, to some extent, from direct evangelistic work, and that consequently the contribution made by the Secession to the general revival of religious life in the country, could scarcely fail to be less than it bade fair to be when it commenced its career.

A good many books have been published within the last few years, in which glimpses are afforded us of the inner life of the ministry of those times. Two or three of these are named at the head of this article. Dr Somerville was ordained in 1767, and died in 1830. Dr Lawson was settled at Selkirk in 1771, and lived till 1820. Mr Taylor commenced his labours in

Levenside in 1786, and entered into his rest in 1836; while the pastorate of Dr Burns reached all through the half century from 1800 to 1859. All of these biographies are exceedingly valuable, as contributions to the religious history of the period which they embrace. Dr Somerville's "Life and Times" has not had the run of Dr Carlyle's "Autobiography," but in our judgment it is quite as interesting, and, as containing the frank confessions of a Moderate of the old school, it is, to say the least of it, not less significant. The character of Dr Burns's "Reminiscences," as bringing us into the houses of the leading evangelical ministers of Edinburgh during the Moderate regime, we have already referred to. And, when speaking of the influence of the Secession on the spiritual condition of Scotland, we may take advantage of the opportunity to say a word of the other two volumes which we have not yet had occasion to notice.

Dr Lawson and Mr Taylor were for several years ministers in the same section of the Christian Church, both being members of the Burgher Synod. But they took opposite sides in the controversy which raged in that community between 1795 and 1799 on the subject of the civil magistrate, and from the last of these dates their walks lay apart, the former becoming in time the theological instructor of the New Light students, the latter acting in the same capacity in the hall of the Old Lights. The "Life of Dr Lawson" has only just been published; and coming after the autobiographies of Carlyle and Somerville, which have given the public a taste for this department of ecclesiastical antiquities, it is not likely to be unduly overlooked. And, indeed, it well deserves to be read. The subject of Dr Macfarlane's sketch was evidently a remarkable man.*

The biographer of Mr Taylor does not claim for the subject of his narrative anything like such a character; but he was,

* It would have been a thousand pities if this endeavour had not been made to preserve his story and character from fading away out of the recollection of the church which he adorned. The biography has not, of course, the peculiar charm of the books with which we have classed it. It was not written by the person chiefly concerned himself, nor could Dr Macfarlane speak from direct acquaintance with him. But so far as arrangement goes, the work is done very artistically. The compiler, instead of attempting, what probably it would now be impossible to prepare, a continuous narrative, has thrown his materials into groups, by the help of which he gives us glimpses of Dr Lawson under all the leading conditions of his somewhat uneven history. Thus we have one chapter devoted to "the youth and his promise," a second to "the professor and his students," a third to "the friend and his companions," a fourth to "the polemic and his associates," and so on. As a whole the volume is an exceedingly useful one, as giving an idea of the inner life of the Secession during the end of the last and the beginning of the present century, and as bringing out the, it is to be feared, indisputable fact that, in the mass, the dissenting clergy of the time were superior in point of character and piety, while not inferior in the elements of ability and scholarship, to the clergy of the national Church. To all this, however, we must add that the book is sadly disfigured by the tone

notwithstanding, a man who well merited such a memorial as he has received. "These notices," says he, "will introduce to the acquaintance of the reader a Secession minister of the Erskine school, a class of men whose trials have been unknown, whose contentings have been unacknowledged, but who, borne onward by an impulse which was the result of high principle, and which supplied the place of all outward and adventitious sympathy, did in their generation great things both for God and their fellow-men."*

In what we have said of the Secession Churches, our object has been to shew how much comparative excellence was in them all through the reign of Moderatism; and how they failed notwithstanding to arrest the progress of the evil leaven or stir the heart of the Scottish people. For accomplishing this last work in particular, God employed other forces; and among these we are now called to notice the operations of the men who ultimately became the founders of Scottish Congregationalism. The movement of the early Scottish Congregationalists was, as Dr Alexander truly remarks,† "from the be-

of exaggeration which runs through it. The style is in itself turgid and magniloquent in no ordinary degree, and the terms of admiration in which the author speaks, not only of Dr Lawson, but of a large number of his contemporaries, are so extravagant that he is for ever going up into a region far beyond the public sympathy or comprehension. There may have been such a numerous company of giants in those days as he affirms, in which case we have another striking proof of how miserably defective Mr Buckle's discourse on the condition of the Scotch intellect in the eighteenth century must be; but the unfortunate thing is, that there is little to shew for it, and while that is the case, their reputation resting mainly on the traditional respect of the community to which they belonged, it would perhaps have been better to have used tones more subdued in a book which, if it gets what it merits, ought to have far more than a denominational circulation. In Dr Lawson himself, the man who was thought worthy to succeed, as professor of divinity, the sainted John Brown of Haddington, we rejoice to recognise one whose memory his country ought to cherish; but we cannot help pausing for at least a moment's consideration, when we are asked by Dr Macfarlane to believe that he was "a man who had no superior in *any church for extent, variety, and depth of learning*; for wonderful sagacity, and withal, for such a majesty of simplicity, such a *fascination of meekness*, and such a power of godliness as entitle him to be held in everlasting remembrance!"

* It was the misfortune of this book to be published before the public mind had taken that peculiar bent towards the past which it has of late been manifesting, and to be given unobtrusively to the world through the medium of a provincial press. On this account, though not a few at once recognised its interest and value, it has never attracted the amount of attention to which it is entitled. It is, however, in the best sense, a charming volume, written in a fine spirit, and with exquisite taste, and affording a fuller and clearer insight into the history and character of the special branch of the Secession with which it is called to deal, than can probably be found in any other quarter whatsoever. Our limited space prevents a more adequate reference to its contents, but we cannot part from this part of our subject without expressing an earnest hope that a new edition of Mr Taylor's little work may soon be issued, and that under circumstances which shall insure for it the more general attention of the reading public.

† *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Ralph Wardlaw, D.D.*, pp. 43, 44.

ginning a purely spiritual movement. Like Methodism in England, the secession which they headed had its source simply in a craving for more life, more energy, more spiritual freedom and diffusiveness than they could find in existing systems."

The same writer also ascribes, in a sense, the reawakening of religious life in Scotland to the tremendous upheaval of the French Revolution. And there can be no doubt that here too he is perfectly right. Of course he does not mean that that natural cause could in itself produce any other than a natural result. The purely spiritual consequences followed from spiritual influences which worked contemporaneously with it. But it is indisputably true that God overruled that leading event of modern history for the good of his church; and we do not know that the fact has been sufficiently observed or realised. The individual experience of Robert Haldane, whom we all recognise as the representative man of the Scottish Congregational movement, enables us to see very clearly how this unconscious religious agency actually worked.*

The conversion of Robert Haldane itself marked the commencement of a memorable era in the spiritual history of Scotland. The munificence and disinterestedness of his plan for carrying the gospel to India, could not fail to give him at once a commanding moral influence among Christian people; and this, together with his social standing and abundant means, secured his immediate recognition as a new religious centre. We think of him accordingly as the prominent figure in that group of worthies whose labours contributed more or less directly to the revival of religion throughout this country—such as Dr Bogue of Gosport, Charles Simeon of Cambridge, Rowland Hill, Andrew Fuller, from the south; and James Haldane, John Aikman, Greville Ewing, and John Campbell, from his own immediate neighbourhood. He does not appear to have taken so active a part as his brother and others in the work of itinerant preaching, but he was evidently the mind, if not also the heart, of the movement; and whatever of credit is due to the organiser of it into a fixed and settled system, that credit can be justly claimed, in a great measure, for him. We cannot, of course, give here even an outline sketch of the proceedings in which he took a part. We have yet so much ground to go over, that it would not do to linger by the way. It will be enough for our purpose that we simply indicate the successive steps by which what sprang out of a condition of singleminded earnestness, went on and developed until it issued in a separate sect or denomination.

* *Lives of the Haldanes*, p. 89.

For a time, the phenomenon presented at Airthrey and Edinburgh, and elsewhere, was nothing more nor less than the very beautiful but, happily, not uncommon one, of men who had received a baptism of the Spirit, filled with zeal for the conversion of souls. John Campbell, in his shop in the Grassmarket, carrying on his extensive and interesting correspondence, or planning his little expeditions to Gilmerton or Loanhead, that he might teach the children of a Sabbath school, or address a company of colliers, has not a thought in his mind, to begin with, but how he may do the largest possible amount of good; and Captain Haldane, setting out from his brother's mansion house for the Orkneys, is just as innocent of any purpose but that of preaching the everlasting gospel. By and bye, an attempt is made to systematise these efforts. On the 20th of December 1797, a number of persons who agreed in their desire to break in upon the darkness of the land by any means that seemed scriptural, formally associated themselves into a "Society for Propagating the Gospel at Home;" but they deliberately disclaimed any intention to meddle with existing ecclesiastical arrangements. "It is not our design," say they,* "to form or to extend the influence of any sect. Our sole intention is to make known the evangelical gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. In employing itinerants, schoolmasters, or others, we do not consider ourselves as conferring ordination upon them, or appointing them to the pastoral office. We only propose, by sending them out, to supply the means of grace wherever we perceive a deficiency." The opening of the Circus in Edinburgh was one of the natural developments of this plan. The idea of it, taken from Whitefield's "Tabernacles," was first suggested, it is believed, by Charles Simeon, and appeared at first sight entirely unobjectionable. There were very many in the northern capital who were not in the way of hearing the gospel—how were they to be reached? The Calton Hill afforded in fine weather excellent preaching ground, but our climate is too uncertain to allow congregations to meet always in the open air, and it was desirable to have shelter. But the force of events soon carried the promoters of the enterprise beyond this simple conception. The jealousy of the various churches, and the division of sentiment which existed even among good people as to the wisdom of the plans that were being adopted, tended gradually to isolate and compact them; and, at length, they were brought fairly to face the question of forming themselves into a separate and self-contained religious community. Rowland Hill was the first who distinctly pointed out the necessity of this advance; but his

* *Lives of the Haldanes*, p. 191.

notions on the subject were more catholic than practical. "If," said he, "another place of worship should be built, what should be its glory? Let it embrace all who love the Lord Jesus, and be the centre of union among them who are now disunited. Let it, then, be called the Union Church, and let her prove she deserves the name. Let her pulpit be open to all ministers who preach and love the gospel, and her communion equally open to all who love the Lord Jesus in sincerity. I would allot at least half the area of the church to the poor, that they may attend it with as much freedom as they attend a field preaching." This theory looked very well on paper, and in Edinburgh, Dundee, and Glasgow, where Tabernacles were earliest built, it was attempted, more or less fully, to put in practice; but, as might have been expected, its unworkableness was soon manifested, and full-fledged Congregationalism was the final result. "Where new churches," says the biographer of the Haldanes, "were established on the fancied model of primitive times, they only flourished for a time. In 1799, they braved the artillery of the General Assembly's pastoral admonition, fulminated against them like a bull from the Vatican, and they were unscathed by the anathemas levelled at them by the Presbyterian Seceders. It was when opposition from without died away, that the internal instability appeared."

There cannot be two opinions about the fact, that this remarkable movement was greatly owned in the revival of religion in Scotland. The story of the conversion of Dr Stewart of Moulin, contains, it is probable, but one illustration out of the many that the inner life of the times might have furnished, of how the visits of itinerants benefited ministers of the Establishment. The wonderful change which came over the Orkneys may be taken as an example of what other districts enjoyed in smaller measure. And the rapid formation of Sabbath schools, tract and missionary societies, and other benevolent institutions, evidence in an unmistakable manner the quickening of the Christian life. We have only again bitterly to regret the dull-mindedness and unwisdom of the national Church, and, we may add, of her dissenting sisters. There may be some, like Dr Somerville, who think the rise of a new sect rather an advantage than otherwise; but no one will affirm that it would not have been Christianlike and wise if the existing denominations had done their best to prevent it, not by fulminating anathemas at men whose single aim was the glory of God and the salvation of souls, but by throwing themselves into the spiritual movement of which it was the expression, and by forwarding and directing it. A man may see his life's blood flowing from a wound, and

smile through the process, and a Church may look on with equal indifference while its best and holiest are finding their way beyond its pale. But the madness of this state of feeling will reveal itself in the long run. This was the second time of visitation which the Church of Scotland enjoyed, but she did not see it. Instead of hearing the call that was addressed to her to awaken out of her sleep, she simply displayed irritation at being disturbed. And what might, had she been prepared to respond, have issued in the renewing of the face of the whole country, ended in results which, compared with the promise of the outset, were miserably disappointing. The Congregational and Baptist Churches, which still remain as substantial fruits of the revival of which we have been speaking, have done their own part in promoting the interests of evangelical religion, and the names of Innes, Anderson, and Wardlaw, are held in universal respect; but it may be safely said that, whatever their excellences, and whatever may have been their successes, they can scarcely be accepted as an equivalent in full for the better issue, which the Haldanes themselves once hoped to see, of the earlier arousing of all Scotland to an understanding of the nature and claims of the gospel of Jesus Christ.

Only two years after those dissensions among the early Congregationalists were brought to a head, which proved but too plainly that they were not to be used as God's agents in moving all Scotland, there occurred an event from which we may date the commencement of the next chapter in this history. We refer to the settlement in Edinburgh of Dr Andrew Thomson. It took place in 1810, and although it was many years after that before the evangelical party which he led attained to such strength as to tell upon the public mind everywhere, yet it is undeniable that it was chiefly through his powerful pleading in the *Christian Instructor*, the Church courts, and in the pulpit of St George's, that that long silent and almost despised sect was restored to something of its original vigour, and made to take its own clear part in the movements of the time. What manner of man he was we are told by one who, like himself, was, in these latter days, one of God's best gifts to Scotland. "When one thinks," said Dr Chalmers, speaking after his awfully sudden departure, "when one thinks of the vital energy by which every deed and every utterance were pervaded—of that prodigious strength which but gambolled with the difficulties that would have depressed and overcome other men—of that prowess in conflict and that promptitude in counsel with his fellows—of that elastic buoyancy which ever rose with the occasion, and bore him onward and upward to the successful termination of his career—of the weight and multiplicity of his engagements, and yet, as if nothing could

overwork that colossal mind and that robust framework, the perfect lightness and facility wherewith all was executed—when we think, in the midst of these powers and these performances, how intensely he laboured, I had almost said, how intensely he lived, in the midst of us, we cannot but acknowledge that death, in seizing upon him, hath made full proof of a mastery ‘that sets all the might and all the powers of humanity at defiance.’” The raising up of such a man at the time he appeared within the Scottish Establishment, was a providential interposition as marked in its way as was the calling forth of Luther at the dawn of the Reformation. Not only did he do for the evangelicals, as a Church party, what Disraeli has been said to have done for the Conservatives in the State—elevated them from being a mere “rump” of what they once were, into a powerful force in the arena of (ecclesiastical) politics, but by the manliness of his Christian character, and the extraordinary eloquence of his preaching, he commanded respect for earnest piety in places where it had formerly been derided as weak, and appreciably affected the tone of general society, even in a city so unpromising as was, in many respects, the Edinburgh of his day. As instances of his power over the public mind, we may refer to such facts as these, that his sermons on the immorality of the stage, “for a time almost ruined the Edinburgh theatre;” that his discourses on infidelity “alike prostrated the pride of the sceptic, and gave confidence to the timid believer;” and that it was mainly through his influence over the Parliament House that so many of the most distinguished lawyers were found on the popular side in the contentings which issued in the Disruption. While Dr Andrew Thomson was thus lifting up the standard so conspicuously and fearlessly in the east, a work similar in kind was being performed in the great commercial metropolis of the west. Dr Chalmers was admitted minister of the Tron Church, Glasgow, in 1815, and in less than two years afterwards (January 1817) there appeared those *Astronomical Discourses*, which ran an almost equal race for popularity with the “Tales of my Landlord,” and which immediately secured for their author the title of the *facile princeps* of Scottish preachers. The influence which he thereafter exercised over the whole country, through the pulpit, and the press, and the professor’s chair—not to speak of his manifold labours as a social economist and Church reformer—is so well known that we need not stay to describe it here. It is enough to say that, even although there had been no such “conflict” as that with which his name came by and bye to be associated, Thomas Chalmers would have been universally recognised as one

whom God had appointed and prepared to give a wide and visible impulse to His own cause in Scotland.

Alas! that we should have to add, that this new Revival had, in one respect, a history precisely the same as that of its predecessors. Erskine, Gillespie, Haldane, Chalmers—each in his turn became the leader in an Exodus. The Moderates of the Church of Scotland refused to be taught, notwithstanding the many painful illustrations of the fact which they had received, that lay patronage, is, to say the very least of it, opposed to the genius of the Scottish people. Contentings in the church courts brought on collisions with the civil authorities; and a decision being at last got from the House of Lords, which was believed by the Evangelical party to be equivalent to a declaration against the great and vital doctrine of spiritual independence, they saw no way open to them but that of retiring from the Establishment, and constituting themselves, under new conditions, into the Free Church of Scotland. That this event has had a deep and wide influence on the spiritual state of the country, cannot be doubted. In less than eighteen years a thousand new churches have been built—home and foreign missionary operations have been carried on, to an extent, and with a vigour unknown before—the blessing of evangelical preaching has been carried to every corner of the land, and the liberality and activities of the people have been called forth in a manner altogether unprecedented.*

But we have yet another incident in the later religious history of Scotland to notice—we allude to the wide-spread awakening which during the last few years has affected, to a greater or less extent, almost every district in the country. The causes which, under God, led to it, are well known.

* There are some who see, in the chequered history of the Church in Scotland, nothing deeper than mere ecclesiastical squabbles—violent and narrow, and very foolish contentings about matters indifferent. Dr Cunningham of Crieff, to whose pretentious "Church History," we have more than once referred, takes this view. "The struggles," says he, "to which we have referred, were more ecclesiastical than religious, and hence Scottish piety is deeply tinctured with ecclesiasticism. It may, without much liberality, be allowed that Christianity would have survived in our country though Presbyterianism had been destroyed. Christianity is not bound up with any form of church polity. The sternest Presbyterian will at length allow that a bishop may be a Christian man. It was not therefore for Christianity, but merely for Presbyterianism, that our forefathers fought. The religious struggles of our country were entirely about church government and church discipline, and not about the inner truths of our holy faith. It is possible that too great attention to the one may withdraw the mind from the attention which it ought to bestow upon the other. There is some reason to think that this result has been exemplified in Scotland. Scotchmen, certainly, talk much more about church matters than about matters purely spiritual. There is an abundance of ecclesiasticism in our country; there is perhaps a deficit of spiritualism."—(*Church History of Scotland*, vol. ii. p. 589.) Perhaps, take it all in all, the logic of this statement

When the tenth year after the Disruption of 1843 was reached, it seemed to many that a reaction was setting in. The excitement of that period, which told not merely upon the Church specially concerned, but upon all the other Churches around it, was dying away; and the accounts which ministers had to render regarding the work of God in their respective congregations had a painful monotony about them—there were few marked conversions taking place, and there was little of the spirit of prayer. Time wore on, however, and streaks of light began to appear. Tract enterprises were established, and worked with wonderful vigour—laymen, as in the days of the Haldanes, commenced to preach—and quietly, and imperceptibly, a returning animation shewed itself in the Churches, and gave promise of a renewal of their strength. Then the news of Revival reached us from America, and a multiplication of prayer meetings followed. The tidings from Ireland succeeded, and the longing for a blessing became more intense. And at last it did come. Over all the great cities—and over many a country village, and rural parish—the windows of heaven were opened, and an outpouring of the Spirit was vouchsafed, which imparted new life to the people of God, and secured a large ingathering of souls into the spiritual garner. The time of this visitation may be said to have extended from the autumn of 1859 to the spring of 1861. There were particular districts which were stirred before the first of these dates, and we have heard of awakenings that have occurred since the last of them, and some at the present time. But speaking generally, there can be little doubt that before the close of 1859, there was rather a diffused expectation that a blessing would come, than the actual enjoyment of the blessing itself; and there can, we fear, be but as little doubt that, with the

is the most remarkable thing about it. Here, for example, is a syllogism: "A bishop may be a Christian man, *therefore*, it was not for Christianity, but merely for Presbytery that our forefathers fought!" Most people will say, that this is rather a large conclusion from so narrow a premiss; but, supposing we get over that—the formal fallacy in the reasoning—what shall we make of that unacquaintedness with the notorious facts of the case, and that ignorance of human nature in its relations to the Christian life, which have allowed a Scotchman, and a Scottish minister, to see in the various conflicts which have rent the national Church into fragments, nothing *better* than battles about nothing. There was one power moving, more or less purely, in all the great eras of Scottish spiritual history—the spirit of the living God! there was also one great vital principle, which was ever more or less clearly contended for in them all—the honour and authority of Jesus Christ; and, looking at the causes, character, and effects of the moral upheavals which distinguished each, we have little difficulty in rejecting that would-be liberal, but really very shallow philosophy, which sets down the whole to the account of a narrow bigotry making much ado about nothing, and in receiving the deeper and more satisfying explanation, that the periods we have referred to were times of Revival—or seasons of quickened and more earnest life.

wearing away of 1861, there has been a gradual subsidence of the tide, which has not, happily, brought back things to their former state again, but which has, to a great extent, eliminated that element of susceptibility to spiritual impression which formed one of the most precious and important features of the peculiar period which we have defined. It is not possible for us, within our narrowing limits, to follow the course of this remarkable spiritual movement, or give a particular account of its nature and phenomena. But, lest we should expose ourselves to the charge of failing to give it the prominence it deserves, in a sketch of the later religious history of Scotland, we must add to the general statement which we have made about it, something, though brief, of a more specific nature. There are few ministers in Scotland more sound and judicious than Dr Julius Wood of Dumfries. He contributes to the *News of the Churches* for November, a "Sketch of the Remarkable Religious Awakening in the South of Scotland in the Spring of 1861;" and from this paper, trustworthy as we are assured it is in every respect, we cannot do better than extract one or two passages.

The events he describes occurred before his very eyes. He had the fullest opportunity afforded him of investigating into their character. And he has not a doubt that the work was essentially the result of an outpouring of the Holy Ghost. After giving a description of Dumfriesshire, which he says was spiritually one of the darkest districts of the country, he proceeds to tell, in regular order, *first*, what were the precursors of the coming shower; *next*, how the gathering emotions of the people at last found vent; *thirdly*, what were the phenomena exhibited while the excitement continued; and *lastly*, what were the realised fruits or final issues of the whole. His account contains nothing peculiar about it. The same story substantially may be told of fifty other places. And the value of his narrative consists simply in this, that being thus typical in its nature, it may be accepted as an outline sketch of the common features of the work in Scotland generally. "When the revival took place in America," he says, "the attention of God's people, both ministers and members of the Church, was fixed upon it with lively interest. When, subsequently, Ireland was made a partaker of the heavenly blessing, an interest still more intense was awakened. A number of ministers and members of the Churches visited Ireland. When they returned home they told what they had seen and heard. Prayer-meetings became more numerous, and were largely attended. News from America and Ireland were communicated at them. A deep and solemn interest and expectation were excited. Prayer was made to God that he would be pleased to pour out his

Spirit on the towns and congregations of Dumfriesshire. And soon there began to be droppings, as the precursors of a coming shower. That was in the end of 1859 and beginning of 1860—that is, twelve months before the blessing came.” The first extraordinary outburst of feeling occurred in January 1861, in the town of Annan, and took place in connection with the labours of Mr Hammond, a young American, who had come to Scotland as a student, and who was used in a very remarkable way in calling forth such manifestations. From Annan the excitement spread to Dumfries, and Dr Wood tells: “There meetings similar to those in Annan were held, and with similar results. All the ministers, with the exception of the Episcopal minister and the ministers of the Establishment, cordially took part in the work. The largest church in the town was crowded in every part every evening, and other churches had to be opened to receive the multitude who eagerly came together to hear the word of life. A profound impression was made by these crowded meetings, not caused (humanly speaking) by anything that was said; for the truth was not put forward with great intellectual power or eloquence, or in the wisdom of man’s words, but only stated pointedly, with plainness and faithfulness. Many who came from curiosity, and who at first were rather offended at what they saw and heard, had their attention arrested, and were awakened to concern about their souls. The inquiry-meetings became crowded with persons whose very countenances indicated the trouble and anxiety within. . . . Beyond all question there was a great work of the Holy Spirit. Many were convinced of sin, and after a longer or shorter period of distress and anxiety, were enabled to believe in Jesus, and find peace.” In course of time this period of intense excitement came to an end; but like the retiring waters of the Nile, it left wealth and the promise of future fertility behind. “The various classes of sins that were wont to be notoriously prevalent were evidently diminished. It was remarked that there was less of profane swearing on the street and in the work-shops. Drinking diminished throughout the county, and also crimes arising out of it, or usually connected with it. . . . Along with this there was an increased attendance on public worship. Everywhere there was manifested a remarkable desire to hear about Jesus Christ and the way of salvation. And large additions were made to the membership of the churches. The religious awakening has also, as might have been expected, affected the reading habits of the people very considerably. A large number of the light and mischievous weekly and monthly periodicals of the day were read in Dumfriesshire. But the booksellers report that in many instances these have been given

up, and periodicals of a religious and profitable kind taken in their stead. . . . There is, besides, every reason to believe that there has been a great improvement in regard to the observance of family worship. Many who formerly quite neglected that duty now delight to engage in it. And in social meetings for praise, prayer, and reading the Word, there is no difficulty in finding those who are both able and willing to take part in conducting the services. This was not the case aforesaid. But as the heart has been interested, the mouth has been opened, and from plain, uneducated men there are now to be heard appropriate and rich outpourings of the heart in prayer to God." Such is a specimen of the kind of awakenings which, during the last two or three years, have been taking place in Scotland. From it we may judge of the character of the whole movement. That it has been in its essence a spiritual movement, in the Bible sense, we entertain no doubt whatever; and if it has not elevated the tone or increased the power of religion to the extent that we could have wished, the circumstance may be owing to the fact that many, from whom other things might have been hoped, refused to take part in it at all, or that not a few of those who did take part in it, did not do so with all their heart.

In bringing this review to a close, we should like to add a word or two on the present state of religious parties in Scotland, and their prospects. Viewed historically, the respective positions of the three great Presbyterian bodies seem to be the following.—First of all, we see gathered up in the United Presbyterian Church the various sects which, in the past, have been specially distinguished by what they themselves call acts of *progress*, and what their opponents call acts of *innovation*. It traces its direct descent from that section of the Burgher Synod which, about the year 1795, began to see new light on the subject of the relations of Church and State, and since that time the original stream has been twice fed by like-natured tributaries, supplied by the New Light Anti-Burgher, and Relief Synods respectively. The Free Church also is a conglomerate. It is a compound of three elements—the great evangelical party that was formed within the Establishment by such men as Andrew Thomson and Dr Chalmers, the Old Light Burghers, who joined the Church before the Disruption, and who mostly cast in their lot with the protesters of 1843, and the Old Light Anti-Burghers or Original Seceders, who have united with the Free Church since that time. In a body so constituted, it may be supposed that the traditional feeling is still strong. There is no disposition to forsake "the old paths." Knox, Henderson, Erskine, Gillespie, are recognised as the fathers of the Church, not merely chronologically, but

in spirit and character. And, in place of there being any desire manifested to feel after "new light," or kindle new fires, the longing seems rather to be to catch something more of the faith and the earnestness which distinguished earlier and more primitive times. At the same time, with all this strong sympathy with the past, there is associated much of that expansive activity that appeared so conspicuously in the representative man of the leading section of the community, Dr Chalmers. The Free Church (and this may be no less said of her United Presbyterian sister) is intensely a missionary church, her efforts for the evangelisation of the heathen at home being as remarkable as her operations abroad. From these bodies much is to be expected, at once in sustaining and in propagating the gospel in Scotland. They are full of zeal and vigour and activity; and whatever be the condition of the Establishment, the great mass of the Scottish people have every prospect of continuing under the sweep, if not the influence, of evangelical truth.

With regard, however, to the Established Church, it is perhaps not a very easy thing either accurately to define its present position, or to predict, with any assurance, its probable future. But looking at it as a combination of two parties—the old historical Moderates, now in the ascendant, and the remnant of the evangelicals, those of them who either could not see their way out in '43, or had not faith enough to follow in the way that they did see, with such accessions as have joined them since—looking at it as a combination of these two parties, its prospects do not appear either very bright or very hopeful. It is possible that the evangelical party may gather strength again, and at last succeed in eradicating the Erastian element altogether. But at present the tendency is in the opposite direction. It seems to us that, in the Establishment, at this moment, there is a state of things parallel in many respects to that which we noticed at the commencement of this article. The days of the Robertsons and the Blairs are threatening to return. No one can read the more recent accounts of disputed settlements without observing that there is a gradual advance being made towards the adoption of the famous "policy" of these times—which was *to give effect, whatever might be the consequence, to all legal presentations*. Along with this we notice, in some of the prominent ministers of the Establishment, certain proclivities, which strangely remind us of the sentiments occasionally put into the mouths of his clerical contemporaries by Dr Carlyle of Inveresk. Take Principal Tulloch of St Andrews, and Dr Cunningham of Crieff, for example. These gentlemen have written books regarding which there can be but one opinion, that their literary merits

are great. But what is the spirit which runs through their historical reviews? It is what they call a *liberal* spirit. What does that mean? We refer the reader for an answer to the quotation we have already made from Dr Cunningham's "Church History," and to Principal Tulloch's "English Puritanism and its Leaders," and his "Leaders of the Reformation." He will find there that their liberality consists in making admissions which turn our noblest confessors into "martyrs by mistake;" and which eliminate from the grandest movements in our history the elements which give to them their importance in our eyes. Such liberality, which blushes to stickle for Presbytery or any other particular form of church government—which, in the excess of its catholicity, reduces to an infinitesimal number the essential articles of Christianity—and which brands the Puritans and the Covenanters as well-meaning perhaps, but ridiculously narrow-minded—is not the product of the nineteenth century, not the final finding of an advanced and enlightened age. We have heard of it before—long ago—in the speeches of Robertson, the pamphlets of Blair, and the table talk at those convivial clubs, which contained on their roll of membership the names not only of the minister of Inveresk, but of David Hume the philosopher and John Home the poet. It is, we cannot help thinking, a significant thing that now, as then, there should be associated together these two things—an antipopular church policy, and a pseudo-liberality of religious sentiment. Other parallel points might be noticed. In both periods, for instance, a disposition has been manifested to flatter and hang on the skirts of the Church of England. In the eighteenth century also it was counted an unpardonable offence by the Moderates that the Lord High Commissioner invited Whitfield to dinner, and the Cambuslang work was unanimously set down as a piece of folly and fanaticism; while, in the second half of the nineteenth century, we have their descendants as heartily opposing themselves to a greater awakening. But we can pursue the comparison no further. Enough has been said, we daresay, to shew the high probability that there will be in the Established Church a revival of the Moderatism of a by-past age. Sincerely do we trust that this calamity may be averted; for, with so many of the Scottish people still waiting on her ordinances, this would be nothing less than bringing a new blight over a large proportion of the families of the land. But whatever be in the future, this is a hope that we may confidently cherish, that Scotland, with all her religious appliances, will not again go back into that unhappy condition in which she was at the close of the last and the beginning of the present century.

There are two religious bodies in Scotland of which we have

as yet taken no notice. We refer to the Cameronians and the Episcopalians. The former, constituting the Reformed Presbyterian Church, the eldest dissenting denomination in the country, have ever been distinguished by their soundness in the faith and by their somewhat stern steadfastness of adherence to the old paths which their forefathers followed. While regarding this body with profound respect, we trust we shall offend none of the members of it if we add, that we observe with satisfaction the beginning of an agitation, aiming at the removal of certain hedges which have kept it in a state of comparative isolation, and that we entertain the confident expectation that, in a few years, one rent in the garment of Presbyterian unity shall be repaired by their alliance with their nearest blood relations of the Free Church. The condition of the Scottish Episcopal Church is a subject which no one interested in the spiritual prosperity of the people of Scotland can view with indifference. It embraces within its pale the great mass of our northern aristocracy; and it is certainly a question of no light moment to the country generally, What is the character of the religious influence which is made to act upon them? We have not time now to discuss that question, but one thing is only too clear, that a current of pro-papal and anti-evangelical feeling breathes, with greater or less intensity, through the entire community; and although we have in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and elsewhere, congregations representing the Low Church party in England, and presided over by men who would be an honour to any denomination, there is reason to doubt whether they counteract, in any appreciable degree, the unsound teaching and the worldly spirit of the body which arrogates to itself the exclusive title of "the Church" in Scotland.

VI.—*The Protestant Church in Hungary.*

Rapport sur l'Eglise de Hongrie, prononcé devant la Compagnie des Pasteurs de Genève. Par L. FILO, Professeur de Théologie à Pesth. Genève, 1861.

History of the Protestant Church in Hungary, from the beginning of the Reformation to 1850; with Reference also to Transylvania. Translated by Rev. J. CRAIG, D.D., Hamburg. With an Introduction by J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D.D. London, 1854.

It is much to be regretted that there should be so little fraternal intercourse and exchange of active sympathy between the various sections into which the Protestant Church has been broken up, by merely geographical or political causes. We are

too apt to let go our hold of the grand ennobling truth of the church's unity in Christ her Head, that truth which is the grave of all discord; the well-spring of peace, and love, and brotherly communion. This can be the only explanation of the strange anomaly, that those whose affection to the church's Head is real and unquestionable, are frequently so indifferent to the welfare, nay, even to the existence, of many of her members. The disadvantages which this isolation produces are too obvious to be mentioned. Different churches stand in need of mutual instruction, mutual correction, mutual encouragement, no less than different individuals. There is none so pre-eminently exalted, so faultlessly perfect, but it may learn something from every other. It is by the reciprocal action of the different members, by word and by example, "provoking one another to love and to good works," that the whole church "grows up into him *in all things*, which is the Head, even Christ, from whom the whole body *fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body, unto the edifying of itself in love.*"

These remarks have been suggested by the total absence of communication between the Presbyterian Churches of our land and the Church of Hungary, so closely akin alike in doctrinal confession and in ecclesiastical organisation. Many of our readers will, we suspect, hear with surprise of the existence in Hungary of a Protestant community, not only far more numerous than any of the Scottish Churches, but actually *outnumbering by a million the whole population of Scotland*. The political struggles of the Hungarians are well known, and heartily sympathised in, by every one worthy to bear the English name. But the past history of the Hungarian Church, of its early struggles for existence, of the persecutions it has been called on to endure, of the noble conflicts it has waged, even in our own age, in behalf of liberty of conscience and the great principle of spiritual independence, is, we have reason to fear, but little known in this country. It will, we trust, be interesting to many of our readers if, in the present paper, we direct their attention to some of the salient points of this history, passing more slightly over its earlier periods, with which our readers may be presumed to be tolerably familiar, and dwelling with somewhat greater fulness on the struggles of recent years, especially on the great conflict between the church and the government, excited by the promulgation of the imperial patent of 1st September 1859. We shall also take occasion to give our readers some idea of the permanent organisation and present condition of the twin churches of Hungary.

It is not until the end of the ninth century that the Magyars,

emerging probably from the barren plains of ancient Scythia, on the lower course of the Volga, and passing the Carpathian range, make their first appearance on the stage of European history. What precise affinity they may have borne to those Hunnish hordes of Attila which, more than four centuries earlier, swept like a desolating locust-swarm over the wide plains of the Danube, and carried panic and dismay into the heart of the old decaying empire, is a question which we leave the antiquarians of Hungary to determine. Their language, which belongs to the great Oural family, comprehending the Finnish, the Tartar, the Samoid, the Mogul, and the Turkish, would seem to indicate the plains of Central Asia as the earlier home of the race. It was not until the beginning of the eleventh century that these fierce warriors began to yield to the civilising power of Christianity. The general introduction of the Christian religion took place during the reign of Stephen, the greatest prince of the Arpad line, and the first who bore the royal title in Hungary. To this prince, a sort of Hungarian Alfred, though unmarked by the mildness, magnanimity, and love of literature, which distinguished the great Saxon king, is to be traced the origin of most of those social and political institutions which survived down to the late revolution. The ecclesiastical organisation of the country, the division into counties, the establishment of municipal institutions, and last, not least, the formation of a great council of state, the origin of the present Hungarian Diet, are the chief claims of Stephen to the gratitude of his countrymen. The chief blot upon his well-earned fame, is due to the cruelty and violence which he displayed in the effort to force Christianity upon his subjects, traits of character, however, which, so far from exciting disapproval at Rome, obtained for him the honour of canonisation. The reign of Andrew II. is memorable as the era from which the constitutional freedom of the Hungarian nation is to be dated. Urged by the representations of his nobles, the king consented to confirm the privileges of his subjects by a new charter, known as the Golden Bull. This charter, which deserves to be styled the Magna Charta of Hungary (though its benefits, unlike those of the English charter, were for many centuries confined to the nobles), was granted in 1222, only seven years later than the great charter of English liberty. All its articles, with the exception of an extraordinary one, which guaranteed to the subjects the right of rebellion, have been sworn to by every subsequent king of Hungary at the time of his coronation. At this time, Hungary stood decidedly above the other states of Europe in regard to social institutions, and under the reign of Louis the Great (1342-1382), who added to his hereditary dignities the crown of Poland, and reduced the Prince of Moldavia to the con-

dition of a tributary, Hungary exerted a preponderating influence among the European powers. But she was destined to play a yet more important part in the history of European civilisation, under the protectorate of John Hunyadi, a hero whose memory is still cherished in the hearts of the Hungarian people, with a veneration similar to that which Scotsmen feel towards the name of Wallace. The heroic defence of Belgrade against the Turks under Mahomet II., is one of the brightest spots in the Hungarian annals, and entitles Hunyadi to the honour of having saved the Christian nations of Europe from falling under the desolating sway of Islam. The rescue of Belgrade (1456) deserves to be ranked among the turning-points of European history, no less than the victory of Charles Martel over the Saracens at Tours, which turned the tide of Moorish conquest in the West. Under the reign of Matthew Hunyadi, the son of John, better known under the maternal surname of Corvinus, unquestionably the greatest prince who ever wore the crown of St Stephen, Hungary attained its highest pitch of grandeur. Not content with compelling the Emperor to renounce Hungary, he brought Austria itself under his sway. He reorganised the military system of the country, and again repulsed the Turks. But he was no less devoted to the arts of peace than to those of war. He founded the University of Buda, and collected there a valuable library of 50,000 volumes. The court of Corvinus was one of the most brilliant and refined in Europe, and his literary enthusiasm and regal munificence drew around him men of letters from every quarter.

Even before the time of Matthew, the doctrines of the Hussites had taken root to a considerable extent in the soil of Hungary. But the persecuting zeal of the Romish Church was ever on the watch for every symptom of heresy; and, in 1444, King Wladislaus had concluded a contract with the Cardinal Julien, that the Hussites, wherever found, *should be completely destroyed*; but the disastrous battle of Varna, in which the king lost his life, had providentially prevented the execution of this bloody decree. Matthew Corvinus was unfortunately induced, by the instigation of the Romish clergy and the Pope, to engage in a Bohemian war, with the avowed design of suppressing the Hussite doctrine. But he subsequently repented of his error, and recalled to their own country those of the Hussites whom he had banished, two years before, to Moravia. Thus, by the gradual leavening of the minds of the people with doctrines fundamentally opposed to the superstitions of Rome, was Hungary prepared for the reception of that glorious light which burst upon Europe in the commencement of the sixteenth century.

• In Hungary the Reformation was, from the first, received

with enthusiasm. The Hungarians had, in virtue of their national character, as well as of their political institutions, a strong tendency in the direction of reform. Naturally hostile to every species of servitude, they have always borne with aversion the yoke of Rome. In fact, the papal hierarchy has never weighed so heavily upon them as upon the other nations of Europe; and even the most powerful popes, such as Gregory VII. and Innocent III., exercised over them but a very limited authority. It was natural, therefore, that they should hail with joy the Christian liberty which the Reformation offered to the world.

The political institutions of the Hungarians, which guaranteed them against the encroachments of despotism, contributed in various respects to the progress of the Reformation. The combined power of Rome and Vienna has repeatedly been put forth for the extermination of Protestantism in Hungary; but, thanks to her constitution and her political liberty, it has always been preserved, even when on the very brink of destruction. The history of the church in Hungary has, throughout, been intimately connected with that of the constitution; for, during the last three centuries, the destiny of the one has been bound up with that of the other. This fact must always be taken into account in attempting to form a true judgment on the actual state of the church.

The diet of 1525, under the imbecile reign of Louis II., had been convoked for the purpose of deliberating upon the means of saving Hungary from the threatened invasion of the Turks. The Romish clergy, without troubling themselves about the Turks, eagerly seized the opportunity for effecting the annihilation of the Protestants. Profiting by the trouble and embarrassment in which the diet was involved, they procured the enactment of a decree for the extirpation of Protestantism, couched in these horrible terms:—"That all Lutherans, wherever they are found, whether by ecclesiastics or laymen, may be seized and *burnt*." But the sequel of events sufficiently proved that such a law was in complete opposition to the national character, for it was only put in force against three Protestants, and it completely fell to the ground long before it was formally abolished. As regards the Turks, Hungary sank under their arms in the disastrous battle of Mohacs, in 1526. The king, the cardinal legate, seven bishops, twenty-eight princes, five hundred nobles, and twenty thousand warriors, lay stretched on the fatal plain. But the curse was changed into a blessing. The most powerful and malignant foes of the rising church were among the slain, and from that day the Reformation began to extend itself with greater energy and success than ever, as if God had designed thereby to compensate the nation for the multiplied disasters of that fearful war.

There is a notable saying of Stephen Bathory, Prince of Transylvania, to the effect that "God has reserved exclusively to himself three things,—to create something out of nothing—to know the future,—and to *rule over conscience*." The Hungarians have always shewn themselves equally indisposed to usurp the latter prerogative for themselves, or to submit to such usurpation on the part of others. They have always been tolerant in religion. Superstition and fanaticism have never succeeded in effecting, even among the lower classes, any considerable conquests; and we are convinced that the Protestants of this country would never have had to suffer persecution at the hands of their Roman Catholic fellow-citizens had these not been instigated by the fanaticism of the clergy and the blind infatuation of the sovereigns and of their governments. We may even affirm, without any exaggeration, that the whole Hungarian nation would have become Protestant, had not Vienna and Rome combined to produce a counter-reformation.

Protestantism made great progress in the country especially under the reign of Maximilian I., king of Hungary (at the same time Emperor under the name of Maximilian II.), a prince devoted by conviction to the cause of the Reformation, but too deficient in energy to depart materially from the traditional policy of the imperial house. At the end of the sixteenth century, as is related, after his fashion, by a Roman Catholic historian, "all the Hungarian aristocracy, with the exception of three families, and nearly all the middle-class nobility, were plunged in the abyss of heresy." And yet no express decree sanctioning the free profession of the Protestant religion had as yet been enacted by the State. The reason for this was simply that such freedom of judgment in religion found itself already sanctioned by usage, and by the practice of a long series of years. But in Hungary a usage which possesses such a sanction is considered as law by the tribunal of public opinion, and enjoys usually the force of law. It may be added, that the Hungarians judged it superfluous to pass an express and special law granting men permission to exercise a liberty of which no legislation has, in their view, a right to deprive them. Hence all the laws which the Diets have promulgated with reference to religious liberty, have been passed rather for the purpose of securing the church against the disturbers of her peace, than of conceding to her as a boon what is guaranteed to her by laws natural and divine as an inalienable right.

The Reformation, on its first entrance into Hungary, received its peculiar form from the doctrines of Wittenberg. But from the time when the doctrines of the Zurich, and still more of the Genevese Reformers, became known, the majority of the Hungarians renounced the peculiarities of the Lutheran Reforma-

tion and adopted those of Calvin, particularly with reference to the Eucharist and the Presbyterian form of church government. The Germans and Sclavonians of Hungary, however, owing to their national connection with the Saxons and Bohemians, adhered to the Lutheran Reformation. The separation of the two Protestant churches took place in 1567, at the Synod of Debreczin, in which the *Second Helvetic Confession* and the *Heidelberg Catechism* were declared *symbolical books*; the Lutherans preserved the *Confession of Augsburg* as their standard. Hence in legal documents the Calvinists, or members of the Reformed Church, are styled *Helveticæ Confessionis addicti*, and the Lutherans *Augustanæ Confessionis addicti*. This division was not, however, injurious to the cause of Protestantism; some disputes at first ensued, it is true, but Lutherans and Calvinists were always harmonious and united as often as the cause of Protestantism was in danger. They fought under the same banners in defence of their religious liberty, and the force of persecution drew them still closer together, when, bound to one another like slaves, they were transported in the same galley to Naples, martyrs to their common faith. This close connection of the Lutherans with the Reformed is secured by the arrangements of the State, for the same civil laws determine in the same manner the relations of both with the Church of Rome and with the civil government.

The Church has never claimed from the State any other aid than that necessary for repelling the attacks of her enemies and persecutors. She has always sought to sustain herself and to provide for all her necessary expenses by her own unaided efforts. Even when the Protestants formed the majority of the population, they never interfered with the domains of the clergy, a fact very remarkable, and, indeed, almost unexampled, in the history of the Reformation. It at least speaks highly for the disinterestedness of the founders of the Protestant Church. The motive which induced the Church to decline receiving financial aid from the State, was undoubtedly her anxiety to preserve, unimpaired, her entire independence and complete autonomy. And, in fact, since the very commencement of the church's organisation, the civil government has exercised no active influence in her affairs. The only right which the State possessed with relation to the Church and her schools, was the simple right of supreme surveillance (*jus supremæ inspectionis*). This autonomy, or right to frame and execute her own laws, is the primary condition and *sine qua non* of the existence of the Hungarian Church; with her it is a question of life and death. Every time that this autonomy has been attacked, the Protestants of Hungary have felt themselves obliged to put forth the

same energy of resistance as when exposed to the most cruel persecutions.

The Church in Hungary has suffered many persecutions. These may be divided into two categories: the one class had directly for their end the extirpation of the church; the other, the destruction of her autonomy; and the success of the latter would have had for its inevitable result the church's speedy annihilation. But, thanks to the protecting care of divine Providence, the church has hitherto ridden safe and triumphant above the surging waves of persecution.

The first general persecution by which the church of Hungary was assailed, arose in the commencement of the seventeenth century. This was the epoch when a reactionary movement against Protestantism began to make itself felt throughout Europe. The Emperor Rudolph II., having entered into a close alliance with Pope Clement VIII., declared, without reserve, his fixed purpose of extirpating Protestantism from his dominions. Rudolph's nature was suspicious, relentless, and tyrannical, like that of his kinsman, Philip of Spain, and the education which he had received at the Spanish court, had infused into his mind those principles of blind submission to the Church of Rome, which rendered him a ready instrument in the hands of priests and Jesuits. He wished, at the same time, to annihilate the political constitution of Hungary. To attain this double end, he deluged the country with troops. Their commanders, Joachim Barbian, Count of Belgiojoso, and Georges Basta, persecuted, with relentless severity, all who dared to remain faithful to their constitutional rights and their Protestant faith. The princes of the Reformed Church were plundered, many of the Protestant ministers were burnt, and some of them even flayed alive. It was the express intention of the Emperor and the Pope, as avowed by the Roman General Barbiano, to "cut off with the sword every grown person in Hungary and Transylvania who refused to join the Roman Catholic Church." But Protestantism was destined to find a heroic defender in the person of Stephen Bocskai, afterwards Prince of Transylvania, who gathered the Protestants under his banner, and repulsed the imperial troops from the Hungarian frontier, pressing forward almost to the walls of Vienna. Rudolph was obliged to enter into negotiations for peace, and the result was the conclusion, in the year 1606, of the treaty known as the *Pacification of Vienna*. By this treaty the Protestants recovered that religious liberty and independence which they had enjoyed for nearly a century; the political constitution previously in force was restored to the country, and severe punishments were decreed against all who should presume to interfere with citizens in the exercise of their legal rights. This treaty

was inserted, two years later, by the *Diet of 1608*, in the legal Code, being placed among the articles of the charter—that is to say, among the fundamental laws of the kingdom of Hungary (*articuli inaugurales*). All subsequent kings of Hungary were thus bound, at the time of their coronation, to sanction by oath the law which guarantees to the Protestants full and entire religious liberty.

Ferdinand II., whose zeal for the Roman Catholic religion is well known, sought to annihilate Protestantism, not merely in his hereditary provinces, but also in Hungary. He succeeded, by means of his dragonnades, and by the aid of the Jesuits, in bringing back the majority of the Hungarians to the Romish creed; but to extirpate Protestantism was impossible. The persecution becoming insupportable, Gabriel Bethlen, prince of Transylvania, took arms along with those who had remained faithful to the Protestant cause, and they soon succeeded in obtaining from the king, by the *treaty of Nikolsburg*, in 1627, a recognition of the right of openly professing the Protestant religion, in conformity with the treaty concluded at Vienna in 1606, and to the ratification of that treaty by the Diet of 1608.

Under Ferdinand IV. the persecutions were renewed with redoubled violence. The Protestants were deprived of their churches and schools, and the pastors were banished from their congregations. It was Georges II. Rakoczi, prince of Transylvania, who now came to the aid of the persecuted. After a short but bloody campaign, in which the imperial troops had again the worst of the contest, the war was brought to a termination by the famous *Peace of Linz*, concluded in 1645. By this treaty the king, in his own name and that of his successors, confirmed the treaty of Vienna, securing to the Protestants the most complete freedom of conscience, and solemnly promising that full compensation should be made for all the injuries which had been inflicted. But as, naturally enough, their reliance upon royal promises had by this time been considerably shaken, the Protestants exacted some guarantee; and, accordingly, the states of Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia guaranteed this treaty of Linz, which was introduced two years after, by the *Diet of 1647*, into the number of the *inaugural laws*.

Despite these treaties, the church and nation were now approaching a dark and gloomy period—indeed, we may well say, the darkest in their whole history, under the reign of Leopold I. During the space of ten years, from 1670 to 1681, the political rights and religious liberty of the people were utterly trampled under foot; and, as might have been expected, the reign of Leopold was pregnant with revolutions. Tribunals were erected at the cities of Kassa and Eperjes, with the design of exterminating Protestants and patriots alike. The imperial commissary

charged with this office, General Karaffa, acquitted himself of his task like a pitiless executioner. Not a few Hungarians, noble alike by character and by birth, who had no other crime than that of being Protestants and men of substance, lost their lives on the scaffold. A considerable number of Protestants sought refuge in the Turkish territory, and enjoyed, under the protection of Moslem rule, a liberty and toleration which should have filled with shame the professedly Christian government of the country which they had just quitted. But this was not enough. All the Protestant pastors and schoolmasters, under the false accusation of having taken part in a conspiracy, were summoned to appear at Presburg before a tribunal composed of Roman Catholic prelates; and as they refused to abjure their faith, they were condemned to die. This terrible sentence was not indeed carried into execution, for, in fact, it was impossible to convict them of any political offence; several, however, were transported to Naples, and sold as galley-slaves at the rate of a ducat per head. These are to be reckoned among the Hungarian Church's most illustrious confessors. Their liberator was the famous Dutch Admiral, De Ruyter.

Such horrible atrocities made a revolution inevitable. Emeric Toekoeli and Francis II. Rakoczi took arms in defence of their country and their religion. By their heroic efforts the country was saved. After ten years of oppression, the former constitution was re-established in all its ancient force. As for the church, she had still much to suffer, both under the reign of the Emperor Charles VI. (who bore also the title of Charles III., as king of Hungary), and under that of his daughter, Maria Theresa. Pity it is that the great name of the Empress-Queen should be stained by acts of cruelty and oppression! Pity that the memory of that never-to-be-forgotten scene, when she stood, a suppliant for aid, before the estates of the realm, holding her infant son in her arms, and "the enthusiasm of Hungary broke forth into that war-cry which soon resounded through Europe, 'Let us die for our King, Maria Theresa,'" should so soon have faded from her heart! But this is not the only time that the Hungarian nation has saved the dynasty of Hapsburg from impending ruin, and been repaid with the vilest ingratitude. But Hungary can scarcely look for so high and romantic a virtue as gratitude from a House which has apparently forgotten the existence even of such commonplace virtues as justice and veracity.

Joseph II. at length entered upon the pathway of reform; but his reforms were unhappily dictated by a spirit of restless innovation, and he shewed himself utterly destitute of respect for constitutional rights and old-established institutions. By his *Edict of Toleration*, he certainly alleviated greatly the

yoke which weighed upon his Protestant subjects ; he did not, however, restore them to the full enjoyment of their legal rights. This glory was reserved for the Diet of 1790-1791, under the reign of Leopold II. The complete re-establishment of the ancient constitution reinstated the Hungarians in the possession of that religious liberty which their ancestors had so often won at the price of their blood ; and this constitution henceforth remained a sure and solid basis for the civil and religious liberties of the nation.

In this same Diet of 1790-1791, the lay adherents of the Roman Catholic Church contended strenuously in behalf of the Protestants against the intolerance of their own clergy. It was owing to their support that the Protestants were enabled to secure the adoption by the Diet of the 26th article, in which the liberty and autonomy of the church were for ever guaranteed, on the basis of the previous treaties.

Thus, then, the *Treaties of Pacification*, concluded at Vienna (1606) and at Linz (1645), with the *Inaugural Laws* of the years 1608 and 1647, by which these treaties were ratified in the name of the nation, and, finally, the *26th Article of the Diet of 1790-1791*, constitute the immoveable foundations of the religious liberty and ecclesiastical autonomy of the Hungarian Protestants, just as the treaty of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, guarantees religious liberty to the Protestants of Germany.

Under the shield of these laws and treaties, the church continued tranquil and flourishing down to the year 1849. During the years which have elapsed since the suppression of the memorable revolution of 1848, she has been called to submit to a new and searching ordeal.

Before proceeding to lay before our readers some account of the recent contest between the Hungarian Church and the Austrian government, occasioned by the publication of the *Imperial Patent of 1st September 1859*, we shall state a few facts of a statistical nature relative to the Protestant Church in Hungary, and indicate briefly the nature of its government, and the mode in which its legislative and administrative functions are exercised.

The Protestant Church in Hungary numbers nearly four millions of souls, of whom two-thirds belong to the Reformed or Calvinistic communion, and the remaining third to the Lutheran. It is a curious fact, and one which might give rise to some ingenious speculation, that the members of the Reformed Church, leaving out of account a small sprinkling of Germans, who do not exceed from 10,000 to 15,000, belong exclusively to the Magyar race ; while the Lutheran Church is composed, in nearly equal proportions, of Magyars, Germans, and Sclavonians of the Slovak race.

The constitution of both these Churches is *synodal-representative*, and their administration *Presbyterian*.

Each Church is divided into four *superintendencies* (superintendencias), the largest and most important of which, in the Reformed Church, is that of *Debreczin*, more correctly designated as *the superintendency beyond the Theiss*; it comprehends nearly half the population of the Reformed Church. *The superintendency on this side the Danube*, which includes the city of Pesth, numbers 243 separate congregations (communantes-mères), and a population of 310,000 souls. The size of these congregations varies exceedingly, some of those in the large cities numbering no fewer than 20,000, while places of worship are not unfrequently found capable of accommodating at one time as many as 8000 people. Each superintendency is again divided into several *seniorates*, each of which contains a number of separate congregations.

Each of these different corporations, viz., the superintendencies, the seniorates, and the congregations, has its own *Council*, or *Representative Assembly*, which exercises the administrative and judicial power within its own province. The presidents are charged with the executive power, but are responsible for the manner of its exercise to the assembly over which they preside. Each corporation, and each assembly or ecclesiastical court, has properly two presidents, equal in rank and authority. The one of these is a minister, the other a layman. This double presidency, however removed from the practice of other Protestant Churches, has, nevertheless, the advantage of preventing an undue preponderance either of the lay or of the clerical element in the assemblies.

In each congregation, the governing assembly is composed of at least *twelve lay presbyters or elders*, and its presidents are the local *pastor* and a presbyter who bears the title of *lay curator*. At the head of the seniorate stands the *senior*, one of the pastors of the seniorate, and the *curator coadjutor*, who is a layman. The presidents of the superintendency are the *superintendent*, who is a pastor, and the *high curator* or *high inspector*, who is a layman. The assemblies of the superintendencies, as well as those of the seniorates, are composed of equal proportions of clergymen and laymen, all of whom are representatives of congregations.

The ecclesiastical code by which the affairs of the church are regulated is made up of two distinct classes of regulations, the one termed *canons*, the other *statutes*. Those of the first class are binding throughout the whole church, those of the second only within the limits of the particular corporation by which they have been passed. The *canons* are decrees of the General Synod, which exercises the supreme legislative power,

and which is composed of representatives from the four superintendencies, half of these being lay, and half clerical, and which, like all the other assemblies, is provided with a double presidency. All those matters which concern the interests of the church as a whole, and not merely some of its separate portions, must be discussed and decided by the General Synod. This Court cannot assemble without the express sanction of the sovereign, and its decrees do not obtain the force of law and take their place among the *canons* of the church until they have received his majesty's approval. This right of the sovereign does not however, materially limit the strict autonomy of the church. The sovereign has, in fact, simply the right of granting or refusing his approval; but to modify in any measure the resolutions of the general synod, to take the initiative in framing any of its decrees, or to devise a new ecclesiastical constitution, are things entirely beyond the range of his legitimate authority. As soon as the decrees of the general synod have obtained the sovereign's approval, they acquire the full force of law, as is declared by the 26th article of the Diet of 1791, in the following terms:—" *Canones, in quorum actuali usu consistunt, nec per Regias Resolutiones, nec per Dicasterialia mandata alterari posse.*"

The last general synod was held in 1792 by the Reformed Church at Buda, and by the Lutherans at Pesth. As its decrees have never received the royal approval to this day, the church is obliged for the present to abide by its ancient canons, though these, as is natural, fail in many respects to meet the exigencies of the present hour. Even the decrees of 1792 are long since out of date, and the church no longer desires their enrolment among the canons. The great object of the church's desire is the liberty to convene a new general synod.

The Hungarian Church in its totality being thus a corporation possessing the most complete autonomy, the integral parts of the organism partake, as might be expected, of the same privilege. Thus, each congregation, each seniorate, and each superintendency has full autonomy in the management of its own peculiar concerns, limited, of course, to some extent by the general canons and the necessary subordination to a higher ecclesiastical tribunal. The congregations are subordinated to the authority of the seniorate; the seniorates to that of the superintendency; and the superintendencies to that of the general synod. But this dependence on a superior authority cannot be said to interfere with the autonomy of the separate parts, for the members of the superior bodies are, so to speak, but emanations from the inferior bodies, called into being in the exercise of that elective right through which every member

has the power of contributing to the general progress and prosperity of the Church.

It is provided by the *leges inaugurales*, that the State has no right to exercise any positive influence on the administration of the Church. The supreme surveillance which belongs to it comprehends only the right of interfering to prevent the church from taking any step by which the political interests of the state are compromised. Thus the Hungarian Church possesses an absolute independence of the State in all its properly ecclesiastical activities, that is to say, within the limits beyond which religion and the church should never seek to pass. Yet, strange to say, the disestablished Churches in Scotland have been branded as fanatical for claiming for themselves that independence of the civil tribunals, which even the Church of Hungary possesses by her very constitution. And the failure on the part of our civil authorities to recognise the simple principle of the independence of the Christian Church in spiritual matters has been attended by results which, however they have been overruled by God for the advancement of His cause, can never be sufficiently deplored by every true lover of religious liberty.

The decisions of the *assembly of superintendency*, based upon the *canons*, are binding upon all the seniorates and congregations represented in that assembly; its decisions are termed *statutes*.

There still remains one point requiring explanation, the nature, namely, of the relations subsisting between the *church* and the *schools*. The same fundamental law which proclaims the liberty of the church, declares also that it possesses a complete and absolute autonomy with regard to the regulation of its schools, whether upper or lower, scientific or elementary. To the church belongs the right of directing these schools, of fixing the system and mode of instruction, of electing the professors and schoolmasters, and of determining their number and the amount of salary they are to receive. According to law and ancient usage, the only right which the State possesses with reference to these schools is that of a general surveillance, with the view of preventing anything in the teaching which may have a prejudicial bearing upon its own political interests. The professors are nominated by the ecclesiastical corporation which directs and maintains the school to which they are attached. The pastors are also elected by those members of the congregations who contribute to their support; and to the *assembly of superintendency* belongs the right of confirming or annulling these nominations: the only right which the civil government possesses in the matter, is simply to be *informed* as to the result of the elections.

So complete and unrestricted is the liberty which is guaranteed by law to the Hungarian Church,—a liberty, it will be seen, as unrestricted as that which the *Westminster Confession* asserts as the right of every Christian Church. It must not, however, be forgotten, that the Hungarian Church receives no pecuniary aid whatever from the State. All its congregations and all its schools are maintained exclusively by the church itself, by means of the voluntary contributions of its members.

The first attack made by the civil government on the rights of the Protestant Church, after the memorable revolution of 1848, was by a ministerial ordinance published in 1849, regarding the organisation of the schools. The government wished to establish a system of instruction borrowed from the Prussian. The *only* difference between the two systems consists in this, that if the Prussian system guarantees the freedom of teaching, the Austrian system utterly subverts it. It is not to be denied that the latter comprehends many good provisions fitted to elevate the standard of public instruction, and deserving the approbation of all enlightened men; but, on the other hand, it contains not a few which are utterly impracticable in Hungary. It is an error to suppose that institutions which are found to be good for one nation must necessarily be good for every other; they must always be adapted to the particular exigencies and individual character of each nation; and every system which aims at crushing the individualities of races, and obliterating all national characteristics, must be pronounced alike impracticable and unjust. The great ambition of the Vienna government, however, is that Austria should occupy the first rank among German powers; and as the German element within her dominions is not of itself sufficiently strong to enable her to secure this pre-eminence, she feels that her object can only be attained by Germanising her non-German populations. But she has already, we should imagine, had sufficient proof of the futility of her efforts to force a multitude of diverse elements into a compact and uniform whole, and to obliterate those natural distinctions of race which are the work of God. The system of education which the government attempted to introduce into Hungary was conceived on the principle of that Germanising policy which Austria has invariably pursued. But the Vienna government will assuredly find, as it has already found to its cost, that in undertaking to Germanise the Magyars, it has attempted a task beyond the strength even of the Austrian Kaiser and his Jesuit camarilla, aided though they be by the practised astuteness of M. Von Schmerling, and the dogged resolution of Count Rechberg.

But there was another feature of the new system which

obliged the church to view it with the strongest dissatisfaction, viz., the entire abrogation of that influence over the schools which she had formerly enjoyed. The schools were to be henceforth under the exclusive supervision of the civil authorities, though the government contributed nothing to their support in return for the power thus assumed. The government passed a decree, that every school not organised in accordance with the ministerial ordinance should be closed, or at least deprived of all those rights which public schools enjoy. It ordained likewise, with regard to the organisation of the schools, that the lower gymnasia should henceforth have six professors, and the upper gymnasia, composed of eight classes, twelve professors,—that certain sciences should be taught exclusively in German, the course of education being so arranged, that after the first few years of study had been passed, the instruction should thenceforth be communicated entirely in German. From very intelligible motives, the teachers were strictly prohibited from giving instruction in the national history, rich as it is in the spirit-stirring memories of ancient heroism, and in appalling records of the wrongs and iniquities of Hapsburg domination. They were also required to make use only of manuals edited under the care of the ministry at Vienna, or at least approved by it, and composed, for the most part, by priests or monks.

The Hungarian Church had never failed to devote much of her care and attention to the work of public instruction; and the consequence was, that her schools were always much more efficiently conducted than those under the care of the Romish Church. Even during the last ten years, notwithstanding the difficulties with which she has had to contend, she has exerted herself to the utmost to prevent her schools from falling behind the others; and has striven to bring them up in all respects to the exigencies of the age. She asserted her rights with regard to her schools, promising that she would herself organise them in such a manner that all the just requirements of the State should be fully satisfied. She declared that it was impossible for her to equip all the schools with so large a staff of professors as the ministerial ordinance required, but promised that she would take care to provide for the teaching of all the sciences included in the new and more extended programme of instruction. But it was in vain that she appealed to her legal rights. The government maintained its ordinance with inflexible determination. And thus the new ordinance, far from bettering the condition of the schools, fell upon them like a thunderbolt; for all those which, in consequence of the insufficiency of their pecuniary resources, were not in a position to satisfy the ministerial requirements, or which refused

to submit to the direction of the government, were closed, or at least deprived of the privileges of public schools. In this painful emergency, in order to escape being entirely deprived of her public schools, the church consented to organise some of her schools in accordance with the ministerial ordinance, consoling herself with the prospect of returning, as soon as circumstances admitted, to her rightful position. The zeal with which the church asserted her claim to autonomy in this matter, proceeded from a sincere conviction that her rights were materially infringed by the proceedings of the ministry, and not from any factious spirit of opposition to the Austrian government, as is abundantly proved by the following fact.

In 1848, while the revolutionary government was in power, Baron Eötvös, Minister of Public Instruction and of Worship, proposed to the Hungarian Church that she should make over all her schools to the State, the government being ready, on this condition, to charge itself with the support of all the professors and regents of the schools, and even of all the pastors of the church. This project was submitted to the church at that auspicious epoch when the new constitution had just been established, and by a government which amply merited the nation's confidence; nevertheless, the answer which both sections of the Protestant Church made to the proposal was sufficiently decided: "We will not, and cannot, part with our rights upon any terms." And, accordingly, the church remained in undisturbed possession of her schools. Could she, then, be expected to shew herself less faithful to her rights and duties in dealing with a government, none of whose principles and tendencies meet with the slightest sympathy, whether on the part of the church or of the nation—a government which has subsequently shewn itself so jealous and illiberal, as actually to proscribe the reading of Cicero and Demosthenes in the public schools?

But the Hungarian Church had yet to submit to another, and a much more trying, ordeal. Baron Haynau, commander-in-chief in Hungary, and invested with unlimited authority, published, in 1850, an ordinance which suspended the entire constitution of the church. What, it may be asked, was the motive for such an ordinance? There were, at the time, not a few who sought to justify it,—a circumstance which cannot greatly astonish us; for unhappily there is no kind of tyranny, however cruel and iniquitous, which has not found its defenders. It was said that, in consequence of the revolution of 1848, Hungary had forfeited all her constitutional rights, civil as well as ecclesiastical. This assertion rests on no better foundation than the right of the stronger,—a miserable

justification for violence and oppression, a principle whose application would speedily lead to the utter subversion of society.

We are certainly no partizans of revolution, whether by conviction or inclination, and are fully sensible of the miseries which are inseparable from every violent subversion of existing institutions. That must be a great blessing indeed which is valuable enough to be purchased by the sacrifice of peace; and it is certainly much to be desired that the progress of humanity and the necessary improvement of all human institutions could always be effected by a succession of peaceful developments, unbroken by violent and convulsive struggles. But we believe that the Hungarian revolution of the year 1848 is one of those revolutions which will sooner or later find their justification before the tribunal of history. And besides, no pretext can justify oppression, no excuse can be made for the infringement of inalienable rights. The ruler who has succeeded in quelling a revolution has certainly the right of punishing the guilty; but so to stretch the exercise of this right as to involve an innocent posterity in the punishment, by abolishing the constitutional rights of the State, is to commit a flagrant injustice, which is all the more apparent, inasmuch as those sovereigns who combat revolution profess to do so in the interest of legitimacy, whereas legitimacy has always a double object, the sovereign and the state itself. Besides, the Hungarian Church had taken no part in the revolution. Why, then, ought she, in consequence of the revolution, to be deprived of her rights? The assemblies of the church never occupied themselves with the discussion of political affairs, and the minutes of their meetings will be ransacked in vain for a single decision which trenches on the political domain. The government has never once had occasion to complain of such unwarranted interference on the church's part.

What, then, could have prompted the ordinance of Baron Haynau? Simply that dread of every species of liberty which is natural to all despotic governments. The autonomy of the church did not accord with the absolute governmental system established in Austria, and therefore it must be annihilated.

The commandant Haynau interdicted the public ecclesiastical assemblies. He replaced them by conferences, composed, not of representatives of the church, but of reliable persons chosen by the superintendent. He abolished the lay presidency, and invested the ecclesiastical presidents, viz., the superintendents, the seniors, and the pastors, with an authority subordinate only to the civil government. It is a circumstance highly honourable to the character of the Reformed Church, that it was impossible for the government to find

within its pale a single pastor, senior, or superintendent who could be induced to accept or exercise an authority so prejudicial to the interests of the church. As regards the Lutheran Church, Baron Haynau deprived all the superintendents of their offices, and appointed in their place administrators paid by government; and it is painful to have to relate that several pastors of that church were found ready to accept this nomination. Although the Reformed Church was spared a humiliation so extreme, the situation in which it now found itself placed was a sufficiently distressing one; for, as the management of the entire business of the church devolves upon the representative assemblies, and their meetings were strictly interdicted, the progress of the church was for the time all but suspended, but the protecting care of divine providence preserved her through the anxieties of this gloomy period.

Since that time the church has repeatedly demanded the restoration of her just rights, but always in vain. In the most urgent yet respectful manner she has supplicated the Emperor, by the voice of her delegates, to reinstate her in her legal position: but the answer, when given, has always been a refusal. Sometimes it has even happened that her requests have remained unanswered, and that her deputies have not even been received. When the Emperor visited Hungary in 1854, a very numerous Protestant deputation, composed of persons of high distinction, appeared before him for the purpose of tendering their homage and of urging the request which had already been preferred so often to no purpose. The reply which they received was in the following terms:—"His Majesty will communicate your request to his ministry, and assures you of his imperial favour." This was very shortly after the famous concordat between Vienna and Rome, by which Francis Joseph surrendered to the Pope the most essential liberties of the church, had been concluded. Hungary has learnt by this time how much value is to be attached to imperial protestations.

The position into which the country was thrown by the ordinance of Baron Haynau, could not be a permanent one; besides, this ordinance itself was only provincial; the moment had arrived when the government sought to reach a definitive and permanent adjustment of the question, and all the more as in the political domain the merely temporary and provisional had already passed away. What, then, was the definitive system of church polity which the government aimed at establishing? This was the question which now claimed the attention of every earnest spirit throughout the land.

The church had on several occasions expressly declared that

the only basis of settlement which she could ever recognise as satisfactory, was the restoration of her imprescriptible rights. But the government wished, at whatever price, to legalise the abolition of her autonomy, and to acquire for itself the right of exercising a positive and active influence in the administration of the church. The plans of ecclesiastical organisation which the government had in view, moreover, met with no sympathy among the Hungarian people.

In 1855 the Minister of Worship and of Public Instruction, Count de Thun, invited a number of Protestants of distinction, men who enjoyed his confidence, to appear before him at Vienna, that he might have an opportunity of learning their opinions as to these new plans of organisation. But they declared that they could not regard themselves, nor allow him to consider them, as representatives of the church, as they had not been delegated by her to act on her behalf, and their opinions could therefore have no official character. They counselled the minister, as he desired to know the opinion of the church, to address himself to her only legal organs, her representative assemblies. They stated, nevertheless, in the sequel their own individual opinions on the question of organisation, opinions which have not indeed been preserved in writing, but which are well known to have been dictated by a sincere devotion to the rights and interests of the church.

In the course of the same year, the minister issued copies of a project of organisation to all the superintendents and seniors, and required them to ascertain the opinion of the superintendencies and seniorates under their supervision. This project was based in part, it is true, on the advice tendered to the Count de Thun by the parties whom he had consulted; but the suggestions they had made were essentially modified by the particular views of the government. Accordingly, the eight superintendencies composing the entire Reformed and Lutheran Churches unanimously rejected the project, declaring that the general synod alone was competent to entertain any such question of organisation. The superintendencies then proceeded with repeated solicitations to urge a return to the constitutional system of 1848, and again entreated the convocation of a general synod. The minister of public worship was extremely incensed at the rejection of his project; he encountered in Hungary a general opposition, while all his colleagues, on the other hand, were everywhere obeyed. He did not despair, however, of finally accomplishing the execution of his plan. Accordingly he had recourse to the Emperor, and it was then that Francis Joseph published his *Patent of 1st September 1859*.

All the organs of the Austrian government were unbounded in their eulogiums of this imperial measure, and the German press chimed in harmonious chorus. Several German *literati* of the first rank asserted that this concession surpassed the most sanguine hopes of the Hungarian Protestants. But the fact was directly the opposite ; for the Patent was nothing else than that very project of the minister of public worship which had been already unanimously rejected. As may be supposed, the first effect which its publication produced upon the church was to call forth a universal feeling of extreme regret and alarm. But in spite of the strength of this painful impression the church maintained for a season the most profound silence. She still retained with almost complete unanimity her former opinion on the matter, and soon the only question with her was, how she might find the most suitable means for giving expression to it. This was no easy matter, for her position with reference to the imperial Patent was more delicate than it had been when she had to deal only with ministerial ordinances. The Patent was invested with all the force and authority of a law. It was declared by the government, that whosoever should refuse to obey it, would incur all the penalties of disobedience to law. The opinion of the church was not asked ; she had only to submit to the will of the sovereign.

To maintain her own legal basis, to refuse to swerve from it by a single hairbreadth, was the starting-point of her opposition to the Patent. She was willing to *render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's*, but at the same time she was resolved not to be found wanting in her paramount duty of *rendering unto God the things that are God's*. And her manner of proceeding was all the more free from every possibility of exception, as the Emperor had expressly confirmed in his Patent the 26th article of the Diet of 1790-91, and as the demands of the church never overstepped the boundaries marked out in that article. It was strange that, in the introduction to the Patent, the Emperor had himself recognised the validity of this article, and yet that, alongside of this, the text of the Patent stood in direct antagonism to its whole tenor. How is this strange contradiction to be accounted for ? The general belief of the Hungarians was that the wish of the emperor to restore their church was sincere, but that his judgment was misled by the false reports of the minister of public worship. They were also convinced that if they could only succeed in informing his Majesty as to the real posture of affairs, their requests would not fail to obtain his favourable consideration. But the government did everything in its power to prevent this. It menaced the church with pains and penalties ; it began even to punish those who refused to accept the Patent ; it

sought to blacken the Hungarian Protestants in the eyes of their co-religionists in other lands, representing them as a herd of factious malcontents, ever plotting sedition and revolution, men who, under the pretext of opposition to what violated the dictates of their conscience, aimed only at fomenting political agitation. It devised expedients for provoking the Protestants to some violent outbreak, that it might then have the opportunity of crushing them by force, as disturbers of the public peace.

In opposition to such manoeuvres, the only arms which the church could wield were an unwavering confidence in God and in the justice of her cause, and a persevering appeal to the justice and benevolence of the Emperor. While maintaining her rights with determined energy, she has never in fact, throughout this whole contest, shewn herself wanting in the respect due to her temporal sovereign.

It was a Lutheran superintendency, composed almost entirely of Germans and Sclavonians, which first openly declared itself in opposition to the imperial Patent. Its protest was given forth in an assembly held at Eperjes; and the fact is noteworthy, that it was M. de Zsedényi, one of the most faithful and devoted subjects of the imperial dynasty, who, indeed, was condemned to death by the revolutionary government of 1848-49, on the score of his attachment to that dynasty, and who has since held the office of Councillor to the Imperial Chancery, who in this assembly uttered the first public protest against the Patent. He declared that it was impossible for the Hungarians to accept this Patent without proving unfaithful to their church, and sacrificing her inalienable rights. The assembly concurred unanimously with the views of M. de Zsedényi, and a memorial was addressed to the emperor, in which the reasons for their refusal to accept the Patent were fully explained. A few days after, the assembly of the superintendency of Debreczin adopted the same resolution. The Minister of Public Worship, learning that all the other superintendencies were inclined to follow this example, interdicted them from holding assemblies in future on any other basis than that established by the Patent. But, in spite of this ministerial prohibition, the church continued to hold her assemblies, as in time past, in accordance with her ancient laws, resolved, while remaining purely passive and maintaining an attitude entirely pacific, rather to suffer martyrdom than to surrender a simple iota of her rights. The assemblies persisted in having recourse to the Emperor, with the view of enlightening him as to the state of public opinion in the country, and of supplicating him to comply with the legitimate demands of the church. The superintendency *on this side the Danube*, belonging to the Reformed Church, had

determined upon holding its assembly at Pesth, on the 12th of December, in accordance with the ancient forms. The government resolved to prevent this, and declared that all persons who should take part in any such assembly would thereby incur a heavy responsibility. The moment of the crisis was at hand. The garrison of the capital was ordered to be in readiness. All the delegates of the superintendency, even those from its most remote districts, nevertheless assembled at Pesth on the appointed day, and proceeded solemnly to constitute the assembly, resolved never to be driven from their position save at the point of the bayonet. The presidents of this memorable assembly were M. Paul de Fodor, one of the seniors of the church, and Count Gideon Ráday, one of the curator coadjutors. It was held in the great church of the city, in presence of an immense concourse of men of all classes and of every creed. A previous conference had appointed two persons, differing greatly in character and position—the one a layman, the other a pastor—to expose the true character of the Patent, and to defend the autonomy of the church. The first was M. de Sárközy, one of the curator coadjutors, one of the ablest members of the superintendency, a high functionary of state before 1848, a man attached with equal loyalty to the national constitution of his country and to the reigning dynasty ; the second was Dr Louis Filó, one of the secretaries of the superintendency, and now professor of theology at Pesth. The motion which they proposed having been agreed to, a protest, embodying its general purport, was drawn up and unanimously approved ; a commission was also appointed to present it to the Emperor at Vienna. The assembly closed without being subjected to any interruption on the part of the civil authorities. The other superintendencies soon followed the example which had thus been set. All those who had taken part in these interdicted assemblies, as well as all who had declared themselves in opposition to the Patent, were speedily summoned before the tribunals as disturbers of the public peace ; but they had no difficulty in proving that they had the full warrant of law for every step which they had taken.

At the head of this ecclesiastical movement stood a man of high eminence, Baron Nicholas de Vay, subsequently Chancellor of Hungary. Alongside of the defenders of the church's liberties who have been already mentioned, we must rank also MM. de Tisza (layman), Balogh (superintendent), Esztergályi (senior), Mádai (pastor), Révész (pastor), de Radvansky, d' Ivanka, Baron Podmaniczki, Baron Pronai, the editors of the *Protestans Lap*, MM. Ballagi, Törcek, and Székács, &c., &c.

In January 1860, Baron de Vay appeared at Vienna, accompanied by a numerous deputation representing the entire

Protestant Church of Hungary. This deputation demanded at the hands of the ministers, with whom they had several conferences, that the church should be emancipated from the yoke of a Patent which it could never consider as having the force of law ; and rehearsed anew the already so often repeated complaints and protestations of the church ; but all to no purpose. They did not even succeed in obtaining a personal audience of the Emperor.

Meanwhile, the government decided upon having recourse to measures of greater severity. M. de Zsedényi and Pastor Mádai, the two chief speakers in the assembly held at Eperjes, were stript of all their official dignities and thrown into prison. This double punishment struck deep dismay into the hearts of some parties ; and among others, of several Lutheran pastors, who were unhappily induced, by the dread of personal consequences, to abandon their attitude of hostility to the Patent. Some other pastors, it is true, chiefly among the Slavonic population, had received it with sympathy and approval ; but they had generally to encounter a strenuous opposition on the part of their parishioners ; and the result was, that there arose such a violent contest in the bosom of several parishes, as even to lead to a forcible severance of the bond between pastor and people. The government succeeded, by dint of the most persevering efforts, in increasing, to some small extent, the minority in the Lutheran Church favourable to the Patent ; but, nevertheless, it hardly amounted to a fifth part of the entire membership ; while, in the Reformed Church, not a single voice was raised in its favour.

One of the means which the government employed, was the addressing of direct appeals to the parishes, in the hope of thus inducing them to set themselves in opposition to the regular ecclesiastical authorities. It thus condescended to place itself on the platform of revolutionary agitation. But in this case, as in so many others, its efforts were utterly frustrated. The representative assemblies of the church are the lawful superiors of her individual members, and each parish is bound to render submission to the decisions of those assemblies. This principle is laid down among the fundamental laws of the Church. Besides, the decisions of the assemblies with reference to the Patent were fully conformable to the general voice of public opinion. There could be no doubt that the government would meet with the same opposition on the part of the people, which it had already encountered at the hands of the assemblies of superintendency.

The government had sent a copy of the Patent to every parish, requiring the pastors to read it publicly in their churches, and commanding the local presbyterial councils to

carry it into execution. The pastors refused to obey this order, and replied, that if the ministry had any communication to make to the parishes, they must address them through the medium of the higher ecclesiastical assemblies, as expressly enjoined by several imperial decrees. Moreover, the parishes themselves declared that they would adhere strictly to the deliverances of the assemblies of their several superintendencies. Several pastors were cited before the tribunals for having refused to read the Patent in their churches; fines were imposed upon several, but the members of their parishes came forward and took the burden upon themselves.

The government had adopted yet another expedient for forcing on the people the acceptance of the obnoxious Patent. The Minister of Worship had declared, by a new ordinance, that all those parishes which should not, before the 24th of April 1860, have organised themselves in accordance with the Patent, should forfeit all right of protection from the State, and should no longer be regarded as lawful communities, but held as standing outside the pale of law. The 24th of April arrived. Not a single reformed parish had obeyed the ordinance; a fifth part at most of the parishes of the Lutheran Church, as we have already said, submitted; yet the greater number even of these proposed to return to the old state of matters, as soon as circumstances permitted. As regards the recusant pastors, they appeared repeatedly before the courts of inquiry; but their defence was so evidently based on the acknowledged law of the land, that no criminal proceedings could be instituted against them. The result was, that a new imperial edict, issued in May 1860, annulled all the judicial inquiries which had been instituted against the Protestants for their proceedings in this matter. MM. de Zsedényi and Máday were restored to liberty and to the enjoyment of their official status, the Patent was suspended, and the parishes were authorised to reorganize themselves in accordance with the ancient laws.

This edict was received with gratitude, but not without fears for the future; for the declaration by which the Patent was suspended, intimated that the new state of things was only provisional, and that the government would renew the conflict as soon as an improved state of political relations admitted of its prosecuting it to more advantage.

As regards the present organisation of the church, all the ancient superintendencies have been restored; the administrators nominated by the government have been replaced by superintendents and high curators legally elected; the double presidency has been re-established; the autonomy of the church, with regard to the management of her schools, is again what it was of old; but she has not yet obtained the power of con-

vening a general synod. The Reformed Church was not indeed subjected to the government of the administrators ; nevertheless, during several years, whenever one of the superintendents died, the government interfered to prevent the election of a successor ; and hence, in several of the superintendencies there are at present only vice-superintendents, nominated by the college of Seniors. In the Cisdanubian superintendency, M. Paul de Törœk, pastor in the city of Pesth, and Count Gideon de Ráday, were elected presidents ; the Baron de Vay and M. de Zsedényi were appointed high curators in other superintendencies, and Pastor Măday, who had been incarcerated along with M. de Zsedényi, was invested with the office of superintendent.

Whoever has followed with attention the exposition which we have attempted of the situation and history of the Hungarian Church, will have duly appreciated, we trust, the reasons which compelled her to oppose the imperial Patent of 1st September 1859. We have shewn that it was contrary to her rights, to her autonomy, to her independence of the State, to the treaties of peace, to the fundamental laws of the country, to the charters known under the name of *inaugural laws*, and, in particular, to the twenty-sixth article of the Diet of 1790-91, an article the authority of which is recognised by the Patent itself. Right and justice were evidently on the church's side. But before passing from this subject, it will be well, in consideration of its high importance, to exhibit in a short and summary way, the grounds of her opposition.

The church has refused to accept the Patent granted in 1859 : *first*, on the ground of its assuming a right on the part of the government to legislate for the church. In fact, if she had accepted it, she would not only, as we have said, have renounced her rights, but would have herself legalized the invasion with which she was menaced. The synodal-presbyterial system would have disappeared, the episcopal would have been established in its place. The Emperor would have become supreme bishop of the church, would have invested himself with the right of ecclesiastical legislation, and would have acquired the power of, sooner or later, imposing upon the church a new and much more objectionable organisation. The church has not consented, and will not consent, to surrender her ecclesiastical rights to the sovereign. She would not do so even if he were a Protestant, much less when he is a devoted adherent of the Church of Rome. Unless she had firmly refused to accede to the fundamental principle of the Patent, she would have doomed herself to an existence the most anxious and precarious. *Secondly*, the Patent has not been accepted, because several of its particular articles are of

an offensive character. If it bears, at first view, a certain appearance of liberalism, a little more attentive scrutiny will shew that it rests upon the narrow principles of an absolute monarchy. In fact, the whole church, the general synod itself, would have been subordinated by it to a council (Oberkirchenrath), the members of which would have been appointed and paid by the sovereign, and would consequently have occupied a position of absolute dependence upon him. The synod would have been stript of its functions as a legislative body, and would have been limited to the task of devising and preparing measures to be submitted to the decision of the council. The superintendents would no longer have been pastors and functionaries of the church, but the paid *employés* of a close and despotic bureaucracy. The Patent presents, it is true, some advantages to the clerical body, granting them, in particular, a certain superiority over the lay members of the church; but this was rather an objection than a recommendation, for it could not have failed to lead to troublesome dissensions between the laymen and the clergy, which would certainly have issued in producing a schism in the bosom of the church. Again, the Patent deprived the church of her autonomy with reference to her schools. For all these reasons, and many others, the rejection of the Patent was equally natural and reasonable. There are now accordingly not more than from twenty to twenty-five small Lutheran parishes, among the Slavonian population, which, under the influence of their pastors, remain favourable to the Patent. But these parishes will return, we doubt not, to their former position, to that of the majority of the church, as soon as they shall be left free to act in accordance with their natural impulses.

It is true that certain persons of high standing in the literary world of Germany have, as we have stated above, given expression to a different opinion, among others MM. Hase and Lechler; they have represented the Patent as a liberal concession of the Emperor, which the church ought to have accepted. But the reason for this judgment was simply that these gentlemen were at that time either entirely ignorant of, or at the best very imperfectly acquainted with, the history and constitutional rights of the Hungarian Church, and the position which it occupied in relation to the government; for, as soon as they had acquired information on these points, they changed their opinion. M. Hase in particular, when better informed, publicly declared that the Protestants of Hungary were fully justified in the opposition they had offered to the imperial Patent, and that he had been completely misled as to the facts of the case when he had given expression to his former judgment on the matter.

Having thus briefly sketched, we trust with candour and impartiality, the history of the Hungarian Church, and of its recent conflict with the State, it remains for us only to say a few words as to the religious life of the church, and the nature of the educational institutions under her supervision.

We may well say of Hungary, viewed as a field for evangelistic exertion, that "the harvest truly is great, but the labourers are few." The paucity of the labourers is, indeed, one of the most serious obstacles to the progress of the church. When the efforts of two pastors, supplemented only by the unpaid agency of lay members of the community, are diffused over a congregation of not less than 20,000, (and congregations of this extent are by no means uncommon), it can hardly be expected that the spiritual interests of all should be duly attended to. But such anomalies must occur in every country whose resources are yet undeveloped, and in which the poverty of the people incapacitates them for the support of a numerous ministry. In spite of this, however, there is much in the actual state of religion which gives occasion for thankfulness to God. The public services of religion are assiduously frequented. Public worship is celebrated in the churches daily, morning and evening, and it is a pleasing sight to observe the simple population of the country villages, before they set out for the labours of the day, wending their way to the village church, there to unite in the exercises of praise and prayer. The Bible and religious books are to be found in almost every house, even among the peasantry, and many of the latter have, indeed, a wonderful acquaintance with the word of God. The primary schools are organised in such a manner as to furnish the people with good religious instruction, and all the children who have attained a certain age are in possession of a large amount of Bible truth. The people have of late given good proof of the sincerity of their zeal for religion by the amount of the sacrifices they have made to supply the church with the means requisite for the organisation of her schools.

The manifestations of religious life vary greatly among different nations, in correspondence with diversities of national character and varying degrees of civilisation; among the Hungarians they may be expected to differ greatly from those which appear among the western nations, from whom the circumstances of their political history have hitherto kept them in a great measure isolated. There is a certain tendency to gravity, and even gloom, in the nature of the Magyar. It is remarked by Kisfaludy, one of their most distinguished poets, in speaking of the general character of the Magyar compositions, that "over all of them is spread a gloomy tinge, and joy itself seems to find utterance in tones of pathos and melan-

choly. This character attaches itself to the national songs, and to the national dances, of which it has been remarked, that the Magyars dance as if they were weeping." Those natural characteristics which display themselves in every other phase of life may be expected also to give a certain colouring to the religious character of the people. The nature of the Magyars has much in common with the grave, earnest, thoughtful character of their kinsmen in religious creed, the Presbyterian Calvinistic peasantry of Scotland. But their character presents many features which are more properly oriental. They are fiery and impetuous, proud and high-spirited, endowed with a certain nobleness of soul and craving for the sympathy of their fellows, which make them open and confiding to an extreme. They are little disposed to submit to dictation, but are eagerly receptive, and ready always to welcome instruction, from whatever quarter it may come. Their intense love of liberty and hatred of oppression have displayed themselves throughout the whole history of their nation and church, ennobling their annals with many a lofty and generous deed, and handing down to latest ages the record of many a noble struggle, sometimes baffled, indeed, but never altogether unvictorious.

There are in Hungary, we rejoice to say, many men whose hearts burn with ardent zeal for the cause of religion, not only among the clergy, but also among the laymen. Besides the superintendents, curators, and seniors, who are all men distinguished for evangelical fervour and Christian devotedness, there are also in the ranks of the younger clergy many pastors whose character and spirit warrant the best hopes for the future of the church.

The gymnasia are institutions similar to the gymnasia of Germany, and to the highest class of schools in this country. The upper gymnasium comprehends eight classes, and the under gymnasium four lower classes. Almost all the superintendencies have a normal seminary for the training of teachers. The Cisdanubian superintendency has upper gymnasia at Nagykeresz and Kecskemet, and under gymnasia at Pesth, Gyöngyös, and Halas, besides a normal seminary at Nagykeresz. As regards the nature of the instruction, it is in most respects analogous to that of the German schools, and in spite of the many obstacles which have opposed the march of improvement, may be pronounced highly satisfactory.

Each superintendency has its academy or college (*collegium*), comprehending the faculties of theology, philosophy, and law. The colleges of the Reformed Church are those of Debreczin, Saros-Patak, Papa, and Pesth. The course of theological study extends over four years. The Lutherans have also several col-

legiate institutions, viz., those at Presburg, Kesmark, Eperjes, and Oedinburg; but as these possess only a preparatory course of two years in theology, theological students have hitherto been obliged to resort to the German universities for the completion of their studies. They now have it in their power, however, to complete their studies at the Academy of Pesth.

This academy was founded and opened some five years since, through the fraternal co-operation of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches; and its establishment is mainly due to the indefatigable zeal of MM. Paul Török and Joseph Székacs, pastors at Pesth,—the former being one of the superintendents in the Reformed Church, and the latter holding the same office in the Lutheran. The chief motive which led to its establishment was a wish, on the one hand, to make sure that Protestantism should be worthily represented in the capital by an academical institute; and, on the other hand, a desire to pave the way for a closer union between the two sections of the Protestant Church. Although this youthful institution has still a hard struggle to maintain for the supply of its material wants, it has already made great progress. It has won the generous sympathy of the German Churches. It has become the object of liberal donations and of active interest and support to all classes of the population, for every one is convinced of the important influence which it is certain to exert on the progress of civilisation, of Protestantism, and of true Christian life. It is destined to become, in time, the Protestant university of Hungary. At present, the number of its *ordinary professors* is four, and of its *extraordinary professors* seven. The number of students who attended it in 1860 was seventy-two, three-fourths of whom belonged to the Reformed Church, and the rest to the Lutheran. Three of the ordinary professors belong to the Reformed communion; the majority of the extraordinary professors are Lutherans.

As regards the predominant tendency in theology, it may be said, that although before the crisis of 1848 the prevailing theology had somewhat of a rationalistic tinge, though never very definite or strongly marked, at present almost all the professors of theology and pastors of the church pursue a tendency in accordance with Positive Christianity; and even the primitive orthodoxy of the Reformation wins its way more and more over all other tendencies.

The theological literature of the country presents not a few remarkable works in almost every department of theological inquiry, though none of them can be said to be marked by high originality. There are also several religious and theological journals. M. Andreas Tatay, at present professor at

Kecskemet, deserves special mention as a man whose high erudition and profoundly evangelical sentiments have contributed largely to the progress of a sound and scriptural theology.

What trials of faith and patience may yet be in store for the Church of Hungary, it is beyond the power of man to prognosticate. No sincere lover of religious liberty can view with indifference the great struggle for constitutional freedom in which the Hungarian nation is at present engaged. It cannot fail to be seen, that with the fortunes of the Hungarian Constitution are bound up inseparably the destinies of the Hungarian Church. When the solemn sanctions of ancient treaties are flung to the winds, and the political rights of a nation are trampled in the dust, it cannot be expected that much respect should be shewn for the rights of conscience, however strongly guaranteed by repeated compacts. What are ancient treaties and solemn engagements to a government which no oaths can bind, which seems to feel the obligation of a compact only so long as it has no opportunity of violating it?

But whatever difficulties and disasters may yet await the Hungarian Church and nation, of the final issue of the struggle we cannot entertain a doubt. It cannot be, that in this world of God the cause of truth and righteousness should finally succumb, and the generous aspirations that stir the heart of a great people be trampled under the iron heel of despotism. Not in vain has the soil of Hungary been watered with the blood of heroes and sown with the ashes of martyrs.

"It cannot be that patriots true,
In freedom's battle slain,
And hearts by sorrows broken too,
Were sacrificed in vain.

"Such mind, and strength, and purpose high;
They surely cannot be
Foredoom'd to wither, droop, and die
By stern fate's dark decree." *

The spirit of the Hunyadis, the Bocskais, the Rakoczis is not yet extinct. But Hungary is too deeply inspired with the consciousness of youthful vigour, too calm in her assurance of ultimate victory, to waste her energy in spasmodic efforts. She has learnt what virtue lies in passive endurance, and can wait with patience for the time when God shall open up before her a path to freedom.

* From the favourite national song of the Hungarians, the *Appeal* of Michael Vörösmarty, who is esteemed the father of Hungarian poetry. See Bowring's "Poetry of the Magyars," and Szabad's "Hungary, Past and Present."

VII.—Discussions in France on the Supernatural.

- Du Surnaturel.* Discours d'Inauguration Prononcé. Par M. le Prof. C. Bois, dans le Temple de la Faculté de Montauban. Le 15 Nov. 1860.
- Du Surnaturel.* Par M. A. RÉVILLE. *Nouvelle Revue de Théologie*, Mars 1861. Strasbourg
- Réponse à M. Réville. Par M. Bois. *Revue Chrétienne, Supplément Théologique*. Aout, 1861.
- Du Surnaturel* (2d Article—Réplique à M. Bois). Par M. RÉVILLE. *Revue de Strasbourg*, Octobre 1861.

M. Bois delivered his inaugural speech, as professor of Hebrew, in the Protestant Faculty of Montauban, a year ago. The subject chosen by the young professor was, and still is, the order of the day in the theological world—viz., *the supernatural*. This choice has caused a sensation as far as Rotterdam, and that, during a whole year: for the discussion raised by the speech between M. Bois and M. Réville, pastor of the Walloon Church at Rotterdam, has hardly yet come to an end. The *Revue Chrétienne* has extended its hospitality to M. Bois, while M. Réville has installed himself, as a matter of course, in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique de Strasbourg*,* of which he is one of the principal writers. We cannot, therefore, let so important a discussion pass by without calling attention to a few of its principal features. The public will be able to judge, also, from the audacious negations of M. Réville, with what a calamity the churches of France were threatened, five years ago, when he stood candidate for this same chair of Exegesis to which M. Bois has been appointed, on its present vacancy, occasioned by the death of Professor Bonifas, M. Réville's successful rival.

We shall first give a rapid analysis of M. Bois's speech. The tendency of the present time is to deny the supernatural. The causes of this tendency may arise partly from the progress made in physical and mathematical science, which would deny liberty to man, and even to God.† To these we must add the philosophy of history, by which the individual is absorbed in the mass, and the development of our race is looked upon as a progressive ascension, a kind of organic growth, of which the formula is—*necessity*. Lastly, philosophy, properly so called, which at one stroke blots out liberty in the threefold sphere of God, of the world, and of man. Not to exist, *to become*, to be only, in order to be immediately dissolved anew into another

* The accredited organ of negative theology in France.

† M. Bois thus defines a miracle: "A fact due to the introduction of an external and higher power. An act of God's free-will."

non-existence, which immediately begins a new *becoming*, and so on, is the fate of everything, of the absolute Being, as well as of all the individual existences in which he displays himself by a necessary movement. God has no personality—he does not act, he develops himself, he realises himself, without being aware of it. In the system of the Pantheists, as it has been well said, the miraculous would be the *super-divine* (*le surdivin*).

In presence of such errors, M. Bois puts but one question : Is God personal, or is he not ? The denial of the supernatural involves the denial of the liberty, the personality of God ; and, on the other hand, the affirmation of the personality of God implies the affirmation that the supernatural is possible. The orator first attacks *Deism*. According to this system, God has created the world by an act of his free-will, but in this act it has exhausted itself. His perfect work claims no more care from him, and, were he to introduce into it any change whatever, would he not cease to be unchangeable ? But have those who use this argument maturely considered it ? Has not their divine immutability received a rude blow by the creation of the world ? From the *one* has proceeded the multiple. Let us go still further. God created creatures with a free-will. But in giving liberty in any degree whatever to the creature, has not God limited himself ? That is to say, has he not allowed effects to take place of which he is not the cause ? Has he not permitted a rebel “ I will not,” to raise its audacious voice, in contradiction to his sovereign “ I will ?”

Still further, has not God given up his work to the rash enterprises of the creature ?

In presence of this liberty granted to man, and heightened by unforeseen circumstances and perils, God has, if we may so express ourselves, preserved intact his liberty of action, and at the very instant in which he commenced the natural order of things, he founded the supernatural.

Besides, on what is the assertion founded, that God is a personal God ? Is it not on the feeling that a man has of his liberty ? But the Deist must deny that liberty, since liberty in us implies change in God.

The author next proceeds to attack Theism, which, while proclaiming the divine personality, and even the immanence of God in history, denies the possibility of the *supernatural*.

Here we do not meet the obstacle at the same point, viz., the immutability of God. By his immanence God is continually mixing himself up with the contingent ; what then would the divine Majesty lose in acting, not merely through the medium of existing forces, but directly by his own free-will ?

We are told of the forces of nature, but, according to the Theist, here is a force acting everywhere—viz., God. What right have we then to confine this force (which is a will) within the inflexible formulas of the physical or mathematical sciences? Man is also a force out of nature.

But it will be objected: God acts always and everywhere in the same manner. The falling of the stone, the rising of the vapour, the suspension of the cloud in the air, are different phenomena, and yet it is the same force which acts in them, according to the same law. The primary and sovereign force, called God, acts precisely in the same way. It is thus that this force is immutable and always consistent with itself, however diverse to the phenomena exhibited by it.

The orator finds no trouble in proving that the God of the Theist is a force acting fatally in everything, without the power of slackening or accelerating his speed, of restraining or carrying on his action, which is precisely the characteristic of the forces of nature. Now, this conception of the divine action precludes the necessity of intelligence and will, and renders the idea of personality superfluous. There is no reason for maintaining it; and, indeed, it would be better to reject it, for how can a force be personal which is not master of itself, and of its own action? There is even more. While the Deist affirms that God makes use of the forces of nature to accomplish his designs, the Theist declares that God is in these forces, and acts by them. Does not this mean that there is, in fact, but one force, and that that force is God; all others being merely *modes* of action. "The terms attraction, electricity, heat, light, movement, mind, &c., by which we seem to distinguish distinct principles, in reality only express the diverse manifestations of the universal force. It is never exercised *except in conformity* with the laws which rule the world." What then becomes of the divine *transcendence*, and how is God to be distinguished from the world? Again, if we compare these results with the doctrine of the eternal creation (which must be that of the Theists), we have a God "who is from all eternity, producing the world, and who, in this perpetual production, moves under the empire of fatal laws; a God whose whole activity is shut up in the forces and laws of this world, by which alone he reveals himself, and we cannot see what separates this Theism from Pantheism!"

The negation of the supernatural then leads logically to pantheism, to the negation of the divine personality.* M.

* M. Réville, while flattering himself that amid his negotiations he has still saved the personality of God, does not the less pronounce a glowing eulogium on Pantheism. His words are: "I do not wish to conceal my firm resolution to enjoy, at my ease, the indescribable poetry which the legitimate side of Pan-

Bois ends by shewing that Pantheism involves the denial of duty, since it does not believe in the personal God of liberty, because, if there be no room for liberty in God, how can there be any in man? and of the conscience, which continues energetically to reject its conclusions, and to persist in the belief in a free and personal God.

In concluding, M. Bois brings forward, as the great proof of the supernatural Jesus Christ—"the word made flesh." "Jesus Christ crucified has been invincibly proved to the soul. In him we possess and adore the personal and living God, who limited himself and humbled himself in his love, yet without losing anything of his glory."

We now pass to M. Réville's criticisms. They are particularly directed against three important points. 1st, The causes which M. Bois points out in order to explain the repugnance of the present age to believe in the supernatural. 2d, The distinction drawn by M. Bois between the divine will and the laws by which the world is governed (*lege naturæ ex voluntate divina*), in the question of immanence; and lastly, the divine immutability.

The present age has a horror of the supernatural. The rupture began three hundred years ago. The Reformation made a complete *razzia* of the saints, relics, &c., of spirits devils (for hell also has its miracles). "Brother Martin" left but one miracle, the Holy Supper, and Calvin made an end of it. Satanic and biblical supernaturalism do indeed still re-

theism pours out in floods on the world, without falling into that dangerous intoxication which veils the face of the Holy Father and of the living God." But does M. Réville really comprehend true Pantheism? M. Bois says that his adversary's system leads him logically into Pantheism, but we feel inclined to go a step further, and say, with M. Ernest Raville, late Professor of Apologetics in the National Academy of Geneva, "True Pantheism is rare in our day, as it has always been. True Pantheism is doubtless an error, but I would venture to say a noble error, of the mind. It is the product of the reason losing sight, in its ardent aspirations after the supreme unity, of the facts of life and experience. Pantheism does not perceive that the reality of the creature is the most brilliant testimony to the Creator's power. It does not perceive that the spiritual God has put his glory in his goodness. There is something great in this dazzling look, fixing itself upon the eternal light, and feeling forthwith for the changing and transitory scene of this world nought but a contempt that betrays itself into a negation of it. This giddiness of lofty intellect will never present serious dangers for the great number of minds. What we see around us, what is threatening us, what is breaking out in the contemporaneous movement of thought, is the negation of God, a complete empirism disguised under an abstract and ambitious phraseology. Out of nature and humanity, out of matter and the thoughts of our mind, there is nothing. This is said and repeated under every form by men who give themselves out as the representatives of the age, and the sworn interpreters of the science of the present century. We are present at the sad spectacle of a great rebellion of the intellect against God. This is preoccupying and rousing the spiritualist philosopher, and they are multiplying their publications against the reviving atheism."—*La Question de la Foi. Leçon.*

main, but the former is quietly disappearing. "The chapter relating to it in the orthodox system of dogmatics might easily be suppressed, without its ever being perceived." Biblical supernaturalism, too, has received a blow. "Has the miraculously inspired text been handed down to us in its integrity? Is inspiration relative or absolute?—that is to say, are there no errors in the holy books?" &c. This is where our Protestant theology is.

M. Bois, in his answer (Supp. Théol. Aout. 1861), observes that it is not enough to know the march of ideas in the world in order to justify our drawing conclusions as to their truth or falsehood. The accomplished fact proves nothing in good morals; and would M. Réville have been a Deist in the eighteenth century? Besides, the philosophy of history, apparently very objective, is the most subjective thing in the world. Take, for instance, M. Réville himself, who maintains that the Protestant of the sixteenth century believed less in the supernatural than the Roman Catholic of the same century, because he rejected transubstantiation. And again, that for three hundred years there has been a rupture between the religious mind and the supernatural. We would rather say the *irreligious* mind; for certainly those who in past times denied the supernatural were not religious people. It is true that, at the present time, miracles are attacked in the name of the interests of religion, but such a pretension cannot be maintained; for would a doctrine calling itself Christianity, and yet denying the supernatural, viz., denying, not only miracles and prophecy, but the incarnation, the resurrection, the descent of the Holy Spirit, be entitled to the name of Christianity?*

But to return to M. Réville. In his second article (*Révue de Théol.* Octobre 1861), he says, M. Bois, while affirming his faith in the presence of God in the world, while saying that God is in the world, around us, in us, that his actual and permanent will constitutes the being of all that exists, denies this immanence, by admitting into the world an exterior and higher power, which, according to M. Bois's own hypothesis, would necessarily be superdivine (*surdivin*), since it would be superior to the immanent activity of God himself.

* "We put ourselves on historical ground, and we maintain our right to exclude from Christian theology notions visibly contrary to the first written documents in which the gospel is preserved, and to the constant tradition by which it is maintained. We should not hesitate to exclude from the Platonic doctrine ideas, although professed by pretended Platonists, if they were manifestly contrary to the writings of the great disciple of Socrates, and to the general teachings of his school. Every intellectual tradition is historically determined by the same method."—*Le Question de la Foi. Leçon.*

"Perhaps," adds M. Réville, "the expression went further than we meant it to go, when we said that the forces of nature were the very will of God! We meant to say,—that what is essential and constitutive in each of these particular forces, and what binds each one of them to that whole which is realised by their combinations, . . . coincides with the divine will, and is derived from that will which brings them back to their unity; consequently, our religious feeling has no need of the miraculous."

According to M. Réville, M. Bois "cannot know the will of God by examining the forces of the world, for this will is only manifested by rare interventions. He cannot say that it is God who sends rain, since rain falls by the combination of certain laws." It is a constitutional royalty that is proclaimed by the professor of Montauban, not a God reigning and governing. We cannot indicate the point at which the germ ceases in order to give place to the individual, but if the germ (that is to say, the divine will) was not in each thing, that thing in which it was wanting would not be. And, if generation existed alone, it would be an idea without reality, and we should require to deny our own existence. M. Réville thinks that, with the help of this reasoning, he is able to maintain the co-existence and the distinction of God. "In the creation," he says, "the unity of the divine will is in a manner broken into a multiplicity of particular wills, which, in so far as they are particular, are no longer the central will, from which they emanate, but in so far as they emanate from it partake of necessity."

To these considerations of M. Réville on the divine immanence M. Bois has not replied. Indeed, we do not see what he could add to what he had already written in August.

"If the forces which act in the world, while doing so in accordance with the will of God, are not distinct from that will, it is impossible to distinguish God from the world. We should arrive at this strange consequence, that the laws according to which the forces of nature act, are the laws of the will and of the action of God himself, so that, for example, the well known law according to which gravitation acts in an inverse ratio to the squares of the distance, ought to be considered as the very law of the will of God, the action of which ought to be four times greater when the distance is half as far, and physics and chemistry ought to be branches of the divine psychology or physiology." *

* M. Réville answers, "I never meant to say that the action of the divine will is four times weaker when the distance is twice as great. I say, that this general linking together of particular facts, ruled by the law of gravitation, is a particular will of God, logically derived from the general will, of which the

M. Bois had accused the modern Theists (who speak so loudly of the divine immutability, not only in its essence, but also in its action) of making their God vary incessantly. As he directs everything in the most changing phenomena, and mixes himself up with these changes, nothing can begin nor end without his coming in for something, for everything. Will the reality of these phenomena be denied? It remains to explain whence they arise. Are they, on the other hand, realities? Then the God who produces these changes varies in his activity. Again, whence proceeds the difference of the manifestations of the force called God? If it be from the divine will, God then has his particular will, his special actions; if it be from the different nature of the objects upon which the divine force is exercised, then he is not immutable. Let us reflect on the consequences of such a concession.

"What," cries M. Bois, "you believe that the action of God is identical on a soul or on a stone? You believe that God means to realise in the stone the very same effects that he produces in an immortal being? And if the effects differ, the difference does not arise from anything in the divine will or action, but only from the difference of nature between a stone and a soul!"

M. Bois went further. He had proved that Theism could not admit the creation (because that would be giving up the immutable identity of God); that it must (in spite of the dualism involved in it) admit a kind of *ἐκδημιον*, fecundated by the Divine Spirit, and passing from an inorganic to an organic state.

Lastly, M. Bois had based the divine immutability on the moral character of God, a character requiring a certain mobility of action.

"In fact, if God is love, it is impossible that his action should always remain the same towards rebels as towards obedient subjects. A divinity without holiness and without love may be immutable in the Theist sense. . . . We want a God who is, and who will remain, for ever love. It appears to M. Réville that everything would fall, logic, religion, immortality. . . . God himself, were a single miracle to take place. The truth is, that miracle strengthens the great interests it is so strangely accused of weakening. Were the miraculous impossible, then the moral world would fall, for God would cease to love and to be good."

whole world is the realisation, and clothed with the character of necessity, in virtue of its connection with the absolute will." But who does not see in this the same confusion between God and his work which M. Bois has all along been reproaching M. Réville with making?

What does M. Réville answer to this demonstration of immutability. "If God varies," says he, "nothing can guarantee the most odious crime from taking the place of the purest self-denial. Immortality, certainly, all disappears along with immutability." As for the moral character of God, M. Réville answers, that the permanent moral character supposes also an essence, a metaphysical character not less permanent. "If God is invariable in his love, he must be so also in all that constitutes his infinite being; if he can vary in his essence, he can vary also in his love."

Doubtless, M. Bois has his answer ready. In the mean time, let us remember Balaam's "God is not a man that he should lie, neither the son of man that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken and shall he not make it good?" (Numbers xxiii. 19.) We would further observe, that liberty is also an attribute of God; and that, as B. Pictet said more than a hundred years ago, "If his will does not change, it is not on that account the less sovereign and free, because God is not obliged by anything to do what he does, and he does nothing but for wise reasons," (Theol. Christ. ii. p. 209).

We may here end our analysis. It will serve to shew that the *supernatural* meets with no better treatment from the theologian of Rotterdam than from the author of the "Essays and Reviews," and in truth the assertions are as bold on the one side as on the other. Thus M. Réville affirms, with the utmost complacency, that "Christianity implicitly contains the denial of the supernatural, as it does that of slavery. My confirmed conviction is," adds he, "that Christianity does not rest upon the miraculous, that it can do very well without the miraculous; and in what is most essential, that it puts aside the miraculous as something superfluous, which damages more than it serves the faith."

In presence of such aberrations, we close with two important quotations, which may well claim serious attention in these denuding and tempestuous times. The first is from the pen of an illustrious and venerable statesman, who has just raised his voice once more to speak to France, and who, in the midst of grave errors in political matters, has written pages upon the supernatural which will not pass by unnoticed. "Materialism," says M. Guizot, "pantheism, rationalism, historical criticism, and scepticism, each with its different arms, are dealing simultaneous and repeated blows to Christianity. It has remained standing amid all changes of fortune, it has survived all wars, and, I am convinced, will equally survive that which is at present being waged against it. But this evil of war is great, great even though the issue should not be fatal.

Souls suffer, society suffers from the blow received by Christianity, from its apparent weakness and its wounds, though they may not be mortal. It will not perish, but it ought to recognise its dangers, to look them in the face, and muster all its forces, in order to surmount them.”—(*L'Eglise et la Société Chrétiennes en 1861.*)

Our second quotation is from the pen of a theologian who, in 1843, wrote: “The authority of the canon cannot be shaken without the authority of the Scriptures—that is, the very foundation of evangelical faith being equally shaken. To look upon the determination of the canon simply as a matter of criticism, to confide it to the discussions of the school, would be to give up to uncertainty what requires the greatest certainty, what is the very principle of dogmatic authority of our Church”—(Schérer, *Dogmatique de l'Eglise Reformée*, p. 44); but who has since gone on from negation to negation, till, in 1861, he finds himself surrounded with ruins. We transcribe the paragraph at length, as M. Bois, in closing his discussion with M. Réville, called his attention to it.

“I cannot help asking myself, with some uneasiness, whether Christian rationalism be really a religion. Is what remains in the crucible, after the operation we have been describing, indeed the essence of positive dogmas, or might it only be a *cuput mortuum*? Does Christianity, when it is rendered transparent to the mind, and conformable to reason and conscience, still possess much virtue? Has it not a strong resemblance to Deism? and has it not the same meagreness and sterility? Does not the strength of belief reside in dogmatic formulas and marvellous legends as much as in their religious contents, properly so called? Is there not always a little superstition in true piety, and can piety do without those popular metaphysics, that brilliant mythology which has been eliminated from it? Are not the elements from which you pretend to separate religion, the alloy, without which the precious metal is unfit for the common uses of life? In short, when criticism has overthrown the supernatural as useless, and dogmas as irrational; when the religious sentiment on the one hand, and an exacting reason on the other, have penetrated belief and transformed it in assimilating it; when no other authority remains standing but the personal conscience of each one; when man, in a word, after rending every veil and penetrating into every mystery, contemplates face to face the God after whom he has been aspiring, will it not be found that this God is nothing else than man himself, the conscience and reason of humanity personified? and will not religion, under pretext of becoming more religious, have ceased to exist?

Such is, if I mistake not, the formidable problem rising up behind all questions of churches and ecclesiastical rivalries, and lending such a tragic interest to the present controversies of Protestantism. It seems that a religion cannot aspire to be, I do not say

more rational, but more religious even, without it so far ceasing to be a religion ; it seems that in perfecting it destroys itself, and that it is equally impossible to resist the movement and to yield to it, to let itself be surpassed and to let itself be carried onwards in the progress of humanity. Let us take care, the future of Christianity depends on this solution of this problem.”*

What are these but the very words we already quoted from M. Naville, bitterly re-echoed by one who, after going the most daring lengths in negation, has the courage to turn round and gaze face to face upon the destruction and blighting desolation he has strewed around him? We may only be permitted to hope that, “after criticising the results of his own tendency, and almost reacting against himself, this vigorous mind may yet be brought to see the terms of reconciliation between experience and reason, “in the knowledge of the living and true God, the direct result of the Christian’s faith ; God was in Christ.”

ART. VIII.—*The Moral Aspects of the Present Struggle in America.**

THE United States are at this moment in the midst of a contest which, for the magnitude of its proportions, and the momentous character of its issues, is unsurpassed in the history of Christendom. We have ourselves not more than half waked up to an appreciation of its importance. It has already not only arrested the attention, but tasked the political sagacity, and seriously, if not vitally, affected the interests of the world. Foreign journals are declaring, in the most confident terms, the utter impracticability of the task with which the government has charged itself, and, arrogantly pronouncing the great American Republic already hopelessly destroyed, call upon us, in the name of a professed humanity, to make peace at once with rebellion, and save the effusion of blood and the waste of hundreds of millions of treasure. Nor can we disguise from ourselves the fact, however sanguine we may be, that history has on record no example of an insurrection comparable to this, either in extent of territory or apparent popular unanimity and resoluteness of purpose, that has ever been effectually quelled. The cost in blood has not been great thus far. But

* *Revue des deux Mondes*, 15 Mai 1861.—Article “On Essays and Reviews.”

† We give this article from the *American Theological Review*, merely to shew how the American Secession is viewed and explained by an intelligent northern writer.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

the expenditure of a million a day, the actual enlistment, on the one side and the other, of more than half a million of men, armed to a great extent with the most recent improvements in offensive and defensive weapons, the suspension and utter derangement of business from one end of the land to the other, the possibility that foreign nations may presently embroil themselves in the contest, the almost sure expectation of a bloody collision of arms, to begin at any moment, and end, God only can tell when and where, and the manifest probability of serious changes in the policy of the government, if not in the constitution of society, as the result of the war, combine to shew us that the enterprise is one encompassed with difficulties and pregnant with most momentous consequences. It is a life and death struggle of a mighty nation.

It is a matter of comparatively small moment, as respects the results of this struggle, what opinions foreign nations entertain in regard to it. We have wasted altogether too much time and sensibility over the question, What will England think, and what will this or that interested English journal or flippant correspondent of the English press say of our proceedings? It is high time we were weaned. If we respect ourselves, foreign nations, petulant and jealous old England among the rest, will be compelled to respect us. They should be carefully watched, and their designs promptly met if they shew the slightest disposition to interfere. They should never be insulted by angry defiance, and all their rights should be religiously respected. But it is not the opinion of European nations that is going to determine this contest. We have nothing to expect from any of them, so long as it remains doubtful. If we fail, either in arms or statesmanship, be sure they will be against us. If we succeed, they will be for us, but it will then be of very little importance whether they are for us or not. The responsibility is ours. The merits of the cause, and the course which duty demands of us, we have to determine for ourselves. If the cause be good, we must *make* it respected, and carry it through by such means as are within our command. With a careful avoidance of every wrong measure, and a wise and liberal use of our abundant resources; with a single eye to the single end which is the best good of this great people, South and North, we have to depend under God solely upon our own *right arm*.

But let it not be inferred that, even as an element of success, the intrinsic merit of the cause is a matter of indifference. We cannot afford to brave public opinion unless we can appeal from it to a better-informed public opinion to arise in the future. Besides, "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has been recognised as due by this nation from the beginning.

And for our own sakes and that of our posterity, for the respect we owe to our history, for the influence and standing we desire to maintain among the nations as a wise, upright, and humane, as well as brave and strong people—above all, in view of our relations to the great King of kings, who, we must never forget, sitteth on the throne judging righteously—it becomes us carefully to examine the wisdom and rectitude of so momentous an enterprise, and set the reasons which actuate us clearly before our own minds and those of our fellow-men. If this contest be, on our part, one of revenge, of ambition, of empty national pride, of sectional aggrandisement, or of self-interest; if it be not a matter of high and sacred duty in the discharge of a responsibility solemnly imposed upon us by the authority of God and the claims of humanity, the “fratricidal war,” as it is contemptuously called by some who wish no good to either party, is, it must be owned, as disgraceful to us as it might then be expected to prove futile and ruinous.

It is not our purpose at present to discuss at large the merits of the question at issue, but only to present a few of its most obvious moral features, thereby to strengthen the purposes and animate the hopes of the defenders of the right, and put ourselves and our associates on our guard against such misapprehensions of the end to be aimed at, as might divert our efforts into a false channel.

One of the first questions to be asked is, How came we into this contest? For more than three quarters of a century we have been a united people. The *Union* has been our boast South and North. Our fathers exerted their utmost wisdom to form and perfect it, and we had received it as our best national birthright from the Madisons, Masons, Pinckneys, Jays, Hamiltons, Shermans, and Franklins of the revolutionary period. Ay, it had been committed to us, in his dying charge, as a trust for our posterity by the immortal Washington. Under it we had prospered and grown great as no other nation ever did. Our progress in all that constitutes the prosperity of a people, intellectual, moral, and religious, as well as material, had been the admiration of the world. Even they who did not like us feared to interfere with our affairs, or put themselves in the way of our rapid and almost irresistible advancement. Nowhere in the world was there such universal comfort, such general intelligence, such scope for the exercise of all sorts of talent, such unmolested enjoyment of religious privileges. We had our political squabbles, but they were soon settled, and in all parts of the country, South and North, the great mass of the people, Whig or Democrat, Federalist or Republican, felt in their hearts that under any administration the privileges to

be enjoyed far surpassed the burdens and grievances to be endured.

It lies upon the face of the recent outbreak that it had its origin exclusively among the population of the Southern States. Not that the people of those States are all involved in it, much less responsible for its occurrence; but it originated among them. The North had its supposed grievances, and at times had smarted keenly under them. Its hardy and industrious population, dependent on their own efforts, and accustomed to form their own judgments, felt that their rights were trifled with, and their moral and religious sentiments abused, by the ever-restless, arrogant, and aspiring leaders of Southern opinion and policy. Southern politicians had monopolised a large share of the offices, and, by dexterous management with Northern parties, had controlled, disadvantageously to the most substantial interests of the North, the policy of the country. But the North had sought its redress, not in revolution, nor even in threats of dismemberment, but through the legitimate channels of the press, the ballot-box, and the legislative arena. And it is worthy of note, that whenever the attempt has been made to fix on any portion of that section the charge of *disunion* sentiments or purposes, it has been necessary to have recourse to ambiguous expressions uttered in the heat of some party contest years ago, as far back as the Hartford Convention or the Annexation of Texas. The North has had its faults, no doubt. It may have contributed its full share to the causes of the present deplorable rupture. But it cannot be disputed, and history will affirm it with an unwavering decision, that the North as a body has always been firmly loyal to the American Union.

In looking for the causes which have brought so large a portion of the Southern people to the position they have assumed, we must go back to a very early period of our country's history. The present posture of affairs is not a mere matter of accident; it is the result of no transient and easily avoidable influences. The seeds of the mischief lay deeply imbedded in the very soil on which our institutions were erected. We may wonder that divine Providence should have permitted it—but so it is. The evil egg was deposited in the very flower of the nation's prime, and was sure from the beginning to break out into a consuming worm in the summer and fruitage of its prosperous maturity. We need not undertake to unravel the vast net-work of causes which have acted and reacted upon each other during three quarters of a century. The intricate lock has too many permutations and combinations to enable us to fix the exact numbers corresponding to the last movement of the bolts. But we may perhaps furnish from the obvious history of the country one or

two master-keys, which, with slight adjustments, may serve for the most practical purposes.

The root of the difficulty is not to be found in an opposition of interests. The interests of the South are scarcely more at variance with those of the North than are those of the East with those of the West. Individual states, lying side by side, have a certain diversity of interest, and may be rivals with each other in determining the industrial policy of the country. The mine and the factory, the field and the ocean, the mart and the plantation, have no doubt their particular facilities and opportunities, and in particular cases the advantage of the one operates to the disadvantage of the other. But, on the whole, it may be affirmed with confidence, that what is for the interest of the South is likewise for that of the North and West. There never was a great people better adapted in this respect to play into the hands of each other, and to flourish by free interchange and co-operation. If the South were to become independent to-day, they would be obliged, for their own sakes, to form relations either with the North, or some foreign country requiring equal if not greater concessions than those they have been accustomed to make in the national Union.

Nor is the source of the rupture to be looked for, as some have foolishly pretended, in a difference of race. In fact, there is no such difference of race. All over the land, it is true, there is a mixture of elements; and every nation of the earth, Jew and Gentile, Celt and Teuton, Anglo-Saxon and Latin, have contributed their quota. The South may have a few more of the Scotch-Irish, and the North of the more aboriginal race of the Green Isle; the South more of the descendants of the Cavaliers, and the North of those of the Puritans. But with different proportions in the mixture, both communities are of the same stock or stocks. Indeed, not a few of those who are now most loud-mouthed in their clamour for Southern rights and Southern honour, are themselves either emigrants from the Northern States, or of Northern origin through one or both parents. As was beautifully said by one of the noblest and most chivalrous Southrons of them all, himself of Northern birth: "The sons of New England are found in every State of the broad Republic. In the east, the south, and the unbounded west, their blood mingles freely with every kindred current. In the veins of our children flow Northern and Southern blood; how shall it be separated?" This process of mingling and commingling has been going on through our entire history, and at the present moment there are few Northerners or Southerners who have not relatives either by blood or affinity in the other section of the country.

Nor, again, is the cause to be looked for in a difference of

political or religious institutions. The governments of these States were all founded on the same republican basis; and the same general ideas lie at the foundation of all their constitutions and laws. If we except the single State of Louisiana, every one of them, old and new, are on the same old platform of the common law of England. In the sphere of religion we have precisely the same denominations, and, till recently, have claimed connection with the same national churches. With few exceptions, we are all Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, and Congregationalists, or Presbyterians. And the fundamental ideas of our worship, doctrine, and discipline present no marks of difference by which one section could be distinguished from the other.

Nor, again, has there been, on the part of the North, any such alienation of feeling as to justify the notion that the two sections might not live together in national harmony. No doubt there has been gaining ground at the South, for a considerable time, a hostile feeling. And at the North, it must be owned, there has been, from the beginning, a deep-seated and almost universal disapproval of certain features of Southern society. But that the feeling has ever, in the great body of the Northern people, transcended the bounds of a friendly difference of opinion, or been the occasion of personal animosities towards the people of the South in general, we confidently deny. Indeed, if we are not mistaken in our observation, there has prevailed among us, to a great extent, a sentiment of partiality; so that, in almost any company, the introduction of your friend as a gentleman or lady from the South, has been the passport to peculiar attentions.

We have alluded to "certain features of Southern society." But this is no time to talk gingerly, or resort to euphuistic and indirect phrases. The *root* and *mother* of this whole difficulty, the subject-matter of it and the predisposing cause, is **SLAVERY**. It has developed traits of character in the Southern population, which alone could have made such a result possible.* It has brought about what we are compelled to

* The opinions above expressed are fortified by that of that shrewd and philosophical observer of our country, De Tocqueville, uttered a quarter of a century ago. "The dangers which threaten the American Union," he says, "do not originate in diversity of interests or opinions, but in the various characters and passions of the Americans. The men who inhabit the vast territory of the United States are almost all the issue of a common stock, but the effects of climate, and more especially of slavery, have gradually introduced very striking differences between the British settler of the Southern States and the British settler of the North. In Europe it is generally believed that slavery has rendered the *interests* of one part contrary to those of another part; but I by no means remarked this to be the case. Slavery has not created interests in the South contrary to those of the North, but it has modified the *character* and changed the *habits* of the natives of the South."

admit has been and is an *irrepressible conflict*. Many of us would fain have repressed it. We were willing to make all sorts of concessions, consistent with the plainest duty, in order to repress it. But it has proved itself too strong for the most powerful and determined pacificators.

This strange anomaly in our free institutions has had a home among them from the very beginning. Our fathers treated it as an existing fact, and, as such, protected its interests; but regarding it as an anomaly, and expecting it to be but temporary, made little or no calculation for the contingency of its permanence. Jefferson's views on the subject are well known; so are Madison's, the father, if any one might be called such, of the Federal Constitution. The very words *slave* and *slavery* were excluded from the instrument, because the thing itself was not expected to continue. But, in the providence of God, and by the working of unforeseen causes, the event has been just the opposite of the expectation. Slavery, which soon died out in the Northern States, has taken deep root in the South, and grown to vast proportions. It has been elevated to the dignity of an *institution*; and, from being regarded as an unavoidable evil, has come to be lauded as the true basis of the best possible form of society. It has formed and governed the habits of thought; and fixed, in a great measure, the relative social standing of the people. It has assumed to be the ruling interest of the South, to which all others must consent to be subordinate. It has put rigid restrictions on the expression of opinion and the circulation of literature. It has assailed with fierce denunciations and epithets of contempt whoever has dared question either its authority or its excellence. It has expelled Southern men from their homes for opposition to its assumed prerogatives. It has demanded recognition by the Northern people, not as a local, but a *national*, institution. It has aspired to rule, and to a suprising extent has succeeded in ruling, the policy of the nation. It has even bound itself by an awful oath never to suffer a man opposed to its pretensions to occupy the chair of President of the United States of America.

We state these things simply as matters of fact, and not for the purpose of throwing reproach upon an entire community. We would not be unjust, even amidst the fearful evils which have recently been precipitated upon us. No person has a higher esteem for a very large portion of the people of the Southern States. Nowhere do we find men more honourable and religious—nowhere women more pure, refined, beneficent, and self-sacrificing. And as respects the unfortunate and dependent race whose relations are the occasion of this collision, we believe few Northern men or women would have half

the patience with them, or bestow upon them half the self-sacrificing attentions, sick or well, living or dying, which not a few of them now receive from those who claim to hold them under the laws in the character of property. Indeed, with all the abuses to which the system is manifestly liable, and the immense irresponsible power which it puts into individual hands, we think it creditable to the Southern people, as a body, that the race is so well cared for as it is, and so few aggravated wrongs are actually suffered. Nor, with all our deep convictions of the intrinsic evil of the system, social, moral, and religious, as well as political, would we cast indiscriminate censure upon the Southern people for its existence among them, or demand, even as a moral obligation, its *immediate* and *unconditional* abolition. It is a question no doubt encompassed with difficulties, and, for ourselves, we are quite disposed to leave to them the responsibility.

But while we say this, and would urge it as we have ever done on the consideration of the North, we must affirm with equal emphasis, that the North is not, on any right view of the case, to be blamed for entertaining and expressing a deep-seated and irreconcilable aversion to the system of slavery. That aversion has been ingrained in the very texture of their institutions and education. Many of them, and we think justly, regard their favourite doctrine of *liberty and equality*—the doctrine which stands emblazoned on the very front of the Declaration of Independence—as just as applicable to men of a dark skin as those of a white one. Their fathers abolished slavery, not because it was unprofitable, but because they believed it incompatible with the principles of liberty, political and religious. They regard it, with a few exceptions, as an enormous evil. This is not the opinion only of a few wild fanatics. The mildest, coolest, most considerate, and thoughtful men, accustomed to judge deliberately and look on all sides of a subject, have long since been settled in that conclusion. This doctrine, held as we have said by the fathers of the Republic, was, till recently, that of three-fourths of the wisest men in the Southern States. Witness the resolutions of the Presbyterian Church in 1818, passed with the concurrence of the great body of the Southern members. No large assembly of Christians has passed as decisive resolutions in recent times. "I am not very old," said a distinguished member of the Mississippi bar a few months since, "and yet I can remember when intelligent men at the South not only doubted whether slavery were right, but there was a *general feeling* that it ought ultimately to be abolished. This feeling in Kentucky and Virginia, in 1832-33, almost culminated into emancipation; and even in this State the Supreme Court decided that it was an

unnatural and unjust relation, and that all presumptions should be indulged against it." * If the South has got new light recently, it cannot be deemed an offence that the North, seeing no reason to change their opinions, should still insist upon the lessons which the South herself formerly taught them. Till it can be shewn at least that the system is compatible with as much intellectual improvement as the race or individuals in it are capable of; till the law of marriage, and the sacred command of the Saviour, "What God hath joined together let not man put asunder," shall cease to be a nullity in the case of four millions of human beings made in God's image, thinking men, out of the immediate influence of the system, will not be likely to regard it otherwise than as an enormous evil. And not merely because we are members of the same body politic, but because we are of a common human family, most men will be likely to regard themselves as under obligations both to God and man, to speak out freely their opinions on the subject, and use their utmost influence to change the opposite opinions of their Southern neighbours.

It is no part of our present design to discuss the merits of the slavery question. We wish only to shew how it lies among the leading causes of the existing rupture. It was not in the nature of things that the North should yield, while they had strength to resist, to the new claims of the South in behalf of this system. To all the guarantees of the constitution, the South was no doubt entitled. The great body of the North, a few radical men only excepted, constantly declared them to be so. They acquiesced while territory after territory, purchased with the money, or won by the arms of the whole Union, had been given over to slavery. They joined the South in passing what were called the compromises of 1850, affording new guarantees against the escape of slaves, and which at the time all parties said should be a finality. But when they saw claim after claim preferred successfully, and the old compromise, which secured the Northern territories to freedom, swept recklessly away; when the doctrine was asserted, and on the point to be enforced, that the constitution itself, *proprio vigore*, carries the offensive system into every territory of the country; nay, that on the principles of natural right, slavery is the rule and freedom only the exception, they could not, without stultifying themselves and consenting to be bound hand and foot to the car of slavery, refrain from vigorous moral and political resistance.

Had the new doctrines been confined to the political arena, the case would have been less aggravated. But they had taken

* Speech of Wm. C. Smedes, Esq., Vicksburgh, Oct. 1860.

deep root in the church; and ministers of the gospel, as if to prove, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that they had freed themselves from the scruples entertained by their fathers, ran great lengths before the more sober civilians, proving, out of the Bible, the excellence of the cherished institution, and denouncing as *infidels* every man who presumed to call it in question. It was thus that the New School Presbyterian Assembly was ruptured. And the ground recently taken by Dr Palmer of New Orleans, of the Old School, does but give a public voice to what not a few of his brethren are well known at this moment to maintain. What would the Assembly of 1818 have said to such language as the following:—"A nation often has a character as well-defined and intense as that of the individual. However derived, this individuality of character alone makes any people truly historic, competent to work out its own specific mission, and to become a factor in the world's progress. The particular trust assigned to such a people becomes the pledge of the divine protection, and their fidelity to it determines the fate by which it is finally overtaken. If then the South is such a people, what, at this juncture, is their providential trust? I answer, that it is *to conserve and to perpetuate the institution of domestic slavery as now existing.*" The italics are his own, as we extract the passage from his printed sermon now lying before us; *to conserve and to perpetuate the institution of domestic slavery as now existing!* And again, he says—"Without determining the question of duty for future generations, I simply say that, for us, as now situated, the duty is plain, of conserving and *transmitting the system of slavery, with the freest scope for its national development and extension.*"

Could the freemen of the North, brought up in the doctrine expressed by the General Assembly of 1818, consent to be silent under such startling assertions? Could the church, for the sake of union and good-fellowship, consent to hold her peace? Could she continue to give letters of recommendation indiscriminately, and that for the occupation of Northern pulpits and theological professorships, with such doctrines boldly maintained in her midst, and say nothing about the matter?

The North was bound by the most sacred obligations, both to discuss the question freely in the moral and religious arena, and debate and resist the new claim in the department of politics. No doubt, some have been intemperate and discourteous in their manner of discussion. With that we have been ourselves sufficiently disgusted. But that is only what occurs on all subjects exciting in a high degree the public mind. We are amazed, or should be, if anything could amaze us from that

quarter, to hear such a man as Bishop Eliot laying the chief stress, in his assertion of Southern grievances, on the fact that Northern newspapers, pamphlets, lecture-rooms, pulpits, senate chambers, &c., in common with those of Europe, have "systematically" "slandered and traduced," "as incompatible with civilisation and Christianity," the institution of slavery. We have always been accustomed to believe an institution which would not bear to be discussed *roughly*, could not have in it much inherent goodness or strength. And yet, if we have rightly judged, the North, as a body, have never been disposed to discuss the question of slavery in a particularly bold manner. We venture to say, the question cannot be named, involving as high moral and religious considerations, which has been handled as cautiously and almost nervously, if we except the discussions of the abolition party, as the question of slavery. And, as to political movements, although, of course, every party will be likely to see most vividly its own grievances, we think it may be asserted without reasonable question, that by far the majority of Northern men, in all parties, up to the moment of the present outbreak, and never more so than at that moment, were agreed in giving to the South every right which they believed could be claimed by them under the Federal Constitution. While, therefore, we assert, as before, that slavery is the grand predisposing cause of the existing rupture, we cannot regard it, *or the course which has been pursued in respect to it*, as in the slightest degree a justifying cause. Nor do we believe such a result as we now witness could have been brought about but for the working of another cause, which has made use of this as its most effective instrument.

That cause, to which we now call special attention, is the *unscrupulous ambition* of political partisans. There is the most satisfactory reason to believe that, for more than thirty years, there has existed, in some parts of the South, a deep-laid plot to dismember the national Union. Its first open demonstration was in the famous Nullification movement, which culminated and was defeated in its plans in the spring of 1833, and which took that shape, partly because the people were not prepared for open and avowed rebellion, and partly because Mr Calhoun was not yet willing to forego his hopes of attaining to the Presidency of the United States. We well remember listening to a conversation, during the spring of that year, between a Southern gentleman of some political distinction, and one of the largest manufacturers of the city of Boston. After discussing, for some time, the then recent Nullification excitement, and the bearing of Mr Clay's Compromise Bill, which had so modified the tariff as to pacify the Nullifiers, the Southern gentleman observed—"After all, sir, you have not got hold of

the secret of the difficulty. It is not the tariff that these men are concerned about. It is the separation of the Union. I know them all," said he, mentioning names then perfectly familiar to the public ear; "they are my friends, and they are good fellows; but they have got it into their heads it would be a good thing to have a Southern Republic, and they mean to bring it about." The old dream of a confederacy or republic, inclosing in its circuit the Gulf of Mexico, and possessing the mouths of all the principal rivers, which they imagined would give them the key of power and prosperity—the dream which is supposed to have turned the head of Aaron Burr, and almost brought that head to the gallows—was even then stirring in the ambitious brains of Southern aspirants. The plot was at that time confined chiefly to South Carolina and Virginia, in the development of which the South Carolinians acted openly, and the Virginians, standing in fear of the immense loyal majority among the citizens of that State, sympathised and assisted beneath a cover.

This disunion project, it is well known, South Carolina has never relinquished. She has lost no opportunity of gaining partisans, or making movements for its accomplishment. In 1850, she actually passed an ordinance of secession, but repealed it because a new compromise prevented other states from following her example. And it serves to identify her last and successful effort with the first, that Mr Rhett, immediately after the act of secession, last December, declared in the Convention—"We have only accomplished what our fathers taught us to do, thirty years ago."

In the first effort, the question of slavery seems to have performed no prominent part, except through the traits of character which the system had contributed to form. In the *Partisan Leader*, a work of fiction, said to have been written in 1836, by a professor in a Virginia institution, and a friend of Mr Calhoun, in which, with one or two exceptions, the whole plan according to which the leaders of the rebellion now in arms are actually working, is detailed with a startling accuracy, almost forcing you to the belief that, instead of twenty-five years, its origin must have been within the last six months—no account whatsoever is taken of the subject of slavery. But this was only at the beginning. It was soon perceived by discerning eyes where lay the true strength of sectional partisanship. Mr Benton, in an address to which we listened five years ago, marked the precise date of the change in the disunion tactics. After describing in an eloquent manner the perilous position in which Mr Calhoun found himself when the proclamation of General Jackson and the passage of the Force Bill, so nobly sustained by Mr Webster in oblivion of all party differences,

brought him suddenly to a stand, went on to relate, that, no sooner did the nullification leader find himself released from his dilemma, as he did by the passage of Mr Clay's compromise bill, than he proceeded to address a letter to his political friends, in which he assured them it was, in his judgment, quite futile to attempt further to make a unit of the South on the question of the tariff. They must adopt another, and he indicated, for that purpose, the question of *slavery*. Mr Clay, said Mr Benton, saw the letter, and taking alarm, wrote to Madison on the subject. And Madison replied that he had seen the letter, and augured from it *nothing but mischief*. Then and there, continued the veteran democratic senator, commenced a series of measures, still in progress, having in view the sectional unity of the South on the basis of that question—such as the employment of the press, the sending forth of lecturers or stump-orators, and the series of Southern conventions. Abolitionism, he added, made its appearance in the North just about the same time, and every extravagant thing that was said from pulpit or press, was carefully gathered up and reproduced in the South, to make the people feel that the North were their enemies.

We have already expressed the opinion that there is and has been no prevailing animosity in the Northern mind towards the people of the South. The dislike and disapproval of slavery has never taken that shape, except sporadically, or in the heat of controversy. But we cannot say the same on the other hand. Left to themselves, we believe the Southern people would be generous and friendly. But under the influence of inflammatory demagogues, having for their object to "fire the Southern heart," animosity and prejudice have sometimes been excited to an astonishing pitch. We find an illustration of this as far back as 1838, in the Memoir of Hon. S. S. Prentiss, a man eminently devoted to every true and honourable interest of the South, while he never narrowed his mind to the exclusion of any section of his country from his generous patriotism. At a public dinner at Vicksburgh, to which he had been invited just after his return from a visit to the North, we find him speaking as follows: "It is the fashionable cant of the day to denounce the Whig party in the South, in the most unqualified terms, as leagued with the Abolitionists, traitors to their own interests, enemies to their own institutions, and with other such like phrases. Southern democracy, it seems, consists in a general abuse of the rest of the Union, a denial of the existence of any common interest with the North, and a bitter denunciation of every man who has the independence to refuse to assent to these strange dogmas. Indeed, to such an extent is this brotherly hatred now carried by some, that a

man cannot exchange ordinary courtesies or civilities with his fellow-citizens of the North, without rendering himself obnoxious to the charge of being an enemy to the South." Then, speaking of courtesies recently received by him during his Northern visit, and which were offered, as he affirms, "chiefly as an expression of good feeling towards the State" he represented, he adds: "Yet have I been most bitterly abused for responding to these courtesies, for daring to break bread and eat salt with our Northern brethren, and, especially, for so far violating Southern policy as to have wickedly visited the cradle of liberty, and most sacrilegiously entered Faneuil Hall."

Thus it is, that, for a long series of years, the Southern mind has been poisoned. At every Presidential election the elements of the poison have been spread abroad most industriously; and Southern demagogues have then enjoyed the aid of Northern slanderers, who have shewn no scruple in maligning the people of their own section. Thus has the mind of the South been prepared to acquiesce in almost any project, however desperate, which might promise to rid them of the power and influence of their hated neighbours. And thus have the people of the South been prepared to drink in, as if it were gospel, the infamous slander of Beauregard's proclamation, or the scarcely less infamous and false resolutions offered by Mr Cobb in the recent Congress at Montgomery as the basis of a recommendation of a day of fasting and prayer.

Meanwhile, the plans of the conspirators were greatly favoured, in the progress of events, by the vast increase of the cotton interest, which had become a necessity, not to a single country only, but to the world, and by the immensely enhanced value of slave property, as inseparably connected with its American culture. It was believed that cotton, and slavery as inseparable from cotton, might claim successfully to be the ruler of the world. The old dream of a confederacy or empire around the Gulf now assumed hues as gorgeous as those which once emblazoned the "Peacock Throne," and the gorgeous WEST, instead of the "gorgeous EAST," was expected soon to "shower on her kings barbaric pearls and gold." Texas had been secured to slavery, with four new States to be carved out of it as soon as they could be settled; and *fillibustering* expeditions to Mexico and Central America, sustained by Southern men, and only nominally interfered with by a Southern Cabinet, were expected soon to extend the area of dominion to indefinite limits. The reopening of the slave trade was indeed a necessary adjunct of the scheme, and that must be approached cautiously, since the sentiment of the South was not yet ripe for its adoption, and the sentiment of the North and the world was utterly abhorrent to it. But tentative opinions

had been put forth again and again bearing in that direction, and tentative expeditions had been fitted out and put in operation not unsuccessfully. A prominent politician of one of the Southern States, on retiring from office a few years ago, declared to his fellow-citizens, in the most emphatic terms, that, in his judgment, the reopening of that traffic was absolutely essential to the occupation of new territory and the multiplication of Slave States; and that, though he was not prepared to advise the measure, the South must understand they had no alternative between its adoption and resting content with their existing boundaries. There is not, we think, the slightest doubt that, could Southern politicians have retained the general Government one or two terms more, the slave trade would have been opened, and slave ships, protected by American frigates, traversed the ocean with their human freight in defiance of the world.

Could this have been accomplished, and the Government secured permanently in the hands of Southern men, could Kansas have been gained to slavery, the Dred Scott Decision been acquiesced in as a finality, liberty obtained to carry slaves *in transitu* into any and all of the States, all restrictions upon slave extension removed from existing territories, or even from those below what was regarded as the line of profitable slave labour, and the Breckinridge clause of the Crittenden Compromise relating to *future* territory made the permanent law, there were those among them who, no doubt, would have been willing to let the Union remain unbroken, or at least try the experiment of pursuing their favourite plans a little longer under its banner. But failing in this, the resolution had been taken long ago, and had waited only for its opportunity, and for the pretext which should bring a sufficient portion of the Southern people to its support, to tear down the pillars of the Republic.

With these views and these extravagant hopes and desperate plans, the slave power, as it has been justly called, became, in the hands of the conspirators and those who supported them, fierce, insolent, defiant, and often violent to the utter contempt of law and principle. You could not approach it or make the slightest rustle of opposition without awakening a hiss, nor put yourself in the way of its designs without feeling a poisonous fang. Even the old friends and defenders of the South, those who had borne the brunt of Abolitionism at the North for a quarter of a century, found themselves among the objects of its fierce denunciations hardly less than the Garrisons, Phillipses, and Lovejoys, whom they had strenuously opposed.

But we must hasten on to the closing acts of the terrible drama. After a long struggle in Congress, through the press,

and at the polls in successive Presidential campaigns ; after the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, which startled the best friends of the South and upset all their notions of Southern honour and good faith, and the fierce battle for liberty on the one hand and slavery on the other in the territory of Kansas, resulting, fortunately for the world, in the triumph of free institutions—the success of the Republican party in the election of Lincoln was accepted as the ripe occasion for breaking out into open rebellion. We need not detail the series of measures which are yet but too fresh in the memory of American citizens. The fiction of *secession*, we are constrained to believe, was but a pretext to beguile unwary but scrupulous souls. The repeated declaration that separation was to be a peaceable measure, and that all the South wanted was to be *let alone*, was but a convenient cover to a policy which the leaders in it must have known would lead, sooner or later, to blood. But the net had been carefully woven round the limbs of the nation, North as well as South ; and the secret machinations of a band of sworn desperadoes distributed through the country, the complicity of members of two successive Presidential Cabinets, who had destroyed the defences of the country or transferred them to the custody or within reach of the seizure of the leaders of rebellion, the distribution in all the offices of the Government of men known to sympathise with the intended movement, and already prepared, by accepting the pestilent heresy of *secession*, to absolve themselves from the obligations of their sacred oaths, the thorough organisation of the whole conspiracy and the maturity of its plans, seemed to make them sure of securing their victim. In the excitement of the hour, the Gulf States were first *precipitated* into rebellion, with no fair opportunity for the expression of public opinion, and, forthwith, an armed resistance was prepared, and armed aggression on the property and fortifications of the United States initiated the measure of WAR.

We all remember, but too well, the fearful days and months of the winter of 1860–61, when a great nation lay prostrate and powerless, completely paralysed with astonishment, or *etherized* with the delusive cry of *compromise* and *no coercion*, while a REBELLION more foul, and a CONSPIRACY more desperate and malignant than that of Catiline was fingering at its throat, and pricking with its poisoned dagger at its jugular vein. American citizens can never forget the strange and utterly unparalleled sensations of those black months. Should they live fifty years, they will ever haunt them at times in their nightmare dreams. We were like men astounded by the fearful throes of a startling earthquake. The very ground we trod trembled beneath our feet, and the key-stone of the great arch of our Government shook and swayed, threatening to crush us.

It has been said there was no design on the part of the rebellious States beyond their own independence. But we know better than that. The utter dissolution of the existing nation, that a new one might be constructed out of its most available fragments, was among their plainly avowed purposes. Says Hon. Robert H. Smith of Alabama, in a speech delivered at Mobile in March last, "I earnestly hope that, not only will the kindred States join us, but abide in confidence, that some of the great North-Western States, watered by the Mississippi, will be drawn by the strong current of that mighty river, and by the laws of trade, to swell the number and power of this Confederation, and that we shall receive them on such terms of their organic law as we ourselves may prescribe; and in doing so, GRASP THE POWER OF EMPIRE ON THIS CONTINENT, and announce to the startled North that it has reached its western limit, and must spread, if spread it can, towards the frozen sea. As sure as the Mississippi flows towards the Gulf, and bears on its bosom the great commerce of the west, and as sure as we are consumers of western products, and *our Tariff will be lower than that of the United States*, so sure will the trouble be, not to have the West with us, but to keep it from us. The only escape from it is, by their government adopting *our system* of low duties, or by New York's *cutting loose from New England* and spreading its gates of commerce wide to free trade. The political economist knows it, the merchant knows it, and the Black Republican statesman now feels it, and stands appalled at the ruin he has done."

There is no need of mistaking such an announcement. What the sympathies of neighbouring States, and the urgency of interest could not effect, was to be made necessary by unfriendly legislation. It is well known that New York city was expected either to join the Confederacy, or to unite its fortunes with it by separating from the State and becoming a free city. And as for Washington, though it has been denied that there was any intention at the outset to seize that, it is very well known that Mr Wise, five years ago, declared his readiness to head a party for that purpose in case Fremont should be elected; and that Mr Walker, the secretary of war of the so-called Confederacy, declared openly, just after the taking of Fort Sumter, that it would be accomplished in a few weeks.

What, then, was the plain and obvious posture of affairs? The United States had before them the single alternative of WAR or RUIN. This is, in our judgment, as certain as any problem in mathematics. The rebel states were actually at war all winter, while they were crying peace. The seizures and other acts of violence which they committed, not even the most unscrupulous of their partisans could have justified to

themselves for a moment on any other supposition. And while our government hesitated and talked of compromise and doubted about coercion, we came as near an utter and irretrievable overthrow as was possible without actually incurring it. Thank God, the booming of the cannon that shattered the walls and tore the flag of Fort Sumter, roused the nation from a dream that had well-nigh proved its death. It was a glorious experience. Strangely, God seemed to give to the nation another heart. Patriotism, that had so long slept, suddenly woke up in the breasts of twenty millions of freemen. The government saw its duty, the sacred duty with which it had been charged, in behalf of the world and the generations, not by man only, but by God, and addressed itself with energy to its performance. The church awoke too, and from all her pulpits sounded out the word of God, which declares, not in the Old Testament, but in the New, that the civil magistrate is "the minister of God, AN AVENGER TO EXECUTE WRATH on him that doeth evil," and "that he beareth not the SWORD in vain."

If ever there was a sacred cause on earth, we believe this is one. It is just the cause for which the New Testament explicitly commands the unsheathing of the sword in God's name. It is said we cannot carry it through. We reply, we did not take that question into the account when we entered on this struggle. It was a plain *duty* to undertake it. "Sink or swim, live or die, survive or perish," we had no alternative. It was a case of life and death to the nation, and we must struggle until the power to do so no longer remained. Could we have met the judgment of the world, could we have met the judgment of posterity, could we have met the judgment of Almighty God, if we had suffered this great nation, this most benign government, freighted with the interests of millions and with the hopes of the church, under God, as well as of the world, to be torn to pieces and its fragments scattered on the sea of anarchy, without a struggle? Peace is a blessing earnestly to be coveted. War is a fearful evil. But who supposes we could have had peace had this foul conspiracy been suffered to triumph? What sort of peace could have been expected, when the Union was broken up, and a new empire, under the name of a Republic, built up at our side on the sole basis of cotton and slavery? Mr Stephens, the Vice-President of the so-called Confederacy, is not ordinarily an extravagant talker, yet he tells us, in vaunting terms, that the ideas held by the fathers of the Republic on the subject of freedom and equality are wrong. "Our new government," he says, "is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas, its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth that *the negro is not equal to the white man*; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and

normal condition. Thus our new government is the first in the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth." Who supposes we could have remained at peace with a nation based on such ideas close on our border, and no natural barrier between us? Suppose we had retained all the northern states, what hope of concord could there be between nations based on principles so diametrically opposite? What hope from a Confederacy, starting as this did, with the unscrupulous renunciation of the most solemn oaths and obligations? No, much as we love and long for peace—indeed, just in proportion as we love and long for it—we believe the utter crushing of this fearful rebellion is the only hope of its permanent maintenance.

But if we did not count the cost at the beginning, we have, we believe, counted it since. This war will cause us an immense expenditure of blood and treasure. It may be a long and wearing, wasting process. But we can carry it through. The mischief is not, after all, so formidable as it seemed at first. If this rebellion were, in the proper sense of the word, an uprising of the people, we might despair of subjugating them. But it embraces only a faction of the Southern people, and has, to our eye, all the aspect of a foul CONSPIRACY. We protest against regarding the contest as a sectional one between the North and the South. In the name of Kentucky and Maryland, Delaware and Missouri, and of loyal multitudes in other Southern States, we protest against it. And though in several of the States vast numbers of the people have no doubt been made to feel that they are fighting for their homes, their liberties, and the safety and honour of their wives and daughters, we know they have been grossly deceived, and believe that, under a change of circumstances, they will see that they have been so, and take a different position. Already, we see more than gleams of encouragement in that direction. Western Virginia is heartily and bravely with us. Eastern Tennessee is only waiting for support to free herself from the toils that have been thrown around her. The whole mountain region, the home of those bold, hardy mountaineers, on whose support the author of the *Partisan Leader* confidently relied, is on the side of the Union. North Carolina begins to give tokens of a loyal movement; and all over the South there is, or was, a loyal element which, if now dead and twice dead, may have a resurrection. It only wants firmness, perseverance, unanimity, and singleness of purpose on our part, and, with a reasonable share of energy and statesmanlike wisdom, we believe this great Union may once more stand before the world in its integrity, and the beautiful "Stars and Stripes," dear to us now as they never were before, wave their cheering folds over every mountain and valley of our extended territory. We have suffered some

defeats thus far, but we needed them, and they will do the nation good. We shall have more, if divine wisdom sees them requisite, either to abate our hurtful pride, or drive a deeper furrow in the fallow ground, to be broken up. But we shall triumph at last, if we trust in God and persevere, regardless of self-sacrifice.

As to the question, What is to become of slavery? we are not careful to answer or inquire. The flagrant crime of rebellion against the best of governments has been committed on the part of the Southern faction avowedly in its interest. The war, on the part of the nation, has been undertaken solely for the support of the government; in other words, of "The Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws." If slavery falls in this contest, it will be its own fault. But God's good providence will decide.

We hear that Christians of the South are praying over the subject, and with professions of devout confidence, laying their cause before God. At this we rejoice. Their own judgment we may think most erroneous. But in God's judgment we have the utmost confidence. In laying the case before Him, they help not the cause of rebellion, but the cause which is their *own true interest*, though they think it not, that of rightful government. To Him the appeal must be made. Let us do our duty, cost what it may, and let the righteous God do what seemeth him good.

ART. IX.—*Dr Hickok's New and Revised Edition of Rational Psychology.**

Rational Psychology; or, the Subjective Idea and Objective Law of All Intelligence. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., Union College. A New and Revised Edition. New York: Ivison, Phinney & Co. 1861.

WE avail ourselves of the appearance of a new edition of this work, to give it an examination correspondent to its own extraordinary claims, and the laudations of its admirers.

The author informs us that in this edition "some modifications have been made of particular parts, but not in the general method. This had been too comprehensively thought out to

* We give an outline of this book, from the October number of the *Princeton Review*, as it seems to be forming a school of American Rationalists.—Ed. *B. & F. E. E.*

admit of any change." He also informs us that, "It is given in this revised form from the conviction that its use is still needed to the same ends, and especially as a text or reference book in the higher philosophical instruction of our colleges." To the "complaint of obscurity from peculiarity of style and of terms," made against the first edition, the author replies that this "arises from the nature of the speculation, and nothing but more familiarity with this field of thinking can make any presentation by language to be perspicuous." He adds that, "To the familiar mind the work is not open to the criticism of obscurity, either from the style or the terminology." He answers further, that, "The vague reproaches in the charges of transcendentalism and German speculation need no other reply than the emphatic affirmation, that whatever danger there may be in transcendentalism or Germanism, these are not to be overcome by any timid ignoring, or valorous denunciation of them. They are to be put down in no other manner than by fairly meeting, and fully refuting or correcting them in their own methods."

One might suppose, after the world has had so thorough an experience of transcendentalism or Germanism, and witnessed the natural ripening of its necessary fruits in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, that it might be lawful at length to apply the *label*; which label should be sufficient to characterise the same principles and method in any scheme in which they form the ground-work and substance; without the necessity of for ever discussing the same principles over again, as often as they may appear anew. One might suppose this, but we will adopt no such method with the work in hand. Let us discuss its principles "in no other manner than by fairly meeting" them as though they had never been discussed or labelled before.

1. *The problem to be solved.* "The problem which philosophy has felt herself called upon to solve," says Dr Hickok (p. 28), "is this: How may the intellect know that which is out of, and at a distance from, itself?" This abstract question will be better comprehended by an example. I hold in my hand a cane. So it seems; but perhaps my senses deceive me. It may be an elephant. It may be a whale. It may be nothing. How do I know that it is really a *thing* outside of myself? If it be a thing, how do I know that it is a cane?

2. *State of the question.* Many philosophers have held that we have no immediate consciousness of any outward thing, but only of our sensations; and surely, say they, our inward sensation is not a cane, a beam, or a horse. These must be wholly without, while consciousness reaches only to that which is within. How do we know that there is anything without? At most, say they, it is but some *representation* of the cane of

which we are conscious ; and how do we know that the inward representation is like the outward object ? Indeed, how can an internal sensation be *like* an outward beam or horse ? A sensation has neither shape, extension, nor solidity. It cannot be *like* an outward object. How do we know that there is anything outward ? Berkeley concludes that we have no faculties that can give us certain knowledge of any outward thing ; and that, so far as our knowledge is concerned, there is no world, save in our own ideas. For the same reason Hume concludes that we cannot know the existence of mind. We are conscious only of fleeting thought ; it is a gratuitous assumption to conclude that there is anything beyond. We cannot know that we have souls. Here come the Matter-of-Fact men, the so-called Empirics. We do not perceive outward things directly, say they. They come within our direct consciousness. We know them by experience. O yes, say the Transcendentalists ; all that is very well while we admit your assumption of an experience. But how do you know that such experience is possible ? It assumes a direct knowledge, in consciousness, of things without. But such direct knowledge in consciousness reason sees to be impossible.

The common sense philosophers come in here, and adduce, not the individual consciousness of one man, but the necessary and inevitable convictions of consciousness which all men have in common. These, they say, must be true, or the mental constitution of man is a lie, and neither truth nor knowledge is possible to him. Dr Hickok admits this common and inevitable conviction of consciousness in all mankind. He says, " It is the testimony in the convictions of universal consciousness, that we perceive immediately the external objects themselves. Every man is convinced that it is the outer object, and not some representative of it, which he perceives. The knowledge that the object is out of myself, and other than myself, and thus a reality, and not subjective merely, is the testimony of common sense everywhere. All minds, that of philosophers as well as of common people, are shut up to the testimony of consciousness for a direct and immediate perception of the outward object." (P. 42.)

But is this necessary and universal testimony of consciousness in all men true ? No ; but utterly false, in the estimation of Dr Hickok. He adds immediately (p. 42), " When the unexamined convictions of consciousness, as direct for the immediate perception of an outer world, are brought to the test of philosophical investigation—the demonstration comes out full, sound, and clear, that all such immediate knowledge is impossible. The very sensation through which the knowledge is given is wholly mental." " All that can be directly known is,

that the mind has such sensations"—"but the reason attains the irrefragable conclusion that the sensation only, and not the object as external, can be immediately in the consciousness. A demonstration of reason thus concludes directly against the testimony of universal consciousness. And now where are we as intelligent beings? Consciousness contradicts reason; the reason belies consciousness"—"they openly and flatly contradict each other." "The nature of man as intelligent, stands out a self-contradiction," "All ground for knowledge in any way is self-annihilated. The truth of our intellectual nature is itself falsehood, and there remains nothing other than to doubt universally."

Such is the problem. Such are the difficulties in the way of its solution. Shall we, with the Common-Sense philosophers, hold to consciousness against all possible demonstrations of reason? Or shall we, with Berkeley and Hume, hold to reason, and conclude against all consciousness and all common sense? We seem to be in a sad dilemma; if we hold our reason, we lose our common sense; if we hold our common sense, we lose our reason. Under any of the common methods of philosophy, Dr Hickok regards the dispute between reason and consciousness as a "drawn battle," whose only result can be "nothing other than to doubt universally." The Critical Philosophy of Kant, which was designed to relieve this difficulty, Dr Hickok regards as commencing "in a specious delusion" ending "in a stupendous dream," and as "consummated in Hegelianism," i. e., in completed Pantheism. What hope remains to save the thinking world from Pantheism or utter scepticism? Nothing; no system conceivable save that which Dr Hickok brings us in Rational Psychology. But,

3. *What is Rational Psychology? And how does it propose to solve the problem?* Rational Psychology utterly refuses to begin with considering the facts of mind, and to learn from these how the mind operates, and what, and how, it knows. No; no science is possible in any such method. On all such methods, "The nature of man as intelligent, stands out as a self-contradiction," and "the truth of our intellectual nature is itself a falsehood." The Rational Psychology therefore begins by questioning all experience, all consciousness, and even calls into question the "full, sound, clear demonstrations" of reason herself. We know not yet that sense, or reason, or experience is possible. Beginning here, the Pure Reason, even before she knows the possibility of her own existence, beholds "*An Eternal Principle*," (p. 73), as if before all worlds or minds were made. "The principle must be an ultimate truth, which in the insight of the reason is given as having in itself necessity and universality, and which consequently is conditioned by no power,

but must condition all power. It is thus no *fact*, or thing *made*, but an *eternal* truth which in the reason *determines how things must be made*," (p. 71).

The reason, therefore, seeing, prior to all experience, how minds *must* be constituted, and how they *must* have knowledge of outward things, if ever they have such knowledge ;—and seeing this by a "Principle" which God did not establish, neither can he evade or alter it ; seeing it is "eternal," "necessary," "unmade"—and "consequently is not conditioned by power, but must condition all power ;" and so must condition even the power of God ;—the reason seeing this principle by her own insight, determines "THE SUBJECTIVE IDEA OF ALL INTELLIGENCE." If God makes an intelligent being he must make it after this plan. No other can be made. If God can deviate from this subjective idea in making intelligent beings, then, by the fundamental condition of the Rational Psychology, all Rational Psychology is impossible ; for that eternal, necessary, and unmade principle, which conditions all power, need not be followed after all ; and the Psychology may be wholly at fault.

Having determined *à priori* how minds *must* be constituted, and how they *must* have intelligence ; and that so certainly that God himself cannot make them otherwise ; and having attained the necessary "subjective idea of all intelligence"—that it must subsist in the functions of sense, understanding, and reason ; each of which functions *must* follow the plan of the Subjective Idea, or else be no intelligence at all ;—having determined all this with absolute certainty, it might seem that a Rational Psychology is completed. No ; it is but half done. We must now find, empirically, minds actually existing and working after the manner of this subjective idea. It should seem, then, this part of the work would be somewhat troublesome, since we must find what is sought in the use of that same consciousness whose inevitable witness in all men reason has demonstrated to be utter falsehood. No matter ; minds must be empirically found so constituted, and so operating, in order to furnish the objective law of intelligence. The correspondence between the idea and the law gives science. We thus have a Rational Psychology ; or the Subjective Idea and the Objective Law of All Intelligence.

All this must be done ere we can know that such a faculty as the reason exists, or is possible. Reason must first find sense and understanding, and establish their idea and law ; then reason must find herself, by establishing her own idea and law. Until she has done this, we know not that there are any facts, or world, or understanding, or science, or reason, or anything. All must stand in abeyance until the reason is found

and verified. If this search after the reason fails, then all has failed, and we know not anything. Such is the Rational Psychology. Such is the method by which she proposes to solve the problem.

4. *But here we too are authorised to assume an à priori position, and to inquire whether Dr Hickok is Dr Hickok, and his book a book.* We may not trust our senses that a cane is a cane. But here comes a man with a book, — we beg pardon ; if our senses cannot truly inform us of the cane, how can they truly inform us of a man and a book ? By the very conditions of the Rational Psychology, we are not yet allowed to say, it is a man. Here comes a *phenomenon*, with a phenomenal book. We beg pardon again ; — the Rational Psychology demands proof that a phenomenon is a phenomenon, and not a hallucination, or modification of our own minds. But let us grant the phenomenon. Here comes a phenomenon with a phenomenal book, offering to prove, by a system of Rational Psychology, that a cane is a cane. The phenomenon, indeed, appears to our senses as Dr Hickok ; so does a cane appear a cane. But Dr Hickok himself assures us (if indeed the phenomena be he), that it is “mere dogmatism” — “to plant ourselves upon an assumption that a clear experience in consciousness is valid for itself, and is never to be questioned.” Be it so ; we will not dogmatise ; we will be philosophical. Our consciousness may be utterly mistaken. We will not make the assumption which the phenomenal Dr Hickok forbids. We find it quite as difficult to cognise a man and a book as to cognise a cane. We know not yet that an experience of either is possible. It may not be Dr Hickok. It may not be even a phenomenon ; for Dr Hickok finds it necessary to give an Ontological Demonstration of the valid existence of the phenomenal. But we have granted the phenomenon ; we may not grant any more. So far as we are able to determine at present, the phenomenon may not be Dr Hickok. For aught that sense or consciousness can tell us, he may be a steamboat, the book an earthquake, and the argument a volcano. He may be Nichts, the German nothing. If it be Dr Hickok, he requires us to receive him on the testimony of consciousness ; while, if the inevitable witness of the consciousness of all mankind be not utter falsehood, the Rational Psychology is wholly unnecessary and without foundation. We cannot rationally believe it to be Dr Hickok ; he would not so belie his own philosophy. Reason and consciousness are doubly contradiction here. What it is that seems to come to us with a seeming book and a seeming argument, we are, as yet, unable to determine. It ought to be anything else rather than Dr Hickok. But whatever it be, we call upon it to stop. We

shall make no dogmatical assumption. Stop. Dr Hickok ; or stop, steamboat ; or stop, Nichts. Prove to us that you are Dr Hickok. Prove that you are even a phenomenon. If we assume the validity of our consciousness in this matter, we must renounce your philosophy. If we receive your philosophy, we must renounce you. If we do really cognise you directly in consciousness, your book is false. If we do not, then we know not that it is a book. In either case, there is no earthly use that we can make of it ; for either we cannot know that it is anything at all ; or, if we can, the book is false and useless. If the phenomenon proves itself to be Dr Hickok, then the same argument suffices to prove that a cane is a cane ; and the book is quite unnecessary. Until it be proved, we are not authorised, by his own shewing, to trust our senses or our consciousness so far as to regard it as anything at all ; for if we may, then the philosophy is thereby proved both needless and untrue.

Here we might, in all propriety, end the matter. Dr Hickok can, in no reason, expect us to begin with contradicting the fundamental principles of his philosophy, and with adopting practically the very assumptions of empiricism and of common sense which he condemns. Here we might end ; yet let us keep on, in order to see whether, as in all other cases where truth is reached, all the lines of evidence from every quarter converge towards that one focus of truth.

5. *Is the human reason competent to give a reliable à priori Idea of All Intelligence ?* What is it that reason here undertakes to do ? Leaving all facts and experience behind, she undertakes to ascend to a position prior to all worlds, and to discern the limits of creative wisdom and power ! God can devise no other plan or method of intelligence ; he can execute no other ! Human reason undertakes to give the *à priori* Idea of All Intelligence ! She sees, by her own insight, the "eternal" and "unmade principle" which conditions the power of the Creator ? The Rational Psychology professes to investigate *à priori* "the whole ground of *possibility* for bringing" a content in the sensibility "within the light of consciousness, and thereby making it to be a perceived phenomenon." Nay, the Psychology professes to have determined, "also, the possibility of all distinct qualities" that can be "matter for phenomena—given in sensation." Indeed ! Was it necessary to a science of mind to determine whether *things* can exist, as well as whether God can make *intelligences* that shall be able to know them ? The Psychology professes, also, "to have determined the possibility of ordering sensation in all the forms which matter for sensation may assume ;" and that "in these several *à priori* conclusions is involved the complete idea of all perception of phenomena in its *possibility*."

Now this idea or plan must include all the plans, methods, and means within the limits of divine Wisdom to devise, and of infinite Power to execute. The Lord God must not be able to go beyond. If he can, then the "subjective idea of *all* intelligence," and of course a rational psychology, is impossible.

But so far is the human reason from being competent to give the idea of *All* Intelligence, that it is unable, even with all the aids of experience, to give the idea of any intelligence at all, in the sense here intended. It can never comprehend how the knowledge of outward things reaches the mind through any one of the few senses which the Creator has given us. All is to us inexplicable. What is true of outward objects is true of all knowledge of things within. How we think, how we remember—no man can explain. No man could tell *à priori* that minds could be made so as to be able to remember anything. Tell us, Dr Hickok, *how* are so many things laid up in the storehouse of memory? Tell us the *à priori* idea of constituting a mind so as to remember anything. How the knowledge of anything reaches the mind through any of our senses, no man can explain. No man could have been the counsellor of the Lord in these things, so as to have given him the *à priori* subjective idea of any intelligence. No man can explain or comprehend any act of intelligence. No man can comprehend how an actual cognition of anything is accomplished. We are lost amid the material enginery of sense; and can never tell how at last the connection is made between extended matter and unextended and immaterial mind. This has been the stumbling-block of philosophy ever since philosophy began. How, in the last analysis, it is possible for external material things, or the modifications of the material organs of sense, so to come into contact with the immaterial mind as to render the knowledge of outward things possible, no man can tell. Is contact possible between the material and immaterial? If it is, does contact give knowledge? or, *how* does it give knowledge? No man can explain it. No man can conceive how anything can be done in the premises. Des Cartes and Malebranche thought contact impossible, and concluded, therefore, that man could have no faculty of knowing of himself, but must have knowledge by direct divine assistance. "We see all things in God," said Malebranche. "God has all their images, and being a spirit, he communicates the vision of these images to our spirits." No, said Leibnitz; it is indeed impossible that the material thing should come into contact with the immaterial. The best affection of the organ of sense, or of the brain, is still a material affection. The gulf between matter and mind is not passed. Sense, therefore, and outward objects, are not the causes of the mental affection or of the know-

ledge. But God has ordained a *pre-established harmony*, by which, when the body is affected, the mind is moved with corresponding affections, and, *vice versa*, the body with the mind. No, say others; the theory of those is better who, seeing the impracticability of any contact between mind and matter, supposed a *Plastic Medium*, not wholly mind, not wholly matter; but having the properties of each, so that both may meet there in common." Others suppose that, as the outward object cannot travel through the organs of sense to meet the mind, the mind goes out to meet the object; but how it meets, and how it knows, even on these conditions, the theory cannot tell. Others suppose, not contact, but *influence*. But what *flows in*, or what that influence is, or how accomplished, or how it causes knowledge, the advocates of the theory are unable to explain. The sum of the whole is, that all is inexplicable. No man can give an idea of any intelligence at all.

Now, if Dr Hickok could have reasoned out, *a priori*, the whole apparatus of our five senses, he could not even then have given us the idea of any intelligence. But our few senses may give us knowledge only of a few of the properties of material objects. An oyster may know external objects by properties which none of our senses enable us to discover. It is vain for Dr Hickok to tell us that "there must be a content in the sensory"—that is involved in the question of knowledge by means of sense. It is no explanation, nor advance of our knowledge at all. *What* content must be in the sensory? How shall knowledge reach the mind through *any* content in the sensory? The Rational Psychology, by omitting these inquiries, has not even comprehended what an Idea of Intelligence must be. It has not reached even the surface of true science touching the matter in question.

But now, instead of an oyster, or a man, take Voltaire's Micromegas from the Dog-star, with his thousand senses; or the inhabitant of Saturn, with his seventy-two senses, each sense making its possessor cognisant of external things by means of properties and sensations to us unknown and inconceivable. *What* is the content in the sensory from each of these? *How* is the sensation accomplished? *How* does the sensation reach the mind? Unless Dr Hickok can tell us all this, and tell us, also, whether more senses and properties are possible, and what, and how many, are possible, he is entirely incompetent to give the Subjective Idea of *all* Intelligence. A Psychology professing to do this must necessarily be irrational.

6. *Instead of giving the Idea of all Intelligence, the Rational Psychology gives an Idea on which all Intelligence is impossible.* Dr Hickok declares it to be the full, sound, clear demonstration of reason, that all immediate knowledge in con-

sciousness, of external things, is impossible. He maintains that consciousness in sense can never tell us "whence the sensation comes, nor reach its causality, nor attain an outer world." How then does our knowledge of an outer world come? The sum of Dr Hickok's doctrine of perception is this; sensation is wholly mental, and gives no intimation of anything without. The understanding, of itself, never reaches to anything without. But a sensation being given, which has neither shape, colour, or anything resembling any material property, the understanding, thereupon, takes this dumb, shapeless sensation, and forms an image of its outward cause. Then the understanding forms two judgments: first, that there is something without; secondly, that the image accurately resembles that outward thing. Has the understanding ever known anything without? Never. The mind has no faculty for knowing anything without, save by the images which the understanding draws. Mental affections have no resemblance to outward things; the understanding has neither seen the outward thing, nor any resemblance of it, save in the image which she herself has drawn. How does the understanding know that her image is *like* the outward thing! It is plainly impossible to form a judgment of resemblance, unless one first knows the things between which resemblance holds. But this, the Psychology affirms, the understanding cannot know; she knows no outward thing, save through the images which are not given in sense, but which she herself has drawn. *It is, therefore, upon the system of the Rational Psychology, plainly impossible to know an outward object, unless we know it before we know it.* But this is absurd and self-contradictory. The theory comes to a demonstrated absurdity. Instead of giving the Subjective Idea of All Intelligence, Dr Hickok gives an Idea on which all knowledge is impossible.

7. *Whether the reason knows, as it is made to affirm, that all knowledge of outward things, as witnessed by the sense in consciousness, is impossible?* The Psychology speaks of reason's "demonstration" as "full, sound, and clear," that all such direct knowledge of outward things is impossible. But the demonstration of the transcendental reason has no steps, no argument, no process. It is not a discursive faculty. What it sees, it sees by direct and immediate insight, or not at all. We need not therefore be troubled by the word "demonstration;" nor are we to look for reason's reasoning to find its full, clear, and sound demonstration. The alleged demonstration we shall find to be simply its dogma, which is certainly "full" enough; whether it be certainly sound and clear, we now call into question.

As reason cannot, in the last analysis of sense, explain the

supposed contact between matter and mind, nor comprehend how such contact is possible; nor how, if it were possible, such contact should give knowledge; as it is wholly unable to comprehend the manner or idea of any intelligence, but is wholly lost in trying to explain a sensation, as it is endeavouring to explain the knowledge of an outward or distant object, it manifestly knows nothing on the subject; and is utterly incompetent to deny any such immediate knowledge in consciousness. A little further light might shew the reason that what the common consciousness of all affirms, is most beautifully true. Reason's demonstration, therefore, is simply its dogma. It demonstrably knows nothing of that whereof it is made to affirm; and on the basis of that ignorant affirmation builds the supposed necessity for this system of Psychology. The certain testimony of the common consciousness is therefore wholly unimpaired, and the transcendental reason is convicted of rashness, presumption, ignorance, and utter error. Its denial is not Rational.

8. *The Idea of the Reason.* In the view of the Rational Psychology, we know not yet that we have any faculty of reason, nor whether such a faculty is possible. We have not as yet an Idea of what it is, or what it must be. Not knowing that we have any reason, we must now set reason to form an Idea of what reason must be, and then to find itself as actually existing. It will not do to learn by experience, and by observation of facts, what reason man has, and what it actually does. We know not yet that there are any facts, or that we have any power to observe them.

And now, by what process does the Rational Psychology propose to find such a faculty as the reason? We must first find the *à priori* Idea of the reason. We must seek a process and faculty of comprehending universal nature. This comprehension must include the question, How nature must begin, and how it must end? But this can be found only by first finding the Absolute, as a compass for comprehending universal nature. Before we can find the reason, we must find the Absolute as an *à priori* position for the reason.* Our first work,

See p. 40. "The whole problem of the reason, therefore, is seen to be in the determination of the Absolute. Nature can be comprehended by the reason in no other possible manner than as comprehended in the being of such an Absolute; and the determination of this is the determination of an operation of comprehension. In the pure ideal of the Absolute, we are to find our *à priori* position for overlooking nature, and thereby determining how its comprehension is possible; and in this we shall have the entire function of a comprehending faculty"—"*even the faculty of the reason.*" Such will be the function of the reason "*in its Idea,*" (p. 410). "So now, the mind's eye must as clearly apprehend the *supernatural spirit* in order to any demonstration, how alone universal nature can be comprehended in an Author as its beginning, and a finisher as its consummating. In this only can we possess the compass

then, is to find the Absolute. We must then, in order to comprehend nature in its beginning, be able to tell how God creates matter; by what eternal and unmade principles matter so created must grow into worlds; that man may be created, and what sort of being he will be; why and how he will sin, notwithstanding all that God may do to prevent it; then we must see *a priori* that God will become incarnate for man's redemption, and what will be the final consummation of the world. So shall we find at length what the faculty of reason must be. The faculty that shall be able to do all this, out of its own unaided resources, is the faculty of reason. The faculty that cannot do all this is no faculty of reason at all. Such is the reason in Idea.

But even so we have found the reason only as a "void conception." We must now find such an *actual* Absolute, who shall be found *actually* creating matter in the prescribed process, which matter shall *actually* grow into a world according to the "eternal and unmade principle" seen by the "insight" of the reason. We must find God *actually* becoming incarnate for man's redemption, and the world arriving at length to an *actual* consummation, such as appears necessary in reason's *a priori* comprehension. Having so established the "necessary process of comprehending nature by the supernatural, and so found the reason in Idea;" and having afterwards found all the actual facts in colligation by a Law in accordance with this Idea; we have at length found the faculty of reason. Our Psychology is completed. We can now solve the problem of a knowledge of outward things. Such is an outline of the process of finding the faculty of reason, as drawn out at length, and elaborated in the Rational Psychology. Let us follow the process.

9. "*The attainment of the Absolute as an à priori position for the reason.*" Such is the caption of the section, p. 397. How shall we come to the proper conception of the Godhead? How shall we attain the knowledge of his existence? Dr Hickok shews us (p. 390) that it is vain to begin the process in "subjective thought;" or to attempt "to reach the supernatural by beginning in *objective nature*," (p. 391). "The search for the supernatural" he affirms to be "just as endless and empty when we attempt the attainment through the indications of

for comprehending how nature, and nature's one time and space, can begin and end. In this necessary process of comprehending nature by the supernatural, we shall attain the true function of the reason in its Idea. We must afterwards find actual facts in colligation by a Law, which is the exact correlative of this Idea, and in this we shall have a completed science of Rational Psychology," (p. 396).

adaptedness to ends" (p. 393). "In an assumed *Theology*, we may flee from absurdities up the stream of adapting *causes*;" "the Canaan of the supernatural cannot be so entered," (p. 395). It is only "when the reason as function is set to work in the light, and under the direction of *its own insight*, no antinomy arises, and the supernatural is fairly and intelligently attained," (p. 395). All other methods "throw the mind on a tread-mill, which forces it to a perpetual and vain toil," (p. 399).

Now, "the reason as faculty," must find the Absolute, not through "the things that are made," but by her own "insight;" and that, while it is altogether uncertain that such a faculty as reason either is or can be. She must first find the Absolute as an *à priori* position for finding herself. Till this is done, reason cannot be found.

And, now, farewell sense; farewell understanding; farewell worlds! None of you can help us in the transcendental flight which we are now to take on the wings of reason, to find whether reason is or can be. The time is gone by when "the invisible things of God"—"even his eternal power and Godhead"—were "clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." When we have already attained the Absolute, by comprehending the universe in him; then *afterwards* the heavens declare to us the glory of God, and his eternal power and Godhead are understood by the things that are made. But it is not in the method of natural theology, by beginning with "objective nature," that the "Canaan of the supernatural can be entered." "We are thus forced, in this part of our work, to dispense with all use of the understanding, and can see that *if the supernatural may in any manner be attained, it must be in the use of the reason only*," (p. 400).

"We make abstraction then utterly of all that is phenomenal, and therefore dispense with all the functions of sense." "The phenomenal is gone"—"we then have the notional only." "We have thus nature in its substances and causes, and reciprocal influences, as things in themselves, and as they must be determined to exist by any intelligence who should know things directly in their essence, without any organs of sensibility." "Substance in its causality is, but no adhering or cohering qualities are," (pp. 40, 401).

Substance without qualities! Matter that is not material! Known in its essence as without extension, shape, or impenetrability! Why, what can it be save the "Nothing" of which President Edwards in his youth said, "the sleeping rocks do dream of?" But, matter or no matter, this is the substance on which we are now to ascend to the supernatural and the Absolute.

10. *The process of ascending to the Absolute by the force which is most simple and primary, viz., "by the force of gravity."* "We are not here concerned with the tracing of nature in its substance downward, as it must develop itself in an experience in the sense; and are only concerned in retracing its conception *upward* to a supernatural Author." "We will then retain only the most simple, and that which is primary and present in all, viz., *the force of gravity.*" "Let there be the reason-conception of an everywhere present antagonistic force; and we shall have in this substance, with its causal laws of attraction, repulsion, inertia, impenetrability, motion by impulse, &c.; and thus, as it were, the framework or elementary rudiments of a nature of things, without regarding whatever distinguishable forces, and thus different substances and causes may be superinduced upon this." "We have in this all that is necessary for an *à priori* representation of a universal nature of things in *itself*, and not in phenomenal appearance," (p. 403).

But why not begin with a real world, with all these laws, and forces, and substances in actual existence? How is it any easier to find God through such an imagined—or reason-conception—world? If it is impossible to find God by beginning with "*objective nature*," as real existence, how is it possible to find him through just such a world conceived or imagined? But we forget. We know not yet that a real world is, or can be. We are to find the reason; and first to find God as a means of finding the reason; and to find the reason in order to find understanding and sense; and all these in order to find that we *can* find a real world! Therefore it is that "we here make abstraction utterly" of all that is phenomenal; and search for the reason "in the use of the reason only."

"We may, then, take any point in this primary space-filling force, and if it is not a centre, it will be tending to some centre of gravity." (Who knows? It is conceived of; and supposed, as "an everywhere present force." Who knows that each point of such a force will not tend equally everywhere?) "Such ultimate point we now assume in conception."—"In the comprehension of that one central point of antagonism we comprehend the universe of nature," (p. 404).

And now to "comprehend the universe of nature," it is not enough to reach Omnipotence, and suffer the work of creation to be altogether veiled from our sight and comprehension; no, we must see *how* God can create matter, and how matter so created, *must* grow into worlds in all their cosmical arrangements; not only without any wisdom or will of God to cause created matter to so arrange itself, but, if possible, even against his will; since we must see it by an "eternal and unmade principle, which conditions all power."

Now listen to reason, while on her search after herself, and in order to attain the Absolute as a stepping-stone to reach her own existence, she tells *à priori* the process of creating matter and worlds. "Conceive of two congealed pencils, such that when their points are to be pressed together, the pressure shall equally liquefy both."—"Then will the liquefaction accumulate itself about the point of contact, and, if no disturbing force intervene, the fluid will perfectly ensphere itself about that point,"—"enlarging as the pressure continues and the liquefaction accumulates."—"In our supposition, for illustration, we have assumed pencils as sense phenomena, but that purpose being answered, we would now retain the pencil points only in the mind's eye, as two pure activities in counteraction, and themselves doing what by the liquid pencils was indicated that the pressure was doing with the fluid; viz., ensphering itself about the point of counteragency. We would now make the mind's eye follow the force, and not now use the bodily eye." (P. 405)

"An infinite agency at the centre can augment the sphere indefinitely at pleasure. So a primal space-filling force as a veritable substance may be."—"With a clear conception of such force, we can readily determine many things."—"The material universe must be spherical; must have its peripheral limit; must have its poles in the line of the antagonism working at the centre; must have repulsion from the centre as the cube of the radius of the sphere, and must have reaction towards the centre in each radius, and which will be attraction at the centre as the square of the radius"—"with many other cosmical principles, that in the Rational Cosmology has already been determined and correctly stated," (p. 407).

And now we have the whole science of world-making—all save the origination of the force at the centre. How to find that?

"With our clear conception of forces as substantial and dynamical, nature has already in her intrinsic being the lines that lead downward in cosmical beauty and order not only, but also lines which lead upward to a wholly supernatural Creator and Governor. The tracing of such lines upward may be as reverent as the tracing of them downward may be patient and careful, and the results may be as sure for the supernatural as for the natural." (P. 409.)

"Who originates and perpetuates this central working"—"the grand central counteragency" on which nature "reposes?" (P. 410.)

That is the question; find the author of this force, and find him personal, and we find the Absolute, through whom, as an *à priori* position, we are to find the reason; through which we

are to verify the sense and the understanding, and so complete a Rational Psychology.

Did our limits permit it, we should like here to follow Dr Hickok through fifty pages, save one (pp. 411 to 460), in which he determines the Idea of Personality, and shews it to consist in "a pure *Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Liberty*." P. 60. It is not sufficient to determine the author of the force at the centre; we must also determine his character, and why he comes to put his simple acts in that counteraction, which makes a world. But how all this is to be determined from the simple acts in counteraction, or how a world actually made by such a process determines by the process alone the character and end of the author of the force, does not appear. Nor is it made to appear from anything save the *à priori* insight of that reason, which "makes an abstraction utterly" of all worlds, and all sense, and goes out into a vacant eternity in search after herself. Dr Hickok has simply put himself under the necessity not only of telling how to create matter, but of telling *à priori* the necessary character and motive of the Creator, and how to determine his personality, without the aid of facts or worlds, before he can find such a faculty as the reason; and the reason must be found before he can know that either facts or worlds have any existence. But waving all this, let us suppose such a Personal Absolute, and follow Dr Hickok while he points out the method of creating matter, which, following its own "eternal and unmade principle," necessarily grows into a world.

"He may originate simple acts which, in their own simplicity, have, no counteragency, and can therefore never be brought under any of the conditions of nature."

And now mark how the Absolute creates.

"From his own inner capacity of self-determination, he may designedly put simple acts in counteraction,"—*He designedly puts simple acts in counteraction*; that is the process. "And at their point of counteragency a force begins."—"The perpetuated energizing in a counteraction is *creation in progress*"—"and an *impenetrable substance is made*," (p. 450). "The energising of the absolute will" may continue the counteraction till the impenetrable substance becomes as large as he wants it.* But doing this, whatever other forces he may add to modify the creation, each force by its own necessary law,—he cannot

* "The energising of the absolute will may fill so much of this whole space, and do this in so much of this one whole of time, as shall be directed by the archetypal rule of his artistic wisdom; and may give the modifications of distinguishable forces also, in accordance with such rule; and all for the end of his own spirit-worthiness," (p. 450).

"Nature henceforth goes on in her development, according to the law of physical forces, and is perpetually a *natura naturans*; but at the central point

prevent the world from growing according to its own predetermined and necessary cosmical principles. These "condition all power." If the Absolute puts his simple acts in counteraction, a world is made, and the Absolute cannot help it, nor alter its cosmical principles. While he continues the counteraction, just such a world must continue to grow. "The conditions for ensphering worlds, for centripetal and centrifugal forces, and the ratios of their action, both as to quantity and distance from the centre; their revolutions upon their axes and their orbits about their primaries; and the relative inclination of the planes of these orbits, and of the axes of each to their equatorial diameters; and, in short, the whole formal arrangements of the universe are given in the very points where the primordial forces have their genesis; as is also the whole science of nature in its original bipolar, chemical, crystalline, and animal forces," (p. 452).

It used to be thought that the astronomical arrangements of the universe manifest in a wonderful manner the wisdom and knowledge of God. But Dr Hickok has corrected this mistake; they manifest only the "unmade principle" which "conditions all power." Dr Hickok could have told the Lord, that if he but put his acts in counteraction, just such a world would necessarily be made, and that the Lord had no room for choice or wisdom, save only on the question whether to put his act into counteraction. Very likely, also, Dr Hickok, or some other man, may yet be able to tell what certain "other forces," being "superimposed," shall necessitate all the "animal forces," and all other superimposed forces that make up the present world and all its inhabitants; indeed, "the whole science of nature." Indeed, Dr Hickok immediately continues: "An *a priori* philosophy may long be detained in this broad field, before it shall be competent to detect all these forces in their distinguishable rudiments; but their laws, and thus all their possible conditioned changes, have already been settled in their creation, and may be determined."

But it is time to inquire,

11. *What is it for a spirit to put his pure activities into counteraction; and how is it known that so they generate an impenetrable substance? What are these "pure acts" of a pure spirit? Do they tend, as in motion, from point to point within the extended being of a pure spirit? Are they anything*

of all counter-working, and in all the points of a superposition of distinguishable forces, a conditioning of nature is determined by the Absolute in his own liberty." He has no liberty to prevent the creation of "Impenetrable substance," or the growth of precisely such a cosmical world, if he once puts his acts in counteraction, and so continues them for a while. If he had such liberty, a Rational Psychology or Cosmology would be impossible.

different from the spirit itself in action? Do they bear any analogy to the activity of physical things? Is the activity like a physical activity? What is it to put them into counteraction? Is their counteraction a physical and forceful *impingement* or *pressure*, of one against the other? Does one part of the spirit physically *impinge* against another part? Or is the activity of the spirit an *entity* different from the spirit itself, which physically impinges against another activity? Or is it simply *thought* impinging forcefully against thought? and if so, is it a physical or a spiritual impingement? And can the latter produce a physical force? Can any one conceive of such a forceful counteragency without conceiving of a spirit with physical properties? Or, let the counteragency be what it may, who knows that such spiritual counteragency will necessarily produce an "impenetrable substance?" Or if the reason sees that 'the pure activity of a spirit, meeting another pure activity of the same spirit, necessarily generates an impenetrable substance, which necessarily grows into a world, then why may not angels, or the disembodied spirits of men, also create matter and form worlds? *

But how can Dr Hickok, or any other man, tell, or conceive, what it is to make a spiritual act meet another spiritual act, so that each shall "hold the other in position?" Is it not obvious that whoever talks of such things, must use words without any meaning conceivable even to himself? †

* Dr Hickok has considered this question (p. 99) of his Rational Cosmology. Man cannot "create matter," because he is himself incarnate, and can thus put forth no act that shall immediately meet another "act in counteraction, but his every act of energising must first encounter forces in which he is incorporated. His activity meets forces and moves matter already created, but his activity cannot, *with nothing between*, meet *itself* in counteraction, and thus begin a new space counteraction."

It is here assumed that man can create matter well enough, if ever placed beyond the limits of a creation other than himself. *He* has power enough, but the circumstances hinder him. Very well; creation is finite; place him beyond its bounds, and the difficulty is removed. Then what will hinder a man, as a disembodied spirit, from creating a world? Dr Hickok supposes that angels are competent, being pure spirits, "to make act meet act, and hold another act in position." "Yet their counteractivities could only be within their subjective spheres, and condition their own conscious activities." "Thus neither man nor angel can be conceived as competent to create force that shall be objective, real, substantial, and impenetrable to another agency," (Cosmology, p. 99).

Very well. *Exceptio probat regulam*; remove men and angels beyond the limits of the present finite creation, and they shall be quite competent, according to Dr Hickok's shewing, to create worlds which shall be "real, substantial, and impenetrable," not to another agency, but to themselves.

† *E. g.* Had Dr Hickok himself any comprehension of any possible meaning of such terms in the following scientific account of the process of creating matter, which he gives, p. 101 of his Rational Cosmology? "God puts his simple activity in counteragency. *He makes act meet and hold act*; and in this

12. *This system of Rational Psychology, necessarily, either deifies the human reason or else undeifies God.* The reason is made to determine *à priori* how God *must* make worlds, if ever worlds are made. It is to determine this "by an *eternal principle*," (p. 73). "The principle must be an ultimate truth, which in the insight of the reason is given as having in itself *necessity* and universality, and which consequently is conditioned by no power, but must itself condition all power. It is thus *no fact*, or *thing made*, but an *eternal truth* which in the reason determines how things *must* be made," (p. 71).

Now, there are two suppositions possible on this subject, and only two. The first is, that *God had some choice*, and exercised some *design* in forming the astronomical and cosmical arrangements of the universe. The second supposition is, that *God could not choose*; but that "eternal and unmade principle" was above him, which was "Conditioned by no power," but which "must itself condition all power."

On the former supposition, no created reason can ascend *à priori* to the necessary laws of the universe; for, by the supposition, they are neither necessary, unmade, nor eternal. They stand in no eternal necessity, but depend on the free choice, design, and wisdom of God; who may ordain and establish them as he pleases, in endless variety of choice. The reason, then, that can *à priori* discern the free thoughts and choices of Eternal Wisdom, must necessarily be Divine. It is God's Holy Spirit alone that "searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God." "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of the Spirit of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." On this supposition, a Rational Psychology and a Rational Cosmology are both impossible. The conclusion is inevitable: either there is no Creator that is God, or a Rational Psychology, that does not deify the human reason, is impossible.*

originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing; a something standing out for objective manifestation, and *holding itself in position* as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity. This force *fixes itself in position*; *holds itself at rest*; and so far from being inert, its very existence is a *vis inertiae*, or a *force actively holding itself still*." Dr Hickok adds to this a "Diremptive activity that works conversely to the antagonism, which"—"may for the present be apprehended as in unity, and the antagonism and diremption to be the one agency of the Absolute spirit, in one and the same limit of action: the antagonism working each way into the limit, and the diremption working each way out from the limit, and both making in their interaction a *compound material substance*." "Any considerable extent of a space so filled, a cubic inch or a cubic mile, is a *Creation of matter palpable to the senses, impensurable and substantial*."

* "T. L.," in the *New York Times* of June 2. 1860, has an article in which he strenuously affirms the divinity of the human reason. After arguing the

Take now the second supposition, viz., "that God is conditioned by eternal, unmade, necessary physical principles, which condition all power," and which consequently control the cosmical arrangements of his creation, if he creates; while he has neither option, power, nor wisdom, other than simply to put his acts in counteraction, and take the necessary results. On this supposition, the reason that can discern *à priori* the necessary, unmade, physical principles of the universe, can indeed make a Rational Cosmology. It can tell *how* to create, and what creation *must be*, and so have whatever "position" this

point at length, and citing Scripture to sustain it, he says, "Let no outcry of Pantheism deter us from saying that man thus born of God has in him something above the natural,—the highest natural; in other words, that he has a true supernatural, a *true divine*. A false religionism might shrink from it as impiety; but why should we fear to say, that there must be in this image of God in man, and so in man himself, *the uncreated and eternal*."

So man, as a rational being, is "uncreated and eternal!" Why should he not be able to see the "eternal and unmade principle," which conditions all power, and is itself "conditioned by no power?" Why should not such a man be able to make Rational Psychologies and Cosmologies? For, as "T. L." continues, "*He is truly divine; he has a supernatural being. He partakes of the immutable reason; he shares in the eternal light; he has a vision of the immortal ideas.*"

Speculations which begin with making man divine should seem to end at last in making God human. *The New Englander*, of November 1860, has an article on the "*Divine Humanity of Christ*;" shewing that God himself is human, and that Christ was human before he was incarnate—eternally human. "There is in God something that is properly human," (p. 860). "There is humanity in Deity, which is the original form which our own humanity is derived," (p. 861). "The Theophanies—of God made in the Old Testament—indicate an essential humanity in the very being and nature of God," (p. 862). "God appears as a man, not by the assumption of a foreign nature, but by the revelation of his own." The humanity in the person of Christ "rests upon, and supposes a prior truth, viz., the Divine Humanity as it exists in God"—"the manifestation of a hidden reality in the Divine Being, viz., the humanity of Deity," (p. 868). Christ's humanity "is eternal and divine, a humanity existing from eternity" (p. 874), and in this sense he "came unto his own," (p. 868). "His humanity was not derived, like his body, from his human mother"—"it is from above, a *divine humanity*," (p. 875). "A *divine man* has descended, and inserted himself into the race." "The eating and drinking of Jesus was not less divine than his raising Lazarus from the dead," (p. 877). "God created man in his own image—kindred to God—of the *same kind* with him." "*Human reason*"—"is a ray from the Divine reason, and its light the *true light* which lighteth every man that cometh into the world," (p. 868). So *The New Englander*.

Dr Hickok, in his Cosmology (p. 41), regards "all theology" as "hopeless" by the philosophy of common sense, because "common sense is a *thing made*," and its primitive beliefs are "*things made*;" and "all *unmade principle*" is beyond her knowledge or conception. And (p. 181) "*Nature* includes the conception of an existence that has a *beginning*." "It is applicable to every *created* individual thing." And (p. 182) "That which *was not created*—has not a nature." "Of *all created* existence, we may say in general, *it is nature*." "Rational being"—"is thoroughly supernatural," (p. 81). "Reason is not a *fact*, a something that has *been made*." What conclusion can be drawn from this, save that Dr Hickok holds human reason to be "*unmade, uncreated, and without 'beginning'?*"

affords for making a Rational Psychology. If it can then see *a priori*, as well, the "necessary, eternal, and unmade principle" which must condition the Creator in making intelligent beings, then it can indeed make a Rational Psychology. The Creator has no choice, and can exercise no wisdom, save only whether, and how long, to put his acts in counteraction, and to supply forces. Unmade principles "condition all power," and determines the rest, whether God will or not. On this latter supposition the Creator is not God; nor could it with any propriety be said, "O Lord, how manifold are thy works; in wisdom hast thou made them all." Their designs, adaptations, forms, organisations, were not from him, nor was there any wisdom in the case; nor had the Creator any power to exercise wisdom in what has hitherto seemed to be the result of design, wisdom, knowledge, and skill. He had but one option—whether to put his acts in counteraction. Eternal laws which were above him determined all the rest. Were it not so, then a Rational Cosmology and a Rational Psychology must both be impossible; that is, the Rational Psychology necessarily either deifies the human reason or undeifies God.

13. *On the system of world-making on which the Rational Psychology attains the Absolute, there is no need of God, nor any room for him in the universe. For aught that man can see, this scheme can be fulfilled as well by chance as by design; nor is it necessary to suppose a creator who has any knowledge, or will, or who is even a spiritual existence.* There is no room for the Only Living and True God in a universe made on this scheme. He could not exercise wisdom, taste, or goodness. Unmade principles conditioned all his power; he had only one choice and one function,—to put his acts in counteraction. Such a being is not God. No conception of God can possibly originate in this scheme. He is unnecessary. The designs of order, harmony, adaptive intelligence, are none of his; nor do they lead to him; they lead only to the unmade, eternal, and necessary principle.

Pure acts, or pure activity, is supposed. But the conception of these involves neither thought, nor knowledge, nor will,—nor anything save pure activity.

The only thing left us to account for is, how these pure acts can come into counteraction. No design or will is necessary for this. They must act somehow; they may as well come into counteraction as to act in any other way. Or, being constantly and necessarily active, these acts may *chance* to come in counteraction; and then a world is made quite as surely and as well, as though the counteraction were designed. If a world is not the necessary result, even upon such chance counter-

action, then the "unmade principle" fails, and the Rational Psychology is, on its own shewing, an impossibility.

Spirit is introduced into the scheme; but it is ascertained by none of the known properties or works of spirit. We have never known, or conceived, that it is a property of a spirit to produce an impenetrable substance by putting its own spiritual acts in counteraction. We never knew,—we cannot conceive,—that it is possible for a spirit to put its pure acts into counteraction. What is it? The *substance* of the spirit pressing against its substance with a physical forceful impingement? Impossible. Thought pressing physically against thought? Impossible! Moreover, if we suppose the pure act of a pure spirit—what is it? and what is the result, says the spirit itself in action? On this plan, the "impenetrable substance" which is made, is simply the Creator impinging against himself; the pure Spirit himself in action is himself the world he makes; and so we end in Pantheism. The scheme of world-making which the Psychology makes necessary to the finding of the faculty of the Absolute, and so to the finding of the faculty of reason, has no need of God, and no room for him. On that scheme the world may as well be made by chance as by design; and when made, it must, so far as reason can see by this scheme be identical with its maker.*

* It is curious to compare Dr Hickok's system of world-making with that of Schelling, and also with that of Coleridge. "We shall never," says Chalybaeus, "succeed in contemplating nature with the eyes of Schelling, unless we first of all get rid of that usual mode of representation which perceives in all individual things but so many self-subsistent"—"substances. The interior of things, their matter or substance as we call it, is no such substance at all, and has no such powers as are commonly imagined." "It consists intrinsically of such powers, or more correctly speaking, of such **ACTIVITIES**," as "*meeting each other in the space that body occupies, mutually support one another, enter a state of tension, and so produce the solid some thing, which appears to us as a body of matter.*" Here is Dr Hickok's "pure activity in counteraction!" Schelling goes on. "Materiality is only the lowest style of the universal life of nature." Going on in a development of itself, and with "increasing energy, internal self-mobility and freedom, the matter so made by "pure activities" meeting each other, advances "under one and the same constant law, from the most rigid existence of the stone or material, up to the play of thoughts in the human brain." It follows, "that in this general self-movement and activity of nature, the law of the world, which when perceived and cognised by itself upon the highest state, is called the Reason, will become cognisable and representable upon the lowest stages as an unconscious and obscure instinct of nature." "Apart from this living impulse movement and activity, there is nothing material or real." "The very real and material itself consists intrinsically in the play of these mutually determining activities."

Here with the "activities meeting each other," the same that Dr Hickok supposes, and by which impenetrable substance is made, which grows into worlds,—out of this same counteraction of pure activities, Schelling sees not only stones, and minerals, and worlds, but thought, human brains, and reason itself. Stones, brains, thought, minerals, and reason, are all the same in essence, and all produced by the same law, when these two pure activities are

But so far we have comprehended the world only in its *beginning*. "And now, that on the other side we may comprehend nature in its *consummation*, we have the same compass of an all-embracing reason in the Absolute as Personality," (p. 453). It is not enough to tell how the world must *begin*; but

14. *The reason which the Rational Psychology requires us to find, must be able to tell, à priori, why God will create: that the world must be an Optimism; that such beings as man may be created; how sin may enter, and in spite of all that God may do to prevent it; that God will become incarnate to make a propitiation; and that the world's career will close with a universal chorus of Glory to God and the Lamb.*

The reason that cannot tell all this *à priori*, is no faculty of reason at all. Thus, pp. 453, 454, we must be able to determine what is the "grand end" for which God will create; and that "this grand end in all the works of God must be an Optimism in nature." We must see *à priori* that "a moral world—a system of varied orders and ranks of persons in liberty," may be made (p. 457); that somewhere the moral world will be brought in connection with the conditions of the physical world;" that "a race of beings compounded of the

put in counteraction! Why, here is the "genesis" not only of matter, but of mind! Here is the reason not only *found*, but we are told *how it is made*, while Dr Hickok could tell only how to create matter and to make worlds!

Turn now to Coleridge on world-making, vol. iii. p. 367, Shedd's Ed. "The transcendental philosopher says, Grant me nature *having two contrary forces*"—"and I will cause the world of intelligence to rise up before you."

"Now the transcendental philosophy demands first, that *two forces should be conceived which counteract each other by their essential nature*; not in consequence of the accidental direction, but prior to all direction." "Secondly, that these forces should be assumed to be both alike infinite and indestructible." The problem then will be, "to discover the result or product of two such forces, as distinguishable from the result of those forces which are finite." "It will then remain for us to elevate the *thesis* from notional and actual, by contemplating intuitively this *one power* with its *two* inherent, indestructible, yet *counteracting forces*, and the results or generations to which *their interpenetration gives existence*, in the living principle, and in the process of self-consciousness, and at the same time will reveal to, and for, what purpose it is possible." "The *counteraction* of these two assumed forces does not depend upon their meeting from opposite directions; the power which acts in them is indestructible; it is therefore inexhaustibly rebuttant, and as *something must be the result* of these two forces, both alike infinite, and both alike indestructible, and as rest, or neutralization, cannot be the result, no other conception is possible, but that the product must be a *tertium quid*, a *finite generation*. Consequently this conception is necessary. Now this *tertium aliquid* can be no other than an interpenetration of the counteracting powers, partaking of the nature of both," (p. 360). All this is in illustration of the naturalist spoken of by Des Cartes, who in imitation of Archimedes said, "Give me matter and motion, and I will construct you the universe." Coleridge, like Dr Hickok, wants only "one power" with "*two counteracting forces*," and he can tell how to construct a universe.

material, sentient, and moral, may be created, and thus that which is personal becomes incarnate, and the free is subjected to the colliding influence of the necessitated, and personal liberty is put in conflict with the conditioned force of nature," (p. 458).

"Sin may enter by any prostitution of an ethical claim to a physical want, or by any assumption of the finite above its proportionate excellency, and become a soul-sin; but this must be somewhere below the Creator, and from creature-personality; inasmuch as no colliding want can reach the Absolute, and sin enter through him."—"Through any finite personality sin may come in; and that it should come in somewhere, in any possible modification of a moral system, in its necessary subjection to a conditioned nature, may be a certainty to the omniscience of the Absolute, except in such interposition for prevention as would compromise the higher ultimate end in behalf of his own dignity," (p. 458). "What he (God) may do, he will do to exclude sin; both in the use of sentient nature as a penalty, and when sin has entered, as a tabernacle for Divinity to set forth a propitiation," (p. 458).

Now here the reason, in search after her own existence, has settled some of the deepest questions in theology, which used to be thought matters for divine revelation alone. What sin is—"a prostitution of an ethical claim to a physical want;" what is the occasion of sin, the "subjection of the free to the colliding influence of the necessitated;" in which sin may not possibly be prevented "in any possible modification" of a "moral system in its necessary subjection to a conditioned nature." God will do what he may to prevent sin, and when it has entered, he "*will make use*" of "*sentient nature*" as a "*tabernacle for Divinity to set forth a propitiation.*"

Ah, then! Reason could have foretold God's mercy to sinners; and by what means he would bring them salvation! How much was Paul mistaken when he supposed it his mission to "make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God"—"the mystery of Christ, which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit!" "Sentient nature—as a tabernacle for Divinity—to set forth a propitiation!" What is it that the reason here sees *a priori*, in her search after her own existence; and without seeing which she cannot comprehend universal nature, nor prove herself a faculty of reason? Why here are the great facts of Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement; all seen by the reason without the Bible, "and before man can ever know the Bible even as an existing, outward thing!" The same reason, in order to be reason, must

comprehend *à priori* that the consummation of the world must be with "the full and eternal chorus"—of "Blessing, and honour, and power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever," (p. 459).

Why was Paul an apostle, "not of men, neither by man;"—Why was he not an apostle of The Reason? Why did he say of the gospel mystery, that it "is not after man. For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by revelation of Jesus Christ?" Why had he not discernment to see that the deepest mysteries of revelation—Trinity, Incarnation, Propitiation—are all open to the *à priori* view of the transcendental reason?

For reason, in the scheme of the Rational Psychology, has no Bible for all this. She has made "abstraction utterly" of all sense; "the phenomenal is gone." Moreover, if she had a phenomenal Bible open before her, she could not yet acknowledge it as an existing *thing*, or even as a phenomenon; for the reason which is to demonstrate this is not yet found; though even while not found, she has made a "full, clear, sound demonstration" that the inevitable testimony of consciousness in all men is false. She is yet in search after herself, and if she fails to find the reason, then all other human faculties, and all their objects, must remain in everlasting doubt.

Now a man who has a faculty of reason that can tell how to create matter, give the Subjective Idea of All Intelligence, explain how sin may come in by the colliding influence of the conditioned upon the free, see beforehand that the Absolute will use "sentient nature" as "a tabernacle for Divinity—to make a propitiation," and tell of the chorus at the consummation of the world—a man who has such a faculty of reason as this—what need has he of a Bible? Are there any deeper mysteries than these, for which Revelation should be necessary to such a man? And what a pity that a man with such a faculty of reason, should not also be endowed with lower faculties sufficient to enable him to know, even without a system of Rational Psychology, that a cane is a cane! Why cannot one endowed with such a reason, after furnishing the world with a Rational Psychology and a Rational Cosmology, furnish it also with a Rational Theology?*

* And to furnish the world with a Rational Theology is precisely what the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of April 1859 calls upon Dr Hickok to do. After representing his Rational Psychology and Cosmology as "the highest and most permanent type of American thinking," and predicting that, "if American philosophy is ever to have a history, the course of its stream, and the bulk of its waters, can appear in no other channel than the one which he has indicated," the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of Andover thus concludes: "It now remains for Dr Hickok to give a THEOLOGY whose principles shall be as absolute as those which prevail in the works before us."

But let us not forget that we have not yet found the reason. We have only found that if there ever is a faculty of reason, such it must be. "We have determined the *à priori* possibility of such a comprehending operation."—"But thus far, the all-comprehending reason is only a void conception. We have not yet found such a comprehending faculty in actual being and operation."—"Our remaining task is, that we take any facts which may present themselves in the whole field of a comprehending agency, and find whether they come at once within the actual colligation of this law of free personality," (p. 462).

15. We come, then, to the finding of an actual faculty of reason by the induction of facts. This is "our remaining task," "that we take any facts which may present themselves"—"First in the physical—system," (p. 510).

Facts! In the physical system! On the system of the Rational Psychology we are not yet allowed to know that there are any facts, or any physical system. It is true, that reason has professed to verify sense and understanding, and has set forth Ontological Demonstrations of the validity of their object. But the reason itself is not yet found, and her demonstrations go as yet for nothing. She alone as yet vouches for sense and understanding. It is therefore impossible for us, at present, to know that there are any facts, or anything physical. If reason now fails, sense fails, understanding fails, Ontological demonstrations fail, the Rational Psychology fails, and goes, beyond redemption, to *Limbus Patrum*, or to the *Ivory Gate*, whence dreams and unrealities alone come forth to the upper world. And now, it is conceded that reason cannot be found save by the help of facts. But facts can never be found until after the finding of the reason! If two burly men cannot help each other to raise themselves from the ground by lifting at each other's waistbands, then neither facts nor reason can ever be found! Here the *à priori* transcendental philosophy perpetrates an absolute *felo de se*. By her own admission, reason can be found only by the aid of facts, and facts can never be found without the aid of reason. One must be found first; while to find either first, the Psychology shews to be an impossibility. Reason fails; she can never be found. Sense fails; understanding fails; facts fail. Consciousness being a demonstrated falsifier, we know not anything without. By the same rule, we know not anything within. All ends in universal doubt;—we beg pardon,—it is not certain that doubt exists. All ends in simple Nihility. The German Ideal Pantheists left still an *Ego*, which they made both world and Creator; but the Rational Psychology of Dr Hickok logically leaves not anything. Facts, worlds, consciousness, thought,

sense, understanding, reason,—it makes an “abstraction utterly” of all, leaving not a wreck behind.

Could the Psychology survive at this point, its destiny awaits it a little further on; for its “all-comprehending agency,” the reason must comprehend universal nature in its “consummation;” and it must wait to prove its Idea by *facts*. Till it finds these, it cannot find the reason. But the final chorus of glory at the consummation of the world cannot be found as a fact without waiting till the period comes. The finding of the reason must therefore be adjourned till the end of the world. Sense, understanding, and physical facts must also wait. On the principles of the Rational Psychology, therefore, while the world stands it is impossible for man to know anything.

16. *The principles of the Psychology destined it to this end from its very beginning.* We fully admit that man is rational. He is able to discern in objects of sense more than sense reveals, and what can be yielded by no mere analysis of the object of sense. He can discern wisdom, thought, design, beneficence; and know spirit, not in its substance, nor as having properties in common with matter. In design he sees a Designer—not contained in the thing designed,—a Creator “*understood*,”—not contained—yet “clearly seen” from the things that are made. We hold to Natural Theology here, as the Bible does, though Natural Theology is so earnestly denied in the Rational Psychology, and by the transcendental philosophers. We have not space to argue these things here. Experience may shew us that, so far as we can observe, two straight lines never *do* enclose a space; it is reason that tells us they never *can*. So far as we can observe in experience, nothing ever *does* begin without a cause. We see directly by reason that nothing ever *can* so begin. The child and the savage do not wait to learn by experience that the whole is ever equal to the sum of all its parts; they see intuitively by the reason that it *must* be so. It is vain to tell us that we can know nothing beyond mere *thought*; with thought we directly cognise the *thinker*. So in all languages, the words *design*, *thought*, always involve a reference to the thinker and designer. There is a *direct beholding* through the proper faculty, just as there is in beholding objects of sense—an *intuition*. The same is true of our knowledge of outward things. It is immediate, direct, given in consciousness. We both *know*, or cognise; and *know that we know*, are conscious of knowing, or have knowledge in consciousness. Such direct beholding, or intuition, by the proper faculty in its normal state and action, is *knowledge*. It is primitive, simple, direct, absolute. We *know*, and we *know that we know*.

Now, no man can explain *how* we have knowledge through

any faculty. No man can give any Subjective Idea of any Intelligence—*i.e.*, explain *how* it can be accomplished.

Nor can a direct beholding, or intuition, by any faculty be *proved*; for the simple reason that there is nothing more direct or certain by which any proof is possible. The very proof would need to be proved; and then the proof of the proof would need to be proved; and so on *ad infinitum*; and at each step by a medium of proof more direct and certain than the one which had gone before it; while nothing can be more direct or certain than the original intuition which was called into question.

Proving the intuitions of one human faculty by those of another faculty equally human, necessarily involves the same infinite series of absurdities. The faculty which proves the other is itself in equal need of proof; and the proof stands in need of proof, and so on for ever.

Demonstration can never go beyond an intuitive truth, or direct beholding. The axiom can never be proved, nor does it stand in need of it. Demonstration consists in bringing any proposition, by a series of comparisons, each step of which is an intuition, to rest at last on an intuitive truth. The geometrician who attempts to go beyond, launches on an ocean of doubt without a shore. So when one attempts to demonstrate the validity of the objects of our knowledge, obtained in the normal use of the proper faculties, he attempts what is both absurd and impossible. Doubt here, and nothing remains but doubt for ever.

When, therefore, the Rational Psychology ventured to charge the witness of the sense in the common consciousness of all men as false; and, doubting all our faculties, undertook to give their *à priori* Idea, and to demonstrate the validity of the faculties and of their objects, it undertook what was both impossible and absurd; and what was destined to land its votary at last in universal scepticism, or in utter nihility. Dr Hickok might have taken some other road; the end must necessarily have been the same. He has laboured with much ability, and with intense thought and industry, and has doubtless done the best which the principles and method of his Rational Psychology allow; but it has been as "labour in the fire—for very vanity."

ART. X.—*The Pauline Doctrine of the Righteousness of Faith.*

Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testament. Von Dr Schmid, Professor der Theologie in Tübingen. Zweite aufl. 1859.

Commentar über den Brief an die Galater. Von Dr Karl Weiseler. 1859.

Die Paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre Von Dr Lipsius. Leipsig. 1853.

Der Schriftbeweis. Von Dr Hofman. Erlangen. 1859.

WE purpose in the present article to consider the righteousness of faith, and to group together the Pauline doctrine on the subject. Amid the manifold negations of the times, a new grounding of this point cannot be omitted. That a great change has entered into the manner of viewing the righteousness of faith, even where the current phraseology is retained, that we are justified by faith, cannot be doubtful to any one who has been watching the changes of opinion on the subject of the atonement. The material cause of justification being altered or removed, a new meaning is attached to the phrase even where it is retained.

The task we here impose upon ourselves is to ascertain the import of the phrase "the righteousness of God" (*δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*), and to define the place which it occupies in the Pauline epistles. Though we aim at an objective statement more than a formal discussion of the opinions which have appeared on the ecclesiastical field, we cannot omit all notice of those recent views which are fundamentally opposed to the proper meaning of the terms. But so far as can be, we are wishful to overstep the intermediate development, that we may go direct to the apostle's words. The task of reproducing apostolic doctrine, and of putting it together in its organic connections, is daily becoming a more urgent duty. And the part assigned to exegetical theology is to recall, as far as may be, not only single phases, but the general outline of those fresh times when apostles, as the chosen organs of Christ's revelation, exhibited in the church the riches of divine grace, as it was discerned by them in the company of the Incarnate Word, and after His ascension.

We may further add, that an occasion for a full inquiry into the righteousness of God will be found in the fact, that there is now a large class of minds who betray a hesitancy in the life of faith, which contrasts painfully with the boldness and liberty which faith breathed in the days of the apostles. And the cure is to repair anew to the sacred springs of Scripture. This peculiarity attaches to not a few whose minds are truly occupied with the personal Redeemer, who turn with eager interest to the contemplation of the divine life, but stop short at the pre-eminently important point of defining the mode in

which the righteousness of God (*δικαιοσύνη*) stands connected with the life (*ζωή*) in the Pauline scheme of doctrine. They evince, indeed, very little interest as to the relation in which these two points stand to each other. They seek communion with God in the person of Christ, without any distinct idea of the indispensable conditions of communion; and under the influence of what deserves to be called a mystic element, limiting its regards to Christ IN US, and failing to give due prominence to Christ FOR US, they never lead on the church to breathe freely in the liberty of the gospel. They have fallen under the influence of a scheme of doctrine by which they are "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought;" and though correctly regarding the person of Christ as the centre-point of Christianity, and as the fountain of life, are yet crippled in every effort, because they do not know how "life" stands related to "righteousness;" a thought pervading the whole Pauline doctrine.

Our first inquiry must be directed to ascertain what is the precise import of the righteousness of God in the Pauline Epistles, and the place it holds in them. A comparison of these Epistles with one another shews that there are two divisions or classes of them, with their own marked peculiarity, according as the apostle has occasion to counteract a Jewish Legalism, or a tendency to an incipient Gnosticism, invading the Christian churches while he yet lived. To the Pharisaic cast of thought, with its attachment to the law and its enforcement of ceremonies, allusion is made in the Epistles to the Romans, Galatians, and Philippians, and there the "righteousness of faith" is the central thought. To the Oriental theology, with its claim to a higher wisdom and its proneness to substitute ideas for the treasures of wisdom found in the personal Saviour (Col. ii. 8), allusion is made in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians; and there the personal Christ and the life (*ζωή*) found in him may be called the central thoughts. To the former class of the Pauline Epistles we are led at present to direct our attention, and shall notice the place which the righteousness of faith holds in them.

Throughout the doctrinal part of the Epistle to the Romans, this righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη*) is the grand theme. The ground-thought or proposition laid down and formally enunciated for that full illustration which it receives throughout the whole epistle, is embodied in the quotation from Habakkuk (Rom. i. 17). The scope of the proposition there given, and then developed in the remaining part of the epistle, may be put into the three words—righteousness, faith, life; and when the necessity of the righteousness has been established by placing it alongside of sin universally prevalent among Gentiles and

Jews, it is next distinctly set forth as actually manifested in fact or ushered in (iii. 22-26; iv. 3-5; v. 17). The Epistle to the Galatians, again, is nothing else than an enforcement of the great truth, that to the close of the Christian's career the righteousness of faith is the one valid plea before God, and that no second recommendation or condition in the form of works is of any avail. When Paul reproved the unhappy vacillation of Peter at Antioch, it was only to shew this truth. He confronts the pretensions of Pharisaism with the righteousness of faith (Gal. ii. 21; iii. 21; vi. 5); and the entire Epistle shews that it must be the undiverted, perpetual, and persistent aim of the church to abide by the righteousness of faith as alone sufficient; and that they who will have anything supplementary to the work of Christ, besides him, or beyond him, have fallen into a legal attitude which brings with it a spiritual and moral blight. In the Epistles to the Corinthians we find the same theme in the same antitheses, with this difference only, that other points required attention in this church (1 Cor. i. 30; 2 Cor. iii. 9). But when the apostle contrasts the two economies, the law is called the ministration of condemnation, while the gospel is termed "the ministration of righteousness" (*διακονία τῆς δικαιοσύνης*). In the Epistle to the Philippians again, we find Paul still counting all things but loss for this righteousness of faith when he was near the close of his career (Phil. iii. 8-9); and far from having outlived this thought, it colours his ideas amid the prospect of approaching martyrdom. We may compare also the pastoral epistles (Tit. iii. 5-7).

Having seen then the prevalence of this phrase, "the righteousness of God," we have next to consider in what it consists, and we shall first obviate some misconceptions.

1. The phrase cannot be held to refer to the divine attribute of righteousness. Though the divine justice, as reflected in the law, is in a definite sense the rule or norm upon which the righteousness of God is measured, yet the righteousness of which we speak is in Scripture uniformly introduced as descriptive of an ethical relation on man's side and for man. The apparent connection between the statements (Rom. i. 17 and 18), that "the righteousness of God is revealed in the gospel," and that "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven upon all ungodliness of man," lends at first sight some faint colour or semblance to the idea that they are the same. But the two statements, though placed in immediate juxtaposition and connected by a grounding particle (*γάρ*), belong to two different economies, and imply that they who have no part in "the righteousness of God" shall be visited with the revelation of his wrath. That mode of interpreting the phrase was in reality overcome at the Reformation, and is not much found now ex-

cept in the Popish Church. We are told of Luther that, having long had a desire to understand the Epistle to the Romans, the expression, "the righteousness of God," understood by him to mean the divine attribute, baffled and deterred him at the threshold, and that after long meditations, and spending days and nights in these thoughts, the nature of that righteousness which justifies us was discovered to him; upon which he felt himself wholly born anew, and the whole of Scripture became quite a different thing. There can be in it, indeed, no allusion to the divine attribute of justice, inasmuch as the act is one of grace. The former acceptation would furnish the idea of an incensed God, which is the purport of the law, not of a reconciling or justifying God, which is the essence of the gospel. Apart from this more general argument, such an acceptation could not adapt itself to the general phraseology of Scripture. Thus, in that remarkable statement to which we shall have occasion to return, "He was made sin that we might be made the righteousness of God" (*ὅτι ἡμῶν γινώμεθα*), it is self-evident that in no sense of the terms, and with no propriety of language, could it be said of the Christian that he is made the attribute of righteousness, (2 Cor. v. 21). The fact that it is commonly put in contrast to "our own righteousness" (Rom. x. 3); that "our own" is said to be of the law as compared with that which is "of God" (Phil. iii. 9); and that it is furthermore called "a gift of righteousness" (Rom. v. 17), determines the significance of the term to be something widely different from the divine attribute on the one hand, or a work of law upon the other. The idea which all these passages bring out is that of a provision made for those who have no proper righteousness of their own; and the only part which the divine justice acts in this matter, is, that it is the rule or normal standard.

2. An opinion much more common, is that, by the phrase "righteousness of God," is meant an inward condition of righteousness, on the ground of which, whether it is already perfect or not, God pronounces men righteous by a judicial sentence. This is the interpretation given by Neander, Olshausen, and others, and approved by not a few believing men in various churches, though it does not prevail by any means to the same extent as formerly. Lipsius, in his treatise on the Pauline doctrine of Justification (1858), contends for this view, and endeavours to prove that the word never refers merely to an objective external relation, but to an inward condition of righteousness as well, delineated sometimes as existing in its principle, and sometimes in its still future perfection (pp. 10-15). This opinion is not simply equivalent to justification by works; and we must do its advocates the justice to state that, while

they interpret "the righteousness of God" of that inner righteousness which God works, and while they represent this as a condition so pleasing to God that he can on account of it pronounce us righteous, though we are not yet completely perfect, they still lay all the stress on the faith which unites us to the person of Christ as the source of life. This view has every thing in common with the doctrine of Augustine on the same subject. A distinction is drawn between a man's own righteousness (*idia δικαιοσύνη*), undertaken in the exercise of his own unaided powers, and that which is wrought by God, which they think is the import of "the righteousness of God," or "the righteousness of faith," because it is all received by faith.

This opinion, though differing essentially from gross legalism, and continuing to speak of the life of faith and of justification by faith, is yet fundamentally different from the Pauline doctrine. (1) It tends to obliterate the distinction between justification and sanctification, whereas in the apostle's language they are carefully distinguished. Thus, when there is occasion to describe in comprehensive outline what Christ is made to his people (1 Cor. i. 30), these two are kept distinct. The holiness (*ἀγιασμός*) is carefully distinguished from the righteousness, however closely connected with it; and they cannot be confounded. This is conclusive, if we are to abide by the apostle's usage of language, and not to efface his express distinctions. But not only so. (2) The objective and external relation expressed by the term in question stands out in bold relief when the antithesis is drawn between Christ "made sin for us," and our being made "the righteousness of God" (2 Cor. v. 21); words which imply that in the very same sense in which he was made sin his people are made righteousness. All attempts to give this antithesis a subjective sense must be set aside at once. Nor is the same signification obscure in another passage (Phil. iii. 9), where the apostle, approaching the end of his life's task, declares that he counts all things but loss that he may be found in Christ, not having "his own righteousness," but that which is "of God." No doubt it is alleged that the antithesis in this passage is between works of nature and works of grace, works of law and works of faith. But the antithesis is a different one. It is between what is subjective (his own) and an objective one (God's).

3. Another opinion is, that faith is of itself counted to us as the righteousness. There are various modifications of this opinion at present before the church. But none of them presupposes an objective righteousness of God which has been wrought out and then revealed in the gospel. And in almost every case it throws the mind back into a neo-nomian tendency.

(a) To begin with that modification of it which has much in common with Arminianism, we find it represented by the younger Tittmann and Nitzsch. The former says, Scripture does not teach that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to men, but that faith is counted for righteousness. Nitzsch in his reply to Möhler approves of this (p. 139), and in his system he calls faith "a righteousness *κατὰ χάριν*, yea, the only righteousness of which man is capable;" and he adds, "such is the Protestant doctrine. Does it then desire that the believer should only be accounted as justified, while in fact he is unrighteous or not righteous? Undoubtedly." Though the view in question has some colour from the rendering, "counted for righteousness," when it should be rendered "unto (*ἵς*) righteousness," as the result, the language of Scripture, properly construed, lends no countenance to the view that a substitute is accepted for a perfect righteousness. The righteousness of God, as a substantive reality, is "through faith" (*διὰ*) as the means of reception (Rom. iii. 22). But the inquiry, moreover, arises, How, on such a supposition, can the sentence of the Judge have a sufficient ground? A method of acceptance without a real righteousness would neither meet the divine claims, nor satisfy the inquiries of an awakened conscience.

(b) Another modification of this view is propounded by Moses Stuart of Andover, and by Wieseler in his recent able Commentary (1859) on the Epistle to the Galatians. Mr Stuart defines "the righteousness of God" as "the justification which God bestows, or the justification of which God is the author, or if any one prefers, he may call it that state of pardon and acceptance." The same explanation of the phrase is advanced by Dr John Brown in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans; he calls it "the divine method of justification," (see on Rom. i. 17). Writing without any knowledge of Stuart's opinion, Wieseler says (p. 177):—

"The act by which God *δικαίω* the sinner, Pauls calls *δικαίωσις*, Rom. iv. 25; v. 18; and the state of possessing this *δικαίωσις* of God he calls *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*; which, therefore, like the *δικαίωσθαι*, comes from faith, Rom. i. 17; iii. 21, 22; x. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21; or *δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ θεοῦ*, Phil. iii. 9; or *δικαιοσύνη* simply, Rom. iv. 3, 5, 6, 9 (with the addition of *ἐν πίστει*, iv. 11, 13); iv. 22; v. 17, 21; ix. 30; x. 4, 6, 10; Gal. ii. 21; iii. 6, 21; v. 5; 1 Cor. i. 30; 2 Cor. iii. 9; 2 Tim. iv. 8. This *δικαιοσύνη* of man coming from God in the *δικαίωσις*, and in this sense bestowed by God (Rom. iii. 24; v. 17), forms the antithesis to man's own righteousness resting upon the rule of the law (Rom. x. 5; Gal. iii. 12); *ἰδὲν δικ.* or *ἡ ἐμὴ*, Rom. x. iii; Phil. iii. 9. From the circumstance that the above mentioned *δικαιοσύνη* is the immediate effect of the *δικαίωσις*, it results that they who, like the Catholics and Rationalists, will

not understand it of a relation to God, but of moral conduct or actual holiness which, it is true, *δικαιοσύνη* means in other passages, are constrained to enter on a proof that *δικαίωσιν* and *δικαίωσις* in the passages adduced denote 'the making righteous,' or sanctification."

To this explanation by the learned German we object, because, however it receives a colour of probability from the phrase, "righteousness which is of faith" (*ἡ ἐκ πίστεως*, Phil. iii. 9), it not only attaches an erroneous meaning to the term, but transposes the Biblical order of doctrines. The justification (*δικαίωσις*) proceeds only on a substantive righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη*), not conversely. The term righteousness does not, in any of the above passages, as we shall afterwards prove, bear the idea of the state of being justified; and if the act of justification is conceived of as proceeding on no underlying righteousness, we are lost in the mists of uncertainty. This is, moreover, abhorrent to the divine rectitude, which insists on a true fulfilment of the divine law, and acquits only on account of an actual obedience. But in this case what are we to assume as the material cause of justification? It is obvious that, in the government of a righteous God, no one can be justified by a mere connivance at defects, or by being accounted what he is not; and it will be found as we advance that Scripture, far from being satisfied with a make-believe or legal fiction, demands that the believer shall be really righteous when he is declared so by the sentence of justification.

(c) We have next to advert to the Exposition propounded by Hofmann of Erlangen, which is decidedly in the Neo-nomian tendency, though of a subtle nature. He holds that faith is accepted as this righteousness, inasmuch as faith is God-pleasing conduct. He wraps up this theory with the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins in a singular way, not unlike the theory of Osiander, with this difference, that forgiveness was supposed to be really procured by the sufferings of Christ in the doctrine of Osiander; while Hofmann makes Christianity merely make known or manifest the forgiveness without any atonement. But then the believing of this offer of forgiveness is, as such, according to him, considered as the righteousness. "If we lay emphasis," says he, "upon the fact that faith is only the acceptance of that which God gives, then we mean by the righteousness of faith a state of righteousness for the participation of which nothing is required but faith. If, however, we lay it on this, that it is the conduct or behaviour without which we cannot please God, then a state of righteousness is meant, of which none but he participates who actually believes." (See the *Schriftbeweis*, i. 649-651.) According to Hofmann, faith is the present obedience required by God.

When a man, therefore, renders this obedience, his conduct is reckoned for righteousness, and accounted good or pleasing in God's sight; and he whose conduct is God-pleasing is rewarded with the forgiveness of sin and a share in the promised restoration. Apart from all other considerations, into which we do not enter, the theory supposes not a real, but a merely putative righteousness. If there be no admission of a real substantive righteousness to be apprehended or embraced, the foundation on which the whole justifying act proceeds is undermined.

All these theories under this category of opinions lead to the notion of a mere acception, or, in other words, to the reputing of one to be what he is not. A complete, prepared, and perfect righteousness, objectively presented, exists no longer. Faith wants its security, and rests on no corresponding reality.

Our inquiry must now be directed to the ascertaining of the precise meaning of the phrase, "the righteousness of God," against those modern interpreters, who, to a large extent, do not scruple to declare that faith as such is taken for the righteousness, without any corresponding reality underlying it. That this is in keeping with recent views on the atoning work of Christ's is true; but is it the import of the Biblical expression?

1. On the contrary, an analysis of Paul's language will satisfy us that this righteousness is a substantive reality; not less a fact than sin, and not less productive of results than sin, but in the opposite direction. The establishment of this as the purport of the apostle's doctrine must now be our task. That this righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*) is a substantive reality, may be argued from the fact that it is put as the great subject-matter of the gospel, and said to be "revealed" (Rom. i. 17); that the gospel is said to be the "ministration of righteousness" (2 Cor. iii. 19); that it is called "a gift of righteousness" (Rom. v. 17); and that it is said to be "unto all and upon all them that believe" (Rom. iii. 22). But the twofold parallel which the apostle draws between righteousness and sin (*δικαιοσύνη* and *ἀμαρτία*) as actual counterparts (Rom. i. 18—iii. 26), and between the death which follows, as the result of the one, and the life (*ζωή*), which is the equally certain result of the other (Rom. v. 12—18), leaves no doubt that the righteousness is a substantive reality. If we look at the first parallel, the apostle intends to place the two points, "sin" and righteousness, in marked antithesis in the third chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. It is evident that, in entering into the copious description of the universal prevalence of sin (Rom. i. 18—iii. 23), he not only intends to display the religious wants of mankind, and to denude them of all self-confidence, but also to exhibit these two great counterparts as equally realities—the

one as the world's ruin, the other as its restoration. The one is a completed fact, as well as the other. The one has come into humanity, and has a footing within the race, as well as the other. They are the only two great events in the history of the race, and they confront each other. Hence the apostle says (Rom. iii. 22, 23) that "the righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*) is unto all and upon all them that believe: for (the grounding *γὰρ*) all sinned (in Adam and in daily acts), and are come short of the glory of God" (*δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ*). Bengel correctly regards the verb (*ἡμαρτον*) as comprehending under it the sin in Paradise, the sinful habits and the sinful acts flowing from them. Without canvassing the great variety of views propounded on the import of "coming short of the glory of God" (*δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ*), we think it undoubtedly intimates a certain close analogy to the "righteousness" which is there mentioned as its counterpart. Many of the older interpreters, such as Flacius, Calovius, Schmid, and Alting, as well as Olshausen more recently, regard the phrase as meaning "the glory originally imparted to man in having the divine image conferred upon him." The true idea, we think, is an allusion to that declarative glory which man was made to render to his Maker, and which he should have rendered by a pure nature and a sinless obedience. When it is said, therefore, that the righteousness of God is unto all and upon all them that believe, BECAUSE (*γὰρ*) all have come short of this glory, the design is to place these two over against each other as antitheses or counterparts, and as equal realities in the human race. Man came short of that revenue of glory which would have resulted from a sinless obedience. In the righteousness of God, that revenue or tribute is restored and paid.

The second parallel between the death which is the result of sin, and the life which is the equally certain consequence of righteousness (Rom. v. 12-18), establishes the same point. The prolific source of such results in these two ways can be no unreal make-believe. As by one man SIN entered into the world, and death by sin—for we must take death in all the force and intensity of the term—so (*ὡς* in v. 12, and *ὡς* in v. 18, leading to *ὡς* as the counterpart) the one approved and accepted righteousness which has been ushered in (*ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ*), stands in the same causal connection with LIFE. This second member of the parallel is expressed in the words, "unto the justification of life," but with the obvious meaning that, this righteousness having come in room of sin, there must be life. The thought is, that where sin is, there must be death; and that where righteousness is, there must be life. And we have adduced the parallel to prove that the righteousness productive of such important consequences, must be a substantive reality.

We may at this point consider the peculiar shade of meaning which the phrase acquires when put in connection with God, whose righteousness it is said to be. Why is it designated "God's righteousness," or "the righteousness of God?" It is now generally understood by modern interpreters to be so called, because God is the author of it, or the provider of it, just in the same way as Christ is called "God's Lamb," or the Lamb of God. We cannot but regard it as only a briefer expression of what is more fully and precisely described as "the righteousness which is of God" (*ἡ ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη*, Phil. iii. 9). The fact that the phrase is put in contrast to OUR OWN righteousness (Rom. x. 3, and Phil. iii. 9), leads us to the conclusion that it means the righteousness of which God is the author. The other interpretation given by the general body of the Lutheran divines after Luther, more a paraphrase than a translation, is that it denotes a "righteousness valid before God," or availing before God, is, of course, an inference which cannot be excluded; for the righteousness will be valid at his tribunal, if he has provided it, and is the author of it. But that thought is a merely secondary idea, which is involved in the former.*

2. The manifestation of this righteousness as a historic fact is noticed by the apostle when he says, "Now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested" (*ανεπαγγελται*), Rom. iii. 21. In that phrase he refers to its coming into existence, or to its manifestation as a historic fact in the incarnation of Christ. The allusion is not to the preaching of it, or to what he calls the revelation of it in the gospel (Rom. i. 17), but to the bringing in of this righteousness, once for all, when Christ was

* Luther's rendering is "Gerechtigkeit die vor Gott gilt," or in the Latin form, "justitia quæ valet apud Deum." Calvin goes in the same direction, though he admits the force of the rendering, "justitia quæ a Deo nobis donatur." In more recent times, expositors pretty unanimously concur in viewing the phrase as an instance of the *genitivus auctoris*, and are persuaded that Luther's rendering cannot be justified by the strict grammatical construction. Fritzsche has indeed attempted, in his singularly exact philological way, to vindicate that rendering, but without success. When the supporters of Luther's view adduce James i. 20—"the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God"—and argue that the phrase, *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, means "righteousness before God," it is not in point. The phrase in James intimates that when men give vent to a passionate, hot zeal in their attempts to produce an effect, which belongs to God alone, they fail; for they do not effect what God only effects. The phrase, though with another shade and scope, is but an instance of the very common use of the *genitivus auctoris*. Though the opinion of Baur is of comparatively small value on a question of exegesis, as he interprets by preconceived ideas, yet it is curious to find that he can engraft his views on Luther's rendering. He holds that the phrase does not mean "the righteousness of which God is the author," and which he imparts, but that of which God is the object, and is determined by the idea of God. He thinks that this Pantheistic idea may be called 'the righteousness valid before God,' (Baur's *Paulus*, p. 524).

"manifest" in the flesh (1 Tim. iii. 16). And the language used by the apostle shews that it is coincident with the person of Christ, and found in him. This is evident from the way in which he speaks of one of those terms which describe the one obedience of Christ in the manifoldness of its effects and benefits. When he says that the REDEMPTION is "in Christ Jesus" (τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ, i. e., τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐν), the meaning is that it is found in his person; that he is personally the redemption, just as he is called "our peace" (Eph. ii. 14); and is furthermore described as "made of God unto us righteousness" (1 Cor. i. 30). It does not denote that we have it in a state of union to his person, however true that is in itself, but that it is actually IN him; that he is himself that manifested righteousness, and will continue to be so while his living person endures. The Judge there sees our righteousness and our eternal redemption, whenever he looks upon the person of Christ. The living Redeemer, in his crucified and risen humanity, is himself the manifestation of the righteousness of God; and it must not be lost sight of, that his living through death, "according to the power of an endless life" (Heb. vii. 16), and the restoration of life to appear in the presence of God for us, was essentially necessary to the existence, validity, and perpetuity of this righteousness of God. It is therefore no putative, past, or transitory righteousness that has been manifested, but one actually in the world, and the only great reality in it. Thus, when the righteous Judge beholds his Son, he sees in him the righteousness of God, the grand readjustment of man's relation to his Maker, the reunion of God and man.

It is in the same sense, as setting forth a manifestation of this righteousness in fact, that we find the phrase used in the subsequent verse, when the apostle says that the Redeemer came "to declare his righteousness." The two expressions, *ὡς ἔδειξεν* τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ (v. 25), and *ἵνα ἔδειξεν* τῆς δικαιοσύνης (v. 26), must be taken as conveying the same idea. In the interpretation of these two verses, however, almost all expositors, from the days of the Reformation downwards, have regarded the word "righteousness" as intimating retributive justice, as if that were not sufficiently expressed in the next clause, "that he might be just." But such an exposition not only alters the force of the preposition (*διὰ*), but introduces much confusion into the entire passage. The apostle means to say, just as he does at v. 21, that, as there was a foreshadowing of this righteousness in the old economy, and more particularly in the blood-sprinkled mercy-seat, so there was a manifestation of it, in fact, as a historic reality, in the incarnation and obedience of Christ.

But the necessity of bringing in this righteousness is also connected by the apostle with its retrospective character and efficacy. In the Old Testament there was a remission of sins that are past (Rom. iii. 25); and, "on account of" that remission (*διὰ*, with *accus.*), the historical manifestation of righteousness was rendered necessary. Without alluding to other points on the relation of the economics, involved in the apostle's words, we seize only this one. And the import is, that the manifestation of righteousness, or the bringing in of the righteousness of God, was necessary *on account of* (*διὰ*) the previous remission of sins conferred upon the Old Testament saints. The statement shews that the righteousness of God, by its retrospective efficacy, stood in causal connection with the remission of sins under the former economy, as the great fact in the world's history to which God had respect from the beginning. This is the sense that must be put upon the words. As the sentence of acquittal had been enjoyed by many in previous ages, it was necessary that such a righteousness should be brought in or actually manifested.

But the apostle is also careful to notice that this righteousness was witnessed by the law and the prophets (Rom. iii. 21). As to the prophets, they are some of them as express with reference to this righteousness as Paul is. The law of sacrifices had special reference to it; and, with regard to the judicial law, which specially adumbrated good things to come (Col. ii. 17), it served to point out, especially when Israel stood in their normal condition to their theocratic king, the readjusted relation of man to his Maker, and the tabernacle of God as with men.

3. The standard or measure of this righteousness of God is divine justice and the law. Partly to bring out the parallel between the violation and the fulfilment of the law, partly to unfold the principle of the law to which this righteousness of God goes back, we find the apostle delineating both sides. Thus, on the footing of law, the reward is of debt (Rom. iv. 4); the transgressor of the law is under sin (Rom. iii. 9), is condemned (Rom. viii. 1), and under the curse (Gal. iii. 10). On the other hand, he who has the righteousness of God, with the rectified relation which it brings, is the antithesis of all this. It must be added that righteousness is measured by the standard of justice. The design of the manifestation of it, in fact, was, that he might be just (*ὡς τὸ θεῖον δίκαιον*)—the word denoting the divine justice, in the proper sense of the term. There is first a manifestation of justice in demanding the satisfaction, and then a display of it in connection with the preparation of this righteousness of God, when it is added, "that he might be just, and the justifier."

But, specially, the law is the standard ; for the law is just the expression of the former. The idea of righteousness in a creature implies a conformity to the law. Law is the sphere of righteousness, the element in which it moves. These two terms, law and righteousness, are correlatives, and suppose each other. Accordingly, a comparison of the numerous passages where the work of Christ is mentioned leads us to the conclusion that wherever the phrase, "righteousness of God," occurs, it involves a subjection to the law as the rule of ethical rectitude, and righteousness, in all the varieties of application of which it is capable, always comes back to this, that it is the accomplishment of law. If law is the sphere of this righteousness, it is evident that no knowledge can be acquired respecting it without a clear conception of the law in its relation to sinners, not only in the extent of its positive claims, but in the extent of its curse. The law to which the Surety must needs subject himself was, moreover, the LAW AS VIOLATED, urging the unalterable demands which it made on man as man, and armed with the curse which its violation entailed. Accordingly, the work of Christ is described in its relation to the law. He was made under the law (Gal. iv. 4) ; the righteousness on which man's acceptance is based is termed the righteousness of the law (Rom. viii. 4) ; the work of Christ is the end of the law for (or unto) righteousness to every one that believeth (Rom. x. 4). This latter phrase (*εἰς δικαιοσύνην*) can only mean that fulfilment which the law demanded, and could not but demand, till its end or accomplishment was reached ; and that additional word, that Christ is the end of it "unto righteousness" (*εἰς*), leaves no doubt that this fulfilment of the law is to be found in Christ alone, and is received in the reception of Christ.

More particularly the obedience of Christ (called *ὑπακοή*), (Rom. v. 19), extended over his entire life, and formed one obedience from first to last. If we look at the usual division of human duty, as traced in the threefold relation which it bears to God, to ourselves, and to our fellow-men, the Son of God learned obedience in all these respects. The element of obedience pervaded his life, and went through all his sufferings. The great commandment laid on him was to die ; and here, amid temptations to recede, the extent of his obedience was displayed. His is no common obedience, but one that passed through superhuman temptations ; and it has a dignity and value, from the greatness of his person, that entitle it to be called infinite ; for he took humanity, that he might have a fit instrument or organ for bringing in the righteousness of God. To put it in a personal form, then, Christ himself is the righteousness of God ; or the Son of God, obedient in life and

death, is the righteousness which avails with God. Scripture knows but of this one righteousness, and the world has never seen another.

4. It remains to be added that the righteousness of God was **IN OUR STEAD**, as well as for our benefit. The vicarious character attaching to it is as plainly taught as the fact that it is a substantive reality; and when believers in Christ come to a realisation of the fact that it was rendered in their room, and that they are one with him, they say, "we are made the righteousness of God in him" (2 Cor. v. 21). The obedience of Christ realises the lofty ideal and goal set before the race, and, on this account, that he was acting for his people, and that they were in him, it is the greatest event in the world's history. The entrance of a sinless humanity, with the law in his heart, and comprehending all the seed, thus becomes the central point of all time, to which previous ages looked forward, and after ages look back. He was the living law, the personal law; and this was an event with a far more important bearing than any other that ever occurred. It is the world's new creation.

That the vicarious character of the whole may appear, it is only necessary to recall the words, that "he died the just for the unjust" (1 Pet. iii. 18, *δικαιὸς ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων*); that by the **OBEDIENCE OF ONE, MANY** are made righteous (Rom. v. 19); that the intercession for us is based on the fact that he is Jesus Christ the righteous (1 Jo. ii. 1); that he is made unto us righteousness (1 Cor. i. 30); that he is designated "the Lord our righteousness" (Jer. xxiii. 6); and that we are in him "the righteousness of God" (2 Cor. v. 21).

It appears no less plainly from the statement (Rom. iii. 31) that we establish the law through faith. This is not explained by saying that the law there denotes the Old Testament as now established (so Ernesti, Fritzsche, De Wette, Stuart), nor by saying that faith establishes the law, as it gives rise to new obedience (so Philippi, Willet, Gerlach); but by the view that the faith which apprehends the righteousness of God establishes the law in the case of all who believe. They have fulfilled it in a Representative with whom they are one. Faith, or, in other words, according to the metonymy which the apostle is fond of using, Christ, received by faith, establishes the law.

It is commonly urged, as an objection to this mode of interpreting the allusions to the righteousness of faith, that the apostle nowhere uses the common theological nomenclature, "the righteousness of Christ;" and we admit that this is a correct observation. But it conveys the opposite conclusion from that adopted by such as call in question its vicarious character. It makes the vicarious character of the righteousness more evident. Christ **HIMSELF** is our righteousness. The

incarnate Son, dying and rising, is, in such a sense, the new humanity to all who receive him, and the realised ideal of what man was made to be, that he himself is made to us righteousness, and we are the righteousness of God. It is true, we do not find the phrase, "the righteousness of Christ;" but, more remarkable, we find the phrase that we are all that Christ is; that he is "our righteousness," and we "the righteousness of God in him."

The relation of faith to this righteousness (Rom. iii. 21), as the receptive organ by which we lay hold of it, and the position of the word as the medium of revealing it (Rom. i. 17), would next fall to be considered. But we pursue the subject no further at present.

THE LATE PRINCIPAL CUNNINGHAM.

Nor the Free Church only, but the whole Protestant community in this and other lands, will receive with heartfelt sorrow the announcement of the death of Dr Cunningham, the Principal of the New College at Edinburgh, and for some years editor of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*.

This mournful event occurred at his own house in Salisbury Road, Newington, on the 14th day of December 1861, soon after he had entered on his fifty-seventh year, and while he was yet apparently in the fresh vigour of robust manhood, and in the full maturity of his intellectual powers.

Writing under the first impression of this unexpected and overwhelming bereavement, we cannot attempt anything like a history of his life, or even a critical estimate of his character and labours as a Christian divine. We cannot doubt that, when his "Lectures on Historical Theology" shall have been given to the world by two of his colleagues, to whose custody they were specially consigned by himself a few hours before his death, full justice will be done to his memory, as one of the ablest and most learned of modern theologians, and that his name will be permanently embalmed in the history of the Church in connection with that of CALVIN, of whose peculiar views, in regard alike to Christian doctrine and ecclesiastical polity, he was a most strenuous, consistent, and judicious advocate. In the mean time we can only give utterance to our heartfelt admiration of his great talents, of his profound learning, and of his truly noble character, while we express our deep sense of the irreparable loss which the New College, the Free Church, and the Christian community at large have sustained by his death. We dare not trust ourselves to give expression to the feelings of those who were privileged to enjoy his personal friendship when they think of the unspeakable bereavement with which they have been visited. The event was so sudden, and is yet so recent, that those who were most warmly attached to him are scarcely in a condition to realise the fact in all its bearings, or to estimate aright its magnitude and importance. But some attributes of his character were "known and read of all men;" and by means of these he was endeared to many who had no access to confidential intercourse with him, but who had the opportunity of observing how nobly and how consistently he defended Christian truth, from whatever quarter it might be assailed, and with what cogent arguments he vindicated its sacred claims, in opposition alike to the assaults of avowed enemies and the injudicious concessions of professed friends.

The solid substratum of his intellectual character was a large measure of sound common sense and great practical sagacity, such as could only be acquired by one endowed with a clear, logical, and discriminating mind, and habituated to the strenuous exercise of all his faculties on every subject which engaged his attention. He had a peculiar facility in discerning, as if by intuitive insight, but really by the combined action of his knowing and logical powers, the one point on which any controversy turned, in stripping it of all irrelevant or inconclusive reasonings, and in explaining the precise "*status quæstionis*," so as to simplify the problem, and lay bare the hinge on which its solution depended. Hence his unrivalled eminence both as a chamber counsel in cases of difficulty, and as a public debater in controversial discussion. In any perplexity which might be felt in regard to the right view of any subject, whether doctrinal or practical, men resorted to him in private for his opinion and advice, in the assurance that they were consulting one who would give no hasty or one-sided deliverance, but would take a comprehensive view of the whole question in all its aspects and relations, and bring to bear upon it the energies of a most vigorous intellect, and also the rich stores of information which were treasured up in his singularly ready and retentive memory. And in any matter of public debate the Church looked to him as a tower of strength, and waited patiently for the expression of his judgment in regard to it, in the confident assurance that he would lay down such broad general principles, couched in precise and well defined propositions, as would not only afford a solid ground for a judicial decision, but furnish them also with a clear and intelligible reason by which it might be triumphantly vindicated against all opponents. We have listened to many eloquent speakers, who made a powerful impression on their audience by their logical acuteness or their rhetorical appeals, but we have never listened to one who succeeded so thoroughly in satisfying the minds of his hearers, and sending them away in the conscious possession of distinct and definite principles, which they could themselves apply to the question at issue, or to any cognate question which might afterwards arise. His eminence, both as a private counsellor and as a public controversialist, arose from the same mental habit—the habit of looking at a question in all its aspects, of taking a comprehensive view of the arguments on both sides, of fixing the precise point which should be proved or disproved, of eliminating everything that was irrelevant to the main issue, and bringing the whole stores of his richly furnished mind to the determination of the one cardinal truth on which the whole controversy depended. In doing so he left an indelible impres-

sion on the minds both of his friends and his opponents—an impression that he was thoroughly informed on the whole matter in debate, that he took a comprehensive view of it in all its aspects and relations, that he disguised no difficulty, and overlooked no objection that had any material bearing on the case, that he was no special pleader, or zealous partisan, but an enlightened and impartial, although a decided and unhesitating, judge; and that he made a fair, candid, and honourable use of all the facts and arguments that might be adduced on either side.

As a minister of religion, and a professor of theology, he was eminently characterised by reverence for the word of God,—by a careful and conscientious endeavour to ascertain, in every instance, what is the mind of the Spirit,—and by a fearless and faithful avowal of his convictions, when they were deliberately formed on what he believed to be the sure warrant of Scripture. No one could be less dogmatic than he was in affirming anything that depended on mere human authority in matters of faith; but no one could be more dogmatic in asserting whatever he believed to rest on the infallible authority of God. He loved the Bible, and studied it as “a little child,” saying with Samuel, “Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth.” Thoroughly convinced of its divine origin and inspiration, he felt that he was as much bound to believe what God says, as to do what God commands; and “thus saith the Lord” was to him a sufficient reason for receiving every doctrine contained in it, however mysterious in its own nature, or however opposed to the reason of the “natural man” who “cannot receive the things of the Spirit of God, because they are foolishness to him.” He had no difficulty, therefore, in admitting and affirming the peculiar doctrines of Calvinism, obnoxious as they are to many cultivated minds, simply because he believed that the Bible is the word of God, and was assured that these doctrines can be proved by the sure warrant of Scripture. And hence, both in the pulpit and in the chair, he taught these doctrines without modification or reserve, but in connection always with those other truths which, along with them, make up the whole revealed “counsel of God,”—and no one could be more peremptory in rejecting, or more vehement in denouncing, the opinions of those who, going beyond Calvin, and pushing his principles to an unwarrantable extreme, applied the doctrine of predestination to disprove either the responsible agency of man, or the freeness and universality of the gospel, as a message addressed to sinners, and to all sinners without exception, or the use and efficacy of means, as included, not less than the end, in the purpose of the divine mind. His preaching, therefore, while it was doctrinal, was

also eminently practical ; and his prelections had the same general character, inasmuch as while they laid a solid scriptural foundation for dogmatic belief, they were invariably brought to bear upon the conscience, and directed to the object of impressing men's minds with a sense of their relation to God, and of their solemn responsibilities as subjects of His moral government.

But the chief charm of his noble character lay in his profound religious convictions, and his habitual personal piety. As a Christian man, instructed by the Word and quickened by the Spirit of God, he had undergone that change without which no one, however able and accomplished, "can enter into the kingdom of heaven." He was a "living epistle of Christ, known and read of all men," but an epistle "written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God ; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart." He had his infirmities, as every Christian man has,—and no one could be more ready to acknowledge them, or to humble himself before God on account of them : he "had a law in his members warring against the law of his mind," but he "delighted in the law of the Lord after the inward man ;" and whosoever bearing the Christian name, if any such there be, is conscious of no conflict in his soul between sin and grace, may cast, if he please, the first stone at him. But a life such as his—a life devoted to the study and exposition of God's word, consecrated to the service of Christ in the ministry of the Gospel, and pervaded, from first to last, by a simple, unaffected, unostentatious piety, is the best proof which his warmest friends could desire that he was indeed a child of God, and that he is now an heir of heaven.

And as he lived, so he died in the faith and hope of the gospel. On the eve of his dissolution, he expressed a wish to see two of his colleagues with whom he had been connected in the bonds of confidential friendship for more than thirty years. On being introduced to his bedroom, he signified that he wished to see them alone, and after shaking hands cordially with both, he said, "I was told to-day about four o'clock, that, in the opinion of my medical advisers, I had nearly finished my course, and that, my constitution having been so enfeebled, they had little hope of its being able to throw off the disease under which I labour. I could have wished that a longer time had been given me for preparation before the great final change ; and that I might have had leisure to re-examine the whole foundations of my faith and hope ; for I feel that the only question now for me, is that of my personal relation to God." On its being suggested that, in his case, the foundation had been settled and ascertained long ago, he answered—"Yes ; I was enabled at an

early period of life to give myself to Christ, and to dedicate my life to his service; and, notwithstanding many infirmities, and many evil tendencies, I have still adhered to Him." He then expressed the great comfort which he had enjoyed in the constant friendship and cordial co-operation of those who stood beside him, acknowledging that they had borne with his infirmities, and had acted towards him as true and faithful friends to whom he was indebted for many acts of kindness, for which he was deeply grateful.

He said, however, that he had a special object in sending for them at this time. He had been much occupied during the day, and was somewhat fatigued. He had been engaged in getting his Will extended and signed; but that deed dealt only with his pecuniary affairs, and did not contain any special instructions to his trustees respecting his papers and manuscripts. He wished, therefore, to commit to the care of his two colleagues the entire charge of his papers connected with the College, to be deposited in the Library there, with power to them to dispose of them as they may think right, and to make such use of them as might seem best for the good of the Church, and the interests of his family. On its being asked, whether, in speaking of his papers connected with the College, he meant to include his MS. Lectures, he said, "I omitted to mention my Lectures specially in my statement, but I meant them to be included in the papers to which I referred." On this matter being settled, he added,—“And my family—you will both remember my family.” On being asked if he had any message to the students of the New College, in whom he took a paternal interest, he lay back for some seconds on his pillow in earnest thought, and then said, “I have no particular word for them except this,—Let them give themselves first to Christ, and then dedicate their whole life to his service; seeking to be able and faithful ministers of the New Testament, ‘not of the letter but of the spirit.’” He then bade his colleagues affectionately farewell; and as he grasped their hands with a cordial and prolonged pressure, repeated these lines:—

“A few short years of evil past,
We reach that happy shore,
Where death-divided friends at last
Shall meet to part no more.”

His last words to them, twice repeated, were, “We shall meet at the right hand;”—and in little more than four hours he “fell asleep in Jesus.” “Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord; they rest from their labours, and their works do follow them.” May we be followers of those who, through faith and patience, inherit the promises!

XII.—FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS.

Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung.

ONE of the most interesting papers in this periodical, is the account of the Ecclesiastico-Theological State of Holland, which has been declared by one of the most distinguished ecclesiastical authorities in Holland to have been correctly drawn. Holland, says the writer, in regard to its religion and theological development, in many respects obeyed the German influences. The powerful impulse which Schleiermacher gave to the new German theology, all the evils of which are far counterbalanced by its blessings, and which even the various opponents of this prince of learning could not destroy, has taken root also in Holland, but much later, and under conditions quite different from those which Schleiermacher met with in Germany.

The religio-ecclesiastical parties in Holland are principally these four :— 1, The *strictly orthodox* ; 2, The *mildly orthodox* ; 3, The *temperately liberal* (to which party belongs the Gröningen school); and 4, The *liberal, properly so called*, out of which has recently sprung, as the extreme left, an empirical materialistic school. The first two of these parties regard each other amicably. Orthodox! and Liberal! These are the two battle-cries shouted with great bitterness by the extreme right, or the extreme left, against each other.

1. *The strictly orthodox party.* The chief seat of this party is at the Hague. Groen Van Prinsterer is the ablest of their distinguished leaders. He repeatedly filled the situation of minister and of deputy of the Diet, which latter situation he resigned because the Diet determined that no instruction in the Christian religion was to be communicated in the common schools which were without any confession. Such instruction, it was asserted, was the business only of the Church. This decision, he contended with all his might, was in effect the conversion of a "Christian state" into an "atheistical" one, according to his conviction. He is also an eminent historian. Other celebrated leaders of this party are Dr Capadose, Makai, Clout Van Souterwoude, &c.

2. *The mildly orthodox party.* At its head stands an association of clergymen calling themselves "Earnestness and peace." An ecclesiastical gazette was published under the same name, edited by Pastor Chantepie de la Saussaye of Leyden, one of the most outstanding members of this party. It has been lately discontinued. The leaders of this party, so far, stand mediately or immediately under the influence of the new German theology. I mention among its present or former most distinguished members, *Beets*, minister at Hemstede, near Haarlem, president of the "Ernst und Friede," one of the most esteemed of the new religious poets and authors of Holland ; *Helldring*, the Wichern of Holland, the founder and advocate of the famed Magdalen Asylum at Steenbeck, the middle-point of all the Dutch efforts to promote home missions, and the zealous advocate of foreign missions ; *Hasenbroek*, perhaps the first preacher in Amsterdam ; *Van Rhyn*, in Nieuwe Loosdrecht, by Utrecht ; *Osterzee*, in Rotterdam, one of

the associates engaged in the great *Bibelwerk* of Professor Lange of Bonn ; *Doodes*, formerly a minister in Rotterdam, recently appointed to the Professorship of Theology in Utrecht, who is at war with the latest pantheistic-materialistic unbelievers ; *Secretan* and *Trotet* in the Hague, the latter a zealous disciple of Vinet. After finishing his studies at Berlin under the guidance of Neander, he became a reformed preacher at Stockholm, and by his communication regarding the state of the Church of Holland in the *Revue Chrétienne*, he drew upon him a sharp assault from the orthodox party. Between the first and the second of the parties, Da Costa of Amsterdam, who has but lately departed to his home, held to the last a happy mediating place.

3. *The Gröningen School*.—It had its first origin in the noble, personal energy of one Professor Van Heusde. Filled with the highest enthusiasm for Plato, he attracted to him many studious youths, principally those who were most highly distinguished, and inspired them with a similar love for that spirit who became even to a Neander the guide to Christ. By the theologians among his scholars, a bridge was easily constructed from Plato to Schleiermacher ; and so there arose a Platonico-Schleiermacher tendency, whose principal representative at present is Hofstede de Groot, professor of theology at Gröningen, who is esteemed and held in honour by all parties. Hence it has received the name of the Gröningen School. Belonging to this school there are many different shades of opinion, both on the right and left, but the following may be taken as its principal characteristics :—

As far as regards their doctrines, they deny the essential divinity of Christ and the personality of the Holy Ghost. In Christology they are Arians, seeing in Christ the image and the ideal of all that is good, and true, and beautiful—the divine teacher of the human race. In Anthropology, they are semi-Pelagian. In Soterology, they are anti-Anselmian—the death of Christ not being received as an offering of atonement, but as the highest manifestation, and the strongest pledge, of the love of God. They have a particular repugnance to all creeds. As to the Christian life, they regard a practical love as everything, and are ceaseless in their activity in all the branches of foreign and home mission effort. Hofstede de Groot was related to Gutzlaff, and is a personal friend of Wichern. A Pantheistic element predominates among them.

The Gröningen school is popular chiefly among the educated classes, who yet stand far aloof from the positive faith of Christianity, for the mild, loving spirit of which, however, they often shew a deep respect.

4. *The Liberals*, properly so called.—I am, perhaps, not far from the truth when, in few words, I thus describe the members of this school :—They *think* rationalistically ; they *speak* biblically ; they *live* worldly. Its adherents are said to be very numerous. The majority of the clergy belong to it, their education at the Dutch universities giving such a direction to their minds.

Of the three universities—of Utrecht, Leyden, and Gröningen—the last is that which gives the name to the party. Utrecht is the more orthodox, Leyden the more liberal. The orthodoxy of Utrecht, however, is more the orthodoxy of the understanding than of the heart—perhaps more related to

the ancient Dutch supernaturalism, not yet animated, inspired, and made living by the union of faith and knowledge.

After this brief survey of the state of the Evangelical Church of Holland, we now turn our attention to certain recent events.

A general assault has been made against the Gröningen school, as they have fully exhibited their views in a work entitled, "*The Encyclopedia of Theological Science.*" That assault originated with the strictly orthodox party, under the leadership of Groen van Prinsterer. They presented a paper to the Synod, demanding that the Gröningen theology should be officially condemned, on the ground of its openly conflicting with the confession of the Reformed National Church on all chief points. Since their demand was not complied with, they turned to the Christian people, and requested them to take part in a petition requiring the dismissal of the Gröningen professors. That assault has only raised them into respect again.

A peculiar phenomenon, scarcely occupying a place among the parties sketched above, is Scholten, professor of theology at Leyden. The son of a Rationalist minister, he has made the attempt to unite together the coldest rationalism with the completest orthodoxy, by making the clothing of the one hang over and cover the other. His starting-point is like that of Schleiermacher, and his pupil Alexander Schweizer—the idea of the absolute sovereignty of God, or the absolute dependence of men. From this he infers the unconditional predestination of God; but differing from the predestination of the church doctrine in this, that it regards the whole development of the history of the world and of man in a more or less Pantheistic way. While in this last point Scholten agrees with Schleiermacher, yet here he becomes completely separated from him, in this respect, that he does not regard, as Schleiermacher did, feeling (*das Gefühl*) but natural common sense, intelligence as the seat, spring, and rule of all religious truth. Jesus is to him nothing more than the rational teacher of that sovereignty of God. As to scientific depth, strength, and penetration, he stands far below Schleiermacher.

The Rationalism and Pantheism, which Scholten covered with a veil, have been meantime brought out by Opzoomer, the professor of philosophy at Utrecht. At an earlier period of his career an adherent of the negative idealism of the German Hegelian School of the left, which resolves the sacred history even of the New Testament into pure myths, he has recently thrown himself into the arms of the crude, empirical Realism which recognises no other realities than those of nature and its unchangeable laws; no other truth than that which can be proved by the test of the senses. Already these errors, which so mark the spirit of the age, have diffused themselves not only from the professor's chair, but one may hear them openly proclaimed even from the pulpit. For example, Pastor Pierson of Rotterdam, one of the most distinguished of Opzoomer's pupils, expresses himself against the resurrection of Jesus—acknowledging that the apostle Paul bases his whole proclamation of the gospel on this fact. He says—"We have never seen the grave give up its dead; while, in every age, we have seen spiritually-minded Christians even commit error? Which is the more

natural, that Jesus rose from the dead, or that Paul was mistaken?" He seeks, by the back-door of a practical need, to bring in again the living God, who had been cast out by the front door of reason.

Thus the death-waters (Todeswasser) of infidelity in Rationalism, Pantheism, and Materialism trickle and eat their way through that protecting dyke which the hand of God has erected around the family of the Church and the State, in Holland no less than in Germany. And, alas! we cannot shut our eyes to the sad fact, that in the one country, as well as in the other, believers bite and devour one another, while the enemy is at their very doors.

But as to the final issue of the strife, we stand not in doubt. We look above all this stir and commotion on earth, to the hills whence cometh our aid.

E.

Theologische Studien und Kritiken.

The third number of the *Studien und Kritiken* for the current year opens with a preface by Ullmann in reference to his recent resignation of his ecclesiastical office. But it is impossible to gather any certain knowledge with regard to the nature of those disputes which have brought about the change in his ecclesiastical position. What will interest the readers of the *Studien und Kritiken* most in this prefatory statement of Ullmann, is the announcement, that he is now left at greater freedom to devote his time to the periodical, both as editor and as contributor; and he expects to be able to give some notice of his friend Umbreit, who was so long united with him in his editorship.

More than the half of this number is occupied with three dissertations, the first of which is entitled "Propylæa to a theology of classical antiquity," from the pen of Dr Friederich Lübker, director of the gymnasium at Parchim, who has already shewn his qualifications for treating this subject, by a work on "The Theology and Ethic of Sophocles." The importance to theology of classical antiquity, has perhaps never been adequately estimated in our own country. Yet it is evident that an accurate conception must be formed of that which differentiates Christianity from all other religions, and especially from those amid which it sprang up, and which it required first of all to overcome. As "Propylæa" to such a study, the article before us is worthy of a careful perusal. The article analyses the heathen religious consciousness in all its various phenomena, and contrasts these with the corresponding phenomena of the Christian consciousness.

The second dissertation is by Dr F. Piper of Berlin, on "Lost and Discovered Monuments and MSS.," who has devoted more time than perhaps any man living to the study of Christian antiquity, the results of which he has already published in some works which were noticed last year in the *Studien und Kritiken*; and the article before us, containing the fruits of several years' travels of inquiry throughout the continent and in our own island, is of permanent value. He proceeds to notice, first of all, some of those antiquities which have disappeared. The principal loss has been sustained by the collection in the Basilica at Monza. A large number of antiquities were carried away from it to Paris in 1797, and although professedly all

were given back in 1815, yet some have never returned. The same collection at Monza suffered an important loss so lately as in April 1859, by the Austrians carrying off an iron crown. The first class of archaeological objects noticed is the precious stones, and among these, first of all, the celebrated Sapphire of the Emperor Constantius; an intaglio, which bears the figure of a boar hunt. The smaragd with the image of Christ, which was sent from the collection in Constantinople by the Sultan to Pope Innocent VIII., for the ransom of his brother, and two or three similar antiquities, are also described in detail. We are presented with a long notice of two illustrated Greek MSS., as specimens of two tendencies, the imitative and the creative, in mediæval Greek art. The first of these is the Vatican MS. of the Octateuch, the second the MS. of the Psalter in the British Museum. But perhaps the most important section of this whole article is that which is devoted to the history and the description of Abgarus's portrait of Christ. This valuable antiquity is now in the possession of Prince Albert, by whom it was allowed to appear at the Manchester Exhibition of art, where Piper informs us he had an opportunity of studying it, as well as several other objects, anew. Professor Piper then closes his article with a narrative of the strange fate of some MSS. with the text alone.

The last of the three dissertations in this number discusses "the captivity and conversion of Manasseh." It is a contribution from a Berlin "candidate," E. Gerlach, in reply to a paper to the effect that the account was a fabrication. The reply of Herr Gerlach goes very thoroughly into his opponent's arguments, and draws attention to facts and modes of interpretation, by which the account of Manasseh's captivity and conversion is verified. Besides these we have a contribution by Ullmann on Frederick the Pious, the third of that name among the electors of the Palatinate. The sketch of the pious elector reminds one of the historian of the Reformers before the Reformation, and induces us to hope that he may yet find leisure to accomplish the purpose, which he here intimates he has had in view, of writing a large work as a memorial of a "man in whom the Christian and the prince were united in so remarkable a manner." In the article before us, the life and character of the elector are portrayed chiefly with a view to exhibit the grounds on which the old hymn in question is attributed to him. The only other paper in this part of our periodical, consists of some contributions to the exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews, communicated from the remains of Dr Schneckenburger, by licentiate E. Riehm.

We come to two reviews, of which the first is written by a theologian now in some measure known among ourselves, Professor Hagenbach of Basle. In the autumn of last year, two German universities celebrated their jubilee, the university of Berlin on reaching its fiftieth, the university of Basle on reaching the four hundredth year of its existence. In connection with the jubilee of the latter, two works have appeared which are noticed in the Review before us. The first of these works is a history of the university from its foundation in 1460, till the Reformation in 1529, written for the occasion by Professor Vischer, at the request of the academical government. The second work is on the theological school of Basle from the foundation of the university to De Wette's death in 1849, and was

written for the same occasion by the reviewer himself, at the request of the theological faculty.

The second review, written by Professor Weiss, introduces to us a new book of 400 pages, on the old and difficult problem concerning the historical occasions of the pastoral epistles. The first Epistle to Timothy, Dr Otto considers as not, properly speaking, a letter, but a charge containing instructions for Timothy's guidance, which Paul put into his hands on sending him into Macedonia, (Acts xix. 22). The grounds for this conclusion are mainly drawn from an exegesis of 1 Tim. i. 3. Dr Otto is met by the difficulty, that we have no accounts of erroneous doctrines having arisen in the Macedonian Church. This objection, however, is removed by an attempted proof, which is led at great length, that the erroneous teachers, to whom this charge referred, were not in Macedonia, but in Corinth, through which Timothy was to pass on his way to the northern province.

The fourth number commences with a continuation of Dr Lübker's article on the Theology of Classical Antiquity. In this paper the author seeks to exhibit the religious conceptions of the ancient Greeks and Romans as developed in their philosophy, his first article having been devoted to the consideration of their religion as presented in their poetical and historical literature. In leaving, however, the one department, and entering the other, he is brought, as he himself feels, into more difficult ground, no longer treading in the more palpable region of popular belief. The discussion on Socrates brings into prominence very finely the intensely practical character in which philosophy came from him as an outflowing of his own deep moral being. The part devoted to Plato is occupied chiefly with a discussion of his conceptions of God and of immortality. What will attract most interest in this discussion is the inquiry, which is entered upon in connection with modern controversies, whether the idea of personality is to be found in the Platonic conceptions of God and of the immortality of man. Dr Lübker's paper cannot be regarded but as very valuably suggestive to all who are interested in studying the fruits of pre-Christian speculation on religion.

The second dissertation is also a continuation of a previous one, which appeared in the first number of the *Studien und Kritiken* for this year, from the pen of Dr Weiss, professor in Königsberg, and discusses the history of the origin of the three synoptical gospels. As the author's former paper on this subject was devoted to the first of these gospels, the one before us treats of the other two. The largest portion, however, of the paper is occupied with the gospel according to Mark. It maintains the Aramaic composition by Matthew to have been the original apostolical gospel. Dr Weiss considers Mark's as the earliest recension of this original gospel. This theory of Weiss, refusing, as it does, to ascribe to Matthew the entire authorship of the first gospel, will, of course, meet with comparatively little favour.

The last of the dissertations in this number is devoted to the elucidation of the prophetic passage on Immanuel, in Isaiah vii. 14, *sqq.*, establishing the strictly Messianic character of the prophecy which it treats of.

Passing from the dissertations, we find, among the "Thoughts and

Observations," an article by Eduard Graf, Superintendent at Schalken, Meiningen, occasioned by an article of Buttmann's, which appeared in the *Studien und Kritiken* last year. Buttmann's article endeavoured to prove that the words of our Lord, "Father, forgive them," &c. (Luke xxiii. 24), were an interpolation; and the article before us is an attempt to refute the arguments of Buttmann in defence of that opinion. It is well known that a considerable number of MSS., headed by the very important Codex Vaticanus (B), are without these words of Christ, and that, consequently, the external authority is somewhat indecisive as to their genuineness. Herr Graf's article is occupied chiefly with bringing out the internal grounds for believing the words to be genuine. This article is followed by another exegetical discussion, by Professor Zyro of Bern, on James iv. 5, 6. The professor had written on this "crux interpretum," as he calls it, in the *Stud. u. Krit.*, so long ago as in the year 1840. Since then there have been two articles on the passage, in the same periodical, by Herrn Grimm and Rauch, in the years 1854 and 1858 respectively. These more recent discussions, as well as that of Wiesinger in his commentary, formed the subject of a contribution by Dr Stein to the *Theol. Litt. Blatt* for May 1858, which has called from Professor Zyro a defence of the interpretation which he suggested twenty-one years ago. Verse 6th is explained as shewing that they fall into contradiction, not only with themselves, but with the God who gives grace to the humble, but resists the proud.

Following this there are three reviews, of which the first is from the pen of Ullmann. It notices a work recently published in Basle, being a course of lectures delivered there by some of the professors and clergymen in defence of the Christian faith. It has been a common practice in Basle to institute popular courses of lectures on theological subjects—the well-known lectures of Professor Hagenbach on various periods of Church History having been delivered originally, not in the university, but to popular audiences in the city. The lectures reviewed by Ullmann may be interesting in this country, as shewing the tendencies of unchristian speculation in Germany, and the manner in which they are met by German Christians. The second review is devoted to Lachmann's New Testament, now brought to a completion, by Philip Buttmann. Of the great principles which Lachmann introduced into the science, a sketch will be found in the article before us, the ability of which is sufficiently guaranteed by the fact that it is the work of Wieseler.

J. C. M.

Theologische Zeitschrift.

This valuable journal, the organ of the orthodox Lutheran theology, is still kept up with spirit under the editorship of Dr Dieckhoff and Kliefoth.

Among the papers which appeared in the early part of 1861, we were specially interested in an elaborate notice of the revival movement in America and Ireland. Even when we see reason to dissent from the judgment presented, it is never uninteresting to read strictures upon our religious questions which proceed from the friendly pen of some divine who has been nurtured under foreign skies, and in the bosom of a foreign communion. The present paper begins with a remarkably careful and candid

statement of the leading facts and characteristic features of the revival. On a review of these, the author summarily dismisses the allegation that the whole was an affair of excited addresses and weak nerves; and emphatically recognises in the movement the agency of the Spirit of God. The addresses delivered, the prayers offered—the whole movement, indeed—have proceeded on a peculiar theory of conversion; whereas, in the writer's view, a certain divine life ought to be presupposed in the case of all baptized persons, as the result of sacramental grace; and the endeavour ought to be to awaken such persons to the consciousness of their privilege, and to persuade them to stir up the gift of God within their hearts. After having been accustomed to associate the inculcation of sacramental grace with the semi-Pelagianism of the Church of Rome, one is struck with astonishment at meeting with it in association with sound views on the subject of justification by faith. It is needless to say that we have no sympathy for the figment of baptismal regeneration, wherever it may be found; and we hold ourselves obliged to address sinners as strangers to the grace of God, unregenerate persons, who, "except they be converted," shall in no case enter into the kingdom of God. Still, it is worthy of inquiry whether some who have taken a prominent part in the revival movement have not been betrayed by their zeal into an extreme way of presenting the subject of conversion. It has been sometimes forgotten that God has made provision for regenerating infants as well as grown men, and that this may be hoped for in answer to the prayers of parents and friends. The Reformed Church, in rejecting the figment of baptismal regeneration, never meant to reject the hope of the regeneration of the infant children of God's people. Now, of course, where a soul has been regenerated in infancy, there can never afterwards be a *conversion* in the proper sense of the word. It would be easy to shew that the great preachers of the seventeenth century, in addressing their calls to the unconverted, were careful to guard themselves on this point.

The July-August number of the *Zeitschrift* contains a learned paper by Dr Krüger on the Church Music of Germany, with notices of the principal changes which have taken place in the manner of conducting the Service of Song from the times of Ambrose and Gregory to our own. It is mentioned as the peculiar glory of the Protestant service, that it alone has been faithful to the ancient custom of congregational singing—the Romish Church, since Gregory, having restricted singing to the choir.

Besides such elaborate papers as those we have named, this Journal presents the reader with notices of the contemporary history of the Lutheran community in Germany. We are thankful to observe that it shews a front of resolute opposition to the Rome-ward movement which has agitated many parts of Lutheran Germany since 1848. It would appear that a paper—the *Volksblatt für Stadt und Land*—has been for some years advocating union with Rome. The party which it represents have been described as the "Tractarians" of Germany. But the resemblance which suggested the designation is a resemblance with some notable differences. On the one hand, the *Volksblatt*, retaining, or anxious to retain, the cardinal doctrine of justification by faith, is far more evangelical than the

Tractarians; on the other hand, German antipathy to the Italian nation and its aspirations, has infused into it a heartiness of political sympathy for the Pope and Papacy which no English party could share. Another movement in the Lutheran community, which constantly reappears, is the extreme Confessionalism, which is more and more refusing the right hand of friendship to the Reformed Church and the Union, which we cannot but deplore.

Le Huguenot Revue Religieuse trimestrielle.

We gladly call attention to this French religious periodical, just started in London. It aims to make known to English readers the state of the Churches in France, and to bring before French readers what God is doing in Great Britain. As it is replete with a sound evangelical spirit, and intends to borrow largely from the journals of both countries, we cordially wish it success. Christian families that have made a study of French could not do better than take in such a periodical for their children, both for the language and the sentiments.

XIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Nichol's Standard Divines. The Works of Thomas Adams, with Memoir by Joseph Angus, D.D. Edinburgh: Nichol. 1861.

The volumes of this admirable library of Puritan Divines are appearing in rapid succession. Already the fourth volume has been issued, containing the first instalment of the works of Adams. Though the class of readers who appreciate the writings of Owen and Goodwin will be startled at the singular transition which they make when they open Adams, with his quips and cranks and antithetic phrase, they cannot but be regaled with his fancy and learning. We are happy that the works of the Puritan writers are to be given without abridgment, and only modernised so far as spelling is concerned. We do not doubt that the public will encourage this important undertaking, which puts within the reach of every reader a whole library of solid, spiritual, and edifying theological works, at the most reasonable price. They are suited to all evangelically-minded Churches, and are beautifully got up as well as admirably edited. S.

Codex Zacynthius. Greek Palimpsest Fragments of the Gospel of St Luke, obtained in the Island of Zante by the late General Colin Macaulay, and now in the Library of the British and Foreign Bible Society. Deciphered, Transcribed, and Edited by S. P. TREGELLES, LL.D. London: S. Bagster & Sons, Paternoster Row. 1861.

All lovers of the Bible owe a debt of gratitude to the Messrs Bagster for their valuable editions of the Bible, and for their many and substantial publications helping to the elucidation of the Holy Scriptures. Many of the works published by them, and which are invaluable helps to the Biblical scholar, are got up at very great expense; and, being confined to a necessarily limited class of readers, considered in a pecuniary point of view, can hardly be expected to be paying undertakings. Such a work is that before us. It is got up in the first style of art. Paper, printing, binding are all such as a lover of books loves to look upon and handle. But the intrinsic

value of the matter of the volume is great. It appears that a MS. volume was presented to the British and Foreign Bible Society, in 1821, by General Macaulay, the brother of Zachary Macaulay, and uncle of Lord Macaulay. The volume he had brought home with him from Zante, one of the Grecian islands, where he had in some way acquired it. The vellum on which the volume was written turned out to be a palimpsest. The later writing is a Greek lectionary from the four Gospels; and belongs, it is supposed, to about the thirteenth century. The vellum is generally coarse, and a few of the leaves are torn. The modern book (so to speak) is about the size of a small folio the leaves measuring eleven by seven inches. The older writing must have been part of a volume of large folio size, fourteen by eleven inches; the leaves being now folded across, and the later writing running the other way. The text of large portions of Luke's Gospel—in many cases quite continuous, from the beginning on to xi. 33—is accompanied by large patristic extracts occupying often the greater part, and at times the whole, of the page. The *text* is in round, full, well-formed uncial letters, such as would have been ascribed to the sixth century, had it not been that the catena which surrounds the text, and is of the same age, has the round letters so cramped as to appear to belong to the eighth century. There are few accents or breathings; and, on the whole, Dr Tregelles sways between the sixth and the eighth century as the date of this precious MS. But whatever may be the doubt about its date, concerning the value of its readings there can be no difficulty. Dr Tregelles says in his preface, "I am not anxious to vindicate a very high antiquity for this MS., for this is a point of hardly any importance in comparison with that of the goodness of the text. Though it contains but a small portion of the inspired volume of the New Testament, its maintenance of the ancient readings in that small portion supports that class of texts in all other parts. I do not think that there is any ancient MS. of which the text has yet been published, which exhibits more important readings; or is, in proportion to its extent, a more valuable contribution to sacred letters than this Codex Zacynthius." The volume is all that could be desired. There is a lithographed specimen page of the original MS.; and all the other part of the Codex is printed page for page with the Alexandrine types of the British Museum, which were lent by the trustees for the purpose. Dr Tregelles has done his part as editor to perfection, and his notes and comments are specially valuable. We cordially wish for the volume such a sale as might be remunerative to both editor and publisher. We are sure both deserve well at the hands of all the Bible-loving public; for this volume is only a small item in a long account. A.

Historical Lectures on the Life of our Lord Jesus Christ: being the Hulsean Lectures for the year 1859. By C. J. ELLICOTT, B.D., Prof. of Divinity, King's College, London, and late Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge.

This is one of the most important contributions which the literature of the gospels has received for many a day. It does not profess to give a complete life of our Lord, but simply to trace the historical sequence of the recorded events of his life. The events, however, whose sequence is thus traced are presented, whether singly or in groups, so vividly, that one real, though indirect, result is a fascinating life of Christ. The first lecture considers the "characteristics of the four Gospels." The remaining seven take up in succession the birth and infancy of our Lord, the early Judean ministry, the ministry in eastern Galilee, the ministry in northern Galilee, the journeying towards Jerusalem, the last passover, and the forty days. The difficulties connected with the harmonising of the gospel narratives, have been yielding one after another to the painstaking and skill brought to bear upon their solution; and nowhere could one learn so well as from this volume the precise stage which the process of solution has now reached—what may be

regarded as definitively achieved, and what remains yet to be done. The work, in its execution, presents both the excellencies and the defects which an acquaintance with Dr Ellicott's previous works would have led one to anticipate. In point of style, there is the same beautiful, manly, chaste English of the highly-cultured English scholar, and the same tone of unfeigned reverence for the word of God. In point of matter, it is replete with stores of learning accumulated by years of wide and accurate reading, and is the work of one who has all the important literature of his subject at his fingers' ends. In adjusting the relations of the events comprising the evangelic story, there is exercised great sagacity and soundness of judgment. Where there is occasion for it, we meet with displays of his usual exegetical tact, his keen and nice grammatical analysis, perhaps unrivalled in England, and his power of tracing the logical connection of his writer's thoughts. It would be exceedingly ungrateful to dwell on Dr Ellicott's defects. We will only specify one, common to this with his other works. It is his want of a thorough training in *mental philosophy*. Whenever he enters the realm of psychology, he is exceedingly apt to be lured by ingenious and novel little German theories,—a danger against which a good course of philosophy would have put him more on his guard. No one can read thoroughly Dr Ellicott's lectures without returning with fresh interest to the gospels themselves.

D.

The Bible Hand-Book: an Introduction to the Study of Sacred Scripture
By JOSEPH ANGUS, D.D. London: The Religious Tract Society. 1861.

Dr Angus's "Bible Hand-Book" has become a standard. It is really a hand-book, and contains a vast mass of well-digested, and well-arranged, and well-condensed information on all Bible topics. It is not needful now to characterise it. It has earned its own way to a sure place in our literature; and we do all that is needful to be done when we simply say that this is a new edition, with emendations, and additions, and improvements, and that it is of a library shape and size.

A.

Epiphany, Lent, and Easter: a Selection of Sermons preached in St Michael's Church, Chester Square, London. By CHARLES JOHN VAUGHAN, D.D., Vicar of Doncaster, &c. &c. Second Edition, enlarged. Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1861.

We are not surprised that these sermons should have reached a second edition, and in so short a time. They deserve success, and they have found it. Of course we differ from their author on very many points both of discipline and of doctrine, but we can approve things that are excellent nevertheless. What we chiefly admire in these sermons is the evident desire the author has to cause his hearers to understand the meaning of the word of God. They are not sermons in the ordinary sense of that word—they are careful and elaborate expositions. It is the text, as it lies imbedded in the word, with which Dr Vaughan deals. If the exceptions we have already stated be kept in view, we could say of these sermons that they are models. Chaste, clear, forcible, simple, direct, personal, you always understand him; and you feel that you are in the hands of a master. We gladly note, too, that Dr Vaughan is quite inconsistent with himself. Holding what is very like baptismal regeneration, and occasionally very loose notions on the atonement, he yet holds and states as much truth as, if carried to its legitimate conclusions, would land both him and his hearers not only in the doctrines, but even in the very form of expressing these doctrines, where the flock of God have fed in all ages.

A.

A Voice from the Ganges. By an INDIAN OFFICER. London: George Manwaring. 1861.

This is a very poor book. Its title no way describes it. It might have been a voice from the Thames, or the Tay, or from the Styx, as well as the Ganges; and it might have been by anybody rather than an Indian Officer, for it is really nothing but a very bad and ill-ordered repetition of the old, used up, and worn-out infidel arguments, with which we are all so familiar. A.

Obscure Texts Illustrated. By MARY C. HUME. London: George Manwaring. 1861.

The chief interest of this book arises, first, from the fact that it is an exposition and defence of Swedenborgianism; second, that it is by a lady, and she the daughter, we understand, of the late Member of Parliament for the Montrose burghs; and, third, that it is written in a clear, forcible, and most elegant style. But it is only Swedenborgianism after all; truth obscured; texts darkened; meaning brought to and put in the Bible; and, what is curiously interesting, all is said in a sweet womanly spirit, till she comes to speak of any point of the orthodox faith, when the bitterness is keen, and sharp, and pungent. Yet, as Dr Chalmers once said, she "makes lucid conveyance of her thoughts." A.

Letters to the Prince Consort on Popery, Puseyism, Neology, Infidelity, &c. By JOHN CAMPBELL, D.D. London: John Snow, Paternoster Row. 1861.

Some readers might think that Dr Campbell is rather too much of an alarmist, and that he expresses himself somewhat more strongly, at times, than is altogether necessary; but few well-informed readers will close this volume without feeling that a great deal of most important "present truth" has been well, vigorously, and clearly expressed. This book consists of a series of papers which appeared from week to week in the *British Ensign*, and which have been already issued, in the newspaper form, to the extent of 350,000 copies. The Doctor treats, with his wonted force, on the topics named, in a spirit bold, fearless, and uncompromising. He stands up for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. It is a comfort to see that, despite of all the hard battles he has fought, this stout defender of the faith still holds manfully on, his eye not dim, nor his natural force abated. May he long be spared to convince the gainsayer; and may this volume be read and pondered by those in high places, for it contains much vital truth which greatly concerns them to know. A.

Papers on Preaching and Public Speaking. By a WYKEHAMIST. London: Bell & Daldy. 1861.

A good many of these "Papers" appeared in the columns of the *Guardian* newspaper. We need say no more to indicate what the reader may expect. Yet, keeping this in view, we could cordially recommend them to as many of our readers as have already made themselves familiar with such books as Baxter's "Reformed Pastor," James's "Earnest Ministry," and Porter's "Homiletics." The volume contains much really valuable, and well-digested, and well-arranged materials; is full of important hints; and the matter is clearly and ably put. One can hardly understand how a writer so well informed and so able could descend to such weakness and pettiness as to print our good friend Dr Guthrie as, what we once knew him, *Mr* Guthrie;

and the royal preacher as *Mr Hamilton*. The offence is frequently repeated, and the Wykehamist is quoting admiringly and lovingly the best passages from these noble authors. With these and many similar drawbacks, the book is to be commended as a most scholarly book, and one well fitted to inform and improve.

A.

1. *The Spanish Peninsula; a Sketch of its past History, present Condition, and future Prospects.* 2. *India; Its Natives and Missions.* 3. *Brazil; Its History, People, Natural Productions, &c.* London: The Religious Tract Society. 1861.

These three volumes are to be commended: specially the last. It is full of interest, and contains a vast mass of well-digested materials. Each of the volumes would form both interesting and instructive reading for the young; they are all written as history ought to be written, with the one thing needful kept distinctly in view. Cheap, well printed, illustrated, and neatly got up, they would be good prizes for schools, or gift-books suitable for the season.

A.

The Fight of Faith: Sermons preached in New College Chapel, London.
By HENRY CHRISTOPHERSON. London: Ward & Co., Paternoster Row. 1861.

This volume is of much interest. — One likes to see what sort of food the students preparing for the ministry among the Congregationalists are fed with from Sabbath to Sabbath. Many of the sermons are fresh, vigorous, and striking. The chief faults we have to find are, that they seem all to be written on the high-pressure principle, a simple thing cannot be said in a simple way. And there is a lack of solid doctrine which we deplore. Surely such an audience as may be supposed to gather in "New College Chapel," could bear to have the fundamental doctrines of the faith more fully handled, and more distinctly stated, than is here attempted. Yet many of the sermons are really striking, and the writer displays a power of accomplishing greater things than he has here accomplished.

A.

Les Moralistes Français, aux XVI. et XVII., Siècles. Par ALEXANDRE VINET. Paris.

It is a good sign of matters in France, that, years after Vinet's death, there should still be a demand for the publication of fresh manuscripts of his. His volume on Pascal, of itself, would have shewn how competent, in combined vigour of stroke and delicacy of touch, he was to the accomplishment of the work embraced in this new volume. The series of French moralists, which opens with Rabelais, and closes with St Grermond, afforded a fine field for M. Vinet; and no reader will feel disappointed by the perusal of the work. Some of the authors embraced, as Charion and Bodin, are rather known to the curious, than now appreciated by the general reader. Yet they had a wide influence in their time. Rabelais and Montaigne find an undiminishing host of readers still. M. Vinet brought to the appreciation of these leaders of the old French literature, a fine literary taste, and a strong moral sentiment. He has allowed no intellectual excellence to elude his notice; he has suffered no moral blemish to escape his verdict. The didactic responsibilities of a Christian philosopher are constantly kept in view. His predecessors, in guiding public opinion, are ably characterised by one whom many will consider the great French moralist of the nineteenth century.

H.

Kirchengeschichte d. Schweiz. Von Dr E. F. GELPKE. Erster u. Zweiter Theil. Berne. 1861.

This is a valuable contribution to the class of national Church Histories. It breathes a thorough Swiss spirit, and is everywhere pervaded by a spirit of active interest in whatever concerns the author's native land. Partaking, as Switzerland does of both the French and the German elements, and having given, from among her sons, not a few distinguished minds to both these literatures, the Teutonic portion of her inhabitants may gladly hail, in Dr Gelpke, a fresh intellectual illustration of themselves. He has diligently availed himself of the labours of his predecessors, Romanist and Protestant, and has done so in a reasonably and liberally critical spirit. The remains of ancient heathen and Christian art have also been carefully explored. He goes over the different provinces of Switzerland in order, starting from the westernmost point, Geneva. This occasions somewhat of repetition; but perhaps no better course could have been pursued in the circumstances. The civil history of the times is also treated of, but without undue overtasking upon his proper subject. H.

Lives of the Archbishops of Canterbury. By W. F. HOOK, D.D., Dean of Chichester. Vol. I. London.

Dr Hook has been well known in the ecclesiastical world as an energetic partisan of High Church views, though opposed to extreme Puseyism. In the comparative leisure of the Chichester deanery, he has given to the public, in this goodly volume, the first fruits of his retirement. But the Dean still retains the partisanship of feeling, which, while vicar of Leeds, was always bringing him into active collision with local, or indeed general, evangelism. Of British, or of early Saxon times, the Dean cannot write without, in text or in note, shewing his dislike of it. But, by the time that Dr Hook has got done with the Heptarchy, we get into the calm historical tone, and about a third of the volume is really pleasant and unpolemical reading. The style never becomes either very dignified or very brilliant. But the Dean has made, on the whole, good use of his materials, and he has yet produced the first instalment of a book really wanted. H.

Histoire des Assemblées politiques des Reforme de France (1573-1622). Par M. ANGUEZ. Paris: Durand.

The volume before us gives a lucid and full account of a remarkable portion of French Protestant history. One class of historians make us acquainted with the sufferings by which the Huguenot Church was, from its commencement, afflicted; another introduces us to the ebb and flow of the civil conflict by which the Huguenot party sought to protect themselves and assert their liberties of worship and action; a third brings before us the great preachers, scholars, and controvertists of the French Calvinist communion. But M. Anguez has had reserved for him a yet different aspect of the subject. For nearly half a century, from the massacre of St Bartholomew to the treaty of Montpellier, the Huguenots had their stated periodical assemblies for political action, and these points are elaborately delineated. H.

The Romance of Natural History. By P. H. GOSS, F.R.S. Second Series. London: Nisbet & Co. 1861.

This second series of the Romance of History is, we think, even more interesting than the first. The chapters on the extinct, the self-immured, and on the hybernation of swallows, as well as those which have less significant

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titles, all attest the exact naturalist, the descriptive writer, and the sincere Christian. We think these works fitted to be as useful as they are interesting. Thus, in a chapter on beauty, he says, "I have delighted to believe that, by and by, when, in the millennial kingdom of Jesus, and still more, in the remoter future, in the dispensation of the fulness of times, the earth—the new earth—shall be endowed with a more than paradisaical glory, there will be given to redeemed man a greatly increased power and capacity for drinking and enjoying the augmented loveliness," (p. 343).

An Inquiry into the Apocalypses. By the Rev. J. BRODIE, Monimail. Edinburgh: Johnstone. 1861.

Mr Brodie gives us in this work, which is of the pamphlet form, the investigations of many years. He belongs to the Historicalists, as they are termed, in contradistinction from the Futurists; and his aim is to find out our present position in the chart of time. He tells us that he has endeavoured to deduce determinate rules of interpretation from Scripture itself. The cautious spirit in which the author goes to work is shewn in this, that he is careful to state the value of his own conclusions, naming them as he proceeds, according to their evidence to his own mind as established, or doubtful, probable, or highly probable. The work demands and will repay an attentive perusal.

S.

The Gospel according to Matthew Explained. By J. ADDISON ALEXANDER, D.D., Professor of Theology, Princeton. London: Nisbet & Co. 1861.

This is the last work on which the pen of Dr Addison Alexander was engaged, and it is complete to the close of the sixteenth chapter. To those who have made themselves acquainted with Dr Alexander's expositions, it is not necessary to say that, while they display exegetical tact of no ordinary kind, and a deep appreciation of all the peculiar doctrines of the Bible, we have the results of learning more than the parade of it. We cannot peruse them without a deep regret that the author was not permitted to go farther in the execution of his task.

S.

Memorials of the Rev. Joseph Sertain, B.A. London: Nisbet & Co. 1861

This is an interesting memoir in many respects. The eminence which Mr Sertain acquired, at a very early age, as a preacher of singular eloquence, and his literary contributions of various kinds, give his memoir a general interest. It is well executed, and affords a view of many of the religious and literary events of his time far beyond the neighbourhood of Brighton, where his eloquence was so much admired. Nor was the earnestness of the evangelical pastor thrown into the shade by his success as a preacher and writer. We cordially recommend the memoir.

S.

Consolation. By JAMES W. ALEXANDER, D.D., New York. Edinburgh: Andrew Elliott, Prince's Street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co.

This work comes from the pen of the late much-loved James Alexander, after an experience of more than twenty-five years in the university. It is sound in doctrine, fresh and interesting in its mode of statement, and breathes a most tender and affectionate spirit. It essays to console the sick, the sorrowful, and the careworn, not by mere hortatory address, but by trying to fix attention and faith upon those great truths, the acceptance of which, as Dr

Alexander says, "lays the basis for joy and peace." Ministers would find it a useful aid in the discharge of what is one of the most delicate and difficult of their duties—that of causing light to spring up in the minds of those who are in any way troubled. D.

The Fulness of the Mediator; or, Christ All in All. By the Rev. A. B. PARKER, M.A. Pp. 398. Blackie & Son.

The general principle of this volume is, "that all the fulness of Christ, all that is needful for the soul's salvation, and the interests of an eternal world, is exhibited in Scripture under the symbol of what is useful for the body, and for man's condition, considered simply as a denizen of earth." The idea, though, in itself, old as Christianity, is new and fresh as the foundation of a book. The treatment of it we regard as highly successful. In twenty-one chapters there are discussed as many particulars in which the resemblance is seen to hold between the earthly and the heavenly things, viz., Christ the Meat of his people, or the Bread of life; Christ the Drink, Clothing, Dwelling, Guide, &c., of his people. In connection with the distribution of the subject, the only thing we could suggest is, that chap. xix., Christ the Existence of his people, might properly have come in first. The matter is purely and richly evangelical. The style has about it a sweet and artless transparency, through which these truths shine clearly and without effort. We find profitable and cheering matter lucidly and pleasantly conveyed. The book, we know, has been useful. R.

La Soria di Savonarola. DU PASQUELE VILLARI. Firenze. Le Monnier. Tom. i.

The great Florentine Reformer has had, in our day, quite a resurrection of interest. Some half dozen lives of him have appeared within little more than twenty years. Germany, France, and England, have each contributed to assign him his due place in public estimation. Following in the wake of Rudelbach, Meyer, and the church historian Hase, Böhringer has, in the last volume of his "Kirchten-Geschichte in Biographien," given us a careful, impartial, and effective account, 300 pages long, of Savonarola. But, obviously, there are many advantages to be gained from a native consideration of the subject. No topic is better suited for the attention of an intellectually revived, and religiously stirred Italy, than the character and fortunes of the Florentine Dominican. Savonarola has found a worthy Italian biographer in Professor Villari, who has been aided in the composition of his work by full access to the Florentine archives. A warm, but not a blind, admirer of the Reformer, he has done full justice to his merits, and neither denied nor explained away his faults, errors, and weaknesses. The professor has brought well out Savonarola's integrity, singleness of purpose, devout and assiduous study of the Scriptures, and zeal for liberty founded on religion. He gives a picture of Lorenzo de Medici very different from the panegyrics of Gibbon, Roscoe, and Hallam. Nor can we wonder that a Tuscan, seeing only now his country beginning to recover from the prostration to which first the Medicean, and then the Hapsburg, Grand Dukes consigned it, should speak with strong condemnation of the man who (whatever his services to literature) prepared the way for those three centuries of degradation. A second volume will relate the closing year of Savonarola's life, and will illustrate the title which Quinet gives to the brilliant chapter in his Revolution of Italy on Savonarola—the Act of Dying well. For that volume also are reserved a number of illustrative documents, new to the world, the fruits of the Professor's well-exercised industry.

Geschichte Alexanders d. Dritten u. d. Kirche seiner Zeit. Von HERMANN REUTER, Erster Band. Leipzig: B. G. Tenbren. 1860. —

The work of M. Reuter is one of those laborious monographs, in which German industry delights. He aspires to relate, in these very large volumes, the history of the two-and-twenty years during which Alexander III. filled the pontifical chair. As yet, only the first volume has appeared. The introduction gives an account of the short pontificate of the English pope, Adrian IV., the immediate predecessor of Alexander, and concludes with a dozen pages explicatory of the church principles of the period. The first book, consisting of five chapters, contains a narrative of the events of the first three years of Alexander's reign (1159–1162). That 170 pages should be occupied with so short a period, shews the scale on which events are recounted.

There is a deficiency in reference to English modern authorship on the reign of Henry II.; but the original authorities, British and Continental, have been carefully studied. In his text, and still more, in the hundred and twenty pages of appendix to his volume, M. Reuter shews himself very competent to discuss contested points, and to weigh conflicting evidence. He aims at giving a full picture of the sentiments, as well as the events, of the times he depicts. In this point of view, we cannot object to the three pages which he has occupied in narrating the legend of the descent of A Becket from a Norman knight and a Saracen lady, who had followed him from Palestine.

The writer is a decided Protestant, but aims to do justice to the characters he has to consider. Pointing out the unscriptural character of the church system of the middle ages, he seeks to describe its assertions with historical impartiality.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

APRIL 1862.

ART. I.—*Anglican Church Rationalism—Present and Past.*

It is a remarkable feature of the times in which we live, that theological questions excite so wide-spread and lively an interest in the mind of the general community. What a striking instance of this characteristic is presented by the agitation and discussion which have followed upon the publication of the "Essays and Reviews." That volume is a purely theological one from beginning to end, but it was not the theological journals or the religious magazines which first brought it prominently into notice. It was the secular Quarterlies that did so : first the *North British Review*, then the *Westminster* and the *National*, and then the *Quarterly* and the *Edinburgh*. It was the shout of congratulation, or the cry of alarm, or the expostulations of apology, proceeding from these exponents of general public opinion, which first aroused the clergy, and brought their united action to bear upon the bishops and convocation. But what is still more significant of the characteristic feature of the age which we have alluded to, is the fact that even the secular newspapers have, in several instances, taken up the theological questions raised by that publication, and have admitted into their columns whole series of articles from the pens of eminent divines or others, containing answers to the Essayists, and vindications of Christian truth upon all the points assailed by them. Dr Buchanan's excellent "Examination of the *Essays and Reviews*" first appeared as a series of articles

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in the *Morning Post* ; and Dr Cairns's effective pamphlet was communicated, in the first instance, to the *Dial* ; and other examples might be given. We have long had what are called religious newspapers among us ; but it is something quite new to see the daily journals becoming theological, and political newspapers supplying long and elaborate answers to unbelief.

The theological tendency of that work may be fairly regarded as indicating and expressing one of the theological tendencies of the age. It is not every single writer, or set of writers, of course, to whom we could attach such a representative character. But who and what are these writers ? They are all, without exception, Church of England men ; they are all, with a single exception, clergymen of that Church, and the most of them men occupying high office and station in the Church—two of them professors, and one of them rector of a college, at Oxford ; one of them vice-principal and professor of a theological college in Wales ; and another head master of Rugby School, and Chaplain-in-Ordinary to the Queen. Much more than any other Church in the country, the Church of England is the index and exponent of theological tendency and opinion in the British mind ; and much more than any other set of men, university men—and especially Oxford men—are the gauge of the state of theological opinion in the English Church. For the last thirty years and more, Oxford has been the great theological focus of the Church and country ; nowhere else has fresh theological thinking been concentrated and systematised ; from no other centre has any powerful shock been given to established forms and habits of religious thought, or any new impetus been communicated to the national theological mind. It was the Oxford Tracts, commenced about thirty years ago, that originated and developed the Tractarian movement—so fruitful in ecclesiastical, and even political, change. That movement has, for many years back, been diminishing in force, though its force is by no means yet entirely expended. Its earlier violence produced a reaction of opinion, both in the academic and the general mind. The swing of the pendulum, the set of the current of ecclesiastical thought, is now turned towards the opposite point, and the appearance of these Oxford Essays is doubtless to be regarded as the effect and the index of this important change.

What, then, is the precise character of the theological tendency to which these Essays belong, and in consequence of which they have been able to excite so much agitation and alarm ? There is no one word that exactly expresses it. It is not Deism exactly, nor Socinianism, nor Secularism. Even Rationalism, unqualified by some limiting epithet, does not

precisely denominate it. It is Rationalism no doubt, but Rationalism of a very peculiar species or variety,—a hybrid—a mongrel,—the offspring of the marriage of belief and unbelief, of a church spirit and an anti-church spirit,—a form of Rationalism the like of which has not appeared, in England at least, for a good many generations.

Rationalism—*i. e.*, the undue and the unreasonable use of reason in the province of religion—manifests itself in many degrees and forms, from the mildest to the most extreme. Sometimes, accepting the Bible as a revelation from God, reason lays claim to the power of understanding its truths adequately, without any help from the enlightening Spirit of God. It does not acknowledge any need of illuminating grace to shine upon the sacred page, or to shine into the heart. This is the Rationalism of Pelagianism, or of the lowest form of Arminianism.

Or, still accepting the Bible as in some sense a divine revelation, reason refuses to accept its teaching in its plain and obvious sense, from repugnance to the doctrines which that sense conveys, and dictates to it a meaning which is forced and unnatural, on the plea that the mind can receive nothing on external authority which it is not able to understand, or not prepared to approve; thus making reason supreme in the interpretation of the Bible, or making the sense of the Bible bow to reason, not reason to bow to the genuine and natural sense of the Bible. Such is Rationalism, as it appears in the Socinian or Unitarian system.

Rationalism also manifests itself in the extreme forms of Deism, Pantheism, and Atheism. In these, reason asserts, not only its supremacy, but its self-sufficiency. It rejects all revelation as unnecessary; it holds the light of nature, or of reason and conscience, to be enough for the religious and moral guidance of man. It dictates to an alleged revelation what it ought to contain, and what it ought not; and it rejects the Bible, not only as unnecessary, but also because it disapproves its teaching. That is *Deistic* Rationalism. Or, reason dictates even to the divine nature what it should be,—that it should not be different from the “all things” which Theism holds to be “of God, and through God, and to God,” but that God and the “all things” should be the same. That is *Pantheistic* Rationalism. Or lastly, and extremest of all, reason, the proud reason of man dictates to the whole universe of being what it should contain, or should not contain,—that it should contain only what is comprehensible or conceivable, or measurable by itself; and finding it impossible to conceive of or understand a Being of infinite attributes, a God, it disbelieves and denies that

there is a God in the universe. That is *Atheistic Rationalism*.

It is seldom, very seldom, that Rationalism anywhere takes the extreme form of Atheism. There is a good deal of Pantheism in Germany, but it does not seem to be indigenous in the English mind, nor likely to take root in it to any considerable extent, even as an exotic. The philosophical habit of thought from which it springs, is not at all an English intellectual habit; and the utter extinction, not only of all religious, but of all properly moral, life, which it involves, is a moral and social catastrophe at which the healthy national mind of our country shudders. But for the last two hundred years and more, the mind of the British nation has never been without a considerable mixture of Rationalism, in the forms of Deism, Socinianism, and Pelagian Arminianism. There have even been times, as under the last of the Stuarts and the first of the Georges, when all these forms of it extensively prevailed. Even so late as the first quarter of the present century, the influence of Deists like Hume and Gibbon, and of Socinians like Priestley and Belsham, continued to be widely felt.

But the Rationalism of the Essays and Reviews is different in species or variety from all these. It is not Pantheism—it does not even, so far as we have been able to see, to any extent pantheise. Nor is it Deism, though its tone and arguments are often deistical, for it still professes faith in Christ and attachment to the Christian Church, and we cannot take upon us to say, that the profession is not genuine and sincere. Nor is it Socinianism either, though it often Socinianises, and is much more likely to sink down to the level of the Unitarians than to induce the Unitarians to come and shake hands with it within the church, of the Thirty-nine Articles, for it does not break with the Articles altogether, nor wish to see them removed from the formularies of the Church. Nor again is it a Rationalism like that which, under the name of Moderatism, so long blighted the religious life of Scotland, or like that which opposed itself in the English Church to the evangelical revival of the last century; for doctrinally it believes far less than the churchmen of England and Scotland of last century professed to believe, and in point of earnestness of religious and moral feeling, it seems to feel far more than the churchmen of that period felt. The name, we think, which would best express the complex and mixed character of the Rationalism of the Essayists, is that of “Church Rationalism.” The Essayists take up a sort of midway position between the doctrines of the church, and the teaching of those who have gone over to open antagonism to Christianity, as if they thought

it possible to find a *via media* between Christ and Antichrist, just as the High Churchmen believe they have found the true *via media* between Geneva and Rome, between Puritanism and Popery. In designating the Rationalism of the *Essays and Reviews* "Church Rationalism," we use the term church of course, not in the scriptural, but in the Anglican, sense, as referring not to the church of Christ at large, but to the national church of England, with its ancient Christian creeds, proper to it as a part of the catholic church of Christ, and its protestant articles, proper to it as a part of the church of the Reformation, and with the endowments, and privileges, and status, proper to it as the established church of that ancient kingdom. And there are two main reasons why the designation thus explained is appropriate and really descriptive, viz :—

1. Because it is a form of Rationalism which still adheres, in some sense and degree, to the creeds and articles of the church.

2. And because it is a Rationalism which is not only in the church at present, as having been born in it, but which claims to be allowed to remain in the church, in the enjoyment of entire freedom of teaching, and of all the privileges and prestige attaching to the established church of the nation.

The following particulars are instances in which the Essayists in some sense adhere to the church's faith, while still essentially departing from, and really subverting, it. They do not teach in an absolute manner as the Deists do, the sufficiency of the natural light of reason and conscience, so as to set aside altogether the light of revelation ; but Dr Temple, the first Essayist, in an ingenious and elegant, but far from solid or self-consistent, paper on "The Education of the World," teaches that however insufficient the light of reason and conscience may have been in the childhood and youth and early manhood of mankind, it is at least sufficient now, when we have all the advantage of a divine expression of law in the Old Testament, and a divine example of excellence in the person and life of Christ. Man viewed collectively as one person—"the colossal man"—is now come to full maturity—he is no longer under law as in the days of Moses—he is no longer in presence of a perfect example, to learn from it, as in the days of Christ—he has outgrown these earlier needs and helps to reason and conscience—he is now able to walk alone, and to guide and govern himself without the aid of any external authority, or at least without any other help than he may derive from his own reflections upon the early lessons of the law which was given by Moses, and upon the grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ—he is no longer under a law exterior to himself, and

distinct from his own reason and conscience, either as to what he is to believe, or to be, or to do : in all these matters he is able to be self-determining, to judge for himself and to act for himself.

Again, the Essayists do not deny altogether that the Bible is a revelation from God, or that holy men wrote its several books under divine inspiration ; they still retain these Christian terms in their theological vocabulary, and they still believe in the things denoted by them in some sense. But they all agree in reducing the sense of them to a *minimum*. In their hands, revelation and inspiration were little more than a divine intensification of mere human knowledge, thought, and feeling ; that is to say, all the knowledge, thought, and feeling expressed in the Bible were simply the highest and best contents of the religious life and consciousness of the prophets and apostles in their several periods and stages of natural development, stimulated and helped, no doubt, by a more than ordinary measure of God's grace and Spirit ; but still the stimulus and the help were the same in kind as those which are common to all good men in every age of the church. Revelation was only human intuition divinely helped to see a little higher than ordinarily. Inspiration was only human gifts, and wisdom potentiated and intensified by the divine Spirit, in a degree no doubt somewhat excelling the operation of common grace, but certainly not in any degree sufficient to make the words spoken by the inspired men the very words and wisdom of the all-knowing God.

Again, the Essayists do not deny and repudiate miracles in every sense ; but, while one of them, Dr Rowland Williams, would reduce the supernatural element of Bible narrative to the smallest possible residuum, another of them, the late Professor Baden Powell, has gone the length of declaring that, within the circuit of the physical system and order of things, a miracle is impossible, and can never become the subject of rational cognisance and belief. In no case, and in no circumstances, let the argument in support of a miraculous occurrence be ever so apparently strong and convincing, can it ever be rational to be convinced of it ; that is to say, such a belief is always an irrational belief, or the belief of what is unreal and unhistorical, of what never did, and never could, take place in the physical world—in that world of things and events which is dominated by natural forces and natural laws. Still he does not assert that miracles are impossible and incredible in every sense. They cannot occur in the physical world, but that does not hinder them occurring in the spiritual or invisible world. They cannot be visible creden-

tials of faith ; but they may be, like other religious truths and facts, parts and contents of our religious faith itself. We may believe them to have taken place, as we believe other things about the unseen world which we do not rationally know ; but we cannot know them rationally, as we know facts of common history, nor believe them upon the strength of competent historical evidence. He asserts that no historical evidence can ever be adequate to establish them ; they are beyond the sphere, the reach, the competency of historical evidence. Hume said much the same thing in his "Essay on Miracles," about the miracles of the New Testament being objects of faith, and not of reason ; but he said it in a mocking and derisive tone. There is nothing of this tone in the Essays of Professor Powell. He seems perfectly in earnest when he thus relegates miracles from the sphere of the visible to that of the invisible world—from the province of reason to that of faith. But what a strange and monstrous birth of Rationalism is this ! To deny miracles in the only sense in which the Bible affirms them, and to affirm them in a sense in which the Bible knows nothing of their existence, and in which they lose all their validity and value as vouchers of the Christian faith !

It is in the same halting and half-and-half manner that the Essayists express themselves in regard to the ancient creeds of the church. They neither accept them altogether, nor reject them altogether. These dogmatic decisions of the early church, Dr Temple admits, "were right *on the whole*. They always embodied, if they did not always rightly define, the truth ; but the career of dogmatism in the church was in many ways similar to the hasty generalisations of early manhood." "We can acknowledge the great value of the forms in which the first ages of the church defined the truth, and yet refuse to be bound by them ; we can use them, and yet endeavour to go beyond them, just as they also went beyond the legacy which was left us by the apostles." How different is this language from the language both of decided Unitarians and of decided churchmen ! Dr Temple reverences the early creeds, but apparently does not subscribe to them. He is too much of a churchman to part with them entirely, and yet they no longer express his dogmatic convictions ; he has got beyond them, and attained to some dogmatic view which, as he expresses it, "absorbs such statements into something higher than themselves."

These instances will suffice to give some idea of the curious medley of positive and negative elements which are forced into unnatural connection in the system of "Church Rationalism," like the iron and the clay in the feet of Nebuchadnezzar's

image, and which we have sought to designate by that composite name. But there is another reason for thus designating the system. The Essayists have no wish to cease to be churchmen; they have no intention of leaving the national church, if the ecclesiastical tribunals will allow them to continue in it; and they plead strongly in one of the Essays in favour of abolishing subscription to the articles, in order that the ecclesiastical tribunals may have no pretext for interfering with their position, or depriving them of that freedom of teaching which they are now so publicly using. Mr Wilson, vicar of Great Staughton, in Huntingdonshire, is the writer of that essay—a gentleman who made himself very prominent at Oxford many years ago in putting a stop to the issue of the Tracts for the Times, on account of the theory of subscription put forward in Tract 90, which defended the practice of subscribing the articles in a non-natural sense; and who now, curiously enough, comes forward to defend the very same theory, with this only difference, that the non-natural sense now intended is a rationalistic sense of the articles, whereas in Dr Newman's celebrated tract it was a Romanistic sense. Mr Wilson sees no reason why a churchman, believing or not believing, as he believes or not believes, may not honourably and lawfully sign the Thirty-nine Articles as they stand, because the words "allow," and "acknowledge," and "assent," which he is obliged to use in subscription, do not necessarily express a confession of their truth on his part, however naturally that may appear to be the meaning of these terms. Even therefore, if subscription should still be enforced, he sees no reason why churchmen of his opinions may not continue honourably in the church, and should not be allowed to continue in it. But, strange to say, he is still very uncomfortable under the weight of the articles, and cries out against them as an intolerable yoke. He urges many reasons why subscription should be done away, as though it were a yoke and no yoke at the same time, and as though the position of churchmen, like himself, were both a condition of enviable freedom and of unendurable bondage. But it is evidently the bondage which he feels most sincerely after all, and he does his utmost to heave the yoke from his shoulders. A happy expedient has occurred to him, and an expedient of the same half-and-half character as most of the other thoughts of the volume. He proposes that the articles should still remain as the confession of the church, but that subscription to them should not be required of the clergy. Why should the clergy subscribe them, and the laity be excused? Why should the clergy have less freedom of teaching in the pulpit than the laity have freedom of thinking and talk-

ing at their own tables? What harm would there be in the church having articles as the public index of the teaching of her clergy, and yet leaving all her clergy at liberty to teach the doctrine of the articles, or not, as they please?

The Essayists want to be churchmen, and yet not to hold or teach the doctrines of the church. They are rationalists, and yet they are determined, if possible, to maintain their footing in a church which has no sympathy with Rationalism, but which, in the main, is built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone. And this is the high question of law and ecclesiastical right which now awaits its decision by the tribunals of the realm, and during the dependency of which all parties in the church are holding their breath for a time. The Bishop of Salisbury has commenced proceedings against Dr Rowland Williams, with the view of removing him from his office as a minister of the Anglican Church. Will the Bishop of Salisbury succeed in his suit? He is a bold man, or an inconsiderate one, who would venture to predict that he will. We venture upon no such prediction; we have serious misgivings of the issue. The policy of the Church of England is a comprehension-policy. The action of the Privy Council, as the court of final appeal, in all the ecclesiastical cases which have lately come before it in connection with the Tractarian controversy, has evidently been much more determined by considerations of policy than by principles of law—that policy being to allow precedence and predominance to no single party in the church; to mediate between parties; to moderate the eagerness, and discourage the too sanguine hopes, of all parties; and thus to prevent the disruption and dismemberment of the church. We expect nothing else than that the Privy Council, whatever may be the strictly legal decision of the Court of Arches, will apply to the case of Dr Williams the same politic considerations, and will not allow the party of the Essayists either to be altogether crushed, or to be altogether triumphant. There is much in the liberalistic spirit of the age to suggest to them such an ambiguous and halting decision; there is much, too, in the condition of the protestant church of the continent to give countenance to a policy which would allow Rationalism to keep its place in the national churches by the side of orthodoxy; for in Germany, in Switzerland, in Holland, and in France, the rationalists constitute the majority of the national clergy. But, on the other hand, the consequences of such an unsatisfactory decision would probably be very serious to the interests of the church. It would put new weapons into the hands of her enemies, and would greatly weaken the hands of her own best

children and friends. It would swell loudly the cry for a separation of Church and State, and might ultimately bring on a great ecclesiastical crisis. The public questions raised by the present controversy are, therefore, extremely grave and pregnant. They must arouse the anxiety of statesmen, as well as of churchmen; and we are, probably, on the eve of a period of great ecclesiastical agitation and change. Three mighty powers have rushed into conflict with each other, on a field already covered with the monuments of many a hard-fought battle—Low Church principle, High Church principle, Broad Church principle—the gospel of Christ, the gospel of Rome, and the gospel of Rationalism; and our age is destined to see the grand issues which must needs emerge from such a *ῥιγαιραμαχία*—such a battle of giants.

The school of the Essayists, however, does not stand alone in the Church of England—without allies, or destitute of what is called moral support. It is only one section—the most advanced section, it is true, and so much advanced as to have far outrun the sympathies of more moderate Rationalisers; but still only one section of a party in the church which is much larger than itself, and which is commonly called the Broad Church party. And there is at least one other section of this party, which has a pretty distinct type and complexion of its own—that which is usually called the Maurice school. In the “Tracts for Priests and People,” recently issued, the men of this section have declared themselves on the subject of the Essays, and their declaration is, that they can neither sympathise with the book, nor with the popular denunciation of it, and for the same reason in both cases—viz., that, on both sides, the teaching set forth is almost entirely *negative*. One of the tracts in the series is entitled, “The Mote and the Beam: a Clergyman’s Lessons from the Present Panic.” Mr Maurice himself is its author, and it is easy to guess in whose eye he finds the mote, and in whose the beam. It is not the Essayists plainly, in his view, who are the worse of the two parties in this controversy. The truth is, Mr Maurice and his school are rationalists too, though their Rationalism is of a somewhat different kind from that of the Essayists. It is what may be called the Rationalism of conscience, as distinguished from the Rationalism of intellect, or the understanding. With them the conscience of every man is the supreme judge and criterion of religious truth, and no doctrine of Scripture can be admitted which the individual conscience does not approve or sanction, however plainly the obvious grammatical meaning of Scripture may teach the doctrine. Mr Maurice has evidently much more sympathy with the negations and doubts of the

Essayists than he has with the answers and solutions which are brought forward by their evangelical antagonists. It is no breach of truth or charity, therefore, to hold that these two schools are sections of one and the same party; that they have the same general tendency, although the one is less extreme than the other, and has not yet developed itself into growths of unbelief so serious and alarming.

But the party of Broad Church is, no doubt, a vast deal more extensive than both of these schools taken together, and comprises a great many shades and degrees of what are called liberal opinions and tendencies, which are not represented either by Mr Maurice or Mr Jowett. Mr Maurice and Mr Jowett represent opinions and tendencies in a concentrated form, and as drawn together into foci or burning-points, as the Germans expressively call them. But the rays may be diffused more or less in men's minds, without being brought to a focus; and in all the members of the party this is the case in manifold degrees. And in all of them the common feature is this: a rationalising tendency to exalt reason and to depress Scripture—a tendency to be more in sympathy with the spirit and teaching of modern philosophy than with the spirit and teaching of the word of God, and a disposition to make room for the lessons of human science, not merely at the side of divine wisdom, as a support, and a supplement to it, which would be legitimate enough, but more or less in the room of it—in competition with it, in disparagement of it, as a substitute for it. As if Christ and his apostles could now no longer claim a monopoly of religious teaching, but must abate somewhat, be it more or less, of their ancient claims before the majesty of modern science, and admit it to share with them in the office and honour of the lights of the world, and the moral guides of mankind. The protest of the clergy of the Church of England against the *Essays and Reviews* has been loud and general, and both Low Church and High Church have united in laying that protest before the bishops. But it has been far from universal. Multitudes of the clergy have taken no part in it; and of these a large proportion, no doubt, have abstained, not from indolence or indifference, but from sympathy with the accused, and from the feeling that the difference between themselves and the *Essayists* was more one of degree than of principle, and that their own views, if developed to their consequences, would probably have more resemblance to those complained of than to those of the complainers.

There has thus, we have reason to think, been what we may call an extensive landslip in the theology of the Anglican clergy in the direction of a rationalising unbelief—a land-

slip effected by the silent but powerful action of modern science percolating through the strata of the theological terrain, and at length loosening the mass from its old hold upon the underlying rock of Bible inspiration and authority. In some parts of the slip the depression which has taken place is less, and in some it is more. In some the derangement of the old levels is just perceptible; in others it is distinctly and clearly visible; in others it is patent and manifest in the form of riven and shapeless masses of soil, ruined buildings, and sheer chaos. But everywhere there has been a movement from the old foundations, and a giving way of the old tenacity and fixity. Solvents have been everywhere at work, and the operations of disturbing forces, long at work under ground, stand at length revealed by new appearances and a perfectly new lie of the ancient and familiar terrain.

Nor is this theological landslip a perfectly unexampled thing in the history of the Church of England, any more than in the history of other churches. It would be easy to find a sad parallel to it in the history of English Presbyterianism in the latter half of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth. But what we wish to call attention to at present, is a parallel state of things in the history of the Church of England itself, which it will be interesting and useful to contemplate, and which we have not seen pointed out hitherto, at least at that early stage of it which corresponds best with the present stage of the theological movement of our own time. Dr Mark Pattison, in the essay entitled, "Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, between 1688 and 1750," points out a theological resemblance between that period and our own age. He is of opinion that, in our own time, there is "a growth and gradual diffusion through all religious thinking of the supremacy of reason;" and he remarks, that "a person who surveys the course of English theology during the eighteenth century, will have no difficulty in recognising that throughout all discussions, underneath all controversies, and common to all parties, lay the assumption of the supremacy of reason in matters of religion." Rationalism, he observes, "was not an antichristian sect outside the church making war against religion. It was a habit of thought ruling all minds, under the conditions of which all alike tried to make good the peculiar opinions they might happen to cherish." And he adds, that "if we are to put chronological limits to this system of religious opinion in England, we might, for the sake of a convenient landmark, say that it came in with the Revolution of 1688, and began to decline in vigour with the reaction against the Reform movement, about 1830. Locke's "Reasonableness of Christianity" would thus open, and the com-

mencement of the "Tracts for the Times" mark the fall of, Rationalism. It was not merely that Rationalism then obtruded itself as a heresy, or obtained a footing of toleration within the church ; but the rationalising method possessed itself *absolutely of the whole* field of theology. Reason was at first offered as the basis of faith, but gradually became its substitute." If this description of the eighteenth century be accepted as substantially correct (and it may be so, with the demurrer that the term Rationalism is used by this writer inaccurately to express all and every use of reason in religion, whether due or undue, right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable), it is evident that the theological state of our own age is not yet nearly so bad as to be a parallel to it. To find an exacter parallel we must go further back—not to 1688, but beyond it, to the middle of the seventeenth century—to the years between 1650 and 1670. For then the Rationalising party, which in the next century extended, according to this writer, to the whole church, was as yet only a section of the church, as it is only a section now. The tendency was then only in its beginnings, and was represented, as now, only by a few leaders.

We wish to communicate to our readers a few interesting facts upon this subject, which have only very recently come to our own knowledge. Looking about for information lately regarding Dr Tuckney of Cambridge, who was an active and influential member of the Westminster Assembly, and had much to do in the work of drawing up the Confession and Catechisms of that great Synod, we turned to the published correspondence between him and Dr Benjamin Whichcote, of the same university, consisting of eight letters which passed between them in the year 1651, and printed along with Whichcote's "Moral and Religious Aphorisms" in 1753. This correspondence proved to be a monument of the most authentic kind, of the state of theological opinion in the university at that period. It shews that it was precisely at that date when what began, some ten years later, to be called the Latitude party, was in the process of formation ; when it was beginning to publish its sentiments boldly in the preaching of Whichcote, Cudworth, Worthington, John Smith, and others ; and when the Presbyterian heads of the university began to be seriously alarmed at the new ideas which this party broached, and at the growing divergency of their principles from the doctrines which had always been preached at Cambridge. Not only since the ascendancy of the Parliament and the expulsion of the Royalists, but in every generation since reformation times, Cambridge men, it seems from Tuckney's second letter, had always been accounted more profitable preachers than Oxford

men. But the tradition “of a spiritual, plain, and powerful ministry” was now passing away from Cambridge. Whichcote himself was one of the chief innovators. He was now vice-chancellor of the university, and Tuckney, in his first letter, “craves leave to tell him, out of that ancient and still continued love and respect which he bore him, that he had seldom heard him preach, especially since his becoming vice-chancellor, but that something had been delivered by him, and that so authoritatively, and with the big words sometimes of *divinest reason* and sometimes of *more than mathematical demonstration*, that had very much grieved him and others with him, and yesterday as much as any time.” Omitting the strictures he had to make on yesterday’s sermon, and passing on to his second letter, written after he had received an answer to the first, we find the following remarkable passage, which contains a general account of the views of the new school:—

“Whilst you were fellow here you were cast into the company of very learned and ingenious men who, I fear, at least some of them, studied other authors more than the Scriptures, and Plato and his scholars above others; and hence in part hath run a vein of doctrine which divers very able and worthy men whom, from my heart, I much honour, are, I fear, too much known by. The power of nature in morals too much advanced. Reason hath too much given to it in the mysteries of faith. A *recta ratio* is much talked of, which I cannot tell where to find. Mind and understanding is all. Heart and will little spoken of. The decrees of God are questioned and quarrelled, because according to our reason we cannot comprehend how they may stand with his goodness which, according to your phrase, ‘he is under the power of.’ Those our philosophers and other heathens made fairer candidates for heaven than the Scriptures seem to allow of; and they in their virtues preferred before Christians overtaken with weaknesses. A kind of moral divinity minted—only with a little tincture of Christ added—nay, a Platonic faith unites to God. Inherent righteousness so preached, as, if not with the prejudice of imputed righteousness, which hath sometimes very unseemly language given it, yet much said of the one and very little or nothing of the other. (This was not Paul’s manner of preaching.) This inherent righteousness may be perfect in this life; an estate of love in this life above a life of faith. And some broad expressions, as though in this life we may be above ordinances, with divers other principles of religion, by some very doubtfully spoken of. And in case any cannot well digest these, complaint is made in the pulpit and elsewhere of their *rixa et lites*, and that about notions and speculations, sects

and superstitions, as all opinions are accounted which a man may hold, and yet be never the better man for them; and so, that there is a God and a Christ will thus come to be but a notion and speculation. Sir, these are some and the most (if my weary head could remember more, my hand, though weary, should write them, because I would now once for all unbosom myself to you), of the *cordolia* which I, and others of your friends, have been affected with. And although God knows we love you and them, yet you will not take it ill if we love what we conceive to be the truth of God more, and therefore cannot desert it, though we be little able to maintain it. And I hope that the thoughts of your being reputed a wise man, and both you and they learned men, will not stop your ears to the weaker suggests of your true friend; and the rather because, whatever otherwise your worth and ability is, yet I know you are not ignorant what very sinister thoughts are conceived, and reports scattered both of yourself and some others, which from my soul I desire may, by your full and plain appearing for the truth of God, be really confuted; and that we may join head and heart and hand, and with one shoulder, in the work of the Lord, growing up in the truth in love, which was one of the greatest encouragements I had in my return to Cambridge, as hoping to have much help in this kind by the company and assistance of such friends, whom I so much honoured and so entirely loved; as the contrary hath been the trouble of my spirit in such an unhappy disappointment."

Here, then, we see the old Puritan theology as it had been preached at Cambridge since the Reformation, face to face before a new and unexpected theological movement. When Tuckney left Cambridge in 1627, at which time Whichcote himself was one of his most esteemed pupils, there was no appearance of any such theological tendency as he describes in these letters. There were only two parties in the university then—the Puritan party and the party of Laud—what would be called now the Low Church and the High Church parties. It was in the interval between 1627 and 1648, when he returned to Cambridge, that the new school had begun to form itself; and it was already, in 1651, so strong in the number and eminence of its members, that Tuckney and the rest of the Puritan party had already begun to fear the worst consequences from it to the purity of doctrine and the interests of religion and godliness. The questions discussed in these letters between Tuckney and Whichcote throw much light upon the rise and progress of this new school, and deserve more attention in this respect than they appear to have received. Ten years later the party was fully formed, and had been nicknamed 'The Lati-

tude men," or the Latitudinarians. Some of the most distinguished divines of the Church of England belonged to it, including Dr Whichcote, Dr Henry More, and Dr Cudworth, who may be considered its three founders, Dr Worthington, John Smith, author of "Select Discourses," John Wilkins, Bishop of Chester, Dr Stillingfleet, Dr Simon Patrick, Dr Tillotson, Dr Horton, Dr Outram, and many more. The party rose at the Revolution, to be the ruling and predominant section of the church, and gave a tone and determination to the whole theology of the Church of England for the next hundred years. Bishop Burnet, who was of the party himself, describes them in "The history of his own times" in the following terms:—He is referring to the very indifferent character of the generality of the bishops and clergy under Charles II., and he makes this remarkable statement, "that if a new set of men had not appeared, of another stamp, the church had quite lost her esteem over the nation. These were generally of Cambridge, formed under some divines, the chief of whom were Drs Whichcote, Cudworth, Wilkins, More, and Worthington. Whichcote being disgusted with the dry, systematical way of those times, studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider religion as a seed of a deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to this he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotinus, and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God, both to elevate and sweeten human nature, in which he was a great example, as well as a wise and kind instructor. Cudworth carried this on with a great strength of genius and a vast compass of learning. Wilkins was of Oxford, but removed to Cambridge, where he joined with those who studied to propagate better thoughts, to take men off from being in parties, or from narrow notions, from superstitious conceits, and a fierceness about opinions. He was also a great observer, and a promoter of experimental philosophy, which was then a new thing, and much looked after. More was an open-hearted and sincere Christian philosopher, who studied to establish men in the great principles of religion against Atheism, that was then beginning to gain ground. In this More led the way to many that came after him. Worthington was a man of eminent piety and great humility, and practised a most sublime way of self-denial and devotion. All these, and those who were formed under them, studied to examine further into the nature of things than had been done formerly. They declared against superstition on the one hand, and enthusiasm on the other. They loved the constitution of the church and the liturgy, and could well live

under them, but they did not think it unlawful to live under another form. They wished that things might have been carried with more moderation, and they continued to keep a good correspondence with those who had differed from them in opinion, and allowed a great freedom both in philosophy and in divinity—from whence they were called men of latitude; and upon this, men of narrower thoughts and fiercer tempers fastened upon them the name of latitudinarians. They read Episcopius much; and the making out the reasons of things being a main part of their studies, their enemies called them Socinians. The most eminent of those who were formed under those great men I have mentioned, were Tillotson, Stillingfleet, and Patrick. This set of men contributed more than can be well imagined to reform the way of preaching, which, among the divines of England before them, was overrun with pedantry. The style of their discourses was clear, plain, and short, in which they opened the nature and reason of things so fully, and with that simplicity, that their hearers felt an instruction of another sort than had commonly been observed before. So they became very much followed; and a set of these men brought off the city in a great measure from the prejudices they had formerly to the church."

As early as 1662, a curious tract was published, professing to be "A Brief Account of the new sect of Latitude Men, together with some reflections upon the new Philosophy," meaning the mechanical philosophy of Descartes. It is in the form of a letter to a friend at Oxford, who had sent to the writer at Cambridge for information about the new sect who were everywhere spoken about, and spoken against; and the initials of the writer, S. P., very probably point to Simon Patrick, afterwards Bishop of Ely, as the author. The tract was reprinted in the collection of printed rarities called the Phoenix, published in 1708, and taken along with the correspondence of Tuckney and Whichcote, the two documents give a very full and satisfactory view of the early progress and condition of a school which was destined to exercise immense influence, both for good and evil, upon the theological science and the ecclesiastical and religious life of England.*

We have been thus full and particular in our account of the latitude men, because of their remarkable resemblance to the Broad Church party of our own time. Indeed this resemblance extends to a surprising number of particulars, not only

* See also Baxter's Life by Orme, i. 326-328.

in regard to the doctrines taught and the principles held by both schools, but even in regard to the causes which conspired in both cases to the rise of the parties, and the personal characteristics of some of the chief men of both. In both schools we find distinguished students of the Platonic philosophy, and of the theology of the Alexandrian fathers—More, Cudworth, and Smith in the one; Coleridge, Maurice, and Kingsley in the other. In both, also, we meet with eminent philosophers of the experimental school of mechanical or physical science: in the one case Dr John Wilkins, in whose college rooms were first held those meetings of *savans* or *virtuosi* out of which afterwards sprang the Royal Society; and in the other case, Professor Baden Powell, for many years secretary of the British Association, and one of the principal historians and expounders of inductive science in our day. More talked much of “a divine sagacity” in the soul, which is “antecedaneous to reason and sense;” and that we take to be the equivalent term in his philosophy for the modern “spiritual intuitions” of which we hear so much in the school of Coleridge. More was on intimate terms with the leading Quakers of his time,—with Penn and Barclay and Keith,—and his language was often little different from theirs about the inward light. He acknowledged that they “professed and gave witness to excellent things, most excellent things, of the gospel,” though “encumbering them with other things uncouth and ridiculous.” And it is a curious fact, that even in this particular our modern school supplies a coincidence; for Maurice, it is well known, propounded a good deal of Quakerism in his earlier works. Add to these points of resemblance the further coincidences, that the universities were the nurseries of both schools, that many of the chief men of both were academic teachers, and that in both cases several of the principal writers were, or are, among the most popular and successful authors of the day, and the historical parallelism is almost complete. Almost the only difference in the two cases is a local one. Cambridge was the focus of the movement two hundred years ago, while Oxford is the focus of the movement now.

Important suggestions spring from this historical parallel in regard both to the causes of the theological movement which is now exciting so much alarm, and the probable consequences, both good and evil, which may be expected to flow from it, and, finally, in regard to the position which it behoves the evangelical theologians of the country to take up in anticipation of the further progress and development of this movement.

In the seventeenth century there came, first, a mighty revival of evangelical theology and the religious life, of which

we may take the Westminster Assembly and its documents as the fruit and exponent. Then came a reaction and decline in the direction of latitudinarianism and rationalism, which, beginning about the middle of the century, rose into the ascendant at the Revolution of 1688. And last of all came a general lowering of the tone of religious life, not only in the national church, but through all denominations, which continued to go down lower and lower till the middle of the eighteenth century, when spiritual life was almost extinct in the nation, and would have been utterly quenched had not God been pleased to grant a revival by the instrumentality of Wesley and Whitefield. Well, we too, in this century, have seen a powerful awakening of religious life and evangelical truth in all the three kingdoms. Doctrinal Puritanism has been again in the ascendant, and has resounded from innumerable pulpits throughout the land; and we have seen the tide of religious feeling and earnestness rise so high, that it has touched with its sacred influence the highest positions and offices in the empire. But obviously the cycle of theological and religious change has again commenced. Reaction, innovation, declension have again begun to set in, and we have now reached a point of view from which we can descry probabilities or certainties of further change for many years to come. Let us ask the history of the past, then, to help us to understand the meaning of the present, and to prognosticate and prepare for the events of the future. It is no new thing which has befallen us. "The thing which hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done, it is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun."

1. The main cause of the rise of the Latitude men of the seventeenth century was the new expansion which had taken place in the first half of the century, of the human mind, and the new growth and enrichment of human knowledge. The grand revolution of the sixteenth century—the Reformation—had emancipated the mind of western Europe from the shackles of Papal authority, and set it free to roam at large over the realms of thought and knowledge. Men in the jubilant use of their new liberty, either went back to philosophies more ancient and sublime than that of Aristotle, or went forward to new philosophies more solid and progressive than those of ancient times. The study of Platonism was revived; Baconianism was brought forward; the great discoveries of Galileo and Kepler and Copernicus were published; the school of Descartes was founded; the career of Sir Isaac Newton had begun. The reason of man, strengthened by new studies, enlarged by new acquisitions, and emboldened by great exploits,

became conscious of its powers, and put forward claims to know the grounds and reasons of moral and religious truth, as well as of all philosophical systems. The English Deists, too, had begun to appear. Lord Herbert of Cherbury had given his writings to the world, the drift of which was to prove the sufficiency of reason and conscience as religious and moral lights, without any assistance from an external revelation. In these circumstances the theology of the first half of the century, whether Puritan or Laudian, was felt to be too narrow. The channels within which it ran were felt to be too strait. It rested everything upon authority,—mere authority,—whether the authority of Scripture or the authority of the Church, or both authorities combined. It did not shew the concurrence of reason with the dictates of that authority. It did not allow any *locus standi*, to reason as a distinct party. It did not make any room, in its exposition of truth, for such views as reason was able to supply in corroboration of divine truth; and it did not take adequate cognizance of the difficulties and objections which reason suggested in reference to divine doctrines. It was inevitable, therefore, that a new school of theology should arise. It was a necessity of the times. Reason must be attended to; its support must be accepted where available; and its difficulties must be considered and met. Hence the rise of a broader method of theological exposition,—a method which laid down a wider ground-plan for the theological edifice, and built up the fabric with more various materials,—with the materials supplied by the reflections of reason, and by the discoveries of philosophy, both old and new, as well as with the materials furnished by Scripture and the great teachers of the church.

So it was then; and it is the same now. Our own century has witnessed an immense and astonishing enlargement of the domain of human knowledge. Science—physical science especially—has now reached its manhood, and fills the world with its lessons, covers the globe with the practical fruits of its exploits, and divides with Christianity the office of the world's teacher and lawgiver. It was inevitable that a demand should arise in our day for a fuller recognition of the truths of science in the expositions of theology than has ever yet been accorded to them. Natural truth is as true as supernatural doctrine; for nothing, come whence it may, can be truer than truth; and at all those points of the theological system—and they are very numerous where Christian doctrine comes into contact with the natural system of things, whether in man's mind, or man's life, or man's world, or God's universal world—the men of our age wish to see natural truth taken into theo-

gical account, to see it taken up and applied in theology for what it is worth,—not ignored, still less contradicted, but appropriated, brought into its right place in the system, and exhibited in harmonious union with the old truths.

That, we believe, is the meaning of the rise of the Broad Church party, and that, we believe, is its fundamental drift and tendency,—a right drift in itself, we think, though men may go far wrong, and have already gone far wrong, in the way and spirit in which they pursue it,—a good and necessary tendency, we are persuaded, if wisely governed, but still one which may easily be pushed too far, and may easily be turned aside into the most dangerous and fatal paths. For the transition is easy from giving science its due to giving it more, much more, than its due; from allowing it to have a just influence to allowing it to domineer, and from the handmaid of religion to make her mistress and despot.

2. Very much good and very much evil resulted from the teaching of the Latitude men of the seventeenth century. The good was, that they met the demands of the age in which they lived,—they supplied what was felt to be lacking in the older theological method; and by falling back upon the light of reason and conscience, and shewing how harmonious their teaching was with the light of revelation, they retarded the progress of infidelity, and established the minds of many in the faith of the gospel. More and Cudworth wrote powerfully against Hobbes. Stillingfleet was a learned and able champion of the truth. No less so was John Smith of Cambridge, the author of "Select Discourses." Wilkins, Whichcote, Worthington, Tillotson, Burnet, Patrick, and Lloyd, all famous preachers, and occupying the chief pulpits of the country, leavened the public mind with much sound moral and religious principle, when, under Charles II. and William of Orange, infidelity and immoral principles came in like a flood. And in this sense many of the leading Puritans and Nonconformists were latitude men as well as they. Baxter appealed to reason, in defence of Christianity, in his great work published in 1667, "The Reasons of the Christian Religion," and in the supplement to it, published in 1672, "More Reasons for the Christian Religion, and no Reason against it." Howe did the same in his "Living Temple," published in 1676, for which his biographer, Professor Rogers, claims the praise of "the ablest work on the atheistical and deistical controversies which had yet appeared, and one of the earliest." Locke admirably states the principle upon which all these theologians alike argued the question of Christianity, and successfully maintained its cause before the tribunal of public opinion, when he says in his

Essay, Book iv., cap. 19,—“Reason is *natural* revelation. Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of by the testimony and proofs it gives that they came from God. So that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation puts out the light of both, and does much the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.”

Still much evil also resulted from the teaching of this school of divines in its ulterior development. From the first the place and functions of reason in the province of religion were ill defined; and it was not long before they were exaggerated and totally misconceived. It soon began to be thought that no doctrine of revelation could stand upon the testimony of revelation alone, or unless it was supported and corroborated by the independent testimony of reason; that reason was not only the ultimate basis of our faith in revelation, inasmuch as the evidences of revelation make their appeal to reason, but that every single doctrine of revelation must rest ultimately upon reason, otherwise it has no basis at all—reason must be able to understand it, to see the ground and reasons of it, and to stamp it with its approval before it can be accepted as true. So that, when at last accepted, it was so, not because God had revealed it, but because man concurred in it. In other words, Christian faith was transmuted into common conviction—reason became the substitute for faith, as well as the basis of it—and man believed only himself, when he imagined he was believing God.

Already in Tuckney's time, as we have seen, this evil had begun to appear. *Recta ratio* was cried up and unduly magnified. Episcopius, a very advanced and rationalistic Arminian, was a favourite author; and men of university learning, on listening to some of the new preachers, shook their heads, and said they Socinianized. And there is reason to think that the charge was true enough. It is certain that the school had its left, and its extreme left, as well as its right and centre. It let men down, in many cases, first into Arianism, then into Socinianism, and last of all into Deism; and even in the numerous cases where it had not these extreme effects, there is no doubt whatever that it became everywhere first *un-evangelical*, and then *anti-evangelical*—utterly destitute of the sap and the savour of true apostolic Christianity—a mere moral philosophy, or little more—the supernatural element everywhere ignored or even opposed, and nothing but natural truth and virtue allowed to remain. Indeed, the sermons of Which-

cote himself answered but too well, notwithstanding many excellencies, to this description. Lord Shaftesbury, who edited a volume of them, with a characteristic preface, says of Whichcote, that "for appearing in defence of natural goodness, he may be called the Preacher of Good Nature;" for "this," says he, "is what he insists on everywhere, and to make this evident is, in a manner, the scope of all his discourses." This preface was reproduced in a volume of Whichcote, reprinted in Edinburgh in 1742, under the editorial care of Dr William Wishart, Principal and Professor of Divinity in the College of Edinburgh, to which Wishart prefixes an address—"to young ministers and preachers of the gospel, and students of divinity"—in which he recommends the sermons to them in the warmest manner, "as a mine," says he, "out of which you may dig, and a model, by which you may improve"—a fact in bibliographical history which, taken along with another, that farther on in last century a complete collection of Whichcote's sermons was brought out at Aberdeen under the eye of Drs Campbell and Gerard, gives us a glimpse of the way in which the *latitude* men of England influenced the *moderate* men of Scotland, and how the low level of religion in the south during the last century helped to drag down the religious life of Scotland to a level as low, or lower.

Well! so it was then; and so, no doubt, it will be now again. The new school in its better sections will do a work for theology which the age requires to be done; and in its worse it will doubtless do a vast amount of evil and mischief. The good done will, we expect, be that we shall see brought about a reconciliation of theology and science, if not by these writers themselves, at any rate as the remote issue and effect of their writings. This is the great end they are aiming at; and though they may not take the right road to it themselves, they will no doubt stimulate others by their very errors and failures to find out the right road and follow it. Pioneers are needed when new territory is to be occupied, and new roads are to be opened up; and these bold, fresh-minded writers will do the work of the pioneers. They lead the way, but they are only precursors—wiser, if not so bold, teachers will follow. Men of one idea generally go first; but it is men of comprehensive views and of many ideas who come next, and who do the work which requires to be done in a really workmanlike manner. It is usually the men of the left who clear the ground, who pull down and destroy, and run up hasty tenements which are soon themselves to fall. It is the men of the right who come with large ideas, and more deliberate and well-considered plans, and rear up a theological architecture that will endure for ages.

But the evil to be done by this movement we already see, and shall doubtless see more of by and by. Already in the school of Maurice we see a Socinianising tendency—Plato put against Paul—moral intuitions set up against plain Scripture texts—the atonement evacuated of its substance and force—and evangelical theology derided and caricatured. Already, too (for our century travels faster than the seventeenth), we see the halfway house to infidelity reached in some of these Essays and Reviews. Half-and-half is their motto; but “Thorough” will soon be the watchword of those who imbibe their poison, and become infected with their rationalistic spirit. Already, indeed, in Oxford, as one of its own professors tells us, “Thorough” is the cry, and the goal is already reached. Professor Goldwin Smith has these words in a letter, sent a few weeks ago to the *Daily News*:—“When I was an under-graduate twenty years ago, Theology at Oxford was the queen (and tyrant) of the sciences; now it is an extinct science. In those days scientific experience was set at nought, and we were told that, though in science the earth might go round the sun, in theology the sun went round the earth. Now, moral *experience* is set at nought, and we are told that, morally, we may know action to be free, but that science pronounces it to be bound by the law of causation.” That is to say, there are men in Oxford, it would seem, who have quite given up, not only the theology, but the moral principles of Christianity, and have returned to the atheistic and immoral doctrines of Hobbes.

Who were the men that thought and wrote the most wisely in that former theological movement of which we have been speaking? Certainly, neither the men who left no room in theology for reason, nor the men who gave reason the whole room, but the men who gave to reason what room was meet and just, and nothing more. It was the men who accepted, on the one hand, the maxim of Locke, that “reason is a *natural* revelation,” and appropriated to the use of theology whatever natural truths could be shewn to be derived from that divine original, but who held fast, on the other hand, to the foundation truth of Christianity, that the Bible is a supernatural revelation superadded to the natural, and refused to surrender any of its genuine doctrines to the demands of Rationalism. They were not narrow-minded divines; for they were open to receive the contributions of reason to the support, and confirmation, and illustration of Bible truth; but they were broad-minded in the true sense of breadth—they were broad every way and on all sides—broad not only in the sense of accepting all that is true in reason, but in the sense also of keeping hold of all that is plainly taught in the

word of God. The fact is, that it was "the latitude men" who, in the end, became narrow-minded, because in the end they would accept nothing, or next to nothing, but the truths of reason, and reduced theology to the narrow limits of a branch of human philosophy. The true idea of a narrow-minded divinity is that which refuses the truths either of the natural revelation, on the one hand, or of the supernatural on the other; and that theology will be at once the broadest, and the truest, the most noble, and the most useful, which uses, and combines, and harmonizes the lights of both.

Of all the theologians of the latter half of the 17th century, the man who stands out as the grandest example of intellectual and spiritual broad-mindedness, is John Howe. He is a philosopher as well as a divine, but he never sinks the character of the divine in that philosopher. He is a Platonist but not a Platoniser,—a master of reason but no rationalist. What breadth of sympathy tied with the Christian life—with the heart of Christ—with the mind that was in Christ Jesus. The pulse of spiritual life beats high and strong in his compositions. It is not only the teaching of Scripture he reproduces, but its fervour, its holiness, its heavenly-mindedness. There, then, was the true breadth—a breadth of mind and heart that fulfilled all the conditions essential to such a character and claim—not only breadth of ideas, and of knowledge, taking in all ideas and knowledge that are truly derived from either revelation, but breadth of sympathy too, of spiritual as well as natural sympathy—of sympathy with the divine life in man, as well as sympathy with man and with common life. We miss this element in many of the latitude divines of the Church of England; we meet with it, in its highest and most fervent expressions, in Howe, and we may add, in Owen and Baxter.

Let this, then, be our watchword, to hold fast the *old* truth, in the love of it, and in full sympathy with it, as well as to keep our minds open to new knowledge, and let the men of former times, whom we take for our models and examples, be men who kept pace with their times, and were fully abreast of the age in which they lived, but who knew how to enrich themselves with the new, without impoverishing themselves by the loss of the old, and who, whatever they might think of the excellency of the new wine, and however much they might relish its recent flavour, still felt, and owned, and maintained that "the old was better." In a word, the motto of all lovers of evangelical theology and religion in our times should be that ancient and deep saying of Solomon—himself an illustrious example of broad thoughts, and "largeness of heart, even as the sand that is on

the seashore"—"Buy the truth, and sell it not." Wherever you find truth, and by whomsoever set forth, buy it at any price; make it your own; add it to your stock of knowledge, and assign to it its place in the system of your thoughts, however much it may cost you in labour of study, or effort of discrimination, or pain of parting with long-cherished opinions, or prejudications. But be as much resolved never to sell the truth, as you are eager to buy it. To sell a thing is to part with it at a price after consideration. Never consent to part with the truth for any consideration in the world, not even that the cause of Christ may acquire in certain circles the credit of being liberal and broad-minded, or that the hostility of mere men of science may be disarmed. One ounce of infallible divine truth is better than the whole weight of the world's temporary good opinion. And if evangelical theologians will only distinguish well and warily, in the pure, "dry light" of the divine word, what is really God's truth, from what is only man's interpretation—divine verities from human opinions—it is impossible for them to grasp too firmly the one, however willing the severe discipline of progressive science and controversy may make them to part with the other.

ART. II.—*The Positive Philosophy.*

To penetrate beyond the appearances of things—to get at the ground of these appearances—to look beyond the phenomenal to the actual—to see what is—to arrive at the ultimate element or essence of being—has ever been the active craving of human thought—the demand of human intelligence. We are not contented with the seen—the visible—we do not hold that to be all of being or existence—we think there must be that which is seen, which manifests itself. The common ground where mind and matter meet is not the objective existence, but the outward form or appearance through which it comes into the cognizance of mind. An active and speculative tendency could not be long of discerning a unity beyond all the multiform appearances of things—a condition underlying all existence, and which was the ground of existence, or existence itself. Any single object was obviously made up of a variety

of parts, was possessed of different qualities, and cognizable to the senses through these parts and qualities. We detach these parts, these qualities, and what remains? What holds them in unity? What exhibits them, or is composed of them? Are matter and qualities the same? Are what we call the qualities of matter, matter itself? But the qualities of matter, again, are what they are, not in themselves, but as they *affect us*. The colour of an object, is in the eye as much as in the object: the object is coloured only to the eye that is adapted to such and such impressions. Hardness itself is a sensation, and is not in the object. There is that which produces the sensation. But the inquiry in the case of all the qualities of matter is as to the nature of that which affects us in such and such a manner, and which we accordingly denominate such and such a quality. The properties of matter, again, which are not qualities, which are not such and such to our sentient organ, are certain powers or susceptibilities of being affected, or affecting in such and such ways. It is obvious, therefore, that the qualities and properties of matter are resolvable into certain powers and laws; are these all of matter, or what is matter apart from these powers and laws? The grand generic states in which matter exists, as solid, or fluid, or aeriform, suggested to the mind, in turn, each of these as the primary element of all existence. But still, restless, inquisitive mind interrogated: What was the nature of *that* existence? What was the element here? Is this the ultimate element?—or is there nothing beyond which is the ground of this, or which explains it? It is thus that philosophers were led to the ONE, whatever that one was; and the universe was thought to have its solution in the ONE and MANY. All being, all forms of being, met in unity—had a unity which was the substance or substratum of all. That was the essence of all being. Some made that no more than a principle—endowed with a kind of activity indeed, but not a living principle or being; soul was not yet apprehended or thought of. The thought of soul, however, of a living, active principle, and by and by of an intelligent principle, soon became the demand of the mind. Pythagoras resolved the elements of existence into unity itself, and by certain mystic relations of abstract number he accounted for the universe. Democritus found the elements of existence in certain atoms floating in illimitable space. The relations of these to each other gave the orders of being, and allowed a cosmogony of the universe. Xenophanes made the grand conjecture of one God, and contended against the anthropomorphism and polytheism of his times. He went about proclaiming—“God is One.” He was the preacher of this grand truth,

and he was almost maddened in the effort to arrive at, or to know that being. "O that I knew where I might find Him!" was the burden of his grand utterances—was the expression of his ardent soul. He succumbed under the inability to have communion with, or to attain to any certain knowledge regarding, this being. His melancholy breathed itself in complaints that he found no certainty to all his inquiries. The one and the many, then, was the grand problem of ancient philosophy, and it is the grand problem still. What accounted for all existence? What was the condition of all phenomena? Atoms and their relations—a far-seeing conjecture: but what accounted for atoms and their relations? Was there nothing prior to them? Did they originate themselves? Abstract relations of number: were these eternal, necessary, or constituted? The "*ἄπειρον*"—the infinite: but what was the infinite? A universal soul—a God. But the relations of this universal soul—this infinite—this unity—to the finite, to the many, to all phenomenal existence—was the grand enigma. This is still the puzzle; and it is this which gives occasion to negative philosophy. It is maintained that nothing can be known as to the nature of *existence*—that nothing can explain to us the cause of phenomena—that we cannot say whether there is *being* apart from *phenomena*, or how these stand related to each other. All the deep questions in metaphysics or philosophy, in other words, admit of no positive answer—lead only to a negative result. *Nescience*, or a science of ignorance, is all that is attainable. Without pushing the question so far, without carrying it up to the heights of being—to the problem of the divine existence itself—a negative philosophy denies all certainty to philosophical inquiry: it cannot say whether matter exists, or what it is,—whether soul exists, or what it is—whether there is causation, or what power is—whether there is space or time, or whether these are but forms of mind. All is negative, all is uncertainty.

"All that we know is, nothing can be known." It is this also which has given rise to a sceptical philosophy. This was precisely the state of mind realized in ancient scepticism. The sceptic doubted because the theorist could not determine the reality of existence, or its relation to phenomena. Space and time equally refused to yield up the mysteries of their being. This is precisely the scepticism of Hume: Berkeley also repudiates at least all material existence. Hume discards mind as well as matter, and causation he resolves into only a connection of events. A sceptical and a negative philosophy, therefore, are one. And German idealism partakes of the same character, if it has not the same origin or source. It denies all objective

existence, or it finds the objective in laws of mind. The mind objectifies its own states or ideas. There is not even a subject mind, but subjective thought. Schelling goes at once up to the eternal and absolute mind; and this, objectifying itself in the finite, or reflecting itself in phenomena, accounts for all finite existence. The finite is the infinite reflecting or embodying itself in outward forms, or just outwardly reflecting itself. It is still nothing different from the infinite—but the infinite in a certain potency of reflection—or in the act of putting forth that potency. This was accounting for the one and the many without allowing the latter a real objective existence—or rather denying an independent existence in the case of all multiform phenomena. Spinoza had broached a theory identifying the one and the many, and making this material—confounding therefore God with matter. Matter was the eternal substance, and all existing things were but its varied phases, or modifications. With Hegel all is a process of thought—nothing can be realized, or is certain, but this process, from the first identification and difference, to the last and highest deduction of reason. German philosophy is for the most part of this absolute and idealistic character; and it is essentially, therefore, negative in its results as respects the grand question of existence, or at least of outward existence. It may be said to be creative of outward existence, while yet it makes that which it creates nothing distinct from itself creative. But it is sceptical also, if we regard it as first calling in question what it comes after positively to deny, viz., all objective existence, except in so far as that is at the same time subjective, and owes its existence solely to the subjective. The negative philosophy is at first the sceptical. The mind may only doubt, it may not deny. A sceptical or negative philosophy finds reality only in the logical faculty, or in the fleeting consciousness of the moment. We can pronounce nothing certain beyond that consciousness, and beyond the deductions of reason from given premises. To it there is no substance, no soul, no causation, no infinite—neither space nor time. We know nothing here. We can at most but guess: we are not warranted even to believe. The Germans land in nihilism; we are not far from nihilism when we have arrived at scepticism.

But is scepticism inevitable? Must we yield to a sceptical tendency? Must we settle down in a negative philosophy? Must we be for ever entangled in a maze of uncertainty and doubt? Is there no outgate from this labyrinth of conjecture and theory—no retreat from this mist-land of shadow and appearance, where no substance is, where no real existence greets the eye, or appeals to the sense? We think there is.

We think it can be shewn that there is a *positive philosophy*. We are not left to mere illusions and shadows. The enigma, if it cannot be resolved, can be denied. We can believe in spite of scepticism: we *must believe, and faith in this instance is knowledge*. There is at least the objective; there is the phenomenal; there is space; there is time; there is soul; there is God.

But before we take up the subject of the positive philosophy, we must consider another phase of the sceptical, which seems to us involved in Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the conditioned, and in Mansel's application of that doctrine in his work entitled—"The Limits of Religious Thought." These seem to us to be essentially sceptical; for while they make a demand for faith, and the very object of these philosophers is to clear the ground for faith, they in reality cut away all ground for faith; they do not rest faith in any principles of mind, but rather in the very vacuity which they have themselves created. The very chasm into which the mind would otherwise plunge itself erects a causeway which bridges it over. But it is one thing to shew that we have no grounds in certain cases for our knowledge, but the convictions of our own minds, and earnestly to contend for these convictions, and another to uproot these convictions, and then in the emergency created, in the blank bewilderment of mind induced, in the necessity for some ground of confidence and certainty, to take shelter in faith.

Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the conditioned, it will be admitted, displays wonderful originality and amazing comprehensiveness. It sweeps the boundaries of being and of thought. It fixes the limits of the *thinkable*. The doctrine was propounded in opposition to Cousin, the celebrated French philosopher, as well as to all who held with him, or propounded a similar view to his, viz., that the infinite, or absolute, or, as these may be included under one term, the unconditioned, is an object of consciousness, or can be known in consciousness, or can be known at all. The way in which the particular view is worked out by Cousin is immaterial to what is implied in the view itself, viz., that the infinite can be known. This is what is of main importance. It will be seen at once, that to say that the infinite or the absolute can be known in consciousness, is known in consciousness, must be some extreme way of putting a doctrine it may be otherwise true, an adaptation to theory, or an accommodation to some system of psychology.

Cousin's view, in fact, is just the ancient doctrine of the one and the many—the one as the condition of the many—the infinite as the condition of all finite being—the absolute as the condition

of all phenomenal existence. We are, and can be, no otherwise conscious of the infinite and the absolute than as we are conscious of the finite and the phenomena; and as for the finite and phenomena, reason may demand the infinite and, the absolute as the explanation of their existence. This plainly removes both the infinite and the absolute from the sphere of consciousness to that of reason. It is obvious that Sir William Hamilton could most triumphantly maintain, as against Cousin, that the infinite and the absolute cannot be known in consciousness: was he equally correct when he maintained that they cannot be known at all? This is Sir William Hamilton's view, which he propounds and elaborates in his doctrine of the conditioned. It would have been enough to maintain against Cousin, that we cannot think the infinite, because the infinite, according to the very signification of the term, must be ever escaping beyond the utmost boundary of thought, and, in like manner, we cannot think the absolute, for what is out of all conditions cannot be known to an intelligence which thinks only under conditions. But this would not have been a bare enough anatomy, or profound enough analysis, for Sir William Hamilton. We will give his doctrine in his own words. We must premise, however, the sense in which Sir William understands the term, or takes the notion, of the absolute. It is always in *antithesis* to the infinite. Both are unconditioned, but the infinite is the unconditionally unlimited, the absolute is the unconditionally limited. This we regard as an altogether arbitrary and gratuitous use of the term, or understanding of the idea. The absolute is *that which is out of all conditions*, and the unconditionally unlimited, therefore, is as properly the absolute, as the unconditionally limited. We shall have to remark upon the proper notion of the term, confining it to that which is out of all *necessary* conditions—the independent, in other words—when we come to speak of Mansel's application of the doctrine of the conditioned. Meanwhile, keeping in view Sir William Hamilton's particular use of the term, we give his own statement of what he regards as the true doctrine on the subject of the absolute and the infinite.

"In our opinion," he says, "the mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the *limited*, and the *conditionally limited*. The unconditionally unlimited, or the *infinite*, the unconditionally limited, or the *absolute*, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived only by thinking away from, or abstraction of those very conditions under which thought itself is realised; consequently, the notion of the unconditioned is only *negative*,—negative of the conceivable itself. For example: On the one hand

we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent or realise, or *construe to the mind* (and here *understanding and imagination coincide*), an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same reason, can we follow in thought an infinite divisibility of parts. The result is the same, whether we apply the process to limitation in *space*, in *time*, or in *degree*. The unconditional negation, and the unconditional affirmation, of limitation; in other words, the *infinite* and the *absolute*, properly so called, are thus equally inconceivable to us."

In other parts of his writings, Sir William Hamilton applies his doctrine at length to the three ideas respectively, space, time, and causality. In regard to each he contends that we can think only between two inconditionate extremes, and that these inconditionates are themselves unthinkable. Now, it will be conceded that infinite time, in the sense of a completed infinite—absolute time, in the sense of an absolute minimum—which would be no time, as it would imply no duration,—it will be conceded that these are inconceivable. And the same with regard to space. But are we warranted to regard the infinite as a completed idea? Is this not a gratuitous conception of our own? It is, at all events, obvious that Sir William Hamilton's argument proceeds upon this sense of the infinite; and when we dismiss this sense, it has no application or relevancy. The infinite in the sense of the *indefinite*, is not at least unthinkable, and an absolute minimum in time, space, or degree, is what we have no need to think of; for existence supposed, it must suppose parts or degrees, and a minimum of these is inconsistent with the very idea. In all fairness Sir William Hamilton's argument can apply to the infinite alone, as a completed idea, and to the absolute in the sense in which he understands that term. To the unlimited it cannot apply, and this is the only sense of the infinite with which we have any concern. We are not bound to have in view a completed idea, either as regards space, time, or degree. Unlimited space, unlimited time, unlimited attribute, are not inconceivable or unthinkable. Sir William Hamilton's inconditionates are gratuitous assumptions. The nature of the infinite should be left undetermined by us: we should not venture any positive idea of it. The mode of a being's existence as infinite or absolute—as unlimited, and out of all necessary conditions of space.

time, and attribute, but what are necessary in these modes of existence themselves—we have no right to try even to determine. Sir William Hamilton's argument, therefore, depends wholly upon the gratuitous sense which he has himself attached to these ideas. The infinite, as a completed idea, and the absolute, in Sir William Hamilton's sense of it, have no existence to our minds. Let us see, however, how Sir William Hamilton's argument proceeds.

All thought is between two inconditionate extremes ; and these are equally unthinkable. But as they are contradictory, one of them must be true. Sir William Hamilton's conclusion, therefore, is, that as one of the inconditionates is true, and to us they are equally unthinkable—there is no preponderance of the one over the other—we may *believe* in the infinite. What is implied in this ? There is, first of all, the absurdity that we may believe in what is *unthinkable*, and faith is left us where knowledge fails. But this is not all. There is a contradiction, it is said, and one of the contradictories must be true, overlooking the grand circumstance that the contradiction is between two impossibles in thought, and how one of two impossibles can be true, because they are contradictory, is certainly inconceivable. But, again, they could not be contradictory if they were impossible, and they could not be impossible if they were contradictory. As impossible in thought they are *nil*, and there can be no logical contradiction between them. We are warranted, moreover, to ask, which of the contradictories would Sir William Hamilton incline to ? Would he incline to the absolute in space, in time, in causation ? Would he admit the possibility of limited space, time begun, and cause absolutely commencing ? For which of the alternatives is it that he wishes faith ? Why should we contend for the possibility of the infinite, and demand faith for it ? Why is there an implied preference for it, and is the argument to establish *it* on the ground of faith ? Why this presumptive desire for the infinite ? Why establish *it* on the ground of faith ?

That we cannot conceive of the infinite no more holds against those who think that there is a ground in mind for believing in the infinite than it does against Sir William Hamilton, when he demands faith for it apart from any ground in mind except the opposition of two contradictories. He at last demands faith for what is inconceivable : why may there not be a *ground in mind* for what is inconceivable ? All the difference between Sir William Hamilton and those who adopt the older view—and we would with all deference say, the more rational view—is, that he maintains, that we may believe in the inconceivable, and they maintain, that there is ground for our faith. It is not a hap-hazard faith—it is not an irrational faith—it is not

a groundless faith. It is not a faith struck out of the mystic collision of two contradictories. It has its ground in mind.

Says Sir William Hamilton, and we leave the passage to the reflection of our readers :

"The conditioned is the mean between two extremes,—two inconditionates exclusive of each other, *neither of which can be conceived as possible*, but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, *one must be admitted as necessary*. On this opinion, therefore, our faculties are shewn to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other, as equally possible ; but only as unable to understand as possible, either of two extremes ; one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognise as true. We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence ; and are warned from recognising the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all apprehensible reality."

It is the latter of these sentences that Mansel quotes as the ground of his argument in the now famous Bampton Lectures. We shall take up Mansel's views by and by. Meantime, while we do not affirm with Cousin, that the infinite is a subject of consciousness, or is immediately known in consciousness—and we have seen the way in which Cousin so regards it—it is yet the conclusion of reason from what is given in consciousness. It is the one described in the many ; it is the ground which the mind demands for the existence of the phenomenal ; it is the consciousness of the infinite in the finite. It is the old doctrine, as old as Anaxagoras and Anaximander. That we have such an apperception, or intuition, of the infinite is undoubted. We would not hold such an intimate sense of the infinite to be possible as the mystic does—we may not maintain a communion with the infinite as he believes himself to do—that "nympholepsy of the mind" which was charged upon Numa, and which has been imitated by so many others—and yet, there is a scriptural doctrine of fellowship with the infinite :—but we would contend, nevertheless, that "a feeling of the boundless bounds all feeling"—that this is as truly as it has been beautifully said—and that William Archer Butler has rightly recognised that to be a science which Sir William Hamilton would remand to the region of faith—the science which "includes as its chief subjects those important topics, the independent reality of material substance, the reality and value of abstract truth, the absolute nature of time and space, and

above all, the real, eternal, and necessary existence and attributes of that great and animating principle of all things, which antiquity, by a noble and just analogy, entitled the soul of the universe, and whom it is given us—while by the force of irresistible conviction of his Deity we can place him on the throne of the universe—by the revelation of his assumed humanity, to welcome to the almost nobler throne of the heart.”

Let us not be misunderstood, however, as maintaining that there is such a science in the same sense that there are sciences of phenomenal existence and law. The latter rest upon experience and consciousness: the former upon faith, but faith grounded in mind. It is faith rather than science in the case of the former, but it is a faith which amounts to knowledge. May not the indestructible laws of mind be as certain a ground of knowledge as experience or consciousness itself? We are entitled to ask where Sir William Hamilton finds his faith? In the very vacuity of the unthinkable! and yet not so, for it is generated out of his two contradictories—neither of which is conceivable, but one of which must be necessary. Sir William never condescends to say which is necessary. Of course, it is the infinite. Why not then say so? And if this be necessary, it is no longer a matter of faith: it follows by a strict logical sequence. But are we not warranted to say which is necessary? and is it here that we have room for faith? But this is rather uncertainty between two extremes of thought than faith in either. Such is the jumble that arises out of Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the conditioned. We prefer the simple laws of mind as the ground of faith to any such logical sequence. We shall refer more particularly to these laws when we take up the subject of the Positive Philosophy. —If we yield ourselves to these logical puzzles the conditioned itself, it might be shewn, is impossible in thought. For it is either a part of the *unconditionally unlimited*, or it is composed of the *unconditionally limited*, and these being impossible in thought, the conditioned itself must also be impossible in thought. If it were a problem with beings of different laws of intelligence from ourselves—could we make such a supposition—whether the conditioned could exist, we could conceive such beings maintaining an argument with as much rigour against the conditioned as Sir William Hamilton does against the unconditioned. The conditioned happens to be given to us in consciousness—to them it would not be so, and they could maintain a very learned argument, a profound metaphysical argument, against the possibility of all such existence.

It follows, as the legitimate issue of Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the conditioned, that the infinite and the absolute, as they are unthinkable, are non-existent, as they are impos-

sible in thought, are impossible in themselves. "Nihil cogitabile," as it has been well put, they are "nihil purum." This seems to be admitted by Mansel when he says :—"The infinite, as *inconceivable*, is necessarily shewn to be *non-existent* ; unless we renounce the claim of reason to supreme authority in matters of faith, by admitting that it is our duty to believe what we are altogether unable to comprehend." To us as intelligents, or to intelligence itself, the infinite is really non-existent. We may believe in it, we may set ourselves to believe in it, we may summon up faith to its appropriate task, we may compel it to the rescue, but so far as the rigorous conclusions of reason are concerned, or so far as the conditions of thought itself allow, the infinite and absolute do not exist. The whole object of Mansel's work, comprised in his eight Bampton Lectures, is to demonstrate this, is just the evolution of this argument. To the human mind, the infinite and the absolute are non-existent. "The attempt to construct in thought an object answering to such names necessarily results in contradiction." It does not mend the matter when Mansel adds : a "contradiction, however, which we have ourselves produced by the attempt to think ; which exists in the act of thought, but not beyond it ; which destroys the conception as such, but indicates nothing concerning the existence or non-existence of that which we try to conceive." It is obviously implied in this, that to *thought*, the infinite and the absolute alike result in contradiction. How can it mend the matter when it is said : "a contradiction which exists in the act of thought and not beyond it ?" Can it be truly said "which destroys the conception as such, but *indicates nothing concerning the existence or non-existence of that which we try to conceive.*" It is very convenient for Sir William Hamilton and his disciple, to take refuge in this state of mind which we denominate faith, but which is not faith after all, if it is not grounded in mind itself, and if it is opposed by all the previous conclusions of mind, or by the very conditions of thought. The grand error with which Sir William Hamilton, and more particularly Mansel, in his fuller elaboration of the doctrine of the conditioned, are respectively chargeable, is in supposing faith to be possible in opposition to mind, or in spite of mind. If the infinite and the absolute are unthinkable, and inevitably involve the mind in inextricable contradiction, whenever it attempts to realise them in thought, it does not seem that we can have any ground for faith, or that we are entitled to make any demand for it.

We may as well notice, in passing, an expedient of which Sir William Hamilton and Mansel are very dexterous in availing themselves, and which creates perplexity in taking up their argument, while it saves their argument itself from instant con-

demnation, which would immediately follow, if the adroitness to which we have alluded were not resorted to. It is in perpetually confounding the inconceivable with the unthinkable, what is impossible in thought and what is simply incomprehensible. These are not the same. A thing may be inconceivable which is not unthinkable—incomprehensible which is not impossible in thought. That two straight lines should enclose a space is unthinkable; it is impossible in thought because it is impossible in itself: that these lines can be produced to infinity may be inconceivable, but it is not unthinkable. A substance as underlying quality may be inconceivable or incomprehensible; we cannot represent to our minds that underlying substance: but so far from its being unthinkable, or impossible in thought, it is what the very conditions of thought impose upon us, what we cannot help thinking. Now, Sir William Hamilton and Mansel derive great assistance from being able to employ these expressions as interchangeable, as being every way identical. And this leads to considerable confusion—shall we say, to not a little culpable mystification?—in the statement and comprehending of the argument of both writers. No one would be unwilling to admit that the infinite and the absolute are inconceivable—but who would say that they are unthinkable or impossible in thought? Not even Sir William Hamilton or Mansel himself, though in prosecuting their particular line of argument they may—they do often—say so. If we can believe in the infinite and the absolute, we must be able to think them, though we may not be able to conceive them, or to us they may be incomprehensible.

It is obvious, again, that both Sir William Hamilton and Mansel employ the terms “infinite” and “absolute” in a different sense when they speak of them as unthinkable, and anon when they demand our faith for them. How can we believe in what is unthinkable, what is proved by such rigorous logic to involve us in endless contradiction. Accordingly, Mansel himself says:—“*We are compelled by the constitution of our minds to believe in the existence of an absolute and infinite being—a belief which appears forced upon us, as the complement of our consciousness of the relative and the finite.*” Veil it in whatever words we may, this is to think the infinite and the absolute. The belief is grounded in mind. But an infinite and an absolute which involve, in the very supposition of them, such contradictions as Mansel proves in connection with these ideas, cannot be admitted by mind, or embraced in faith. As proved “inconceivable (or rather unthinkable) they are necessarily shewn to be non-existent”—and therefore they are equally impossible to faith and in thought. It is obviously therefore, another kind of infinite and absolute that we are to believe

from what involves such contradictions, when we attempt to think of them, or construe them to our minds. But how can there be more than one sense in which the infinite and the absolute can be understood? That is perhaps not for us to determine. It was for those who undertook to prove that the infinite and the absolute are unthinkable, and yet that we must believe in them, to shew in what sense they are unthinkable, and in what sense they may still be the objects of our faith—in what different senses they are unthinkable and may yet be believed in. The grand quarrel that we have both with Hamilton and Mansel is, that they confound these senses, and that they demand our faith for the infinite and the absolute as if they were the same that had been just proved by such startling conclusions to be unthinkable. They cannot be the same, and it should have been at once shewn, or admitted, that they are not the same. To ask our faith for what is proved to be unthinkable, is equivalent to proving an absurdity, and then asking our faith for what is thus demonstrated to be absurd. Every one knows better the effect of the "*reductio ad absurdum*" in argument. This is what completely damages, we think, Mansel's work. It affects the whole argument. It is the vice which runs through it. He asks our faith for the infinite and the absolute, without once discriminating between the sense in which he had been contending against these as possible in thought or in fact, and the sense, undefined and indeterminate as that may be, in which we may yet believe in these. He perplexes us by allowing us to suppose they are the same, and, first proving them to be impossible in thought, charged with such infinite contradictions, still demanding our faith for them, still making a reserve for them in our faith.

The object of Mansel's work could never be to unsettle our faith. "*The Limits of Religious Thought*" is a series of lectures preached on the Bampton foundation, in the University of Oxford, for the very purpose of defending the faith—as it is expressed in the words of the original foundation—"to confirm and establish the Christian faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics." For this purpose he conceived the design of proving the systems of the Theist, the Atheist, and the Pantheist alike, involved in contradiction, and, striking away the ground from each of these systems, remanding us to faith based upon Revelation, both for our Theistic and our Christian beliefs. Such is the plan of the work, and in some respects it is an admirable one. It shews the objector to the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, on the ground of the difficulties that environ them, that there is equal difficulty attaching to his own system or to any system of belief we may espouse. It has the irrefragable evidences of Christianity to fall back upon, and these are very

ably stated in a brief and comprehensive summary. Our object, however, is not with the argument as establishing the Christian faith; it may be wise, or it may be unwise: it serves an admirable purpose in shewing the difficulties that attend any system of belief, and it does make an important demand for faith in spite of all that is difficult, or may be incomprehensible; in the matter of our faith. But the grand error is, that it makes this demand in the face, not merely of difficulties, but of impossibilities. The infinite and the absolute are impossible in thought: they involve innumerable contradictions; they lead to innumerable impossible consequences. The mysteries of the Trinity—predestination and free will—special and general providence—original sin—the atonement—justification by faith—the operation of divine grace—are not insurmountable or to be rejected, when theism itself—when atheism—when pantheism—are all involved in equal mystery and contradiction. But are these on the same level? that is the question. Is theism, is Christianity, to be established by such a mode of argument? Are the articles of a rational theology really so incapable of proof? Must we not modify our views of the infinite and the absolute? Or rather, are not the views that have always been entertained very different from those of a rigid, metaphysical, interpretation of these terms? Ought not Mansel, at an earlier stage of his argument, to have shewn that the terms must be accepted in a different sense from that which they may be verbally understood to express? Ought he to have made it his object to demand our faith for the infinite and the absolute in spite of the contradictions in which, in the *prima facie* meaning of the terms, they inevitably involve us?—on that constructing his argument against infidelity, and in favour of Christianity. This is what we have a right to except to; and having cleared our ground here, we can allow of any amount of contradiction which the metaphysical notions of the infinite and the absolute may involve; they are not the infinite and the absolute with which we have anything to do.

Mansel makes an important admission in a note to the preface to the fourth edition of his work, such as will justify our course of observation, and is tantamount, in fact, to a giving up of the whole question. He there says:—

“A writer in the *Christian Observer* has devoted two articles to these lectures; in the second of which he persists, notwithstanding my direct denial in the interval, in maintaining a statement made in the first; namely, that I adopt ‘the absolute and the infinite, as defined after the leaders of German metaphysics,’ as a ‘synonym for the true and living God.’ To most readers it is, I hope, tolerably obvious that I do exactly the reverse. I assert that the absolute and infinite as defined in the German metaphysics, and in all other

metaphysics with which I am acquainted, is a notion which destroys itself by its own contradictions. I believe also that God is in some manner incomprehensible by me, both absolute and infinite ; and that these attributes exist in him without any repugnance or contradiction at all. *Hence I maintain throughout, that the infinite of philosophy is not the true infinite.*"

The infinite of philosophy need not be other than the true infinite. Mansel has argued from the German point of view of the absolute and the infinite, or the strictly metaphysical point of view, and his whole demonstration might have been spared, had he set aside that view from the beginning ; or it would have been a very legitimate process to have proved the contradictions in which such a view involves us, if he had guarded us against supposing for a moment that such was the way in which he himself understood or received the ideas. The great evil which we charge upon the work, is in allowing it to be imagined that the infinite and the absolute, in the sense of these terms which leads to such contradictions, is the true sense of them, and leaving us only with a vague faith, for which there is no ground in mind, or anywhere else, as if the infinite and the absolute could still exist, and we could believe in them in spite of every contradiction in which they logically involve us. There is great confusion created by the very conditions of the argument. The terms *infinite* and *absolute* might seem to admit but of one meaning, and so far as the terms themselves are concerned, they do admit but of one meaning ; but the reality is very different from the terms which are employed to designate it. The divine Being cannot be the infinite and the absolute in the metaphysical or German understanding, or use, of these terms. It would have been an important object to have shewn to what contradictions such a use of the terms, or understanding of the ideas, necessarily leads, and in what consequences a merely rational theology, or a German rational theology, may involve us, had the protest been put in from the first against such an acceptance of the ideas. But this is not done, and we are left with the painful feeling, as we follow the course of Mansel's uncompromising logical exercitation, that we must part with the infinite and the absolute altogether, that these cannot exist ; and it is like an insult, after the merciless process of logic to which we have been subjected, to make a demand for our faith, or to hold out to us that faith is still in reserve when reason fails. True, the infinite and the absolute, as terms, have but one meaning, but God is not the infinite and the absolute in that verbal sense.

Let us now give some specimens of Mansel's argument, and we shall meet them, individually, as they pass under our review, upon the principles we have set forth in these preliminary

statements. A few specimens will suffice, for we think we have brought out the principle which satisfactorily applies to them all.

"To conceive the Deity as he is," says Mansel, "we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the *First Cause* is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the *Absolute* is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being." It will be seen how this definition of the absolute differs from the sense in which Sir William Hamilton employs that term. "By the *Infinite* is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable; and which consequently can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all eternity."

"But these three conceptions," asks Mansel, "the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A cause cannot, as such, be absolute; the absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation."

This is either forgetting his own definition of the absolute—"that which exists in and by itself, having no *necessary* relation to any other being,"—or imposing a new meaning upon the term.

Mere appearance would be an effect as much as real existence, and would be no escape from the contradiction. But is there a contradiction, or is the contradiction not the result of an assumed meaning to the infinite which it does not really sustain? It is only the verbal meaning of the term which would allow such an argument as is implied in the question, "How can the infinite become that which it was not from the first?" "If causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite." This is to proceed upon a material conception, a quantitative idea, of the infinite. In causation, it is numerically that which it was not before. But are we bound to adopt such an idea of the infinite? Is our idea of the infinite necessarily quantitative? Is it such that there is necessarily no room for any other existence but itself? Is it such that the infinite may not *cause*, cannot create? Is this inconsistent with the idea of infinite? Is the infinite inconsistent with *action*, with modes of existence? Of the spiritual essence of the divine Being we can know nothing, and cannot affirm, therefore, that it is incompatible with the existence of other beings: we cannot say that

it must exclude all other being, and can exist only by itself alone. Does our idea of infinite power, again, require the supposition of its being ever in action? Can it never be in abeyance?—be power potential, and not actual? In this way there can be no infinite; for it must be admitted that other existences besides that which we have been accustomed to regard as the infinite do exist. The infinite of our conception, therefore, cannot be truly infinite, and the infinite is really impossible. Causation, again, must suppose the cause limited: we cannot conceive of an infinite cause. Is this not to violate all our ideas of the infinite? It is obviously to argue from the verbal acceptance of the term.

"Supposing the absolute to become a cause," proceeds Mansel, "it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect."

It will be admitted that the absolute and eternal cause, when it became a cause, operated by free will. Mansel's argument is valid against a *necessary* cause as infinite or absolute; though we are not sure to suppose all motive absent from the infinite and absolute cause of all existence. Is motive inconsistent with the infinite and the absolute? Is not this, again, to proceed upon the verbal acceptance of the terms? May not the absolute be still held and regulated by motives which are proper to the infinitely wise and infinitely good? Must the absolute be free from all motive?—and in the absolute must wisdom and folly, evil and good, be confounded? Who can say that the absolute must be absolute in this sense? "What kind of an absolute being is that," says Hegel, "which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?" "We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation," says Mansel, "but the reasoning is unassailable." The reasoning is unassailable only upon a certain assumed acceptance of the terms. "If the absolute and infinite," says Mansel in continuation with the above, "*is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other*, is the conception required,"—viz., a conception which involves Hegel's consequence. Is the absolute and infinite not "an object of human conception?"—is it only an object of human *faith*? Then, must we *believe* in an absolute being which contains in itself all that is actual, even evil included? It must be in a different sense, surely, of the absolute, that we are to believe in an absolute being, from what would involve a consequence like that of Hegel. Mansel would never insist upon our believing in such an absolute.

"The act of causation," Mansel proceeds, "must therefore be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another, and the absolute as related to itself. The absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself." We have always been accustomed to regard the province of consciousness as one's own internal states, although Sir William Hamilton maintains that we are conscious of the external world. This, however, by the way. "But this alternative," continues Mansel, "is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the other,"—the alternative that the absolute may be said to be conscious, if it is conscious only of itself. "For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the former case, the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or, if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for existence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation."

This we regard as words only—"vox et præterea nihil." It is not worthy of any serious reply.

"The corollary from this reasoning," says Mansel, "is obvious. Not only is the absolute as conceived incapable of a necessary relation to anything else, but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance, composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object. For, if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives. The almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this absolute unity as indifferent and containing no attributes, can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived

as unconscious; it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible."

Of what use can *faith* be after this? Very little, one would think. Is it such an absolute that we are to believe in? Is it not rather the independent—that which is absolved from all *necessary* relations, except such as were necessary to its own mode of existence? Must it be that which is absolved from all relation? Can we not conceive it eternally related to itself—to its own attributes—to its own intelligence—to its own moral perfections? Why must we suppose absolute unity and simplicity? Do our conceptions of the divine Being necessitate such a supposition? Certainly the divine Being is incomprehensible—must be incomprehensible. "Who can by searching find out God? Who can find out the Almighty unto perfection?" But surely he is not so incomprehensible, or in such a way incomprehensible, that we must involve ourselves in inextricable contradiction when we attempt to think of him. Truly, it is philosophy falsely so called when we think of him after this manner. It is not a false philosophy when we think of him so as not to land ourselves in altogether irrational and contradictory notions regarding him. It is but a part of his ways we comprehend; but a part at least we do comprehend.

Est quadam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.

"The fundamental conceptions of rational theology being thus self-destructive," says Mansel, "we may naturally expect to find the same antagonism manifested in their special applications. These naturally inherit the infirmities of the principle from which they spring. If an *absolute* and *infinite consciousness* is a conception which contradicts itself, we need not wonder if its several modifications mutually exclude each other. A mental attribute, to be conceived as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is potential only with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and an unrealised potentiality is a limitation. Hence every infinite mode of consciousness must be regarded as extending over the field of every other; and their common action involves a perpetual antagonism. How, for example, can infinite power be able to do all things, and yet infinite goodness be unable to do evil? How can infinite justice exact the utmost penalty for every sin, and yet infinite mercy pardon the sinner? How can infinite wisdom know all that is to come, and yet infinite freedom be at liberty to do or to forbear? How is the existence of evil compatible with that of an infinitely perfect Being; for if he wills it, he is not infinitely good; and if he wills it not, his will is thwarted and his sphere of action limited? Here, again, the pantheist is ready with

his solution. There is in reality no such thing as evil ; there is no such thing as punishment ; there is no real relation between God and man at all. God is all that really exists : he does, by the necessity of his nature, all that is done ; all acts are equally necessary and equally divine ; all diversity is but a distorted representation of unity ; all evil is but a delusive appearance of good. Unfortunately, the pantheist does not tell us whence all this delusion derives its seeming existence."

Pantheism is not the escape from these results. These consequences follow only upon the material conceptions of the infinite, against which we have already put in our protest. The infinite is not to be conceived of as a continuous quantity, in which case "every infinite mode of consciousness must be regarded as extending over the field of every other," and "their common action would involve a perpetual antagonism." The infinite is not so to be thought of. Infinite power is that to which nothing is impossible : how need that extend over the field of infinite wisdom ?—and can infinite power not withhold itself when infinite goodness forbids its exercise ? Where is the antagonism here ? We see no antagonism inconsistent with both of these attributes being infinite. The infinitude of each attribute must be measured by its own kind : it is infinite as that attribute and not another. And then that infinitude—how are we to conceive of it ?—is it to be conceived of according to the etymological meaning of a word ? Infinite goodness cannot withhold a blessing which it is consistent for infinite wisdom and justice to bestow. Infinitude is an idea less capable of being associated with the moral attributes of God than with his natural. Take the most moral of the attributes of God—his hatred of sin : what must be the recoil from sin of a Being of infinite nature ? What must be the goodness of a Being of infinite resources ? In some such way may we conceive of the moral perfections of an infinite Being. Infinite power can do all that to power is possible. Infinite wisdom can know all that to wisdom is knowable. These attributes do not clash or extend over the field of each other. The purposes of infinite wisdom may not be limited to one design or another, for infinite power may accomplish the same purpose in many ways. But even the purposes of infinite wisdom are circumscribed by the conditions of space and time. These must be had regard to, and it is in the regard had to them in the works of creation that we have such admirable evidences of adaptation and design, and consequently of a designing Author. In the necessary relations of space especially have we field for this adaptation, and accordingly for these evidences. And therefore it was that Dr Chalmers was accustomed to regard the "collocations" in creation as the great field of the

theistic argument, or where we have especially proof of a designing Creator. It was in accommodating itself in these that the wisdom even of the absolute and the infinite was especially seen. Adjustment, too, is the grand idea or law which Dr M'Cosh has seized upon, as especially illustrative of the "Method of the Divine Government." Surely the attributes of the Infinite are not to be regarded as limiting or excluding each other.

The last quotation that we shall make from Mansel is to the following effect:—

"Let us, however, suppose for an instant that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection."

It is enough to make the quotation. It needs no criticism of ours. The argument still proceeds upon the erroneous view of the absolute, which we have pointed out. But besides this, there is the familiar distinction between what is declarative and what is absolute, or essential, in the glory of God. Who needs to be told that it was for the former that creation was called into existence. The condition of causal activity is not a higher state than that of quiescence, but it exhibits the glory of the divine Creator. "The heavens declare his glory, and the firmament sheweth his handiwork."

Such is Mansel's argument from the objective side. He shews the infinite and the absolute to be equally impossible of conception from the subjective laws of our own being. In this, however, we do not intend to follow him. Our object is not to review Mansel's work: it is to shew that his argument, as Sir William Hamilton's high argument on the subject of the conditioned—that both of these are essentially of the sceptical school of philosophy, even while the grand object of their authors is to remand us to faith, and to magnify the province of faith. They call us to believe what they have proved to be impossible. Or, do they not call us to believe in that, but in something different,—in a different absolute, in a different infinite? There was no need for such an elaborate argument in making this demand, if this was the amount of it. At all events, they should have explicitly announced this to have been their purpose. There would have been less confusion

less mystification, less appearance of profound wisdom. The unconditioned, it would have been seen, may be the conditioned after all—may conditionate itself—the infinite may be the unlimited. The absolute, it would have been seen, may assume relations, may come into conditions, and yet be absolute, may not be affected in any one of his own essential attributes,—the infinite may be infinite without any one attribute crossing the path of another, or eliminating another. There is a positive philosophy of the absolute and the infinite.

The question for a Positive Philosophy to answer, and on which depends the possibility of a Positive Philosophy, is, whether we can be said to possess *knowledge*, or whether what we possess as knowledge is not purely regulative ideas, representing nothing actual or existent? Has our knowledge any actual value which it represents, or for which it may be said to stand? Do the ideas of the mind go for any actual object, or are they not purely regulative, informing us of no real thing, conveying to us no real information, and expressing, or representing, no real object or objects?

Now, put in this form, the question may seem to admit of a speedy issue, of a very summary disposal. Who will allow that all our knowledge is but seeming, is nothing real, is purely ideal, represents nothing actual, and is simply regulative? Regulative for what, it may be asked? Does not the idea of regulation imply that there is a world in which we exist, that there are objects with which we are conversant, that there are beings with which we are in relation, that there are purposes for which we live? What is the use of regulative ideas, if this is not implied? Who can deny at least the practical purposes for which we exist, and which we must fulfil, whether in an external world of matter, or at least among a world of beings like ourselves? Berkeley would deny the world of matter, but he would allow a world of beings of mind. Kant was recalled from the negation of a world of matter by the practical purposes for which we must recognise ourselves as existing. The practical with him was the solution of the speculative, and the phenomenal was proved by the demands upon the personal. The relations which exist among persons could not be ignored or denied. With ourselves this has always seemed to be conclusive as to the existence of the phenomenal, or of the outer world. We know what can be said as to the *phenomenal*—about its being purely phenomenal—about our never arriving at the knowledge of substance—about every cognition being ultimately a subjective state—about the qualities of matter being as much sensations within us as actual qualities without us, answering to our internal states—about every quality being relative to our sentient organism, and possessing no stability or

permanence, or independent existence—requiring the existence of a subject for its own existence as the objective quality. The material universe might thus be purely phenomenal, be so many illusions, so many phantasmagoria, so many dissolving views, and stage effects, and strange deceptions, held out, enacted, or practised, before us. We know all this, and we may not be able to give any very decided or conclusive answer to the arguments of a subjective philosophy. We have already seen what can be said in favour of a negative philosophy—of subjective idealism. But the one thing of personality, viz., the feeling of our own personality, our existence and consciousness as persons, the existence of personality in others, the conscious ends of existence, the practical purposes of being—the moral, in a word, the practical, dissipated all such illusions, or thought of illusion, and recalled us to the real. For the sake of illustration, we may put our subject in this form: The phenomenal world may be nothing more than, or may be like, the illusions practised upon the subject of mesmeric experiment, or could be accounted for in some such manner. We may be the subjects of some such illusions; we may be practised on in the same way by some superior being; we may be the sport of some such deceptions; or, to put the matter in a serious light, such deceptions may be practised on us for wise and important purposes. We may be existing, and walking, and acting amid such dreams and phantoms, but personality at least was real; it refused to be reduced to an appearance; it would not be resolved into an illusion, into phantom; the personality of others was a reality; we could not mistake its existence; it made demands upon us which we could not put aside; it had claims which we could not resist; our moral relations, especially, could not be denied. This, then, carried, this granted—our own personality and the personality of others—why might there not be other existence besides personality? Why may not matter exist? Why may not those possible illusions, of which we may possibly be the subjects, be no illusions, after all, but veritable realities? Why may not the phenomenal world be actual? The consistent denier of material existence denies also spiritual. That there is a purely spiritual state of existence, where there are not at least the material conditions of being that now obtain, we believe; and that we can exist as persons, apart from such material conditions of being, is granted in the very supposition of such a state. But that is not the question. The question is, Have we any more assurance of personal existence than we have of phenomenal? Is spiritual existence any more a reality than material? Why should we have reality in the one, when we deny it in the other? or have we not the same laws of knowledge in the one case as in the

other? The pure idealist admits that there is no more certainty for the one than there is for the other; and a peculiar class of idealists reduce every cognition to the Me plus the object; that is, the object in no case exists but as there is the cognitive subject: the object is a cognition, and has its existence in thought in the first place; what is our certainty for its existence otherwise? Is it not obvious that for the reality of existence in every instance, we are thus reduced to the laws of knowledge, and the question just is, what are these laws? What are the conditions on which we have our knowledge? Have we knowledge? Are our ideas, are our convictions, anything more than ideas or convictions? Are we to take them as *knowledge*? Do we know the material world? Do we know phenomenal being? Do we know personal existence? Are the laws which reciprocate among these real, so that they may be known? Is the material universe a reality? Is there moral law and moral being? Is there spiritual law and spiritual being? These, it will be allowed, are no vain questions. They are not unimportant to determine. It is of the utmost consequence that we arrive at a satisfactory solution regarding them. It is not the existence of the material world alone that is dependent upon the answer to them. It is the validity of knowledge itself. It is, therefore, every vital question that again is dependent upon the validity of knowledge. Mansel, in the last resort, makes our knowledge of the Infinite—of the divine Being—purely *regulative*; it is not real; the divine Being cannot really be what we think of him as being; we think of him, by the laws of our constitution, *only as he would be thought of, not as he really is*; these laws are simply *regulative*. Revelation also makes known, not the real Deity—God as he is—but only as he himself would be conceived of. And yet, strangely enough, Mansel argues against those who represent the statements in Scripture regarding the acts and the attributes of God as “denoting correspondence in effects, but not similarity of causes.” Mansel says this “contains indeed a portion of the truth, but a portion which is sometimes treated as if it were the whole.”

“Does Scripture,” he says, “intend *merely* to assert a resemblance in the effects, and none at all in the causes? If so, it is difficult to see why the natural rule of accommodation should have been reversed; why a plain and intelligible statement concerning the divine acts should have been veiled under an obscure and mysterious image of the divine attributes. If God’s anger means no more than his infliction of punishments; if his love means no more than his bestowal of rewards, it would surely have been sufficient to have told us that God punishes sin and rewards obedience, without the interposition of a fictitious feeling as the basis of the relation. The con-

ception of a God who acts is at least as human as that of a God who feels ; and though both are but imperfect representations of the Infinite under finite images, yet, while both rest upon the same authority of Scripture, it is surely going beyond the limits of a just reserve in speaking of divine mysteries, to assume that the one is merely the symbol, and the other the interpretation. It is surely more reasonable, as well as more reverent, to believe that these partial representations of the divine Consciousness, though, as finite, they are unable speculatively to represent the absolute nature of God, have each of them a regulative purpose to fulfil in the training of the mind of man ; that there is a religious influence to be imparted to us by the thought of God's anger, no less than by that of his punishments ; by the thought of his love, no less than that of his benefits ; that both, inadequate and human as they are, *yet divinely indicate some corresponding reality in the divine nature* ; and that to merge one in the other is not to gain a purer representation of God as he is, but only to mutilate that under which he has been pleased to reveal himself."

Does not Mansel, then, hold that there is some reality in the divine nature corresponding to *our conceptions*, and to *God's own representations of himself* ? Can we part with the validity of our knowledge ? Can we allow it to be only regulative ? How far is it valid ? How far is it knowledge ? Let us see what are the conditions on which we hold it as knowledge.

And it may be enough at once to assert that, unless our whole existence and mental constitution be a lie, mind is a knowing, as it is an intelligent, subject ; that mind must know ; that its laws and processes exist for knowledge ; and that, whatever these laws and processes are, it is knowledge we arrive at, however imperfect, and however far short we may come at any time of what may be actually known. Mind knows. Its clear and distinct ideas, which besides come to us with all the conviction of reality, must be taken for reality, or as having their prototype in reality. Clearness and distinctness in our ideas were the tests of existence laid down by Descartes.

Accordingly, whatever may be made of objective existence—however it may be explained or accounted for—we cannot doubt that objective being does exist. We have not only an idea of it, but the idea comes to us with the conviction of existence. Our own consciousness is not accompanied with a more vivid feeling of reality. No "Theory of Knowing" will unsettle our convictions of that which we cognize as objective, as objective existence. No portioning of the share of existence, or our knowledge of existence, between the subject and the object, can alter our conviction of the reality of objective existence itself. A cognition may be the subject plus the object

there is at least the object. In the most ideal theory, the object is distinguished; is therefore, *pro tanto*, recognised. The objective world, therefore, exists.

But the objective world, in some of its phases, is material. There is a material world without us. This also we arrive at by the most certain laws of our constitution. How an immaterial substance can cognize a material; how sensation links on with our spiritual phenomena, and is a part of them, must ever remain a mystery. This gate that opens both ways, who does not admire? "How the immaterial can be united with matter," says Sir William Hamilton, "how the unextended can apprehend extension—how the indivisible can measure the divided—this is the mystery of mysteries to man." It is the peculiarity of our spiritual nature that it can see into the two worlds—the material and the spiritual—at the same time. Janus like, it looks into both regions at once. Or, in one blended cognition, it recognises, at the same moment, the material and the spiritual. How this is effected we may in vain labour to explain. We are afraid that Sir William Hamilton's theory—that our organism is at once a part of ourselves and not a part of ourselves, is at once within and without the mind, is at once subjective and objective—is more ingenious than satisfactory. The connection of the organism with the mind is no more nearly being explained than before. If Sir William Hamilton means that the mind is present at every part of the organism—as Sir William does maintain—is the connection of the organism with mind a whit more conceivable or intelligible than ever? We do not think it. Sensation as at once material and spiritual is the grand phenomenon. This double function of the mind, this twofold law or process, we may not explain. It refuses all explanation. But *through this process* there comes to us a knowledge of the material world. Matter is made known to us in this way.

Now, the question is, Is this *knowledge*, or is it *illusion*? What right have we to say that it is not knowledge? That the sensation is subjective, does not surely prove that it is not *sensation*, and accordingly a *mental state derivable from a material source*. Here Sir William Hamilton's theory may be of some use; it shews to us how the sensation is at once in the mind and in the organ, though it is as far as ever from enabling us to realize how the mind is in communication with the material or the outward.

Mind, then, is in communication with *Matter*; it informs us of a material world. Are we entitled to predicate illusion here? Are we warranted to affirm that the mind may be under some mistake or deception, may be practised on by appearance merely? Is it but a negative philosophy, after all,

that we arrive at? Is there no positive philosophy that we can attain to? The Positive Philosophy is in the laws of our constitution. What, again, is so firm, so stable, so permanent—so clear and distinct in our impressions or knowledge—cannot be an illusion. The Idealist has at least to account for the objective; and it will not do to resort to subjective laws in order to account for what is admitted to be objective in phenomenon. Every theory must explain in some way the existence of the objective. No theory can escape from this necessity. This is the entanglement of any possible theory of the mind, or of knowledge. It may be as good a theory as any, that there is an objective world—that there is a world of matter—that the mind is in communication with this external, this material world; but how it is in communication it may be impossible to say. The communication is certain, though the mode of it is hid from our knowledge, from our mental view.

This goodly frame of earth and heaven, these fair forms of creation, the empyrean stretching into sublimity above us, ocean in its majesty, the loveliness of the verdant year, the spangling stars of eve, the flowers of varying tint and pensile form, the many twinkling leaves of forest and woodland, the gorgeous light of day, the splendid drapery of clouds, the landscape of every hue and outline—

"Nature's charms, the hills and woods,
The sweeping vales, the foaming floods,"

—we shall believe that these are all real till a better philosophy has taught us they are all illusory.

There are certain principles of mind, or laws of belief, which in philosophic phrase are denominated "Intuitions," from which it is that we have the certainty of our knowledge, and, in fact, also the actual pabulum or material of our knowledge—always supposing sensation and consciousness the conditions of that acquisitive process by which our knowledge is obtained. From these "intuitions," or "laws of belief," we derive the knowledge of self or personality, of the external world, of matter, of mind; of space, time, and cause; of the great First Cause—the Absolute; and, we may add, the conviction of order, and the anticipation of uniformity, which are the grand principles of generalization and of science. We shall shew that these principles of mind furnish us with all the knowledge we possess or can acquire (apart from revelation), and allow of what we characterize or distinguish, in opposition to the sceptical and negative, as the Positive Philosophy.

Of what does our knowledge consist? What is our knowledge concerned about? Is it not about the personal self—the external world—mind and matter—substance, space, time

cause—the great First Cause—the laws and processes of nature—the phenomena of the universe? To this must be added, as also a part of our knowledge, the esthetic and moral judgments. All knowledge is reducible to these heads. If we connect with these the relations of identity and difference, resemblance, analogy, and proportion, we have the very categories of Aristotle. We have said that we possess this knowledge from intuition, or from the intuitions of the mind. These intuitions are nothing more than the constitution of the mind itself, or of our thinking being, imposing upon us certain convictions, which may be said to amount to knowledge, although some of the intuitions are more deliverances of the mind itself; others seem rather an authority put upon mind from without, than any judgments given in the mind from within. The conviction of personality and externality of space, time, and cause, with our esthetic and moral judgments, seem to be of the former description; while the ideas of substance, of matter, of spirit, such, at least, as we possess of these, seem rather to belong to the latter. But all agree in being immediate convictions of the mind, or the thinking self; for which we are indebted to no reasoning process, to nothing out of ourselves, except it be an authority imposed upon us by the author of our being.

We have thus the knowledge of *self*—the personal self. We know it in the very consciousness of thought. We are not conscious of self, but we are conscious of thought, and we have self intimated to us in that consciousness. The proposition is, "I think." In like manner we have the knowledge of the external world. We feel ourselves controlled, resisted; we feel our volitions counteracted, opposed. In this very consciousness we have externality.

Mind and *matter* are cognized. The conscious self is mind: the resisting something is matter; the sentient, voluntary self is mind: the controlling, counteracting agent is matter. Contemporaneous with the feeling of resistance are the other affections of sense, and these coalescing with the feeling of resistance, we have the one general impression or idea of matter. The knowledge of mind and matter, just as the knowledge of self and not self is obtained in the same act of thought, or unity of consciousness. The one includes the other, or each is the correlative of the other.

We have the notion of *substance*; we can hardly call that knowledge. It is knowledge, however, too, so far as it goes—as the knowledge of that in which qualities reside, or to which attribute pertains. There must always be some unity or substratum as the very condition of the existence of all modes, attributes, or qualities; at least so the mind conceives. It seems to be a necessity of thought that substance underlie

all attribute or quality. The very notion of quality or attribute is, that it is such and such, or that it is the distinguishing characteristic of some unity or substance, manifesting either. Hume, of course, repudiates the idea of substance, and Locke also seems to define substance as really nothing distinct from the collection of ideas which, in our conception, we are accustomed to regard in some way united as one. Sir William Hamilton says of such a view, that it is "altogether futile." "It belies the veracity of our primary beliefs; it leaves unsatisfied the strongest necessities of our intellectual nature; it admits as a fact that the phenomena are connected, but allows no cause explanatory of the fact of their connection."

We cognize *space*. It is the condition of all existence, at least material existence: while it is seen to be in itself necessary and universal. The notion of it immediately accompanies the perception of body, or it may be suggested to us by our own voluntary motions in space. We raise our arm, or we perform some voluntary act of motion, and perhaps the notion of space is inseparable from that act. The first conception of body must have involved in it this notion.

Time, in like manner, is cognized as necessary, and as the condition of all existence. Whatever exists must exist in time. We not only have a notion of time—we *know* it; it is a part of our consciousness, or it is in the very succession of our states of consciousness.

Again, we cognize *Power* or *Cause*. The idea is contained in the very nature of change. Change cannot take place without cause. Change leads along cause as in procession. When we observe change we observe cause. The notion was desecrated, perhaps, in the first dawning of consciousness. Power became manifest in the first awakening of mind or thought. Our notion of power is our knowledge of it. It is only when we attempt to define it that it becomes obscure. What can better give us the idea of it than the very term itself? This or that power, differing each from the other, is nevertheless power in the abstract, or it is this or that particular power. Power is not a non-entity, because it cannot be realised to the eye, or grasped by the hand. The senses are not the only avenues of knowledge. A thing may be known which is not known to the sense. Our ideas of things are our knowledge of them.

We thus rise to the Great First Cause. We cannot think of the causes which come under our observation as having their causality inherently in themselves. Our minds refuse to believe of any of the causes that we perceive, that they possess power inherently in themselves. There is nothing to indicate that their powers are underived, but everything to suggest that they have been created; bestowed. We have no feeling of absolute

ness, of independence, in our own case, and we cannot conceive of it in anything around us. We cannot be gods ourselves, and we refuse to believe that any of the agents that we observe are gods. The deification of the powers of nature was not so much the realisation of a divinity in the individual agency, as the realisation of a divinity in all agency. The ancient mythologists believed in a supreme divinity—the father of all the gods. We may as well put forth the claim of divinity for ourselves as for anything that we perceive. It is of the very nature of cause to be adequate only to its effect. A cause cannot produce itself, is not creative. The powers and forces in nature may propagate or may transmit themselves, but they do not create. The mind refuses to attach the idea of creation to any of the activities we see in operation. We conceive them as causes, as powers, as not simply terms in a chain of sequence, but still derived, not properly active, or having their energy in themselves. We do not adopt the view of Sir William Hamilton, that there can be no absolute commencement, and that everything that exists or operates in nature existed in some prior form, had a virtual existence before, and exhibits modification, change, but not causation. We believe the causes in nature to be possessed of real energy, but that energy is not self-derived. Thus we ascend to the First Cause, who had all energy in himself, who created all secondary causes, and from whom they still take, even while they operate independently. This is the belief forced upon us by the very constitution of our nature. It will not do to say that “we do not see causes, we but see effects.” We see cause in its effects. We cannot observe an effect or change without the conviction of cause. It is as impossible to believe in an effect simply, as a link, and no more than a link, in a chain of sequence, as to believe in consciousness without a conscious subject. The argument is perfectly conclusive from subordinate causation to the Great First Cause. The evidences of design around us are proof of a designing agent. They do not exhibit blank law where no intelligence reigns, where there has been no contrivance, and no contriver. It is not a Positive Philosophy in the sense of Auguste Comte that we argue for, or that we insist upon. The Positive Philosophy we contend for is certainty in our convictions, in the intuitions of our mental nature. Auguste Comte would contend that all the certainty that exists is in the regularity of *law*. There is no God, for all is fixed law, and the supposed proofs of intelligence are but the conditions of the agent or existence. But it is not only Auguste Comte that would ignore the proofs of a Deity from the evidences of design in the universe. This argument seems to be set aside by Mansel and by Hamilton. It is in the moral consciousness, according to them, that we have the evidence of a

God, or that we are led to believe in his existence. The two feelings of dependence and of moral obligation are, according to Mansel, the great source of this conviction. We have the theistic argument only in the mental phenomena and the moral consciousness. This seems a very dangerous position. We are safe, indeed, in arguing from the feeling of dependence and sense of moral obligation to the existence of a God, but not if the evidences of design in the universe are not conclusive to the same effect, are not proofs of a designing agent. May not the feeling of dependence have its root in the belief of a God arising from the evidences of design in nature, for if there were no such evidences, might we not well resign ourselves as chance units in the universe of being, and seek support from no source higher than ourselves and the creatures around us? Is it not the pervading and overspreading proof of the existence of a God, the intimate conviction of such a Being as is demonstrated to us in creation and in providence, that, with the feeling that we are not sufficient ourselves for our own happiness and welfare, leads us to cast our dependence upon that Being to whom all creation bears witness, to whom all nature testifies? The sense of moral obligation, too, it might be shewn, would have no existence did not the proofs of a moral Creator in the possession, by ourselves, of a moral nature engender the feeling. We think there was never a greater instance of paralogism than in this attempt to destroy the ordinary theistic argument, and to erect one on a supposed higher platform and securer basis. The way in which the theistic writers are set aside, Paley among the number, has, to our mind, somewhat of an air of superciliousness, and is extremely ungracious to writers to whom we are so much indebted. There seems something like the assumption of a superior sagacity and acumen, when all the sagacity is the other way, and all the acumen is a grand mistake. The theistic argument from design, from "nature up to nature's God," will maintain its hold upon the mind in spite of all such views, and will lose its hold only with the laws and consciousness of our being. It will assert its power while these laws and while that constitution continue what they are.

Another source of knowledge to which we have referred, is the intuition of uniformity, and the generalising process which is founded upon that. Hence science: all science proceeds upon that, is derived from that process. How vast the knowledge derived hence! How multiplied the sciences! How extensive the range of each! The conviction of uniformity gave to Newton the law of gravity. The principle on which the universe is upheld was unfolded. The same conviction in Cuvier's mind gave the science of geology to the world. Jussieu and De Candolle made the fine innovations upon Linnæus's classifications

from the same principle. Sir Humphrey Davy generalised the law of the safety-lamp. Franklin brought electricity from the clouds. Liebig has created the science of agricultural chemistry. The electric telegraph is a generalisation similar to that of Franklin's. Man can buttress the sea, or repel its invasions, from a generalisation of statics. Columbus was led to the discovery of America from the same grand law of mind. What limit can we set to the advances which science will make, as there is hardly a limit to those it has already made? In all departments does this principle secure its triumphs. It is achieving its conquests in mental, as well as in physical science—in the political and economical sciences—in ethnological, in social, science. Has not the last grown into vast importance of late? Is it not but a number of important generalisations connected with social existence, and made upon the physical, and mental, and moral nature of man? Now, what we assert is that it is *knowledge* that we have in all this, in these intuitions of the mind, and in the sciences to which they lead. True, ultimately it is faith, but it is faith grounded in mind. What would the faith be worth if it had not its ground in mind, in the very intuitions to which we have referred, perhaps in the very nature of intelligence, to conceive divisibility. We are inclined to regard the law of our own intelligence as the law of all intelligence—to believe that in respect to those intuitions which we have briefly described mind cannot think otherwise—that all mind cognises in the same way what is within the scope of pure mind, and that if senses were accorded to other spiritual beings such as we have, they would cognise in the same way what would come within their range. Our intellectual nature is not a provisional apparatus, or constitutional arrangement for effecting certain purposes, but it is a real source of knowledge, a principle of intelligence, by which we know, and believe, and think, not arbitrarily, but certainly, not according to an arrangement, or constitution merely, but essentially and necessarily. We thus arrive at knowledge, and not a hap-hazard faith, not merely regulative laws, but truth and reality.

The esthetic and moral judgments also must be regarded as real, as true, and not simply as constituted, and regulative. It is to contend for a moral nature, and deny it at the same time, to admit that we are possessed of such a nature, that there is an immutable morality binding upon us, that the moral judgments partake of an *a priori* character, and yet to allege that the moral, the one law of right, can be affected by, and only co-extensive with, the law of human intelligence, and the conditions of human existence. The moral judgment is very different from the necessary judgments of space and time. The

latter may so far depend upon the special relations of particular being to these conditions of experience, although, abstractly considered, we may fairly challenge the judgments of universal intelligence in reference to the abstract relations of these modes of thought. We can transcend human intelligence, and maintain the relations of space and time to be necessary and universal. Human intelligence is not the standard or measure of these relations: they would be the same to all intelligence, if appreciable, or appreciated at all. And so with moral relations. They may be affected by the conditions of being, to the extent of being modified by the circumstances in which the particular relations emerge, but the relations themselves, and in their moral character, are not affected thereby, but are immutable and universal. Grant a moral relation, and while special according to the special circumstances in which it evolves, it is yet, as a moral relation, universal and immutable, has a universal character, though of special obligation in the particular case. It is thus that precepts of the Decalogue that can apply only to man, that can be promulgated in a system of legislation applicable only to the human race, are yet emphatically the law of God, because they possess essentially a moral character, involve a moral relation, and belong to the universal law of right. It is certainly a strange theory to hold, that there is an "absolute morality based upon, or rather identical with, the eternal nature of God," but that "what that absolute morality is we are as unable to fix in any human conception as we are to define the other attributes of the same divine nature." This is very different from the royal Psalmist's estimate of the divine righteousness, of the moral law, for it was the moral law he was contemplating: "*Thy* righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and *thy* law is the *truth*."

It is singular how Mansel's views vacillate between what is imposed in thought by the idea of the infinite and the absolute, in the etymological sense of these terms, and the divine Being as accommodated, and accommodating himself, to us, in personal relations with us, and possessing, in some inconceivable manner, the same laws of intelligence, and modes of existence, spiritual and moral, with ourselves. This arises from not steadily keeping in view that God cannot be the absolute or infinite in any mere verbal acceptance of these terms, so that the argument is conducted from that very point of view, while, again, the same estimates are formed of him, and judgments regarding him, as if he were not absolute or infinite in any such verbal sense. The etymological application of these terms should have been at once discarded, as inapplicable, and the infinite in the sense of unlimited (which after all is the real meaning of the word), to which we can set no bounds, and of which we can but vaguely

conceive, and the absolute, in the sense of independent—independent of all *necessary* conditions or relations—should alone have been regarded, and those contradictions and complications would not have emerged which are so confounding and perplexing. The absolute morality of an absolute being would have had no existence, for such a being, on Mansel's own shewing, can have no existence; and the idea would not have been ventured that the divine Being may suspend the laws of human duty, or morality, without being chargeable with violating the immutable principles of morality itself. Such a view Mansel holds, and it is but following out his own argument, in its legitimate consequences. To be bound by a law, even a moral law, Mansel maintains is itself a limitation, and is therefore not to be thought of in the case of the infinite. There is some higher morality applicable to him. His own law is not a law to himself: he has modes of regarding it which we cannot have; and in this way all those acts, recorded in the divine word, to which the infidel may take exception, and the profane may make the subject of their profane or ribald jest, may be vindicated and explained. An absolute morality is no morality, if such be its nature, and if such be its consequences. But the moral judgments do not partake of this variable character. How different was Kant's view, albeit inconsistent with his critical philosophy!

The esthetic judgments we need not enlarge upon. It might be shewn that they partake, also, of a necessary and immutable character, are not an effect of creation, or the result of a constitution, are not regulative merely, but universal and eternal.

Have we not then a positive philosophy? Shall we bind scepticism about us and hold the language, that there is nothing we can believe, and nothing we can know? Shall the mystery of existence—of that unity to which we must go up in the case of all existence—of its relation to plural phenomena—the inheritance of this plurality in unity—the one and the many—the infinite and the finite—substance and accident—mind and its attributes—matter and its qualities; shall the incomprehensible thought, but not impossible, of the boundless infinite—the unlimited in space, time, and power; shall our inability to conceive either an absolute minimum, or infinite divisibility—subordinate causation—derived and ever deriving—infinite morality:—shall the mystery, or inconceivability, in all these cases deprive us of a positive philosophy, and drive us upon faith alone? Faith! what is faith in such a case? Is it not as impossible as *knowledge*?

Are we not conscious of unity and plurality in ourselves?—do we not see unity and plurality in matter? Can we not distinguish between matter and mind? May we not

" feel this mind of ours
In a wise passiveness?"

Have we not ideas, although these must always imply an object in a mysterious correlation with a subject? Are we not conscious of space although we cannot tell how it is generated, or how it can exist without a commencement? Is time not given in consciousness, although the same mystery—viz., of an absolute commencement or an infinite non-commencement—attaches to this idea as to the former? Are we not conscious of power, although it may slumber, and be evoked at any moment at our wills? Do we not exhibit the phenomenon of voluntary choice, of will, although we may not be able to see how this can consist with the immutable volitions or purposes of the absolute will? Do we not observe subordinate causation? Have we not an intuition of the infinite, of the absolute, in which all being is held, and on which all being is dependent? Are our moral intuitions the less real, that they seem to conflict with absolute morality? Is absolute morality independent of moral law?

It is consoling to think, that, if the divine Being must be in some sense absolute, he is not so absolute, but that he can be also not unconditioned, but conditioned to our personal relations with him, conditioned to our temporal exigencies, in providence, and to our spiritual exigencies, in redemption.

ART. III.—*Annals of the American Pulpit.**

Annals of the American Pulpit (Methodist). By WILLIAM B. SPRAGUE, D.D.
Vol. VII. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1859.

WHEN the first two volumes of this work appeared, we were delighted to find that it was to be published serially. The task which Dr Sprague had undertaken seemed to be so immense, that, though we knew he was a man of no ordinary powers, we had serious fears of his being able to complete it, unless he should reach fourscore, and retain his mental and physical force unabated. We are both surprised and gratified, when we think of the rapidity with which these stately volumes have followed each other; and all the more, when we consider the important charge which the author fills, the rare diligence with which the various duties connected with it are discharged, and the other productions of his affluent and graceful pen. His many friends, we are sure, will join us in cordially congratulating him on the

* This article appeared in the July number of the *Princeton Review*.—ED.
B. & F. E. R.

appearance of the volume before us, which, in any point of view, will compare with those which have preceded it, and in our earnest desire and prayer that he may be spared to complete these *Annals of the American Pulpit*.

We cannot help feeling peculiar satisfaction when we reflect that a work so truly national in character, and so thoroughly catholic in spirit, was planned, and thus far has been so successfully executed by a minister of our own church. Dr Sprague has indeed laid all the branches of the evangelical church of our country under great obligations, by his record of the lives and labours of the noble men who have adorned their pulpits, and are now gone to their reward and rest; but he has a special claim on the grateful regards of his own, by this important addition to our Christian biographical literature.

Our previous notices of the earlier volumes of the *Annals*, will have made our readers sufficiently acquainted with their plan. We need, therefore, only to say, that it is continued in the portion of them now before us, except on one point to which the author himself adverts in the Preface. "The work," he says, "is not limited to the Methodist Episcopal Church, but includes a representation from the three most prominent bodies that have successively seceded from it." In adopting this rule, the author we think has acted wisely, and we beg to add, that we rather regret that it could not have been applied to the Congregational and Presbyterian parts of the series.

The number of Memoirs in this volume is one hundred and eighty-one, while the letters, illustrative and commemorative, appended to them, amount to two hundred and fifty-eight. Of course, most of those who have contributed their reminiscences are members of the Methodist Church, and among them are very many of the most eminent living (or lately living) ornaments of the denomination, viz., Bishops Morris, Janes, Baker, Kavanagh, Andrews; Doctors Bangs, Deems, Holdich, J. T. Peck, G. Peck, M'Clintock, Clark, Luckey, Sargent, and Stockton. There are no less than ten letters from the pen of that exemplary Christian patriot and judge, who for so many years adorned the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, and who has recently gone to his rest, the late Hon. John M'Lean of Ohio. The large number of his contributions shews how lively an interest he took in the success of this enterprise, and how ready he was, even amid his engrossing and responsible public duties, to help it forward. But the list of those who, in this way, lent it their aid, also includes the names of honoured brethren belonging to other sections of the church, among whom are Doctors Mathews, Bethune, Murray, J. N. Campbell, Pinney, Bates, Hall, and Ludlow. Of these, too, as of their Methodist co-labourers, there is occasion to say, "some are fallen asleep."

With reference to the subjects of the Memoirs, it is hardly necessary to state that the catalogue of them contains all the most illustrious names to be found in the annals of American Methodism; not a few of them being the names of men who have done honour to our common Christianity; men of whom any church might well be proud, or we should rather say, profoundly grateful for the gifts and grace of God in them. The list begins with Philip Embury, and ends with J. N. Maffit, and it includes the names of nearly, if not quite, all the pioneers of Methodism, all the departed bishops of the church, all its renowned orators, and a great many less known worthies, whose memory has been happily and deservedly rescued from oblivion. Indeed, as we have gone through these Annals, the well-known lines of Gray have been repeatedly called to mind, as we have read the brief histories of men whose names we had never heard of, but who, if the accounts given of them by those who were well acquainted with them were to be relied upon, might fitly be called children of genius, as well as ministers of God.

Two of them occur to us, who were contemporaries, one of them a Carolinian, the other a New Englander, both of them refined Christian gentlemen as well as preachers, and both of them subjected to personal outrages which now seem almost incredible. The first was George Dougherty. He was once asked to preach by the Rev. Dr Flinn, one of the most eminent Presbyterian ministers of his day in Charleston. Courtesy had obliged him to tender the invitation to his Methodist brother, who was a total stranger to him, and he had a good deal of misgiving as to the result, for Mr Dougherty was a person of most unpromising visage, tall, lean, awkward, and clothed in very mean apparel. When he began his sermon, Dr Flinn fixed his eyes upon the floor so that he might not see the ungainly form in the pulpit; but, "in fifteen minutes," said he, "I found myself not only straightened into an erect posture, but absolutely enchained by a burst of eloquence, a mellow blaze of rich thought, as rare as it was overwhelming; and to this day my recollection of George Dougherty places him in the very front rank of American preachers. He filled my ideal of an able minister of the New Testament." This is high praise, by a competent and unprejudiced judge. And yet this man, endowed with gifts and graces so rare, was attacked by a mob in the city of Charleston, and was kept "under the pump" so long as to endanger his life, simply because he was a Methodist preacher. His ministerial career was as brief as it was brilliant—from 1798 to 1807.

The other was Elijah Robinson Sabine, whose ministry, extending from 1799 to 1818, was exercised in eastern New England. Two years of it were spent in Boston, and, while there,

such men as Dr Eckley, and his colleague, Mr Huntington of the Old South, Dr Lathrop of the Old North, Dr Baldwin of the Baptist, maintained with him the most intimate relations, and held him in the highest esteem. Unlike his southern brother, Mr Sabine was physically a person of commanding presence, but of a temper gentle, sensitive, high-toned. On the score of personal indignity, however, though their fields of labour were so wide apart, their experience was similar. Mr Sabine was once felled to the floor with the butt-end of a whip while preaching; at another time he was waylaid; at another he was surrounded by a rabble, blowing horns and trumpets; at another he was silenced by drum and fife; and at another was prevented from performing his service by the shouts and epithets of a raging mob. It should be observed that none of these disgraceful scenes occurred in Boston. It is strange that such barbarians could have been found in any part of New England. The person so roughly handled was not a half-crazy or eccentric fanatic, nor a rude enthusiast, but a refined scholar, and a preacher of consummate eloquence.

As many of our readers probably have an imperfect knowledge of the wide field from which Dr Sprague has gathered the materials of his interesting volume, a hasty survey of its history and internal condition may not prove displeasing to them. It is a question still undecided whether the first Methodist church in America was founded by Mr Embury at New York in 1766, or by Mr Strawbridge in Maryland in 1764. Some favour one date, some the other. Whichever be adopted, the first century of American Methodism is not yet completed. and yet, at the present moment, there is not a State within the Union which does not contain numerous Methodist societies; nay, it would be difficult to name a single considerable town which has not one or more of them. This is a marvellous growth, especially when we take into account the obstacles that impeded it during its earlier stages, and the fact that it has been so entirely indigenous. During the period reaching from 1764 to 1776, Methodism appears to have gained considerable strength in some of the southern colonies. But when the tie which had bound them to Britain was violently sundered, and the war of the Revolution was seen to be inevitable, the most zealous and efficient evangelists of the new sect were seriously crippled by suspicion of their toryism. With few exceptions, they were Englishmen; most of them abandoned the field and returned to England; and even those who, like Asbury, sympathised with the colonies, and stood their ground, being non-jurors, *i. e.*, unwilling formally to renounce their allegiance to the king, were repeatedly arrested and imprisoned. Mr Wes-

ley's *Calm Address to the American Colonies*,* in which he maintained the absolute right of Parliament to tax the colonies, with or without their consent, was well fitted to deepen the popular feeling against his societies; and if his influence over them had been as great in political as in religious matters, the subsequent fortunes of American Methodism might have been widely different from what they were.

On the other hand, this growth has been mainly indigenous, unlike that of the German and Scottish churches; for example, it has never been materially quickened by emigration. England was the only country from whence it could receive nutriment in this mode; and Wesleyanism was working its way there, in the face of bitter opposition, just as Methodism was advancing in America, and among classes of people little inclined to quit the land of their birth.

Two years after the war of the Revolution had closed, 1784-5, the number of ministers was eighty-three, and of members about fifteen thousand. Up to this time, the Methodist preachers had been considered merely as lay-preachers, with no authority to administer ordinances. Their congregations were societies rather than churches, and their members were consequently dependent upon ministers of other communions for the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's Supper. In England, the inconvenience resulting from this state of things was of small account, as the "societies" were, in a certain sense, pen-dicles of the Established church, of which Mr Wesley was a member. But in this country it was very different, after the recognition of our Independence. It then became perfectly evident that Methodism must assume the form and functions of a church, or come to a speedy end. An earnest appeal was accordingly made to Mr Wesley, and after some demur on his part, on the 2d of September 1784, he consecrated Dr Thomas Coke, a presbyter of the Church of England, as Superintendent of the American Societies, and ordained Messrs Richard Whatcoat and Thomas Vesey as elders. These three brethren he sent to America, with instructions to organise the societies into a church after a model framed by himself. Soon after their arrival, 25th of December 1784, a Conference was held at Baltimore, by which the plan of Mr Wesley was unanimously adopted—Dr Coke was recognised as superintendent; Mr Asbury was elected to the same office; twelve other preachers were ordained as deacons and elders, and three to the order of deacon only. Mr Wesley had also sent an abridged form of the Book of Common Prayer, including twenty-five Articles of Religion, and various rules, suited to a new church, all of which

* *Miscellaneous Works*, iii. 180.

were adopted by the Conference. This, therefore, may be regarded as the date of the organization of the Methodist Church in the United States. It went forth to its "work"—to use a Methodist word—with all the fresh, hopeful energy of youth, and speedily it began to gather large numbers into its fellowship.

The first General Conference was held at Baltimore in November 1792, and its proceedings occasioned the first schism in the newly organised denomination. At the head of the secession was James O'Kelly, a presiding elder in Virginia, the ground of it being the dissatisfaction felt by himself and others with the absolute power of the bishops in stationing the preachers. This schism appears to have been confined to certain parts of Virginia and North Carolina, and never gained much strength. The party gradually dwindled, and ultimately ceased to exist.

The next division in the ranks of American Methodism occurred in 1830. It grew out of the question of lay representation, in what we would call the judicatories of the church, which began to be warmly discussed about the year 1824. During the ensuing six years, vigorous efforts were made by a considerable number of individuals, some of whom were among the most prominent in the body, to bring about what they deemed to be a fundamental reform in the polity of the church, *i. e.*, to give the lay membership their due weight in her local and other conferences. The dispute waxed so earnest, that the leaders in this movement were expelled from the main body, and, in conjunction with others who seceded from it, established a new society, under the name of the *Methodist Protestant Church*. No change was made in the doctrinal articles, as held by the old church, nor in the form of government, except the abolition of the episcopacy, and the introduction of the lay element into the General and Quarterly Conferences. It began in 1830 with eighty-three ministers and about five thousand members; in 1858 there were two thousand stationed ministers, twelve hundred churches, and ninety thousand members.

Another secession occurred in 1843, which took the name of the *Methodist Wesleyan Connection*. It was caused by differences of opinion respecting church government, slavery, and total abstinence from intoxicating drinks. The new body was organised at a General Convention of dissatisfied Methodists, held at Utica, N. Y., in May 1843. All who buy or sell men and women as slaves, or who claim that it is right so to do, all who make, buy and sell, or use, or knowingly aid others in the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, except for mechanical or medicinal purposes, are excluded from church fellowship. This body is the most democratic section of Methodism, each church having power to act for itself, while its several conferences consist of an equal number of ministers and laymen.

In 1858, there were three hundred preachers, and twenty thousand members, reported as in the connection. It has also two colleges under its control, viz., Michigan Union College, and the Illinois Institute.*

The Methodist Episcopal Church, in 1845, was split into two grand sections, one of which has been since, and is now known as the Methodist Episcopal Church *South*. Of course, the sole cause of this division was slavery. The immediate occasion of it was the passage, by the General Conference of that year, of some moderate resolutions designed to keep the episcopacy free of slavery. Up to this time no bishop had held slaves, though some of them were Southern by birth and residence. In 1844, the fact that one of the bishops, the Rev. Dr Andrew of Georgia, had become by marriage the owner of slaves, was brought to the notice of the General Conference, and after a protracted debate, it was resolved that he should desist from exercising the functions of his office so long as he was thus connected with slavery. The result of this action, as already intimated, was that thirteen of the annual Conferences in the South and South-west, withdrew and formed a new organization under the name of the *Methodist Episcopal Church South*.

Previous to this division, the Methodist Episcopal Church had seven bishops, forty conferences, four thousand and four hundred and seventy-nine travelling preachers, eight thousand and one hundred local preachers, and one million, one hundred and thirty-nine thousand, five hundred and eighty members. In 1860, it had six bishops, fifty-one Annual Conferences, six thousand nine hundred and eighty-seven travelling preachers, eight thousand one hundred and eight local preachers, nine thousand seven hundred and fifty-four churches, and nine hundred and ninety-four thousand four hundred and forty seven members.

The Southern church now numbers twenty-four Annual Conferences, two thousand six hundred and sixty-seven travelling preachers, including six bishops; over five thousand local preachers, and seven hundred and twenty thousand members, white, negro, and Indian.

The government of both branches of the Methodist Church is, as the name indicates, Episcopal, and as many of our readers are unfamiliar with its several parts, we append a summary account of it, derived from the Historical Introduction prefixed to this volume. The *society* consists of all the church members in a particular locality. The *class* originally contained twelve

* There is a striking analogy between the history of Methodism and that of Scottish Presbyterianism. Both have been split into parties strongly opposed to each other. Both are very familiar with secession, but the cause of these divisions have been simply points of discipline, and not articles of doctrine.

persons, but now is often much larger. It is under the care of a *class-leader*, who meets with it once a week for religious purposes, and who also gathers what each individual is willing to give for the support of the church. The *stewards* have charge of the fund collected for the maintenance of the ministry and the poor, and disburse it according as the discipline directs. The *trustees* hold the real estate and the church edifice, and are elected by the people in such manner as the statutes of the states, or the discipline provide. *Exhorters* are licensed by the quarterly meeting, and are authorised to hold meetings for exhortation and prayer. A *local preacher* usually follows some secular calling, and preaches without compensation, except when filling the place of the *travelling preacher*, who is devoted to the work of the ministry, and is supported, like any other pastor, by the people. A *supernumerary preacher* is one disabled for effective service, but who still has an appointment, and labours according to his ability. A *superannuated preacher* is one disabled by feeble health, or by old age, from effective duty. A *deacon* is ordained by a bishop, and has authority to preach, baptize, and assist the elder or travelling preacher in administering the Lord's Supper, and to perform the rite of marriage. A *presiding elder* is appointed by the bishop, and has charge of a district containing several circuits and stations. It is his duty to visit each of these circuits once a quarter, to preach, and to preside in the quarterly conference, which is composed of all the preachers, local and travelling, the exhorters, stewards, and class-leaders of his district. A *bishop* is elected by the General Conference, and is consecrated to office by three bishops, or by one bishop and two or more elders, or if there be no bishop living, by any three elders designated for the service. He, however, has no defined diocese, but travels through "the work" at large, superintends the affairs of the church, temporal and spiritual, presides in the Annual Conferences, ordains such persons as may be elected by these conferences to the order of deacons or elders, and appoints the preachers to their respective charges. For his official conduct he is responsible to the General Conference alone. A *leader's meeting* consists of the class leaders and the stewards of a circuit, and is presided over by the preacher in charge. Here the weekly collections of the classes are paid to the stewards, inquiry is made into the state of the classes, the sick, the poor, and delinquents are reported. A *quarterly-meeting conference* is composed of all the local and travelling preachers, exhorters, stewards, and class-leaders, within a given district. It is presided over by the presiding elder; exhorters and local preachers are licensed by it; and suitable persons are nominated by it to the office of deacon or elder. It also hears appeals of individual church.

members from the decisions of committees by whom they have been tried for any delinquency. The *annual conference* consists of all the travelling preachers, deacons, and elders, within a state or other large territory. It examines, each year, into the character of the travelling preacher; admits or continues on trial applicants to be received into the travelling connection; hears appeals of local preachers, and names those who are to be ordained elders and deacons. It, therefore, has original jurisdiction over all its members, and may try, acquit, suspend, or expel him, according to the discipline. The *general conference* is a delegated body, its members being chosen by the Annual Conferences. It is the highest judicatory of the church, and meets once in four years.

Such, then, is the interior economy of the field—if we may use the expression—over which the author of this volume has travelled, undeterred by its immensity and the manifold difficulties incident to his enterprise, that he might garner and preserve the fast-decaying memorials of the sainted dead. As we have before intimated, he has succeeded in saving from forgetfulness the names of a great multitude of faithful heralds of the cross, the story of whose toils and sufferings, unquenchable zeal, unwearied labours, and singular success, may well be read and pondered by those who are reaping a rich harvest from the seed sown by them. For our Methodist brethren this volume will, of course, have a special interest, as it has a special claim upon their regards; but it abounds with incidents pregnant with lessons which may be profitably studied by ministers of every name, who would learn how to “endure hardness as good soldiers of Jesus Christ.” The first generation of Methodist ministers was composed of men any one of whom almost might be taken as an example of some of the noblest qualities of the evangelist. Bishop Asbury, for instance, was an Englishman by birth and education. If he had followed the example of most of his fellow-labourers when the Revolution began, he would unquestionably have become a Wesleyan of mark and influence in his native land. But he resolved to stay in the struggling colonies, and watch over the infant societies, at the certain cost of great trials and sacrifices. At one of the gloomiest periods of our national history, 1785-7, he projected a literary institution in Maryland; but which, after having been twice burnt to the ground, was abandoned, the disheartened Asbury mournfully exclaiming, “I feel convinced that our call is not to build colleges.”

For forty-five years this indefatigable pioneer of Methodism may be said to have lived in the saddle and the pulpit. In 1812, when seventy-one years old, he presided over nine Conferences, was present at ten camp-meetings, travelled six

thousand miles, preaching almost daily, although his physical system was so feeble, often so utterly prostrated, that his friends were compelled to lift him into and out of his carriage. His last sermon was preached, from Rom. ix. 28, on Sunday, the 24th of March 1816; and seven days afterwards he entered into rest. He was never married, and in his journal, 26th of January 1804, he thus explains how it happened: "If I should die in celibacy, which I think quite probable, I give the following reasons for what can scarcely be my choice:—At twenty-one I travelled, and at twenty-six I came to America. Thus far I had reasons enough for a single life. At thirty-nine I was ordained Superintendent Bishop in America. Among the duties imposed upon me by my office was that of travelling extensively; and I could hardly find a woman with grace enough to enable her to live but one week out of fifty-two with her husband. Besides, what right has any man to take advantage of the affections of a woman, make her his wife, and, by a voluntary absence, subvert the whole order of the married state, by separating those whom neither God nor nature permit long to be put asunder?" From the reminiscences of those who knew Bishop Asbury, it appears that he was a man for whom domestic life would have had peculiar charms; yet, for the sake of "the work," he denied himself these in every form in which he might have enjoyed them.

But the man who strikes us as the most remarkable among the pioneers of American Methodism is Dr Thomas Coke,—a name second only to that of the venerable founder of the denomination. "He was," says Mr Thacher, "one of the finest models of the Christian gentleman whom I remember ever to have met with. His voice was melody itself, and his whole manner was bland and attractive." Coke, like Wesley, was a scholar of Oxford, an ordained clergyman of the Church of England, and for several years prior to his connection with the Wesleyan movement he had ministered at her altars as curate of Petherton. He came to America in 1784, with a commission from Mr Wesley to organise the societies in this country into a distinct and independent body. He was unanimously accepted as General Superintendent; and having accomplished the immediate design of his mission, he made an extensive tour through the United States, and, in conjunction with his colleague, Mr Asbury, he laid the foundation of the first Methodist college that was ever established in this or any other land. As an Englishman, he naturally felt a warm sympathy for those unfortunate colonists whose adherence to the royal cause had obliged them to seek new homes in the inhospitable regions of Nova Scotia; and under the influence of this feeling he returned to England, with a special view to awaken an interest

on their behalf. Having secured three missionaries, in October 1786, he embarked for Nova Scotia, in a ship commanded by a captain who proved to be a very brutal fellow; and after encountering a succession of terrific gales, which drove them far from their course, they landed on the island of Antigua. Brought thus providentially to the West Indies, Coke at once addressed himself to an inspection of the field which had been so unexpectedly opened to him, and spent many months in going from island to island. He reached Charleston, South Carolina, the 28th of February 1787; and after a short stay in that city, where he had excited some animosity against himself, during his previous visit, by his free opinions regarding slavery, but which in the interval seems to have died away, he travelled northward to Philadelphia, preached his farewell sermon, and set sail for England, in the hope of meeting the British Conference, which he was happily enabled to do.

The limits of this article will not allow us to follow Bishop Coke through the perpetual journeyings, by land and sea, which occupied the remainder of his busy life. If not incessantly in motion, he was constantly at work, "stooping to the very drudgery of charity, and gratuitously pleading the cause of a perishing world from door to door." He made eighteen passages across the Atlantic; and at last, when he had finished his course, he found a grave in the middle of the Indian ocean. In 1805, he called upon a Miss Smith of Bristol, a lady of large fortune and eminent piety, and asked from her a donation for the cause of missions. She not only gave him her money, but her hand. They were married in April of that year; but even domestic life could not charm him into inactivity. His heart seems to have been specially set upon carrying the gospel to regions where Christ had not been preached; and, in the words of Adam Clark, "the convulsive effort which terminated his days was a missionary exertion to carry the gospel to the heathen." In 1814, though in his sixty-ninth year, he planned a mission to India, to be established by himself and seven brethren, who had volunteered to accompany him, and generously offered to bear the whole expense of their outfit, amounting to £6000. The company sailed from Portsmouth, but the venerable evangelist entered into his rest before the voyage was ended. He died suddenly at sea, May 3. 1814; and, as we have before said, his grave is in the middle of the Indian ocean. It is proper for us to add, that Dr Coke's pen was as active as his tongue. He was, in fact, a voluminous author; and we wonder how a man living such a life could write so much and write so well.

Asbury and Coke are historical names, known and honoured far beyond the limits of the sect which they did so much to

establish ; but there are others that might also be styled historical, although their fame has been confined within the bounds of their own denomination. In Methodist circles, the names of Freeborn Garretson, Jesse Lee, Ezekiel Cooper, William M'Kendree, Enoch George, and other departed worthies, are "familiar as household words ;" and richly do they deserve to be thus embalmed for their labours of love. We would gladly draw upon the annals for incidents illustrative of their personal characters, of the fields they cultivated, and their various achievements, but we must quit the tempting theme.

The origin and progress of Wesleyan Methodism form the staple of one of the most remarkable chapters in the history of the church since the Reformation. They illustrate and confirm the doctrine of divine providence as we hold it, but which many of our Methodist brethren are hardly willing to accept, viz., God's powerful preserving and governing all his creatures and all their actions. The half-dozen Oxonians who used to meet in Lincoln College for prayer and conference, and whose methodical piety rendered them "a peculiar people" in the University, little dreamed of the immense harvest that should grow from the handful of corn planted by themselves on the top of the mountain in the arctic zone of Oxford. If they could have anticipated that they were preparing the way for the birth of a new sect, it is quite probable that their prejudices as Anglican churchmen would have been greatly shocked, and that they would have promptly abandoned those methods of religious culture and of active benevolence which contained the seeds of schism. But, as usual, God led them by a way which they knew not, the outgate of which they could not see. They originated a religious movement which some of them afterwards would have gladly stopped ; but this was beyond the power of man to accomplish, for the hand of the Lord was in it.

At the time when the new sect was born, the Reformed Church in nearly all her branches, in Europe and America, had sunk into a state of great spiritual deadness. The intense excitement in regard to religious matters awakened by the Reformation, and perpetuated in England by the struggles of the Puritan and the Nonconformist for freedom of conscience and purity of worship, was succeeded by, if it did not itself produce, a sort of reaction not unlike the *ennui* that follows some extraordinary physical or mental exertion. Such undoubtedly was the case of the British churches. In the Church of Scotland those influences were at work which culminated in the dreary reign of Moderatism. Among the fifteen or eighteen thousand clergymen of the English establishment, Mr Romaine of London, a contemporary of the Wesleys, declared that at the beginning of his ministry he could not count twenty faithful

preachers of the gospel. The parsons Trulliber and Jolter of fiction were, in truth, the representatives of multitudes who in that age ministered at the altars of the Anglican Church. Episcopalians themselves, Tractarians even, have confessed that the spiritual condition of that church during the greater part of the eighteenth century was fearful. Indeed, one of the most dismal pictures of the period that we remember to have seen will be found in one of the Tracts for the Times. Among the Dissenters, too, there were signs of spiritual declension. The once glorious Presbyterian Church of England had not only lost her ancient fervour, but opened her doors for the admission of the deadly heresy which denies the Lord that bought us.

No man knew better than Mr Wesley himself how profound was the ignorance, how deep was the moral degradation, of the masses of the English people, and how intense was the hatred which dignitaries and curates, lords and squires, with few exceptions, felt for the gospel of Christ and for living religion. There was not a county in England which he did not visit, bearing the glad tidings of redemption; and there was not a county in which he did not encounter the heathenism of the lower classes and the hatred of the higher. But nothing could induce him to set up the standard of schism, or to become a seceder from the Church of England, into whose holy orders he had been admitted. The earnest desire of his heart was to maintain his loyalty to her; while he was attempting to accomplish a work to which he was sure his Lord had called him, but which she either would not or could not perform. Mr Wesley was too keen witted not to perceive and appreciate the opportunity afforded of becoming the founder of a new denomination. He had, in a pre-eminent degree, the very gifts that qualify a man for such an enterprise. He did ultimately occupy that position; but we deem it due to him to say, that it was rather forced upon him than sought by him. If the Lavingtons, Warburtons, Hurds, Louths, and other occupants of the episcopal bench, had comprehended the wants of their times, and had reciprocated the spirit which Mr Wesley evinced to his dying day, how different had been the subsequent history of Methodism and of the Church of England. But, instead of sympathy, he met only the most determined hostility; while he was striving with all his might to keep his "societies" within the bosom and under the guardianship of his mother church, her lordly dignitaries were labouring pertinaciously to drive him and them from her pale. And so Wesleyan Methodism became, what it is now, one of the recognised churches of evangelical Christendom.

Though its origin is comparatively so recent, it has long been one of the most numerous and powerful of Protestant

denominations. To what cause is this surprising growth to be ascribed? In one view the question admits of an easy answer. It is the Lord's doing. He had a great work to accomplish, the work of reviving a declining church; of rousing professing Christians from the spiritual lethargy into which they had sunk; of conveying life and grace to the thousands of heathen within the limits of Christendom; and he called and qualified the instruments needed to attain these ends. But the inquiry may still be made into the special means and agencies by which these ends were effected. In other words, what gave to Methodism its peculiar power? What was it that enabled Wesley, Asbury, Coke, Lee, M'Kendree, and their compeers, to win such glorious spiritual triumphs?

Our Methodist friends doubtless will say that this result is to be attributed to their emancipation, or their freedom from the trammels of Calvinism. We have reason to believe that not a few of those good old Methodist preachers, who are now with the saints made perfect, were very much given—much more, we think, than most of those who are now prosecuting their “work”—to denouncing certain “horrible dogmas of the Presbyterian Confession,” such as election, perseverance of the saints, irresistible grace, &c. They gloried in their Arminianism. But for all that, we make bold to affirm that the spiritual power which their ministry unquestionably possessed, was derived from the earnestness, the plainness, the unction with which they proclaimed the essential doctrines of that very Calvinism which they so frequently and vigorously vituperated. Man's ruin by the fall, his native depravity and alienation from God, his absolute need of a Saviour, and utter inability to save himself, the necessity of regeneration by the Holy Spirit, justification, not by works, but by faith alone in the blood and righteousness of Jesus, the free offer of salvation to every human being without money and without price, the necessity of holiness, not to merit heaven, but to become meet for it—these articles constituted the very burden of their preaching. And in every really Calvinistic pulpit that ever existed, or is now to be found on the face of the earth, these are the precious truths that have been and are preached every Sabbath-day. We honour and love the Methodist Church for the tenacity with which her ministers, from the days of Wesley until now, have held fast to these essential elements of the faith once delivered to the saints—the faith for which Calvin contended so earnestly, the faith which thousands of Calvinists have confessed on the scaffold and at the stake, but the faith which Arminians, properly so called in Holland, Germany, England, America, have reprobated and rejected as dishonouring alike to God and to man. And those articles which our Methodist friends

have so often and so heartily denounced, but which, when they attempt to state them, they rather disfigure than describe, are only the logical consequences of the very doctrines which they and we hold and preach in common.

They call themselves Arminians; but it is perfectly obvious that their theology differs as widely from that of Limborch, and Whitby, and Warburton, and all the recognised Arminian divines of Holland and of England, as it does from Calvinism. They differ widely and radically in principles and in results; whereas, when we hear the gospel preached by a Methodist, we feel that it is the very same to which we love to listen, and are accustomed to hear as Presbyterians. And when we read the records of Methodist religious experience, we meet with essentially the same type of piety as that which is fashioned under Presbyterian preaching—the same love, faith, and hope—and often the confession of the very truth which, when stated in a dogmatic form, was the object of the strongest antipathy. Indeed, we have been often half-amused, as well as delighted, to notice the inconsistency between the prayers of many a worthy Methodist, or the account of his experience at the love-feast, his self-renunciation, his magnifying the riches of divine grace, his confidence in God for the future, and his speculative theology.

But besides the truth proclaimed, the kind and character of the men who proclaimed it should be taken into account, when considering the causes of the rapid spread of Methodism. Untrained in the schools, they could say, "That which we have seen and heard, declare we." Most of them were taken from the people, they were in sympathy with the people, they comprehended their modes of thinking; and therefore their sermons, though not constructed according to the rules of art, though often wanting in tastefulness and order, proved themselves to be true and effective *conciones ad populum*. A successor of Sir Isaac Newton, Dean Milner, himself one of the greatest preachers of his day in Cambridge, described them as of "the slapdash sort of sermons;" and enthusiastically added, "it is the sort that does all the good." They were not dissertations nor essays, they never attempted grand argumentation, refined analysis, nor metaphysical speculation, but were the utterances of hearts which had felt the agony of conviction and the bliss of forgiveness, which had been shaken with terror by the awful thunders of Sinai, and had been melted into penitence and love beneath the cross, by the sight of a Saviour who had given himself for them. The necessities of the "work" were urgent; the Macedonian cries which reached the ears of Mr Wesley were many, as well as loud, and he evinced his rare talent for handling bodies of men, to use a military phrase, by the methods he used to obtain co-workers. If a convert had graces

and gifts fitting him for public service, he very soon found a sphere within which to exercise them. The latent abilities of the "societies" were developed, and devoted to the "work." Such has been the wise policy of the Methodist Church. She has turned to good account the spiritual and natural endowments of her members, as class-leaders, exhorters, or local preachers. She has encouraged her gifted laymen to "speak unto the people;" but she, at the same time, subjects them to suitable tests, and controls them by the rules of discipline. Hence, in her early days, whenever a society was formed, most, if not all, of those who composed it, like the scattered Christians of Jerusalem, in one way or other did the work of evangelists; and no wonder, therefore, that in her early annals we find the names of so many men who, though they never enjoyed the culture of the schools, rose to be truly mighty and successful preachers.

Our exhausted space forbids our discussing, as fully as we could wish, that distinctive institution of Methodism, viz., its itinerant ministry. This much, however, we may say, that considering the kind of work to which Mr Wesley felt that he was called, and the character of the instruments he was obliged to employ, he shewed great practical wisdom when he provided for his societies an itinerant, rather than a fixed, pastorate. We are inclined to believe that its itinerancy has been one of the chief means of keeping the Methodist Church so free of those speculative tendencies which have revealed themselves, more or less, in other prominent denominations; and we are persuaded also that some of the peculiar traits of Methodist piety are to be ascribed to this cause. Under a pastorate changed every two years, it seems to us unreasonable to look for the staid and sober type of Christian character, for a church not content with the *disjecta membra* of the faith, but demanding the systematic exposition of the books of Scripture and of the doctrines founded on them; we should rather expect to find Christians, not indeed ignorant or indifferent to gospel truth, but fond of excitement, and, provided the masses around them are roused to seek religion, indisposed to criticise severely the means by which the result is produced.

We will only add, that the Methodist movement deserves to be studied, not only as one of the great events of the past century, but because its history may suggest hints as to the best method of dealing with some of those problems which are now forcing themselves upon the attention of the church. Within the most Christian parts of Christendom "there remaineth yet much land to be possessed;" there are huge masses of heathenism to be reclaimed. How can they be reached? Under the pressure of this question, Presbyterian Scotland, of late years, has

lent her sanction to agencies which her Bostons, Erskines, and Browns, would have rejected, as against the "good order of Christ's house." Only a year ago the General Assembly of the Free Church formally recognised the Episcopalian and layman Brownlow North as an evangelist. Radcliff, Grant, Weaver, Hammond, and others baptized with the same spirit, men taken from the highest and lowest ranks of society, though unordained by the laying on of hands of prelate or presbytery, are welcomed to pulpits of almost every name, that they may tell to listening thousands what God hath done for their souls. It is a sign of the times, and it behoves us to ask, whereunto this thing shall grow? The careful perusal of the volume before us may help us to give the right answer to the question.

ART. IV.—*Bengel and his School.*

*The Theological Significance of J. A. Bengel and his School.** By HERMANN
FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ.

IN recent times, a theological school, in which Scripture investigation and systematic thought on divine truth are combined, is exciting general attention. It differs from the historico-critical school, which handles Biblical dogmatics as a testimony to primitive Christianity in a historical interest, and from the psychological school, which unfolds a theological system out of the facts of Christian consciousness.

The new school starts from the assumption, that the collection of books which we possess in the canon is a perfect, and self-contained memorial of the redemption acts, (Heilthaten) and revelations of God, given by his appointment for our instruction. Starting with this assumption, it exerts itself to find out the inner connection which exists in Scripture itself; the fundamental thoughts which rule the particular books, and bind them together; and in this way to attain to a systematic insight into the whole of Christian truth.

A twofold method is possible in this. Either starting from the historical unity of the Biblical traditions, to seek to discern, in the development of the history of redemption, the foundations, the realisation, and end of the economy of God (*Haushaltung Gottes*), and pursuing in Scripture a philosophy of the history of mankind; or to trace the ultimate ideas underlying

* This article is translated from the third number of the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie* for 1861.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

the Biblical writings, and to reach a system of Biblical metaphysics, by putting them together.

Though these attempts have only at this day been honoured by earnest attention, still they may be traced far up in Protestant theology. The school is not only akin, in its historical direction, to the labours of a Herder and a Hess, and comes in contact, in its metaphysical tendency, with J. Böhme and the Theosophy, but we find their fundamental thoughts, at the beginning of the former century, clearly enunciated and fruitfully cultivated by a line of distinguished thinkers.

Herein consists the too little appreciated significance of J. A. Bengel, whose exegetical ability is recognised by all theological parties. Under his influence, the second half of last century became the classical period for Württemberg theology, during the rising dominion of rationalism over the spirit of the times. To elucidate this, and indicate the theological significance of the Bengel school, is the design of our paper. The old Protestant theology had, indeed, derived its religious principle of salvation exclusively in Christ, and of justification through faith alone from holy Scripture; but for the working out of doctrine, used Scripture only as the basis of this one truth, not as source of all truth; rather it made the principle of the subjective way of salvation the theological centre-point of Christian doctrine. Anthropology overshadowed theology, soteriology received an exclusively juridical character, Scripture investigation and dogmatics remained separated from one another, and dogmatics itself never reached an organic formation of the theological system. Whole circles of doctrine, as those of theology and eschatology, remained uninfluenced by any productive activity, and the rest lost, under the meagre elucidation of the one subjective truth, the wealth of their colours, their forms, and their relations, which they have in the Scripture. The harmony with which, in Scripture, all truths condition, explain, and organically absorb each other, was lost, and the true systematics of Christian doctrine, as Jesus and the apostles possessed it, without any formal scientific cultivation, gave place to an external and one-sided system-making. With this was connected the serious evil that, under the influence of the short-sighted system, the original signification of the most important fundamental Biblical ideas, as *ζωή, δόξα, δικαιοσύνη, πίστις, πνεῦμα, βασιλεία*, &c., was lost sight of. In theological discussions, the words of holy Scripture were made use of as weapons, but the dominant theology gave them another sense than the sacred writers; in general, a terminology ruled the type of doctrine, which was not only alien to the letter, but to the spirit, of Scripture. A sad practical fruit of dogmatism was the fact, that ecclesiastical science more and more lost the inner influence on

the life of the congregation, and preaching, under the influence of this theology, became tasteless to the people.

The reaction against dogmatism withdrew at first into the silence of mysticism, and into the disquietudes of the sects. Still, in the first half of the seventeenth century, it numbered several important representatives. In the Lutheran Church, it attached itself principally to J. Böhme (1575-1624) and J. Arndt (1555-1621), in the Reformed Church to H. Grotius (1583-1645) and J. Cocceius (1603-1669). Though Böhme dug as much in the depths of his own speculations as in the depths of Scripture, he strove, nevertheless, to attain an entire understanding of the truth from Scripture. The line of thought which attracted to him special opposition was, in its tendency, thoroughly scriptural. It was placing in the foreground the supernatural world in its living power and manifold variety.

Arndt kept himself much more within the limits of revelation, though he pursued no exegetical method. But he had a deep inward relish of the fundamental Biblical thoughts. With a comprehensive glance into the image of God and the destinies of man, with a living and growing grasp of the work of salvation, and the dynamic understanding of reconciliation, along with the juridical, with the introduction of physics and of Christian hope into doctrine, he hit the spirit of Scripture. While Arndt adhered comfortably to the orthodox confession, Grotius, without fear, broke through the fetters of system in unrestrained Scripture investigation. Yet his keen judgment and cool criticism failed in inner understanding of Scripture truth. In this relation, he was surpassed by Cocceius, who also turned his back on dogmatism; but he sought to replace that system by a system derived from Scripture itself. Happy though the ground-thought was in tracing the development of the economy of God (Haushaltung Gottes), in the history of redemption, yet his method of exposition wrought injuriously in bringing in an arbitrary interpretation of Scripture in favour of pet ideas.

At the end of the seventeenth century, Spener arose for the vindication of Scripture and its rights. Bible investigation stepped to the foreground of theological labour, the barriers of system were broken through, and especially prophetic theology was more fruitfully handled. Also with the party of Böhme and Arndt, the friends of Spener immediately entered into living contact. Pietism, however, sank speedily down from the height of Spener's demands. If the holy Scripture had been a depository of proof passages, it became a collection of edifying texts, whose emphasis was industriously sought. Pietism received a practico-legal character, or, under the influence of Zinzendorf, a *comfortable* (gemüthlich) poetical direction.

In Würtemberg, pietism, from the commencement, had.

maintained a more blessed influence and more solid character, through the friendly and prudent reception it met with from ecclesiastical authority. The private assemblies were superintended, but permitted. In Tübingen a more Biblical method began to win influence. A new hymn-book, introduced in 1742, put the rich treasury of hymns newly gained in the pietist awakening into the hands of the congregations. Thorough and comprehensive learning, deep personal piety, warm interest in the awakening of congregational life, greater freedom in reference to dogmatic system, a decided tendency towards a Biblical theology, distinguished the foremost theologians of Württemberg at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It was at the same time that pietism lost its original power, and that Wolff's spiritualistic philosophy began to rule the professorial chair, that J. A. Bengel opened a new path by his hidden pious labours. It is remarkable that Bengel combined in himself the various gifts and mental tendencies that had hitherto been seen separated for propounding a more scriptural development of theology. With Grotius, Bengel shared comprehensive learning, scientific impartiality, and keen critical judgment. He reminds us of Arndt by his mystical vein of feeling and thought, by the more lively grasp of the relationship between God and man, by his genial understanding of the fundamental thoughts of Scripture. Like Cocceius, he started from the historical point of view, and laid systematic insight into the economy of God at the foundation of his theology. Theosophy, it is true, was less natural to Bengel, although he esteemed it; but as with Böhme, the super-sensual world, with its realities, was constantly before his thoughts, and his pupil Oetinger led Böhme thoroughly into the movements of the Bengel school. The Halle pietism exercised its awakening power on Bengel personally, and was deepened and refined by his scientific earnestness and his Biblical sobriety.

To Bengel it was given to open a new path in Protestant theology, which exactly met the fundamental mischiefs of the old ecclesiastical doctrine. We shall first attempt a sketch of his own theology, and subjoin a survey of his school; moreover, we take for granted a knowledge of Bengel's writings.

A glance into the scanty notices of Bengel's education, which Burk has furnished in his biography, reveals the influences to which he was subjected in the development of his character. The writings of Arndt, Gerhard, Francke, and Schade, formed his first spiritual nourishment. As a student, he was a member of a society founded for mutual edification. Reuchlin and Hochstetter, his valued teachers, fostered alike his devout spirit and his inquiring mind. On his tour through the most important German universities, he lingered for a time in Halle,

and received the deepest impressions from the pietists there. Anton was lecturing at the time on the Revelation of St John, and there, too, he was first made acquainted with the excellent exegetical works of Vitringa, the pupil of Cocceius.

But the proper bent of his life Bengel received from his own character—the innermost essence of which may be best described by the word, “the fear of God;” for his calling kept him in a narrow, insignificant sphere. From his twenty-sixth to his fifty-fourth year he laboured as a teacher in the convent school of Denkendorf. When he obtained the elevation of prelate of Herbrechtingen, his far-reaching influence was already firmly established. His most important writings owe their origin to local necessities lying within the circle of his limited calling. Conscientious scruples as to the variety of readings in the different editions used by his pupils led him to undertake his critical works on the New Testament. The Gnomon arose gradually during repeated readings of the New Testament with his pupils, for which he jotted down brief condensed annotations. The sixty addresses on Revelation originated in the hours of domestic edification. All Bengel’s theological writings relate to the criticism of the text, and to the exposition of the New Testament, and contain chiefly the most subtle investigations, and the defence of them against numerous attacks. He has not only written nothing dogmatic, but he has, moreover, made no attempts at the systematizing of Scripture doctrine. Yet his influence on the church and on theology was reformatory, as well through means of his personal influence on the younger theologians, as by means of his writings. In early youth he was taught to regard the invisible God more than visible men in his conduct and labours. A tender conscientiousness, an inexorable strictness towards himself, made him regard every work he undertook as a trial of faithfulness laid upon him by God. Along with an active inquisitiveness and acute judgment, this upright subjection under the fear of the living God gave him accuracy, solicitude, and thoroughness in his converse with divine things, and a proud freedom of mind, as well as an undaunted courage, which feared the face of no man in the confession and defence of known truths, and in the exposure of known errors. So thoroughly was this submissive subjection to God and his word, the unbiassed innermost impulse of his heart, that when any pointed him to the ordinary method of his contemporaries, he might well ask with astonishment—“Must I not then seek truth where God has given it to us?” In this Bengel took the same path with Luther. He did not at first discover the prevailing errors and mistakes of his time, and then throw away the old and seek the new, but for peace of conscience in his secret walk with God, he sought the truth in his word,

confessed it when known, and allowed not himself to be terrified by any pious shibboleth when he found himself with his discovery in antagonism to men. Hence Bengel, to the end of his life, never strove after innovations, or party, or church reformation; the new which he brought forth was the result of investigation begun without bias, and what he accomplished was produced by the impression of a man full of unction (*gesalbten Persönlichkeit*), and by his literary labour. So much did Bengel draw the fundamental thoughts of his theology without bias from Scripture, during many years of converse with it, that he was only faintly conscious of being original for his time; and yet he imprinted them with stimulating power on the minds of his young friends, and on wider circles.

The defect of Protestant theology appears to us to consist principally in this, that it made Scripture only the STANDARD of a fixed system of truth, instead of drawing truth, ever new and ever deeper, from it as the SOURCE of knowledge. It is, however, the spirit of the whole activity of Bengel's life, that he regarded Scripture, not only as the criterion of truth already developed, but also as a well from whence truth was yet to be drawn; that he worked restlessly himself to draw truth solely and entirely from Scripture; and that he keenly perceived the dangers when devout thought estranged itself from Scripture as its fountain. Equally important with teaching nothing which had no foundation in Scripture, did it seem to him to teach everything which Scripture set forth as of chief consequence. Thus chiefly were the fetters of the prevailing dogmatic system burst, but neither the *vagaries* of a devout sensibility, nor the system of human philosophy, were substituted for it, but on the ground of evangelical truth he endeavoured the progressive building up of doctrine from Scripture. The received church doctrine and the rising theology advanced to Scripture with already developed views, and either carried their preconceptions into Scripture, or with their preconceptions came into collision with Scripture. Bengel, on the contrary, sought after the divine fundamental thoughts in the Scripture itself. Such an effort, doubtless, presupposed that Scripture contains a connected system in which the organism of objective truth stamps itself. We may therefore inscribe on the characteristics of his theology the motto—*The pure Scriptures—only the Scriptures—the whole Scriptures.*

The fear of God, which was the tenderest and deepest trait of his character, made him above all act in earnest with holy Scripture as the WORD OF GOD. Let us hear him himself, in order to understand what far-reaching consequences the pious spirit of his investigation of Scripture involved. He sometimes called the holy Scriptures "God's book." So in his "*Abriss der Brüder gemeinde*," sec. 24, "The sacred Scripture is God's book.

The whole contents of it are holy, wholesome, and satisfying. Nothing in them is in vain or unfruitful. No one can understand everything, but all the saints of all times and places are but as one disciple, who turns to use the whole contents." Again, sec. 86, "Every ray and beam of divine truth in the Scriptures can beget in man the knowledge of God, and of himself; can humble, raise, and direct him." It was thus a matter of conscience with him to draw out of Scripture everything which was set forth in them. His principle was, "Non timide, non temere." Thus we read, "*Ordo Temporum*," cap. 8, sec. 1, "What God teaches we must by all means learn, one thing after another. Step by step God advances in revealing the secrets of his kingdom. What is given to each age by God must be appropriated by the saints. Nothing more must they take to themselves, they must receive nothing less. The measure of revelation in every age is the measure of the knowledge of the saints." The piety with which Bengel submitted himself to Scripture gave him unfettered courage and freedom towards those who would hold him back with the charge of heterodoxy. *Ordo Temporum*, viii.—"In things that are not written I am just as timid as any, but whithersoever the word of truth calls and permits us, thither I follow and search. This is my plan in the greatest and in the smallest matters, in that which all teach and learn and in that which many despise and neglect, in that which is manifestly fruit-bearing and in that which is considered empty and useless. What is written, I appropriate as written for me. What God reveals, he means us to learn." *Erklarte Offenbarung, Beschluss*, p. 1065—"What the great God lays before us in his word is for our belief—in more important or in minor matters, in spiritual or in material things, whether it concern a thing itself, or the circumstances of place and time, or the way and manner of the thing. Unbelief picks out what suits it, and casts the rest away under the best appearances."

Specially characteristic of Bengel's attitude towards sacred Scripture, is the spirit in which he spent a large portion of his life in the laborious work of TEXT-CRITICISM. It was with him less the desire to enrich the stores of learning, than the necessity of conscience which impelled him. *Gnomon*, preface, sect. 8:—"The pure text is so important, lest we should pass over apostolic words unprofitably, or handle the words of learned men instead of those of the apostles." *Erkl. Offenb.* p. 1051 (cap. 22, ver. 18, 19):—"It can be indifferent to no one who trembles at God's word what *text* of the revelation falls into his hands; but he should institute inquiry, and thank God when the best has been discovered." The thought of God ever counterbalanced with Bengel the consideration of what was counted holy by men; and he bravely endured the severe

attacks of the orthodox on the liberty he allowed himself with respect to the *textus receptus*, as well as the assaults of the school of Ernesti, on account of his tender and timid consideration for the traditional text. Bengel stood, as he said in another connection, between two fires. The same freedom, founded on the word of God, reveals to us the way that Bengel regarded the understanding and exposition of Scripture. His first hermeneutical principle was to this effect—"Te totum applica ad textum, et totum textum applica ad te." "Omnia te textus, si sapias, ipse docet." The work of the expositor he considered to be to place the Bible student of to-day in the position of the original reader.

"The use of science and commentary consists principally in these things :—

"I. To preserve, to restore, to defend the purity of the text.

"II. To elucidate the proper signification of the language which the sacred writers made use of.

"III. To exhibit the historical relations which the passage presupposes.

"IV. To remove errors and mistakes which have subsequently crept in—i.e., in short, to place the readers of to-day in the same position in which the original readers found themselves." (Gnomon, preface, sec. 4.)

Bengel not only found this work sufficient for the task of Scripture exposition, but he yielded no other right to it; because the Scriptures carry with them their own perspicuity and power. Erkl. Offenb. Einleitung (Introduction), sec. 3, he says:—"Hypotheses generally flow from human caprice, and the word of God is so bent in accordance with them, that men bring out of it whatever pleases them. No one will ascribe to me that sort of thing. We must commence only with such observations as lie clearly before our eye in the text. Afterwards, by right conclusions, we are led ever further."

The double impulse which animated Bengel to bring out or it all that the Scripture contained, to put into it nothing of his own, extended not only to the use of Scripture which aims at a knowledge of the truth, but also to its application to the heart. He was convinced that, "whoever obeyed the drawings of divine love in the truth, draws out of the divine word, when he has understood the sense, all that is wholesome, without labour, without particular incitement," (Preface to Gnomon, sec. 25). Similarly he remarks in the preface to Erkl. Offenb. sec. xii.:—"We may usefully dilate on the word of God to one another in public discourses and writings, but apply it only in a closer contact with it; yes, a brave soul can have it best applied by the Spirit of grace in solitude. An expositor is like a maker of wells, who dare not pour water into the spring, but

whose sole work is to see that it flows without escaping, without obstruction and impurity, through the conduit and pipes into the casks, so that others as well as himself may get enough. But sometimes I come in unexpectedly with a sting. Let any who is concerned about honest profit leave that until he again falls upon such a passage."

However important therefore to Bengel, according to the above statement of the exegete's task, were all the aids of human learning, he yet saw the proper understanding of Scripture in a spiritual relationship with heavenly things themselves. As he says in the preface to the exposition of Revelation, sec. viii. :—"The proper exposition of holy Scripture depends on the gift of divine grace, though with this the science of language, history, and helps of that kind do service."

That Bengel stood pretty much alone in this pious attitude of heart towards holy Scripture, and that he was bound to it by the fear of God in spite of all human authority, he knew right well. "God has taught me from my youth up to look to him alone; and in my course I have encountered so many human judgments, that it is a matter of indifference to me, as regards conscience, whether God and man, or God alone, pronounces my conduct good." Even a well-disposed pious will did not seem to him to be a sufficient qualification for treading the arduous, self-denying path of truth.

"Now-a-days few of the well-disposed deal with Scripture as they ought, and as becomes the counsel of God. Those who are regarded as the greatest lovers of the Bible, seek only a moderate knowledge, and halt at surface and secondary matters, which are otherwise valuable and useful in their degree. Others grasp what first dawned upon their minds when they were awakened, or what has been impressed upon them by approved teachers in a certain form, and there remain in too easy repose, flatter themselves into perfect contentment, and henceforward make no further progress. They exalt themselves into a rule, according to which they measure not only themselves, but also other souls—readers, teachers, even Moses and all the prophets, the apostles, and Jesus Christ, our alone Master, himself. The first holds an accurate understanding of Scripture to be impossible; the second unnecessary; the third dangerous; the fourth to be something suitable not for himself but for others, or for himself not now but another time. Hence it happens that the Lord Jesus, who is ready to give us beautiful and ever new lessons, is deserted by his best pupils, to whom he so willingly opens the Scriptures, but who run out of school and leave him alone." (Erkl. Offenb. ou. i. 1, p. 158.)

The utterances quoted are sufficient to prove that Bengel, driven by liveliest pressure of conscience, assumed once more the posture towards Scripture which Protestantism had only

too early abandoned. Rejecting allegorical, mystical, and dogmatical straining of interpretation, he held the GRAMMATICO-HISTORICAL exposition to be the alone right one; but demanded a regard to the whole and the connection of Scripture itself, and an inward relish for the divine truths revealed therein. It may be replied that the strongest expressions of devout submission to the holy Scriptures are not wanting in the earlier Protestant teachers. That is true; and a champion of orthodoxy, Flacius, has laid down some excellent hermeneutical rules in his *Clavis*. The result, however, shews that his devotion to the divine word and the fear of God have not actually been so thorough in practice. Bengel, whose theological theory became theological practice, drew his fundamental views, his comprehension of Scripture, his systematics, from his converse with Scripture; and thus was his theology led, in the most beneficial way, into a new path.

With the same energy, and with important results, Bengel applied his truly Reformation principles of Scripture exposition, thus again made available. He really laid the foundation for a more scriptural development of doctrine. Twofold are the evil consequences observable from the estrangement of the Protestant doctrine from Scripture. In the short-sighted limitation to an isolated centre-point we may say, in the first place, that the connection of the whole revealed truth was lost, and the separate doctrines were viewed, not in the original light of the primitive comprehensive thoughts of God and of the deeds of God developing themselves according to plan. Next, in the dialectic cultivation of doctrine from the abstract centre-point, the language of instruction and preaching was estranged from the language of Scripture, and an unbiblical terminology and growing confusion of ideas gained footing in the professor's chair and in the pulpit. Both evils Bengel began to pull up by the roots without any reformatory bias, and solely from the fear of God and the conscientiousness with which he placed himself as a docile pupil under the word of God; and his disciples advanced more consciously and fruitfully along the same path. Little as Bengel worked up the results of his Scripture study into systematic form, the germs of a theological system derived from the Bible are clearly to be found in his exegetical writings. In his persevering study of Scripture, directed to the inner understanding of it, he made the Scripture method of elucidating all things in heaven and earth, from *one centre-point*, his own. From this connected knowledge of all revealed truth he thought and judged; and had any one asked him about the *analogia fidei* by which Scripture interpretation must be regulated, he could only have named the original system of truth of the divine economy, which lies at the founda-

tion of Scripture. Bengel sought the knowledge of the truthless in single texts and declarations of Scripture; he saw rather in the holy Scriptures a whole, and compared the inner organism which combines the works of God in one system, where all the parts find their significance only as members of the whole, with the inner connection which runs through all divine revelation. Gnomon, preface, sec. xiii.—“In the works of God, down to the smallest blade of grass, the utmost symmetry prevails; in the words of God the closest connection prevails, down to the most insignificant points.”

Bengel declares distinctly what is the ruling centre-point in the Biblical system of truth in *Ordo Temporum*, cap. xi. 13, —“The holy Scriptures form one harmonious work. All its books form one *corpus*. Each is self-contained, and fulfils for itself perfectly its particular object. All together make one book, which grows out of those parts, and has a more general, far more comprehensive, object. It is *one ground thought*, which infinitely, divinely comprehends all in itself,—from which all times proceed, which has measured past, present, and future.” And, “we must not regard Holy Scripture as a text-book and example-book, but as an incomparable narrative of the *divine economy with reference to the human race*, from the beginning to the end of all things,—through all the ages of the world as a *beautiful, glorious, connected system*. For although every Biblical book is a self-contained whole, and every author has his own manner, one Spirit breathes through all, one idea penetrates all. The one ever explains and confirms the other. What God does to individual saints and to his whole people are wondrously interwoven together, and a single glance into his economy, which extends to everything, is more valuable than the most secret intelligence from all the cabinets of earthly potentates.”

Bengel was clear in his own mind on the point, though he seldom spoke of it, that with the elucidation of the separate portions of Scripture from this fundamental thought controlling all the Scripture, theology would enter on a new path. His Gnomon itself advances the claim in the preface, sec. v.—“In the treatment of Holy Scripture, there have hitherto been several periods. We find (1) the native method; (2), the moral; (3), the dry; (4), the revived; (5), the polemical, dogmatic, logical; (6), the critical, polyglott, archaeological, homiletic method. The knowledge, and understanding of Scripture, has not yet entered into the power which is offered in Scripture itself. The manifold diverging differences of opinions, and the darkness in which our eyes are involved in the prophets, prevent that. Hence we must advance to the manly and royal treatment of Scripture which corresponds to its perfection.”

That the idea which Bengel placed in the centre of theology renders a systematic unfolding possible, which would embrace the whole contents of Christian truth, no one will deny. From a merely dogmatic standpoint, the fundamental thought of an economy of God embracing heaven and earth, time and eternity, may be called a happy discovery. For what has been called the principle of reformed theology, God's honour and glory—and what has been termed the principle of Lutheran theology—the salvation and life of men in Christ, are comprehended and united in one in this thought. The contents of the economy of God, as well according to the decree before the foundation of the world, which lies at its foundation, as according to its development and execution, as also according to its ultimate aim, are no other than that the invisible and hidden God reveals and glorifies himself by the creation, preservation, government, restoration, and glorification of the creature. Viewed from this standpoint, all parts of Christian doctrine indeed are comprehended in one whole—all is in one, one in all. At the same time the predominantly earthly point of view of Protestant doctrine is expanded into cosmical significance, the metaphysical truths of revelation are enclosed together with the development of the history of revelation, and in fact not the least particle of Christian truth can be named which is not rooted in that fundamental thought. The parts are beheld in the whole, and the whole in the parts. But Bengel, to whom productive dogmatic labour was alien, laid no stress on the fact that a dogmatic system might be built upon this foundation, but rather on the fact that the idea of the economy of God is actually the fundamental thought which rules all Scripture, and links all together into one harmonious whole. The dogmatic consequence of this—which, however, he himself did not draw—would have been this: A system of doctrine founded on Scripture must, from the central-point of the economy of God, elucidate divine and human things. The Scripture revelation does not either purpose to reveal the secret essence of God alone, without relation to the human world, or to shew to the individual alone the true worship of God, and the most direct way to happiness. A kingdom of God, founded in God, comprehending the visible and invisible world and many eternities, is the inner bond of all the works, deeds, and revelations of God. The inner unity of the manifold parts of Scripture consists in this, that it is a connected, perfect, and clear memorial of the economy of God. Whoever has attained an inward comprehension of Scripture—has entered into its spirit and plan—will spontaneously regard and judge the manifold variety of revealed facts and truths just from the centre-point from which the holy Scriptures are written in inner harmony.

Only by the assumption of this fundamental thought, are we in the position to appreciate, in their true significance, the chronological and apocalyptic labours of Bengel. The former cost him an extraordinary expenditure of time and strength, which seems to bear no proportion to the value of the results. The latter were the darling labour of his life, and in his time—in a certain circle, mainly contributed to procure for him a prophetic reputation—though his understanding of the Revelation of St John, in detail, has no particular value now-a-days. The design of our paper does not permit us to enter into any further estimate of the actual results of these investigations. Without apologizing for Bengel's chronological and apocalyptic systems, we shall indicate the theological significance of these labours. The spirit and value of these labours lie in the kernel concealed within the shell. At the foundation of his chronological labours lay the idea of the projection of a history of redemption, and a historical comprehension of Christianity as a gradually progressive institution of God. With regard to the Apocalypse he got at the kernel of Scripture, in again placing prophetic theology in the foreground; and the fundamental thoughts which he derived from the Apocalypse, became the foundations of a new development of Protestant doctrine. Bengel belongs to that rare class of inquirers, whose appetite for thorough knowledge leads them into the most subtle and careful examination of details, while at the same time, they continually *keep in view* the spirit and scope of the whole. It can easily be proved from Bengel's own utterances, that in this sense he sought to determine the age of the world,—to link together the chain of Biblical chronology to explain the apocalyptic numbers. The inwardly connected economy of God was in his thoughts, and he considered its inward gradual unfolding as divided also outwardly into definite periods. Thus we read in his work, "*Weltalter*" (Age of the World), chap. i. 11: "From the beginning of the first book of Moses to the end of Revelations, so many periods are not named in vain. If we regard them piecemeal, they often appear frivolous and contemptible; if we take them together according to their introduction in Scripture itself, we find a continuous connected line of time, consisting of proportionate parts, which must be worthy of divine wisdom, and be of inestimable importance. The goal of this Scriptural line is the day of Christ. Without this goal it is impossible to say why so many important histories are recorded in Scripture without any indication of the date, and why the circumstances of time are often so punctually declared in connection with minor histories." The assumption that the Scripture is a monument of the organically membered economy of God, and that the revelation of God in Scripture is designed

to give man an abiding insight into the aim of God's ways with the human race, lay at the foundation of Bengel's interest in Biblical chronology. Because he supposed that this inner organic development of the economy of God had also its outward measure of defined, regular periods,—for this reason alone did he attach importance to the chronological chain. So at the introduction to *Erkl. Offenb.* sec. 34, "Jesus Christ has revealed things and times together; therefore we dare not separate one quite from the other, because they have not been joined together in vain. Whoever has a false chronology will also falsely understand the thing itself." All soothsaying curiosity to raise the veil of futurity was far from Bengel. *Ordo Temporum*, chap. xi. 15, "An audacious inquiry concerning the last day I remove far from mine eyes, not only by public protest, but also in the innermost chamber of my conscience, and wish it removed from the eyes of all who walk in the faith."

The reverence with which Bengel regarded everything which is in the Scriptures as a gift of God, full of design, caused him to inquire why so many dates run through the Bible; and as the connection of the economy of God dawned upon him out of Scripture, he believed he might find in the chronology an outward scaffolding for the history of revelation, inwardly so harmoniously ordered and jointed. For example, on the detailed dates in Luke iii. 1, 2, 23, Matt. iii. 1, he remarks in the "*Harmonie der Evangelien*" (*Harmony of the Gospels*), sec. 12, obs. ii., "This also is a part of Scripture, and should be despised by no one in self-conceit or self-will, or in apparent zeal, as something in vain; but should be received with gratitude, modesty, and reverence, and be expounded as much as possible. Everything that may be learned must be turned to the use, without boasting, which may be drawn, if not by all, yet by different readers in different degrees, not just in the most important hours of repentance or death; yet, notwithstanding, for their improvement, strengthening, and discipline, and especially to the praise of God, in the wisdom of God, and truth of his word."

How earnestly Bengel strove to construct a connected history of the economy of God with his chronological investigations, is proved by the way in which he, following the track of Matt. i. 1, 13, believed that he had furnished an important contribution to Christian apologetics. Thus he says, in the "*Weltalter*" (*Age of the World*), chap. i. 12, "A proper decision by which the dates of the Old and New Testament are brought into their fit place, serves for a noble proof, particularly against the Jews, that the books of the Old and New Testament are accordant and inseparable, in purport and origin." And "*Ordo Tem-*

porum," chap. xi 13, "The chronological line from Genesis to the Apocalypse establishes, in the firmest way, the immutable truth of all Scripture, against all opponents of the Old or of the New Testament." It is interesting and characteristic as to the spirit of Bengel's theology that, in the preface to "*Ordo Temporum*," sect. 1, he places the new thought, which lay at the foundation of his Scripture investigation in connection with Biblical chronology, alongside of the old Protestant doctrine. "The holy Scripture gives as a double monument: first, the knowledge of God, the Creator, Redeemer, Comforter, of angels, of men, of sin, of grace, &c.; and this knowledge is the most necessary. Next, the way and manner of the divine economy in the education of the human race, in the promises of Christ, given, fulfilled, or yet to be fulfilled, in the government of the people from the first to the last times. A physician may not forget the bones in examining the finer parts. So he who uses Scripture in a becoming manner will handle the chief points of faith for his own and others' salvation; but just so he may not neglect the sacred times, particularly as both parts mutually elucidate and confirm each other." In the historical direction, which a great part of the recent theology has taken, it appears superfluous to indicate the pioneer significance of these fundamental thoughts of Bengel.

Intimately connected with the chronological were the apocalyptic labours of Bengel. "*Ordo Temporum*," chap. viii. 13: "The goal of all times in Scripture is the return of Jesus Christ in glory." The ground on which Bengel founded his industrious investigation of the Apocalypse is again respect for the words of Scripture: "Happy is he who reads and hears the words of the prophecy." He did not permit himself to be deprived, either by the difficulties of understanding, or by the variety of interpretations hitherto offered, of the hope of discovering the true meaning of Scripture. According to the fundamental thoughts which he derived from holy Scripture, it was necessary that prophecy should advance more into the foreground of research than it had hitherto done in Protestant theology. He saw the cause of this in the fact, that the interpretation offered in Scripture itself had not yet entered in power, partly in the darkness in which our eyes are involved in prophecy. For the economy of God receives full elucidation for the separate parts of its development, only from the ultimate aim of it; inasmuch as the decree lying at its foundation comes to realisation. Here too the particular results of his research are less important, than the prompting spirit and the abiding fundamental thoughts, which he transferred from the prophetic parts to the other parts of Christian doctrine. He thereby gave a new direction to the entire studies of his school, and acquired new

ground-thoughts, out of which a more scriptural, systematic structure of Christian doctrine was unfolded. He regarded, moreover, these labours more in the light of a service of God, than the considered censure or praise of men. "Abriss der Brüdergemeinde:" "I do not make apocalyptic theology solely the subject of my writings, but it is a part of them. I have never presumed to play the prophet. Who is a bad interpreter or a right one in prophecy, depends not on the dictum of any man, but on the testimony of the Lord." Bengel sought in prophetic theology the key to the true appreciation of the present, and from the thoughts and plans of God laid down in it, elucidated the varied human relationships. "Erkl. Offenb." ou. xii. 12, p. 621: "God has given this remarkable prophecy so solemnly, not only in order that we may have a *commonplace* of his providence over his believing people, or that after the final fulfilment we may know his omniscience, known to us without that, but that his servants in every age may know how it is with them; and the more dangerous a time is, the greater the help which is offered them in the prophecy." The survey of the school of Bengel will complete the proof, that the significance of Bengel consists less in what he added of actual results to theological science, than in the fundamental thoughts, of which he was only half conscious to himself, which he derived from a conscientious converse with the holy Scriptures, out of which all his laborious special studies proceeded.

In fact, the germs of a Biblical system of doctrine, *i.e.*, of a connected knowledge of the truth from Scripture, lay in the method of Scripture interpretation, which Bengel originated, and in the fundamental thought of the economy of God, which with Scripture he placed in the centre point of theological thought. Once in Weltalter (i. 23) Bengel expresses pointedly this significance of his researches—"The great economy of God is exhibited in Scripture, how he has given his promises, has fulfilled them, and will fulfil them in Christ Jesus. In this last connection we first perceive, why the holy Scripture, in its books, is arranged as it is, and not otherwise; as well as how they are composed after each other, from Moses till the apostles, and furnish a system or connected record. Without such a consideration many use the holy Scriptures, for the most part as a little text-book (*Spruchbüchlein*). To the same effect Hahn writes (1778) to Ewald—"I honour the writings of Oetinger and Bengel, those two despised men, not so much on account of style, as on account of the principal ideas, which I feel in my heart to be in accordance with Scripture."

Ph. M. Hahn's system affords a thorough proof of this assertion, for he has worked up systematically the fundamental

thoughts of Scripture brought to light by Bengel in the most unmixed and clearest way. Here we can only give some preliminary hints.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD, under the point of view of the economy of God, was brought out of the metaphysical abstraction in which the isolated treatment had placed it, and put in the most living relation to revelation and its history. The secrets of the inner life of God, which is perfect in itself, and independent of all finite being and events, were not denied, but so toned that the God of Scripture is the revealed, and not the hidden God, while it is from his works and deeds that we know his nature (*Wesen*). Hence Bengel connects the doctrine of God with the name of God, places in the foreground the attributes of *holiness* and *glory*, which are exalted in revelation, insists on the careful distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit.—Compare the discussion on Apoc. i. 7, in *Gnomon*, on the names of God, and especially the discourses on Revelation.

The fact that Bengel directed thought to the end of the ways of God was not only a completing of inquiry, but the means by which the entire understanding of Scripture found a new path. The heavenly world with its unseen realities entered vividly into consciousness. The eye of faith was directed from the earthly church as an institution of piety for salvation, to the kingdom of God, which is of heavenly origin, of heavenly power, and heavenly design, and which stretches itself far beyond the horizon of this earthly world. By directing thought to the future world, the world of spirit attained reality and form as a self-subsisting, fulfilled domain of life; and a Biblical consideration of the nature of things must needs break through the world of sense. Compare, for instance, the *Excursus* in the *Gnomon* on Heb. xii., on the independent existence of the blood of Christ in heaven. The spiritualistic separation of the spirit and the body, the mistaking of the ultimate design of God in the visible, bodily exhibition of his glory, ceased; and with the ideas of the corporeality and essentiality of the spirit, he more deeply appreciated the living bond between the world of spirit and the world of sense. At the same time the right point of view for the historical understanding of revelation was supplied from eschatology. In connection with this, the evil of neglecting the living, ethical, and physical bond between God and man, in favour of the juridical relationship to God, necessarily ceased. This affected the doctrine of the atonement, and the comprehension of the Christian life. In his chronological and apocalyptic writings there was opened up furthermore a deeper understanding of the Old Testament, although none of his literary activity was elsewhere devoted to its exposition. His pupils first advanced further on the path opened up by him. Moreover, the human, historical

figure of Christ attained fuller recognition than in the ecclesiastical Christology. Though, as remarked, the germs and indications only of these consequences are given in Bengel's writings, the further unfolding is found only scattered here and there in single observations.

More immediately successful and more worked out were the fruits of Bengel's research in the new elucidation of the original significance of the **PRINCIPAL BIBLICAL THOUGHTS**. Here also he took up the interrupted work of the Reformation period. In the short, pithy annotations of the "*Gnomon*," a store of biblico-theological material, towards this side, is deposited. In this labour Bengel was obliged to combat not only dogmatism, but also Pietism and the Moravians. Not only had orthodoxy broken off its doctrinal development in a firmly fixed unbiblical terminology, which estranged the substance as well as the form of doctrine from the holy Scripture. Cocceius also, under the one-sided influence of his federal system, and of his far from sober propensity for allegorising, and Pietism, in the effort to make the reading of Scripture fully edifying, misemployed the emphasis of Biblical language in well meant but arbitrary interpretations. Bengel's fear of the words of God deterred him alike from the too much and the too little. The simplicity of Scripture words concerned him more than pet ideas and pious feelings; his sober perspicuity and his tender conscientiousness revolted from every human addition. He combated the trivialities and audacities of Zinzendorf's hymns with the zeal of earnest admonition and warning. It was not only a postulate of his piety, but a conviction, tested by long years of converse with the Scriptures—that the Bible as the word of God speaks only one language, *i. e.*, that in the designation of sacred things it has a manner throughout the same, however different the causes, garbs, and points of view of the individual authors may be. His notions of the independent peculiarities of the separate writers, and of the influence of their human gifts on their writings, were, according to the standard of the orthodox idea of inspiration, daring and free, as the way in which, in the Harmony of the Gospels, he ascribes to Matthew and John "a higher and greater measure of the Spirit," than to Mark and Luke. But this conviction took for granted that in the manifold parts of Scripture, which had from time to time arisen, an harmonious self-connected system of truth was concealed out of which the sacred writers discoursed. The inner harmony of the truth living in them permitted them to bind with the same words ideas which ever remained the same, and communicated a force and moderation to their method of discourse which far surpasses classical literature. This force, which grasps much in one, and this moderation which knows no exaggeration, no empty phrase, im-

parts to Scripture that irresistible charm which it exercises over every unvitiated taste. Hence the word of God is never exhausted through the centuries, and the intelligent reader never grows weary of exploring its depths. The saying, that an elephant must swim, in Scripture, and a sheep may wade in it, was adopted by Bengel from the church father from his innermost experience. In the preface to the Gnomon, sec. xii., he makes the demand—"To exegesis belongs especially knowledge of Biblical language, which is ever worthy of divine wisdom, even when it condescends entirely to our low condition. Three things were combined in the holy men of the Old and New Testament with accurate knowledge of the truth—the orderly connection of thought, the precise expression of ideas, the original power of the affections." This claim proceeded from the observation that Scripture in its form is a whole—a self-connected production of the Holy Ghost, and attention especially to the last two points cuts at the root of the mischief of the exegetical and dogmatical theology previously prevailing. Then Bengel sought (Gnomon, preface, sec. xiv.) "to explain the meaning and force of the words of the text, *i. e.*, to understand what substance of thought the words concealed in the mind of the author, not too much and not too little. The niceties and accuracies of the divine language must be sought out. The emphatic style must be studied in which the proper signification is sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker. The Greek language is rich in means of emphasis. It happens very easily that false emphases are found and the true overlooked. Both must be narrowly observed. Through all periods of Scripture there runs wonderfully an analogy of precise usage, *usus loquendi*, uninterruptedly remaining the same;" and Gnomon preface, sec. xiv., "A good style must be deep and simple. Both, seldom combined elsewhere, are united in holy Scripture, the greatest depth with the greatest simplicity. All human niceties of court style are surpassed by the language of holy Scripture. God speaks worthy of God. Deep are his thoughts, and therefore his words are inexhaustible in excellence and power. The verbal expression of the sacred writers corresponds exactly to their mental impression of the things. Much is expressed with the most appropriate medium. That must be sought after. In this sense, Luther says, theology is nothing but a grammar, which occupies itself with the words of the Holy Spirit."

This harmony of the Biblical *usus loquendi* was not understood by Bengel in the sense that every word in every connection, and in every author, had only one narrowly fixed idea. That the fundamental thoughts in their harmonious light are broken into many rays, Bengel clearly saw; and his Gnomon is full of this. But he saw in Scripture such an accuracy and clearness in the delineation of heavenly things, preserving

under the most manifold applications a similar character, that from this similarity of delineation there shines a connected system of truth, out of which the sacred writers spoke. Through the rubbish of a terminology which grew up under the influence of heathen philosophy and dogmatic controversies, Bengel sought, by a careful comparison of Biblical language, anew to realise THE ORIGINAL THOUGHTS of the apostles; and thus to attain an insight into the spirit and plan of revelation.

Intimately connected with the original force of the precise Biblical ideas, is the investigation of what Bengel called the *affectus* and *mores* of the holy Scriptures. He says, in the Harmony of the Gospels, sec. 153:—"In a well-formed discourse three things are always to be found. (1.) The grounds of the doctrine, and proof (*λογος*), by which a subject is elucidated and confirmed. (2.) The strong emotions of the heart (*πάθος*)—as love, desire, joy, and such like. (3.) What belongs to propriety and grace, and often draws with it tender movements of the heart (*ἡθος*)." The two first are pretty tolerably considered by expositors, but the third is not borne in mind by them so diligently as it ought.

"Cum affectibus sanctis quod comparari possit terra nihil alit. Continentur autem in iis etiam τὰ ἡθος, sive mores vocabulo minus commodo. Affectuum rationem habent sapientiores, spirituali experientia præditi; mores omnium pace dixerim, propemodum negligentur, præterquam quod verecundia scripturæ interdum prædicatum. Et tamen mores per omnes sermones atque epistolas Novi Testamenti ininvibilita diffusi continuam quandam commendationem habent ejus, qui agit aut loquitur, aut scribit et decorum præcipue complectuntur." (Gnomon, preface, sec. xv.)

The Gnomon has specially addressed itself to the task of considering the *mores* as well as the *affectus*. "The most of it is of that kind which is more accessible to the disposition, the feeling of the heart, than to reproduction in words."

"Earnest and graceful as were the words of the Saviour, we find in them a sameness of appropriate expression peculiarly suitable to him as the Son of God, as carried with it nought of irony." (Harmony of the Gospels, sec. lxxiv. 2.) "There is something incomprehensible in the glory of Jesus Christ—about his manifestation and humiliation. From this arose a wonderful *temperamentum* of his holy affections, discourses, and whole testimony towards his heavenly Father, towards his disciples, and towards all those with whom he held intercourse, as sometimes the one, sometimes the other, predominated as it were. In both cases, however, the *decorum* which became his divine majesty, and the condescension towards his poor brethren, act their part in and through each other in the most admirable manner. No human wisdom and tact

have sufficed to express this in a becoming manner, and yet the evangelists have splendidly succeeded in doing it." (Harmony of the Gospels, sec. clii. 2.)

The dispute of Bengel with Zinzendorf shews to what far-reaching consequences the arbitrary neglect of the *temperamentum* and the *decorum* of Scripture language leads, and what influence Bengel's insight into the tenderer, finer features of Scripture had upon his dogmatic views. As a model of a controversial treatise, as acute as it was humble and affectionate, which unreservedly exposed error and confirmed truth from Scripture, the "Sketch of the Moravian Brethren," is highly worthy of perusal. Lange had silenced Bengel—nay, more, had defended the Count against Oetinger—but the growing levity of Zinzendorf in the choice of his words, and the stiffening of doctrine into some pet materials, constrained him to publish his views. He missed in the wounds-theology the recognition of the resurrection and glory of Christ; in the doctrine of God, chaste reverential awe before the thrice holy One. He censures him for these things: that the Father of Jesus Christ is not allowed to be Creator of heaven and earth, that the Holy Ghost is arbitrarily trifled with as the dear "little mother of Jesus" (*dem lieben mütterlein Jesu*); that in the expression "little Jesus" (*Jesulein*), the Lord of glory is forgotten in irreverent familiarity; that in railing words against Satan expressions are employed contrary to Scripture, which grants him a δόξα; that, in an unbecoming manner, the tender relationships of human family life are transferred to the Holy Trinity; that the precious promises of Revelation to the Church of Philadelphia were presumptuously appropriated, and the reverence due to the word of God thereby violated—and so on. Repeatedly did Bengel acknowledge the living heart-piety of the Count, but so much the more needful did he believe it to be to sound the word, "the whole Scripture," in his ears. Especially did he subject Zinzendorf's translation of the New Testament, step by step, to a keen but telling criticism, on account of its deviation from the simplicity and moderation of Scripture language. An essay in the "Weltalter," entitled "Consideration of Holy Scripture, how it is our model even in phraseology," refers more to the arbitrary and antiscriptural phraseology in the hymns and sermons. He here points out how, through the light use of words, the doctrine, the life, and the worship of Christians deviate from healthy truth. "Holy Scripture is a rule of faith and life; but one seldom reflects, that even in the phraseology the strictest accuracy is observed. God only can speak in a perfectly becoming manner of himself, and his words ever correspond exactly with his truth. Hence it often happens that the most important doctrines are derived

in the New Testament from the most minute words in the Old Testament." In the case of the Fall, and other instances of Bible history, Bengel points out the danger of neglecting the phraseology of God even in the apparently least respect. He then animadvertes in detail on many expressions customary in science, in worship, in society, and adds, "One might draw up an Index Expurgatorius, in which even FINE prayers, hymns, and meditations would needs be condemned, and not unreasonably." The thorough and clear limitation of Biblical ideas, in their original signification, and the indicating of the tenderer and finer traits of Scripture, as also the elucidation of it in detail, facilitated by the spirit of the whole, these are the things which render Bengel's Gnomon valuable to this day.

Since its publication, this excellent work has never been out of the hands of believing Bible students; and the more it is used the more will it be valued. Whoever glances for the first time into this remarkable book might become giddy, like an ignorant person in a picture gallery, suited for a higher point of view. Almost nothing but short, often unfinished, sentences; and what varied contents! We find sometimes critical remarks, which occasionally extend to whole treatises; sometimes hermeneutical rules; sometimes a sting in the conscience; sometimes a general life-truth, derived from the text; sometimes a Biblical theological excursus and development of the sacred fundamental thoughts. For the most part they are only short grammatical or archæological annotations, elucidations of the connection, or parallels from Scripture, often without application, simply inserted. Extraordinary learning is applied: sometimes the old rabbis are summoned for the most diverse purposes; sometimes old and new theological literature; moreover ancient classical literature, in the most different representatives, is cited to furnish linguistic proofs. A tabular view of the contents heads each book; but elsewhere, too, we find retrospective and prospective allusions which elucidate the thread of the connection. In other places polemical remarks against the Romish Church are suddenly encountered, apologetic hints, censures of prevailing customs and most settled prejudices. Things which are ordinarily discussed at length in commentaries we miss entirely; other matter, which is generally passed over, is carefully annotated. Especially occasion is taken from particular observations to clear up the *usus loquendi* of all Scripture. (Compare, for instance, on Rom. i. 17; on *ἀναστροφή*; and on 2 Cor. v.)

Nevertheless, the Gnomon is far from being a copious commentary, embracing all these sides. For the manifold remarks are found quite scattered, attached to individual passages—sometimes of this, sometimes of that kind. Very few marked

verses are subjected to an all-sided illustration. For the most part the single verse receives its exceedingly sparing allotted portion, and the character of the annotation changes with each. The reader likewise has the impression that plan and design prevail in the work, and that annotations are not added to the text just as they occur. What, then, is the harmonising fundamental thought which reduces to plan and order the chequered thronging crowd? We remember the fourfold task which Bengel prescribed for the exposition of the in itself perspicuous and transparent Scripture, in order to put the reader in the possibility of understanding, in which the original readers found themselves. Indeed, this point of view, next to calling to the reader's mind of modern culture the grammatical and historical suppositions of the text, gives unity and design to the extraordinary expenditure of learned knowledge which Bengel interwove with the exposition. We know what an important matter of conscience the maintenance of the purity of the original text was to him. Hence he diligently made use of, for this end, all the available MSS., all the ancient versions based on MSS., all the citations of the most ancient ecclesiastical literature. He had not prosecuted independent creative studies in philology, philosophy, and archæology; but diligent predecessors in these helps had stored up immense materials. And besides close acquaintance with classical antiquity, he not only usefully appropriated the treasures already discovered, but most valuable is the economical, discerning, unostentatious way in which he applied the material at command duly to elucidate every passage. The illustration of Biblical language has not only a philological, but also a theological side. In this Bengel consulted Scripture itself; and by comprehensive comparison, fine observation, precise grasp, and deeper understanding of the ideas, has rendered unsurpassed service. The Gnomon is a rich fountain for the apprehension of the original Bible ideas in their simplest root-signification and their fine shades of difference. He explains them partly etymologically, partly through parallel passages, partly through the elucidation of their position in Biblical doctrines as a whole, partly by the particular connection in which they everywhere occur. He points out forcibly the linguistic connection of the Old and New Testaments; how, especially in the Apocalypse, John spoke Greek, it is true, but thought in Hebrew.

But not only in important fundamental ideas, but also in particles; compounds, especially prepositional, in different formations of words from one root; in synonymes, we find his striking hints, which cast unexpected light on particular passages. Moreover, in the connection of sentences, he points out clearly and pithily the relations, the antitheses, and the cor-

robations, with a penetrating acuteness ; and thus, by a grammatical method, wins out of Scripture the emphases which an affectation of believing had inserted in the Scripture. Sometimes he gives, on the occasion of single observations, hints on the *usus loquendi* of Scripture in general, as one acquainted with the most hidden features of Scripture, which are excellent sign-posts to the understanding of it.

As the fourth problem of the exegete, Bengel appeared to clear away the prejudices and abuses that had subsequently crept in. It is itself a great thing that his Gnomon, free from the fetters of the prevailing dogmatic system and method of preaching, followed the footsteps of Scripture itself. But he definitely opposed, too, many an error ; and here he was aided by his keen eye, practised in the discernment of the true and the false, his slow, but conscientious, pious judgment, his unbiassed, thoughtful character.

Concerning the distribution of the varied material among particular passages, Bengel expresses himself thus in Gnomon, preface, sec. xvi. :—"I do not purpose to paraphrase only, nor to make grammatical remarks only, nor only to give scholia, nor only to explain archæologically, dialectically, dogmatically, polemically, porismatically, but to do something of each. Each has its use, but must not be abused by too great stress being laid upon it. Whatever style of annotation each particular section, each particular passage demands for the explanation of its peculiarity, that I employ. Everything, however, is so set forth, that cause is given to the reader to think more about it." This leads to a remark which must strike every reader of the Gnomon. Bengel takes for granted attentive and thinking readers. The remarks are chiefly of that kind which furnish answers to questions not expressed, which force themselves on the reflective reader of holy Scripture. This is explained by the fact, that the Gnomon is the result of his labour as a teacher. The annotations were originally only jottings for use in his school. When one attentively reads Scripture, and is detained by questions grammatical, historical, or about things, he finds in the Gnomon an answer in solid, pregnant sentences, in a form which pre-supposes just such inquiry. The Gnomon, as its title indicates, purposes only to be a directing sign-post. It professes to give no exhaustive exposition, nor even to unfold the rich consequences of its annotations ; but where light on the subject or historical explanations are not needful for the modern reader, he indicates only what is peculiar and important in the text, and leaves the reader to make the application of it for himself. Bengel himself expresses it. His Gnomon says only, "Thus the text has it, not otherwise. Just this noun, just this verb, this participle, this case, this tense is employed, no

other ; just this construction, this repetition, this transposition, this train of thought, and no other."

As a guide at home in a magnificent country, grown grey in the love and knowledge of it, has to reply to the thousand inquisitive questions of the wanderer travelling through it, with open mind interested on every side—questions which, by their motley succession and ever-changing contents, reveal the manifold impressions made by the scene on the wayfarer's mind—and, in addition, incidentally draws the tourist's attention to beauties and peculiarities which escape the stranger's eye ; and as he from his treasury of ancient legends and events, which he himself has witnessed, imparts to that monument, that house, that tree, its peculiarly memorable significance, so Bengel, intimate with the Bible by incessant study from early youth, accurately acquainted with its language, its histories, its niceties, penetrated with a pious love and reverence for it, leads us, instructing, replying, narrating, through its fertile plains. This is the learned, scientific side of his exposition ; the other is the manly and royal handling which he missed in his predecessors, comprehending all, great and small, in the one fundamental thought of the economy of God. Not only where Bengel plants piercing stings in the conscience, where he reproves, exposes, calls, consoles, stimulates, but everywhere he places reverently in the foreground whatever spiritual contents reside in Scripture, without himself adding anything to it. Hence, abundance of homiletic material is found in the Gnomon. Compare, for instance, Menken's sermons with it. Inward reverence and fear of the word of God communicate themselves involuntarily in the use of the Gnomon. Holy fear of everything, even the least, spoken by God, trembling and adoring joy at the glory of the kingdom of God and its inhabitants, which surpasses thought and anticipation, obedient earnestness towards the inviolable demands of the will of God, tender purity with which he sacredly handles holy things, breathe, like a fresh, soft breath of life, through this book.

We can now understand in what sense Bengel combined the different gifts of Grotius, Cocceius, Böhme, and Arndt. The theosophy of Böhme was certainly foreign to him. But he does not speak in utterly disparaging terms, but cautiously, of a theosophy founded in Scripture :—

"There are those who seek in Revelation a *sensum theosophicum, metaphysico-mysticum, microcosmicum, simul et macracosmicum*, or whatever else it may be called ; others reject it at once, pronouncing it to be fanatical stuff. For my part, I tremble to cast away without discrimination what does not militate against Scripture, but only more closely determines the utterances of Scripture ; otherwise I might slander something that is good and true, but only too high

and too deep for me. He is to be called to account who blindly rejects what may be actually a dream and an error. Without doubt, the foundation and circumference of this prophecy has a more secret length, breadth, height, and depth, than I can understand, of which I attain nothing, but what the perfectly clear expression of prophecy carries with it. Nevertheless, let every one of those who build on such theosophic foundations consider: Whether he has a divine certainty of what he teaches? Whether he so speaks, because he had a forerunner whom he considers peculiarly enlightened, or because he enjoys a gift at first hand? Whether he and it are in no point conflicting? Whether those who enjoy no such gift are bound to approve what he utters, or whether they could steer themselves into something of the sort? Whether he first acquired his knowledge from the veritable words of revelation, or whether he previously got it elsewhere, and afterwards discovered that the revelation agreed with it? And if, after all, it should be right, such expositions are, nevertheless, not perfect, if they do not so far condescend to revelation itself, as to exhibit what is to happen in the outward visible world by what is already fulfilled in history, and vigorously follow to its results, so far as it remains to be fulfilled. We must not desire to be more spiritual than the Spirit himself will have it; but in the language in which God speaks to us, we must both understand him and again discourse with men. They, on the contrary, accustom themselves so much to a certain kind of inward feeling, and a certain impression of secret things, that their understanding is almost inaccessible to the most convincing conclusion and proof derived from the words of prophecy and history. My heart is ready to receive with all desire and esteem an exposition of this book, penetrating to the innermost foundation of all things; but God leads us by degrees in the communication of his light, and we cannot place ourselves in the full conception of it by a single *raptus*, flight, or leap, away from so many forced human interpretations, over the proper literal understanding of the prophecies; and we dare not ascribe to extraordinary illumination and inspiration what we can attain by diligent research in the fear and invocation of God. That which is most secret may, as I most heartily acknowledge, be revealed to much worthier friends of God, and if these dare utter something of it, others do not therefore just thus apprehend it. On the contrary, what appears plainer is more necessary for the multitude."—(Erkl. Offenb., p. 388.)

Very significant is this utterance of Bengel, for this reason, that, on the one hand, he feared much play of imagination from the theosophic handling of Scripture, but at the same time he acknowledged the defect of his own endowments, which restrained him from penetrating to the deepest grounds of Scripture. To the defect of speculative endowment is to be ascribed the fact, that Bengel applied his insight into the inner connection and progress of the divine economy principally to the outward chain of dates, and in the exposition of the Apocalypse

remained entangled, in the church-historical view of it. The submissive subjection to whatever was prominently set forth in Scripture let him into the heart of it. But it was reserved for other more profound natures to advance further in the direction pointed out. Genial suggestiveness, spiritual fructification, was the task of Bengel, out of his modest and humble class-room, as a centre. The systematic development and speculative deepening which the ground-thoughts suggested by him have received from his pupils, under his influence, prove the extent and significance of his researches.

Bengel's *Gnomon*, his critical and chronological labours, are in the language of the learned, and are written for the learned. In general, his literary activity has scarcely extended beyond the circle of the learned world. Only his translation of the New Testament and his apocalyptic labours extended further; but they obtained such an extended influence, that the eyes of all the Württemberg pietists were speedily fastened on Bengel as their venerable head. The disciples of Bengel enter into the closest personal relationships with the people, and write more and more for the people. What, then, made Bengel's theology so popular that it soon ceased to interest the learned world, and became a thing of the people? The only answer to this question is, that Bengel rejected all forms of human dogmas which had made the Scripture tasteless to the people, and spoke in the deep childlike language of Scripture, which is intelligible to every mind open to the truth. The things handled, too, in Bengel's theology presupposed only the love of truth and earnest reflection, in order to interest men, and to be apprehended. Of course no intellectual culture was necessary in order to follow him into this domain, but an inward heart-cultivation, which came but little in contact with the various grades of human culture. Hence this theology grew over, more and more, out of the lecture-room, and mingled with congregational life, and gave it a peculiar stamp. The writings by which Bengel obtained influence over the congregation treated a branch which theologians hitherto had considered the least accessible to the people; yet Bengel succeeded in initiating the congregation into the fundamental ideas of the Bible through the Apocalypse. This popular character, too, which made the Scripture investigation of the Bengel theology accessible to the people, which exercised a distinct and moulding influence on them, has its foundation in Bengel, little as he himself emerged from the learned sphere. We need only read one of the epistolary testimonies of that period to him, for instance, No. 58, in "the letters of tried Christians to Stilling," in order to get a glance into the almost unearthly holy impression which his saintly presence made at the first meeting. Meanwhile,

Bengel in his day enjoyed universal esteem, and in the narrower circles of his fatherland and of his followers a prophetic reputation; but on the great course of the history of doctrines in Germany he exerted no immediate influence, and in the old church histories, a *g.*, Hencke, is only slightly mentioned; but he has, notwithstanding, outlived the heroes of his time, and obtains to-day first a decided influence, as he said before his death, "I shall be missed a while and forgotten, but afterwards shall again be anew sought out."

II. When we call the list of Wurtemberg theologians who attached themselves to Bengel "the school of Bengel," we are not to be understood as asserting that they appropriated the views of the master, and only worked them out further. They rather acted, according to their gifts and labours, much more freely towards the particular views of their master than the numerous party of Bengel among the parish clergy and the people of the country. Such kind of discipleship which swears by the words of the teacher, and forms a party, was incompatible with the spirit of Bengel's theology. The first thing a true pupil of Bengel learned was not to rely on men, but, fixing the eye on God, to draw truth from its fountain. Indeed the pious, reverential subjection of heart to the word of the Lord communicated itself to these men as the most marked feature of their investigation. It was less the special results of Bengel's labours which they appropriated than the direction which they received from their teacher in their search for truth. Their researches thus received a current utterly counter to the spirit of the times; and if their influence extended itself at first, especially to the narrower circle of their home, the labours of notable writers in more recent times, is striking again into the path opened up by them.

To appreciate the influence of Bengel, we must realise with what omnipotence the Leibnitz-Wolff theology had possessed itself, first of the philosophical, then of the theological, chair. It sought to rule over culture and conscience as exclusively as orthodoxy had done before it, and it tainted Christian doctrine in its deepest life-roots. Pietism, repelled by orthodox church authority, lost itself in the conventicle, and became estranged from scientific activity. The kingly character and pious zeal of Zinzendorf sucked the best marrow out of the church. Hence, in Germany, theology rushed into the arms of rationalism, and ecclesiastical life into the arms of worldliness, and the spiritual and social interests freed themselves more and more from ecclesiastical traditions. Only in Wurtemberg did Christian thought and life unfold themselves in joyous growth alongside of the inevitable influences of the spirit of the times. Along with the judicious attitude assumed by church authority towards pietism,

and the blessed preparatory work of a Hedinger, a G. C. Rieger, and a Weissmann, Wurtemberg is indebted principally to Bengel for this development.

When one realises the alternative offered to honest minds, either to withdraw obstinately into the fortress of a system built by vain human hand on divine ground, or to plunge without peace of heart into the wide field of a jejune wisdom invented by short-sighted men, one can understand the fresh, joyous, spiritual breath which breathes through the school of Bengel. While so many strove for light without finding it, knowledge here struck its roots on healthy ground, under friendly sunshine, into the depths of the divine secrets.

Glancing over the list of theologians, we meet with two different groups, though with fundamental features in common, who in the beginning walked side by side, but afterwards did not always come into friendly contact. The first group, whose most prominent representatives are first, J. Fr. Reuss, D. Burk, and Fr. Chr. Steinhöfer, more recently, C. H. Rieger, and M. Fr. Roos remained in the limits which had restrained Bengel himself. The second group, which is distinguished by the names of Fr. Ch. Oetinger, Ludwig Fricker, Ph. M. Hahn, and Michel Hahn, entered into treaty with philosophy, and carried out Bengel's ground-thoughts to a fuller systematic development.

Common to both tendencies was an impulse to research in the Scriptures, independent of the orthodox system. The systematising of theology according to the principle of justification by faith, lay without the circle of their thought. Whereas the seed-corn of Bengel's investigation impregnated all, more or less, with the desire to seek out, with wider vision, the ideas and the points of view peculiar to Scripture. They all cast aside the traditional terminology, searched *con amore* in the prophets, traced the ways of God in the sacred history, attentively considered the signification of the Biblical words, and their life-work was in everything a thoroughly popular one—they sought to lead the more awakened portion of the community to the inner understanding of the Scriptures. The first mentioned group, however, continued Bengel's work more in a re-productive than in a productive way. As Bengel himself never undertook a systematic working out of his theology, although the most fruitful germs for such a treatment were present to him, so the endeavours of these men were predominantly exegetical and practical. They busied themselves, in the spirit of Bengel, with those portions of Scripture to which the interest and gifts of each led them. Especially in the Old Testament they applied the fundamental ideas of Bengel, and particular parts of the New Testament were subjected by them to special

examination. Actuated, like their teacher, by deep and conscientious piety, by an earnest spirit of inquiry, and humble subjection to the word of God, they avoided, as he did, giving their deviation from the traditional doctrine currency more than necessary, and did not feel impelled to advance to a new systematic development of theology. Their interest being predominantly of a practical and religious character, they could take offence at the daring flight which their theosophic companions took, and be so much the more induced to limit themselves to the saving truths of most immediate practical value for edification. Reuss and Burk had their sphere of operation still principally in the learned world: Reuss in highly successful labours in the academical world, Burk in his valuable labours on the Old Testament, and his edition of the *Gnomon*. With the manifold influence of new currents, the direction which theological doctrine at Tübingen received in this way may be traced in men like Storr, E. Bengel, Schmid, into our century. The younger generation of the school, especially Rieger, Roos, as also the elder Steinhöfer, have the uncommon merit of having made the Biblical theology which Bengel originated the common property of all Christians. Not only did they exchange the language of the learned for the people's speech, but they succeeded in making intelligible, in a manner at once deep and simple, the riches of Christian truth; and they considered it a greater honour to dedicate their intellectual powers to the edification of the congregation than to shine in the learned world.

The writings of these men are now in the hand of all who love wholesome truth—too much approved to require eulogistic notice. The expositions of the apostolical epistles by Steinhöfer offer, even for learned theologians, a storehouse of clear, deep knowledge of Scripture, and in his sermons we find again Bengel's fundamental thoughts of the economy of God. Rieger's annotations on the New Testament render the treasures of the *Gnomon* available for the Christian people in the happiest manner. Roos's "*Footsteps of Abraham's Faith*" lead into the inner history of the life of faith, and open up the rich store of edification contained in the history of the Old Testament—too little searched into for this end. He, moreover, exerted himself, like Steinhöfer, in the track of Bengel, to clear up the original signification of the fundamental Bible thoughts, as his little book on the Biblical doctrine of the soul proves. But, as remarked, the theology of Bengel was not carried further in its inner development by the labours of these men, but applied diligently, and with a blessing, and popularised for the rich edification of the church.

The peculiarity of the second group of the Bengel school

that they connect Scripture investigation with philosophy, and unite mysticism to theosophy. On the other hand, however, these theologians are to be regarded as pupils of Bengel in a higher degree than the others, seeing that they took up the fundamental thoughts of Bengel's theology, and continued and advanced in the path which Bengel had opened up towards a connected, systematic knowledge of the truth. To build up the Biblical system of truth, in its inner organism, according to the fundamental thought of the economy of God, was reserved for those whose thirst for truth, and scientific necessity, impelled them to seek a connected knowledge of the ways of God, and whose fear of God bound them to Scripture as the only aid in this effort. As a desire for knowledge directed to the essence of things, and a pious subjection to the revealed word of God were combined in them, so the way chosen by them was thornier and stonier than the plain path of those who remained in the simpler circle of practical truths. The path of their development is marked by search, investigation, and growth, with many by-paths. They came into open collision with the traditional ecclesiastical system, and had to suffer from it. They ran the risk of forgetting the boundary between the one divine truth and the manifold forms of their own genius; we must therefore sift and prove while we use their researches, as they regarded themselves to be disciples of one master, and desired their doctrine to be tested at the source of truth. In spite, however, of the apparently unshackled character of their investigations,—for they bound themselves to no human authority,—in spite of the difference of form into which the difference of their intellectual tendencies led them, in spite of the startling things into which their disposition to dive into inaccessible depths brought them, in spite of the abuse caused by unripe disciples originating party and contention from the doctrine of their master,—in spite of all these evils, partly connected with the thing, and partly attaching themselves to it, one spirit, one fundamental thought pervades the investigation of these men, and their labours were a new breach towards a scriptural-connected knowledge of Christian truth. The harmonious spirit of their theology has been called “Biblical Realism,” whereby its relation to other philosophical and theological systems is well expressed. As realism it places itself in opposition to the spiritualism of ecclesiastical doctrine; as Biblical realism it confronts materialism and empirism.

The fundamental thought of the realism of the theosophic school which attached itself to Bengel, is that the invisible world of spirit is not only a world of thoughts and ideals, but a complete and formed world, whose forms of life only escape our senses, though they are more real and more complete than those

of the sensible world; nay more, though they lie at the foundation of the sensible world, as the hidden power of its life, and next, that the establishment of a spiritual bodily world of glory is the ultimate design of the whole world-development. This fundamental conviction of the living essentiality of the spirit-world asserted itself so strongly in these theologians, that they did not shun the consequence, but rather accepted it as the key of metaphysics, that the spirit is body, that the unseen world has a spiritual corporeality, which serves to the spiritual individual as well for limitation and form, as for an organ. In this view they found, as it appeared to them, the solution of the two deepest metaphysical problems: (1.) The transition from the absolute to the finite; the bond between God and the creature. (2.) The connection of the corporeal and spiritual world in one life; the bond between body and soul.

As regards the first, their realism could not imagine God who absolutely has life in himself, without body, *i. e.* without the forthbeaming of his hidden fulness of life and power. Along with the constant and immutable in God, they considered life and development, motion and communication, to be inseparable from his being; and thus, from the idea of God, they arrived at the idea of revelation. In this manifestation of God, the outshining of his hidden life, they found the ultimate grounds of the finite world, the living bond between God and the creature; between the absolute life of the Creator, and the distributed individual life of the creation. Without losing itself in the fatalistic consequences of Pantheism, realism thought of God as the all-working one, as the source and permanent power of all spiritual and corporeal life, and knew, moreover, a creaturely individual life acting with freedom within the all-life of God. Corporeally and spiritually, the creature, according to these pre-suppositions, entered into a living connection with God by a bond, embracing all manifestations of life; and the development of this relation implanted in life itself contains not only a relation of persons bound to each other by right and duty, but a real connection of life, which is subject to laws of growth. Because the creature is from God and in God, it is the dissolution of its own life when it places itself wilfully out of God, in whom it is.

Moreover, the theosophists thought they avoided the dualism, by which philosophy separated soul and body, or had seized the one at the expense of the other, by their principle of the corporeality of the invisible world. The spirit has its own corporeality, corresponding to its excellence; and it dwells with it in the sensible body as in a habitation, with the destination that our body shall become spirit. They thought that the mutual influence of body and spirit was thereby explained, its subordi-

nate position assigned to the earthly body, and that its true light was assigned to corporeality in general as the end of the ways of God. Finally, they saw in this connection of being and form, of power and organ, of spirit and body, the solution of the enigma of man's final destiny. It consists in the transfiguration of the creature to spiritual corporeality as a mirror of the glory of God.

It is scarcely necessary to indicate what significance such a fundamental view must acquire in its application to theology. The doctrines of the Trinity, of creation, of the relation of God to the creature, of the destiny of men, of original sin, of death, of the person of Christ, of revelation, of the atonement and redemption, of the new birth, of sanctification, of the future world, received thereby a new formation. The simple evangelical truths, which the Reformation brought to light, that an eternal atonement is founded only in the blood of Christ, that men are justified before God through faith alone, remained untouched, but the deeper grounding and systematic arrangement took quite another direction than in the traditional system of doctrine.

The theosophic school, with these doctrines, by no means wished to place a philosophical theory alongside of others. They stepped forward with the claim of drawing their fundamental ideas from Scripture itself. The doctrines of the manifestation in God as the living ground of the world, of the formed and completed corporeality of the heavenly world, of the destination of men to spiritual corporeality, of the laws of growth in the inner life, of the real completedness and manifoldness of the future world, upon the relation of the pre-existing word, on the one side to the Father, on the other to the man Jesus, were brought out of Scripture itself as the massive underlying thoughts of all revelation. The idea of LIFE was put at the top. God has it in himself, the creature only from him and in him. For our present condition life in the full idea of his word is a future, promised life, belongs essentially to the future aeon, and our present state is called in Scripture death. The holy Scripture certainly does not say God has a body, but the idea of the glory of God, as the ground, the power and the aim of his revelation and communication, runs through the whole Scripture. The idea attached by the Bible to the word *δόξα* (praise, honour, glory, brightness, clearness) is not only an ideal one like glorification, but a real one, the idea of a revelation of life which can be seen, heard, and tasted with spiritual senses, and which in the plan of creation is designed for man as the image of God, and by means of redemption shall again be communicated to him.

Hence glory in God corresponds exactly to what body is for man, and if it is a fact that in the man Jesus, as the anointed of God, the fulness of the Godhead bodily dwells, the living,

real bond between the invisible God and corporeal man is certain. Further, in Scripture the idea "spirit" is never opposed to the idea, "body," but the "flesh" is opposed to the spirit, and as there is a fleshly or soulish (seelischen) body, so too, there is a spiritual body. As a birth, a growing dawn of life from the flesh, is spoken of, so also is there a birth of the Spirit. The invisible world, the heaven, and the throne of God found in it, the central seat of his glory and government of the world, are set forth in Scripture as formed realities, which move and make themselves locally operative. Certainly, the throne of God is not subject to alteration of place, but the alteration of place is subject to the throne of God. Reflect on paradise, Sinai, the tabernacle, the temple of Solomon, and the vision of Ezekiel.

Finally, the future world of promise appears in the prophecy of Scripture, in much more defined, more real, features than the far-sighted word "eternal blessedness" expresses. A kingdom where God through Christ is all in all, and the whole creation a mirror of his glory, and which realises itself by gradual steps, forms the contents of the gospel; and as the length of the kingdom is measured by aeons, of which the aeon of this passing world is one, and the coming aeon of the imperishable world, for which the faithful wait, is a second, so its breadth is measured by all the nations of the earth, and its height by heaven and earth. Under the guidance of such fundamental thoughts, derived from Scripture, the path to a connected entire understanding of divine things was formed, and the way to the foundation and upbuilding of this system was Scripture investigation. It is easy to recognise how the germs of these thoughts were collectively at hand in Bengel, without his having himself developed them. His writings, particularly those on the Apocalypse, and his correspondence with friends, offer plain proofs of it. Bengel led the way in the search for the original and super-natural meaning of the words employed by the sacred writers; he first penetrated to this—to the viewing of holy Scripture as a whole—a connected memorial of the organically-membered economy of God; he had first directed his eyes to the glory of the future world. Therewith the ideal and historical complement of the previous mode of thought was propounded. His disciples continued the work begun, to attain a systematic knowledge of truth from the deeds and words of God.

Little as Bengel was of a philosopher, the principles raised by him found an immediate application to philosophy, in strong opposition to idealism; in Wurtemberg, by Chr. Fr. Oetinger and G. Ch. Storr; in North Germany, by Chr. A. Crusius. The memory of the last named has been revived by Delitzsch in his Biblico-prophetical theology. He penetrated through the theological spiritualism and philosophical idealism with which

he was surrounded, and attained a deeper insight into the teleological importance of corporeality, into the bond of mutual operation between the spiritual and bodily. At the same time he opposed a historical to the prevailing abstract, ideal method of thought which kept in view the development of revelation, and attempted to found a theory of liberty in opposition to determinism. Both combined gave to his idea of God, and his view of the world, a more lively form and one more corresponding to the facts of nature and of revelation, and made him the most important opponent of Wolffianism and of the rationalistic theology springing contemporaneously from it. *Principiis obsta!* Crusius had indeed begun his philosophical studies before he knew Bengel intimately; he sought essential truth, however, not in the measure which our limited ideas apply to supernatural things, but in the connection of the objective deeds and words of God. In this search Bengel became his leader, with whose writings he felt a mental affinity without personal contact. Like many others, Crusius was stimulated and impregnated by the fundamental thoughts of the Scripture, to which Bengel pointed, and by his bent to philosophical thought, he transferred the fundamental thought derived from his apprehension of Scripture to the domain of philosophy. He attacked the errors of the prevailing philosophy at their roots; and Kant attached himself to Crusius in that revolution of his which overthrew dogmatic idealism.

Oetinger, as a student in Tübingen, was so immersed in the monad doctrine of Leibnitz, that he only with difficulty extricated himself by the help of the scriptural ideas imprinted in him by Bengel; yet all the more decidedly and successfully did he oppose Biblical realism to idealism. In the profound desire to investigate the most secret foundations of life, he dived, with Böhme, and the help of chemistry, into theosophic depths. His fundamental ideas of the essential glory of God, of the corporeality and completedness of the invisible world, and of the organically-membered economy of God over heaven and earth, are drawn from Scripture, though in the footsteps of Bengel, with whom Oetinger was on a footing of most confidential personal intimacy. As Crusius opposed the living God of revelation to the dead idea-idols of Wolff, so Oetinger opposed to the doctrine of the simplicity of the soul, the idea of life as a real combination of harmoniously attuned powers, and made, in fact, the attempt to found a system on this idea of life. The philosophical ground-thoughts of Oetinger were subsequently detached from their Biblical foundation, and introduced by Schelling into German philosophy, were even partly drawn from it. As they in that day supplemented the one-sidedness of idealism, so now-a-days they oppose themselves as the most important adversary to the purely empirical science

of materialism. G. Chr. Storr appeared as Kant's opponent. He acknowledged the value of his criticism, as opposed to the logmatism of the Wolfian school, but brought into prominence the historical truth of Christianity. He not only defended the historical credibility of the Bible, but found the significance of Christianity generally in this, that it is a certain, historical, divine fact. That, moreover, was a point of view which Bengel had deposited in men's minds. Storr's supernaturalistic circle of thought moved otherwise very much in the Scripture-stranged ideas of the philosophy of his time.

In his apology for Scripture in its literal truth against Semler's accommodation theory, Storr trod in the footsteps of a predecessor—the Chancellor Reuss, the younger friend and disciple of Bengel—who in earlier years had written against the philosophy of Wolff, and defended, as an old man with force and dignity, the Revelation of St John against the virulent attacks of Semler. In consequence of this transfer of the Scripture thoughts brought to light by Bengel to science in general, we see the isolated noble minds who, in last century, would not submit to the yoke of the spirit of the times, entering into intimate connection with the school of Bengel. Hamann became attentive to Bengel's Gnomon, and Hahn's sermons were his Sabbath reading for edification. No direct relation of Herder to Bengel is known to us ; but his philosophy of history, and his appreciation of revelation, during his more positive period, indicate a partial mental affinity, for which the sympathy with which Herder's theological writings were received among the Württemberg school offers proof. The relations of the Zurich thinkers to the Bengel school were more immediate. Lavater, Pfenninger, and Hess, maintained the closest, personal, and epistolary intimacy with Hahn. While Lavater shared the views of the Bengel school about eternity, and his leaving to the man Jesus, the Saviour, Hess was more intimately related to them by his theologico-historical standpoint and idea of the kingdom of God. The same threads may be traced on the lower Rhine. Through Ludwig Fricker, who carried Oetinger's writings thither, and subsequently, through Ph. M. Hahn's writings and epistolary influence, the theological conviction of Collenbusch and the brothers Hasenkamp attained their peculiar form, which then found in G. Menken an important representative. Also Witzenmann, Ewald, Von Cölln, Disperger, Jung Stilling belong to this circle. In the consciousness of their spiritual affinity in the Lord, these men attended to each other the right hand of fellowship, and maintained an epistolary correspondence in the so-called Swabian correspondence-books. Hahn originated the idea ; and the doctrines of the atonement, the last things, the gifts of the

Spirit, and also single points of the Christian life, were discussed; but above all, fellowship in the common faith was cherished. In the volumes lying before us, there are letters from Hahn, Lavater, Pfenninger, Hess, the Swiss fellow-countryman, Kaufmann and Bosshardt, from Collenbusch, and the brothers Hasenkamp, Seyd in Wichlinghausen, Hoffman in Düsseldorf, from Thomas Witzenmann, from Ewald, from v. Cölln, Häfeli, and others.

After this general sketch of the theosophical school which attached itself to Bengel, in their fundamental thoughts and in their relation to the culture of the age, the two most important representatives of it, Oetinger and Hahn, offer so much that is peculiar to themselves, that it is not without interest to enter into their different ways of getting at a systematic view of truth from Scripture.

We have already indicated, in the sketch of Bengel's theology, that a thirst for knowledge directed to the essence of things may, from his fundamental views, arrive at a theological system in two ways. A tracing of the ultimate fundamental ideas, and their organic connection, led to a system of BIBLICAL METAPHYSICS, and a development of the plan of the economy of God through all times laid THE HISTORICAL POINT OF VIEW at the foundation of the system. A system of Christian doctrine attained in the last way, worked out most purely the ground-thought brought to light by Bengel, and ran the least risk of mingling its own metaphysics with the Scripture thoughts. The first method promised richer booty for philosophical speculation. Indeed, Oetinger and Hahn made attempts to attain to a comprehensive knowledge of Christian truth by both methods: Oetinger with wider horizon, more original genius, and deeper metaphysics; Hahn with a purer Biblical method, and greater systematic results. Oetinger leant more on Böhme, Hahn had greater affinity with Cocceius.

"With Oetinger," said Schubart, "a whole academy of sciences was borne to the tomb. His was a profound mind, restlessly penetrating to the roots of things, embracing wide paths, towering above all the disciples of Bengel in intellectual significance. As his method called up the secret common sense of men, the results of the attentive experience of life, and the revealed word of Scripture combined, as witnesses of the one truth, so he traced in outward nature, in the inner process of life, in the formation of law and custom, the powers working from within, and sought to view in God everything connected for one life and aim. His mind was too unsteady and active, too expanded and many-sided, to attain to a formal systematic development of his philosophy; yet one thought lay at the foundation of his restless search for truth, which we have already described by

the characteristic of Biblical realism. Life appeared to him to be a harmoniously attuned combination of powers; and he sought, with Böhme, to view separately these simple powers of the kabbala and chemistry, whose unity is life. The conviction of the corporeality of spirit attached itself to this, which peculiarly defined and bound together his doctrine of God, of man, of the future world. The aim of his theological efforts was, to search out the ultimate ideas of Scripture, and to guard their full supernatural contents against the evacuating method of spiritualistic exposition. LIFE and GLORY are the two foundation pillars which imparted unity to Oetinger's principles on God, the world, and redemption.

If Oetinger did not succeed in controlling the expanses and depths, which he sounded with his thoughts, by one clearly uttered and firm central position, we meet in Hahn a circle of thoughts, more limited in extent and depth, but also a more systematic formation and complete finish. Hahn was a very independent, but not an original, genius as a theologian. His essential thoughts he took in through the influence of Bengel and Oetinger, but indeed only preserved what is essential, subsequently shaking off the peculiarities and specialties of these men. He was no metaphysician, and what of metaphysical theology was imported into his writings he got from Oetinger, before his own system of thought was completed, and was subsequently abandoned. His thought was confined within the limits of the economy of God with the human race, and within these limits his efforts were directed towards a connected knowledge of it. He stood with Oetinger on the ground of Biblical realism, but his thinking was historical, directed to facts. He sought nothing more than to know the plan, development, and design of the divine revelations, in their harmonious connection. Hence, in him Bengel's theology found its purest, most developed cultivation. The ground-thought of Bengel has been preserved unadulterated in him, and worked out with the greatest systematic success; and therefore we have chosen him, in order, if God gives time and strength, to throw light on the investigation of Bengel, by a more detailed exhibition of his theology.

As in the case of the practical group of Bengel's school, the transition from the learned to the popular form was gradually accomplished, so, too, was it in the theosophic. Oetinger laboured half for the learned world, half for the people. But Ph. M. Hahn wrote exclusively for the awakened Christian people. M. Hahn, who dived successfully into metaphysic depths, belonged himself to an uneducated position. The more the Bengel school was pushed aside with profound contempt, by the scientific spirit of the time, the more deeply did it

strike its roots into the inner life of the congregation, and drew renewed strength from this fellowship, so that it never petrified into an inoperative system of doctrine. A sketch of the manifold blessed influences of Bengel and of his school on Christian congregational life in Wurtemberg and beyond it, we must, with regret, forego, in a treatise on Bengel's theological significance. We, however, indicate, in fine, the connection in which the new Biblical school stands to it. The most important names which connect the believing theology of recent date with the last century, as Stilling in Baden, Blumhardt in Basel, Spleiss in Schaffhausen, v. Meyer in Frankfort, Jänicke in Berlin, Marken in Bremen, and others, point back, as is apparent from the biographical notices of them which we have received, and from their writings, direct to Bengel and the Würtemberg theologians. In the same manner, Hengstenberg and Stier, Hoffmann, Delitzsch, Kurz, Baumgarten, Beck, and Auberlen, have partly the most striking inner affinity with the Bengel school, partly, too, have, in the history of their education, a more or less immediate connection with it. As Beck's theology reminds us of Oetinger, so the system of Hoffmann has the most striking resemblance to Ph. M. Hahn's, although both rest entirely on intellectual affinity.

If an entirely different and mightier theological movement has gone forth from Schleiermacher, which, as regards method, still influences the most of our theologians, yet the approximation of Nitzsch, Rothe, Müller, and others, to the theological authority of Scripture, points, if not to direct contact with the Bengel school, at least to an approaching more general justification of the principles asserted by it.

If the author has succeeded in setting in a clearer light the theology of Bengel, whose works are named with veneration, and recommended with warmth, even by those who strive against the spirit of his theology as a heretical phantom, the design of his labour is accomplished.

Now-a-days, some importance attaches to the historical demonstration, that there is a higher objectivity of holy thoughts than the objectivism of ecclesiastical orthodoxy; that there is another humble subjection to the authority of Scripture than the analysis and polemical treatment of single proof passages; that there is, finally, another scientific system than that which makes the short span of subjective feeling and thoughts the standard of God's ways and works. It is, moreover, valuable to prove, that the penetrating views which now-a-days strike afresh into the more general theological movement, were, in a former age, given to humble God-fearing inquirers.

ART. V.—*The Resurrection-Body.**

A LITTLE child receives its father's teachings with unquestioning faith. Its own love is a guarantee of the parent's, and the parent's love is the guarantee of truth. Nor is its trustful axiom, "Whatever my father says is true," in the least impaired when, after a year or two of progressive knowledge, it begins to ask, "In what sense is it true? and with what limitations?" for, in process of time, it discovers that what was perfectly true to its infantile conception, is not all the truth to be discerned by its maturer reason.

The church of God, which was once a little child in the knowledge of physics and psychology, though less so, perhaps, than our boastful moderns maintain, and which ought never to be otherwise in spirit, sustains very nearly such a relation to the precious doctrine of the body's final resurrection. Our heavenly Father told us, long since, in the infancy of our faith, not to be afraid of death,—that it is not what, to the eye of flesh, it seems to be, the end of our bodily being; that it is only a "sleep," and that, after a certain period of repose passed in the grave, these same bodies shall awake to light and to immortal life. Or, if this is not taught in so many words, *it seems to be*; for this is the substance of this teaching, when interpreted according to its first and most obvious meaning. Now, we believe what he says; we believe every word of it; and the more earnest our love, the more firm our faith; but, remembering the rule of our opening childhood, and remembering, too, that language is to be rightly interpreted only by its evident intentions, we are inclined, after having made some little progress in knowledge, to pause and ask, In what sense is his language true? and with what limitations? Shall we understand it as we did in the simplicity of the world's childhood? Or, conscious that, though children, yet we are, as a generation, "older than our fathers," and possessed of knowledge which they had not, shall we compare this truth with other truths given to us, and thus modify our former conceptions? *All truth* is of God.

We shall better understand the posture of the subject by taking a rapid survey of its history. The doctrine of the resurrection—one of the sweetest to the pious in prospect of death, and one of the most comforting to those who lay their loved ones in the grave,—is peculiar to the sacred Scriptures, and belongs almost exclusively to the New Testament. The earliest

* This article is from the *Southern Presbyterian Review* (American). It shows the real points of difficulty, but goes, perhaps, further than is necessary in the explanation of the mode.—ED. B. & F. E. E.

announcement of it, in such terms as to leave no doubt of its import, is to be found in the language of "the evangelical prophet," where he says (Isa. xxvi. 19), "The dead even shall live; together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust; for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead." The next and only other satisfactory passage, in the Old Testament, is in the Book of Daniel (xii. 2), "Many of them [or, the multitude of them] that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." It will no doubt be painful to many to learn that the celebrated passage in Job xix. 25-27, beginning with, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," and constituting a part of the impressive burial service of the Church of England, cannot be relied upon as a proof text on this subject, since it is given up by the great body of learned men (including Calvin, Grotius, Le Clerc, Patrick, Warburton, Eichhorn, Jahn, and many others), as not touching the doctrine of the resurrection at all. It is a remarkable fact, and worthy of note by the Biblical student, that throughout the Pentateuch and the historical books, not the first allusion to the general resurrection occurs.* What ideas may have been excited by the bodily translations of Enoch and Elijah, or whether any ideas whatever on the subject were entertained for the three thousand years preceding Isaiah's day, we have no means of judging.

Between the close of the Old Testament canon, however, and the opening of the New, the doctrine of a partial, if not a general, resurrection, seems to have become deeply rooted in the minds of the people. We find traces of this fact in a postscript to the Book of Job in the Septuagint, dating at least two hundred and fifty years before Christ, "But it is written that he shall rise again with those whom the Lord raises." Also, in 2d Maccabees vii. 14 (written about one hundred and fifty years before Christ, concerning current events), where one of the seven brothers, martyred by Antiochus, is represented as saying to him, "It is good, being put to death by men, to look for hope from God to be raised up again by him: as for thee, thou shalt have no resurrection to life." The Jews of our Saviour's day were divided in their opinions. The Sadducees, who professed to be guided in their faith by the plain letter of Scripture, without regard to traditional interpretations, and particularly to believe in the writings of Moses, who says nothing on this subject, rejected utterly, or at least disputed, the doctrine of the resurrection; while the Pharisees, who professed to believe in

* This does not consist with the declaration of our Lord, quoted by the author himself (see below, page 488), from Luke xx. 37, "Now that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush," &c., &c.—Eds. S. P. E.

"the resurrection of *the just*" (to the exclusion, it would seem, of the resurrection of the wicked), held at the same time such gross opinions about the continuance in another world of the relations existing in this, as to expose themselves to the just ridicule of their opponents.

In the teaching of our Saviour and his apostles, this doctrine occupies so prominent a place, that it has constituted an article of faith in every Christian church from that day to the present. Most of the churches have contented themselves with using the language of the apostles' creed, "I believe in . . . the resurrection of the dead." Others, however, go farther. The Heidelberg Catechism, published in 1563, says, "*My body* [or, *my flesh*] also being raised by the power of Christ, shall be united with my soul, and be like the glorious body of Christ." The Synod of Dort, in 1618, representing the churches of the united provinces, and of England, Scotland, Switzerland, and other countries, expressed themselves thus: "For all the dead shall be raised out of the earth, and their souls joined and united with *their proper bodies*, in which they formerly lived." But by no church has the doctrine been enunciated with greater fulness and precision than our own, both in the Confession of Faith and in the Larger Catechism. In the first of these (chap. 32, art. 2), it is said, "At the last day, such as are alive shall not die, but be changed; and all the dead shall be raised up *with the self-same bodies, and none other, although with different qualities*, which shall be united again with their souls for ever."

With these time-honoured decisions of the church, Christians generally have appeared to be content. Occasionally, however, men of restless minds, dissatisfied with the grounds on which these decisions have been based, and stimulated by new discoveries, real or supposed, in the physical sciences, have called in question the sense in which we are to understand the Bible doctrine of the resurrection. Among these, the most distinguished for ability, and at the same time for failure, is the late eminent Prof. Bush. In the years 1844 and 1845, he put forth two books ("*Anastasis*" and "*The Soul*"), in which he endeavoured to prove, first by a "rational argument," and then from the Scriptures, that there is to be expected *no resurrection*, either general or particular, in the usually received acceptation of the term,—that the body to be re-united with the soul, in the future state, is not, *in any sense*, the one committed to the grave, but that it is the psyche (*ψυχή*) or psychical body "which constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and lives again in another world, *because it cannot die*,"—that this physical body is *not raised up* from the grave, but is "developed, by a natural law, from the material body at death,"—

and that what we are to expect in the resurrection is, not a change to take place at the end of the world, but that at the instant of each person's death the psyche, or vital principle, "which conjointly (with the intelligence) constitute the essence of the man," goes forth from the body. The scheme of the unfortunate philosopher was, however, so gross a departure from the manifest teachings of that volume on which the pious rely more confidently than on any deductions of mere reason, that few persons, except himself, appear to have been led away by his error. The theory has in a great measure died with its author.

And yet the agreement among Christians upon this interesting point is more seeming than real. The main doctrine, that there is to be a final, general resurrection, is conceded by many as a plain teaching of revelation, as well as of the church catholic; while the question, "With what body shall we come?" involving largely the substance of the main doctrine, is still discussed with great diversity of opinion. Indeed, a close examination of the terms, quoted from the above-cited Confessions, will reveal the fact that, admitting, with perfect sincerity, their authority, both theological and exegetical, their indefiniteness is such (perhaps intentionally) as to admit of widely different interpretations.

An ancient Pharisee, for instance, might have said, in the language of the Heidelberg Catechism, *I believe that our bodies being raised shall be united with our souls*; or, in the language of the Synod of Dort, *"The dead shall be raised out of the earth, and their souls joined and united with their proper bodies, in which they formerly lived,"* or, in the language of our own Confession, *"The dead shall be raised with the self-same bodies, and none other;"* and yet it is well known that they held some grave errors in connection, which our Saviour in part corrected, when he said to his disciples, "the children of the resurrection neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God." The grosser forms of this error have long since disappeared from the church; still its germ manifestly exists, and exhibits itself under many refined, though it may not be harmless, forms.

A second phase in popular opinion has been brought about by modern discoveries in physiology. A few generations back, no one conceived the possibility of a person's having more than one body during his earthly life. But the fact is now universally familiar, that we change our bodies as we do our garments, only not so suddenly or so perceptibly; and that in the course of the threescore and ten years allotted to man, the change may occur as many as ten times. The question, therefore, has arisen, *Which of these TEN complete bodies is to be THE body raised up at the last day?*

If it is replied, the last one worn, then there arises other difficulties. This "last body" is known in some instances to enter into the composition of other "last bodies." A ship's crew, for instance, are driven to the horrid necessity of cannibalism. In the course of a few days, one of the men, whose body is composed in part of the "last body" of his comrade, falls a second victim. The process is continued; and finally the remainder of the crew, whose bodies are composed of the compound and recompounded bodies of those devoured, are engulfed in the ocean. Who, by any conceivable mode of reasoning, can disentangle from this hopeless intricacy the "my body" of the Heidelberg Catechism, the "proper body" of the Synod of Dort, or the "selfsame body, and none other," of our own Confession? It is manifest that, if by these terms we are to understand the *entire last body of each*, the propositions involve an absurdity. Nor is this all. It were easy to shew, on sound chemical principles, that the dissolved elements of our material structure escape from the grave, are borne by winds and waters in boundless diffusion over the earth's surface, and become incorporated into thousands of plants, the food of men and beasts, or are received by the lungs into the blood, and thence into the solid structure of other human beings; so that there is probably not an individual on earth whose body is not in part composed of elements that belonged in turn to the last bodies of hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of the race. The thought bewilders.

For this last difficulty, it may be replied, that the resurrection-body will be composed of so much and no more of its former materials as may be necessary to a *consciousness of identity*. We will just take a peep into this part of the subject. The human frame, besides its organised (or, more correctly, its *organising*) vitality—"the psychical body," or "essential vitality," of Prof. Bush—is composed of certain substances well known to chemistry, the principal of which are carbon, lime, potash, iron, sulphur, phosphorus, oxygen, hydrogen, &c. But can lime think? Can *potash* be conscious? Can any aggregation or combination of these inert substances be made to know anything of identity? Of course not. Then the identification spoken of must be the act of the intelligent *soul*, and not the act of the material body. But what do we mean when we speak of the soul's identifying its former body? That it shall recognise certain long-scattered particles of carbon, lime, iron, &c., as being *the identical* lime and carbon which once composed its earthly house? Scarcely; for every atom of any one substance is so exact a counterpart of every other of the same substance, that, in the reconstruction of the future body, one particle would suit as well as another, and be as much the

subject of identification. It is not the mere matter, viewed in any form we will, that can constitute the body to be finally identified. The mind is not satisfied with any conception of "body," in this connection, that does not include the idea of *vital organism*. But are we to suppose that this essential endowment of the animal nature survives death and continues its existence through the lapse of ages, until evoked from the grave by the returning soul? Assuredly not—at least in the only aspect of the case acknowledged by science; for, if there is anything in man which seems to come to an end, it is his animal vitality; and if there is anything in him which is dissoluble, and actually dissolved in the grave, it is his animal organisation. The whole structure, so far as the solid and gaseous substances above mentioned are concerned, becomes resolved into its chemical elements; and these elements having served one of their many purposes in constituting his material body, are called to serve other purposes, and probably to constitute other bodies, ere the day of the general resurrection. Then *what* shall be the subject of the soul's identification? So far as we are able to see, it cannot be inert elementary matter. It cannot be the extinct animal organisation. The question still is, *What?*

In thus pursuing the subject, under the guidance of human knowledge, we find ourselves getting into deep waters, but still able to touch bottom; and feeling that we have not forsaken "the Rock," let us for security return to where that Rock is more plainly manifest. *What say the sacred Scriptures on the subject of the resurrection-body?*

The language of the Old Testament has been in part considered. The passage in Job, we are informed by those to whose judgment we bow, is inadmissible as a proof-text; and in referring to the others (Ps. lxxi. 20; Ezek. xxxvii.; Isa. xxvi. 19; and Dan. xii. 2) we ascertain that whatever they may tell us of a resurrection to be expected, they shed no light upon the particular point in question. What may we glean from the language of him who, on all points of truth and duty, spake as never man spake? Selecting only such passages as may give us light, we come first to John v. 21-29: "As the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, so the Son quickeneth whom he will. . . . The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live. . . . All that are in the graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation." In this doctrine of a universal resurrection, we are taught that in the resurrection-body we are to expect something which had been deposited in the grave—which had been regarded as dead

—yet which had been so preserved in existence* that it was capable finally of being vitalised and of changing place. Again, John xi. 11–26: “Our friend Lazarus sleepeth, but I go that I may awake him out of sleep. . . . Lazarus is dead.

. . . Thy brother shall rise again. . . . I am the resurrection (*i. e.*, of those already dead) and the life (*i. e.*, of those who are yet to die); he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live (*i. e.*, in the body), and he that believeth in me shall never die.”† In these words of our Saviour we have an instance of that sweet thought (recorded first in Daniel xii. 2), so often repeated by the early Christians, and even yet embalmed in our word *cemetery*, or sleeping-place, that, “in the language of heaven, death is the sleep of the pious,” (Bengel); and we may gather from it the hint, elsewhere more fully expanded, that, as in sleep the vitality is not extinct, but only dormant, and capable of being reawakened, so in death the resurrection-body, whatever it may be, is not wholly deprived of its existence as a body, but is only in a state of transitional repose between one period of activity and another. Again, Matt. xxii. 23–33; Mark xii. 18–27; and Luke xx. 27–38, on that occasion, when the Sadducees, who disputed the doctrine of the body’s resurrection, came to the Saviour proposing that conjectural case of a woman with seven husbands, which the Pharisees, with their gross ideas on the subject, found so difficult to answer, he replied: “The children of this world (*i. e.*, persons in the present life) marry and are given in marriage, but the children of the resurrection (or persons in the future state, after the reunion of soul and body) neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are *as the angels* (*ὡς ἄγγελοι*, Matt. and Mark) of God in heaven; neither can they die any more, for they are *equal unto the angels* (*ἰσαγγελοι*, Luke xx. 37). Now, that the dead are (*i. e.*, to be) raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for *all live unto him*.” The following remark, made by the prince of commentators quoted above, is worthy of notice here, although out of its appropriate place (Bengel’s Gnomon, John xi. 15): “It is beautifully in accordance with the divine decorum, that we never read of any one continuing dead in the presence of the *Lord of life*.” Our Saviour teaches us that God is not the

* “The restoration of life to the body is one day to take place, in virtue of the *immanent* principle of the new life which proceeds from Christ.”—Tholuck *in loco*.

† Compare this passage with Rom. viii. 11—“If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken *your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you*.”

God of the dead, but of the living ; and that, in a certain and important sense, the Abraham, and the Isaac, and the Jacob, that are to be after the resurrection, even now live with him. They are not dead. He also teaches that "the children of the resurrection" shall be "*like the angels*," in this respect, that the relation of sex shall no longer exist ; and that they shall be "*equal to the angels*," in this other respect, that they shall not be subject to bodily death, which is equivalent to saying that they shall undergo radical changes in their bodily structure, appetites, and liabilities.

Putting together, now, in one connected view the facts concerning the resurrection-body, given to us by our great Master, we learn : 1, That, at that time, and in that event, known as the general resurrection, there shall emerge from "the grave" a something deposited there, and called "dead ;" 2, That, however, it is not dead, since it "lives unto God ;" but it is in that state which may properly be called "sleep," and from which it can be awakened ; and 3, That the future body shall be radically different from the present body in its structure, appetites, and powers, being in these made "*like the angels*," or "*equal to the angels*." And now, with these hints as to the character of the resurrection-body, gained from the lips of the Great Teacher, let us compare the teachings of those who, though infinitely inferior to him in personal authority, were commissioned to speak in his name, and to unfold more fully his doctrines, under the guidance of the Divine Paraclete.

1. The central thought, imbedded in the language of our Lord to Martha, "I am the resurrection and the life," &c. (that the body laid in the grave is not wholly dead, but that there is an occult vitality kept somewhere), seems to be alluded to in other passages besides that already quoted from Rom. viii. 11. It is glanced at by the apostle in Col. iii. 4, where he says, "When Christ, *who is our life* (both of soul and body), shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory ;" and also in 1 Thess. v. 16, "Christ died for us, that whether we wake or sleep (*i. e.*, whether we are bodily alive or dead), we should live together with him." The allusion, in these passages, to an extra-natural energy pervading the dead body is, however, so obscure that we only notice it and pass on.

2. The prophetic fact implied in the language of our Saviour to the Sadducees, that very great changes shall take place in the future body, is repeated by the apostles Paul and John, with an important addition which was not possible in our Saviour's day. Christ "shall change our vile body," says Paul (Phil. iii. 21), "that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body." "*Beloved*," says the apostle John (1 John iii. 2), "it doth not yet appear what we shall be ; but we know that when he shall

appear we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." The glorious body of Christ is the type on which our glorified bodies shall be constructed. As he is, so, only in an inferior degree, shall we be. Some persons, in commenting upon this passage, seem to think that they are warranted from it to depict the future body as being one like that which was assumed by Christ at the Mount of Transfiguration, or like that which was seen by John in the apocalyptic vision. But it is a significant fact, and worthy of being remembered by those who entertain this opinion, that *the same John*, who witnessed the transfiguration, and to whom the glorious vision in the isle of Patmos was given, says, "Beloved, WE [*i. e.*, you and I] KNOW NOT *what we shall be*." It is not reasonable, therefore, to hold that the glorious body of Christ, seen in either of these cases, is to be the type of ours. What is to be its shape or appearance, John says, "we know not."

3. The richest mine, however, in which we may dig for thoughts upon this subject is in the 15th chapter of 1 Corinthians. In that is embodied all that is elsewhere implied, and with an eloquent fulness, that leaves upon every mind the sense of satisfaction. But even in this rich mine we must gather humbly and cautiously, for two reasons: First, because it is probably not within the power of human language to describe the things that belong to the unseen world; and secondly, because at the very outset of his remarks upon this subject, "the chiefest of the apostles," in reply to a supposed trifler, who asks the question, "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" says, "Thou fool." But, inquiring cautiously, we find some hints of a most valuable character. (1.) Verse 36, "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die." The figure here used, and kept up through most of what is said, is, that *the body is a seed*. It possesses an innate vitality. Its dissolution and alteration of parts, so far from being a real death, is only the prelude and prognostication of a glorious development. This, it will be perceived, is only the repetition, under another form, of the idea expressed by our Lord to Martha, "He that liveth and believeth in me shall never die." (2.) Verse 37, "Thou sowest not that body that shall be." The body that shall emerge from the grave shall not be the same, except in part—in very small part—with that deposited there. The body placed in the grave is the germ; the resurrection-body is the development of that germ by the addition of elements not found in the seed itself. (3.) Verse 38, "God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body." Each human body placed in the ground, like each seed, will be developed according to its distinguishing idiosyncracies. The two bodies (that buried and that raised)

shall be the same, just as the seed put in the ground is the same with the stem, leaf, flower and fruit of the mature plant; but they shall differ in substance, configuration, adaptness, and mode of existence.* (4.) Verses 39, 40, "All flesh is not the same flesh. . . . There are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial." Not only may the same substance differ in texture, as do the different kinds of flesh, but also in impressiveness of appearance, as do the sun, moon, stars, and earth—which are all material, but as different in aspect as a stone on earth is from a star in the sky. (5.) Verse 42, "So, also, is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption." "Corruption," perishableness, dissolubility, is as true of what is mortal as of what is dead. "Incorruption," the antithesis of this, if construed as the attribute of a material structure, such as seems to be all along implied, is strictly predicable, so far as we can see, of that only which is uncompounded. This idea was no doubt familiar to the mind of Paul, being continually taught in the philosophy of that day. The teaching of the text, therefore, may be that the future body shall be marked with elementary simplicity, possibly constructed of some uncompounded, and therefore indissoluble, substance. It certainly teaches that the body to be shall be imperishable. (6.) Verse 43, "It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power." "Sown in dishonour"—stripped of its majesty as the head of the animal creation; deprived of its glory as a wonderful machine, and rendered offensive to the eye; banished, like a felon, from society, fettered with grave clothes, and condemned to a cell. "It is raised in glory"—released from its prison; redeemed from its fetters; endowed with more beauty and majesty than was possible for it on earth; and become resplendent with the imparted glory of Christ. (Phil. iii. 21.) "Sown in weakness." It never was capable of fulfilling the higher behests of the spirit, and now it can fulfil none. "The weakness which belonged to it in life, is perfected in death," (Hodge). "It is raised in power,"—"instinct with energy,"—endowed, possibly, with "new senses,"† or "with faculties of which we have now no conception,"‡—a thing of power, not liable to accidents of injury or dissolution, and

* It is possible to find in this language the obscure hint of a future recognition. The idea has been expressed by a learned writer, that every angelic and other heavenly being is a *species* complete in itself, inasmuch as each is a distinct creative product, without parentage or posterity. If, therefore, in the isangelic condition of the resurrection-body we are to regard each individual as a species, complete in itself, it is not impossible to conceive that the specific development of the future body may be so far influenced by the known idiosyncracies of the earthly seed, that each person who knew another in this life should be able to recognise his development in the other.

† Grotius.

‡ Hodge.

capable of fulfilling to the utmost every demand made upon it by the immortal spirit. (7.) Verse 44, "It is sown a natural (i. e., an *animal*) body," consisting of flesh, blood, and bones—a body that *must breathe*, and that without breath must die—a body moulded by the organic life to suit the necessities of *food, repose, and reproduction*. "It is raised a spiritual body"—one that need not breathe, since it is breath of itself,*—a body that never hungers nor thirsts; that is never weary, nor reproduces its kind; a body that is moulded by the organizing energy within it out of such materials, and wrought by it into such shape, as shall suit the spirit. (8.) Verse 50, "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." The words "flesh and blood" constitute a paraphasis of definite significance; and in this passage they are evidently used to mean "the body as now constituted" (Hodge), or "man, as far as the circulation of the blood quickens his flesh," (Bengel). The earthly bodies of all, and even of those who are alive at the general resurrection, shall be changed, so that they shall be no longer "flesh and blood," but something *not unfit* for entering the glorious kingdom of God.

This concludes our inquiry into the teaching of the sacred Scriptures on the subject of the resurrection-body. Let us now, as at a former point, gather into a synoptical view the substance of what we have gained. We learn—

1. That at the general resurrection, there shall emerge from the grave something that had been placed there and regarded as dead.
2. That this dead thing, however, shall retain throughout its repose a vitality, extra-natural and occult, continued in it by him who is "the resurrection and the life;" in consequence of which its seeming death is called "sleep."
3. That this *dead life* of the body, in its intermediate state, is analogous to that of germinating seed, which dies to live, and which lives in its death.
4. As to the *elements* of the future body; that it shall not consist of "flesh and blood," as our bodies do now; and yet that it shall sustain to its former body the relation which the developed plant sustains to the germ.
5. As to its *form and appearance*; that every human body shall be developed according to rules, not made known to us ("God giveth a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body,") yet rules that exist, and in view of which we may conceive a mutual recognition as possible; but that the future body may be no more like the present than a star is like a stone, or than the grain of the harvest field, or the

* Alluding to the meaning of the original word (*πνευματικόν*), translated "spiritual."

beauty of an opening flower, is like the seed from which it sprang. 6. As to its *qualities* and *capabilities*, that it shall be negatively (1), No longer corruptible, or liable to decay and dissolution; (2) Nor dishonoured by wearing the badges of sin; (3) Nor inadequate to the desires of the spirit; (4) Nor dependent, by reason of its organisation, on breath, food, and rest. Positively, that it shall be, (1) For ever indissoluble: by which we may understand, constructed out of some pure, uncompounded substance; (2.) Endowed with a majesty and beauty unknown on earth; (3) Instinct with power—gifted, perhaps, with new senses, and capable of fulfilling the utmost demands of the spirit; and (4) Moulded by the life-giving energy within to suit the then existing life, as the bodily organisms are now moulded to suit the animal necessities.

Furnished now with light, which in a case of this kind must be regarded as incomparably more reliable than any light of mere philosophy, let us revert to the question so abruptly terminated a few pages back, at the words, "What shall be the subject of the soul's identification? So far as we are able to see, it cannot be inert elementary matter; nor extinct animal organisation. Then, what?" Let us inquire *how far we can see*. What is matter? What is animal organisation? To what extent is science able to pronounce upon them with such certainty as to demand a modification of the views usually held by intelligent Christians respecting the resurrection-body? Look where we may through nature, we are impressed with the evidence of two physical coexistences—an object acted upon, and an agent that acts upon it. That object we call matter, and the agent, physical force. These two are ever found in union. We cannot separate them even in our thoughts, for, when describing one, we are compelled to bring in the idea of the other. Force we define as "the cause of motion," that is, in matter; and matter we define (when reduced to its utmost possible simplicity, and its ultimate essential indication) by its "inertia," which means its relation to force. Yet that they are distinct, —perfectly, and even antipodally,—we gather from the very terms of the definition; matter is not and cannot be potential, —for this is the prerogative of force; and force is not and cannot be inert—this is the attribute of matter. Or, if they are to be regarded as being one and the same, it can be only by conceiving them, if such a conception is possible, as *opposite polarities* of the same physical existence. This is a point where our philosophy is perfectly, and, perhaps, must be for ever, at fault. We cannot penetrate beneath the surface. We know nothing of matter, except by its relation to physical force; and nothing of force, except by its connection with matter. Fami-

liar as they are to our experience, and patent as they may seem to be to our senses, the invariable confession of the profoundest students of physical being is, that, as to their nature, we are in ignorance, almost perfect, concerning both.

Above these, and connected with both, though separated by a nature more sharply defined than either, is a *third something*, in the shape of a high controlling energy, which, because it is not obvious to the senses, is by some regarded as shadowy and unreal. In every instance, however, even the lowest, and where the line of demarcation between it and the inferior kingdoms is faintest, it is marked by these two distinguishing peculiarities, sentiency, or the faculty, in some form, of perception; and a self-determining control, to a greater or less extent, over physical force, and through that, over matter. This third existence (if we are warranted in calling it a third, when we know not but matter and force may be only antagonistical phases of each other) we term spirit; and, in the examples more familiar to us, and at the same time more perfect, than that just described, it is marked by thought, feeling, and voluntary action. How far from being *shadowy*, may be conceived from these high prerogatives. Indeed, the time may arrive when spirit shall be regarded as the only thing substantial, and matter to be the shadow.

Now, by *animal organisation* we usually mean that material structure, or that combination of material parts, by which a being endowed with sentiency (if no more) may come into active communication with the world of matter and of physical force. But, looking a little further, we see that "the organisation" of a sentient and active being consists usually of a vast assemblage of organs—the eye, ear, heart, &c. Nay, more, that the organs are themselves *organised*, or composed of cells and fibres, each one of which is a distinct organisation. And yet further, that every cell and fibre is constructed out of blood, every atom of which is in itself an organised substance. In view of these facts, how shall we define animal organisation? What are we to understand by it? We are lost and overwhelmed, just as we were when peering into the mysteries of matter and force.

There is, however, one little clue still left us. We follow the leading of the fact that the term "animal organisation" is as properly applicable to the ultimate atom of arterial blood, charged with its cell-making property, as it is to the whole structure of the animal, and it brings us to what is still more germane to our purpose, that it is as applicable to the *egg*, from which the future animal is developed, as to the future animal itself; and to the central, microscopic *cell* of the egg, as to the developing embryo; and as applicable to the embryotic

dot* (discovered by Prof. Agassiz) in the centre of that cell, as to the being developed from the dot. And now, keeping the eye fixed on this significant "dot,"—this incipient point of being,—where the future bird, beast, or man lies condensed within bounds almost too narrow for the reach of the microscope, let us remember two or three facts: 1st, That the development, which is to be, takes place "under the influence of the principle of life, in connection with which alone any such phenomena are ever manifested;" 2d, That of the nature of this principle, and of the connection between it and the organised structure through which it acts, we are profoundly ignorant; "we know nothing of life, except by the phenomena it manifests in organised structures;" but, 3d, That these phenomena "are so essentially different from the manifestations of any recognised physical force, that we are compelled to attribute them to a *special* SUPER-PHYSICAL principle."† We learn, hence,—what is perhaps denied by few,—that there are forces in nature besides those usually recognised as the physical; and that the *vital* force, in being "super-physical," must be either spiritual or intermediate. But, since it cannot be spiritual, as is manifest from the fact that the vital energy is as much the property of the *tree* as of the animal, we are shut up to the conclusion that there are at least two kinds of force intervening between the thinking, feeling, self-acting spirit, and the dull, inert matter on which the spirit is known to act. Nor is this all. When we come to scrutinise the framework of our familiar-looking world, we find—what it may be important for us to know in connection with our subject—that it consists, just as the animal body does, of a congeries of power within power, and principle within principle, "*whose foundation is in the dust*," or, in plain language, which use matter as their basis and the theatre of their action. Matter, considered in its essentials, is so near to nothing, that we can only say of it that it is. Prof. Faraday, who studied it in the atom, (the only true place for learning its essential character)—the solitary atom—supposing one only to exist—and being, of course, without attraction, repulsion, or sensible motion, speaks of "inertia as perhaps its only true indication."‡ It is the superinduced operation of the various forces—gravitation, cohesive, chemical, vital, and others—that give it its weight, solidity, variety, beauty, and that are to be seen encased one within another, in harmonious glory, like jewel casketed in jewel.

* The writer of this article hopes he does no injustice to the teaching of the great embryologist. He quotes from the recollection of a lecture too eloquent to be easily forgotten.

† Prof. Gray, of Harvard University.

‡ See his Address before the Royal Institution, 1857.

But it is time that this subject, increasing in interest and intricacy as it advances, were brought to its close. Let us, with such light as we have been able to gather from science and speculation, as well as from Scripture, revert once more to our question—"What shall be the subject of the soul's identification?"

We are still inclined to say, "It cannot be inert, elementary matter," but we dare not reject the idea of matter altogether, because we know not what it is, either as to its capabilities or its incapacities. For, so far as we know to the contrary, matter may be susceptible of other laws and other qualities than those revealed to the senses. It is not impossible for it, (and in this conjecture we may find our warrant in the language of our Master to the Sadducees on this very subject, "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, *nor the power of God*," Mat. xxii. 27)—it is not impossible for matter to be divested of its gravitation, chemical and other qualities, not essential to its existence, and to be endowed with others better suited to that condition needed by the returning spirit. In this state of ignorance, it is certainly the part of wisdom to leave the subject just where revelation places it.

As to the second point—"the animal organisation"—we are compelled, of course, to surrender the idea of animality, but not necessarily that of organisation. The very science (physiology) which starts the difficulty in one view of the case, brings, in another aspect, the answer. Organic life is a mystery. Just as, in the case of mineral crystallisation, we know not where the formative power resides, whether in some *atom* which rules the rest, or whether in some *law of the mass*, compelling the aggregated atoms to unite in definite shape around a central point; and, also, as in the case, somewhat more complex, of the germinating seed, we know not where lies the vital principle, whether in the carbon, the potash, or the three essential gases, or whether in the organic combination; still, we do know that the formative principle of the one, and the vital principle of the other, are *somewhere*; so we may conceive of the principle which is to evolve the future resurrection-body. It may reside in Prof. Agassiz's embryotic *dot*, which, having proved the germ of the animal body in one case, may continue indestructible, and prove the germ of the spiritual body (under a new constitution of matter) in another; and in the stimulating energies of a higher life, it may rapidly gather round itself, in the great day of resurrection, all that is needful for its expansion, and in the light of Christ's presence, like plants in the sunshine, it may live in brightening beauty for evermore.

There is a third point necessary to the completeness of our subject—the future body as it shall stand related to our con-

sciousness of identity. The universal heart of mankind demands that if there is to be a future body at all, it shall be such that those who knew one another on earth shall recognise one another in heaven. But if neighbour shall know neighbour, shall not a man recognise himself?

Where there is no other proof, and especially no proof to the contrary, "the will of the people is" usually regarded as "the voice of God." On the subject of a future recognition the sacred Scriptures say little—that little being all in favour of the common demand. The rich man and Lazarus are represented in the parable as knowing one another from a distance; and Peter, James, and John, on the mount of transfiguration, seem, by a sort of intuition, to recognise Moses and Elias, whom they certainly never saw before.

Still, it is fairly questionable whether the future recognition of self, and of each other, so plainly indicated, both by revelation and by natural desire, shall take place in consequence of any likeness such as we now conceive. Even the mother, who lays her babe beneath the clods of the valley, does not expect to meet her darling hereafter as a babe, but in the full maturity of its being; and the man in middle life, who deposits in the grave the body of a revered parent, does not expect to see hereafter a figure bowed with the decrepitude of age, but one rejoicing in immortal vigour. Thus does popular opinion correct popular opinion, and teach us that the body to be is probably very unlike the body that is.

And this probability is still more confirmed when we combine the teachings of Scripture with the established facts of science. "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God,"—"it is sown an *animal* body, it is raised a spiritual body,"—"the children of the resurrection neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as, like, equal to, the angels of God,"—"thou sowest grain, but (in its germination and maturity) God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body." Now, admitting the natural, and almost necessary, interpretation of these passages, we are taught by daily experience that "every seed hath its own body," adapted to the natural functions necessary for it to perform; and that every animal has its own organisation, adapted to its mode of life. So universal is this law of adaptation, that if you give a botanist a flower, he will tell you what kind of fruit its structure is fitted to develop; and if you give a zoologist a bone from the fore-arm, or even the tooth of any animal, living or extinct, he will tell you its mode of life. The organisation of every known being is suited to its peculiar sphere of existence. Now, under the safe (and, so far as human science has yet gone, the unerring,) guidance of this law, what figure shall we assign to a

being whose corporeal structure is without "blood," and which therefore needs no heart to propel that blood, arterial ducts to convey it, or veins to carry it back?—a being whose life is independent of breath, and which therefore may be supposed to be without lungs, nostrils, and bronchial tubes?—a being which requires neither food, drink, nor repose, and in whom the wonderful apparatus suited to the functions of nutrition and recuperation are useless? Such an organisation is beyond the reach of our present conception. Vastly sooner might an intelligent caterpillar conceive the unseen glories it shall wear when, bursting its silken coffin and its shroud, it is to appear, no longer a crawling worm, feeding on gross herbage, but a thing of light and beauty, a fluttering gem, that adds brilliancy to the flowers which supply it with its dew.

Faith, hope, natural desire, unite to persuade us that there will be a ready, though it may be at present an imaginable, mode of recognition hereafter. Still, the teachings of science, and the infinitely more reliable hints of revelation, warn us not to conceive grossly of that future state; and especially not to expect there the cumbrous, *earth-bound machines*, which now condemn us to crawl through the dust, and to feed upon its productions; but to picture to ourselves a body suited to that "inheritance of the saints in light," which is described as "incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away."

ART. VI.—*Suppression of Protestantism in Bohemia.*

Gedichte der Gegen reformation in Böhmen. Von M. CHRISTIAN ADOLPH FRIEDRICH, erstem Diakonus in der Hauptkirche zu Zittau. Dresden und Leipzig, 1844.

Lectures on the Religious History of the Slavonian Nations. By COUNT VALERIAN KRASINSKI. Lecture II., Bohemia. Edinburgh, 1847.

FROM the close of the apostolical age downwards, there is certainly no period in the history of the church, that more powerfully attracts the attention of the lover of evangelical truth, than the half century following the memorable year 1517. Especially does this hold true of the early years of the Reformation, when the long-forgotten truth of a simple gospel, the glad tidings of salvation through the merit of Christ alone, proclaimed in accents of irresistible power by the monk of Wittenberg, seemed, like a potent spell, to throw open the prison gates,

and snap asunder fetters and chains, and many a soul, long enslaved by a debasing superstition, at once escaped, and passed into the full enjoyment of the liberty of the sons of God. The truth, proclaimed simultaneously from the plains of Saxony and the mountain valleys of Switzerland, was everywhere joyfully received. It seemed as if, over the greater part of Europe, a genial springtime had succeeded the dreary frosts and snows of winter. How full of hopes were those early days of the Reformation, when that whole system of imposture and iniquity culminating in the papacy, seemed to be tottering to its fall. Yet soon were these anticipations doomed, in great measure, to meet with disappointment: ere the half-century had run its course, a reaction had already set in. It seemed as if the truth had lost its power, and Protestantism had reached its limit. Jesuitism began to do its work. In many countries hopeful beginnings were suppressed by fire and sword; and Rome shewed both determination and power to hold what still remained to her. Even subsequently to the close of the sixteenth century, provinces won to the Reformation were retaken, and countries all but entirely Protestant were lost to the gospel. The inquiry into the causes that hindered the further progress of the Reformation, or that gave Popery new powers of resistance, is certainly a very important one. Our purpose, however, in this article, is simply to give a brief account of the means, by which one of the fair conquests of the Reformation was, in an astonishingly short space of time, all but wholly recovered to Rome.

We have derived our information chiefly from the work of Pescheck, the title of which stands at the head of this article. Our intention is not to review the work critically, but to put our readers in possession of the leading threads of the mournful tale which it records. It is but justice to the author, however, to state that we consider it a highly valuable work. It is the fruit of great and painstaking research. The sources from which the author has derived his statements are carefully indicated. Several documents of great historical value are printed at length. If we were disposed to criticise, we might say the style is rather heavy, the narrative scarcely so lively and interesting as might have been expected from the materials at the author's disposal; the latter, moreover, is sometimes inconveniently interrupted by the insertion of the documents referred to, which might better have been reserved for an appendix. Further, while we have no complaint of any want of sympathy on the part of M. Pescheck for suffering Protestantism, we cannot but feel, in reading his book, that he is a little lacking in sympathy with a nation struggling for its liberties, political as well as ecclesiastical, against a cruel oppression. Still, we have no

hesitation in saying, that he has laid the Protestant church under a debt of gratitude by a work so fully detailing the method of Popish conversions, and shewing in so striking a light, how terrible is the curse entailed on any country by the combined yoke of Popery and despotism. We believe this book has been translated, but not having seen the translation, we can of course say nothing of its merits; only, we cannot but regret that a work, shewing so much of the spirit and doings of Popery in a bygone age, and indicating what might be expected, if that unchanged system should again have the power, seems to have attracted comparatively little attention.

The historical labours of the late Count Krasinski are well known. At once a warm Protestant and a patriotic Pole, he could not but regard with deep sympathy the struggles of the kindred race of the Czechs; and his lecture on the history of Bohemia will be found to be full of interest.

The Bohemians are, as is generally known, a race of Slavonian origin, nearly allied to the Poles. Their religious history is in many respects unusually interesting. First converted to Christianity by Greek monks, they gradually became, like the other nations of Europe, subject to the western or Romish Church, retaining, however, for a long time, the right to have the liturgy read in their own language. So early as the fourteenth century, some reforming tendencies began to shew themselves in Bohemia. The preachers, John Militz, a Moravian, Conrad Waldhausen, an Austrian, and Matthew Janowa, son of a Bohemian knight, and pupil of Militz, were especially distinguished: the former two for their powerful preaching, and the fearlessness with which they exposed existing ecclesiastical abuses; and the last, for the remarkable enlightenment of his views, indeed in some respects he was a further advanced Protestant before the Reformation than the more celebrated John Huss.* By these good men the way was prepared for the labours of that renowned Bohemian reformer. We pass over the times of Huss and his friend Jerome of Prague—two of the noblest martyrs of Christ that church history has to tell of. Passing over, also, the wars of the Hussites, and the victories of Ziska and Prokop, of which a short but deeply interesting account will be found in Krasinski's lecture, we merely mention that, at the close of these terrible struggles, Rome was at last compelled to make some concessions secured in the so-called "*Compactata*," the chief of which was allowing the cup, in the Lord's supper, to the laity, or to such as insisted on the privilege, who came in consequence to be called Calixtines or Utraquists. The great majority were

* A pretty full account of Militz, Waldhausen, and especially Janowa, will be found in the last volume of Neander's Church History.

satisfied with these concessions; still there remained the Tabornites or true Hussites. Crushed as a power, they still continued to exist in the kingdom, calling themselves Bohemian or Moravian brethren, called also by their enemies "Pickards." Often they were exposed to cruel persecution, but they seem to have been purified in the furnace, and may be called the Protestants of the fifteenth century.

When, a little more than a hundred years after the martyrdom of Huss, the voice of Luther again startled Europe, probably there was no part of it more likely to be predisposed to receive the gospel than the kingdom of Bohemia. Ever since the revered martyr had been so perfidiously put to death, Rome's power over the nation had been sensibly shaken. A large proportion of the people, if differing little from the Romanists in doctrine, still clung tenaciously to the privilege of the cup, wrung by their fathers from the council of Basel, while the brethren, often much oppressed, and threatened even with extinction, continued silently to spread the knowledge of a purer faith, to which also many of the Utraquists were secretly inclined. Accordingly, as might be expected, the tidings of what Luther had done at Wittenberg were received with joy in the regions watered by the upper Elbe and the Moldau. It is said that, in 1519, Lutheran doctrines were preached in Prague, and Seckendorf states that the gospel was first preached in Joachimsthal, on the estate of the Counts Schlik, in 1521 by Philip Eberbach.*

M. Pescheck states, it is not easy to ascertain the exact time when the various cities and provinces of Bohemia became Protestant, but there is no doubt, that at an early period Lutheran doctrines were generally preached over the country, and that Calvinists also soon found their way into it, and the doctrines of the Genevan Reformer were embraced by many Bohemians. After the death of Louis, of the house of Jaghellon, King of Hungary and Bohemia, at the battle of Mohacz in 1526, the

* At an early period we find the brethren in correspondence with Luther. From a letter of the reformer, of date 13th Nov. 1523, "to the Bohemian and Moravian brethren," it appears that they had sent him a confession or statement of their tenets. His letter chiefly refers to various matters in which he and they were not at one. In some points he finds their views still retaining something of Popery; but in one respect they seem to have been in advance of himself; for their views of the sacrament of the Lord's supper seem to have approached those of the Swiss reformers. Luther, while stating his own views of the real presence of Christ in the elements, strongly, and at considerable length, yet writes in a very friendly and Christian spirit. At the close he begs them not to take his letter amiss, as if he had pleasure in marking their failings, adding, "Whereas you are held to be the worst of heretics, I bear witness how much nearer you are to the gospel than all others with whom I am acquainted. I know how I expose myself to hatred in saying it." We quote from Luther's *Reformatiorische Schriften*. Darmstadt, 1847. Vol. II. p. 518.

Bohemian crown, as well as that of Hungary, was obtained by the archduke Ferdinand of Austria, who afterwards succeeded his brother, Charles V., as emperor of Germany. His bitter hostility to the Protestants is well known, and for a time his Bohemian subjects had to suffer persecution for their faith. Towards the end of his long reign, however, he seems to have been much softened, and during the reign of his son, Maximilian II., and the greater part of that of Randolph II., toleration seems to have been generally allowed.

This brings us to the beginning of the seventeenth century. At this time, according to the testimony of the historian Pelzel, "all Bohemia was, with the exception of some nobles and monks, Protestant." This author must, however, be understood to include under the name of Protestant the old Utraquists, many of whom were at least favourable to evangelical truth; indeed, in the reign of Maximilian II., they had joined with the three Protestant parties—viz., Lutherans, Reformed, and Brethren, in presenting a short confession, composed, as it appears, by some learned theologians, on a comparison of the writings of Huss, various old Bohemian confessions of the brethren, and that of Augsburg (see Pescheck, i. p. 103). The Protestants, properly so called, then were, Lutherans; Reformed, holding the Helvetic Confession; and Bohemian Brethren. The last mentioned were the most obnoxious to the Papists; the Lutherans least so. At the time of which we are speaking, the sense of a common danger led the Protestants of the three Confessions to act generally in concert.

The first attempt (at least since the earlier years of the reign of Ferdinand I.) to suppress Protestantism, and to reconvert the nation to Popery, was made in 1602, at the instigation of the Jesuits. Still, though many hardships were suffered, the political disturbances of the later years of Rudolph's reign were such as, to put it out of his power to carry out the wishes of his counsellors, and even to enable the Protestants, by shewing a united front, at last to force from him, in 1609, royal letters patent, known in history as the "*Majestätsbrief* of 1609," granting full toleration to all his Protestant subjects. His death soon followed; he was succeeded by his brother Matthias. It is not our province to follow the political movements of this reign, an account of which will be found in Krasinski's volume. Suffice it to say, that Matthias persuaded the States, at a very thinly attended diet, to accept of his cousin Ferdinand of Styria, as his successor; that, Ferdinand being well known as a bigoted Papist, who had devoted himself and his dominions to the Romish see, the anxieties and fears of the Protestants were naturally excited; these and various events led to a rupture; and already, at the time of Matthias's death, war had

broken out. Fortune at first seemed to favour the Bohemian arms. On the death of Matthias, Ferdinand was declared to have forfeited his throne, and another king was chosen in his place. For taking this bold step, the Bohemians have been accused of rebelling against their lawful sovereign. But it is to be remembered, that the Bohemian nation, like their Polish brethren, always claimed the right to elect their sovereigns; and further, no one, who maintains the lawfulness of our own Revolution of 1688, will deny their right to reject a prince who refused, as did Ferdinand, to bind himself to maintain their constitutional liberties, civil and ecclesiastical. The step may not have been expedient at the time, though much may be said in favour even of its expediency, and the disastrous issue could not then be foreseen. Their choice was unfortunate. It fell on the Elector Palatine, Frederick, son-in-law of James I. of England,* a man who possessed none of the qualities fitting him for the very difficult position which he was called to occupy. The few months of his brief reign soon came to an end. The hopes of Frederick and the Protestants were all dashed to the ground by the disastrous battle of the White Mountain in 1620; the king was fain to save himself by a hasty flight; and the country lay prostrate at the emperor's feet.

Ferdinand II. was now King of Bohemia, as well as Emperor of Germany, without a rival. His well-known bigotry could leave little room to doubt that, so soon as he should feel himself secure on the throne, this pupil and tool of the Jesuits would take measures to secure the dominance of the Romish Church in the kingdom which he had conquered. His obvious policy was, first of all to get quit of the leaders of the three Protestant confessions—the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Bohemian Brethren. The events which had just occurred afforded an opportunity, eagerly seized, for the accomplishment of his purpose. Most of the Protestant chiefs had been more or less directly concerned in the election of Ferdinand, and all had lived as his subjects during his brief reign. It was thus easy to charge them with treason. A delay, however, of three months was first allowed to take place, apparently to throw them off their guard, and perhaps to induce some of the nobles, who had fled, to return to their estates, in the belief that the danger was past. On the night of the 20th February 1621, however, forty arrestments were made in Prague, and after other four months had passed, an imperial commission sentenced twenty-seven of the forty to public execution, and

* We need scarcely remind our readers that Her Majesty Queen Victoria derives her right to the British throne through her descent from Elizabeth Stuart, Electress of the Palatinate and Queen of Bohemia.

condemned the rest, some to perpetual imprisonment, some to banishment. Although the crime laid to the charge of these men was treason, yet as they were Protestants—the heads of the Protestant party, who had fought and risked their all for their faith—whatever doubts Pescheck may express, we have no hesitation in ranking them as Protestant martyrs.* Among them were found many men of high rank and great worth, as well as of distinguished ability and erudition—men who may well be classed with the Russells or Argyles of our own country. As their removal was the first blow aimed at their religion, a short account of their tragical end may not be unacceptable to our readers.

As we have said, an imperial commission was appointed for their trial, composed of their enemies, and including several renegade Protestants. When they were placed at the bar, the Count Schlik, the head of the Lutheran party, in name of his companions, replied to the charge of treason brought against them: "Love for freedom and for religion compelled us to draw the sword; but since God has allowed the emperor's sword to prevail, and delivered us into his hands, now his will be done." On the 19th June 1521, sentence was passed, and twenty-seven were condemned to suffer on the morning of the 29th (Pescheck, i. 415). Lutheran pastors were allowed to attend them the night before their death, but though nearly half of them belonged to the old Hussites or Bohemian Brethren, no minister of that confession was allowed access. During the night they were engaged in religious services. After the 86th psalm had been read, one of them repeated the words, "shew me a token for good," expressing a wish that some token might be granted. The sentiment was taken up by some of the rest, and it was remarked, that in the early morning a beautiful rainbow was visible from the prison window, which also attracted notice in the city. At five A.M. the work of blood began. The condemned were called out one by one, according to their rank. Rosacius, a Lutheran pastor who was with them, says:

"As they were called they stepped forward with a cheerful air, as if to a feast, each, as he was called, addressing the others in such terms as these: 'Farewell, dear friends. God grant you the consolation of his Holy Spirit, and give you patience and constancy, that you may stand fast by what you have already confessed with heart, mouth, and hand. I go before you to see the glory of my Lord

* Pescheck admits that they honestly believed themselves to be such, though he is not quite of the same mind. Carpzov, the Lübeck theologian having expressed astonishment that they shewed no penitence for their revolt, from Ferdinand, he rightly states that in their judgment their conduct was only a necessary defence against a prince who had broken his word and his oath. Pp. 416 and 426 (notes).

Jesus. Follow me, that together we may see the Father's face. The sorrow of this hour is transient, but the joy is eternal." The rest would reply : ' God bless thy departure, and grant thee a happy passage out of this vale of tears into the heavenly fatherland. May our Lord Jesus send his holy angels to meet thee. Hasten, brother, into the Father's house ; we follow thee. Soon shall we meet in heavenly glory ; for he in whom we believe is our surety.' (Pescheck, v. 1. p. 425).

On the scaffold, attended by the pastors, they committed their souls to God, and spoke with such wonderful presence of mind and animation, that even their judge and the very soldiers of the guard could not refrain from tears.

We mention a few particulars of the first two, who had generally taken the lead among the Lutherans, and the Bohemian Brethren, respectively. The first in order, as in rank, was Joachim Andrew Count Schlik, who was usually considered the head of the Lutheran party. He had escaped from the country after the battle of the White Mountain, but was basely delivered up by the Elector of Saxony. At five on the fatal morning the booming of a cannon was heard from the castle. The Count then said to his companions, " That is the signal, I must go first. But thou, Lord Jesus, be merciful to me." Presently imperial officers came to the room, and announced that the hour of execution had come, and that they should be ready to come in order, as they were called ; then came the city officials and called first the Count Schlik. As he left the room two Jesuits met him, one of whom began to say, " Lord Count, think well ;" but was immediately interrupted by the Count saying, " Leave me in peace." As he mounted the scaffold and saw the bright morning sun, he said, " Sun of righteousness Christ, grant that, through the gloom of death, I may come to thy light." His calm dignity and composure made a deep impression on the spectators, and after a short prayer he received the fatal stroke. (i. pp. 426-8.)

The second in order, and still more remarkable in character, was the Baron Wenzel Budawecz, of Budowa, one of the most distinguished of the Bohemian Brethren. A Protestant has said of him, " He was an ornament of his native country, a star of the church, to his vassals rather a father than a lord ; in a word, a person dear to God and man." The well-known historian Pelzel, himself a Roman Catholic, after a long account of Budowa's services to his country, of his kindness to his vassals, telling how, as a Bohemian Brother, he used to preach to them with most persuasive eloquence ; how, when meetings used often to be held in reference to matters of religion in Prague, he frequently used to open the proceedings with prayer, and afterwards speak with such eloquence, as would

melt the assembly in tears ;" concludes by saying, " He was of the type of the ancient, earnest, deep-thinking, unbending Bohemians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Budowa was the last of the Bohemians, as Brutus was the last of the Romans." His last hours were distinguished by the Christian constancy and faith which he displayed. Two Capuchin friars waited on him, telling him they came to shew him the way to heaven. He assured them he knew it already, and stood on sure ground. They answered, he was mistaken, for he was not in communion with the holy church, out of which there was no salvation. He immediately answered. He had not said it of a mere fancy, that he knew the way of salvation. " I have said it in a hearty faith in my dear Saviour Christ Jesus. I have the precious promise, ' Whosoever believeth on him shall not perish, but have everlasting life,' therefore will I remain in our true church till my death." The friars struck their breasts, said they had never seen so hardened a heretic, crossed themselves, and went away. The account of Budowa's interview with two Jesuits is also very characteristic. They introduced themselves by complimenting him on his acquaintance with sciences, and then said, they wished to do a work of mercy to him, in directing him to salvation. He replied, he wished for them, that they were made as sure of their salvation, as he was of his own through Jesus Christ. One of them answered, his lordship ought not to boast too much of his safety, he was deceiving himself with an imagination of his own, for the Scripture said somewhere (he could not just tell where, but he thought it was in St Paul's Epistle to Timothy), that no man in this life knew whether he lived in the grace of God, or under his wrath. Budowa appealed to Paul's own words (2 Tim. i. 12), " I know in whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed to him," and " henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness ;" the Jesuit interrupted, " Yes, St Paul says that of himself, but he says nothing about others." " That is not true," was Budowa's immediate rejoinder, " for he adds, ' and not for me only, but for all who love his appearing.' Therefore go away, and leave me in peace." The same Jesuits were observed at his execution looking on with an expression of rage in their countenances. This venerable man, now seventy-four years of age, on being called, stroked his grey head and long beard, and said, " Now, grey head, thou comest to thy honour, the martyr's crown will adorn thee," (vol. i. pp. 429-35).

The rest followed in succession, and on that one day twenty-seven died before the Rathhaus of Prague.

The chiefs of the Protestants being now cut off, another step still seemed necessary before it was safe to take coercive mea-

asures for the conversion of the nation to Popery, viz., to impoverish the remaining portion of the Protestant nobility and knights. To secure the easy accomplishment of this object, an edict was issued, by which all who had taken part in the revolt, or in any way acknowledged Frederick as king, were summoned to appear before an imperial commission, and there confess their crimes, under pain of the severest punishment to all recusants, but with promise of grace to all who should obey. In consequence, 728 nobles, knights, or landed proprietors, gave in their names and begged for pardon. In due course, their fate was announced—"They had indeed merited the severest punishment, but the emperor, with the innate mercy of the house of Austria (*sic*) would spare their lives and allow them to retain their rank: but he would dispose of their property according to his pleasure." In many cases the entire estate was confiscated, and the unfortunate owner mocked with the name of mercy in being allowed to retain the empty title; in other cases the half was taken, and at least heavy fines were extorted.*

By such means the way was prepared for steps, which had for their open and avowed purpose the suppression of the evangelical faith. The leading men had been put to death or banished; the remainder reduced to poverty. Still hitherto the professed object of the severe measures taken was simply to punish treason; and as yet the Protestants were ignorant of the fate which awaited them as such. They still constituted by far the majority of the nation, and for a time no further measures were taken to compel them to apostasy: but the well-known character of Ferdinand, and of the Statthalter or viceroy Prince Charles of Lichtenstein, as bigoted papists, was enough to fill them with uneasy apprehensions for the future. Further, monks of various orders began, like birds of evil omen, to swarm over the country. At first, indeed, they endeavoured to ingratiate themselves with the people, flattering them, promising the emperor's favour, or seeking to allure the poor by promising assistance in a time of scarcity. When such means failed to win, then dark hints would be thrown out of what might be the consequence of incurring the displeasure of so powerful a prince; the emperor would not tolerate heretics in his dominions; and let them not think of flight, for in all lands the Catholic Church was about to assert her authority, and

* Vol. i., p. 481. It was remarked that the severest measures were always taken against the rich. If a man had means, it was scarcely possible for him to clear himself of the charge of treason. When proof of anything else failed, the judges would say, "At least he is tainted with original sin, for he is a heretic, and being rich, it is impossible that he can be allowed to pass without punishment."

heretics were no more to be tolerated. The first blow, struck with the avowed purpose of clearing the country of heretics, fell on a society of anabaptists in Moravia in the autumn of 1622. About one hundred families were then exiled, being compelled to leave their houses, fields, and vineyards, shortly before harvest and vintage. They are described as a quiet, peaceful, inoffensive people, interfering with no one, but enriching the country by their honest industry. But if these were the first to suffer, they were afterwards deemed happy by their less fortunate countrymen, then allowed to remain, yet only to suffer more severely at a subsequent time; for, exiled from Moravia, they found a home in Hungary and Transylvania, and a protector in the renowned prince of the latter country, Bethlen Gabor. The banishment of the anabaptists was intended as an experiment, and it was resolved not yet to proceed to the same extremity with the other Protestants. One Paul Michna, a man of low origin, but a favourite counsellor of the emperor, is reported, when it was debated whether or not they should be immediately banished, to have given his judgment against such a measure, "for they have still too much to take with them; too much money will be taken out of the country, and the exile will be too easily borne. We must first empty their purses, make them poor, quite poor, then all will be much more easily managed." Accordingly Michna's advice was taken, and other measures were had recourse to, before all Protestants were ordered to depart. It was thought that heresy might best be overborne by cutting off the supply at the fountain head. So it was determined to seize the churches, remove the ministers, and destroy all Bibles and Protestant books. And these were the first measures taken directly for the suppression of the Protestant faith.

First the churches were seized.* All over the kingdom they were ordered to be closed. Many of them remained long shut up, such as were ornamented were disfigured. The device of a cup, which from the Hussite times was found on many churches in Bohemia, was broken or defaced, and probably replaced by an image of the virgin, or of some popish saint. Churches that were not likely to be of use to the catholics were pulled down, while such as were conveniently situated for immediate occupation were supplied with Romish priests or monks. Ludicrous accounts have been given of the means employed to prepare them for their new consecration. Of course they were well besprinkled with holy water; it is said the altars, from which the communion had been given in both kinds, and the pulpits, from which heresy had been preached,

* Vol. ii. pp. 11-19.

were beaten with rods. In Prague, the Jesuits got possession of a church that had belonged to the hated Bohemian Brethren. Extraordinary measures, it seems, must be taken in such a case; accordingly, the fathers laid trains of gunpowder along the passages, and set fire to them, in the hope that the flames and smoke would counteract the contagion of so dire a heresy. Sometimes the churches received the names of saints, and bones, real or pretended, of the said saints, were brought and deposited to sanctify them. Not contented with seizing the churches, the agents of Popery violated also the graves that surrounded them; tombs were broken and defaced, the bones of evangelical ministers were dug up, broken in pieces, scattered, or burned. One tomb then destroyed deserves a passing notice. In the cathedral church of Czaslau, a large monument attracted attention; it bore the following inscription: "In the year 1424, on Thursday before the day of St Gall, died John Ziska of the cup, ruler of his country in the time of danger, in the name and for the name of God. He is buried here."* One cannot help the reflection, had there been a Ziska to rule his country then in the time of danger, these minions of Popery and despotism had not been there to trample on its most sacred liberties. But now, as if still smarting under the wounds which he inflicted, and remembering how the very terror of his name used to scatter their armies, the Papists sought to wreak their vengeance on his tomb and his dust. The marble was broken in pieces, they dug deep beneath it, hoping to find his bones, but in vain, and in their impotent wrath they cast the dust without the cathedral.

By these proceedings the Protestants had a foretaste of what was awaiting them. The houses in which they and their fathers had worshipped were now closed against them. A still heavier stroke immediately followed. Their houses of prayer were closed; the voices to which they had listened must also be silenced. The ministers, first of the Bohemian Brethren, then of the Calvinists, and lastly, those also of the German Lutherans, were ordered to quit the country. Before this time, the Protestant pastors had, in many cases, suffered very severely at the hands of the licentious soldiery—mostly foreigners and bigoted Papists, who overran the country after the battle of

* Mercator, the Dutch geographer, gives the inscription thus: "Anno mccccxxiv. die jovis ante Festum Galli vita functus Joannes Zyska a Calice, Rector Rerum publicarum laborantium in nomine et pro nomine Dei hoc templo conditus est;" he adds, that near the wall was an altar with paintings of Huss and Ziska, and suspended from the wall a square stone tablet, each side a span and half long, with this distich written on it:

Mensa fuit Zyskæ lapis hic dum Corpore Christi,
Vescitur et potum sanguinis ore bibit.

the White Mountain. Pescheck gives a harrowing account of the sufferings of the pastors at that time. Their houses were plundered, their books burned, many of themselves severely tortured, and not a few murdered. Paul Moller, pastor of Zrutschsen, was shot in his own pulpit. Martin Maresch of Krzessin, after being dreadfully tortured, barely escaped with his life; and his two daughters were carried off by the soldiers, and never more heard of. Others were tortured in a variety of ways, and many of them died in the hands of their tormentors. Such excesses were not formally sanctioned by the authorities, but the soldiers were never called to account for them. (Vol. ii., pp. 19-24.)

At last an edict was issued by the Prince of Lichtenstein, among other things, requiring all Protestant pastors to conform to the popish rites; to apply to the Archbishop of Prague for new ordination; if they were married, to put away their wives, or make a special application to the Archbishop for permission to retain them; allowing them, however, the alternative of becoming laymen, if they chose to renounce their office. This edict having had no effect, another was issued by the same authority, requiring them all to leave the kingdom. The Bohemian-speaking ministers of the capital were allowed only three days to prepare for their departure from the city, and within eight they were ordered to leave the country. A longer respite was, owing to the influence of the Elector of Saxony, allowed to the German Lutherans; but, ere long, they also were ordered to depart. A touching account has been given by one of themselves of the departure of the last-mentioned pastors from Prague. A vast multitude of people accompanied them to some distance from the city gates, and took farewell amidst sighing, weeping, and tears—the people “sorrowing most of all because they should see their faces no more,” and the pastors’ hearts broken, because now they must for ever leave “the flocks over which the Holy Ghost had made them overseers,” and knew too well that, after their departure, “grievous wolves would enter in, not sparing the flock.”

This edict was to have force over the whole country; but it was some time before it could be fully carried into execution, and so it had to be repeated with even greater stringency. At last all were driven from their parishes. In many instances, their ejection was effected with extreme brutality. The law allowed them to carry with them their moveable effects, and to sell the rest; but often the savage soldiery destroyed the whole, and many of the pastors suffered severe personal injury. Some had previously fled; others, on hearing of the edict, had betaken themselves to hiding-places in the forests, that they might still be within reach to minister

secretly to their flocks. If such were discovered, they were brought before Jesuits, and offered pardon if they would become Papists. Few, however, fell ; most of them had grace to be faithful ; some had to seal their testimony with their blood ;* others, after much hard usage, were removed from the country.

It is easy to see what a discouraging effect the removal of their pastors must have had on the Protestants of Bohemia and Moravia ; but it is not easy to estimate the amount of suffering occasioned by this measure, and that not only on the families compelled, at so short a notice, to enter on a mournful exile, but on the Christian people at large, now by a single stroke deprived of those from whom they had heard the word of life, by whose ministrations they had profited, and to whom they had ever been wont to look up for comfort and consolation in all their former times of trial. Gloomy, indeed, were the prospects of the Protestants. They saw the places recently occupied by men so highly esteemed, now filled by strangers, who hated alike their religion and themselves. Farther, as there was not an adequate supply of priests for the vacant churches, monks were brought from Poland and other countries, most of whom, on the testimony even of Catholic historians, were drunkards, or otherwise unworthy and ignorant men, and many of whom were men whose lives were stained by licentiousness and crime. Ill must it fare with the church in such circumstances. The elder generation might be preserved from apostasy, but how should the children be trained up in the fear of God ? for now Protestant teachers, as well as ministers, were banished, and the care of educating the rising generation entrusted to monks. If a boy gave promise of good talents, he was seized by the Jesuits, and carried off to be brought up for their order. Parents who loved the truth were thus exposed to the unutterable anguish of having their beloved children torn from them, that their minds might be moulded into form by those whom they could not but regard as the enemies of the cross of Christ. In times of distress a Christian will naturally turn to the word of God for consolation, but this was now to be denied to the unhappy Bohemians. For now an order was issued, that all Bibles and books of devotion should be destroyed. (Vol. ii. pp. 93-104.)

Great quantities of Bohemian books had already been destroyed by the soldiers without any commission to do so ; but now the authorities took the matter into their own hands. Ferdinand had determined that heresy should be expelled from his dominions. He and his counsellors judged rightly that, so

* A very interesting account, too long for insertion here, is given of the trial and execution of Matthew Ulizky, deacon at Czeslau, vol. ii. p. 49.

long as the Bible and evangelical books were allowed to circulate freely among the people, there could be little hope for their religion ; all other means would fail to keep down heresy. To keep the people in ignorance and darkness, the key of knowledge must be taken away. Therefore, it was ordered that all evangelical books, especially German and Bohemian Bibles, and Luther's writings, should be destroyed—books of licentious and immoral tendency being allowed free circulation. This enactment was carried out with the utmost stringency. The Jesuits made themselves especially busy in the work. It was the boast of one father that he had burned 60,000 volumes. The measure was usually carried out in some such way as the following :—The inhabitants (Protestant) of a certain town would be summoned, on a given day, to surrender their books at an appointed place. While they were doing so, a strict search was made through their houses ; if any were found concealed, the unhappy possessors were severely punished by fine, imprisonment, or otherwise. When a great quantity had been collected, the books were piled in heaps and burned, sometimes in the market-place, or under the gallows, or outside the gates. While the pile was burning, the monks would make themselves merry, and indulge in such expressions as "See how beautifully the heretical books burn ; so it fares now with the books that contain false doctrine. If after this any one be so obstinate as to refuse to be converted to the true Roman Catholic faith, he shall fare just as the books have done."

While such measures were being taken to suppress the Protestant faith, Rome was fast filling the country with agents, alike able, indefatigable, and unscrupulous, in the shape of Jesuits. The nation, broken in spirit, bleeding under the many strokes that had so recently been inflicted, mourning over the noblest and bravest already slain or banished, with none to whom they might look up for guidance—seemed to be just in the state most favourable for receiving impressions from these wily fathers, so thoroughly skilled, as they were, in all the arts likely to prove effectual in winning them over. The Jesuits came at first with fair speeches, and great professions of kindness and sympathy ; then, if those means failed, they knew how to insinuate what would be the consequences of resisting. By turns they fondled, flattered, warned, threatened, exhorted, entreated. It is not to be wondered at, that only too many of the weak in faith, weary of a time of protracted suffering and anxiety, and seeing that quiet was to be purchased by yielding, should have fallen under the temptation. But the larger part still proved faithful, and additional measures were taken to wear them out. With this view an anti-Protestant commission was appointed, whose special duty was to send deputies, accom-

panied by monks or preachers, to go from place to place and introduce the "Reformation," as it was called, by formally summoning the people to renounce their heresy, and be reconciled to the church; in token whereof they were required to confess to the priests, and receive the communion after the Popish fashion. For, just as in the times of persecution under pagan Rome, the Christians were commanded to offer incense to the idols, in token of their renouncing the Christian faith, so the evidence of apostasy required from the Bohemian Protestants, was to receive the communion in one kind, or go to the confessional.

The nation consisted of three classes: the nobility, or landed proprietors, the citizens, and the peasantry. Steps were now taken to reduce each of these classes to obedience to the emperor's wishes. First of all, Protestant officials were ordered to conform, or renounce their offices. Then followed an edict, directed against the Protestant nobility.* It made known that the emperor would have none but Catholic subjects, and therefore commanded all landed proprietors, who would not become Catholic, to sell their estates within six months, and leave the kingdom. Already, as we have seen, a great number of the nobles had, on the plea of treason, been in whole or in part robbed of their lands, and many were now out of the kingdom. It was hoped that the remaining part, weakened and dispirited by the loss of their old leaders, would now at last conform. Some did so; but, as the Roman Catholic historian Pelzel informs us, the great majority remained true to their faith, preferring exile to apostasy. The number of applications for admission to the Romish Church not being so great as had been expected, a longer delay was granted, though accompanied with harder conditions. For example, minors were not allowed to leave the country, even though their mothers might still be alive. It was ordered that they should be sent to be educated by the monks, doubtless to the unspeakable anguish of many a disconsolate widow, thus deprived of her last remaining earthly consolation. Between seventy and eighty noblemen, in consequence of this decree, sold their possessions, and left their country for ever. Though nominally permitted to retain the price of their lands, they suffered great losses, being, on various pretexts, plundered by the soldiers and priests; and besides, as so much land came into the market at once, it was impossible to sell it for half its value. So at last the old Hussite and Protestant nobility were rooted out.

We have now to speak of the citizens. Besides Prague, the

* Vol. ii., p. 174, *ib.* This decree was dated 1627.

metropolis, there were several flourishing and populous cities in the kingdom, such as Leitmeritz, Iglau, Königgrätz, &c. In almost all of them, the preponderating majority of the citizens were Protestant. But the government was determined to compel them to abandon their faith. The measures taken were cruel and tyrannical in the extreme, insomuch so, that those who had been banished with the loss of their goods, were considered happy, and were envied by the less fortunate ones who remained at home, reserved to be exposed to every conceivable torment, till they should "of their own free will" become Catholic. Seldom, indeed, was life actually taken, but every kind of suffering short of death was inflicted, to compel to apostasy. Those who shewed determination to be faithful, were often exposed to torments more intolerable than death itself, till, in too many instances, emaciated and wasted in body, and rendered half insane in mind, by the horrors of loathsome dungeons, and the suffering of cruel tortures, those who at first would have gone fearlessly to the scaffold, were at last induced to yield to their tormentors, and confess to the priests.

In the capital, the work was thus gone about.* The conversion of the city having been determined on, an order in name of the emperor was issued, by which all the citizens were required to conform to the Catholic religion, or leave the city and country. Should they choose the latter alternative, they were to be allowed to dispose of their effects for their own behoof, though means were taken to make this permission as nearly as possible a dead letter. Arrangements were then made, by which certain commissioners were appointed to go from house to house, over the whole city, each with a paper containing four columns with the following headings:—1, Native Catholics; 2, Converted Catholics; 3, Protestants willing to entertain the question of conversion; 4, Protestants determined to continue such. This paper was presented to each household, and he was required to enter his name in one of the four columns. It was found that the number of names in the fourth far exceeded all the rest. It was thought unsafe to proceed at once to a wholesale banishment; and to strike terror, in the first place, four of the most venerable and influential citizens were selected, summoned to appear before the judges, commanded to conform or leave the kingdom, while means were taken to rob them, as far as possible, of what property they possessed. They all remained firm, and so were banished. Still the effect was not what had been desired, and so other seventy were similarly dealt with. Like the first four, they were without exception faithful, and had to follow their

* Vol. ii., p. 190, &c.

brethren, as exiles to foreign lands. At last, however, these measures began to tell: the people were dispirited; their ranks were broken; those from whom they might have sought counsel were removed; and courage began to flag. Many voluntarily removed themselves by flight; the rest, nominally at least, conformed; and now at last, after two centuries, Prague was to all appearance Popish. So fared it with the capital. But all this was mild treatment, when compared with the proceedings of the anti-Protestant commissioners in other towns. These were usually dealt with somewhat in the following way:—

The anti-Protestant commissioners would come to a town, accompanied by Jesuits, if such could be had; if not, by Dominicans, Capuchins, or other friars, and a body of troops. The inhabitants were summoned to meet them in the market, or other convenient place. There the will of the Emperor was made known. A discourse would then be delivered by a monk, pointing out the advantages to be gained by embracing the Popish faith. The people were assured of their sovereign's good wishes; he ordered them to abandon heresy, because he wished to save their souls. They were told that he had hitherto treated them with extraordinary clemency, and reproached for having so long and so obstinately persevered in their heresy; but now there must be an end of such leniency, and they must become Catholic, for such was the will of their gracious prince. In case of refusal, they would be deprived of their rights and privileges as citizens, forbidden to buy and sell (as, *e.g.*, in a town in Silesia, during a time of scarcity, bakers were forbidden to sell bread to Protestants), to marry, or even to bury their dead.* To avoid all these penalties, they were urged to go to the confessional, and receive the sacrament; in so doing they were assured of the emperor's favour. At first, in most cases, the people shewed constancy; but their persecutors had too firm a grasp of them to let them easily go. Various measures were used to compel conformity. Perhaps a procession of the host would be announced. All were required to be present, and commanded to shew reverence by taking off their hats and bowing the knee as the idol was carried past, under pain of ruinous fines or long imprisonment. If any failed in shewing what was considered due reverence, they were cruelly beaten, and sometimes half dead thrown into prison. But the most effectual of all the means in use, was the billeting of soldiers. These were the so-called "*Lichtensteiners*," dragoons

* "And that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name."—Rev. xiii. 17.

and musketeers composed of the very off-scourings of humanity, generally foreigners, Spanish or Italian fanatics, who never had faced a foe in battle, but were kept in pay simply for the purpose of persecuting the unhappy Protestants, till, weary of life, they should yield and become Papists. As it was in cruel mockery pretended that the object of all this compulsion was to save the souls of the poor heretics, these soldiers were called "*Die Seligmacher*," *i. e.*, "the saviours." Those who are familiar with the accounts we have of the doings of "the Highland host" in the west of Scotland in the covenanting time, may form some idea of the severity of the infliction when these soldiers were let loose on the country. The commissioners, in making their rounds, were accompanied by a number of these *Lichtensteiners*; and after milder measures had been used to compel the Protestants to apostatise, troops were billeted on the recusants, Papists being spared the infliction. The people were required to provide them with provisions and wine, and to give them whatsoever they should desire; the soldiers being given to understand that they might do as they listed. The people sighed and groaned under the yoke: it was to them as if a Sodom had poured out on them a portion of its vilest contents. Virtuous families found their houses filled with drunken fanatics; they saw their property wasted and pillaged; their ears were greeted with oaths and imprecations, with the ribald jests, the licentious and blasphemous talk of villains heated with wine and bigotry; their persons were not safe from assault and violence. When their sufferings were almost beyond endurance, the authors of all their calamities would blandly tell them how easily they might obtain relief: let them just confess to a priest, and produce a confession ticket, and immediately the troops should be removed from them. It is not to be wondered at, however much to be deplored, that only too many should have faltered under such a trial. For a father to take farewell of his family and friends and die the martyr's death, were surely a trial less severe than day after day to endure the presence of a cruel and licentious soldiery, knowing that he was completely under their power, and that no authority would interpose to protect those most dear to him from their vilest and most brutal assaults. But as one after another fell, the condition of the remainder became always the more intolerable; for the soldiers, withdrawn from those who had fallen, were sent to the few who remained steadfast, already overburdened as they were, till, like the locusts of Egypt, these troops had consumed all that belonged to their unhappy victims. Then at last, as a favour, the Protestants who had passed this ordeal might be

banished, or it might be, after all that they had endured, thrown into prison, where many died.*

By such means were the Bohemian towns and cities recovered to Rome—at a fearful sacrifice truly. The best of the land became exiles, died in prison, or sunk under accumulated woes, more than the mortal frame could bear. Those who remained did so with a wounded conscience, which must have entailed on many of them anguish more than can be told; and thus degraded in their own eyes, from having been possessed of a noble spirit of freedom, they sunk to nearly the level of slaves; as Pelzel laments, “the courage of the nation lay buried on the White Mountain.”

We have still to speak of the country people.† As in the greater part of Europe, and especially in the Slavonian countries, the people were then in a state of serfdom or vassalage. Yet to a great extent they were Protestants, and many of them in the highest sense of the word free. Not a few of the nobles, like Budowa, were distinguished for their excellence and godliness, and had used every means in their power for the advancement of the spiritual interests of their subject peasants. The latter were thus, to a very large extent, zealous Protestants, many of them of the Bohemian Brethren, the true descendants of the old Hussites, who had fought under Ziska and Prokop. But Ferdinand, true to his maxim, that he would rather have his kingdom desolate than heretic (*malum regnum vastatum quam regnum damnatum*), had determined that the peasantry, as well as the higher classes, cost what it might, should be compelled to become Popish. If the sufferings of the citizens were dreadful, those of the country people were, in some respects, even more so. Similar expedients were made use of in this as in the former cases. Their Bibles and hymn-books were taken from the poor people, in the hope that heresy, having nothing more to nourish it, might die out. Monks, too, were sent among them, to ply them with their usual arts, beginning with flattery and pretended kindness. In a time of scarcity, provisions and money were freely offered to those who would deny their faith. But as a contemporary

* Don Martin Huerda, a Spaniard, in command of one of the regiments, made himself peculiarly notorious for his brutal violence and his sad success in carrying on the work of perversion. His name became as terrible in Bohemia as was that of Jefferies in England after Monmouth's rebellion; and not content with abusing his victims in such language as the English judge could pour out with such fluency, he would, in the paroxysms of his fury, seize a stick and beat his prisoners till the blood flowed, if they dared to refuse compliance with his wishes. A renegade Bohemian, Zdenko Kolowrat, is also mentioned as noted for his brutal violence.

† Vol. ii., p. 270, *ib.*

writer says, the monks "from foxes soon became wolves." As few conversions took place, the peasantry of a district would be summoned to appear before the authorities in the chief town of the district. If they failed to comply, soldiers were let loose on them. Many of the unhappy people were seized on winter nights, dragged from their houses half naked, and driven like cattle through the snow to the appointed place, and then thrown into dungeons, where hunger, thirst, cold, and filth, often brought them nearly to death. One kind of torture in common use was this :—A sort of wooden cage was constructed, of such dimensions that it was impossible either to stand upright or to sit in it. When the victim was placed in it, the constrained position in a short time occasioned pain almost past endurance. From time to time the sufferer was asked, if now he would become catholic "of his free will." Many were beaten till nearly dead, with thongs and sticks. Some, in their distress, begged to be put to death, rather than compelled to deny their faith. They were told, with bitter mockery, that the Emperor did not thirst for their blood, but desired their salvation. The whole policy of the time was intended to wear them out, to shake them out of their constancy, not to put them to death. Many of the lords of the soil, especially such as were renegade Protestants, were most zealous in persecuting their subjects. With whips or drawn swords, they and their retainers would drive the poor defenceless people to the churches, that they might receive the communion, and there beat them till they knelt down ; if they still kept their mouths shut, they would force them open, and thrust the wafer down their throats : withal commanding them to declare that "of their free will they became catholic." A favourite mode of compelling conversion was, where a mother and infant were found, to bind the mother, and remove the infant beyond her reach, that its cries might move the wretched parent to deny her faith, lest she might see her child die of hunger before her eyes. Another mode was to shut up all access to the fields and pastures, that the lowing of the starving cattle might compel their owners to submit. So it came to be said among them, that the cows, oxen, and swine were more learned than Jesuits or priests ; for in a few weeks their cries had accomplished more than the sermons of the latter could have effected in many years. To conclude the account of these conversions, we quote the words of one who was certainly in no way prejudiced against the house of Hapsburg. "Some were massacred without mercy ; some hunted and driven like wild beasts to the woods and mountains ; some dragged to masses and processions, with every species of insult and cruelty ; and those who ventured to oppose these enormities were

racked, and mutilated, or put to death with tortures too shocking for humanity to describe.”*

The persecution was not, indeed, alike severe over the whole land, and some of the nobles, either more mercifully disposed than others, or less bigoted as Papists, overlooked the Protestant tendencies of their subjects, whose condition remained thus for a time, at least, comparatively tolerable. Among these has been mentioned the celebrated Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland. Yet such were rare exceptions. One result of the cruel measures which we have mentioned was, that many, especially of those who lived near the frontiers, made their escape to foreign countries, though even that was done by stealth, and those who were caught in the attempt were

* Coxe's *History of the House of Austria*, Vol. ii. p. 208 (Bohn's edition). As we have found that monks had much to do with the forced conversions of which we have been speaking, it may be interesting to know how "heresy" was treated when it appeared in a convent. In such cases, it was not usual for the superiors to take measures to put the offender to death, lest the honour of the particular order might seem tarnished, if it were known that a member of it had been tainted with such a stain. The offending brother was usually allowed to languish out of sight in a dungeon. A monk named George Holyk, who afterwards escaped and became a Protestant, and who has left considerable accounts of the Bohemian persecutions, of which he was an eye-witness, has also given some account of the treatment of heretic monks. An example may be given. There was a certain Father Ambrose, of the Dominican order, on whose mind the light of divine truth began to dawn. One day, when instructing students, he told them, with deep emotion, that he had been leading them astray, exposed to them the errors of popery, and opened up to them the gospel. The matter was soon reported to the superiors. Father Ambrose was summoned to their presence. At first he was gently dealt with, told that a charge of heresy had been made against him, from which the Prior had no doubt he would easily clear himself. The points were then stated. Ambrose boldly stated what he had taught, and said he would not contradict God's word. Now their tone was changed. Ambrose was severely beaten, and, bleeding profusely, cast into a dungeon, where no book was allowed him but Thomas Aquinas. After some months, he was again brought up for examination. Again he declared he would sooner die than deny God's word. Again beaten, he was cast into a worse and more loathsome dungeon than before. It was now ordered, however, that he should be brought up twice every week, at dinner time; and that he should lie down at the door of the refectory, that the brethren, in passing, might trample on him. The last of them, a thorough rascal, would give him a kick, and order him to go to the middle of the hall, where he must kneel till dinner was over; a piece of black bread, baked for the dogs, and a little salt were handed to him, while the Prior and the friars feasted sumptuously. After dinner, he was taken to the chapter house, where a terrible discourse was pronounced over him. He was loaded with reproaches, and consigned, thousands of times over, to the devil and to hell. Then he must kneel before the Prior, and kiss his feet, and do the same to each of the friars, during which ceremony he received many a hard kick on the mouth. After this, he was beaten with rods by the prior and friars in succession, and then, all bleeding, again consigned to his dungeon. At last came the general chapter of friars, when he was once more offered grace; but continuing steadfast to his confession, he was condemned to perpetual imprisonment, and cast into a loathsome dungeon, where Holyk says he languished many years.—*Peschek*, ii. 858, 864.

very hardly used. Providentially, the province of Lausitz, or Lusatia, one of the dependencies of the Bohemian crown, had been mortgaged to the Elector of Saxony, who, being a Lutheran, protected the fugitives, and great numbers settled in that province. Such, also, as made their way to his dominions were kindly received by the Elector of Brandenburg, whose successors the kings of Prussia have, on repeated occasions, honourably distinguished themselves by the ready welcome given to Protestant exiles from the Austrian states and from other countries. There is at this day, in Berlin, a church built by Bohemian exiles—at a somewhat later date, however—which retains the name of “the Bohemian Church.” Many escaped to more distant countries, especially to the Netherlands, so often the home of Protestant exiles in the seventeenth century; and there, it is said, their descendants may still be recognised by their Slavonian names. As to those who remained, it is not to be wondered at, that the majority of them were Romanised; for even had the elder generation remained true, they had now neither pastors nor teachers, and the education of the youth had entirely fallen into the hands of the monks. Thus the rising generation must either grow up in ignorance, or receive instruction from those teachers. In either case, they were likely to fall an easy prey to the arts of the priesthood. And so the measures of Ferdinand II. were but too successful. One of the earliest conquests of the Reformation was lost to the gospel, and from this time till the edict of toleration of Joseph II., in 1781, whatever remained of Protestantism was hid in the depths of forests, or in the fastnesses of those mountain ranges which encircle the Bohemian plains. In such inaccessible retreats meetings were sometimes held for the pure worship of God, and Protestant ministers were occasionally enabled, though at the risk of their lives, to visit them, and so to aid in keeping alive the flame which, since the days of Huss, had never been wholly extinguished.* But, as Peizel says, Bohemia, almost entirely Protestant in 1620, in the course of twenty years became, to appearance at least, entirely Roman Catholic; and it was the boast of Austria, that heresy had at last been rooted out. The victory was thus gained, but at a fearful cost. The noblest and best of the land, the wisest and most learned, were either dead or banished; while villages were laid waste, towns, once most flourishing, nearly depopulated, fertile fields became a wilderness; and the

* Peschek gives interesting accounts of some such conventicles, vol. ii., pp. 306, 307. It should not be forgotten, that the Moravian brethren, who now hold so honourable a place in the history of the church, sprung from the scattered remains of the old Hussites, or Bohemian and Moravian brethren.

population, which in 1618 amounted to nearly three millions, at the close of the thirty years' war had sunk to about 780,000.*

In other countries, scenes similar to what we have described have occurred. Probably, for instance, the sufferings of the French Protestants after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes were quite as severe as anything endured by their co-religionists in Bohemia; but we are not aware of another instance in which an entire kingdom, once so thoroughly alienated from Rome, was again so completely subdued. But when we know the means employed, we have little cause to wonder at the result. When a Jesuit, in presence of the Pope, was claiming for his order the credit of the work, a Capuchin, Valerius Magnus, is said to have replied: "Holy father, give me soldiers as they were given to the Jesuits, and I shall convert the whole world." The proximate cause of the success of the Papists in Bohemia was certainly the base desertion of the German Protestants, and especially of the Elector of Saxony. Krasinski imputes it to the German antipathy, or at least want of sympathy, with a Slavonian race. Remembering, however, that the elected king was a German prince and elector, we are inclined to think it would be nearer the truth to trace the desertion of the Elector of Saxony and other Protestant princes, partly perhaps in the elector's case to personal jealousy, but mainly to the divisions amongst Protestants, and especially to the bitter animosity of the Lutherans against the Calvinists, for Frederick was a Calvinist, and the majority of his Bohemian subjects were known to be either Calvinists or Brethren. And certainly we shall not read this mournful history in vain, if we learn from it the necessity lying on the Protestant churches to combine their energies so as to present a united front against the common foe. Surely, further, the review of these persecutions, which issued in the extinction of the liberty, religion, and national life itself, of a once celebrated kingdom, ought to suggest to us a lesson of the most profound thankfulness to the great Head of the church, that in our own land, while our fathers had their own share of sufferings for the truth, yet succour was sent, ere the life of the church had been fully trodden out; and God did not allow the rod of the wicked to rest on the lot of the righteous till even they were driven to put forth their hand to iniquity, and deny his name.

* Krasinski, p. 164.

ART. VII.—*Schleiermacher*.*

As a *scientific* man, Schleiermacher was peculiar in this, that it was science purely in which he was interested, and not learning, as that may be distinguished from science. Although his attainments were of the most astonishing variety and profundity in themselves, as isolated matters they had no interest for him; they were interesting only as they could be interwoven with the totality of his own views, and embraced among the living elements of his own system of convictions and means of operating successfully upon others. And as science had become a vital part of his own personal existence, and was sustained by and interfused with a strong moral sentiment, so, in his activity as a man of science, his personal intercourse and direct influence on others, it was a constant and serious necessity with him. He had no high opinion of merely literary activity. On the 1st of August 1791, he thus writes to his sister: "The duty which, in my view, is unavoidably laid upon every man, is to teach others, whether they be old persons or children, his own or others. Many a time I try to persuade myself that if one write books he exerts an educating influence upon the world as he best can; but it is not so; it is only a fantastic performance without any life in it, without sight, without utility." Hence, for Schleiermacher, the academic sphere of life was assuredly best adapted. Yet, at first, when the call to Wurzburg put it clearly before his mind, he hesitated timorously, and expressed himself in the following language: "It still seems to me a most marvellous idea, that I should read lectures, and I wonder at myself for not regarding it as altogether impossible; it is so strange to me, and I am deficient in so many respects. My literary acquirements, for example, are altogether too limited." But when soon afterwards he actually engaged in the work at Halle, all his anxieties on the subject gave place to the greatest delight in his calling. The fact that, at the commencement he was not resorted to by extraordinary throngs, he explained in part from the fact that he was a thorn in the side of his colleagues, who were actuated by a widely different spirit; partly, too, from his method of teaching, which required eager and discerning students at the start; hence he rather dreaded a too

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prompt approval, such as might originate in curiosity or some other external grounds. But after the lapse of the first quarter, he is able to write to Charlotte von Kathen, on the 17th January 1806: "Teaching from the professor's chair is a noble business, especially as, day after day, I find myself more at home in it, and discover that there are always some youth who appear thoroughly to grasp what I present to their apprehension." Three quarters later he writes to Willich: "In general, dear friend, I have great cause for thankfulness for the fair degree of success as a teacher which I enjoy, and for the agreeable prospect I have in regard to the next generation of young theologians. True, it would not be hard to outnumber my school, and I am very well satisfied that the crowd does not press in; but I have found many a noble spirit and many a precious talent among the students, leading to a hearty acceptance of the truth; indeed I know of a couple who have been cured by my lectures, of the repugnance which philologists especially often cherish towards Christianity! What greater joy than this could I experience?" Here we may already see how the interest he felt in science never was dis severed from the interest he took in Christianity and the church, and in this view the connection of the duty of preaching, with his academical position, must have been very welcome. Thus he writes to Willich, December 1805: "This much I can very confidently expect, that, by the relation of my pulpit exercises to my lectures before the students, I shall make clear to them the relation of speculation and piety, and thus from both places, the pulpit and the professor's chair, enlighten and warn them alike."

With what lively enthusiasm he writes to his bride, when, after the uncertain condition into which the overthrow of the University at Halle had plunged him, the prospect of a renewed academical career opened before him in Berlin, and he had already prepared and delivered several lectures in this expectation, December 4. 1808: "What at present gives me truly great joy is my lectures. With the introductory I am seldom satisfied, and was not at this time, just as I am never satisfied with the introduction to my sermons. But as I go further, and the audience with me, everything falls into better order, and it becomes clearer that we have seized upon the truth; the delivery becomes easier, and frequently in the midst of the lecture I am surprised by the spontaneous suggestion of an idea not previously in my thoughts, and so I myself come away instructed from almost every lecture. I cannot tell you what a pleasure it is! To give the young men of to-day clear views of Christianity and the state, which is in fact to give them all they require to make the future better than the past has been!" Thus inclination and duty in him wrought together to such a degree

that he discharged his professional duties with the utmost strictness and punctuality, and that, for instance, as late as May, in the disturbed year of 1813, he continued the delivery of his lectures after all other teachers had closed.

It is due to this intimate ingrafting of his acquirements and of his teachings into his entire personality, that Schleiermacher was incapable of acquiescing, in any outward manner, in a doctrine or a practice which did not inwardly commend itself to his convictions. Hence, too, it was impossible for him to adopt the catch-words of parties, which so seldom convey any clear idea; frequently the suspicion of indecision fell upon him, when his position was simply the result of a higher degree of penetration and a truthfulness to himself. As early as the execution of Louis XVI., during a period of great excitement, he writes in this regard to his father, (February 14. 1793:) "As I cannot refrain from opposing, to the best of my knowledge and convictions, the narrow and partisan views of men, or from guiding them in a practical way to the *audiatur et altera pars*, I am able to satisfy no one, and I, poor man, who rarely have an opinion upon matters in the concrete, and who can, with still less truth, be reckoned as a party man, now frequently pass with democrats for a champion of despotism, and an adherent of the old routine; with the hot-headed, for a time-server, who sets his cloak to the wind, and will not say what he thinks; with the royalists for a Jacobin, and with prudent people for a thoughtless man, with a tongue over-long."

That a mind of such clearness and penetration, subjecting everything to the severest scrutiny, should be exposed to little, if any, danger of system-hunting, is self-evident. Well may he confidently have responded to a warning of his father's on this subject, December 23. 1789: "I do not believe that I shall ever arrive at a perfectly developed system, so as to answer all the questions one may propose, decisively and in harmony with all the rest of my knowledge; but I have always believed that to prove and to examine, to give all witnesses and all parties a patient hearing is the only means of at length reaching a sufficient degree of certainty, and above all, of discovering the fixed limits between the things on which a man must be capable of taking a part, and giving every one a reason for it, and the things one can leave unsettled without injury to his peace and happiness. Thus I calmly contemplate the struggles of philosophical and theological athletes without pronouncing for any; but I cannot help continually learning something from both."

As to his *Method of Study*, Schleiermacher was not guided by a plan laid out in accordance with some fixed system, but followed whithersoever the particular interest led him. In the same letter we read on this subject: "Study is, so to speak,

too much of a passion with me to allow me, so long as my time is my own, to keep certain hours and busy myself in them, until the stroke of the clock, or something of the sort, summons one to an entirely different branch of knowledge. Everything that I undertake is done with a certain vehemence, and I do not pause before I have reached a result upon some point or other. Hence I do everything, not by the hour or by the day, but by impulse, by periods. At one time some great division of philosophy engages my interest, I investigate its history, I go through all the different opinions held, and see which among them is tenable or untenable, consequent or inconsequent. While at this work, it may be, something has drawn my attention to a particular point in history, or to a disputed point in philology, and as soon as the first investigation is completed, I turn with the same earnestness to that. Thus practical and theoretical philosophy take their turns. At present, I am engaged in a thorough revision of my specifically theological acquirements. This whole manner of study has, doubtless, as every other, its defects, but it has its undeniable advantages too; one is not distracted and confused by a multitude of utterly diverse objects, and since one is drawn to his pursuits by a certain want, by a void in his attainments of which he has become conscious, everything is done *con amore*, and one is not likely to spend his time on some unnecessary pursuit merely to carry out an established plan." Schleiermacher's reading proceeded, of course, but slowly on this plan, as he himself felt and regretted, but what he once had acquired in this manner stayed by him, and in the end he found himself in possession of a richer store of the fruits of reading than he would have gained by a more rapid and extensive, but more cursory, reading. And it arose from this energetic concentration of his whole mind upon the subject at any time in hand that, in spite of his manifold official duties, and notwithstanding his extensive acquaintance, he could be so prolific as a writer. The "Discourses upon Religion" (*Reden über die Religion*), were written in Potsdam in about two months (from the middle of February to the middle of April 1799). In the composing of the "Christmas Feast" (*Weihnachtsfeier*), which was written in Halle, about Christmas 1805, there transpired, "from the first thought to the last syllable, only three weeks," during which, moreover, he had no cessation from the work of preparing lectures. The admirable academical treatise "on the Various Methods of Translating," he wrote, as appears from the correspondence, amid many interruptions, in June 1813, in three days, and the day before he delivered it he was still busily engaged upon it.

We owe it to the deep personal interest which Schleiermacher took in every separate, scientific, and literary employment in

which he was engaged, that in these wholly confidential letters, which are in no wise designed to serve literary objects, *mention is nevertheless made of all of his more extensive works.* Especially is this true of the Discourses upon Religion, the Monologues, the Critique of Morals, the Christmas Festival,—writings which are in a high degree reflections of his own experiences. In regard to the Dogmatic Theology, he announces his work to his friend Willich as early as December 1805, though it actually appeared some fifteen years later. Concerning the relation between his dogmatical and philosophical views, we find some interesting remarks in a letter belonging probably to the close of the year 1818, and addressed to Jacobi: "My philosophy and my dogmatics are purposed not to conflict with each other, but just for that reason will neither of them ever be completed, and as far back as I can remember, they have always harmonised and always approximated each other."

Alkin to this praiseworthy modesty was the reluctance which Schleiermacher always shewed to pronouncing a hasty decision upon the mysterious phenomena of the natural world. He seems at one time to have had considerable confidence in animal magnetism, and even used it as a remedy for some of his constitutional infirmities; what opinion he formed of its efficiency in this respect does not appear in the sources before us.

It might be expected that a man who took such a healthful interest in all the great concerns of society, and laboured so earnestly for their advancement, would not find *political matters* foreign to his taste. Schleiermacher's participation in the political issues of his times was, in fact, livelier, his opinions upon them more thorough, and his influence over them more extensive and important, than one would have had reason to expect from his professional calling; not as though he sacrificed his special interests of his pursuits, by meddling with a multiplicity of political engagements which did not concern him; his course, in this respect, only illustrates that interest in public affairs which it is the duty of every citizen to take, but which, he is too often selfishly lost sight of in exclusive attention to his own particular profession.

To his father, under date of May 14, 1792, he expresses himself very justly and wisely upon the French Revolution, then in progress. The movement, on the whole, strikes him very favourably, while he condemns the violent passions and extravagant ideas manifested in its course. Four periods may be distinguished in the time when, holding a public office, he was brought into closer contact with public affairs: first, That of the confusion consequent upon the unfortunate battle of Jena; then that of the internal development of the national spirit of Prussia, under the burden of a foreign yoke; next, the

period of the struggles for freedom ; and finally, the ensuing reaction.

Amid these changing situations, and the altered feelings and policy they occasioned, Schleiermacher's conduct was perfectly consistent, because, from the beginning, with the penetration and clearness natural to him, he formed a substantially correct judgment of the position of affairs, and perceived the source of the mischief, and the means needful for its removal. As early as the 20th of June 1806, he writes to Charlotte von Kathen, at Rugen, in view of the possibility of the French attacking Sweden : " Believe me, there will take place, sooner or latter, a general conflict, in which our mode of thought, our religion, our culture, will be at stake, just as truly as our outward freedom and external goods—a conflict which must be met, which not the kings with their hireling forces, but the people, making common cause with their kings, must fight ; which will unite people and princes in a nobler style than they have been for hundreds of years past, and in which the common cause will require every one, every one to take a part. I perceive a storm in the air, and wish its approach, that the explosion may be over ; for that it can be avoided, I have no longer any expectation." Thus forearmed, the calamity which soon after actually befel disturbed him not. Taking his own advice, given at that time to Herz, " to look at the fates of men in the mass," he paid slight regard to the dreadful confusion which reigned at Halle after the battle of Jena, when soldiers were quartered upon him, and he was stripped of money, and of the very necessities of life. In the midst of all this, he had no greater anxiety than that the king should not conclude a dishonourable peace. " If only," he writes, November 21st 1806, to Henrietta Herz, " if only a good spirit guides the decisions of our king, so that he does not change utterly, and conclude a dishonourable peace, but remains true to Russia ! This is the only course which will ensure us better times ; and I have a tolerably strong conviction that he will not do otherwise. Everything that is German must soon experience chastisement. The rod must now come upon everything German. Only upon this condition can any really noble or advantageous result come to pass. Happy they who survive it ; happy they who die, if they die in faith." Similarly in a letter to Willich, of December 1st : " If I look at things in the gross, I am tranquil again. The constitution of Germany was a thing which could not have been maintained ; in the Prussian monarchy, too, there was much of a promiscuous, untenable nature, that has disappeared ; whether its germinant idea will be preserved, and how, must be determined by its own virtue. I am sure that Germany ; the centre of Europe, will once more arise in beauteous

shape,—but when—and whether only after far harder trials, and after a long period of severe oppression, God knows. I fear naught except a dishonourable peace the while, which leaves an appearance, and nothing more than an appearance, of national existence and freedom.” Hence he rejoiced in the firm and noble stand taken by the king, in disdaining such a peace; and he expresses his joy in connection with the deep sense of his own losses, in a truly affecting manner, in a letter to Charlotte von Kathen, December 1st: “I was almost certain that the first battle would be lost; and I hence trembled with indignation that the battle-field was not sought at a greater distance; but the dreadful disorders which ensued, and the universal panic—with a single illustrious exception—far surpassed any idea I had formed. I was pleased only with the king, and with the fortitude he displayed. I hope, now that he has suffered the occupation of his capital and the surrender of his fortresses without suing for peace, he will certainly not divide his fate from that of the rest of Europe. The times have arrived of which I wrote to you, and it may be, all that has as yet happened, is but the beginning. The struggle will have to take a deeper hold, if life and weal are to issue from this wide-spread desolation. To this pleasing hope I adhere, and death itself shall not rob me of it, if I should not survive to the fulfilment. At present, dear friend, I am placed in about as disagreeable circumstances as possible; restricted to the pitiable, inactive life of a mere man of learning; suffering, indeed, the penury which seems attached to the lot of such; professor’s chair and pulpit gone; the university, in which such a delightful sphere of labours was opening before me, scattered in all directions, and in fact, little hope left of its re-establishment, so long as our district remains in the hands of the enemy. For the great conqueror appears to have a hearty hatred of Halle, and if this has its origin in the conduct of our youth—refusing him any sign of joy, and, indeed, scarcely of astonishment, their whole appearance betokening much rather the reverse—why I am decidedly pleased that it should be so. Just now, I believe, God is helping me again to the sphere of activity, without which, life would have lost all its value to me.”

We need search no further to learn how clearly Schleiermacher saw that the conqueror contended, not simply against the armies of Germany, but with quick perception recognised more dangerous and far more odious enemies in German Protestantism, German philosophy, the teachers of German views, and their principal seats, the German universities, and that, therefore, circumstances might arise requiring martyrs from the learned as well as the military profession, among the former of which, he, as a man not accustomed to put the light of his opi-

nions under a bushel, would surely not be among the last. On the same 1st of December of the year of peril, a date so rich in letters, he writes to Willich: "*Napoleon hates Protestantism as he hates speculation.* I believe my prophecy in the Discourses is not untrue. When it comes to pass, my friend, then let us simply stand at our post, and fear nothing. I wish that I had wife and child, that I might be behind no one in this event. I have preached twice during this period, twelve days ago and to-day; both times, as you can imagine, referring to the times and their indications, in my own way, and without reserve;" and shortly before to Herz: "He (Napoleon) will certainly soon rage against Protestantism, and then it will be my lot to come forth in advance of many others. None can know what is in store for him in these times. There may be such things as martyrs again, both for science and for religion." We see that it was just *because* danger threatened that, with manly courage and German feeling, he persisted in remaining at his post while it was practicable to do so.

As early as Nov. 4th, he writes to Reimer: "Should there be a peace soon, it is very unlikely that Halle will remain Prussian. If it becomes Saxon, the University will, in all probability, go down, or if it is sustained, my remaining cannot be thought of, because the Lutheranism of Saxony is so strenuous. If it falls to some French prince, I could not remain, but as long as there was a corner of Prussia remaining, to that I should return." Ten days later, to Herz: "I have already had a repetition, in a remote manner, of the invitation to Bremen, but while there is a shadow of hope for the continuance of the University upon the foundations of the past, I shall give heed to nothing of a different nature. And more reluctantly than ever would I separate from the king, to whom I earnestly long to address an encouraging word, in the misfortune which has befallen him and us, not, certainly, as the consequence of his own sins."

When at length Halle had ceased to be Prussian, and he was now settled in Berlin, he communicated to Charlotte von Kather the following: "I cherish but this purpose, to follow the fortunes of my immediate fatherland, Prussia, while it exists, and is not utterly unworthy of this preference. Should it quite succumb to misfortune, I am determined to seek the German fatherland, wherever a Protestant can live, and Germans do govern. There I shall never be entirely without opportunity to follow my calling. This is the only comfort of such as are unable to bear arms. Ah! see that your boys grow up to be right strong, right firm, courageous, with a taste for arms, amiable and pious."

On the 31st of December, he writes in explanation of his leaving Halle: "The new Westphalian Government, it is true,

gives hope of a restoration, but I cannot acquiesce in this government, and I must live under a German rule, while ever there is one to be found. For I cannot countenance, even by my presence, the measures which are put in operation for the very purpose of destroying German taste and feeling. For the preceding two months I had been sorely harassed in Halle, and after the prayer for the King and Queen of Westphalia was introduced into the service it was impossible for me longer to occupy the pulpit. In a word, I can have no enjoyment there in teaching; hence I have taken my final departure, and would have gone even if I had not entertained the lively conviction that a French government cannot allow a German university to exist in peace."

Yet, amid all this grief, he does not lose his sense of the valuable uses of such a period, and he therefore thus comforts the same friend in another place: "This time of distraction, however, is, in various respects, of a character to promote union among those who belong together, and a time when every virtuous endowment and every power of love finds greater than usual opportunity for development."

"I cannot refrain," says Baur, at this point, "from making me of the admirable letter which, on the 15th December, he wrote to Thiel, as furnishing, in conclusion, a complete picture of the prevailing state of mind which, in that unhappy period, characterised the noble man."*

"The times are evil, and it is hard to keep up one's spirits; but one must learn to do it. I am acquainted with three little contrivances, and very cheap ones, too, which are to the purpose. As to the fatherland, Germany, to look as far into the future as possible, for it is only in the distance that the clear and cheerful light can be seen; then, to contemplate the calamities which are transpiring around us, only in the mass, and in reference to their general and well known causes, without going too deeply into the specialities, for these are what chiefly distress and disgust us; and finally—do not laugh at the prescription—to allow eyes to the stomach for only a fortnight beforehand, else the greatest evil of all, the care of providing sustenance, will have to be borne. As to this last I have somewhat to boast of, for I have just rejected a reiterated call to Bremen, though I really have no prospect for above a fortnight for my stomach. But while our gallant king is so brave as not to make peace, I cannot abandon my chair, and am inclined to think that the stones must be made bread rather than that I should be driven to lend a hand in the destruction of Halle, or to cause the fatherland the least particle of pain. Such rude violence cannot continue long, and then everything, even in its outward appearance,

* Vgl. Fr. Schleiermacher, die Darstellung der Idee eines sittlichen Ganzen im Menschlichen entwerfend. Berlin, 1855, s., 82 f.

will come forth again more beautiful than before. The misfortune which has befallen us here has something in it very comforting; if we look well into its causes we shall find it due to nothing else than that no one here has consented to debasement."

This disposition, which first operated to sustain him in distress, afterwards led him to seek remedies for the distress. What he had once written to a friend, that for him there was no endurance possible but a struggling one, that any other would be a despairing stupor, the immediately subsequent period furnished him the most abundant opportunity to verify. The glory with which Arndt has adorned the name of the heroic Scharnhorst, the glory of being a man

Who, though the rage of devils filled the world,
Never of the fatherland despaired,

this glory the theologian Schleiermacher has won; he, too, belongs, like that "armourer of German freedom," to the band of patriots who could not be discouraged,

Who, in the stillness, had formed
Horses and men, weapons and war.

At the close of the year 1808, a few weeks after Stein had, at the instance of Napoleon, been compelled to resign his ministry, a few days before the French Ambassador, Von St Marsan, had delivered Napoleon's order of outlawry, issued December 16. 1808, from the imperial camp of Madrid, against *le nommé Stein*, in consequence of which the latter left Berlin as early as the 6th of January, Schleiermacher, in a letter to his wife, expresses his unshaken confidence in the future of the fatherland, in these words: "*I can never bring myself to the point of despairing of my country; I have too strong a faith; I know too well that it is an instrument and people chosen of God.* It is possible that all our pains will be in vain, and that a time full of hardship and oppression is about to come upon us, but our country will soon come gloriously forth out of all."

Supported by such hopes, he co-operated boldly in the work of quiet renovation then going forward. His glowing zeal, guided by the most penetrating judgment, his courage and his energy, his staunch and persistent demeanour, won for him a high degree of confidence on the part of his associates in the work. As early as the 18th of August 1808, we find him in Halle, on a patriotic mission. He expresses himself upon the subject to his wife as follows: "I fear no danger; do you fear none. I am on no other road than that of my calling, and neither am I, nor those who have the direction of my work in its particulars, lacking in moderation or foresight. It is an entirely honourable, blameless part I am performing, and what

can there be nobler for me than to be able to render assistance in the managing and bringing to pass that state of affairs on which depends the happiness of our life? Only may heaven grant that things shall take such a course, that the execution of what has been determined upon can really be undertaken; for it can only be done at all under circumstances under which it is almost impossible for it to fail. And so pray for me, that God may guide and bless and protect me, as *I* pray that he may keep you strong and of a good courage."

Eight days later (after the 25th of August), he is in Königsberg, in the family of a friend, Wedeke, but entrusted with business matters, of which he dare say nothing, and which he must despatch, notwithstanding they consume very much of his time, in a manner to attract the least possible notice. Meanwhile he is in correspondence with the most important persons upon whom rests the hope of the country. At first he expected to be absent only about two weeks, but it was only on the morning of September 30th that he returned to Berlin. There is a note appended to the collection of letters, which remarks that it can now no longer be made out what was the precise connection of Schleiermacher with this movement. It is probable it had something to do with the formation of the *Tugendbund* (Virtue Society), which is known to have taken place in Königsberg, in the summer of 1808, and which had its chief council there. . . . Even during his stay in Königsberg, his wife received his letters always *after they had been cut open*, and in the excitement arising from the conflict between the French and German party, on account of the well known letter of Stein, and its consequences, he probably acted in a manner to excite peculiar suspicion, and thus he had the honour, on the 27th of November, to be cited before Davoust. At the conclusion of a letter of this date to his wife, he narrates the circumstances as follows: "I intended to tell you much more; but what happens? A carriage drives up, a French officer alights, comes up, and asks me to go with him before Marshal Davoust. There are two others sitting in the vehicle; and the whole amounted to nothing beyond a discourse he held with us, to the effect that we were noted as hot-headed, and disturbers of the peace, and things of that sort. The whole thing was rather comical than otherwise. I had to act as interpreter for the rest, and I acted my part quite earnestly. Do not be frightened. It all amounts to nothing. The others were persons altogether unknown to me, certainly none of my friends. These lucky fellows are quite unknown to the government, and I have to thank a mere stupid rumour about my sermons for the honour."

This account does not betray any great terror on the part of

the delinquent before his inquisitors; while, on their part, a degree of respect for him seems to have been felt, as they never again troubled him in a similar manner.

In regard to the existing circumstances of the Prussian Government, he expresses himself shortly afterward: (Dec. 15th) "There is much that weighs me down, not in my own immediate circumstances, but in the general position of affairs. Our good king has suffered himself to be surprised by a miserable party, and to be led away to a step which thrusts everything out of the safe course in which it had begun to move. There are, it is true, excellent men constantly at the head, but who knows how long they will be able to make helm against the bad who have again ensnared the king; and thus it may happen that our country will the second time be brought to the verge of ruin, unless the better sort attempt to save it by measures which are always extremely uncertain. More fully than this I may not write you, even if I were confident of its entire security, but I cannot refrain from disclosing to you, in general, what lies so near to my heart. All my occupations are thrown into confusion, and must be constantly broken in upon, whether I will or no, to study the position of affairs and the possible remedies. The pulpit and the professor's chair are the only places where I do, in any systematic manner, what belongs to them."

How correctly he estimated the meaning and design of Napoleon's decree of outlawry against Stein, at the very beginning, appears in the following extract, written January 26, 1809: "Stein's persecution has not affected me; true, I had not calculated upon it, but when it came, it was as something known and expected to me. Only one thing gave me an amazing amount of distress, that he should have gone off so hastily, which was not indeed necessary, (?) and that I did not at first get to see him. I have sent him my congratulations, for it was the greatest honour that could befall a private man to be counted an enemy of the great nation."

On the preceding New Year's day, Stein had read Schleiermacher's New Year's Sermon: "On the things which men are to fear, and which they are not to fear." He recalled it to mind soon afterwards, as "a very suitable preparation for the events which so quickly followed."

How must the man's heart have expanded when, at the winter solstice of 1812, the sun which had arisen in the East ascended in higher and still higher circles, and started into life the seeds which had been sown so faithfully, and with such trust in the divine favour! But alas! our collection furnishes us with no letters earlier than the month of May 1813; but we know what a lively interest Schleiermacher took in the popular movement of the day, that he was nominated as one of the lead-

ing members for Berlin at the organisation of the people for the national defence, that he was the joy and strength of the brave, a rod and a terror to the bad, his whole activity resting upon the sole foundation besides which none other can be laid, and all his words salted, purified, and transfused by the still and sacred fire of the gospel. It was only when Berlin itself, in May of that year, was apparently threatened, that he suffered himself to be disturbed, not for his own safety, but for that of his wife and child, whom he had, with other Berliners, sent into Silesia, but who, as it unexpectedly turned out, were exposed to the perils of war in that region. However, we owe to this two months' separation, a series of deeply interesting letters, which prove that Schleiermacher's self-sacrificing and courageous temper was not broken in the least. Upon receiving intelligence of two murderous, but indecisive battles, he writes to his wife, May 25, "not to allow herself to be disturbed by the multitude who regard everything in the most afflictive light," and he adds: "We may venture anything that we will not lose our heads, in which case everything will come out right at last;" and on the day before, upon hearing that the German legion had at length reached the Oder: "I have ere this cherished the wish that the legion, too, could use me for some purpose, and I would cheerfully go with them."

It could not fail to happen that the man who had taken such an active part in the patriotic rising, should, after the liberation of the country, become an object of suspicion to those who were intent upon nothing so much as to be rid of the spirits which had been summoned up at first, but which were gradually becoming intractable. As early as the 24th of July 1813, he had made himself an object of dislike to the government, as the editor of "The Correspondent." In regard to this matter, he writes to Reimer: "Schuckmann, who had a commission by order of the cabinet to reprimand me severely, and to threaten me in case of a repetition, with actual process, commenced grossly and wildly with an accusation of high treason itself, but concluded with the repeated assurance that he regarded me as a man who had the most upright intentions towards his country, and with an unrestrained conversation upon the proper limits to be assigned to the freedom of the press in the case of newspapers. My immovable countenance, and the explanation of a misunderstanding in an old affair in which he believed himself to have been personally assailed by me, produced the most instantaneous effect upon him. I have reserved to myself the right of a written defence; he will probably just put it among the records. I shall see to it that it becomes as widely known as possible." That the subsequent movement caused by that critical occurrence in the history of the reaction, the mur-

der of Kotzebue, should enter into the matter of these confidential letters, is not to be wondered at. Schleiermacher's opinion of Kotzebue is given plainly enough in a letter to his wife, as early as January 28. 1809: "Kotzebue is a base fellow. He has not the slightest idea of true morality, and even where he means to portray noble characters, he disfigures them most abominably, and one is generally ashamed and angry with one's self when one allows himself to be touched by isolated situations, which here and there is the case with me, honest dog that I am!" In regard to his death, he thus expresses himself in a letter of April 23. 1819, to Henrietta Herz, at that time on a long journey with the family of William von Humboldt in Italy: "With us everything is astonishingly quiet, with the exception of the dead Kotzebue. He stalks and blusters about at a prodigious rate, and if but a couple get into a quarrel, it is he that has set them on. Hence many are anxious in regard to the future existence of the university." The far-reaching consequences of this lamentable occurrence, and the disturbance which it created in the inmost affairs of the bravest and most cautious men, are still more clearly reflected in a letter of June 2. 1819, to Gass: * "Furthermore, the crisis is apparently taking a favourable turn for the universities. The Lord Chancellor lately invited a number of Professors, including rector and deans, to a great dinner, and at the table proposed the health of the university. This was assuredly not without a design, and it must mean this much at least, that the university shall not be made accountable for the murder of Kotzebue and other insane acts. No, this affair of Kotzebue's was past all conception! But could you imagine that since that time Gneisenau seems to have thrown himself open to bad influences from every quarter? I leave it all go, and expect it all to come right again."

When political suspicions were, upon the whole, quieted, Schleiermacher had to undergo new vexations in the department of his theological labours, by reason of the determination with which he pressed his objections to the introduction of the *agenda*. On this subject he writes to Charlotte von Kather, April 9. 1824: "I am in an embarrassing position outwardly, perhaps more so than ever. I have no longer anything to do with political strifes, but church matters must soon come to a decision, and if it is a violent one, it is inevitable that I shall be one of the first victims." It is well known that after a time Schleiermacher's difficulty with the government was satisfactorily arranged; in January 1831, he received the order of the Red Eagle, third class; and if in reality it could only be an

* Comp. W. Gass. Schleiermacher's Briefwechsel mit J. Chr. Gass, s. 174.

honour to Schleiermacher in view of antecedent circumstances, that the decoration was not earlier bestowed upon a man whose fame had gone far beyond the boundaries of his own country, and who had contributed so largely to the fame of the Berlin University, yet it was not less honourable to the king that he could forget past disagreements, and could recognise the true value of the man. Schleiermacher's letter of acknowledgment to the king, together with his declaration of opinion in relation to the political parties of that period, are documents masterly alike in their form as in the tone and temper which they reveal. They are found in this collection of letters. Meanwhile, as late as July 17. 1827, we find Schleiermacher obliged to write to his wife, then absent in Karlsbad: "And now, dearest Hetty, I would ask only one thing more, that is, not to address *me*, so that your letters may not pass around by Prague or Vienna, but to direct to our Hetty, [Henrietta Herz?] without even mentioning my name in the address. In like manner I will always address F." [the friend with whom his wife was staying in Karlsbad]. The year 1830 brought new political disorders. September 5. 1832, he writes to his wife, then at Warmbrunn in Silesia: "To-day I had a long conversation on the street with A. v. H.,—it is not difficult to recognise the individual indicated by these initials,—who, as an arch-liberal, is very indignant at the present condition of German affairs. I do not sympathise with him fully, yet I am not, on the other hand, so tranquil as our friend Eichhorn is. It often fills me with sadness to think that after all our noble attempts and high expectations, I must leave our German world in such an uncertain position when I depart, as most probably will be the case." He cherished great hopes of the crown-prince, in regard to whom he wrote to his son at Aachen, but three months before his end. "I hope that in your next you will give us some account of the reception of the crown-prince in Aachen. I rejoice greatly that his journey is such a triumphal progress. I cherish the very highest opinions and hopes in regard to him, and fear neither the aristocratic nor the pietistic leanings which the people ascribe to him."

In the view here given of Schleiermacher, it has been our object to let him speak for himself, so as to give an authentic image of the man on the basis of these letters. For *about* him, or rather about his doctrines and his writings, much has been spoken and written; and there has been so much discussion, *pro* and *con*, as to the construction to be put upon them, and as to what in them might and should have been otherwise, that the estimate formed of his character also, is, through partisan bias, a fluctuating one. But we still need, as we did, in a much

higher degree, before the appearance of this precious collection of letters, a representation of the man faithfully and truthfully executed, even to the separate features, yet done by a friendly hand; for from such a work we may learn what he really was, and what, from his own peculiarities, and from the position he occupied in his age, he could not but be; how, too, his teachings and his acts in turn proceeded from his own personal being, as its thoroughly truthful and natural expression. The design is, that one of the greatest spirits of our age should not merely be criticised, and then, perchance, condemned or applauded, but that he should be understood and explained by his own peculiar nature. And what a man must he have been, who, while he wrote simple letters on matters of the most intimate personal nature—model letters too, inasmuch as they never depart from the tone of the liveliest individual intercourse—yet, at the same time, with the marvellous clearness of his intellect, casts the most surprising and significant light upon all the great spheres of human life, the family and science, the church and the state, all because the liveliest interest in all the great questions of life had interwoven itself inseparably with his whole existence. A complete and life-like portraiture of this entire personal existence can be gained, by those who have not had the opportunity of personal intercourse with Schleiermacher himself, from this collection of letters. And it is a portrait well calculated to rectify the views of his opponents, and at least to complete those of his friends and admirers.

This much cannot be questioned by the *opponents* of Schleiermacher, that he was an extraordinarily wise man; they had this, however, against him, that he seemed to them a "Schleiermacher" [veil-maker], who would not disclose his real sentiments, and of whom they could not help feeling that, as Tholuck expressed it, in dealing with him they had to deal with a man who would undertake to prove anything and everything. These opponents may now learn from Schleiermacher's letters how this clear thinker united with his incomparable pre-eminence as a dialectician the most perfect honour, and how, instead of employing in his scientific pursuits a trifling play of empty artifices, he rather sought, with the most earnest and incorruptible love for the truth, to become perfectly clear on the subject in hand for himself, and at the same time to follow his calling, "to give a clearer expression to what was already in the thoughts of others;" how, too, in actual life, he united to the wisdom of the serpent, a heart devoid of falsehood, integrity of the most reliable character, and a steadfastness that could not be shaken.

In regard to the *friends* of Schleiermacher as we have de-

scribed them above, many of these, too, limiting their view to the results of his labours as a writer, have found in Schleiermacher only the great thinker, the acute man of learning, especially the epoch-making theologian. And precisely the epoch-making theologian. For his mission was just this, to kindle anew the interest of the cultivated classes in religion, which had died out, by his intellectual conception and representation of it, and to give theologians a powerful impulse to revise their learned material, and to work it all over anew. As a permanent matter, his method could not give satisfaction, since it carried in itself very distinctly the marks of its origin in a time of unbelief, and proved itself incapable of doing scientific justice to certain essential parts of the Christian faith, whereupon there were those who made haste, "going in advance of Schleiermacher," as they imagined, to supply the deficiencies by registering at the proper place in his system the omitted matter. Yet in the case of a man who regarded it as his special calling, simply to give expression to what was already existing in his own and others' minds, who, it is to be particularly noticed, regarded articles of Christian faith as nothing more than the expression of the pious Christian's state of mind, and propositions in systematic theology as simply so many attempts to give the highest degree of definiteness to the expression of inner experiences, who, in fine, *regarded authorship as a piecemeal affair, and furnishing no sufficient opportunity by itself for the entire personal activity of a man of learning* who sought to promote the interests of science,—in the case of such a man we are not at liberty to conclude that we have the complete reflection of his intellect in his scientific system and in his writing, while, on the contrary, he himself never found anything more in them than an imperfect attempt to set forth clearly what he found animating his own bosom; rather is it indispensably necessary to a just view of his teachings to contemplate him in his personal aspects. Baumgarten Crusius once well said of Hegel, that he seemed to him always to possess too much manly German soundness, to have been capable of approving the consequence which many of his scholars have reached by playing with the principles of the system detached from the man himself, just as they would with the factors of a sum in arithmetic. So, too, may Schleiermacher's teachings be justly judged, rightly understood, and corrected and completed in the spirit of their author if they shall be contemplated in connection with the personal character of the man. And for this object his letters present a copious store of materials. He who has ready the old objection of pantheism, against an easily misunderstood expression in his system, will be likely to withhold it when he sees how this dangerous pantheist

trusts, like a child, in his God, and not only prays to him himself, but very urgently needs the intercession of his friends besides, and particularly requests it of them. To whomsoever the Christology of Schleiermacher appears like the cautious dressing up of an abstract idea in the customary phrases of Christians, let him only see how it was, and continued to be, an inmost necessity to this exalted intellect to the last days of his earthly existence, to enjoy real living communion with his Redeemer in the believing use of the sacrament. And if it does sometimes seem as if the rule of doctrine was not so much the Bible as the pious heart with its inner experiences, yet, on the other hand, in the customary assembling of his family every evening around the holy book for worship, we meet with proof of a profound reverence for the authority of the Scriptures. But especially beneficial was the influence of that child-like, pious feeling, which, originating in the house of his father, and receiving a fresh impulse among the Moravians, became not only the "maternal womb" from which issued his peculiar spiritual life, but accompanied him through his whole existence; to receive the kingdom of heaven as a little child, was a thing which the famous professor of theology had not unlearned. Under the influence of this feeling he ever afterwards gladly revisited the beautiful services of the Moravian Church, and nothing was more detestable in his view, than that base "hierarchy of intelligence," which, assigning religion to children and women and to the populace, sought to rear upon the basis of their sublime speculation, "a church for the learned," whereas with him, as with every true theologian, the inner experiences of the simple heart, the simple *πίστις*, must form not only the *basis*, but the *continual corrective* of the scientific *γνώσις*. The personal character of Schleiermacher, as it meets us in these letters, impressively admonishes us instead of "passing in advance of Schleiermacher," which those beardless adepts in the mystery of the new "positive theology" find so uncommonly easy, much rather first to penetrate more deeply the views of Schleiermacher, not with the purpose of adopting his system—he, who had no higher object, would have been esteemed a poor scholar by the master himself—nor yet with the view of understanding the system correctly, and of supplying its deficiencies in the spirit of the author, but more especially to learn, in this age of conventional theology, which is truly no longer the handmaid of philosophy, but which rather slavishly conforms itself to the actual state of affairs, wrong as they often are,—to learn how to surrender one's self unreservedly to the subject, to strive unweariedly for clearness in one's own views, and to attain incorruptible truthfulness and fidelity towards one's self—traits, by means of which Schleiermacher was

enabled to set forth the harmony between science and life, in a manner so masterly as to have few equals in the modern world.

Thus from time to time to turn back to contemplate the men whose appearance has marked an epoch in some particular sphere of intellectual life, even if the results of their labours are open to amendment, has always a quickening, stimulating effect; because the new principle, which it was their calling to proclaim and vindicate, exists in its purest form in their own minds, and, as they devote themselves to it with their whole spiritual energy, finds in them its most effective representation. An unprejudiced consideration of Schleiermacher's character, not restricted to some specialty, ensures us these advantages in a high degree, for the reason that in his case every specialty stands in the liveliest connection with the collective organism of science, and with the whole of human life. Schleiermacher warns us as an antique character,—a phenomenon of a very peculiar sort in our age,—because, aside from other reasons, the expansion which the separate sciences have attained, forbids their followers applying themselves to other branches in a comprehensive, understanding spirit, and uniting with their labours to *accomplish* something for science and for their fellow-men, the aim, above all things, by the harmonious and thorough culture of their own personal nature, themselves *to be* and to *become* something. It is the lively susceptibility of Schleiermacher's nature, his clear-headedness enabling him to distinguish everywhere the essential from the non-essential, the reason of the thing lying at the bottom, from separate results and mere symptoms, his surpassing power of intellect, which one would need, in order, to-day, to do as he did, instead of *se rebus, sibi res subjungere*, and to deserve the toast, in its best sense, with which he was greeted at the brilliant festival, in honour of his return from Sweden, September 28. 1833: "*The thinker, the preacher, but especially the man!*" And the advantages which belonged to this noble specimen of humanity in comparison with the wisest of the Greeks, of whom otherwise Schleiermacher so often reminds us, were the inward depth of the German feeling, and the warm life-breath of the gospel of the redeeming love of God in Christ, which penetrated and irradiated his whole being. Starting from this sacred centre, he realised in his degree the apostolic declaration, "*all is yours;*" his influence, wherever he laboured, and most deeply in the limited circle of his immediate associates, was purifying, confirming, quickening, being, in fact, directed to a steady, uninterrupted "conflict with the unchristian powers and tendencies of the world to his last day."

Yes! if the nature of edification consists in establishing more and more firmly the entire being and life of man upon

the foundation besides which none other can be laid, and if the representation of a man who has carried on this work of edification in himself, unceasingly and with blessed effect, must also work to edification, then it is permitted us to say that Schleiermacher's letters make a truly edifying impression—edifying first in reference to the life they set forth in the sanctuary of the household, edifying in reference to the great affairs of the country with which they are occupied. It is a sad truth that many theologians are but too ready to allow themselves to be used, either consciously or unconsciously, as instruments of sustaining, not the everlasting foundations of civil society, but the base and selfish ends of a mere partisan interest in politics, and then to appeal to the secular arm for support in their individual interests as a return. Here they may learn how the theologian should take part in questions pertaining to civil and national life, and how this participation may be a very earnest, animated, and energetic one, though the distinction of church and state is preserved in its utmost purity; they may learn, too, how the really living Christian, as such, has a heart for his fellow-citizens, and among us must be a good German, as on the contrary, a good German can scarcely be such without being a living Christian too.

But it is time to bid adieu to our letters, and to express our thanks to the publisher, with the wish that others may soon follow, and particularly that an exhaustive biography of the great man may not be long delayed, who,—pardon the attempt to embrace in a single expression the rich endowments of his peculiar nature,—*starting from the centre of a personal character of deep meaning, harmoniously trained and cultivated, and enlightened by Christianity, attained an understanding and a mastery of the entire sphere of human knowledge and life, as no other person of the present century has done.*

ART. VIII.—*The Criticism of the New Testament.*

A Plain Introduction to the Criticism of the New Testament, for the use of Biblical Students. By FREDERIC HENRY SCRIVENER, M.A., of Trinity College, Cambridge; Rector of St German's, Cornwall. Cambridge: Dighton, Bell, & Co. London: Bell & Baldy. 1861.

It is now five years since the quarto edition of the *Codex Vaticanus* made its appearance. Since that time it has been more than once re-edited, but is still only imperfectly known to the public. The numerous defects in the Italian editions

have been pointed out in Mr Burgon's Letters from Rome, first printed in the *Guardian*. But the more the Codex Vaticanus is examined, the more will the veneration with which it has been regarded hereafter diminish. Already it has found a rival in the Codex Sinaiticus, which Tischendorf ascribes to the fourth, the same century with the Codex Vaticanus. Both these MSS., however, are in all probability of the class of critical MSS.; that is, MSS. formed upon *subjective* criticism, with intentional omissions and other changes, which render them an unsafe standard of the text of the New Testament. Such instances are the omission of our Saviour's agony and bloody sweat in the garden of Gethsemane, in Cod. B, and the omission of the last chapter of St Mark's gospel, from both these MSS., from the end of the 8th verse.

Although the Codex Sinaiticus is yet but partially known, it is already clear that it is far from unanimous with the Codex Vaticanus, or with any other MS. of the same class. "From the number of *ῥησιν* and other errors," says Mr Scrivener (p. 79), "one cannot affirm that it is very carefully written. Its itacisms are of the oldest type, and those not constant; chiefly, for *α*, *η* and *ο* interchanged. The grammatical forms commonly termed Alexandrine occur, but rather as the exception than the rule. With regard to the more important question, as to the class of readings it supports, it cannot be said to give its *exclusive* adherence to any of the witnesses hitherto examined. It so lends its grave authority, now to one and now to another, as to convince us more than ever of the futility of seeking to derive the genuine text of the New Testament from any one copy, however ancient and, on the whole, trustworthy."

Mr Scrivener's labours have already made a serious and, we believe, a salutary impression upon English scholars. Amongst the recent schools of theology there has been the same readiness to innovate in the department of criticism, even to the introduction of conjecture, supported by no manuscript authority. Professors Jowett and Stanley, with the same adventurous rashness that has led them to depart so widely from the faith which, by their professions, they are bound to uphold, have given in their blind adhesion to Lachmann as their guide in the criticism of the New Testament.

In respect of the Old Testament, the Codex Alexandrinus was regarded as far superior to the Codex Vaticanus by one of the ablest of orientalists, and who has written very elaborately upon the variations of the Septuagint from the Hebrew in his "*Thesaurus Philologicus*"—John Henry Hottinger, one of that learned family which conferred so much lustre upon Zurich in the seventeenth century. Hottinger had carefully examined

the Codex Alexandrinus in the library of Charles I., through the kindness of the learned Patrick Young, the king's librarian, whose brother had been made Dean of Winchester by that cordial patron of learning, James the First (see Hottinger's "Thesaurus," p. 343, and *seq.*). Much information respecting the history of the Vatican MS. was presented to our readers in January 1859 of our Review. Mention was then made of the late Baron Bunsen's "Bibelwerk." We scarcely need observe here our deep regret that that work should have given so many unhappy proofs of the unfitness of its eminent author to meddle in the domain of theology. The edition of the Codex B, published in London, but struck off at Leipzig, and which "proved but a hasty, slovenly, and unscholarlike performance," "was put aside, in 1859, by a cheap Roman edition in octavo, prepared like the quarto by Mai, prefaced by another graceful and sensible epistle of Vercellone. This last edition was undertaken by the cardinal, after sad experience had taught him the defects of his larger work, and he took good care to avoid some of the worst of them. The readings of the second hand are usually, though not always, banished to the margin; their number, on the whole, is increased; gross errors are corrected; omissions supplied; and the Vatican chapters are given faithfully and in full," p. 92.

In 1860, appeared another edition at Leyden, by Professor A. Kuenen and C. G. Cobet, to which is prefixed a very well written preface, a notice of which is given by Mr Scrivener in a note to p. 385.

It is questionable whether from any of the editions we can form an accurate estimate of the amount of the errors of the copyist of this celebrated MS. It is acknowledged that many of them have not been suffered to appear in print. Those who shall make themselves acquainted with Professor Spohn's Appendix to his very valuable edition of Dr Woide's "Prolegomena to the Codex Alexandrinus," will probably very greatly moderate their esteem for that class of MSS., which has been permitted to take the lead of all the rest on the plea of their antiquity. And in respect of their antiquity, great have been the controversies between the disputants in favour of A., or the Codex Alexandrinus, on the one side, and those in favour of B. on the other. Matthæi, whose life was as laboriously spent in the collation of MSS. as any of his successors, and probably with more learning and judgment, assigned the Codex Alexandrinus to the eighth century, as did also Michaelis the younger, the son of the able orientalist, Christian Benedict Michaelis. Dietelmayer, in a thesis published at Halle, 1739, entitled "*Dissertatio qua antiquitas Cod. Alex. vindicatur novoque argumento confirmatur*," carries its antiquity as high

as the fourth century. And so did also Grabe, whose Prolegomena to the Septuagint is published together with Lee's "Notitia Codicis Alexandrini," in Breitinger's edition of the Septuagint. "I confess," observes Michaelis, "that there is a circumstance which excites a suspicion that the Alexandrine manuscript was written after Arabic was become the native language of the Egyptians; that is, one, or rather two, centuries after Alexandria was taken by the Saracens, which happened in the year 640. The transcriber confounds, and that, if I am not mistaken, in many instances, the two letters M and B, an exchange which frequently takes place in Arabic. See my remarks on 1 Mac. ii. 1 and iii. 16. According to my opinion, therefore, the Codex Alexandrinus is not more ancient than the eighth century."*

Certain it is, that it possesses various corruptions, traceable to a class of MSS. varying with the Codex Claromontanus from the sixth or seventh to the eleventh century. And this same evidence is sufficient to bring into discredit the high antiquity of the Codex Vaticanus. Both are corrupted from the Vulgate: *Qui Spiritu sancto per os patris nostri David pueri tui, dixisti.* Hence in both A and B at Acts iv. 25, ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου στόματος Δαβὶδ παιδὸς σου εἰπών. And so from D, E, F, G we have the Latin *parabolatus de animā* copied into the Greek of A and B, παραβολυσάμινος τῇ ψυχῇ. Many other instances may be seen at p. 111 of the "Tractatio Critica de variis Lectionibus N. Testamenti" of Christian Benedict Michaelis, published at Halle, 1749. Hence, in all probability, neither of these MSS. can date, under any circumstances, before the Vulgate.

The Codex C, or Ephreimi Codex, placed by Tischendorf in the middle of the fifth century (to this century Mr Scrivener also assigns it), is, in some very material instances, more accurate than A and B. But in regard of 1 Pet. i. 3, Mr Scrivener points his readers to a very observable instance of erroneous agreement between the Codex Sinaiticus N and A C. For παρὰ; φθαρτῆς these three MSS. have φθορὰς; φθαρτῆς. Mr Scrivener remarks, "that the same gross error should be found in three out of the four oldest codices, and in no other" [the italics are his own], "is very suggestive, and not a little perplexing," p. 456. To us it suggests the ignorance of the transcribers, of which others have pointed out numerous examples; ignorance so palpable, as to justify the severity with which Matthæi was in the habit of alluding to this class of MSS.

* Introduction to the New Testament, edited by Bishop Marsh. Vol. ii. p. 207.

We regret that Mr Scrivener, who is a far better scholar than either Tischendorf or Tregelles, had not written more at length upon the subject of his eighth chapter, *Considerations derived from the peculiar character and grammatical form of the dialect of the Greek Testament*. To what we have just adduced, we may pertinently add the following passage, toward the conclusion of that chapter :—

“One caution seems called for in this matter, at least if we may judge from the practice of certain critics of high and merited fame. The sacred penmen may have adopted orthographical forms from the dialect of the Septuagint, or the debased diction of common life; but they did not, and *could* not, write what was merely inaccurate or barbarous. Hence repudiate, in St Paul especially, expressions like Tischendorf’s *ἰφ’ ἰλαρίδι*, Rom. viii. 20, as simply incredible on any evidence. He may allege for it Codd. *ℵ*, B*, D*, F, G, of which the last three are bilingual codices, the scribes of F, G shewing marvellous ignorance of Greek (see pp. 134, 137). That Codd. *ℵ* B should countenance such a *monstrum*, only enables us to accumulate one example the more of the fallibility of the very best documents (see p. 377 and chap. ix.; notes on 1 Cor. xiii. 3, Phil. ii. 1, 1 Pet. i. 23); and to put, in all seriousness, the inquiry of Kuenen in some like instance: “Quot annorum codex te impellet ut hoc credas? . . . ecquis est, cui *fides veterum membranarum* in tali re non admodum ridicula et inepta videatur,” (N. T. Vatic. Præf. p. xx.) In the same way we utterly disregard the manuscripts which confound *ὄχι* with *οὐκ*, *μέλλει* with *μὲν*, sense with nonsense.”—(Scrivener, p. 418.)

On the various sources of textual corruptions, the older manuals of Christopher Matthew Pfaff, Amsterdam, 1709, and of Christian Benedict Michaelis, already noticed, are still not without their use. We incline to think that Mr Scrivener has spoken somewhat too harshly of Whitby’s “*Examen*,” published at the end of his truly learned, however theologically defective, commentary. Not only Whitby, but C. B. Michaelis, animadverted upon Mill’s inaccuracy—the latter especially, in regard of his quotations from the Fathers.* It is now well known that Mill, and Bengel after him, both fell into numerous errors from following only the imperfect Latin translations of the Syriac and other versions in the English Polyglot. Mr Scrivener has collected a mass of very interesting materials in his third chapter, *On the Ancient Versions of the New Testament in various Languages*. We only regret that he has been less copious, especially upon the old Syriac version. Our readers may further consult G. Wichelhaus *De Novi Testamenti Versione Syriaca antiqua quam Peschito vocant libri*

* § 18. Tract. Crit.

iv., 8vo, 1850. Professor Ellicott, now Dean of Exeter, whose indefatigable devotedness to the cause of sacred literature cannot be too highly commended, has taken in hand the study, not only of the Gothic, but also of "those somewhat intractable languages, the Coptic and Ethiopic."^{*}

To the sources of the various readings of the New Testament, Mr Scrivener devotes the 10th and 11th sections of his first chapter. But many illustrations of this very fertile topic may be gleaned from the numerous critical disquisitions that adorn his volume.

Beginning with variations of the gravest kind, he mentions these two remarkable instances—the omission in various MSS. of the 16th chapter of St Mark, from the 9th verse inclusive, and of St John vii. 53–viii. 11. To the consideration of these passages he returns in the 9th chapter of his "Introduction." Mr Scrivener ingeniously suggests, in the sixth section of his 7th chapter, that the "Codex Sinaiticus" and the "Codex Vaticanus" were written under the influence of Eusebius. If this conjecture be correct, a precise solution of the omission of the first of these two passages from these celebrated MSS. is at once provided for the biblical student.

It is well known to the most cursory readers of ecclesiastical history that the Emperor Diocletian persecuted the Scriptures themselves. By his order, copies of the holy volume were collected and burnt in the market-places. The year A.D. 303 saw the commencement of the last and fiercest persecution which Christianity was called to sustain at the hands of Pagan Rome, since imitated by similar impieties from the hands of Rome calling herself Christian.

"Hence arose the need, when the tempest was overpast, of transcribing many new MSS. of the New Testament, the rather, as the church was now receiving vast accessions of converts within her pale. Eusebius of Cæsarea, the ecclesiastical historian, seems to have taken the lead in this happy labour; his extensive learning, which, by the aid of certain other less commendable qualities, had placed him high in Constantine's favour, rendered it natural that the Emperor should employ his services for furnishing with fifty copies of Scripture the churches of his new capital, Constantinople. Eusebius's deep interest in biblical studies is exhibited in several of his surviving works, as well as in his canons for harmonising the gospels; and he would naturally betake himself, for the text of his fifty codices, to the library founded at his episcopal city of Cæsarea by the martyr Pamphilus, the dear friend from whom he derived his own familiar appellation, Eusebius Pamphili. Into this library Pamphilus had gathered manuscripts of Origen, as well as of other

^{*} See Scrivener's "Plain Introduction," pp. 229, 295.

theologians, of which Eusebius made an index (Ecc. Hist., vi. 32). From this collection Cod. H of St Paul and others are stated to have been derived; nay, even Cod. N in its Old Testament portion, which is expressly declared to have been corrected to the Hexapla of Origen. Indeed, we know from Jerome (Comment. in Epist. ad Titum), that the very autograph (*'ipsa authentica'*) of Origen's Hexapla was used by himself at Cæsarea; and Montfaucon (Preliminaria in Hexapl. c. l. § 5) cites from one MS. the following subscription to Ezekiel:—Ὁ Εὐσέβιος ἐγὼ σχόλια παρέθηκεν. Πάμφιλος καὶ Εὐσέβιος ἰδιωρῶσαντο.

"We are thus warranted, as well from direct evidence, as from the analogy of the Old Testament, to believe that Eusebius mainly resorted for his Constantinopolitan church books to the codices of Pamphilus, which might once have belonged to Origen. What critical corrections, if any, he ventured to make in the text on his own judgment, is not so clear. Not that there is the least cause to believe with Dr Nolan (Inquiry into the Integrity of the Greek Vulgate, p. 27), that Eusebius had either the power or the will to suppress or tamper with the great doctrinal texts—1 John v. 7; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Acts xx. 28; yet we cannot deny that his prepossessions may have tempted him to arbitrary alterations in other passages which had no direct bearing in the controversies of his age. Cod. N B. are quite old enough to have been copied under his inspection; and it is certainly very remarkable that these two early MSS. omit one whole paragraph, Mark xvi. 9–16, with his sanction, if not after his example."—(Pp. 387, 388).

Upon the above extract we may remark, that Codex H (St Paul's Epistles) is a fragmentary MS. of the sixth century, an antiquity probably equal, if not superior, to A and B, according to our previous notices of the internal evidence afforded by those codices. Mr Scrivener's unfavourable notice of the character of Eusebius we regret; we incline to the more equitable opinion of Du Pin, Cave, and the late learned and pious Bishop of Lincoln, expressed in his very interesting and valuable "Account of the Council of Nicæa."

The influence of Eusebius probably did survive his age, and may have induced the compilers of critical MSS. to make the omissions alluded to in St Mark's Gospel, if not others.

The genuineness of this passage (Mark xvi. 9–20), was vindicated at some length in pp. 161, 162 of our 27th volume. It is still more elaborately defended by Mr Scrivener, who thus severely, but too deservedly, alludes to that most incompetent of modern guides and critics, Alford:—

"Yet, in the balance of probabilities, can anything be more unlikely than that St Mark broke off so abruptly as this notion would imply, while no ancient writer has noticed, or seemed conscious of, any such abruptness? This fact has driven those who reject the concluding verses to the strangest fancies—that, like Thucydides,

the evangelist was cut off before his work was completed, or even (I tremble while copying the words, and I would not draw them forth from the obscurity of an unknown book) 'that the last leaf of the original gospel was torn away.'—(P. 432.)

Tischendorf, who still retains a most exaggerated idea of the value of B, rejects this passage, and is here followed, as we have already seen, by Alford. Professor Theile of Leipzig has also followed Tischendorf in this, as in other instances, where a sounder judgment would, we think, have hesitated. This is the more to be regretted, as his miniature edition of the Greek Testament is one of the most convenient for reference of all that have appeared in this century.

Hahn's edition (after Tittmann) is more cautiously and judiciously based upon the labours of preceding critics. Tischendorf has, in this and in other important instances, outrun the better examples of Griesbach, and his follower Vater, and even of Lachmann. Matthæi, in the first edition of his New Testament, observes that Origen probably brought this passage into doubt. In the last century Dr Storr, in his *Dissertatio Exegetica in Librorum N. T. historicorum aliquot loca*, pp. 50–67, Tübingen, 1790, 4to, gave a very learned and ingenious defence of its authenticity.* As it is now clear that these verses fell under suspicion upon the uncertain grounds of conjectural criticism, so observes Matthæi, Toup in the last century would have expunged from Mark xi. 13, *the time of figs was not yet*—ὁ γὰρ ἦν καιρὸς σύκων. Matthæi farther observes upon this passage (Mark xvi)—“Ad defendendum hunc locum in primis etiam valet mirus Codicum consensus in vocalibus et loquendi formulis singulis.”† Our readers will find much interesting information upon the whole subject at p. 266 of the second volume of the first edition of Matthæi's Greek Testament. In 1775, Matthæi edited from the Moscow MSS. a commentary on St Mark, from Victor of Antioch (A.D. 401) and others. Victor, says Matthæi, admits that he found these verses, in most copies, according to the Palestine Gospel of St Mark. The Palestine Gospel is the gospel as found in “the famous Palestine codices which had belonged to Origen and Pamphilus,” (Scrivener, p. 431). Such copies had been consulted by the writer of the Cursive MS. 24, of the eleventh century. This MS. is Regius 178 Colbert, 4112, folio, with a commentary, and also synaxaria, or a calendar of the daily lessons, but written in a later hand. Griesbach has given a specimen of its readings in his Symbolæ, p. clxv.

* See Marsh's edition of Michaelis, vol. iii. part 2, pp. 145, 146; 2d edition. London. 1802.

† Matthæi's N. T., tom. ii. p. 271. Riga. 1788.

We come now to the account of the woman taken in adultery, an account which no reader who is imbued with the mind of his divine Redeemer can regard as otherwise than a genuine record of his divine wisdom and grace. It was in the spirit of his blessed Master that St Augustine felt at once the conclusiveness of its internal evidence, and complained that "some weak in faith, or rather *enemies to the true faith*, had taken it out of their copies, as though he had conceded impunity to sin, who said *henceforth sin no more*, or because on this ground the woman ought not to be healed by her physician and her God, by the forgiveness of that sin, lest the unsound should be offended." See more in this truly great divine's work, *De Adulterinis Conjugiis*, l. ii., c. 7.* Jerome attests that it was found in many MSS. of his time, both Greek and Latin. It has been *erased* from the *Codex Veronensis*, given in Blanchini's "Evangelium Quadruplex," and assigned to the fourth or fifth century. See Scrivener's account of Latin MSS., p. 256, in his chapter on the ancient versions of the New Testament. We may observe, in passing, that we are not satisfied with him of the common origin of these MSS.; neither can we admit with him that, when St Augustine speaks of this class of MSS., he is speaking from vague conjecture. His position gave him an opportunity of uttering the convictions of the best scholars of his age, and we are not justified in assigning his words simply to his own isolated bias. The passages to which we refer are taken from one of the most valuable of his minor treatises, that "*De Doctrinâ Christianâ*," lib. ii. c. 11-15. He attributes the unusual number of Latin translations to the zeal of private individuals, at a very early period; and this is singularly countenanced by the judgment which the learned have passed upon the Latinity of these various translations, and, in some measure, of the Vulgate itself. Not, indeed, that all exhibit exactly the same features—some are more barbarous than others. Michaelis relates that Gesner was wont to say, that the Vulgate was to him an *auctor classicus*, not because he could learn from it to write elegant Latin, but because it enabled him to survey the Latin language in its whole extent. Eichhorn, in his Introduction to the Old Testament,† originated the theory, since regarded as demonstrated by Cardinal Wiseman, that these Latin translations proceeded from the African Church.‡

We have then the testimony of these translations, and of the Latin Vulgate, and of numerous Greek MSS. in the fifth

* Opera., tom. vi. p. 1071. Lugduni. 1562.

† Bishop Marsh in Michaelis's Introduction to the N. T., vol. ii. part 2, p. 627.

‡ Scrivener, p. 256.

century, as reported by Jerome, in favour of John vii. 53–viii. 11. Why should the “Codex Sinaiticus,” the “Codex Vaticanus,” and a few other MSS., whose great antiquity is a point that can never be made good against the internal evidence brought to bear upon this question by the learned father of John David Michaelis, and by Matthæi, whose criticisms have often been ignored, but never refuted—why should such MSS. as omit the agony and bloody sweat, i. e., the celebrated A and B, be suffered to overrule the testimony of Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine, and of the majority, the infinite majority of existing MSS.? Bishop Marsh acted so unfairly in regard of this question as to keep back from the world, with acknowledgment indeed, the vindication of this passage by Michaelis, in his translation of his Introduction. (See vol. i. pp. 317, 318, and 516.)

Scholz (Prolegomena, p. cxxiv.) and Matthæi (on Acts xiii. 41, Nov. Test. tom. ii., 1804) both agree that the Syriac is corrupted from the Latin. But the rule formerly maintained amongst critics can never be set aside on any sound principle of criticism, that versions are nothing against the authority of manuscripts. In the very MSS. in which this memorable passage is omitted, the uncials B C L T X Δ, a void space is left, thus shewing that it existed before the oldest of them. Notwithstanding this evidence, contributed by the very MSS. that omit it, this beautiful and undoubtedly genuine passage is omitted by Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles.

Dr Tregelles, alone of the three, ventures to read “the only begotten God,” in John i. 18. Is it true that ancient testimony is unanimous in favour of this singular reading? On the other hand, if it is found in Origen, so is also the *textus receptus*, and so in the case of Eusebius. The received text is also supported by the “Codex Alexandrinus,” and by all the uncials (some of them most carefully written, and free from all suspicion of a made-up or critical text), except the Cod. Sinait., with B C and L, a manuscript but carelessly written, and abounding with errors of the ignorant scribe, who was more probably an Egyptian than a native Greek. See Mr Scrivener’s notice of this MS. at p. 109, and the facsimile, No. 21, on plate viii., at the end of his volume. These twelve plates are very interesting specimens of MSS. of every period. They prove, indeed, the great difficulty of classifying manuscripts by centuries, anterior to at least the seventh century. From the facsimile, we may reasonably question the great age of the “Codex Sinaiticus.”

Mr Scrivener very justly contends for the testimony of cursives, where there is any doubt respecting the verdict of older authorities. In the case of John i. 18, every cursive

MS., except that numbered 33, is with the text as it now stands in our version. Dr Tregelles* himself admits that Irenæus (A.D. 178), Origen (A.D. 210), Eusebius (A.D. 320), and Basil (A.D. 380), speak of the common reading, as well as of that which he prefers. Griesbach received the more unusual in his first, but rejected it in his second edition. The *textus receptus* is also found in Tertullian, Athanasius, and Chrysostom. Matthæi remarks that Cyril of Alexandria, in the first part of the fifth volume of his works, p. 768 (ed. Paris, 1638), unjustly charges the Arians with expunging *Θεός*. For our own part, we are unwilling to disturb the received text in a case where it is clear that it was admitted by the most eminent fathers, both of the east and west, by the Vulgate, and by MS. Greek authority, undoubtedly as early as the "Codex Alexandrinus."

In regard of the doxology in the Lord's Prayer, Mr Scrivener is inclined to modify the opinion he expressed in his earliest and also very valuable work entitled, "A Supplement to the Authorised English Version of the New Testament." At p. 421 he remarks, "It is right to say that I can no longer regard this doxology as *certainly* an integral part of St Matthew's gospel, but I am just as little convinced of its spuriousness." It is observable that even the cursive MS. 33 contains it, together with all but five cursives, and the majority of uncials, with even L, which is, as Mr Scrivener adds, conspicuous for usually siding with B. Its absence from the Latin caused the Complutensian editors to omit it, though it was found in their Greek copies; and it is highly probable that its absence from the Vulgate was the cause of its omission in B and the very few other uncials that do not contain it. On the silence of Origen and Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 386), Mr Scrivener notes the uncertainty of any judgment formed upon such omissions. But what if Origen did not receive the doxology as genuine? Chrysostom, who was contemporary with Cyril, did; and Mr Scrivener affirms that the Syriac and Thebaic versions bring up the existence of the doxology to the *second* century. We must, however, except in this instance to the Thebaic version as a witness. Mr Scrivener does not make out such an antiquity in its favour at pp. 270-272. Tischendorf indeed assigns to all the Egyptian versions an age as great as toward the end of the third century.† Dr Woide, the editor of the "Codex Alexandrinus," contended for an earlier period in a German essay, printed in 1778, in the third volume of the "Kiebsche Beiträge," pp. 1-100, see Bishop Marsh's "Notes to Michaelis,"

* Account of the printed text of the Greek N. T., 1854, pp. 284, 285.

† Prolegomena, p. cccxxiii., N. T., 7th edition.

vol. ii., part ii., p. 585; Cambridge, 1793. There is considerable weight in Matthæi's words respecting the omission of the doxology: "Qui hæc tollunt, ii necessario ambabus manibus amplecti debent, 1 John v. 7. Utriusque enim loci eadem est crisis."*

But those who would form a judgment respecting the comparative value of MSS., cannot be invited to a more opportune example than the various reading at Matt. xix. 17. Here we have Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles, after Griesbach, and lastly, Dean Alford, all agreeing to bring into the Gospels a reading in one of them at direct and irreconcilable variance with the other two,—placing in a word, St Matthew in direct opposition to Sts Mark and Luke. The various reading which Griesbach and the rest would introduce is to be found in the third century in Origen. But the received text is confessedly in Irenæus in the second century, and is recognised by Justin Martyr. What then shall we think of the Vulgate, with B, D, and L, and the critical acumen of Origen? Origen, however, witnesses to the existence of the *textus receptus* in p. 238 of his Fifth Book against Celsus (ed., Paris, 1733–1759). *Why askest thou $\epsilon\pi\iota$ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*; our Lord's answer, according to this reading, is utterly irrelevant. The truth is, the text was uttered out of a guilty misgiving of the original; that so, by a pious fraud, a seeming difficulty might be removed. The original appeared to some to be opposed to the dignity of our Saviour's nature.†

Amongst the cursives, this evidently intentional departure from the correct reading is found only in those numbered 1 and 22. Of these, the first is well understood to follow pretty closely B L, and others of that class in the Gospels; No. 22 omits with them $\delta\iota\upsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, in Luke vi. 1, also the account of the woman taken in adultery. It, on the other hand, retains the doxology in the Lord's Prayer, the usual reading at John i. 18, our Saviour's agony in the garden as found in St Luke, the account of the angel troubling the water, John v. 3, 4, and the 1 Tim. iii. 16. No. 1 is of the tenth, No. 22 of the eleventh century.

After Matt. xx. 28, there occurs in the *Curetonian Syriac*, and in the *Codex Bezae*, as also in very many codices of the *old Latin versions*, amongst them, the codices *Vercellensis*, *Veronensis*, *Colbert*, *Palatinus*, *Claramontanus*, and *Sangallensis*, a very considerable and evident interpolation, clearly borrowed in part from Luke xiv. 8–10.

Of Dr Tregelles's utter unfitness for the office of a biblical

* Nov. Test., tom i. p. 28. Wittenbergæ, 1808.

† See Matthæi, tom i. p. 96.

critic, there cannot be required a proof more complete than his absurd change of *the first to the last* in the parable of the two sons, Matt. xxi. 31. This comes indeed of his implicit following of Lachmann. Lachmann here followed the Codex Bezae (which, however, has *αἰσχάρος*, i. e., *ἰσχαρος*), and a host of the old Latin MSS., and those that are called the *best* codices of the Vulgate. In B, and in some other authorities that have *ἕρπεος*, the order of the parable is so reversed as to require the change into *ἕρπεος*. (See Mr Scrivener, pp. 426-428.) In Matt. xxvii. 35, the quotation from Psa. xxii. is not to be found in the far greater majority of MSS., both uncial and cursive, and is accordingly given up by all critics.

We now come to the well-known reading of the Vulgate in the Angels' Hymn *to men of good will*, *εὐδοκίας*, received by Lachmann and Tischendorf. It was rejected by Laurentius Valla in his "Revision of the Vulgate" in the fifteenth century. Tischendorf, who has been commended beyond measure for his accuracy, here gives B as in favour of the common reading. By the third edition of B it appears that it has the reading of the Vulgate corrected *secundâ manu* to that of the *textus receptus*. With it agree A and D, i. e., the Codex Alexandrinus and the Codex Bezae, whilst all the remaining uncials, and the hymn at the end of the Codex Alexandrinus, support the common reading, which is found in Origen himself in the third century more than once (see tom. i., p. 374; and ii., p. 714; ed. Paris 1733-59). There can be no doubt that here we have another of the many instances which evince the real inferiority of both A and B as standards of the genuine text, as also of the Vulgate itself and its readings, when conflicting with those of the majority of known MSS. Tischendorf's allegation that the hymn is most harmoniously completed in two, rather than in three parts, is absolutely nugatory.

Mr Scrivener follows up his elaborate disquisition on the omission of Mark xvi. 9-20 by an equally valuable notice of Luke vi. 1. There the Codex Sinaiticus and Codex Vaticanus coincide in a reading which cannot be approved, omitting *δυσχερὲς* by way of getting rid of a difficulty, as do both in Mark xvi. 9-20, and N in Matt. xxiii. 35 (*οὐ βαραχίαν*). "The very obscurity of the expression, which does not occur in the parallel gospels or elsewhere, attests strongly (to) its authenticity, if there be any truth at all in canons of internal evidence." Besides these two uncials, it is absent only from L, and from the cursives 1, 22, 33, 69 (the Codex Leicestrensis, of which Mr Scrivener has given a complete account in the introduction to his Codex Augiensis, pp. xl.-xlvii.), 118, 157, 209. We need not be surprised, as Mr Scrivener remarks, at its *general* omission in the versions. He adds in a note, "Just as Bentley, (in

Mr Ellis's 'Bentleii Critica Sacra,' p. 35,) speaking of the latter part of 1 Cor. vii. 35, says, "In Lat. Codd. *ob translationis difficultatem* hoc penitus non invenitur."* "Tischendorf excluded ~~ἀπορρηγμένον~~ in his earlier editions, but restored it in his last." Lachmann and Alford place it within brackets. Dr Tregelles, with his accustomed temerity, rejects it.

Luke ix. 23 is an instance in which Lachmann, after Matthæi and Scholz, rejects the *textus receptus* upon ample grounds, whilst Tischendorf retains *καὶ ἡμέρας*, following A, B, K, L, M, R, against C D, and a majority of other MSS. of various classes.

At Luke x. 1 we have a singular instance of the misplaced interposition of that eclectic ingenuity which we have seen exemplified in other instances in the Codex Vaticanus. A minority of the ancients gave out that *the seventy elders*, the assistants of Moses, was but a round number in the place of seventy-two, to make six from each tribe, and in accordance with this the Vulgate, and with its B, D, M, read seventy-two. This error may have been drawn from that apocryphal work, the Clementine Recognitions. Tischendorf, in this instance, abstains from following the Codex Vaticanus.

In the 21st verse of the same chapter we have the manifestly false reading, *In that hour he rejoiced*, *ἐν τῇ ὥρᾳ ἠεὶ ἠγάλλετο*, in the Vulgate; and, after it, in B, C, D, K, L, X; and in the cursives, 1, 33, 114, 130, 145, and 253, of which 1, 33, 114, and 130 are highly recommended by Tischendorf. Tischendorf notwithstanding rejects, but Lachmann receives, this manifest interpolation.

A similar instance of interpolation we have in the 15th verse of the 12th chapter in, *ᾠδόν*, "beware of *all* covetousness." Here again a more numerous train of uncials, with a comparatively less number of cursives, follow the Vulgate. At the head of the uncials stand A and B. Accordingly, both Lachmann and Tischendorf receive it into the text. Griesbach was more cautious than to adopt it, resting, in part, upon internal evidence in this instance.

But the most signal instance of wilful corruption in both A and B, is the omission of our Saviour's agony and bloody sweat, the 43d and 44th verses of the 22d chapter of St Luke. A, however, affixes to the latter part of verse 42 (αὐτῷ) the Ammonian and Eusebian numerals for the missing verses, thus proving that the scribe of the Codex Alexandrinus was

* "Bentleii Critica Sacra. Notes on the Greek and Latin text of the New Testament, extracted from the Bentley MSS. in Trinity College Library, with the Abbé Belot's collation of the Vatican MS., a specimen of Bentley's intended edition, and an account of all his collations. Edited, with the permission of the Master and Seniors, by the Rev. A. A. Ellis, M.A., late Fellow and Junior Dean of Trinity College, Cambridge."

acquainted with the passage. These two verses are also omitted in the uncials R and T. R is now indicative of the Codex Nitriensis in the British Museum, a palimpsest of only 45 leaves, containing 505 verses of St Luke in 25 fragments, under the black, broad Syraic writing of Severus of Antioch against Grammaticus, of the ninth or tenth century. See Mr Scrivener at p. 114, and his facsimiles 5 and 17. Tischendorf places T, the Codex Borgianus, containing parts of Sts Luke and John, in the fifth century. (See more at p. 116 of Mr Scrivener's volume.) "In all known Evangelistaria, and their cognate Codex 69 (see p. 151), the two verses omitted in this place follow Matt. xxvi 39, as a regular part of the lesson for the Thursday in Holy Week," (Scrivener, p. 435.)

Nothing can be more significant than ἀπ' ἀρῆς, in the last verse of the first chapter of St John's gospel, "*Hereafter ye shall see heaven open.*" Here, as in chap. xiv. ver. 30, *hereafter* has the meaning of *from this time forth*. Nevertheless, ἀπ' ἀρῆς are omitted in the Vulgate; and in the kindred versions, the Coptic, Armenian, and Ethiopic, and in B and its follower L. Lachmann, with his narrow principles of criticism, accordingly omits; Tischendorf more considerably retains the words.

At p. 438, Mr Scrivener treats of John v. 3, 4. These he would retain on a supposition with which we cannot feel satisfied in such important documents as the gospels, namely, that their authors themselves put forth copies of them, varying from time to time, as other authors are in the habit of publishing, improving, and enlarging the successive editions of their works (see his Preliminary Considerations, p. 16). Griesbach gave forth his doubts respecting these verses. Tischendorf, Tregelles, and Alford unite in pronouncing them spurious. Scholz and Lachmann, with Hahn, retain them. The greater majority of both uncials and cursives have the passage in question. It is retained in the Vulgate itself; it is found in the Codex Alexandrinus. It is clearly admitted by Tertullian in the 5th chapter of his work upon baptism. It is recognised by Chrysostom, whose homilies are of more certain antiquity than B or any other manuscript. With such ample testimony, therefore, we do not see any need of recurring to the untenable solution of Mr Scrivener. Matthæi proposed for ἱράπασον, ἱραπίασον ῥέ, upon very considerable authority, as may be seen in Mr Scrivener's note, p. 438.

At John vi. 11, τοῖς μαθηταῖς, οἱ δὲ μαθηταί, is omitted in the Vulgate; and hence also in A, B, L, and a few kindred cursives. All other MSS., of every class and age, are all but unanimous in retaining the words. They are confirmed by Matt. xiv. 19, Mark vi. 41, Luke ix. 16.

The Codex Vaticanus, in John vii. 8, sides with the majority of MSS. in retaining the common reading, *ὄψω*, "I go not up yet." Lachmann retains it, but Tischendorf here follows the Vulgate, with the Codex Bezae and K, M. Both these last are but of the ninth century, so that of all the uncials only the apocryphal manuscript D favours the reading *οὐκ*. Dr John Benedictus, in his revised edition of the Vulgate, Paris, 1551, placed in the margin *nondum ascendo*. More may be seen upon this much litigated reading in Matthæi's first edition of the New Testament; and in Michaelis's "Introduction," vol. ii. chap. viii. sec. 6, and chap. ix. sec. 3.

In John xv. 11, Tischendorf and Lachmann, following the Vulgate, from which probably A, B, and D took their reading, substitute *ᾖ* for *μὴν*. Here again the almost unanimous authority of the other uncials is disregarded. Whitby attributes this version to the scholiasts. The context certainly favours the common reading.

In John xx. 18, the Vulgate still has *Quia vidi Dominum, et haec dixit mihi*. Hence probably the inconsistent reading of the Codex Vaticanus, *ὅτι ὡρακα κ. τ. λ.* The Complutensian here, as in the next instance that we shall adduce, forsook the Vulgate.

Acts ix. 31. The Vulgate reads in the singular *the church*, and this is accordingly the reading of A, B, C, and of those uncials alone. The common reading is justified by the only analogous passages in the Acts, xv. 41 and xvi. 5.

Acts xx. 7. The Vulgate reads *cum convenissemus*, and is followed by A, B, D, E. This last is the Codex Laudianus 35, the age uncertain; from the sixth to the eighth century, according to the varying judgment of various periods. Here again the context establishes the common reading. For as Wolf ("Curæ Philol. in N. T.," tom. ii. p. 1304) observes, it is clear from the sequel *διέλεγο αὐτοῖς*, and from ver. 13, where St Luke, proceeding with his narrative, plainly distinguishes his company by *ἡμεῖς* from the disciples at Troas.

In Acts xx. 28, Mr Scrivener, at pp. 444-446, defends the common reading, *the Church of God*, on a balancing of probabilities. Here the Codex Sinaiticus and Codex Vaticanus are with the *textus receptus*, whilst the Codex Alexandrinus and the Ephremi Codex read *τοῦ Κυρίου*, the reading that is followed by Lachmann and Tischendorf. On the side of the common reading may be consulted Baumgarten's "Vindiciæ Vocis Θεοῦ, 1 Tim. iii. 16," and Ernesti's "Specimen Castigationum Wetstenii." Matthæi would read *τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ Θεοῦ*. So the Complutensian, with G, H, and a great majority of cursives. The Vulgate probably decided B in favour of the

common reading. Chrysostom has again, and again the common reading. The MSS. of St Athanasius vary.

And now, in the midst of this really conflicting evidence, what shall decide our choice? There can be little doubt that the impartial Griesbach, as he is still ignorantly regarded by perhaps not a few critical students, was decided in his choice of *κρίου* by his heterodox prepossessions. Hence he was induced to place in this instance the testimony of the Codices Alexandrinus, Ephremi, Bezae, and Laudianus before that of the Vulgate and the Codex Vaticanus. The MS. authority for the reading of Matthæi is confessedly very considerable; but the safest course appears to be to refer to the *usus loquendi* of the speaker in such a case as that before us. It is remarkable that we find the apostle invariably writing, not *the church of Christ*, but *the church of God*; and yet he hesitates not to approach such language, when he calls Christ the head of his church, and describes her as his bride, as in the 5th chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians, where he also speaks of *the Lord* as loving and cherishing the church; but, as the apostle of the Gentiles, he evidently chose this term, *the church of God* (1 Cor. i. 2; x. 32; xi. 16, 22; xv. 9; 2 Cor. i. 1; Gal. i. 13), as taking the place of God's ancient people, and representing it, or rather as represented by it, the church being the true Israel of God, composed of all the spiritual seed of Abraham. Hence the significance of the term *the church of God*, and its adoption by the apostle of the Gentiles. Meanwhile this term includes also the great truth, that characterised both the apostolic and the patristic theology, that the Son was the Jehovah of the Old Testament, the Shepherd and King of Israel; and at the same time the servant of his Father, as his representative through all the dispensations of the divine government, from the creation of the world, as the divine nature and the mediatorial office were both united in the Angel of the Lord, the messenger of the covenant. And if we read here *κρίου*, it would, however Griesbach and the Unitarians overlook it, point to a divine dominion that only Jehovah could administer.

We now retrace our steps to the 25th verse of this chapter. Here we find Griesbach suggesting, Lachmann and Tischendorf agreed, in the omission of *τῷ Θεῷ* in the concluding words of this verse, *the kingdom of God*. The omission is countenanced by A, B, C, the common reading by E, G, H, and the Vulgate. Here again the invariable usage of the apostle is sufficient to decide us in favour of the *textus receptus*. *The kingdom* is never found alone, except in 1 Cor. xv. 24, where it is obviously connected with a preceding word. In this and in some other memorable instances, we may observe that some

of the *better* readings of the Vulgate were not transferred to the Codex Vaticanus.

Acts xxiii. 9. The Vulgate, followed by A, B, C, E, and the kindred versions, omits *μή θεωμαχῶμεν*. Here we may well be content to follow G H and the majority of cursives, although Lachmann and Tischendorf again unite in expunging the words. Matthæi conjectures that the Vulgate was here, and in some other instances, influenced by the readings of Chrysostom.

At ver. 30, where *μέλλειν* is supported by the more recent uncials G H, Tischendorf retains it, whilst Lachmann, following A, B, E, omits it.

Acts xxvi. 30. *Καὶ ταῦτα πάντες αὐτοῦ* is omitted in the Vulgate and A B, but probably rightly retained in G H. But Lachmann and Tischendorf are agreed in following the Vulgate.

In Acts xxvii. 41, *τῶν κυμάτων* is omitted in A B, and by both Lachmann and Tischendorf, but found in the Vulgate and C, G, H, and in most MSS., and evidently required in this place.

In Rom. v. 1, the Vulgate, with A, B, C, D, K, L, and some other MSS., have *ἔχωμεν*, but its improbability is so great that both Lachmann and Tischendorf have felt themselves constrained to retain the common reading, Lachmann, indeed, placing it in the margin. Mr Scrivener remarks with good reason, that this is a case for the application of the *paradiplomatic* canon, p. 476,—that the itacism *ω* for *ο*, (see pp. 10, 15,) so familiar to all collators of Greek MSS., crept into some very early copy, p. 376. Matthæi had long before made the same suggestion in the second edition of his Greek Testament, tom. iii., p. 60. He gives us, however, a less probable suggestion, *καυχώμεθα* as the origin of this error, as leading the transcriber to assimilate *ἔχω* to it. He also assigns a third and not improbable reason for this corruption, its being more adapted to the hortatory style of preachers. A similar mistake occurs at 1 Cor. xv. 49, where B remarkably vindicates the common reading *φορέσωμεν* against the other uncials. There, however, Lachmann follows them against the more correct reading of B, whilst Tischendorf retains it. Mr Scrivener reminds his reader of as general an error in the uncials, nay, a still more general error in 2 Cor. iii. 3, where *ἐν πλαγίῳ καρδίας σαρκίνους* is found in A, B, C, D, E, G, L. Only F and K have the correct and common reading. These are the Codex Augiensis and the Codex Mosquensis.

1 Cor. xiii. 3. Here A and B, followed by Lachmann, read, by an evident oversight, *καυχῶμαι* for *καυθήσμαι*. Matthæi prefers *καυθήσμαι*, the reading of D, E, F, G, L. This would be the indicative future following *ἴνα*, as in Ephes. vi. 3. (Scrivener, p. 449.)

Phil. ii. 1. Here Matthæi would read *τις* first for *τι*, and then for *τινα*. *τις* is found in the place of *τινα* "in all the uncials extant at this place. As regards the cursives, nearly the same must be said," p. 449. Matthæi yields to the torrent of evidence, and gives some examples of elliptical passages in vindication of this reading: Acts xiii. 15, Rom. xii. 6, 7, 8, Apoc. xiii. 10, in his edition; *ἢ τις ἀρχμαλωσίαν ὑπαγεῖ*. The common reading, however, is found, says Mr Scrivener, in Clement and later fathers. For *τινα* he would propose *τι* as the original text dictated by the apostle. It is found in fifteen cursives, and is held to be grammatically tenable by Joh. Cha. Wm. Alt, in his Latin "Grammar of New Testament Greek," p. 280, Halle, 1829.

Col. ii. 2. *τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Griesbach, Scholz, and Tischendorf only retain *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. Lachmann reads *τοῦ Θεοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Matthæi defends the common reading. Lachmann follows B. The Vulgate has *Dei Patris et Christi Jesu*. A has *θεοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. And so C. "The received text is found in apparently the great mass of cursives," and in E, K, L. Mr Scrivener inclines to the reading of A, C; but the internal evidence is strongly in favour of the *textus receptus*.

We now come to 1 Tim. iii. 16. *Θεὸς ἰφανερῶς*. Mr Scrivener has very convincingly shewn that A favours the common reading, a reading that has been too readily given up by Dr Wordsworth and others. We must refer our readers to Mr Scrivener's own account of the Cod. Alex. in regard to this passage, pp. 453, 454. It is found in Cyril, Chrysostom, and the Acts of the Council of Ephesus, A.D. 431. It occurs in K, L, in the Complutensian, and the far greater number of MSS. The Vulgate *quod* was the probable source of *ὅς* in the Cod. Bezae. B wants the Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon. Matthæi (tom. iii. p. 441) justly inveighs against the absurdity of the now popular reading *ὅς* following *μυστήριον*. We doubt not that Mr Scrivener's attestation to the agreement of the Codex Alexandrinus with the common reading will have great weight with the learned. It is a very candid, as well as complete, reply to Mr Ellicott's remarks upon this most important passage.

At 1 Pet. iii. 15, Mr Scrivener expresses his cordial agreement with Dr Tregelles, who says, upon this passage, at p. 235 of his "Account of the Printed Text," &c., "Thus the reading *Χριστοῦ* may be relied on confidently." It is found in the Vulgate, the Syriac, and A B C; and the consent of these authorities is held to be decisive. On the other hand, the later and more carefully written uncials G K, with the majority of cursives—many of them, in all probability, faithfully representing more ancient copies—uphold the far more likely reading of the *textus receptus*, *τοῦ θεοῦ*. "But sanctify the Lord God in

your hearts." Clemens Alexandrinus probably accommodated the original text to the subject before him when he wrote *χρῆσθαι* for *εἶναι*, and might thus have laid the foundation for this change. We cannot argue for certain from the Syriac. The Complutensian did not favour the Vulgate in this passage, but retained *εἶναι*.

1 John ii. 23. Here all modern critics concur in receiving into the text the words printed *in italics* in our version, "*He that acknowledgeth the Son hath the Father also.*"

From the consideration of this passage Mr Scrivener passes on to 1 John v. 7, 8, an interpolation brought into a few Greek MSS. from the Vulgate. Mr Scrivener argues that Cyprian, in the third century, had these verses in his copies. Even should it have been so, it is admitted by Mr Scrivener, agreeably to the opinion of the most candid and judicious of all patristic scholars, Dr John Kaye, the late truly meek and pious Bishop of Lincoln, that it is amply clear that Tertullian, Cyprian's senior, knew nothing of it. (See the third edition of Bishop Kaye's "Account of the writings of Tertullian," p. 514. London: Rivingtons. 1845.)

The last passage which Mr Scrivener discusses is Rev. xiii. 10; but here he does not so much as notice Matthæi's reading, who devoted the most exemplary labour to the revision of the text of this most difficult portion of the New Testament, not only in an exegetical, but in a critical point of view. Dr Wordsworth, in his edition of the Apocalypse, made use only of the *first* edition of Matthæi. His reading is *ἡ εἰς ἀρχιμαλωσίαν, ὑπαγῶν ἢ τις ἐν μαχαίρᾳ, διὰ αὐτὸν ἀποκτανθῆναι*. Matthæi regards it as an elliptical expression, like xi. 8. His reading is that of some of his MSS.

Mr Scrivener, from his love of this highly interesting and indispensable department of sacred study, has added 100 pages to this volume beyond the terms of his engagement. And yet he has left his readers to desiderate the brief limits of his work,—brief in comparison of the extent and variety of the topics included in it. He has everywhere evinced the ingenuous modesty of the Christian scholar. Indeed, he has here perhaps erred in excess. He is probably far better qualified to speak *ex cathedra* in this department of letters than some who have prospered more; and who, by their more extensive labours in deciphering MSS., have laid claim to another kind of talent, in which they have already been outstripped in the earlier publications of our author. We would refer our readers to his "Supplement to the English version," Pickering, 1845; and to his "Contributions to the criticism of the Greek Testament, being the introduction to a transcript of the Codex Augiensis," royal 8vo, 5s. Deighton, Bell, & Co.,

Cambridge. He has been attacked by Dean Alford; but has, with a perfect command of temper, and with an ample command of his subject, met the charges of his opponent in the volume before us. Whilst we have freely expressed our dissent from Mr Scrivener wheresoever we felt called upon to differ from him, we have done so, we trust, not in a captious or unfriendly spirit. We believe that he is destined to attain a still higher reputation than that which he now enjoys. Living solely for the conscientious discharge of his duties, he has received as yet but a scanty reward of a temporal kind; whilst others are elevated month after month to dignities and preferments which after all fail to make them known beyond the narrow circle of their admirers and friends.

In 1860, Mr Scrivener edited an unique edition of the Greek Testament, from the text of Stephens, 1550, with the various readings of Beza, 1565, and of the Elzevir edition, 1624 (the *textus receptus*), with those of Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles. Besides this 16mo edition, another in quarto has been prepared on writing-paper for notes.

We had noted many points in our perusal of the volume before us, with a view to enlarge upon a variety of collateral subjects. But these may peradventure come before our readers on some future opportunity.

In what has been laid before the reader, an attempt has been made to enable him to form his own judgment on the intrinsic value of those MSS., which have of late been loaded with an exaggerated veneration that is threatening to introduce an amount of change into the text of the New Testament, to an extent the most unreasonable and with results the most unpropitious. We have accordingly brought together examples from every portion of the New Testament, forming a considerable body of evidence, which, had our limits permitted, we should gladly have enlarged. It has been by the careful investigation of such examples that we have ourselves been enabled to feel our way in this department of religious inquiry. And we are increasingly assured, from our own experience, of the desirableness of this kind of study being far more generally pursued than it has hitherto been. What object can be worthier the Christian student than the preservation of the sacred text in its integrity?

ART. IX.—*Professor Doedes on the so-called Modern Theology of Holland.**

A THEOLOGIAN in our fatherland, who has lately taken on himself the task of furnishing the church with an answer to the question, "What the modern theology teaches," has told us that the most cultivated members of the church know what the modern theology is and aims at. If there be no ground to call this in question—we leave it undecided—then, least of all, may we allow those to put us to shame, whose calling is to make the phenomena and movements in the province of theology and philosophy the subjects of close inspection and enlightened judgment. If the cultivated members of the church know what is the peculiarity and the aim of the modern theology, it certainly should not appear as if we were ignorant of the same—we, who must claim the honour of belonging to the most cultivated members of the church of our Lord Jesus Christ. The so-called modern theology deserves, moreover, to be narrowly examined, as being nothing less than the attempt of speculation to unravel the great mystery of the world—to solve the problem of the relation between God and the universe, for the explanation of the *world-life* (*wereldleven*). If we do not accept its verdicts, we must know why; we must be able to vindicate our not doing so. Let not our sentence rest on arbitrary sayings or stock-phrases, but on good grounds, when we assert, the modern theology does not unravel the mystery of the world, does not solve the great problem which seeks to define justly the relation between God and the universe.

Whoever wishes to be acquainted with the so-called modern theology, would do well not to neglect attending, first of all, to the expression itself, "modern theology." Who is the author of this expression? It has now been in vogue for some years. To explain it, attention must be paid to the expressions, "modern science," "modern consciousness," and more of a like nature. More than twenty years ago, D. F. Strauss gave one of his writings the title of, "The Christian Doctrine of Faith, in its historical development, and in conflict with modern science." He says in the preface (p. vii), that in dogmatics, instead of the earlier confessional antinomies of Lutheran and Reformed, of Catholic and Protestant, there must now be the antithesis between the stand-point of Chris-

* This paper is a translation of the introductory address delivered at the commencement of the session at Utrecht, in September 1861, by J. I. Doedes, Professor of Theology in Utrecht.—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

tian faith in general and of modern science. "Christian" and "modern" stand with him in mutual antithesis. "Not every one," he says, further on (I. p. 70), "possesses the apparatus and the perseverance with which Schleiermacher pounded Christianity and Spinozism into such fine ingredients of mixture, that a sharp eye is necessary to distinguish the mingled elements; with many the combination of the Christian and the modern element is only that of oil and water shaken together, which appear intermixed only so long as the shaking lasts." After bestowing a single word upon other, and these not innocuous, dogmatical systems, which resemble, according to him, a piece of sausage—orthodox church doctrine answering to the meat, Schleiermacherian theology to the fat, and Hegelian philosophemes to the seasoning herbs—he says that Lessing had already shewn a like strong aversion to similar compounds, to that so-called rational Christianity, of which he declared, that he as little knew wherein properly lay their rationality as their Christianity, to "that modern theology," above which he placed the old orthodox faith; because the latter plainly jarred with man's common sense, while the former was rather disposed to bribe it. Strauss thus applies the expression, "modern theology," to something that he does not esteem very highly, that stands in connection with Hegel and Schleiermacher, that is not of one piece. That theology which he calls modern is too accommodating for him; that is, it would fain unite those mutually repelling and excluding things, "Christian" and "modern." For the "modern" he has full sympathy. With him and many others it is the distinguishing mark of the *new* period, in opposition to what is called the *old*, and especially the Oriental world with relation to philosophy (wereld beschowing). To this he referred twenty-five years previously, in his "Life of Jesus," when he said (p. 94, 3d edit.)—"The newer period owes to a series of the most difficult investigations, continued through many ages, the view, that everything in the world hangs together by a chain of causes and operations which suffers no interruption;" a conviction "which has become to such a degree the consciousness of the new world, that, in actual life, the opinion or assertion that a supernatural cause, a divine activity, has anywhere immediately interfered, is regarded as a proof of ignorance, or as a fraud." NOWHERE A MIRACLE, as a breach of the continuity in nature or in history—ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE A NATURAL CAUSE, never anything supernatural; such is the watchword of those who desire the credit of having been instructed by the *modern science*. Do you wish to be "modern?" Deny the miracle, the supernatural—what does not find an explanation in nature itself. Do you wish your theology to be called "mo-

dern?" Adjust everything, so that the supernatural, the miraculous, remains excluded.

All has been so adjusted. A starting-point is chosen, by which the miracle, the supernatural, is shut out; and then the theology, which thus fell into harmony with the modern consciousness—into harmony, as it was said, with the results of modern science, has been also named "modern." This expression has come more and more into use, as fitted to characterise that theology which disallows the supernatural, and has come at last to be employed without the least fear of ambiguity. When Karl Schwartz (a man who may be named in treating of the modern theology) published, in 1856, his contribution "to the history of the newest theology," he dreaded no misunderstanding in using the expression, "so-called modern theology;" what it meant was, he thought, sufficiently known. The highest interest belongs to his communications and hints regarding the history of this "so called modern theology" in Germany. As its heads, he names Hegel and Schleiermacher;* two men, he says, who, however the paths they trod may have differed from one another, were on this point at one, that they made the immanent unity, the interpretation of the divine and human, to be the basis of their system. Hegel and Schleiermacher are, according to Karl Schwartz (it would be well not to differ from him here), the two head factors, the proper sources of thought (*gedachtensubstantie*), of the modern theology,† which starts‡ from God's immanence in the world, so that his relation to the world is a necessary, constant, and continuous one, and leaves no room for uncommon acts, for any operation of God outside of natural law, beside or against it, permits no special divine, no supernatural, intrusion—in one word, no miracle. Not to believe in a supernatural existence and operation of God, in any special manifestations of the divine omnipotence, distinct from the operation of nature and its law, is to stand on the platform of the modern mode of contemplating the world, that is, of God's activity—immanent, continuous, following fixed laws.§ Thus is "the so called mo-

* Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie, Leipz., 1856, p. 14.—"Auf diesen Voraussetzungen ruht die Sogenannte *moderne theologie*. . . . Sie strebt danach, aus der Zerfallenheit und Zerbrückelung der Vergangenheit heraus den neuen Geist in eine neue Form zu binden, das Religiöse Bewusstsein der Gegenwart in die Einheit des Systems zu fassen, in seinem innern und nothwendigen Zusammenhange darzustellen. An der Spitze dieser modernen Theologie stehen die Namen zweier Männer. . . . Wir meinen die Beiden: Hegel und Schleiermacher."

† *Ibid.*, p. 63.

‡ Der "Boden der Immanenz, welcher ja die Voraussetzung der ganzen modernen Theologie ist."

§ With regard definitively to Schleiermacher, Gass, in his article upon him (*Herzog's Real-Encycl.*, xiii. p. 769), calls to mind—"Das von ihm behauptete

modern theology" characterised* by Schwartz. He insists, moreover, and rightly so, on consistent development and application of that which is its great presupposition; and it may be said that, to this day, he has not been surpassed for justness of apprehension in what relates to the handling of the so-called modern theology. To the question, What it properly is and aims at? he furnishes a good and perspicuous reply. He sets it forth as the doctrine of God's immanence in the world, necessary, continuous, and working according to fixed laws, to the exclusion of the transcendental,† the supernatural, the miraculous.

Uebernatürliche wird doch nicht aus der Natur herausgerückt noch in metaphysischer Strenge gefasst; es ist ein Historisches und Ueberhistorisches, ja es wird selbst wieder zu einem Natürlichen, indem es in die Geschichte und das Leben der Menschheit eingeht. Auch den Wundern wird nur relativ, nicht alechthin ein uibernatürlicher Karakter beigelegt, und das unbedingt Uebernatürliche hat Schleiermacher entschieden zurückgewiesen." Schleiermacher himself, in his *Zweiter Sendschreiben über seine Glaubenslehre an Dr Lücke* (Stud. u. Krit. 1829), p. 582, expresses himself as follows:—"Wo uibernatürliches bei mir vorkommt, da ist es immer ein erstes, es wird aber hernach ein natürliches als zweites. So ist die Schöpfung uibernatürlich, aber sie wird hernach Naturzusammenhang; so ist Christus uibernatürlich seinen Anfang nach, aber er wird natürlich als rein menschliche Person, und eben so ist es mit dem heiligen Geist und christlichen Kirche. Also müsste man für mich lieber ein uibernatürliches, das zugleich ein natürliches seyn kann, aufstellen. . . . Ich setze mich als reellen sapernaturalisten." . . . According to his *Christliche Glaube*, 2d edition, § 18:—"Die Erscheinung des Erlösers in der Geschichte ist als göttliche Offenbarung weder etwas schlechthin uibernatürliches noch etwas schlechthin überunnünftiges." In developing this proposition, he insists—"Dass auch die strengste Ansicht von dem Unterschiede zwischen ihm und allen anderen Menschen nicht hindere zu sagen, dass seine Erscheinung auch als Menschwerden des Sohnes Gottes etwas natürliches sei." Farther below, § 14—"Es ist natürlich von demjenigen, der die höchste göttliche Offenbarung ist, auch Wunder zu erwarten; welche Wunder jedoch immer auch nur beziehungsweise so hieszen können, da unsere Vorstellungen sowol von der Empfänglichkeit der leiblichen Natur für die Einwirkungen des Geistes als auch von der Ursächlichkeit des Willens auf die leibliche Natur eben so wenig abgeschlossen, und eben so einer beständigen Erweiterung durch neue Erfahrungen fähig sind, als unsere Vorstellungen von den leiblichen Naturkräften selbst."

* *Ibid.*, particularly pp. 126, 127.—"Glaubt man an solche Uebernatürlichkeit (to a specific operation of God exalted above the continuity of nature, proceeding purely from God's creating power), und an besondere Manifestationen der göttlichen Allmacht in Unterschied von dem Wirken der Natur und ihrem Gesetz nicht mehr, nun—so steht man auf dem Boden der modernen Weltbetrachtung, d. i. der immanenten, zusammenhängenden, gesetzmässigen Wirkksamkeit Gottes."

† Yet some representatives of the modern theology are not averse to all that is, in any sense, transcendental. For example, Schwartz himself says, *ibid.*, p. 308:—"Wenn Gott als der Absolute ihre (der Welt) Endlichkeit überragt, so ist diese Transscendenz nicht ohne die Immanenz zu denken, ist nichts als die ewige Rückkehr Gottes in sich aus seiner nie aufhörenden Weltthätigkeit." Dr Reville says in his treatise *du Surnaturel, Nouvelle Revue de Theologie*, vii., 1861, 3, p. 133:—"Pour nous la transcendence de dieu est celle de l'esprit un, infini, créateur, intelligent et sage, sur les êtres multiples, fins, inconscients et bornés."

The thought will not readily arise in any intelligent mind, that the modern theology in France or Holland, or wherever it may appear, has the liberty to publish teachings which, were it to preach the same in Germany, should expose it to the charge of inconsistency. One feels that to cross the frontier of Germany does not free the modern theology from the obligation to maintain its character. We do not assert that all so-called modern theologians must adopt the same expressions and phrases, that they are bound to the same forms, that within the circle that has the stand-point of the modern theology for its centre, deference to consistency must debar them the freedom of their individuality. But we assert that there is a circle within which, on the subject of the modern theology, they must abide; a sphere defined and fenced off, defined by the stand-point "modern," fenced off by the principle of consistency. It is with the so-called modern theology as with every tendency, every school, which has a defined, all-governing fundamental idea. Its friends, its followers are bound to this. The modern theology may be called a "liberal science," but it has not the liberty of being inconsistent. Nothing may be adopted into its system, that is not deduced from its fundamental idea, nor harmonises therewith.

This will also be understood by the genuine representatives of the modern theology in our fatherland, who will certainly express it as their conviction, that God never reveals himself outside the natural concatenation of phenomena, never interferes nor has interfered in the course of events; that there is nothing in nature or in history, for which there exists no ultimate natural cause; that every supernatural operation of God must be denied, and on the contrary God's natural, regular activity always held fast.* It does not therefore give a just representation of the modern theology, when one says,†—"If it does not, moreover, entirely shut out all miracle *a priori* as impossible, it yet leaves scarcely any room for the Bible miracles, which were performed by or upon the messengers of God, and denies their value for our religious faith;" and when one further says,‡—"It extends the notion of miracle much more to every manifestation of God's almighty working. The individual miracle it recognises with difficulty and reluctance, because it holds all to be miraculous." With respect to this last every one will agree, that, when all is to us miraculous, we can just as well say that nothing is to us miraculous. The distinction

* According to Professor Kuemen, "Het Supranaturalisme, &c., Godg. Bydr." 1860, p. 708.

† With Dr H. J. Spijker, "de theologische rigtingen van onzen tijd. Maandschrift voor Christenen," 1860, p. 691.

‡ The same, *ibid.*, p. 692.

between miraculous and not miraculous has disappeared. But it is not true that the modern theology does not shut out the miracle *a priori* as impossible, and that it makes all to be miraculous. What is done by this or that so-called modern theologian, is not the question. The question is, what the modern theology must do in virtue of its starting-point, its principle, its fundamental idea, and what, moreover, it actually does when it is consistent? Now, in that case it leaves no room for a single Bible miracle, for any miracle however designated, for anything "of the nature of miracle." It is then the theology of naturalism. In the world God works always without disturbance of the continuity, that is its teaching.

With equally little reason, as it is averred that the modern theology does not exclude the miracle *a priori* as impossible, has it been said, that it is an error to take determinism (fatalistic predestination) for a characteristic of this theology.* The truth is, that the immanence of God in the world, and thus also in man, in the way in which it is placed in the foreground by the modern theology, excludes all disavowal of determinism. It is God that does everything. Opposite to him there stands nothing, exists nothing. God's immanence in man leaves no room for a self-determining of man, that is not entirely determined by God. One does not therefore speak much in the spirit of the modern theology, when he regards indeterminism to be reconcilable with it.

In like manner it is quite incorrect to represent the modern theology as teaching, that any thing can be so imputed to man that he is thereby accountable, and God on the contrary left out of reckoning. With relation to God and man in the modern theology, it is never "God and not man," and as little "man and not God," but always it is "God and thus also man, man and thus also God." Moreover, no phenomenon in man can be ascribed to man in such a sense, that God must be entirely left out of notice. In the modern theology God is uniformly the cause of every thing, and thus the distinction is lost between what God originates in man and what man himself does. It is therefore an error to make the modern theology to say† :— "God makes himself cognisable at all times to every man, and

* Dr Spýker, *ibid.*, p. 695. The ground on which the position of this scholar rests, that determinism is no characteristic of the modern theology, seems to us more strange than satisfactory. He says, "Those are doubtless in error who hold that determinism is a characteristic of this theology, for we know that among us that system is controverted by Hoeksah, and that at the same time this writer must take place and rank among the modern theologians." The weak side of this reasoning must be sufficiently obvious, without our indicating it.

† With Dr Poelman, "Wat de moderne theologie leert," Groningen 1861, p. 88.

speaks to him mouth to mouth, face to face ; and whoever does not see nor hear, let him ascribe it exclusively to his own eye and ear." On the stand-point of the modern theology it is to be ascribed neither exclusively nor partially to one's own eye and ear, since these are in no other condition than God causes them to be in. Equally erroneous is it to regard the modern theology as teaching,* that when one man is better able than another to read the book of revelation that lies open to all, and is thus able to obtain a higher gift of God, " the reason is not that God makes himself cognisable to him in another and special way, but because his spirit's eye is clearer." Indeed, the eye of one man is not clearer than that of another, unless God causes it to be so. Whoever, with a view to explain one or other phenomenon in man, remains at last with man and excludes God, forsakes therewith the stand-point and the province of the modern theology.

The modern theology does not tolerate all kinds of teachings, least of all such as conflict with what it emphatically places on the foreground. If it be said† that up till now it ought still to be regarded, not as a system, but as a tendency, and the wish be thereby expressed that it may permanently remain so, we are inclined to ask whether it is not nearer the truth that some so-called modern *theologians* perhaps prefer to hear of a tendency rather than of a system? whether, on the other hand, the modern *theology*, which its friends themselves term a "science," can well be anything else than a system? and whether, in fine, so much be gained by this distinction of system and tendency? Unless we be deceived, they will rather have the modern theology called a tendency than a system, because more scope is thus allowed for special "opinions" to play. Among the special opinions of so-called modern divines we may class,‡ "for example, the denial of miracles, determinism, and the like," at the same time, remembering that "all modern divines do not by any means think entirely alike on these and other points. We are to distinguish, then, between "single peculiar teachings" and "the fundamental idea of the modern theology." We are told,§ "its principles, and not its dogmas, form its character." But if its principles form its character, these principles define its dogmas; the fundamental idea is unfolded in its teachings, and has necessarily an exclusive attitude towards single peculiar opinions of individual modern divines, which are not capable of being reconciled with

* With Dr Poelman, *ibid.*, p. 41.

† Dr Spýker, *ibid.*, p. 687.

‡ With Dr Modderman, "Moderne Theologie in de Bybelvriend," 1861, p. 220.

§ With Dr Spýker, *ibid.*, p. 688.

it. This remains true, even if the modern theology must be termed a tendency. Regarding a tendency, we desire to know whither it leads, and we assume that it has its starting-point somewhere. A tendency (in science) is a thing defined, and is by no means to be thought of as a line that touches and avoids, with the greatest flexibility, all that you are but pleased to indicate. Does the modern theology start from God's activity, immanent, all-pervading, always regular, continuous, natural, necessary? Well then, in that case, the modern theology, tending onward toward consistent development, can never come into contact with anything supernatural, or with anything of which we must say, that is now of man, but not of God, can never come in contact with miracles, or with indeterminism. These do not lie in the direction of the straight line. We willingly grant that, in a certain sense, the question, Whither does this lead us? does not apply in science, since the point first of all to be settled is not what we shall meet on the way, but whether the way on which we enter be the right one to reach the end. But still we may urge that, in another sense, this same question, Whither does it lead us? doubtless does apply in science, namely, to render account to one's self of what in consistency he must receive and reject. Even in the case of the modern theology we must insist on *consistency*. When we look at it entire, and then consistently developed, it is only after this that we can pass a just judgment upon it.

If you ask us for our opinion on it, we think that we must bring forward against it more particularly the following points:—

1. The modern theology assumes to give the true representation of the relation between God and the world; but the point on which the matter chiefly turns, it leaves entirely in the dark. We are told that God is not separated from the world, that he does not stand over against it, nor beside it, nor outside it, any more than it exists over against, or beside, or outside God. Moreover, God is not identical with the world. No; God must be distinguished from the world, and the world from God; but God is in the world, and the world is in God. This phrase is the latest utterance of the modern theology. Does this now furnish us with a reply to the question as to the relation between God and the world? and does it overthrow what is called dualism? We have not yet got the least light regarding this relation itself. God is in the world, not over against, not beside, not outside it. But what does this mean, when it must be made plain *how* God, whom, as spirit, we distinguish from the universe, that is not spirit, stands related to that universe distinct from him? We hear it said that he dwells in the universe. But since he is thought

of as a person,* and has self-consciousness ascribed to him, the question is how God, as self-conscious, can be said to dwell in that multitude of spheres, to us innumerable, which, at vast distances from one another, revolve and float in space. Where do we find anything analogous that gives us any ground for such a representation? If we be referred to the relation between the soul and body of man, we call to mind that the human body is an entirely different organism from what we term the "universe," and that we cannot say that the human soul is a person that is immanent in the body, as they will have it that God is personally immanent in the universe. The modern theology says nothing regarding the manner in which the self-conscious God, who is spirit, stands in relation to that universe that is by no means homogeneous with him. Is he the force of the universe? But how, then, think of him as self-conscious? If, being a person, he is not what is usually termed "force," how, then, does he stand in relation to the universe? We do not get at the distinction, nor at that unity which is meant by "immanence." This phrase, "God in the world, and the world in God," has not brought the problem one step nearer its solution. We get words, but no elucidation; a formula, but no key. We still comprehend nothing of the distinction between the two factors, which we must distinguish, and not identify. No light is let in upon the darkness.

2. The modern theology still holds fast the personality of God, but, if it will hold fast God's immanence, and at the same time the self-consciousness of man, it must at last surrender the personality of God. We do not now take account of the fact that no answer is given to the question, how God is immanent in the universe? We assume that he dwells self-consciously in the universe, and therefore in the world to which we more especially belong, and therefore also in us, as a part of that world, in which God personally dwells. If we do not yet comprehend how God dwells consciously in unorganised matter, and as little how he is personally immanent in the organism of plants and animals, much less do we comprehend how God can be self-conscious in us, while we are conscious of self, but have no consciousness of the fact that God dwells self-consciously in us. If God must be distinguished from the world, and therefore also from man, if God's self-consciousness must be distinguished from man's self-consciousness, then God cannot be said to dwell self-consciously in man, unless there

* All so-called modern theologians do not acknowledge a personal God. For example, Heinrich Lang, in his treatise, *Die Moderne Weltanschauung (Zeitstimmen aus d. ref. Kirche d. Schweiz. II., 1860, No. 22)*, denies that God may be regarded as a person. God is "the reason which actualises itself in the world." That means . . . ?

be something observed in man that gives ground for the assumption. But we observe nothing within us that gives us any ground to assume, besides our own proper self-consciousness, a self-consciousness of God in us. If God dwells in us, it must be without self-consciousness, unless we would maintain that our self-consciousness is nothing else than the self-consciousness of God in us; but in that case the distinction between the personal God and personal man should disappear; and of religion, and in general, of a relation between the self-conscious God and self-conscious man, no more mention could be made. If we would not change the self-consciousness of man into self-consciousness of God immanent in man, and yet hold fast the immanence of God as an indwelling of God in the universe, in this world, in unorganised matter, in organic bodies, in man, then the personality, distinctively the self-consciousness of man, must be surrendered, or it must be acknowledged that the stand-point of immanence is untenable.

3. The modern theology speaks of religion, but, on the stand-point of immanence, this has no sense, if a setting one's self in relation to God (we leave the how or by what means out of consideration) belongs to the essence of religion. However we may think regarding the notion of religion, it must be allowed that nothing can be said on the subject unless we may assume a distinction between man, in whom the religion is, and God, to whom it has relation. If there is no God personally distinct from man, with whom he can place himself in relation, to whom he can stand in personal relation, in whose fellowship he can self-consciously live, and that while God, too, is conscious to himself of living in fellowship with man; then, along with the thing that the word religion expresses, we may allow the word also to go to rest. Now it appears that the modern theology can listen to this with great calmness, since it will at once acquiesce. That, it will say, is no fault of mine. But we ask, how is religion, how is a life in communion with God, in consequence of placing one's self in relation to God, possible, if God is immanent in man, and man, thus properly speaking, does not need to spend a moment's thought of placing himself in relation to God, as if God stood and existed outside, or beside, or opposite to him? If God dwells in man, there is then no sense in man's needing to try to place himself in fellowship with God, as if God was not present in him; there is no sense in man calling upon God, praying to him, pouring out his heart before him, supplicating anything from him. If God dwells self-consciously in man, as on the stand-point of the immanence of a personal God we must assume,—and if this indwelling of God in man is not to go on outside man,—there must be in man, what we might call, a “feeling of God” (*Godsgevoel*).

Now, in the same proportion as this feeling of God is lively and powerful, there must be the less room for religion in man. All religion presupposes a distinction between God and man, and it must just be the "feeling of God" that effaces this distinction. The completeness of God's immanence in man must thus be the negation of man's religion. Yes, we can say that, on the stand-point of immanence, where God is the cause of everything, and nothing may be regarded as being from or by man, in such a manner, that it can be therewith asserted not to be from or by God; that, where the sentence runs, from or by man, and therefore, from or by God, religion, too (as a being placed consciously in relation with a self-conscious God, distinct from the religious subject), is, properly speaking, an illusion. It is not too much to say, that religion of man is then converted into self-adoration of God immanent in man. If that be termed religion, it is not what was originally intended.

4. The modern theology finds no difficulty in accepting a revelation of God to man, as the act of God, by which he brings to man's knowledge all that he wills that man shall know concerning him, and with that it adopts a mode of consideration which is irreconcilable with the stand-point of immanence. On what must we think when we speak of a revelation of God to man? One man reveals himself to another by causing his spirit to become cognisable to him. The mere becoming cognisable does not, strictly speaking, deserve to be called revelation. But let this pass. If we be now told, "As the spirit of man becomes cognisable to his fellow man through the utterances of his spiritual life, through words and deeds, in which his thoughts and perceptions, his desires and intentions, acquire a perceptible form; so does God, the perfect Spirit, become cognisable to man only in his works as in the sensuous perceptible utterances of his thoughts, and dispositions of his will, and his designs;" and if all so-called immediate revelation be thereby denied,* it is not clear how, on the standpoint of immanence, we can tolerate this comparison. The man, whose spirit becomes cognisable to his fellow man, stands outside, or beside, or over against that fellow man, is not immanent in that fellowman; and just because the one man is not immanent in the other, but stands outside, or beside, or over against him, is there need of revelation of the one to the other, if they are to know anything of each other? But, according to the modern theology, God is not to be thought of as beside, nor outside, nor over against man. The consecrated formula certainly runs, "I in thee, and thou in me," when man is introduced speaking to God. If, then, God is in man, and man in God, how can we

* As is done by the modern theology according to Dr Poelman, *ibid.*, p. 83 seq.

talk about God's revelation to man in a mediate manner, how can there be need of revelation of God to man? God shall be immanent in man, man shall be in God; and God shall require to reveal himself to man, as if he were to him unknown; and this, forsooth, though he dwells in him, must he do in a mediate manner, and not as we should expect, by simply turning himself directly inward to him. As if, on the stand-point of immanence, it did not lie much more in the way to do battle against the notion of mediate revelation, for this single reason that, just when God truly dwells in man, it is not necessary, since God must then be manifest in man. When some make the modern theology draw still a further distinction between external and internal revelation, they thereby certainly deliver it for a moment from the great straits in which it must fall when the question is put, how to explain that one man has so much more correct a knowledge of God than another, how to explain that all men have not the same knowledge of God. They make the modern theology reply, that the outward revelation is the same to all; while, on the other hand, the inward differs, and that every one must ascribe this to his own eye and ear. But it soon appears that the modern theology must totally reject this distinction between outward and inward revelation as a heterogeneous element in its sphere of thought. Certainly God, who is immanent in man, cannot be said to reveal himself to man, so long as he does not (granting it is ever necessary) remove from within man that which hinders him discerning the so-called outward revelation. So long as the uncovering of the inward revelation does not follow, God cannot be said to have revealed himself. A revelation of God to man, of which man sees nothing, because God has not yet uncovered for him that which is outwardly revealed, by stripping off all veils in him, is no revelation of God to man. If we hold that not God but man is the cause that the uncovering does not take place, then we do not hold the stand-point of the modern theology; and if we hold the stand-point of the modern theology, then we shall be forced to surrender either the notion of God's immanence, or that of mediate revelation of God to man, by which it should be possible that God should remain unknown and hidden from him.* God immanent does not need to reveal himself to man, as a man makes himself cognisable to his neighbour; a God who, if man is to be able to know

* According to Dr Poelman, *ibid.*, p. 42, the modern theology teaches, "that God's word, God's thought, God's image, can stand expressed for us in his works, and he himself can yet remain unknown and hidden from us." If this is truly taught by the modern theology, we might imagine that the notion of immanence has remained unknown and hidden from it. A God self-consciously immanent in man, who yet remains unknown and hidden from him!

him, must reveal himself to him, and does that only mediately, is surely not immanent in man, surely does not dwell in him.

5. The modern theology disallows the supernatural, but it thereby comes into conflict with the results of unprejudiced historical criticism, while it appeals in vain to the discoveries of natural science. Let all things, whether in history or in nature, be explained naturally : so cries the modern theology ; explain all things by natural causes ; nowhere a direct interference of God. But now, if the results of unprejudiced historical criticism should compel us to accept one or more facts which nature cannot explain—one or more phenomena in the world's history which are not to be explained from human nature—think only of the resurrection of Jesus ! of his entire, unique personality ! With respect to the last, it is indeed asserted that Jesus, in his entire manifestation, must be explained from human nature, that he does not at all compel us to think of anything more than natural. We agree to this whenever we may allot him a place in the list of morally imperfect, of sinful, men. But if we must call him sinless, if we must call him morally pure, then must we also deny that he is a natural product of humanity. If the modern theology continues to see in Jesus the one entirely sinless, "the man of pure and perfect virtue," who stands there quite alone as such in the world's history, in this respect without an equal,* then

* That in Jesus which is incomparable, which is wholly unique, most so-called modern divines vie with one another in a remarkable manner to acknowledge. They do not assert that they comprehend him. He is a mystery. They say, indeed, that he can and must be explained from human nature, but they do not explain him. It is as St René Taillandier says, in his treatise, "Des idées religieuses au XIX^e siècle, p. 44 of his collection "Etudes et Fragments," under the title of "Histoire et Philosophie Religieuse :"—"Toutes ces investigations de la critique la plus hardie qui fut jamais, ont abouti à remettre en pleine lumière l'originalité exceptionnelle du rôle qui appartient au Christ. . . . Tout ces esprits si résolus (M. Baur, &c.) sont constamment ramenés à ce point : un personnage a paru dans l'histoire, qui a enseigné une doctrine sans précédents, qui a produit des œuvres sans aucune analogie dans le passé, auquel enfin on ne peut comparer aucun des personnages de notre race. En vain a-t-on essayé de la confronter avec Bouddha, avec les prophètes Hébreux, avec Socrate, avec les saints du moyen âge ; plus on l'examine à cette lumière, plus on le voit grandir et dépasser la mesure de l'humanité—'Croyez-moi, disait Napoléon à Sainte Hélène, je me connais en hommes, et je vous déclare que Jésus Christ est plus qu'un homme.' Napoléon sans doute est une médiocre autorité en des questions qui exigent les plus délicates finesse de la vie morale ; n'est-il pas curieux cependant que ce jugement de l'homme d'action soit si exactement conforme aux conclusions de la critique la plus subtile et la plus audacieuse ? Les théologiens allemands (je ne parle pas, bien entendu, des Protestants orthodoxes) n'osent point affirmer sans réserve la divinité de Jésus Christ ; ils déclarent du moins, selon l'expression de Napoléon, 'Jésus-Christ est plus qu'un homme.'"

To leave no score uncanceled, Dr Poelman, *ibid.*, p. 87, makes the modern theology teach, "that the thoughts of God, impressed on the boundless expanses of the whole universe, stand there for us in the flesh, in human flesh ; that here is the focus in which are collected the rays of the sun of truth dis-

shall it also remain bound to answer the question, how such a sinless one could proceed from the not sinless, without speaking now of the difficulty that, as sin is necessary, the exception, which we see in the sinless Jesus, remains inexplicable. If we refer, further, to the miracle of his resurrection, the modern theology finds, in its denial of the supernatural, a new difficulty. If it maintains, on the ground of God's immanence, that miracles are impossible, we call to mind that the doctrine of God's immanence is nothing more than a hypothesis, burdened with more than one difficulty. If it asserts that the impossibility of miracles is a position justified by the investigation of nature, we bring to mind that the investigation of nature alone gives right to the position—what is reported in those narratives as miracle, is not to be explained by natural laws unknown to us. If, in historical criticism, we do not start from the position that miracles are impossible, then everything that relates to the resurrection of Jesus pleads for its recognition as fact. The historical connection demands it. No psychological explanation of the faith of Jesus' first disciples in his resurrection has been devised which was entirely satisfactory, which had not something forced, which did not soon lead us to suspect that it had been devised because the position had been once *a priori* assumed that miracles are impossible.* If we surrender this position, which there is nothing to justify, we must then come to the recognition of Jesus as a man perfectly pure, entirely sinless, raised from the dead, and with that we have already granted the supernatural. Has the modern theology a right to close the door? Yes, if it may determine *a priori* that there is nothing supernatural. But if it seeks to justify its denial of the supernatural by the way of empiricism, it shall not reach its aim. What is meant, for example, by saying, "In nature which surrounds us, in the history of mankind, in our own destinies, we remark a regular, never-disturbed connection between cause and effect?"† No doubt of it, when the cause, not less than the effect, is known.

persed through the whole universe." I am not sure whether I understand these words, but if I do understand them, I do not understand how those who thus speak about Jesus, dare presume to explain him "naturally."

* After the application of repeated tests, I have seen no cause to recall anything of what I formerly wrote on this subject in "Modern of Apostolisch Christendom." I need not hold as refuted what I there said, p. 6-30, to prove that what the so-called modern theology offers as the result of its historical inquiry regarding Christianity in the first century, is only obtained (1) by means of a process of reasoning by which that is previously taken for granted which yet remains to be proved, and (2) at the cost of the only thing by which the rise of the Christian church can be explained. Compare now also, further, what Prof. Prius writes in his work, "De Realiteit van 's Heeren Opstand-ing uit de Dooden," Leiden, 1861, p. 162, &c.

† Prof. Kuenen, *ibid.*, p. 707.

But we do not need to recall to mind, that, both in history and in nature, the cause of many phenomena is hidden, and that therefore, in these cases, we cannot speak of this regular, never-disturbed connection. Not to refer again to the person of Jesus, and the faith of his first disciples in his resurrection, we call attention to that in physics, physiology, and chemistry, in geology, botany, and zoology, in anthropology, which leads the naturalist to declare that he does not know the cause.* How shall the first organised body, the first plant, the first animal, the first man, the first organic life, be explained on natural principles? Why speak as if there were nowhere anything to be found in nature that is not to be explained from nature? We do not assert that all that up till now has never been explained from nature shall certainly never possibly be explained. But those who *believe* that the cause of what is till now unexplained shall come one day to find its class in the world of finite things, may not forget that this *belief* gives no certainty, and therefore cannot be a ground on which to base anything. If the natural continuity which is observed in nature, in the events of our time, in the experience of our own life, is to be *assumed* also elsewhere, also in the past, let us remember that *hypothesis* is not science. The certainty which science gives us does not at all constrain us to deny the supernatural. We know far too little of the ultimate causes of natural phenomena to be able to speak with such certainty against the supernatural, without making ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of men of ability. The denial of anything supernatural in nature and history, rests only on the *belief*, by no means justified, in the certainty that everything in nature and in the history of the world can and shall be naturally explained; and on the *supposition*, chosen as the starting-point, that miracles are impossible.† Now, then, when the modern theology denies the supernatural,‡ we shall always remember that it

* "Toutes les origines sont obscures, les origines religieuses encore plus que les autres."—Renan.

† Dr Réville, *du Surnaturel*, speaks of "Esprits critiques, si nombreux de nos jours, qui, l'expérience et l'histoire (?) sous les yeux, se demanderont encore: si le surnaturel est possible, où est il réel? Où sont les miracles certains?" A difficult question to answer, since with these esprits "critiques," if I be not deceived, un miracle *certain* stands much on the same footing as a *contradictio in adjecto*, so long as they have not seen the miracle with their own eyes. But should they ever acknowledge that they have seen a "miracle"? Never.

‡ The supernatural has lately again been taken into protection by Prof. Bois in his "Discours d'inauguration du Surnaturel," and has been thereupon contested by Dr Réville in his above-named treatise upon the same subject. Both scholars acknowledge a personal God, both distinguish him from the world; and while Dr Réville does not deny all that is transcendental (see above, p. xx.), Prof. Bois acknowledges God's immanence. The last named

does not do this on the ground of results obtained through unprejudiced historical criticism, or brought to light through the investigation of nature. Neither nature nor the world's history protests against the supernatural. That is done only by a—prejudice.

6. By representing God as the cause of everything, without making any exception, as it must in consistency do, the modern theology at last removes the distinction between moral good and evil, leaves no room for sin as something that is in any case contrary to God's will, and thus comes into conflict with the verdicts of our moral consciousness. With perfect consistency, the modern theology teaches that God is the author of everything, that everything is a revelation of God. One does not go in the least too far in making it teach* that all that lives or has lived, is or has been, happens or has happened, that all the life-utterances of every creature, that all the results of these life-utterances,—that all this is a revelation of God, without whose will nothing happens; that the human race, every people and its history, from Christians to the wildest heathen, every human being; all the ungodliness of the atheist, as well as the revealed piety of the Son of God, the words of folly and of wisdom alike; all the utterances of human life, in every department of that life, be it good, be it evil, be it great, be it small;

only defends the position, that if we accept the personality of God, we must accept the supernatural also; and if we deny the supernatural, the personality of God must also be denied. (P. 14: "Dieu est il personnel ou ne l'est-il pas? Voilà, dans notre pensée, où doit se réduire tout le débat. Nier la possibilité du surnaturel, c'est nier la liberté, la personnalité de Dieu; et, d'autre part, affirmer que Dieu est personnel, c'est affirmer que le surnaturel est possible.") This last Dr Réville denies. Prof. Bois has answered his observations in the "Supplément Théologique de la Revue Chrétienne" of August 1861, where, among other things, he declares that he does not see how the immanence of God, rightly understood, comes in conflict with the supernatural. "Il me semble que c'est elle qui, amie à la transcendance, rend possible cette action extraordinaire. C'est précisément parce que Dieu est à la fois présent dans le monde et distinct du monde qu'il peut y agir d'une manière nouvelle." In the recognition of God's personality by Dr Réville, Prof. Bois sees not a principle, but an inconsistency. "En effet," he says, "admettez sérieusement que Dieu est personnel, et, par suite, distinct du monde. Vous en concluez inévitablement que Dieu est supérieur au monde, que ce dernier ne le renferme pas tout entier, n'épuise pas toute son activité, ne réalise pleinement ni sa puissance ni aucune de ses perfections. Dès lors, vous comprendrez que Dieu puisse manifester son activité d'une manière nouvelle, qu'il puisse introduire dans le monde des faits ou des forces qui n'y sont point contenus déjà." For our own part, we question whether this discussion, continued in such a manner, shall come to much. Rather than first instituting an inquiry into the relation of God and world (universe), and asking whether *the world contains God, or God comprehends the world*, we should begin with inquiring whether facts, phenomena, data, in nature and history, can be shewn which are not to be explained "naturally," but supernaturally; i. e., not out of nature. We should thus start not from the notion of God, but from the contemplation of the world.

* With Dr Poelman, *ibid.*, p. 84, 85.

that, in a word, the universe, nature, the entire history of the great Total in all its fulness, as well as of each of its smallest parts, is the result of the power of God." If all is "natural" and nothing "unnatural," if all is of God, nothing contrary to God, it follows that there is no sin in the sense of withstanding of God, transgression of God's command, or, however we may express ourselves, to characterise moral evil in opposition to moral good. We can assume development from a less perfect to a more perfect condition. We can assert that, for example, the cannibal, the robber, the adulterer, does not yet stand on the platform of development for which man was properly destined; but we have no right to see sin in cannibalism, robbery, unchastity, &c. There is no sin, and there can be no sin, if God is the author of all things, if God self-consciously dwells, lives, and works in all things and in all men. A man, be his condition what it may, can never be termed a "sinner" if we would thereby represent him as one who does not do what God wills he shall do. There is no place for a "living in sin" as opposed to a living in God; and we scarcely believe our eyes when we see man termed in a system of modern theology a "stray" child of God. There is for man no possibility of straying from God, who is immanent in him. No sin against God immanent in him is conceivable, for God immanent is all in all without any limitation, without any closer defining. Everything is grounded on God. Moral evil, as something ungodly that stands opposed to moral good, there is none. But when we hear this taught by the modern theology consistently developed, our question is how to explain the feeling of trouble that man has when he is conscious of having acted at variance with his moral obligation. How explain now the phenomenon that man, when he is conscious of not having satisfied the claims of duty, and therefore is disturbed, has not at the same time the consciousness of having acted in and from and by God? God, who is consciously immanent in man, must surely make all unrest of conscience in man impossible! Has this ever a place in man? Must man sometimes justly accuse himself of not having done what he ought to have done? And not to do what ought to be done is surely not to be said to be of God! Then everything is not of God; then there is a distinction between what ought and ought not to be and to happen, between moral good and evil; then the doctrine of God's immanence is untenable. The moral feeling protests against the modern theology.

If our discourse has *thrown any light* on the so-called *modern theology*, it remains for you to decide whether, when consistently developed, it merits your approval and applause. Inquire for yourselves whether we have said anything regard-

ing it that cannot be defended, that cannot be justified; and be willing to keep in view the distinction between what one or other so-called modern *theologian teaches*, and what the so-called modern *theology*, according to its fundamental idea and starting-point, *must teach*. In the case of what so-called modern theologians publish, we must always ask whether they also become guilty of any inconsistency. Not all that so-called modern *theologians* teach is on that account to be taken for the doctrine of the modern *theology*. It is noticeable that with some of them we still constantly stumble on phrases, expressions, propositions which do not at all bear the proper stamp of the modern theology, but belong to an entirely different sphere of ideas. Judged from the stand-point of the modern theology, they are old patches on a new garment. Why not break with the old? Why not put the new wine into new bottles? Why still constantly speak of "Creator" and "creation;" of God as of the "heavenly" Father, who "is enthroned in heaven," and dwells on the earth; of man as of "heavenly" origin, and more in the same vein? Has all this a good sense on the stand-point of God's immanence? Do men perchance use such expressions because they cannot lay them aside, because they continue to have need of them, because they see in them something more than sounds,—truths, namely, which they cannot deny, cannot abjure, even though they be condemned by the stand-point they have themselves adopted? It should not surprise us. But it is otherwise strange, when, for example, a divine, who is reckoned a fit representative of the modern theology—a divine who will not hear of the supernatural, just because he lays all stress on God's immanence—is heard to speak as follows of those who, like himself, cannot believe in the supernatural:—"When they pray . . . it is to say to God, 'Our Father who art in heaven, thy name be hallowed, thy kingdom come, thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven.' . . . They understand how greatly repentance, conversion is necessary for them, if they would attain to fellowship, to peace with God. . . . When the sense of sin overwhelms and humbles them, they recollect that God is ever the same. . . . They live in hope, they enjoy in hope, they suffer in hope, they will die in hope. Gone out from God, they say that they live in God and that they go to God."* What think you, is such language reconcilable with a con-

* Dr Réville, *ibid.*, p. 155. We have not transferred the entire passage which was in our eye; but only those words which seemed to us specially remarkable. The summit of the remarkable is reached in our view by the words, "*Partis de Dieu, ils disent qu' ils vivent en Dieu et qu' ils vont vers Dieu.*" How far is God separated from them?

sistently developed modern theology, according to which God dwells consciously in the world and in man? and therefore such words as we have just heard have in reality no sense. If they speak so from inward conviction, which we do not doubt, then we conclude that the modern theology ultimately satisfies the hearts of its adherents just as little as the understanding. Then too we wish for you that by careful, earnest, calm, persevering inquiry, you may find something better, and make it your own,—something to satisfy your heart as well as your understanding; and that you may be preserved from the temptation of that which disgraces the theologian as well as the Christian, we mean *verbiage* and *inconsistency*.

ART. X.—*Welsh Nonconformity.*

Hanes of Bedyddwyr yn mhllith y Cymru, o ddyddian yr apostolion hyd y flwyddyn hon yu ddiwy ran. (History of the Baptists among the Welsh, from the days of the Apostles to the present year, 1777.) In Two Parts. By the Rev. JOSHUA THOMAS, Leominster. Pp. 468.

Methodistiaeth Cymru : sef haues blaenorol, agwedd bresenol y Methodistiaid Calfaidd yu Nhymru ; o ddechreuad y Cyfundeb, hyd y flwyddyn. 1850. Gan y Parch. JOHN HUGHES, Liverpool. (Methodism in Wales; that is, the past history and present state of the Calvinistic Methodists in Wales, from the beginning of the connection to the year 1850. By the Rev. JOHN HUGHES, Liverpool. In Three Vols.)

History of Nonconformity in Wales, from its Rise to the present Time. By THOMAS REES. London: John Snow, 35 Paternoster Row. 1861. Pp. 512.

THE first two works are, what they profess to be, histories of two Nonconformist denominations in the Principality; and are tolerably fair towards other sections of Christians, when points of contact lead their writers to make mention of them. The writer of the third work on the list has taken a wider scope. The title of this work does not well agree with its contents. "The History of Congregationalism or Independency in Wales" would serve better to indicate the contents of the book. We propose to offer a few remarks regarding these works, before we proceed to make a short review of Welsh nonconformity.

The "History of the Baptists in Wales" is divided into two parts, preceded by an excellent introduction of twenty-nine pages. In the introduction, the writer has traced the history of the gospel in Britain, and of the ancient British Church before the Reformation, with delicate tact, producing carefully

his authorities. In this part, we think the writer of the first work excels that of the second, who also traverses the same ground. Fairness and candour towards parties differing in their views from the writer, and the absence of dogmatism on doubtful historical points, may indeed be said to be the leading characteristics of this work.

The second is a work of somewhat higher pretensions. It is diffuse to a degree, but almost exhaustive of its subject. Doubtless it contains much historical matter that would fail to interest many outside of the section of Christians whose history it sketches. The whole is composed upon a scale somewhat gigantic, consisting of little less than two thousand closely printed octavo pages. As a history of a section of Christians not much above a century old, the work seems bulky, but it will be highly prized as a library, a museum of facts and materials for future historians of Methodism in Wales. We wish its talented author had taken in hand to publish an English version of it, with the first part extended and remodelled, mentioning the authorities for each fact in footnotes; and with a selection of a few of the most interesting facts and incidents in the third and fourth parts incorporated together to form one part. It is an able work, written in an easy and popular style, and has already taken its place as a standard work in the literature of the Principality.

The third work on the list is divided into seven epochs and a concluding chapter, giving a "historical sketch of the colleges of the Welsh Nonconformists, from A.D. 1662 to the present time." As this work is composed in English, and within the reach of English readers, we are spared the trouble of furnishing any further analysis of its contents. As it is alleged that the able and candid writer of the "History of the Baptists in Wales" has claimed events and churches not his own, the present writer has laboured to restore them to their rightful places in the ranks of congregationalism. It is somewhat amusing to read the history of the claiming and reclaiming of dead men and defunct churches throughout this work.

Nor do these historians agree in reference to persons. According to the Baptist, Wroth and Cradock were two Independents; and Erbury and V. Powell two Baptists, from the beginning of their nonconformity; whilst the Independent asserts that Erbury was a maniac, and his creed no one knows what, but that he was more of a Quaker than a Baptist. Mr V. Powell became a Baptist "suddenly," after preaching as an Independent minister some fourteen or sixteen years. Several other Nonconformist ministers are claimed by one party, and reclaimed by the other, in the two volumes before us. We think, judging from the evidence adduced here, that the scale

of proof inclines slightly in favour of our Independent historian on this point.

Nor does Mr Rees seem disposed to award the full meed of praise to the Welsh Methodists. "The early Methodists, either from prejudice against their nonconforming brethren, or a desire to claim to themselves the undivided honour of having evangelized the principality, designedly misrepresented or ignored the labours of all other sects." He enumerates various others who were "revivalists, in the fullest sense of the term;" and "Mr Howell Harries and his coadjutors had only to blow into a flame the fire already kindled," p. 303. We doubt much whether Mr Morgan, the celebrated biographer of the Welsh reformers, or Mr Arthur James Johnes, ever noticed the names of these "revivalists," as the originators of the Methodist Reformation in Wales. Nor is the loss of their names as revivalists the only calamity; it is doubtful what became of the revival; the national memory does not appear to have preserved a record of it.

Wroth and Erbury Cradock and Vavasor Powell were revivalists and reformers; but they were all originally Church of England men. Whitefield, Wesley, and the great Methodist revivalists in Wales, were Reformers, but they also came from that church which gave to Wales both its Methodist Reformers and its modern Nonconformists. Our author informs us that religion was in a very flourishing state in Wales, especially in South Wales, five years before the rise of Methodism, and yet it happened that almost all the great Methodist reformers appeared in the south of the Principality, and started from the ranks of the Episcopal clergy. Our Baptist historian, who was partly a contemporary of those reformers, and who heard the celebrated Daniel Rowlands of Llangetho, thought otherwise regarding the state of religion in Wales at that time. Mr Newton, an excellent clergyman, in his sermon on the death of Whitefield, observes—

"He was raised to shine in a dark place. Religion was very low in our own church when he began to appear in public. I say the truth, though it may prove offensive to some. Before he appeared, seldom were the doctrines of grace heard from the pulpit; and there was but little knowledge of the life and power of religion. Many of the most spiritual amongst the Nonconformists were bewailing the great degeneracy which was spreading among them."

In reference to this testimony of Mr Newton, our Baptist historian remarks:—"I believe that this is the truth, in few words, as to the state of religion in England and Wales before the rise of Methodism," (*History of the Baptists*, p. iv., note).

The Welsh Methodists have good ground for complaint

against the incorrectness of Mr Rees's statements in reference to the Presbyterianism of Wales. He says—

"The reader will therefore understand, when he meets with the word 'Presbyterian' in the ensuing pages, that it only refers to *individuals* who entertained Presbyterian sentiments, and not to a distinct denomination, for such a denomination never existed in Wales," p. 175.

We always understood that the Welsh Methodists were Presbyterians; that they are divided into presbyteries, and hold regular synods of ruling elders and delegates, and annual assemblies or associations for carrying out their Presbyterian principles. If any body of Christians hold that church authority is to be exercised by the united counsels of a number of elders or ministers, and delegates, by whatever name such a body may be called, it is a Presbyterian body.

In reference to the statement that "no such a denomination as the Presbyterian one ever existed in Wales," our author's narrative is not perfectly consistent throughout. According to him, there appears to have existed, too, some mystical connection between the Presbyterian Church polity and anti-Calvinistic and Arian creeds (pp. 283-285); and again, after the rise of Methodism, the ministers who embraced Arminian and Arian tenets were "Presbyterian ministers" (pp. 299, 300); and ultimately, "after the separation of the Pelagians from the Calvinists, the former party has been distinguished as Presbyterians, and the latter as Independents," (p. 411.) These are self-evident inaccuracies, and savour of prejudice.

We regret to observe, too, that there are some elements connected with the tabulated figures furnished by Mr Rees (pp. 483-4), which prevent us from putting much confidence in the tables. In the first place, the proportion of hearers to members appears to be contrary to general experience in Nonconformist places of worship. Out of an attendance of 201,998 individuals in 766 places of worship, there are 97,647 communicants, or only 6704 persons less than the total number of hearers, whereas, under ordinary circumstances, excepting at periods of revivals, we believe the hearers in Nonconforming places of worship to be considerably more numerous than the members.

Another objectionable element in the tables is that the table compiled at Mr Rees's request was compiled after the late revivals, and the other tables taken from old diaries compiled previous to the revivals. Hence the tables are not trustworthy as means of comparing the relative numerical strength of the different denominations.

But our principal objection is against Mr Rees's rule for

"estimating the number of persons belonging to any place of worship at any ordinary service." The rule is, *to take the actual number of attendants* to represent *one-half* the people that belong to that place of worship (p. 293). We suppose that Mr Rees's table was compiled under this rule, since the statistics were compiled at his suggestion and specially for his book. Thus, a congregation is reckoned to consist of 400 individuals at any ordinary service," and then $400 \times 2 = 800$ would be the tabulated number, instead of $400 \times \frac{1}{2} = 200$, which we believe to be the more general and more correct rule of approximation.

We are far from wishing the reader to think that we regard Mr Rees's book as a bad book. On the contrary, we consider the book a good one as a history of Independency; and its title only is unhappy, as not informing us that it is so. It is a good, an excellent book as regards its matter and style. As a history of the rise and progress of Independency, it is a valuable addition to our Welsh literature. But a fair and impartial narrative of Welsh Nonconformity is not to be found in this book. That task is still left to some future historian.

Having noticed the books, we shall now proceed to offer a few observations upon Welsh Nonconformity.

The Kymry had a national existence, both politically and ecclesiastically, before Hengist and Horsa landed on their shores. Their religious existence was distinct and separate up to the time of the monk Augustine, about the beginning of the seventh century. The first conflict of the British Kymry in reference to their ecclesiastical polity was identically the same as that between the Eastern and the Western Churches. The Kymry advocated the former, and Augustine, with the Saxons, the latter. This conflict was carried on with various success for five centuries. Every inch of ground gained upon the British Christians was gained by force, not by persuasion and voluntary conformity. After a severe struggle of nearly eight centuries, from A.D. 460 to 1282, they lost their *political* independence, and became subjects to Edward the First, under the "*Statutum Walliæ*," known to this day among the Welsh as "*Ystatut Rhuddlau*." But their national existence, their language, and the traditions and reminiscences of their past, remained to them. The disturbances under Rhys ab Meredith, Sir Griffith Lloyd, and Owain Glendwr, might suffice to indicate their political and national feelings during the following centuries. The foolish and cruel laws made by Henry IV. and Henry V. with a view to blot out the language and nationality of the Kymry, or, in case of failing to do so, to exterminate the people, will tell their own tale as to the views entertained

by those monarchs regarding the national feelings of the Kymry. That attempt failed, as it deserved. Both the nation and its language outlived the storm, and are likely to survive for many centuries yet to come. The Welsh-speaking people in Great Britain, the United States, and the British colonies, are at present ten times, at the least, more numerous than they were at the time when "*Statutum Walliæ*" was made. The grand error of Christendom during the middle ages was the source of three-fourths of the sufferings and the troubles of the Kymry,—the error of considering political and ecclesiastical authority and political and ecclesiastical allegiance as essential to, if not identical with, one another. It was supposed for ages that he who refused allegiance to a priest must also be disloyal to his prince. A more fertile source of bad laws, bad politics, and unjust wars than this grave error never poisoned the relations of mankind. This alliance between the magistrate and the priest, between political and religious allegiance, has been the cause of more misery to the human race than all the other errors of men put together. The Kymry had to drink a full portion of that cup of wormwood.

The Tudors ascended the throne of England, and the Tudors were Welshmen. The descendants of Owain Tudor or Tudyr, of Penmon in Anglesea, form a glorious group among the crowned heads of England. It may be that Owain Tudor had no higher qualifications, by means of which he gained the heart and hand of Queen Catherine, than a handsome face, a fine figure, and an attractive gait in a dance. Yet that union gained to the crown of England the heart and affections of a whole nation. David Gam and his two Welsh compatriots had already done good service to Henry V. at Agincourt; and it is probable enough that the young French princess had heard of the fame of David Gam and his nation from her husband during the bright days of her nuptials. Ever since the ascension of the Tudors, no people in Great Britain have been more attached and more loyal to their prince than the Welsh. They feel, in fact, that their relation by blood to the royal family of Great Britain is closer and nearer than that of the English nation, and their conduct is in accordance with that feeling.

"It was not," observes Sir James Macintosh, "till the reigns of the Tudors, '*Britannia's issue*,' that wise attempts were made to humanise the Welsh by equal laws. Their language withheld many of them from contributing to English literature; and yet their small numbers, their constant disorders, and their multiplied links of dependence, repressed a genius which might otherwise assume a national form. If considered, as they now should be, as a part of the people of England, their contributions have been by

no means inadequate to reasonable expectations. But the mental produce of a nation has been inconsistently expected from a people robbed of national character, and who are only now reappearing on a footing of legal and moral equality with all other Englishmen."—(*History of England*, i. p. 255.)

But in religion there have been no Tudors. The Kymry make a distinction between allegiance to a prince and allegiance to a priest, between attachment to a government and to a hierarchy. The attempts made to conceal or deny this distinction, and charge Nonconformists with disloyalty, are now nearly exploded. More enlightened politics must ultimately banish or abrogate those bad laws, founded upon that cardinal error.

By whatever agents and means Christianity was introduced into Britain, it is sufficiently evident that the form of Christianity which the Kymry received was of the eastern type. The evidence of this fact is found in the nature of the long dispute between Augustine and his successors with the British Christians of those days, and the disputes of Columban, from his fastnesses in the Vosges, with the French clergy and bishops. The Kymry never conformed voluntarily to any of the forms of Christianity forced upon them by the authority of Rome and the sword of the Saxons. Religious questions are never settled by force of arms. A people may be conquered, may be temporarily silenced by the sword, but they can never be converted by such means. Druidism found its last refuge in Scotland. At the battle of Arderydd, in 577 A.D., it was finally overthrown. But the Christianity of the ancient Britons was not overthrown when King Ethelfrid destroyed the great monastery of Bangor-is-coed, and put eleven hundred and fifty or twelve hundred innocent Welsh monks to the sword, about A.D. 603. The synod at Wigorn, in A.D. 601, produced no good results, and the haughty bearing of the Roman monk rendered conformity impracticable. The Scotch and Welsh were one then in the principles of church polity. The British-Scotch churches appear to have defended their own form of worship, hand in hand, up to the period of the synod at Hertford, A.D. 678. Soon after that synod, we find the Anglo-Roman form spreading rapidly among the Scotch and the Irish. The Britons still clung to their ancient usages, within their own confined fastnesses. In the time of King Alfred, the ancient British Church was still free, independent, and un-English. That good king selected the Welsh monk Asser to be his private tutor, who, in return for his promotion, traduced his compatriots in terms not of the mildest character. Notwithstanding these sufferings, the British preserved many of their ancient ecclesiastical customs.

In the dark ages ignorance came to the aid of oppression. Many of the British clergy were gained over to adopt the Roman forms between the seventh and the eleventh centuries ; and a portion of the nation tendered submission to the Archbishop of Canterbury about the year 1115. Meanwhile the dioceses were fixed, and attempts were made to enforce the payment of tithes by law about that date. The nation was conquered, but not subdued, though the national mind had been tranquillised by a sort of coma. It was much the same in Scotland. Wycliffe rose in England. Walter Bute sent forth his clear notes amongst the hills of Wales. Lord Cobham found its mountains a safe asylum for years. The Kymry, as a nation, slept for centuries.

The Tudor Prince, Henry the Eighth, began his conflict with the Pope, and ended by defying his bulls and assuming his authority. The Welsh, usually the most reluctant of nations to give up their customs, in this instance were ready to back their prince. Within a single generation they flung away the forms of a religion which had been forced upon them. Henry Tudor proclaimed himself pope in Britain in 1534, and before the death of his daughter Elizabeth, in 1603, the Welsh nation was far on its way in search of a Biblical Christianity, for which it stands so high at the present day. The very year in which the invincible Armada sailed from the mouth of the Tagus to subvert Elizabeth and Protestantism, the Welsh were rejoicing over the first complete copy of the Bible in their own language. As Bibles increased the national mind awoke, the mental view-point was changed, and the people soon began to discover that the former conformity to Rome, and submission to Canterbury, were but the incidents of a national dream, the wanderings of the mind, disordered by ignorance, by oppression, and superstition. The light of the Bible brought back to the national mind the brighter days of their national British Church, the days of their Asaph and Catwg, of their Cynog and Dyfrig, of their Deinol and Iltyd, of their Dewi Sant, Padarn, and Teilo, and of the great British luminaries who had scattered the light of a simple and pure Christianity over Britain and the continent. The Welsh people may be called now one of the most eminently Bible-loving nations on the face of the earth. The Welsh peasant of to-day may know but little of the political movements of the world ; but let the most profound subject in Biblical theology, or the most subtle point in metaphysics, be introduced to him, and his countenance will be found to brighten with a keen intelligence. Such are the national characteristics. The British mind, both ancient and modern, makes its home in theology, metaphysics, and poetry.

But national awakenings introduce life into society, and life introduces activities and conflicts. The Welsh people soon discovered that the Christianity taught in the Bible had greater affinity and similarity to the few traditional traits preserved from their ancient Christianity than to that of the middle ages, forced upon them during their slumber. Henry the Eighth promulgated the "Law of the Six Articles," to keep down the Protestants, and proclaimed freedom to the Bible. The Welsh quietly embraced the latter, observing silence regarding the former, which soon spent its force in air. In Wales there was no Earl of Moray and Earl of Morton to take up the politics of Protestantism, nor had the Welsh a Luther, a Calvin, or a Knox to give its religious character to the national movement. But they bought up edition after edition of the Bible, and continued to cry for more. Oppression had taught the Kymry to avoid the turmoils of political factions, and to carry on their national work in silence. They took what liberty was granted them to read the Bible, and the Bible gave its tone and character to the Reformation in Wales. The Tudors established the loyalty of the Welsh, and gave them the germs of their nonconformity. Those rulers raised the nation of their ancestors to a state of equality with their conquerors.

When the Stuarts ascended the throne, there were storms already brewing. Elizabeth had committed the great error of the middle ages, and made it the foundation of her policy. Storm after storm arose. The Welsh continued to call for more light, more Bibles, and more liberty to read them. And they prepared to assert their ancient religious freedom, their ancient synodical and Presbyterian form of Christianity, and their ancient nonconformity. The Bible-loving followers of Wycliffe in England joined in the general movement for religious liberty. The Puritans of the Tudors became the Presbyterians of the first Stuarts, and the Independents of the Commonwealth. The "Act of Uniformity" came, expelled them from their livings, and took away their support. This was soon succeeded by the "Conventical Act," which robbed them of their goods, made their families beggars, and flung them to the prison-cells of thieves and felons. The "Five Mile Act" followed, which banished them to woods and forests, houseless and homeless; and to crown the series came the "Test Act," which excluded them from all offices of trust and honour. They bore all with patience, and came out of every storm, not scatheless, yet with their principles, their honour, and their Bibles.

Wales was not behind hand in producing champions and sufferers when the day of conflict came. We may name William Wroth, William Erbury, Walter Cradock, Vavasor Powell,

Henry Maurice, Stephen Hughes, David and Samuel Jones, and a host of like spirits. John Flavel was got hold of one day by a crowd at Exeter. They persuaded him to preach the gospel to them in an adjoining forest. The justices and clergy were soon upon their track. Constables stole in among the crowd. A part was carried away before Justice Tuckfield to be fined and imprisoned, whilst the other part bore away Flavel through the midst of their unwelcomed visitors to another part of the wood, where he preached the gospel to an attentive congregation. Henry Maurice, having left a good living for the sake of conscience, threw himself and family upon the providence of God and the bounty of Welsh peasants. Now and again his cupboard became empty. A carrier knocked at his door, inquired for him, delivered into his hand, at one time a bag, at another a handful of money, unreckoned, untold, and from sources unknown.

Adversity failed to shake the faith of the great Nonconformists; let us see the effects of prosperity.

About A.D. 1641, it became evident that the crisis of the struggle had been reached. The Star Chamber, the Court of High Commission, and the Northern Court were swept away. The Westminster Assembly issued a Presbyterian form of church government, a Confession of Faith, and two doctrinal catechisms, and three thousand clergymen were ejected from their benefices.

Next the Independents were in the ascendant, with Cromwell at their head. The power of ordaining ministers was taken from the Assembly and handed over to a committee of thirty-eight "triers," of whom twenty-nine were clergy, and nine laymen. The celebrated "Act for the better Propagation and Preaching of the Gospel in Wales, and redress of some grievances," of the 22d February 1649, was passed. Erbury, Cradock, Vavasor Powell, and other leading Nonconformists in the principality, were on their trial, and they bore their prosperity far worse than their adversity. Seventy-one gentlemen were appointed as commissioners, and twenty-five clergymen as "triers" of candidates for ordination. The "scandalous, malignant, delinquent, non-resident" clergymen in Wales, then ejected by the commissioners, were exposed, no doubt, to considerable hardships. It is difficult now to discover what number of those "malignant" clergymen were ejected. Dr Walker, in his work on the "Sufferings of the Clergy," says that they were between five and six hundred. Mr Rees fixes his estimate at one hundred and fifty, or less (p. 94). Mr Thomas observes that "Mr Vavasor Powell says that eleven or twelve clergymen were not ejected in his county, and also more or less in each county," (*Hanes y Bedydd*, p. 30). The Independents received the tithes in those days. "Since the

Independent pastors are turned parsons, and the preachers of the gospel parish priests," observes Erbury, "the burden of tithes hath been more oppressive in them than in the prelates and presbyters heretofore."—(Hist. Protest. Noncon., p. 84.)

The Restoration came, and the persecutions recommenced. But the Nonconformists of Wales received such an accession of strength from the *Black Bartholomew*, that they could afford to suffer some hardships for receiving the ejected ministers. Charles the Second's twenty-five years of rule were disastrous to the Nonconformists, above 8000 of whom were imprisoned, and not less than 60,000 had to suffer in various ways. They continued to suffer, to preach, and to increase. James the Second was no sooner established upon his throne than he began to speak of "liberty of conscience," and of "indulgence" to Nonconformists. All acts and laws against "liberty of conscience" must sleep in silence. The prison doors let Baxter out; the city of Utrecht yields up the philo-sophic Howe; all the champions of Nonconformity may move at pleasure about the capital and the kingdom. The great Nonconformist leaders accepted the "indulgence" as their right, but rejected it as a favour, and refused to thank king James or it. They saw the Magna Charta of Britons trampled under the feet of the man who claimed the "dispensing power" to grant them, in the shape of an "indulgence," the liberty which they held to be their birthright.

Some of the prisons in Wales had been "so full of Independents, Baptists, and Quakers, that the jailers had to pack some of them to upper garrets," ("Hist. of Noncon. in Wales," p. 111). In the summer of 1685 the Nonconformists were now, miserable, and all but hopeless; but before the winter of that gloomy year had set in, a few scattered rays had begun to penetrate the cloud which enveloped them. Those were the first indications of a brighter future. A Popish king, and a persecuting parliament were beginning to bid against one another for their favour.

The Revolution of 1688 decided the question whether Great Britain was to be Protestant or Catholic. The "Toleration Act" at the outset unchained freedom. From the Revolution to the rise of Methodism, a period of forty-seven years, the Baptists increased rapidly; but the balance, as regards influence and numbers, continued to oscillate between Presbyterianism and Independency. The formal coalescence of these two bodies in and about London in 1691, three years after the Revolution, together with the scattered state of the Presbyterian Churches throughout England and Wales, rendering it difficult for ministers and delegates to attend presbyteries, provincial synods, and annual assemblies, weakened the bond of union, and gave

an advantage to the Independents to gain a preponderance of influence. This turned the scale in favour of Independency in England as well as in the principality. Those ministers and churches which embraced Arminian and Arian tenets, by so doing, ceased to be Presbyterians, since they abandoned the doctrines of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms. The formal coalescence, referred to above, enabled the Independents gradually to swallow up the orthodox Presbyterian Churches in England and Wales one by one. Some faithful and impartial historian will, we trust, undertake the task of compiling a history of the amalgamation of these two bodies of Christians, giving prominent place to the evidence to be deduced from title-deeds and similar documents. Such a history would of necessity embrace the question of the lost Presbyterian Churches.

It was mainly, however, by the rise of Methodism that the Nonconformity of the Welsh, considered as a nation, was established. Other sections of Christians have contributed largely towards establishing it; but from that movement they received their impulse, and still continue to receive it. Since that great movement, the nation of the Kymry may be called *Bible Christians*. They have no series of traditions and dogmas drawn from councils and antique sources; they group around the sacred volume, and draw all their views and notions of religion from its simple sentences. Different sections of Christians there are in the principality; but no section that would venture to depart far from the plain words of the Bible, either in doctrine, discipline, or practice, could continue long to flourish among them. No church, or body of Christians, could long remain popular among Welsh peasants, which has become mystical or latitudinarian in doctrine, loose in discipline, and lax in morals. The bulk of the nation, both professors and non-professors, tests everything religious by the simple, unsophisticated statements of the divine volume, which is read by almost all, and is the general test-book of all classes. It is difficult to enable other nations to comprehend this singular trait in the national character of the Welsh. To an inhabitant of the Principality, religion never appears simply as a ceremony, or a something to be attended to at church or on Sunday, but as an element of life, which must pervade the soul, modify all the thoughts and aspirations of the inner man, and regulate the whole social life of the individual.

Judge Johnes, in his work on the "Causes of Dissent in Wales," draws the following conclusions from his examination of the effects produced by the "Free Circulating Schools," established by the Rev. Griffith Jones, of Llanddowror, upon the national mind:—

"1. That before the rise of Methodism in Wales, the churches were as little attended by the great mass of the people as now.

"2. That indifference to all religion prevailed as widely then as dissent does in the present day.

"3. That if the influential members of the church had evinced the same zeal for the religious education of the people as was shewn by Griffith Jones and his coadjutors, the Welsh peasantry would have continued to look to the church for instruction, instead of seeking it from the Methodists."—(*"Causes of Dissent,"* pp. 26, 27).

We fully concur with the first two conclusions. But the Welsh, as a nation, never did conform to the Church of England. It is very strange if the learned and candid judge failed to perceive that this is the fact attested by history. To the third conclusion we cannot assent. The more correct view on the subject referred to in the third conclusion, appears to us to be this: the Welsh nation never regarded the Church of England as their national Church. No sooner was the Bible given them in their own time-honoured and powerful language, than the nation grasped it with a giant's grasp. The Bible became the consecrated centre of the religious aspirations of the nation. Around that centre the Welsh people have grouped ever since.

Before the Revolution, the Methodist revival would perhaps have proved an impossibility. It arose and prospered in the shade of the Toleration Act. It was not the revival itself that enabled the Welsh nation to start up on its feet; and assert its national existence in matters religious; that was the work of the Bible and the Sunday schools which followed it. The revival aroused the national mind to a sense of the widespread ignorance and immorality which covered the people. The celebrated Charles of Bala established Sunday schools in the principality about 1787. Seventeen years later, the Bible Society began to pour forth its Bibles into Wales. Mr Rees refers to some earlier Sunday schools; and no doubt Christians might have taught some people to read the Bible on Sundays as early as the time of Wycliffe, Bradwardin, or Anselm; but the powerful institution known under that name in the principality at present, was undoubtedly established by Mr Charles. The organisation commenced with and by him. It required a generation of hard and continuous labour to put a nation in motion. It has been effected by the united labours of the Nonconformists. The national feeling is now very powerful in favour of liberty in religion.

The national religion of the Welsh may be called "Nonconformity" or anything else. Such as it is, it is watched over by the people as a body, Bible in hand. No religious doctrine or practice can continue long to be popular without their test-

ing it by that old standard, discussing its elements, and condemning or approving it, as it is found to accord with the divine voice. Certain principles and elements in the common sense of mankind usually serve as their canons of criticism, and laws of investigation.

The influence produced upon the national mind by this habit of religious independence and close alliance with the Bible, has been very remarkable. We shall take the liberty of making a few extracts here from an admirable article which appeared in a Welsh quarterly of great talent and power, called the "*Traethodydd*," (the Essayist), upon the "Civilised state of the Kymry." The excellency of the observations will be an ample apology for the length of the extracts. ("*Traethodydd*," vol. xiii. 1857.)

"Religion, and the support of religious ordinances, form some of the leading characteristics of the Welsh; and, with the exception of the Scotch, the Welsh are, without doubt, the most religious people in Europe. Before the rise of Nonconformity, the church was held in great repute by the people; but the clergy neglected their duties, and the church, in consequence, fell into general disrespect."

We believe that history not only will not support, but will reverse the position that the "church was held in great repute by the people," as we have previously mentioned.

"The church now feels that neglect, and strenuously strives to regain her lost ground, and to re-establish herself in the hearts of the people; and she has, and does, in some measure, succeed in her endeavours. But Nonconformity is the general characteristic of the Kymry."

Again, the same able writer goes on to describe the national characteristics of the Kymry:—

"But to whatever denomination they may belong, the Kymry are all religious people. The majority of them attend regularly at the churches, chapels, and Sunday schools; they are attentive hearers, and thoughtful readers of the word of God; and they joyfully appropriate the whole of the Sabbath day to the services of religion. The effect of this is manifest in the morals of the people; in the wide circulation which Bibles, Testaments, and doctrinal books have among them; and in the universal acquaintance with the leading points in theological polemics which obtains among them. In the observance of the Sabbath the Welsh and Scotch are far in advance of the English and the Irish; and in the thorough devotion of the working classes to the study of divinity, and the discussion of religious questions in their monthly periodicals, the Welsh people stand alone. It may be that the ideas are often superficial, and that they take up difficult subjects without the preparation and the learning necessary for handling them to any satisfaction; yet

it is an honour to them that they undertake at all to handle such subjects. The universality of this custom is also a fact worthy of notice. It may be affirmed as an undoubted fact, that there is no nation under the sun, into whose moral and mental existence religion has penetrated to such a depth as the Welsh nation. Religion is the native element of the Welshman, without excepting even his patriotism. In it he desires to exist and live; he swims in it, as a swan upon the surface of a clear lake; it pervades all his actions; it regulates, adorns, and elevates all his behaviour; it fills all his thoughts. The literature of Wales accepts religion as the *summum bonum*—the chief good, the one thing needful. All its discussions depend upon the Scriptures for their examples and proofs; and its words and phrases are formed and produced by the word of God. No Englishman can understand, nor form any clear conception of, what religion is in Wales. In England, generally, religion is but a ceremony to be attended to on Sundays; but in Wales, it is the business of life. *Hardly a day passes without some kind of religious service.* Sundays and holidays are given up to the service of God: almost every hour, not required for the necessities of life, is spent in this service; and when the body fails, as long as the spirit is willing, it is almost felt that the defect is a fault that should be removed, if possible. Burns's song, "The Cotter's Saturday Night," is in all respects as applicable to Wales as to Scotland; and I am surprised that no Eisteddvod has furnished a translation of it. The 'big ha' Bible' is in quite as much honour here as there; and the fruit is manifest in the social morality of the two countries, when compared to that of the English and the Irish."

These are glowing words, worthy of the author of the "History of the Literature of the Kymry;" but they furnish a truthful representation of the national characteristics of the Welsh during the last fifty years. In general education, the Kymry are, perhaps, a little behind England, and much behind Scotland; but they are in advance of both in purely Biblical education, such as is supplied in Sunday schools. "The Sunday school," remarks the same excellent writer, "is the crowning honour of Wales, and is an ornament to Nonconformity." That article furnishes a list of periodicals published regularly in Welsh, almost all of a religious character. Six weekly periodicals, with a circulation ranging from 2500 to 9000; sixteen monthlies, with a range of circulation from 900 to 8000 or 9000; two quarterlies, with a circulation ranging from 900 to 1800. Add to these the large number of books continually issuing from the Welsh press, and it will be obvious that the habit of reading and writing among a population of less than a million and a quarter, cannot be wanting.

The statistical tables furnished by Mr Rees, defective as we hold them to be, yet may suffice to shew that out of a population, according to the Census of 1851, of 1,188,914 souls, four

nonconforming denominations only had 263,505 members ; and if we estimate the number of hearers among the Baptists and Wesleyans as nearly equal to that of their members, say 51,000 to the former, and 25,000 to the latter, we have, between hearers and members, 617,430, out of a little more than a million of men, in regular attendance in nonconformist places of worship. These statistical facts prove what the nation is at heart.

Hardly any of the modern speculations on theology have invaded the principality. Most of the theology of Germany, and the form of what has been termed "negative theology," such as has appeared in England, being founded upon peculiarities in critical exegesis, rather than upon the broad and unsophisticated statements of the Scriptures ; the Welsh people leave the critics to wrangle, and cling with their wonted tenacity to the plain statements which they find in the open Bible. Neither the clergy nor the laity of Wales have entered far into the wilderness of the newly-discovered lands in theology. They prefer to stand fast by the Bible, as understood by the ancient fathers and the Puritan champions, and regard the modern discoveries as a mirage offered them in exchange for the old *terra firma* of the ages. A few attempts have been made, principally by young clergymen in the Episcopal Church, to introduce certain wild theological speculations into the literature of the Kymry ; but they proved abortive, and were almost all forgotten in a couple of years. That must always be the result, wherever the voice of God in the Bible is considered clearer and more decisive than his voice in Reason, as it now is. The people of the principality hold that God, in his present relation to man and to the world, can only be fitly known by means of the Bible.

The modern tendency to try to constitute the physical and mathematical laws of the universe into a sort of necessity from which neither the world, nor man, nor even God himself, can in any case deviate—the tendency, in fact, to deny the spiritual and the supernatural altogether—has not ruffled the surface of the national mind of the Kymry.

The religion of the Bible is a religion of power. Outwardly it may put on different forms, but power is inherent in its nature. He who believes that God always speaks the Bible, will always find him in it ; and he who, by a felt faith, finds him there, finds that religion is a power, as the Welsh people know by experience.

XI.—FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS.

Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1862. Parts 1st and 2d.

THE first number of this periodical for 1862 opens with a discussion between Bähr and Ullmann, on the subject of the universal priesthood of believers as the basis of the constitution of the evangelical church. Bähr, who maintains the affirmative, regards this principle as the decided antithesis to the hierarchy of Rome. He elaborately establishes the Scripture basis of the universal priesthood of believers by an exegesis of the most important passages, such as 1 Peter ii. 5, and then inquires into the way in which it has been recognised in various periods of Church history, especially adducing the strong statements of Luther and Spener in former times, and of Neander and Rothe in our time. Ullmann, who follows him with "one word more on the significance of the universal priesthood for the constitution of the evangelical church," coincides with Bähr in all the essential points of his exegetical and historical exposition. But he maintains that the universal priesthood is neither destined nor adapted to furnish the principle and foundation of a church-constitution. He insists that it is rather the idea of the church as the body of Christ, which must stand in the first rank. While Ullmann assumes a different idea, he does not maintain that the thought for which Bähr argues has nothing to do with the matter; for where it is lost sight of, the church necessarily assumes a hierarchic form, opposed to the apostolic spirit. But he shews that the priestly action of the universal priesthood does not consist in ruling, but in offering "spiritual sacrifices;" and he shews that not every nominal Christian or baptized person comes within the class of the spiritual priesthood. This is an important discussion, which has been also carried on in the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie* during the past year.

After this there follows an elaborate exegetical paper, which is continued at still greater length in the second part, on the resurrection of Lazarus, and particularly on the statement that Jesus *ἐνθυμήσατο*, rendered "groaned within himself" in the English version. The writer labours to prove that the word can only denote "to be indignant," and adduces the immense preponderance of exegetical authorities, from the Greek expositors to the present day, as supporting his view. He holds that Christ's anger had for its object death under which Lazarus lay. The erudition of the paper is very great, and will be read with intense interest, whether the writer's conclusion be adopted or not.

Next follows a paper by the younger Krummacher, on the subject or party who speaks in Rom. vii., which is well vindicated and proved to be Paul himself. Then there is an interesting review of the correspondence recently published between Sailer, Diepenbrock, and Passavant, three of the most remarkable men that the Church of Rome has recently produced. The last article is an erudite review of the value of Kuenen's New Testament, according to the Vatican MS.

In the second number of this periodical we have, from the pen of Prof. Auberlen, of Bâsle, an elaborate eschatological paper on Christ's discourse in Matt. xxiv. and xxv. A full outline of all the recent literature is supplied. The writer asserts that "this generation shall not pass away," means the Jewish nation, which is a sense that *γένεα* will not bear. Besides some papers of less importance, there are two interesting reviews, one of Henke's *George Calixtus*, and another of Bleek's *Introduction to the Old Testament*.

Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie, 1862.

This important Review, in its first number for this year, has an article "on the Pauline doctrine of the resurrection," by A. Klöpfer, Private Dozent in Greifswald. The article is based on 2 Cor. v. 1-6, of which it gives a full exegetical analysis. The next article, by Dorner, is one of much value "on the sinless perfection of Jesus." This we shall endeavour to transfer to our own Review next number. The next article is "on the heavenly corporeity." Next follow reviews of books, of Hengstenberg on John, of Kahnis' *Dogmatik*, of Schmid's *Christian Ethics*, &c., &c.

Theologische Zeitschrift, 1862.

This Lutheran Review, in the part that has come to hand for the present year, contains the following articles: on the symbolical numbers of Scripture, by Dr Kliefoth; on the relation of the divine word and of the holy sacrament to each other, by Pastor Kracht; the Lutheran Church in Hungary; and reviews of theological works.

Zeitschrift für die gesammte Lutherische Theologie, 1862.

The articles in this periodical for January 1862, are the following: contribution to the revision of the idea of Inspiration, by Prälat Mehring; a literary and historical life-sketch of Dr J. Peter Mynster, by Rudelbach and the reforming martyrs of Italy. The number contains the usual book-notices so justly appreciated.

Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie, first and second part, 1862.

The first number of this periodical for the present year contains a luminous account of the Polish literature, by Schnaase of Dantzic; and communications relative to the history of Protestant sects in the Hessian Church. The second number contains two valuable papers: Bernard's (of Clairvaux) views of the Christian life, an article which evinces a thorough acquaintance with Bernard's opinions and writings; and the history of the attempted union between Rome and Hanover during the 17th century, by means of the memorable negotiations between Bossuet and Leibnitz. This is followed by an interesting letter of Mosheim's to a friend in reference to a literary performance in which the latter was occupied.

DUTCH REVIEWS.

Protestantische Bladen for Dec. 1861.

DR GESLER, a Lutheran divine, thus describes the parties and theological schools in the Dutch Church :—

No nation has a more glorious past than Holland ; in no land has the quickening power of the Reformation more manifested itself. Long was it ere the people were moved ; for many years did they submit to the most fearful persecution and oppression ; but once roused, they yielded not till they achieved their freedom,—they waged that eighty years' war which has, not without reason, inspired Schiller with so much enthusiasm.

The old renown of Holland is lessened, almost gone. The people whose past was so great have an insignificant present, a dark future. Why ? All parties are ready with their respective answers. One replies, "Because the Netherlands have denied God, by separating Church and State." Another asserts "that constitutional progress has hitherto been too much impeded ; that love of the old has been too strong to permit the country freely and fully to develop her resources." But, notwithstanding these and similar party answers, the question still remains unsolved. Nor indeed can one reply be given. Many causes have contributed to this result, the chief of which has certainly been the internal degeneracy of the nation. But even in this change the peculiarity of character to which we have alluded manifests itself. So long as the nation contended for those rights which are dearest to man—civil and religious liberty—the object aimed at was never for a moment lost sight of ; but these once obtained, the people, weary with the contest, pursued every one less noble objects. Thus increasing wealth produced luxury, and the still worse evils of licentiousness ; and, while the *character* of the people in general degenerated, the *nation*, as a whole, became weakened by internal dissensions ; to all which must be added, that, on the death of the great Orange, who had delivered England from Popery and tyranny, a new race succeeded to the stadholder-ship, less eminent than the former heroes of the House of Orange. Many reasons can thus be mentioned why a land, once synonymous with freedom, has been deprived of almost all share in the politics of Europe, and why the people themselves have lost so much of their internal strength. But who would search for the causes of such a change in human strength and weakness only—in the character of the people alone ? Does not the Spirit of God control the destinies of nations as well as of individuals—does he not dethrone kings and set kings up—exalt nations and humble them—and, when they have fulfilled their task, permit other nations to occupy their place ? As Saxony, which first represented the new ideas of the sixteenth century, has been replaced by Prussia—as the might of Sweden has passed over to Russia—so, in western Europe, has England assumed the place formerly occupied by the States General. The small republic could overcome Spain and France ; but against England, exalted by her Protestantism, she could not prevail.

Holland has fallen ! And the greater her past has been, the sadder her present position appears. Not that the old spirit of the people has died out. No ! there are still noble influences at work ; and these, where they are found, act in the old traditional manner. It is only needful to recall the year 1815, and the universal enthusiasm amid which freedom from the French yoke was achieved and the hereditary House of Orange restored—to remember the bloody days of 1830, when, in spite of the foreign aid extended to the Belgic rebellion, the little country so nobly defended her rights—to be convinced that the old spirit still lives. And this appears also in the revived *ecclesiastical* life of which we now purpose to speak.

The present movements have their origin of course in the history of earlier times ; but the ecclesiastical history of Holland is, on account of its transcendent importance, so well known, that it is unnecessary for us to glance at it. It is significant as to the character of the people, that the "*Brothers of the Common Life*," who, as recent investigations have more and more clearly shewn, exerted so powerful an influence in preparing the way for the Reformation, were of Dutch descent ; and that a Gerhard Groete, a Thomas à Kempis, a John Wessel, Ganzvoort, are genuine types of the religious Dutch character. If the Reformation was only gradually effected, its influence has been permanent ; and it is not without significance, that in Holland the Lutheran Reformation was speedily replaced by the more decided Calvinistic doctrine. And if the religious life expressed in the Calvinistic form, which, starting with the absolute sovereignty of God, has for its aim the full assurance of personal salvation, is more decided, but at the same time more one-sided, than the other development, it was in Holland that the dogma of predestination found, in the articles of the Synod of Dort, its completion. But not the less, on the other hand, is the *Remonstrant* theology a genuine child of the Netherlands. Is it necessary to mention that the Dutch Reformed "*Scholasticism*" has been still more developed, and tends still more to narrow-mindedness than the Lutheran, and that the most animated controversies find their models in the Voetian and Cocceian disputes?

Later than elsewhere, but with greater results, the new movements of the eighteenth century manifested themselves in Holland. There, too, after Arminianism, long proscribed, became all-prevalent in the state church, and the battle commenced between rationalism and supernaturalism which has given rise to the present theological parties, a reaction has taken place, which, finding support in a great body of the people, has gained much ground ; and out of this battle betwixt the old and new Protestantism has sprung a whole series of different parties, which are still encamped against each other, and which, under the two leading divisions of orthodox and liberal, comprise a number of smaller parties. It is impossible for the Dutch theologian not to choose his party ; and it is a religious duty on the part of the foreigner to hear all parties, but let his judgment be dependent, not on *their* opinions and prejudices, but alone on the spirit of Christ, which, in the life of the church, is indeed developed under many different forms, but which in the word of God is not divided.

1. *The Orthodox Schools*.—A great proportion of the people, and a not insignificant number of the preachers—at the highest, however, not reckoned above a fourth of the whole clergy (1500 in number)—comprise the different sections which are generally reckoned as orthodox. Some more *symbolico-believing*, others *mystico-pious*, others still taking their ground on a Biblical stand-point.

The true rise of the orthodox school dates from the Restoration of 1815; more particularly the celebrated publication of Da Costa against the spirit of the age, which appeared in 1823, may be regarded as its first significant note. Its origin, however, we must look for further back; it is to be found in the long-existing convictions of the people. As from the beginning there appeared in the history of the States General, side by side, two mutually opposite currents of opinion—the one more inclined to the stadholdership, the other more aristocratico-republican—the one preferring Calvinistic orthodoxy, the other Remonstrantism—and, as is well known, the political and religious elements flowed side by side in the Synod of Dort, so these two politico-religious parties have continued ever since. And when, in the convulsions of the years of revolution, the politico and ecclesiastico-liberalism triumphed, love for the House of Orange and the orthodox doctrines of the fathers continued as deeply rooted among the middle and lower classes as before. With the reaction of 1815, which everywhere restored the old kings, old laws and the old faith, or orthodoxy in Holland, gained much ground also; while in the theological chairs, not rationalism properly so called, but great indifference as to dogmatic theology, still prevailed. This orthodoxy, ingrained in the affections of the people from earlier times, naturally distinguished itself by ecclesiastical and religious zeal, by inward child-like piety, and by extensive knowledge of the Scriptures; but not less by the unsophisticated (*naïve*) conviction that religion and orthodoxy are identical.

Thus Groen van Prinsterer, in a publication to which we shall again have occasion to refer ("Le Parti-antirevolutionnaire et Confessionnel dans l'église Réformée de Pay-Bas," 1860, p. 10), describes how, after the years of revolution and war, and finally of deliverance (1813-15), as later, after the storm of 1830, the life-giving Spirit of the Lord revived an active Christianity. "Thus led to the knowledge of the gospel, one found one's self, in common with a considerable number of those in the Reformed Church, who, with greater or less fidelity and life, had preserved the good treasure of the faith, on the territory of great scriptural facts. In itself regarded, the revival was neither Calvinistic, Lutheran, nor Baptist: it was Christian. It assumed not for a banner the old orthodoxy of Dort, but the old banner of the Reformation—the tones of God; and if it found the doctrine of salvation admirably expressed in our symbolical books—if it set a high value on a rule of faith so consistent with the holy Scriptures—if it set the doctrine of the church and the duty of the preachers over against the desolations of rationalism—then it cared not, with childish fear, either to accept or reject the absolute and literal yoke of symbols." If to this religious awakening much has been attributed which does not properly

belong to it, it remains notwithstanding a bright epoch in the history of the Dutch Church. But that a revival of the later orthodoxy must have been favoured by it, appears from the simple circumstance that it was not *theological*, but *religious*; and hence the well-known confounding on the part of many of theology and religion, which makes religion consist in the accepting of definite theological formulas.

The rise of the school of Bilderdyk, from which have come the most distinguished representatives of orthodoxy, must be regarded, not as a religious revival, but as having exercised no less influence. Willem Bilderdyk, poet of the first rank—an exceedingly creative mind in more respects than one—had, from various causes, become estranged from the spirit of his times, and began to search for his models in the earlier periods of the nation's history. But repelling others as he had himself been repelled, his influence would never have been much felt, but for his more distinguished disciple Da Costa. Da Costa is now deceased; the theological and political differences which separated him from many during his life, have, on account of his greatness as a man and a poet, been forgotten, and all parties of his fatherland are proud to name him as their countryman. It would lead us too much into details to relate how, led by Bilderdyk from a belief in Moses to faith in the Saviour of his people and of all peoples, he attacked with glowing enthusiasm the spirit of the age, which, according to him, had become alien to Christianity. But great was the sensation which Da Costa's *polemique* produced: and if it gave rise at first to prejudices and suspicions, we yet find in it the first signs of life of the now considerable orthodox party. But his greatness consists, and this must not be forgotten, not in his theological views, whose fundamental idea, a Judaic Chiliasm, was in conflict with the prevalent, and (by himself so named) heathen Christianity, not in his power of controversy—the unprejudiced foreigner can only regret the mode of his attack upon Groningen and Leyden; it consisted far more in his eminent talents as a poet and an orator, and the movement effected by him, still more than by Bilderdyk, to which, as the *poetical* current, we must assign a place, next the *old orthodox*, and *religious* awakenings, as a *third* chief cause of the formation of the present orthodoxy, has more than all the others been represented by poetically gifted minds whom he had attracted. That, in general, is a peculiarity of the present Dutch orthodoxy, that her most distinguished representatives, under the influence of one or more of these three currents (none of which has a strictly theological aspect), adhere to the principles common to all.

The most ultra-party consists of the Dissenting Reformed Church, which numbers nearly 60,000 souls, but which possesses no representatives of importance, and has from the beginning been torn by internal dissensions. But nothing brings out the difference between the present and earlier periods more clearly than the fact that, while at one time the party inclined to Remonstrantism were at Dort driven out of the church, the *ultra-Calvinists* have now separated themselves from her. In this party we find the first mentioned current of opinions prevalent, a party which can present the principles of Protestantism in the form only in which they have received

them at the hands of distinguished fathers, and whose many extremes, in spite of the active zeal by which they are animated, furnish unbelief more with an occasion for scoffing, than with reverence for the divine power of the Christian faith. The influence of this party upon the general body is, however, not important enough to detain us longer here.

Of much more importance are the representatives of orthodoxy within the Reformed Church itself, who in various degrees attract our attention. The party known in the Netherlands itself as the "Stahl" party, and the closely connected anti-revolutionary party, deserve the greatest attention. Contending for truths which are opposed to the spirit of the age, it shares the lot of its German co-religionists, that it is more slandered than known, while in the bosom of orthodoxy itself there are men of eminence who are opposed to it. Not as a divine, but as a distinguished statesman and historian, Groen van Prinsterer represents the cause of orthodoxy in its connection with his state policy. The views, as a statesman, of a man whom Beville, a representative of the "modern theology," ranks (in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, 15th June 1860) among the men of whom a land may well be proud, may not be passed over without notice in a sketch of the theological schools of Holland, since he assumes the authority of the divine word as the fundamental principle in the government alike of church and state. Deducing from the Scriptures the divine right of the magistrate, he condemns, not indeed every so-called revolution—for some revolutions, such as the Dutch and English, he defends as *just*—but such a revolution as is, in principle, an overturning of the order appointed by God; a revolution which is an upsetting of the common foundations of freedom and right. In a series of important publications (among which his important work "Infidelity and Revolution," *Ongeloof en Revolutie*, may be mentioned), and in many contributions to the weekly newspaper "*De Nederlander*," Groen has stated and defended his views. The result of all his efforts, Groen himself, in the introduction to the 2d vol. of his collected works, has stated thus:—"Every system against which I have contended triumphs in the church, in the school, and in the state, even in the course of history, but they cannot shake my convictions." As a son of the Reformed Church, he distinguishes himself from the Lutheran Stahl, of whom, however, in his last publication ("Le parti anti-révolutionnaire et Confessionnel," &c., p. 6-9), he expresses his high esteem. The connection between his anti-revolutionary principle and orthodoxy he shews himself in an article written against Trotter in the *Chrétiennne Evangelique* of 25th Oct. 1859. He describes the principles of the school thus:—"We are the *anti-revolutionary* party. That is, we contend against the greatest of all errors, both political and theological, the doctrine, viz., which substitutes for revealed truth and divine authority the supremacy of reason and of the individual will, which overturns church and state, and destroys the foundations of morality and of society. We are the *confessional* party. That is to say, we hold that every church ought to possess a creed, and to give a reason for her hope and faith, and that the Reformed Dutch Church, once so distinguished and faithful, can proclaim no unlimited freedom of doctrine, without denying her confession, her faith, and her past

history, and without separating the bands which connect her with the Reformation of the 16th century, and with the holy catholic church. We are the *orthodox* party. That is to say, we profess the truths which the evangelical churches, with remarkable unanimity, have expressed in their symbolical books."—(Pref., pp. 9, 10.)

In this section of orthodoxy, powerful chiefly because of the personal influence of Groen, we find those who are influenced by the old reformed spirit, which has still survived among a considerable proportion of the people, and the personal friends of Bilderdyk; while the "*philanthropic*" trait by which it is characterised shews that they not unjustly regard the revival as its historical origin. We must, however, place in the first rank of the party the proper *Bilderdykians*, such as the now deceased Da Costa, and his distinguished friend *Capadose*, who says: "I cannot forget how he once demonstrated to me, with the enthusiasm of youth, that all science was really founded upon faith; since that was no science which was the product only of man—God was the central point of all science, philosophy itself having its origin in faith." His severe logic, frightened at no consequences, pointed him out as a genuine disciple of Calvin, and he appeared to find his calling in comparing the Christianity of the Protestants of the present with the old orthodoxy.

A genuine Calvinist also, according to competent judgment, we find in *Molenaar*, whose anonymous "Address to my Reformed Fellow-Believers," published in 1827, at one time produced a great sensation, and which, with the shortly before published writings of Da Costa and Capadose, belongs to the first signs of life of the orthodox opposition. When, somewhat later, the secession movement commenced, the strict confessional party found an organ in the "*Nederlandsche Stemmen*," among whose editors, besides Da Costa, *Willem de Clerck* deserves notice. As a poet of remarkable talent, he gave in the monthly survey of the above periodical, proofs of rare erudition, of amazing breadth of view, but above all, of unaffected childlike faith. By the noble epitaph which Da Costa has consecrated to him, by the beautiful verses which Beets has written to his memory, one is made continually to regret that so much precious treasure of Dutch literature is so limited by a language almost exclusively confined to so small a land. If the *Nederlandsche Stemmen* was formerly the organ of the strict orthodox party, we may now name as such, the *Heraut*, edited by the Jewish missionary Schwartz.

If the evangelical or ethical school, represented by Chantepie de la Saussaye, in the *Ernst en Brede* (now stopped), is opposed to the confessional party just described, still less can we number the few theologians properly so called, who can be named among the orthodox party, as belonging to it. We refer here to the old supra-naturalistic Utrecht faculty, which in Heringa's disciple *Vinke* continues to occupy the position held by the most distinguished expounder of the practical theology. Not less are we reminded of the two founders of the "*Jaarboeken voor Wetenschappelyke theologie*," *Van Oostersee* and *Doedes*. While the confessional school can appeal only to Hengstenberg as holding similar views, and with the school of Schleiermacher and Neander can claim no connection, *Vinke* represents the well known older

supra-naturalistic school, as it flourished particularly under Heringa and Van der Palm, whom we must rank, however, as belonging rather to the *liberal biblical* than to the orthodox party. We should do the supra-naturalistic party no injustice, were we to assert that, with all its merits, it is more adapted to the past than the present time. It is not the surest pledge of the theological life inspired by this section of the Utrecht school, that its most distinguished pupils have, within the last few years, been more influenced by the philosophy of *Opzoomer*, who has called into life the most extreme *liberal* section, and that orthodoxy first began to be inspired with hope for the spread of her principles with the appointment of Doedes as professor at Utrecht.

Doedes, on the other hand, as well as *Van Oostersee*, since the commencement of their career (which the first began with a dissertation on Christ's resurrection in 1841, the second, with a defence of Christ's birth from a virgin), a career which, by the founding of the *Jaarboeken voor Wetenschappelyke theologie*, has been of much importance to the whole Dutch theology, must be regarded as the defenders of the moderate orthodoxy. *Doedes*, however, who is more particularly distinguished as a Biblical critic, has always maintained the same stand-point, while *Oostersee* has changed the principles which he originally maintained. In 1847, after *Opzoomer's* well-known attack on the fundamental fact of Christianity, he developed, in his defence of Christianity as against philosophy, the fundamental question as a historico-critical one, since Christianity has no foundation to stand upon if the historical facts are surrendered; and, in like manner, in his inaugural address as professor, he maintains, that if the evangelical narratives were unworthy of belief, faith could exist no longer, and demanded from the empirical school, which denied the possibility of a miracle, the twofold proof, that the formation of the *Cosmos* absolutely excluded a miracle, and that the evangelical history in general could have happened apart from miracles. Bitterly did *Pierson* attack his *mihi constat* with respect to Christ's resurrection, reproaching him, that while denying the application of the *impossible* to miracles, he has acted inconsistently with his own position in affirming that it was impossible that the disciples could have been deceived. In opposition to him, *Doedes* puts the difference between apostolic and modern Christianity in the clearest light, while not in all points withholding his consent from the results of the more recent criticism. In general, he is more highly esteemed as a critic and exegete than as a dogmatist.

A wholly different path has been followed by *Van Oostersee*, the colleague for many years of *Doedes* in the church at Rotterdam, and who for his eloquence as a preacher has become well known in other lands. We must distinguish two periods in his mental development. He began, in the first year of the newly commenced periodical, with an article on the present state of apologetics, and its scientific development. His fundamental principle was, that the proof from miracles, now no longer tenable, must be exchanged for the internal, experimental evidence. But as he gave expression to his views on this point in ambiguous terms, his reasoning could not but afford the less satisfaction after the acute empirical fallacy of *Opzoomer*. He, however, defended in substance the same position, in his article in the third

year's issue, on "the testimony of the Holy Ghost as the last ground of the Christian faith;" in which he laid down the position, that the religious experience produced by the Holy Ghost in every Christian was an infallible ground of faith. But more hardly pressed, he gradually relinquished this position; and at last, in the ninth year's issue, he frankly declared that, seduced at first by the example of many disciples of Schleiermacher, he had adopted the subjective theory, but that he must now relinquish it, and yield to the objective authority of the Scriptures. The principle of *authority* is now the central point of his system. It cannot appear wonderful that he who himself, in the sixth year's issue of the periodical, had described this position as *unscientific*, should now be regarded by his (old) party as dead to science. Nevertheless, there are not wanting to this second stage, when he could for the first time be regarded as orthodox, important theological works by him—and on account of oratorical talents, his reputation as a preacher has steadily increased. It is alleged against him that he is not self-dependent enough, and that he has therefore not only taken refuge in the unprotestant doctrine of authority, but that he has permitted himself to be guided by others, (Reville, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1860, p. 949).

If, in spite of this, we find in Oostersee's poetical mind an important support of the milder orthodoxy, we must by no means omit mentioning other men, more poetically than critically moulded, who, in their own respective spheres, represent this section of the Christian faith. As, e. g., *Beets*, whose *Camera Obscura*, written during his college course, continues one of the genuine classical works of Dutch literature, and whose *Stichtelyke Uren*, highly appreciated by all parties, not only in Holland, but in Germany, furnishes an excellent illustration of the union of Biblical knowledge with that of *man*. So likewise *Hasebroek*, who, at first a mystic (he holds Tholuck in high esteem, and in many respects reminds one of Tholuck), proposes as the fundamental principle of orthodoxy, not a Calvinistic system, but simply faith in the divinity of Christ. Next him we may also mention here the name of *Ten Kate*.

That these men first mentioned stand in conscious opposition to the stricter orthodoxy, is sufficiently shewn by the article which *Beets* wrote in *Ernst en Vrede*, against the well known address of *Ludhoff* in 1854, on the appointment of theological professors. He was also the president of a society of the same name (*Ernst en Vrede*), which numbers about forty members, and whose principles were, moral earnestness and calm discussion.

Chantepie de la Saussaye, who names his position the *ethico-irritical* ("ethisch-irritisch"), must therefore be regarded as a mediator between the liberal and orthodox schools, since his aim from the beginning has been to effect a cessation of the contest between science and faith. Rightly placing in the foreground personal faith in the Saviour as the principle of life in every Christian, and finding this expressed in a remarkable way in the Protestant Confession, he found himself moreover, as he himself says, attracted to orthodoxy by the powerful influence of *Da Costa*; but the hatred and uncharitableness, which, among other faults, manifested themselves among the orthodox, repelled his milder spirit, yet more mystic than "pietistic." And in truth, when one considers the articles and addresses circulated by

many orthodox unions of the so-called *friends of truth* and others against liberty of scientific inquiry in general, and the persons of heterodox preachers in particular, every one who finds the central point of religion, not in an ecclesiastical dogma, but in the living personality of the Saviour, and who knows that Christ shall recognise his people by their love, can only cherish the silent wish that the Lord may not impute their uncharitable judgments to those who assume to themselves exclusively the name of "the faithful." Since Saussaye sees that the unbelief of our age could not be refuted by the old arguments, and from the first sought after a conception of Christianity which was not dependent on this method, his ethical as well as his irenical tendency attracted him towards the liberal party. Still, he went for a long time along with the orthodox party, and was regarded abroad as one of its most distinguished defenders. The strictly orthodox however regard him as now no longer belonging to them—the more so, as he himself, in *Ernst en Vrede* has separated himself more and more from them; and this separation has been made more apparent by his last pamphlet, "*La Crise religieuse en Holland*," which appeared in 1860. We must class him, notwithstanding, rather among the milder orthodox, than among the properly so-called liberal party. The principal result of his theological studies from the beginning has been his controversy with the Leyden school—the determinism of Scholten: of all the opponents of this remarkable man, Chautepie has been the chief—and Scholten himself has, in consequence of the controversy with La Saussaye, modified many separate points of his system. In general, the liberal party have not stood by him. Thus he stands betwixt both parties; and inasmuch as he himself is no party man, his periodical has ceased; Loman opposes him as standing alone; Sepp, in his history of Dutch theology, mentions his system "as ready to die." But in spite of this *opinion publique* we must judge differently of La Saussaye. There are various reasons which explain why he stands alone. His system, founded upon the German speculative theology, is in itself less in accordance with the Dutch mode of thinking; his French, as well as his Dutch style, must be obscure and ambiguous; his undeniable wavering between both parties, however highly his personal character is respected, cannot commend the stability of his system. But it is just as certain that La Saussaye searches after truth not otherwise than the most distinguished men of whom German theology may be proud (e.g., Nitzsch, Müller, Dorner, Rothe), and while therefore the manner of his mediation between the two parties cannot find acceptance, yet neither his ethical principles nor his efforts at reconciliation can remain fruitless.

Certainly if we would at this moment name men of kindred minds ("geestverwanten") we should find none. Perhaps to Gunning—who has lately been called from Helversum to the Haag—might be assigned a place between the two parties, since he also, at first pietistic, but passing over to orthodoxy, will not disavow the aspects of truth which liberalism presents. But it is no pledge for the clearness of his views that he could have received a call from the independent congregation of *De Liefde*, who, distinguished by many indisputable talents, and by cheerful practical zeal, a zeal, however, partaking too much of his own individual idiosyncrasy, has been in-

duced to attach himself to a peculiar form of church government; and who has gathered around him a congregation, which is wholly dependent on his person. We have yet to name, as an organ of the moderate orthodox party, the *Christelyke Stemmen*, edited by Heldring, the Wichern of Holland; while for its strict orthodox tone, the title of another periodical, *De Wachter opziens Muur*, (The Watcher on Zion's Wall), is sufficiently characteristic.

FRENCH RELIGIOUS PERIODICALS.

1. *Revue Chrétienne*, 1862.

In the monthly numbers of this periodical which have appeared for this year, there are papers on the religious life of the United States, on French literature during the eighteenth century, and on the ecclesiastical crisis in French Protestantism. But the quarterly supplement to this periodical, which is more particularly theological, is by far the most important part of it. In this supplement we have a translation of Dorner's article on the sinless perfection of Jesus; the two new theologies, by Prof. Astié of Lausanne; the supernatural, a second reply to M. Réville; a new discovery in the Greek text of the New Testament, by Herzog of Erlangen; the theological year in Germany; and the theological year in France.

2. *Le Chrétien Évangélique*, 1862.

Among the articles for this year's issue, we may notice an unpublished sermon of Vinet; English preaching in the eighteenth century, with special reference to Wesley; the new constitution of the Canton de Vaud; an essay on the means of stimulating the young to study, and of inspiring them with the love of study; and Biblical studies, by F. de Rougemont. There is the usual chronicle of religious events, and critical notices of recent Italian publications.

XII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Textual Criticism of the New Testament for English Bible Students, &c. &c.
By C. E. STUART. London: Samuel Bagster & Sons. 1862.

This is another of the Messrs Bagster's praiseworthy efforts to bring the results of the labour of the most recent scholarship within the grasp of the merely English reader. In the author's own words, in his introduction, it is "an attempt to afford the English Bible student, in the form of marginal notes (which are here collected), all the latest information regarding textual criticism. To effect this, the readings of the authorised version are compared with those of Griesbach, Scholz, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Alford, and Tregelles, as far as the work of this last-named critic has been published. The plan pursued has been to note only such readings as affect the sense. This, with few exceptions, has been adhered to. And to guard as much as possible against the charge of rashly proposing emendations, no reading is brought forward unless two or more of the textual critics named above agree in considering it worthy of notice." This plan, so far as we have

had opportunity of judging, is well and accurately carried out. The work will be of very great value to the merely English student, as it will give him an opportunity of coming as near to the very words inspired by the Holy Ghost as modern scholarship has reached; and it will not be without its value to the Biblical scholar, as bringing together into one view the state of the opinions of the best textual critics, and in many cases of the MSS. on a disputed passage. The work is published in various sizes, to bind up with the different editions of the Messrs Bagsters' Bibles and New Testaments. A.

APOLOGETICS.

The Bible and Modern Thoughts. By the Rev. T. R. BRAXS, Rector of Kelsall, Berks. London: The Religious Tract Society.

This work was undertaken by its author, in compliance with the request of the Tract Society, with the view of meeting, in a popular form, the sophisms and errors of the "Essays and Reviews." The service requested of him in the Christian cause has been rendered with the author's well-known and accustomed ability. His materials are arranged with great skill, so that the volume forms an excellent manual on the Christian evidences, so far as they are needed to counteract current forms of sceptical and erroneous opinion. The volume will be more useful for the mass of people in refutation of the book to which it is a reply, than treatises of greater bulk and pretensions. The earlier portion of it contains an intrepid exhibition of the degree to which the supernatural and miraculous are inwoven with the whole texture of revelation. No attempt to eliminate these elements can be made without seriously involving in suspicion the honesty of him who makes it, if he still claims to be recognised as a Christian. It is a century since the religious mind of Britain had reached the conclusion, that revelation must be accepted or rejected as a whole. There is in truth no intermediate position; and the authors of the "Essays and Reviews," so far from occupying advanced ground as the pioneers of fresh discovery in the march of intellect, are in truth the laggards behind the age. The able reasonings of Mr Birks—calm, searching, and effective—shut them up either to retrace their steps from the swamp of deadly error, or advance till they have entirely discarded the Bible as an inspired volume. The straightforwardness thus imperatively demanded of them may issue in events that will occasion to Christian circles deep feelings of sadness and surprise. The abnegation of the Christian faith as supernatural in origin and character, is in all circumstances painful to Christian men who witness it. Better for the world, however, that such disclosures be frankly made, in order that the scandal may disappear, of a profession of Christianity used as a cover to sceptical men. Better for the church that it no longer may seem to tolerate a laxity incompatible with truthfulness of character. Better for the unhappy men themselves; for the same spirit which leads to the intrepid disavowal of belief, affords the best hope of a return, as honest and intrepid, to faith in the creed once abandoned as untrue. G.

Aids to Faith: a Series of Theological Essays, by Several Writers. Edited by WILLIAM THOMSON, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. London: John Murray. 1861.

This is the long-expected volume, written by various clergymen of the Church of England and others, as a reply to the "Essays and Reviews." The writers are all men of high name; and they have executed their task in a manner worthy of the place which they hold in the world of letters

and in the church of Christ. "These essays are intended," as they tell us in the preface, "to offer aid to those whose faith may have been shaken by recent assaults." And the effect on the mind of every candid reader capable of following them along their various lines of thought will, we venture to say, be found to be in no ordinary degree of a confirming and assuring character. The very sight of so many men, some of them already distinguished as honest and independent thinkers in the highest departments of metaphysical science, and others no less eminent for their exact and mature scholarship or their powers of historical research, coming forward with all their powers and acquirements, unveiling the solid foundations of the faith once delivered to the saints, and vindicating the essential and peculiar doctrines of evangelical truth, is one of singular interest and value. The book is clearly as well as ably written; the only essay which taxes to any extent the reader's power of thinking and patience being that by Mr Mansel, the first essay in the volume. The essayists have written independently of each other; but even in those instances of repetitions which, in spite of the editor's precautions to the contrary, occur throughout the volume, there is a wonderful harmony of view as well as of aim. The essays are nine in number; and the essayists are Mr Mansel, the Bishop of Cork, Dr McCaul of King's College, London, Mr F. C. Cook, Mr George Rawlinson, Mr Edward Harold Brown, the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, and Mr Ellicott, Dean of Exeter; the editor of the whole being the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol.

The subject of the first essay is "MIRACLES AS EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY," by Mr Mansell. The magnitude of the point at issue in this question is first of all distinctly stated. It is not that one of the extrinsic defences of Christianity may be abandoned while those that remain are confessedly far more than sufficient to defend the fortress. The miracles of the Bible, and especially the great miracle of the resurrection of Jesus, are so interwoven with the entire structure of revelation, that the assertion of the *impossibility* of a miracle is equivalent, when understood, to an avowal of blank infidelity. The assertion is then examined, that a miracle cannot be proved. In the demolition of this point, Mr Mansel brings into play that peculiar power of metaphysical reasoning for which he is so remarkable. We cannot say that we agree with him in every point, but we can assure our readers that they will enjoy his essay. He makes out his point satisfactorily, though in some places we think more might have been said. One leading idea dwelt upon and illustrated is that of the parallel between the limited power which man wields over creation, modifying results without interfering with laws; and the interposition of a superhuman will, applicable to the whole extent of creation, and to all the phenomena which it embraces. The following is the sentence with which the essay closes: "If there are times when the very vastness of the material system which science discloses seems to thrust the Author of all to an almost infinite distance from us—if there are times when we feel almost tempted to echo the wish of the poet, to be 'a pagan suckled in a creed outworn,' so that we might have a clearer insight into the presence of Deity among the phenomena of nature—if there are times when the heaven that is over our heads seems to be brass, and the earth that is under us to be iron, and we feel our hearts sink within us under the calm pressure of unyielding and unsympathising law, as those of the disciples of old sank within them under the stormy violence of wind and wave—at such times we may learn our lesson and feel our consolation as we turn to those vivid pictures which our sacred story portrays of the personal power of the incarnate God visibly ruling his creation; and may hear through them the present voice of him who spake on the waters, 'Be of good cheer; it is I, be not afraid.'"

The second essay, discussing the STUDY OF THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY,

is by the Bishop of Cork. After a sketch of the history of opinion in England as to the value attached to the external evidences of revelation, the writer lays down, as the fundamental point of his essay, the reality and magnitude of the historical element in Christianity. Christianity is essentially based on facts. These facts therefore must be discussed, examined, and proved in the same way as any other facts alleged to have taken place in the history of the world. And no attempt to disentangle Christianity from all historical inquiries, and to bring forward a set of ideas as commending themselves to the mind merely by their intrinsic beauty and suitability to man's wants and wishes, can result in anything else than confusion and darkness. But while the author exhibits in its truly pitiable character the modern spiritualism of Germany, which has for some years been finding its way into this country, and recalls to his readers' minds the reality of those glorious historical facts which form the basis of Christianity, and the value of that unbroken chain of historic proof by which it is proved to contain actual and direct utterances from the unseen God to feeble and erring man, he altogether fails, we think, to do justice to the internal argument arising from the manifold adaptations of the communications sent to the wondrous peculiarities of man's nature in its present alien state,—an argument as real, and in its own place as important, as is the one to which he very properly attaches so much value.

The third essay on the subject of PROPHECY is written by Dr M'Caul. We are first a lucid and accurate account of the nature and position of the prophet in Old Testament times. A supernatural call, a specific message from God, and satisfactory credentials ready to be produced when required, were all held in every case to be indispensably necessary to entitle a man to hold the office of prophet. In opposition to every shadowy view of prophecy, the author establishes that the prophets of the Bible announced not merely principles of the divine government to be brought out in future events, but specific facts which were to take place hundreds of years after they had been foretold. When Nahum, for example, wrote, the shadow of the Babylonian or Medean power was not such as to cause much alarm for the existence of Nineveh. Notwithstanding the loss of an army of 185,000 men, the Assyrian power was still the greatest in the world, whilst the kingdom of Babylon was still so inferior as to be unable to undertake anything against it by itself, and glad to seek the alliance of Hzekiah, one hundred years before the event. Nahum predicted the siege and utter destruction of Nineveh. Can any of those men, asks Dr M'Caul, who now assert that this prophecy was a mere conjecture, tell us what will be the fate of Paris or London a hundred years hence? Again, that one hundred and fifty years before the event, the Babylonian captivity was foretold in the most unequivocal language by Isaiah, is as certain as any fact in history. The specific prediction by Isaiah of the destruction of Tyre, and that by the Chaldeans (although it takes a little exegesis to bring out distinctly this latter point), one hundred and thirty years before the event, is a prophecy of the same class. In addition to various other prophecies of this kind, the writer of course gives due prominence to the remarkable prophecies concerning the Jewish nation still in the way of being fulfilled, and to the numerous minute and diversified prophecies as to the birth, divine nature, life, sufferings, death, and resurrection of our Lord, and the extension of his kingdom in the world.

The fourth essay, entitled IDEOLOGY AND SUBSCRIPTION, by Mr F. C. Cook, comes over, but in a more full and perfect form, a good deal of the ground traversed by both of the two preceding essayists. The sketch of the history of opinion as to ideology, as well as the picture of the hideous thing itself, are extremely interesting and valuable. The question as to what is implied in subscription, is happily inapplicable to Scotland, where each subscriber

not merely subscribes the Confession of Faith, but the form of words, or *Formula* as it is called, "I do hereby declare that I do sincerely own and believe the whole doctrine contained in the Confession of Faith, and I do own the same as the confession of my faith."

The fifth essay, on the MOSAIC RECORD OF CREATION, by Dr M'Caul, is perhaps the least valuable of the series. Natural science does not seem to be far enough advanced to furnish the materials which are necessary for the thorough and satisfactory discussion of this subject. There is, however, much valuable matter and some novel and very ingenious speculations in this paper.

The sixth essay, by Mr George Rawlinson, on the GENUINENESS AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE PENTATEUCH, is an able production. On every ground on which the genuineness and authenticity of any ancient record can be maintained, may the Pentateuch be defended as the oldest book by far in the world. The amount of historical research which this essay displays is very great, and the use made of the abundant materials so laboriously collected and so skillfully arranged in vindication of the Pentateuch against recent assailants, is most masterly.

In the next essay, which treats of INSPIRATION, the author, Mr Edward Harold Brown, appears to be scarcely well enough acquainted with his subject for the task which he has undertaken. The historical sketch of opinion on "Inspiration" from the age of the apostles to modern times is exceedingly good. The same thing may be said of much of that abstract reasoning which constitutes the greater part of the essay. But the author concedes too much, and seems to have forgotten that after all the question as to the reality and kind of inspiration are to be determined solely on the evidence given by the sacred writers themselves; their trustworthiness, and the genuineness and authenticity of their writings, having been previously established. The author also appears to have overlooked a peculiarity of Scripture, perfectly unique, viz., the entire absence of every statement inconsistent with scientific or historic truth in writings, where the occasions for such statements occur at every turn, the very absence of such proving the guidance of a divine hand.

The tenth essay contains a good defence of the orthodox doctrine of the ATONEMENT in its general aspects, by the editor of the essays, the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol.

The eleventh essay, on SCRIPTURE AND ITS INTERPRETATION, by Dean Ellicott, we are inclined to regard as the most valuable in the volume. It calmly and satisfactorily exhibits the Scriptures as entitled to the highest veneration of the most cultivated minds in those passages, especially in the quotations by one sacred writer from another, in which by an unsound interpretation it has been held up to the sneer of contempt. When these passages are interpreted, as Dean Ellicott shews, on the principles of sound exegesis, they ought to be, the contempt intended to be fastened on the sacred writers recoils upon those who have manifested in some cases mere ignorance, and in others a profane spirit in dealing with Scripture. The essay does all this in a great variety of instances. But it has a permanent interest and value, as a brief but comprehensive treatise on exegesis. As such it is indeed a *multum in parvo*, remarkable alike for the breadth and soundness of its general principles, its wide field of observation, its multiplicity of details, and its singularly suggestive character. The subject of inspiration, though occupying only a small part of the essay, is far more ably and thoroughly handled than it is in the essay specially devoted to it. There are also some excellent remarks on the subjects of types, prophecy, and second meanings; and in the latter part of the essay, on the principles of interpretation applicable to these matters. The remarks towards the close of the essay on grammar, and the laws of the latter, and the numerous cases by which these remarks are illus-

trated, are invaluable to every student of the word of God. The closing paragraph of the essay brings us into contact with the fervent glow and the noble Christianity of the writer's heart, as the essay throughout had made us acquainted with his scholarship and his intellect. T.

The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural. By the Rev. J. M'COSH, LL.D. Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1862.

The author of this work has earned for himself a title to be heard on the supernatural, which is, in an eminent sense, the question of the day. He states that he has all along intended that his "Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral," should be followed by another work on "The Method of the Divine Government, Supernatural and Spiritual." He wishes this to be the first part of that contemplated work. With regard to the plan of the work, the first book discusses the natural in relation to the supernatural, the uniformity of nature, in what this consists, the mental principles involved in our conviction of it, &c. The second book discusses the precise nature of the supernatural, the possibility of a miracle, the purposes served by the supernatural, and the relation of the supernatural to the natural. Next to this there is a chapter which will perhaps have more interest than any other part of the volume to the majority of readers, entitled "system in the supernatural." Here the author surveys the typical system of revelation, the system of prophecy, the plan of Christ's life, the system of duty, the system of means, and the system in the dispensation of grace. Besides elucidating the evidences of Christianity, and the connection between the miracle and doctrine, there is an appendix on the Oxford philosophy, and on Bunsen and the German theology.

It will be seen from this outline that the author travels over a wide field. The various points are ably handled, with all his well-known peculiarities of thought and expression; and we doubt not that it will be welcomed at the present moment as a seasonable contribution to English thought. The author, while keeping the notorious "Essays and Reviews" before his mind, has done well to occupy positive ground of his own. The work is highly suggestive. But we should have liked, for our own part, that in discussing the present state of the question in reference to the supernatural, the accomplished writer had more decidedly taken up his position within the limits of nature as marred and ruined, and no longer in its normal state. This is all the more necessary on account of the Pantheistic view of the question which confronts us on almost every side. The volume, we doubt not, will lodge elements in the thinking of the day that will be found to be salutary and directive in many respects. S.

MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE AND BIOGRAPHY.

A Popular Account of Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa.
By DAVID LIVINGSTONE, M.D. London: Murray. 1861.

The merits of this volume are so well known, and have been so fully appreciated wherever the English language is read, that it is superfluous to do more than merely intimate this new edition, which renders the work accessible to readers generally. S.

Brief Memorials of the Rev. Alphonse F. Lacroix, Missionary of the London Missionary Society in Calcutta. By his Son-in-Law, J. MULLENS, D.D.
London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

The memoir of this eminent missionary has a special interest, and puts the reader abreast of Indian Missions, for about forty years. Mr Lacroix of,

Swiss origin, originally went out in connection with a Dutch Society in 1821, and transferred his services to the London Missionary Society, when the former society withdrew from India. Though the biographer states that his father-in-law has laid the strictest injunctions of silence upon all his papers, sermons, and home-letters, he has been able to prepare a highly-interesting memoir, from his complete acquaintance with the life of the departed missionary. There is appended to the memoir an additional chapter, containing memorials of Mr Lacroix's daughter, Mrs Mullens.

The Basutos : or, Twenty-Three Years in South Africa. By the Rev. E. CASALIS, late Missionary Director of the Paris Evangelical Mission House. London : Nisbet & Co. 1861.

We have in this volume the experience of a missionary among the untutored tribe of the Basutos, journeys of exploration among the natives, with descriptions of their manners and customs, religious ideas and superstitious practices, all sketched in a lively style. Besides what is more peculiarly of a missionary character, and of interest to the Christian, there are observations on language and cognate points, that address themselves to the philologist and ethnologist. The author proves that these tribes have dim ideas of God, and that their religious system comes out at the death of any of the tribe. 8.

Coast Missions : a Memoir of the Rev. Thomas Rosie. By the Rev. JAMES DODDS, Dunbar. London : James Nisbet & Co. 1862. Pp. 258.

This volume, which, as a fitting monument to Mr Rosie's worth, and as a guide and stimulus to our young men is highly valuable, acquires additional and permanent importance as a record of the origin and progress of the "Coast Missions." The numerous and varied institutions that have recently sprung into existence in Scotland, having for their object the evangelisation of our sea-faring people, are to be traced to the missionary genius, and indomitable zeal, and believing prayerfulness of Thomas Rosie. Mr Dodds has turned his material to the very best account, not only in reviewing the past, but also in bringing down the history of each society to the present time. He particularly specifies "The Union Coast Mission," "The Northumberland Coast Mission," "The Scottish Coast Mission," "The West Coast Mission," and "The North-East Coast Mission."

The incidents of Mr Rosie's brief life are full of romantic interest ; for he was a bold and thorough sailor, as well as a devoted and successful missionary. He did not go in search of adventure ; but in seeking his Master's glory, and the welfare of neglected men, he met with many wonderful occurrences. These are well told, either in his own simple language, or in the select words of his skilful biographer.

The compiler of this work undertook it as a labour of love, from respect to the memory of Mr Rosie, and from a desire to perpetuate and extend the coast mission enterprise. He has devoted much time and labour to the performance, and executed it in a superior and satisfactory manner. In summing up the facts, he says, "It will thus be seen that, in connection with the different coast missions in Scotland, upwards of thirty carefully selected and efficient missionaries are at present regularly employed. But, in addition to these paid labourers, there are several hundred voluntary agents, grouped together in local auxiliaries." L.

CHRISTIAN BIOGRAPHY.

The Life of Arthur Vandeleur, Major, Royal Artillery. By the Author of "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars." Fourth Thousand. London : Nisbet & Co. 1862.

This memoir brings before us the career of an earnest and enlightened

Christian soldier, early brought to the knowledge of the truth, and maintaining a consistent religious profession to the close. It is calculated to leave a salutary impression.

Life and Episcopate of Dr W. Bedell, Bishop of Kilmore. By Rev. A. CLODY, his son-in-law. Printed for the first time from the original MS. in the Harleian Collection. London : Wertheim, Macintosh, & Hunt. 1862.

This life of the great and good Bishop Bedell is a reprint from what is thought by the present editor to be the original MS., containing several letters and documents not to be found in Burnett's *Life of Bedell*. If this is the original memoir of this "most faultless character in all ecclesiastical history," as Coleridge calls him, it well deserves to supersede all the other transcripts. S.

SKETCHES IN CHURCH HISTORY.

The English Confessors after the Reformation to the days of the Commonwealth. By THOMAS COLEMAN. London : J. SNOW. 1862.

The writer of this volume, who is deeply read in the history of the Puritans, has gone back to the early times of Nonconformity. He has already published a volume, entitled, "The Two Thousand Confessors of 1662." The present volume, which sketches the principles and fortunes of their predecessors in the same cause, is called forth by the approach of the second centenary of the Black Bartholemew ; and we doubt not that it will receive, as it deserves, a cordial welcome from an age which is learning to appreciate what England once possessed in her never-to-be-forgotten Puritans. S.

The Martyrs of Spain, and the Liberators of Holland. London : Nisbet & Co. 1862.

The author of these interesting sketches, already known by "The Voice of Christian Life in Song," has done good service in directing attention to the suppression of the Reformation in Spain, and to the liberation of Holland. The works of Llorente, Dr M'Crie, Brandt, and others to whom reference is made, shew that there has been no small research in the preparation of the volume, which is a very attractive one. Though the writer has deemed it necessary to enliven the narrative by an appeal to human interests, in a way which may be thought by some a departure from the severity of history, yet the accuracy of the historical statements are fully reliable ; and the volume is so constructed as to blend information and religious principle with what shall be interesting to the general reader.

The Religions before Christ : being an Introduction to the History of the First Three Centuries. By E. DE PRESSENSE, Pastor of the French Evangelical Church. Edinburgh : Clark. 1862.

This volume is only the introductory part of a large work on the History of the First Three Centuries of the Church. The author's aim is to give a fair statement of the forces at work at the time when Christianity was ushered into the world. He dilates on the oriental paganism, Hellenic humanism, Greek philosophy, before the time of Alexander, the Greco-Roman world, Judaism, Christianity. The essays on all these topics are lucid, exact, and full of information. The work may not offer much that is really new to those who have been following the recent researches in church history, from the time of Neander downwards, but it embodies much important statement in a lively and readable style ; and we trust that the encouragement given to

the first part of M. Pressensé's work will induce the publisher to go on with the rest of the history. This part is interesting, as shewing nature's best efforts as contrasted with Christianity. S.

The Annals of the English Bible. By CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON. A New and Revised Edition, edited by his Nephew, HUGH ANDERSON. London: Jackson, Walford, & Hadder. 1862.

We are happy to see a re-publication of this well known volume. This edition differs from those issued by the late author simply in the omission of those sketches of the civil history of the period, which added greatly to the size and price of the book, but were not necessarily connected with its object. The volume contains more information than is to be had from any other source, on everything connected with the translators of the English Bible, and on the various editions of it which have issued from the English press. No small part of the religious history of the country comes to be interwoven with the lives of a Tyndale, a Coverdale, and the other labourers in this field; and the delineation is accurate and lively. The chronological list of the various editions of the English Bible, with the public libraries and individual proprietors which possess them, is the most complete extant, and has been procured at no small pains and labour. S.

SERMONS.

Sermons by the Rev. Andrew Gray, Minister of the Free West Church, Perth. Edited, with a Memoir, by R. S. CANDLISH, D.D. Edinburgh: MacLaren. 1862.

This volume is a fitting memorial of one who acted an important part in the ecclesiastical affairs of Scotland, and whose memory deserves to be embalmed among her recent worthies. Possessing a combination of qualities found only in a truly great character, straightforward and honest as a champion of truth, with a fearless fidelity to convictions in a time-serving age, Mr Gray was, at the same time, the wise counsellor and the genial friend. The sermons selected from his remains by the editor of this volume are able, comprehensive, and edifying expositions of evangelical doctrine; and they give a fair example of his clear, well-balanced mind. They possess a general interest on their own account, while they afford specimens of the pulpit ministrations of one who stood high in the esteem of all his contemporaries. Prefixed to the volume is a memoir of Mr Gray from the pen of Dr Candlish, which, with wonted felicity, exhibits the part which Mr Gray acted at a critical time in the ecclesiastical affairs of Scotland, and the important place which he filled as an ecclesiastical leader. The volume is replete with interest. S.

Sermons preached in the Chapel of Harrow School. By the Rev. H. MONTAGU BUTLER, M.A., Head Master. Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1861.

A volume of sermons is never so interesting to us as are those preached in public schools or colleges. We think where and what the auditory to whom these sermons were preached will be in ten more years. Many of them will have then passed away for ever from this world. And of the rest, some will be at the bar, in the pulpit, labouring for the press, at the head of high places in the civil and military departments of the state all over the land. And such notions as we find in this volume, somewhat darkened and obscured, will be all they know of the gospel! And of that, here is next to nothing. They are thoughtful, and pious, and manly sermons; they are not inelegantly written, always accurate, often graceful, sometimes eloquent; but they lack one thing—the Gospel. There is much duty preached, but it is not on a

gospel basis. It is building high houses on soft, loose, shifting sand. And what makes this all the more mournful is, that the author does not seem to be in any other state than simply lacking knowledge. He attacks no loved doctrines. He runs down none of the things most surely believed among us. From this book it would appear as if he taught up to the light he has got. The sermons seem the production of a graceful mind, which makes religion and all the things of God only second. As to doctrine, they display only theological ignorance, though a well-meaning ignorance, at every turning of a page. One so near the truth, and with no visible prejudices against it, may surely be expected to get more. A.

Town and Country Sermons. By CHARLES KINGSLEY, M.A., &c., &c. London: Parker, Son, & Bournes. 1861.

Our readers know well enough what to expect at Mr Kingsley's hand. The theology of these sermons is nowhere. There are nearly as many different "gospels" as there are sermons in the volume. Now it is work, anon it is honesty, by and by it is faith; here it is love, there it is candour, or truthfulness, or some combination of these or the like virtues. The thing in hand is always *the* thing in Mr Kingsley's estimation. And as for interpretation of texts, we undertake to produce as many strange misinterpretations and misunderstandings of texts out of this volume as would fill one nearly one fourth of its size. The value of this author's sermons, however, is always their value as mere literary essays. In this view, some of his earlier sermons were really valuable. They contained the results of much fresh and independent thinking, expressed in a dashing, brilliant way. Some of them were curious, and all of them, in some way, interesting. In this volume the very style is, in most cases, coarse and common-place enough. They all, or nearly all, bear evident marks of haste. They will add nothing to the author's reputation, and will very soon sink into the oblivion which has already befallen so many volumes of sermons that had many more elements of vitality in them than these. A melancholy interest attaches to two or three sermons in the volume, for this reason, that they were preached before her Majesty and the late Prince Consort. It is well to think that his Royal Highness had heard other preachers than Mr Kingsley in the pulpit of the Chapel-Royal and elsewhere.

The Path of Life; or the Nature, Origin, and Reception of Salvation. By WILLIAM LANDELS, Minister of Regent's Park Chapel. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1862.

This volume contains twelve "chapters," or sermons. It is professedly an exposition of the way of salvation. The first chapter is entitled, Salvation, the reader's interest in it; the second, the nature of salvation; the third, its necessity; the fourth, its author; fifth, the provision made for our salvation in Christ; then sixth, the extent of the provision; and seventh, God's desire for the salvation of all. It is in these three last chapters that what the author thinks God's way of salvation comes fully out. In brief, it is that the *death of Christ removed out of the way a legal barrier that was between God and man*; that that death was equally intended FOR ALL MEN; and that God desires the salvation of all men in the same sense, and in the same way; and yet the author acknowledges that God is the author of conversion; and also acknowledges that this is a difficulty he cannot and does not try to solve. We also have a difficulty which we cannot and do not try to solve; but the difference between the difficulty of Mr Landels and ours is this, that his difficulty is of his own creation, our difficulty is of God's making, and we have simply left it as, and where, we found it. The book is well written, clear, forcible, and popular in its style, well illustrated by fact and fancy, and in its practical parts very telling, and highly commendable. A.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Hand-book of the English Tongue, for the use of Students. By Dr Angus, Examiner in English Literature to the University of London. London: Religious Tract Society. 1862.

This is an important work, meeting a much-felt want, and truly a hand-book to the English tongue. The author has put together more information for the student of the English tongue, and supplied more principles for guiding the student in the right use of English, than are to be found in any single work with which we are acquainted, or even in many put together. 8.

School-days of Eminent Men; or Early Lives of celebrated British Authors, Philosophers, and Poets, &c. By JOHN TIMBS, F.S.A. Second Edition. Lockwood & Co. 1862.

This little work is a happy conception. The author has adduced a vast variety of examples from every department of literature, art, or science, well fitted to fire the enthusiasm of studious youth, to whom the volume cannot but be highly acceptable.

Christian Thought and Work. A Series of Morning Meditations on Passages of Scripture. By W. LINDSAY ALEXANDER, D.D. Edinburgh: A. & C. Black. 1862.

Some of the chapters look like essays, and others like parts of sermons. We should have greatly liked a volume of essays by Dr Alexander—nothing better unless it had been a volume of his sermons. We should like a volume of such of his sermons as he thought worth publishing. He should know that, though sermons are proverbially unpopular, it is only *some* sermons; and his publishers could have told him that *all* sermons are not unpopular. And if Dr Alexander thought that a volume of his sermons would have lain still on the booksellers' shelves, he is forming far too humble an estimate of himself. We confess to a considerable amount of disappointment with this book, though it is only poor in comparison of what we think the author of it could have done, for we have the highest opinion of his powers. Some of it is in the author's happy, not happiest, style; and all of it is good for the use of edifying. Smaller men need to push their sermons off under chapters and sections. In the pursuit of our critical vocation, we are daily troubled to decide between sermons, chapters, and sections; and we did not expect to find our author following what we cannot help thinking such doubtful precedents. A.

Experiences of an English Sister of Mercy. By MARGARET GOODMAN. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1862.

This is a most interesting little volume. We have read none more so for a long while. It is the personal narrative of a young lady who entered Miss Sellon's house of mercy as a sister—what she saw, and heard, and did at Devonport and at Plymouth, during the cholera; her experiences also as a nurse in the hospital at Scutari, and at the camp before Sebastopol; her return home, when, finding that during her absence Miss Sellon had developed her conventual discipline more fully, in fact, turned her houses of mercy into plain, downright "nunneries," the young lady, older, wiser after all her experiences, returns to her home. Some of the stories in the book are most touching, and graphic, and pointed, with a grave, quiet humour, almost approaching at times to fun. The account of the death of a "sister" makes the blood run cold to think that such things can pass unpunished under the sun in this Christian land of ours. We wish our space permitted an extract or two; but we almost prefer sending our readers to the book itself.

Christianity agreeable to Reason, &c. To which is added, Baptism from the Bible. By the Rev. E. MORTLOCK, B.D. Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1862.

This little volume contains a few good chapters on the evidences. It also contains a reasonably good doctrinal and practical account of the Lord's Supper, and some really valuable remarks on "eating and drinking unworthily, and the meaning of the verse where that is spoken of in its connection with the passage where it stands. But the chapter on baptism is no way commendable—condemnable rather. This part is a later addition, as the author tells us. This book was first published thirty years ago, and this second edition contains that addition. If so, the author certainly has not grown wise as he has grown old; for he has come from what is very good evangelical doctrine to baptismal regeneration, or what we cannot distinguish from it.

Meat for Heaven. By the Author of "Heaven our Home." Edinburgh: W. P. Nimmo. 1862.

We have here what bears every mark of a series of sermons on the topic, "a state of grace upon earth the only preparation for a state of glory in heaven," which is the author's sub-title. If the volume be not a series of sermons, then we can only say they might have been, or might still be, preached. Perhaps the author has written so many sermons, and so little besides, that he insensibly glides into the sermon form and style. At all events, we have what is equivalent to a volume of sermons on this text or topic. They are good, decent sermons, clear, and generally accurate in doctrine, remarkable in no way, but yet readable sermons.

Sunsets on the Hebrew Mountains. By the Rev. J. R. MACDUFF. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1862.

This is a graceful and elegant volume of sermons—biographical sermons they are—on Old Testament and New Testament characters. The volume is marked by all the author's now well-known characteristics. We have no fault to find with the book, saving only in the author's method of printing. He makes most unsparing use of italics, and of capitals, and of marks of quotation, which needlessly disfigure the pages.

Beginning Life. Chapters for Young Men on Religion, Study, and Business. By JOHN TULLOCH, D.D. Edinburgh: Strahan & Co. 1862.

This volume, we are given to understand, was first published as a series of papers in the pages of a monthly contemporary. We are sorry to hear it; for certainly we neither like its doctrine nor its practice. It consists substantially of two parts, a doctrinal and a practical. It commences by a short account of the evidences of Christianity. Of this part we do not approve. It contains many admissions and concessions we should neither admit nor concede to any adversary. There is then a chapter entitled, "What to believe," which is general enough and vague enough to suit all tastes—a garment so wide and loose that it may fit all backs. Then there are a couple of chapters on business; two more on study; and, though it is significantly omitted from the title-page, two closing chapters on recreation. Under the head "What to read," we have a recommendation of the sermons of Robertson of Brighton, in warmer terms, and with fewer drawbacks, than could have been expected from one who has not only himself signed, but whose principal business it is to teach, the Westminster Confession of Faith. But what we like worst of all are the two chapters on recreation. They commend shooting and fishing for out-door sports; and for in-door, we have a "moderate" use of billiards, and all the games "of which that is the type;" then we have oratorios, operas, and, with certain very futile restrictions, the theatre, the

dance, and festive parties among yourselves, where there is "the feast of reason, and the flow of soul:" all these are more than permitted. When you play billiards, &c., do not spend too much time over it; when you do go to the theatre, take some member of your family with you, &c. This is a morality not found in the word of God. It is teaching for doctrines the commandments of men. A.

The Blade and the Ear: a Narrative of the Conversion and Death of E. G.
By Rev. W. CHALMERS, M.A. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

The Light of the World; or Holman Hunt's great Allegorical Picture. By the Rev. RICHARD GLOVER, Maidstone. London: Wertheim. 1862.

The Resurrection and the Life.—John xi. By JAMES CULROSS, M.A. Third Edition. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

The Week of Prayer. By the Rev. ROBERT OXLAD. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

Mighty through God. Some Account of the Extraordinary Labours of Mr George Müller, of Bristol, as Founder of an Institution for Missionary Work. By E. E. TAYLOR. London: Wertheim. 1862.

Sorrow. A Poem. By GILBERT BERESFORD. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

The Testimony of Jesus. By CHARLES TIMINS, F.R.C.S. London: Wertheim.

The Wanderings of the Children of Israel. By the late Rev. GEORGE WAGNER, Brighton. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862

DR CUNNINGHAM'S THEOLOGICAL WORKS.*

As the sheets of this volume, in their progress through the press, have been submitted to us by the kindness of the editors, we are glad to have it in our power to anticipate the long interval that would otherwise have occurred before our readers, through this channel, could be made acquainted with its contents. It consists of the contributions that formerly appeared in the pages of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, supplemented at different places by the additional matter bearing upon the points in question found in Dr Cunningham's lectures. We have no doubt that this volume, which is quite unique in its kind, will be hailed by many in widely different circles as one of the most weighty and important volumes, in a theological point of view, that has for a long time been offered to the British public. That it will exercise a powerful influence on the thinking of the age on many points of primary moment may be safely anticipated.

We shall find, we trust, ere long another and a more fitting opportunity for bringing out the leading peculiarities of the great pole-

* The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation. By William Cunningham, D.D., Principal of the New College, Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark. 1862.

mical divine who has recently passed away from the midst of us. Though these are already well known to all who came in contact with him, and who witnessed the collected might with which he entered into any subject that fully called forth his powers, this volume will shew readers at a distance that, in acquaintance with the literature of theology, and in the thoroughness of that investigation with which he laboured to gain a full comprehension and mastery of all the great questions of Protestant theology, he occupied a position all his own. With a Blondel, a Spanheim, a Claude he might be compared without any disadvantage in point of exactness in theological knowledge. In another respect his mind had a peculiar affinity to his master Turretine. He was never content with mere investigation or research till he had exhibited the true state of the question and the great arguments by which it was to be defended. Learning was with him subservient to this as an end; and in adducing the vast array of argument for and against any given point, we always feel that he has made his way to the heart of the question, and that he does not view the subject with a mere antiquarian interest, nor in the cold and dry mode in which much of the modern *Dogmengeschichte* merely chronicles the manifold forms and phases of opinion. Dr Cunningham uniformly enters into the period, and he never feels satisfied till he has surveyed the field from the true stand-point. His is the eye of a general in the field of conflict, and in this lay his consummate power. From a right view point, with an eye sharpened by experience as well as with intense sympathies for all that exalted the grace of God, he seemed always to be adjusting himself to an occasion when the controversy should have to be fought over again. He always evinced an eager desire, agreeably to that singularly judicial cast of mind with which he was endowed, to disencumber the controversy of whatever was one-sided, mistaken, or extravagant.

In this necessarily brief notice of the volume before us, we can only adduce a few extracts to make our readers aware of what they may expect from it upon some of the most important topics in theology. We shall begin with an extract on the subject of assurance (p. 147), where he incidentally shews the evils of controversy, in so far as it too often leads to the neglect of some sides of truth:—"We have some apprehension that the controversial spirit is rising and swelling in our breast, and therefore we abstain from making any reflections upon the extraordinary inaccuracies which we have considered it our duty to unfold. But we would like to attempt something in the way of expounding and inculcating the great truth taught in Scripture, and set forth in the Westminster Confession, upon the subject of assurance. That it is practicable, obligatory, and expedient, that believers should be assured of their justification and salvation, was, not certainly, 'the fundamental principle of all the Reformed churches,' but the fundamental principle of the teaching of the Reformed churches on the subject of assurance. It is fully and clearly declared in the Westminster Confession. It has been held professedly by the whole body of Calvinistic divines, both before

and since the variation which Sir William has signalised. And yet we fear it has at all times been too much neglected, both theoretically and practically, viewed both as declaring a truth and enforcing a duty. We believe that the prevailing practical disregard of the privilege and the duty of having assurance is, to no inconsiderable extent, at once the cause and the effect of the low state of vital religion amongst us—one main reason why there is so little of real communion with God as our reconciled Father, and so little of real, hearty devotedness to his cause and service. Some sense of the sin and danger of neglecting this subject occasionally arises in men's minds, and is, from time to time, pressed upon the notice of the church, but in many cases such attempts have only led to controversial discussions, and have failed in producing any beneficial practical results. It is not easy to keep the exact high road of truth; and men, filled with some one important idea or object, are very apt to run into exaggerations and extremes. Upon no subject has this been more conspicuously the case than on that of assurance; partly, perhaps, because of the influence of Luther, Calvin, and their associates. It has happened repeatedly in the history of the church, that pious and zealous men, impressed with the importance of getting a larger share of attention to the subject of assurance, have been led into the adoption of untenable and erroneous positions concerning it. Then the champions of orthodoxy have buckled on their armour, and have demonstrated, by irrefragable logic, that these positions are characterised by, it may be, confusion, inconsistency, and error; and then men, satisfied upon this point, settle down again upon their lees, and think no more of the importance of coming to a decisive adjustment upon the question as to what is their present relation to God, and what are their future prospects. This is the abuse, not the use, of controversy. The uses of theological controversy are, to expose error, and to produce and diffuse clear and correct opinions upon all points of doctrine. It is the church's imperative duty to aim at these objects, and controversy seems to be as indispensable with a view to the second as to the first of them. But it is an evil and an abuse, when the exposure of error is made to serve as a *substitute* for the realisation and application of what is admitted to be true. This has repeatedly, in the history of the church, taken place in regard to the subject of assurance; and this result, again, has, we are persuaded, been productive of injurious consequences to the interests of true religion, and tended to keep the church at a low point in the scale of devotedness and efficiency."

The decision which is given on many of the controversies, and the mature wisdom and mellow experience which come to light in handling the points where good men have often differed, and expressed themselves with undue vehemence, are often very striking. We may adduce, as an instance, the comprehensive survey of the discussions on the Supralapsarian and Sublapsarian view of the divine decrees (p. 361), and the admirable manner in which he holds the even balance on the much-debated question of the sacra-

ments, doing justice to Zuingle as well as to Calvin (p. 278). On this latter point, after stating that sacraments are for believers, he inquires, Do not the words "exhibit" and "apply," used in the Westminster standards, sanction the notion that Christ and his benefits are conveyed or bestowed, not previously to the lawful reception of the sacraments, but in and by the use of them? and he takes up the position that the doctrine that the sacraments are for believers, and assume the previous existence in worthy recipients of the great spiritual blessings with which saving faith is invariably connected, sufficiently obviates the supposition. On the great Puritan principle, that nothing is to be introduced into the worship of God which is devoid of positive sanction in Scripture, we find (p. 34) the following important statements:—

"There is a remarkable statement of Dr Owen's on this subject, which has been often quoted, but not more frequently than it deserves; it is this—'The principle that the church hath power to institute any thing or ceremony belonging to the worship of God, either as to matter or manner, beyond the observance of such circumstances as necessarily attend such ordinances as Christ himself hath instituted, lies at the bottom of all the horrible superstition and idolatry, of all the confusion, blood, persecution, and wars, that have for so long a season spread themselves over the face of the Christian world.' It is no doubt very gratifying to the pride of men to think that they, in the exercise of their wisdom, brought to bear upon the experience of the past history of the church, or (to accommodate our statement to the prevalent views and phraseology of the present day), in the exercise of their own Christian consciousness, their own spiritual tact and discernment, can introduce improvements upon the nakedness and simplicity of the church as it was left by the apostles. Perhaps the best mode of dealing with such persons, is to call upon them to exemplify their own general principle, by producing specific instances from among the innumerable innovations that have been introduced into the church in past ages, by which they are prepared to maintain that the interests of religion have been benefited; or, if they decline this, to call upon them for a specimen of the innovations, possessed, of course, of this beneficial character and tendency, which they themselves have decried and would wish to have introduced; and then to undertake to show what would be no very difficult task, that these innovations, whether selected or invented, have produced, or would produce if followed, effects the very reverse of what they would ascribe to them.

"There is a strange fallacy which seems to mislead men in forming an estimate of the soundness and importance of this principle. Because this principle has been often brought out in connection with the discussion of matters which, viewed in themselves, are very unimportant, such as rites and ceremonies, vestments and organs, processions, kneelings, bowings, and other such *ineptiæ*, some men seem to think that it partakes of the intrinsic littleness of these things, and that the men who defend and try to enforce it, find their most congenial occupation in fighting about these small matters, and

exhibit great bigotry and narrow-mindedness in bringing the authority of God and the testimony of Scripture to bear upon such a number of paltry points. Many have been led to entertain such views as these of the English Puritans and of the Scottish Presbyterians, and very much upon the ground of their maintenance of this principle. Now, it should be quite sufficient to prevent or neutralise this impression to shew, as we think can be done, 1st, That the principle is taught with sufficient plainness in Scripture, and that, therefore, it ought to be professed and applied to the regulation of ecclesiastical affairs; 2d, That, viewed in itself, it is large, liberal, and comprehensive, such as seems in no way unbecoming its divine author, and in no way unsuitable to the dignity of the church as a divine institution, giving to God his rightful place of supremacy, and to the church, as the body of Christ, its rightful position of elevated simplicity and purity; 3d, That, when contemplated in connection with the ends of the church, it is in full accordance with everything suggested by an enlightened and searching survey of the tendencies of human nature, and the testimony of all past experience. And with respect to the connection above referred to, on which the impression we are combating is chiefly based, it is surely plain that, in so far as it exists *de facto*, this is owing, not to anything in the tendencies of the principle itself or of its supporters, but to the conduct of the men who, in defiance of this principle, would obtrude human inventions into the government and worship of the church, or who insist upon retaining them permanently after they have once got admittance. The principle suggests no rites or ceremonies, no schemes or arrangements; it is purely negative and prohibitory. Its supporters never devise innovations and press them upon the church. The principle itself precludes this. It is the deniers of this principle, and they alone, who invent and obtrude innovations; and they are responsible for all the mischiefs that ensue from the discussions and contentions to which these things have given rise."

We have only to add that the volume is admirably edited by Dr James Buchanan and Dr Bannerman, to whom the late Principal committed the absolute disposal of all his MSS. They have undertaken their task with all the affectionate regard to the memory of their deceased friend, and all the admirable taste and tact for which they are so well known.

S.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

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ART. I.—*The Poetical Element in Scripture.*

The Spirit of the Hebrew Poetry. By ISAAC TAYLOR. London, 1861.

It is not our intention to enter into a formal and detailed examination of the work placed at the head of this article. Like all the productions of its distinguished author, it displays a refined spiritual taste, and contains many just and profound reflections; but it cannot be characterised as a complete or satisfactory discussion of the subject of which it treats. Indeed, neither the intellectual tendencies of Mr Taylor, nor his previous studies, could be said to constitute any peculiar fitness for the successful treatment of such a subject, or serve to make him thoroughly acquainted with some of its more distinctive features; and, accordingly, we both miss (at certain points) what we should have expected to find, and again find, properties ascribed to Hebrew poetry, which belong, indeed, to Old Testament Scripture, but in no exclusive or pre-eminent sense to its poetical books. Still, there is much good and suggestive matter in the work, and it breathes throughout, we are happy to observe, a deep reverence to those books as given by inspiration of God, and forming a valuable, as well as authoritative, portion of his revealed will. While we cannot exactly adopt it as a guide, we take it as a fit occasion for discoursing a little on the Poetical Element in Scripture, and shall occasionally refer to it as we proceed.

I. We look first at this element in its *formal character, or with reference to the artistic modes which it cultivated.* It is often but a narrow line that separates poetry from prose; for the two make almost indefinite approaches to each other—prose, in some of its higher efforts, rising at times to poetical fervour and boldness, and poetry, on the other hand, differing in little more than in form from the easy march of prose. But the poetical in its own proper nature has somewhat in it of inspiration; it is the offspring of rapt and excited feeling. A fascinating object, a stirring event, or an important truth takes possession of the soul, setting every sense and faculty in a fiery glow; so that it becomes full of life and motion, and sees, or imagines it sees, an image or reflection of what itself feels in the persons and objects around it. The things which occasion the poetical fervour and excitation may be the common interest or property of a people; the sentiments awakened by them may be vibrating in a thousand bosoms; but it is only in the more gifted—or, as we say, poetic souls—that they rise to that degree of strength and potency, which seizes the whole being, and works with a sort of creative energy in providing for itself an appropriate form and vehicle of expression, such as, by blending thought and image, feeling and utterance harmoniously together, might fitly exhibit the internal action of which the writer is conscious. To do so with any measure of success is no common gift; it is the part only of those to whom belong quick perceptions and lively sympathies, a susceptibility that receives its impressions in the freshness of life and beauty, and a surrender of heart and soul to desires and aspirations, joys and sorrows, which but slightly move natures of duller temperament, or pass but as transient impressions through their bosoms. And as the grand aim of the poet, in the words he indites, is to give forth a perfect image of the thoughts and feelings of his inner man, so the clearer the light, and the more intense the emotions under which he thinks, the more energetic also, and commonly the more successful, will be his striving to bring the outward expression into proper correspondence with the internal experience. His production, in such a case, will instinctively assume the impress of a higher style of art; it will be more complete and perfect after its kind.

There is here, however, no invariable and uniform rule; for as poetry itself falls into several kinds, so the things now indicated respecting it may be found under various modifications, and in different degrees. They hold most directly and fully of what is usually the earliest and the readiest species of poetical composition—that which among the Hebrews was both the first in origin, and the one that maintained the most prolonged.

and vigorous existence—namely, *lyrical* poetry. This is more peculiarly the poetry of impulse and excitement—the offspring of strong feelings and swelling emotions, such as naturally arise when the soul is acted on by stirring providences or elevating prospects; and seeks, directly as from itself, and under the pressure of the thoughts that ferment and work within, to tell forth what it has seen or heard, what it fears, desires, or hopes for. It is the poetry of dance and song; for expressing, as it does, the more lively and melting moods of the soul, the simple utterance of speech often seems to be an inadequate representation of what is thought and felt;—there must withal be the accompaniment of an appropriate melody, or a befitting action. So we find it to have been in Israelitish history—for example, in the triumphal ode at the Red Sea, which was at once danced and sung; in the similar song of Deborah and Barak, on the defeat of Sisera and his host; and many a time and oft in the history of David, with whom this species of poetry attained to a kind of ideal perfection, and who, amid the stirring and eventful incidents of his life, while he called upon his soul to magnify the Lord in strains of thanksgiving and praise, ever also awoke his psaltery and harp to give a fuller swell to the pious feelings that sought expression in his words.

The transition was natural and easy from this species of poetry to that which is usually called *didactic*, but sometimes also *gnomic*;—it was so especially among a people like the Hebrews, who were trained under dispensations, and subjected to a polity, which had throughout a moral aim and purpose. In this kind of poetical composition, the more immediate impulse was to impart instruction, and to do so—for the sake of deeper impression, or as a help to the memory—by means of apt similitudes, pointed affirmations, and pregnant apothegms. In this case, the subjects which awakened the sacred muse were contemplated in a calmer mood, and in a reflective spirit; they were viewed as supplying materials for thoughtful meditation, wholesome counsel, or timely warning—yet not without a temperate glow, rising above the level of common frames of feeling, and naturally resorting to modes of speech of somewhat more than common force and intensity. The 25th and the 37th Psalms may be noticed as fair examples of this species of poetical composition; but it numbers many other psalms, considerable sections in the prophets, the entire book of Proverbs, as well as much of Ecclesiastes. Other specimens, in a loftier strain, and rising to almost lyrical fervour, may be seen in such psalms as the 24th, the 62d, and the 92d, in which the sacred theme, with the spiritual lessons involved in it, may justly be said to pour itself forth in “thoughts that breathe and words that burn.”

In these two kinds of poetical composition, there is a perfect naturalness and simplicity, such as—if not hindered by some defect in the mode of execution—might readily accord with the highest aims of religion and morality. And we can have no difficulty in conceiving the introduction of another element, the employment of a certain measure of the dramatic, for the purpose of bringing out more vividly the thoughts and circumstances of the particular occasion, or giving additional point and emphasis to its lessons. Even in the strictly lyrical and didactic compositions of Scripture, a dramatic element is not altogether wanting; since we sometimes find other persons than the writer, one or more of the parties concerned in the transactions that form the subject of the poem, personated for the occasion, and contributing by what they say to the progress and design of the representation. Thus, in the Israelites' song of victory at the Red Sea, while it is the Israelites themselves that *virtually* say all, *formally* it is not all of them; the now fallen and prostrate enemy is brought in, at a certain point, to give vent to his feelings, and proclaim beforehand his assurance of victory: "I will pursue, said he, I will overtake, I will divide the spoil," and so forth. In the Song of Deborah there is still more of this dramatic tendency exhibited; as it proceeds, vivid portraiture is thrown in of the state of thought and feeling that existed among the different sections of the people; and toward the close we have a long and animated address from the mother of Sisera to the women of her court, heralding the speedy return of her son with the honour and spoils of victory. Not unfrequently, too, in the Psalms, the vein of thought is diversified, and fresh life given to the action, by the wicked, on the one side, being introduced, to give expression to their desires or purposes, and, on the other, the righteous to deliver their mind on the events related, or the transactions more immediately in view. In the second Psalm, for example, such scope is given to this dramatic tendency, that the psalmist himself, the heathen adversaries, Jehovah, the Eternal Son, then the psalmist again, all successively take part in the discourse. Even in the Book of Proverbs the monotonous stream of prudential maxims is relieved by occasional personifications of Divine Wisdom, the foolish woman, the sluggard, and various others, uttering sentiments and advices appropriate to their respective characters. It was but proceeding a step farther in the same line, not striking into a path absolutely new, when, in regard to more complicated relations and dark providences, with the struggles between faith and doubt, fear and hope, they naturally awoke, the several sides or aspects of things came to be represented by so many parties, who kept up among themselves a sustained discussion

upon the subject in hand ; as in the Book of Job, the Song of Solomon, and partly also in Ecclesiastes. The dramatic form of these compositions, in the limited extent to which it is carried, was plainly adopted for no other reason, than to give free play to the diversified thoughts and conflicting interests, which the circumstances of the time and the relations of the parties themselves naturally called forth ;—yet still so as to leave no room to doubt what might be the mind of God, and the voice of reason respecting the points more particularly at issue.

Such, then, briefly are the different species of composition into which the poetical element of Scripture has thrown itself, in so far as the writings that exemplify it admit of being distinctly arranged and classified. But there are, besides, many portions of Scripture, in which it discovers itself rather as an under-current, giving a certain tone to the character of the piece, than as a dominant power moulding its entire form and nature ; and, again, others, in which it appears only as an art, the forms of speech and structure of sentences, which the poetic spirit in its livelier exercises had fashioned for itself, being simply adopted as an handmaid for purposes of instruction. Of this the narrative Psalms—such as the 77th, 78th, 105th, and 106th—may be referred to as instances, and some of the more expressly didactic passages in the prophets : in which there is no overflow of feeling, no gushing forth of lively emotions, but a contemplative and thoughtful mood, giving utterance to its meditations under a poetical guise as the one best adapted to its practical aim. But whatever may be the form, which the poetical element assumes in Scripture—whether more occasional or regular, more concealed or obtrusive—there are two considerations which must ever be borne in mind respecting it—considerations which exercised over it a powerful influence, and served to draw a broad line of demarcation between all that is of a poetical cast in Scripture, and the poetical productions of secular and classical literature.

(1.) The first of these is the strictly religious character of the compositions, as having been all indited under the prompting of God's Spirit, and with an eye to his service and glory. We do not say that this was the character of all Hebrew poetry. There might also be productions of a lighter strain—the spontaneous outburst of merely natural feeling, whether in its more playful or its more pensive moods. We cannot doubt, indeed, that there were such ; for the rich efflorescence of psalmodic poetry, which distinguished the brighter periods of the nation's history, could not fail to have its reflection in the commoner walks of life—precisely as a high-toned religious enthusiasm ever tends to generate and foster a spirit of public

virtue and heroic patriotism. But the poetical effusions of this sort, whatever they might be in number or merit, it did not fall within the scope of the sacred writers to preserve. One only of any length has found a place in the pages of Scripture, because it had an incidental bearing on higher things—namely, the lamentation of David over Saul and Jonathan; and it is one of such marked excellence—so select in its matter, so touching in pathos, so graceful and finished even in form—that it must assuredly have drawn after it many imitations. Solomon alone, of David's poetical successors, is said to have made of "songs a thousand and five," (1 Kings iv. 32)—which must have been chiefly other than sacred songs—else they would have occupied a much larger space in the word of God than we find them doing. Of such effusions, however, pertaining to the natural sphere, we know next to nothing. It is the *sacred* poetry alone of the covenant-people which the inspired writers have handed down to us; and this, like all besides that belonged to the great and good in Israel, was always subordinated to the high end of disclosing the mind, and ministering to the glory of Jehovah. If it be regarded as an art, it was art made subservient to the holiest uses—not art cultivated for its own sake, and sacrificing to its aesthetic aims the proper vein of thought and feeling in the composition. For "Hebrew poetry," as justly said by Ewald,* "remained, as to its predominant essence, an interpreter of those sublime thoughts, which never exercised such an influence anywhere else in antiquity; and, as to its form, it preserved that wonderful simplicity and ease which flow from this very sublimity—a poetry unique in its kind." What was said of David, the poet by way of eminence and sweet singer of Israel, "that the Spirit of the Lord spake by him, and his word was upon his tongue" (2 Sam. xxiii. 2), might be repeated of all who took part in this sacred employment. Even the music, to which many of their productions were set, was put under the charge of spiritually gifted men; they are represented as prophesying with instruments of sacred music, and one of the chief among them, Heman, is called "the king's seer in the words of God" (1 Chron. xxv. 1. 5). David himself did not think it beneath him to aid them by inventing instruments of song (Amos vi. 5).

It is from this high spiritual aim that we are to account for the sparing use made in the poetical books of Scripture of mere natural descriptions. So Mr Taylor very properly notes respecting them:—

"Vividly conscious as the writers of those books, or most of them, are to what is sublime and beautiful in the visible world, they are

* Pref. to Heb. Poets.

thus conscious towards the things around them in *one sense only*, namely, as parts of God's creation. The Hebrew poet attempts no local description; he does not dwell upon the picturesque; albeit our modern sense of the picturesque has sprung from tastes and habits, that had their rise in the Hebrew Scriptures; nor do they at any time stop on their way to bring before us the scenic characteristics of their country. None of them has leisure to paint particular scenes, as do our Thomson, or Burns, or Cowper. It is a glance only that they take of nature, and it is such influence, as, from its vividness and breadth, is so much the more intelligible in all lands." (*"Spirit of Heb. Poetry,"* p. 53.)

(2.) Closely connected with this first consideration, and naturally growing out of it, is another—also requiring to be borne in mind, because involving a material difference in respect to the play given to the poetical element in Scripture, as compared with poetical compositions of a merely secular kind,—namely, the freeness and simplicity of the forms within which it developed itself. Its higher aims necessarily imposed a restraint in this respect, and admitted of nothing like the artistic skill and complicated rythmical structures which are to be met with in the classical poetry of Greece and Rome. If, indeed, the expositions given of the subject in the writings of Bishop Jebb and his school were correct, it might be supposed, that the poetical element in Scripture had often assumed a very artificial and complicated arrangement, such as necessitated a great deal of elaboration in regard to the choice of words, and the structure of sentences. Writing from the point of view adopted by that school, Mr Isaac Taylor says in his recent work, that a large proportion, "nearly the half of the entire mass of the Hebrew writings are not merely poetic, as to their diction, but they are metrical in form; or, we should better say, the thought of the writer is subjected to rules of structure that are in the highest degree artificial" (p. 48). "Even in passages," he again says, "which breathe the soul of the loftiest and the most impassioned poetry, a highly artificial apposition and balancing of terms and clauses prevails; as if the form were, in the estimation of the writer, of so much importance, that it should give law even to the thought itself." Statements of this description from such a quarter are somewhat to be regretted, as they, at least, seem to have a bearing not altogether compatible with the plenary inspiration of some portions of Scripture; although it is fair to add, the writer himself disclaims any application of his views in that direction, and holds, that nothing even in the poetical parts of Scripture was sacrificed to the claims of art, so as to make them a less veritable revelation of the mind of God. Still, the view in question is capable of being turned to a wrong use in this respect, and

tends of itself to beget an erroneous impression of the extent to which art prevailed in the poetical portions of the Bible. Instead of being highly artificial, so as, by its severe demands, to control, in a measure, the meaning, it should rather be described as extremely simple, and in its peculiarities of form, taking the natural, almost spontaneous mode of uttering what was spoken in the poetical mood. So men of profound scholarship and accurate taste—the real masters in this department of learning—have judged; Herder, for instance, of the last age, or of this, Von Ewald, whose well known opinions regarding the inspiration of Scripture must free him from all suspicion of undue bias here. He says in his preface to the poetical books:—

“Ancient Hebrew poetry, if it be not as rich and various as that of the Indians and Greeks, yet possesses a simplicity and transparency hardly found elsewhere; a sublime naturalness which, as yet, knows little of strict art, and which suffers art, even where its influence is exerted, to remain as it was, unconscious and careless. When compared with the poetry of other ancient nations, it appears to belong to a still simpler, more youthful period of humanity, to gush forth from inward fulness of emotion, and grace of sentiment, and to be little concerned about external ornament and strict laws of art.”

This wonderful ease and comparative disregard of external attractions arose from the singular greatness and sublimity of the thoughts unfolded by the sacred bards, which enabled them to dispense with the embellishments of art, and to trust what they expressed to its own simple majesty and force. The language in which they wrote did not admit of rhyme, nor did it possess any syllabic metre; so that the writers were altogether untrammelled by the artificial rules, which require lines of so many definite measures, or terminating words of like sounds. Themselves in a rapt mood, or, at least, in an elevated state of feeling, the movements of their soul were naturally rapid and copious; pulsation followed pulsation, now running in the line of pleasing correspondences, now of striking contrasts, and again of fuller amplifications of the thoughts already expressed. And such internal movements quite naturally threw themselves into a symmetrical form and regular diction. They came forth in parallelistic or rythmical sentences, the simplest, and for sacred purposes, the most suitable of poetical measures. Yet with this general resemblance in form, there was no rigid uniformity; for the method admitted of considerable variety in volume and structure, and so could readily be made to accord with the current of thought and feeling that prevailed within. It was the inward that gave law in every case to the outward; the stream of verse-members had not only its seat, but its type also, in the fountains of the writer's own being.

The form and style of poetic diction was only farther distinguished from that of prose by its tendency—a quite natural tendency for minds conscious of the poetic mood—to make use of words and forms of words out of the beaten track ; putting rarer for more ordinary expressions ; preferring also the concrete to the abstract, and whatever in style or imagery might serve to give life and vividness to the representation. It did so, not by constraint, or from regard to mechanical precision, but willingly, and with such variations as the design and impulse under which the mind for the time wrought might render expedient. But it is impossible to go into detail, or, indeed, to enlarge farther on our first general topic of inquiry, the formal character of sacred poetry. We, therefore, pass on to a second point, viz. :—

II. *The distribution of the poetical element throughout the sacred volume.*

Looking simply to Scripture in its great twofold division, as falling into an Old and a New Testament portion, it is impossible not to be struck with the disproportion in which they respectively share the element now under consideration. The poetical books are exclusively those of the Hebrew Scriptures ; and though it is not strictly true to say, as is sometimes done, that the poetical element is altogether wanting in the New Testament, yet it is certainly confined within comparatively narrow limits. Not only so, but when it does occur there, it is rather of an imitative than an original character ; it bears the distinctive impress of the Old Testament. In the whole compass of the apostolical writings, there is not a single instance of a properly fresh display of poetical gifts consecrated to the service of God. The mighty outburst of love and grace which marked the introduction of the gospel era, so immeasurably transcending all that had hitherto been known, and the rich dowry of spiritual gifts it brought to the church, added nothing to the church's treasures in this particular direction. Lyrical effusions, indeed, celebrated the first announcement of gospel tidings, in the beautiful and stirring songs of the Virgin Mary ; and of the aged Zacharias. But these songs run entirely in the ancient channels ; both in matter and form they are substantially an echo of the fine old Hebrew chants, with which the better portion of the covenant people had for ages been familiar ; and they are followed by no others. Of the apostles, it may be said, that they occasionally spoke in a somewhat poetical vein (for example, Acts ii., iv. 24–28), and sometimes also wrote thus (Rom. xi. 33–36 ; Heb. i., ii. ; James v. 1–7) ; but even this was done almost wholly in the words of Old Testament scripture ; they were but using what ancient bards had prepared to their hand. Even in the Apocalypse, where the-

holy evangelist reports what he saw and heard in the Spirit, and where he moved amid scenes of the most sublime and exciting character, there is the drapery, indeed, and not a little also of the diction, but still nothing of the form, of poetry. In its general cast and structure, the book is parabolical and symbolical, rather than poetical. The outbursts of pious feeling, or brief ascriptions of praise, with which it is interspersed, are for the most part plain and unadorned, though sublime and touching addresses. The one song that bears most distinctly a poetical stamp, is formed of a few couplets taken from the Old Testament writings (xv. 3, 4). The poetical is in it merely as a subjective, pervading element; and there is this because its contents were communicated to the writer when he was in a state of ecstasy, a state that is allied to the poetical, and, consequently, the style of thought and expression in a measure partook of the same. As the one, so the other delighted in the concrete, the abrupt, the figurative, the rare and elevated, the peculiar and enigmatical, qualities that every one feels to be quite natural in such a book as the Apocalypse, but which it would be foolish to expect after the same proportion in the other writings of St John. That portion of the book which may be said to approach nearest to the other writings, the epistles to the seven churches of Asia, still exhibits a characteristic difference, and makes a sensible approach to the poetical. The language appears to move somewhere between the region of poetry and of common discourse, having in it somewhat of the figurativeness of the one, as well as of the directness of the other.

It would thus seem, from a glance into the general features of both Testaments, that however the poetical, in the stricter sense, may be capable of being linked to divine communications, and of serving the higher interests of religion, it belongs not so properly to the highest sphere of religious thought and feeling, as to one a certain degree below it. But does not the same conclusion force itself on us from the distribution of this element in Old Testament Scripture itself? In a volume which is commended to us as all given by inspiration of God, we cannot distinguish and say of one portion as compared with another, this holds more directly of God than that; yet we may distinguish—Scripture itself warrants us to distinguish—between some portions as more fundamental in their nature than others, and as such communicated through persons who were in the nearest relative position to heaven. But the portions which occupy that place of relative superiority, are precisely those which have least about them of the poetical in form; they approach nearest to the style and method of ordinary discourse. The terms, for example, in which God

revealed himself, first to the parents of the human family, then to the more ancient patriarchs, terms which laid the foundation of future dispensations, and marked out the destinies of entire races of men, are couched in the most direct and simple style. Or, to look to the properly formative period of the Israelitish commonwealth, that of the introduction of the old covenant by the ministry of Moses, the divine communications through which he gave shape and form to the constitution of things then established, were remarkable for nothing more than their unadorned simplicity; and in what formed the very heart of the whole, the ground-work, as it may justly be called, of the entire polity in its religious, as well as its civil relations, namely, the ten commandments, there is neither ornament nor amplification of any kind, all is plain, explicit, pointed; it is the briefest and most compact, while it is also the most comprehensive, piece of legislation in existence. The poetical portions of the books of Moses, such as were coeval in point of time with Moses himself, belong to the side-pieces rather than to the main body of the Pentateuch; they are to be found in such passages as the prophetic effusions of Balaam, the law-giver's parting benedictions, or his occasional songs, whether of victory or of warning—things which were for chanting on the lyre or committing to memory, but were in themselves incidental and supplementary. Nor was this merely subsidiary employment of the poetical peculiar to the prophetic agency of Moses, for when we glance onward to later times, those which were distinguished for the copious development of prophetic gifts, the man who in spirit and character most nearly resembled Moses, who might almost be said, like him, to behold the face of God, and whose words were spoken as from the presence-chamber of Deity—Elijah—was also the freest of poetical art and embellishment; it seemed as if the crisis were too great and urgent to admit of these; the truth in its naked, skeleton-like distinctness and severity could alone serve the purpose of his mission. His first utterance might be taken as the type, in this respect, of all that afterwards fell from his lips, "As Jehovah God of Israel liveth, before whom I stand, there shall not be dew nor rain these years, but according to my word" (1 Kings xvii. 1). Nothing could be more directly or briefly spoken.

But a greater than Moses or Elias has come, one who not only saw the face, but who dwelt in the bosom of the Father; and with him the characteristic in question becomes yet more manifest. In the recorded sayings and discourses of Jesus, we find many examples—beautiful and striking examples—of the *maṣhal* of the Hebrews; sententious and proverbial utterances, expressed often in the language of symbol, and thrown into

forms of pointed antithesis or pregnant similitude, but altogether without the passionate redundancy and stream-like flow of poetic excitation. There is everywhere rather a quiet majesty and repose, the speech as of a soul that was familiar with all truth, capable, without quitting its ordinary mood, of discerning it in its proper character, and of presenting it in the most appropriate lights. And if we may distinguish between one portion of our Lord's discourses and another, certainly the later addresses, in which he spoke most fully out the sentiments of his heart—above all, that intercessory prayer which immediately preceded the surrender of himself to death, in which, standing midway, as it were, between heaven and earth, he revealed at once what was in the Father's bosom toward him, and in his own bosom toward the Father, and toward those who should participate in the grace and blessings of his salvation; *there* especially we see the highest *spiritual elevation*, unaccompanied by any symptoms of poetic fervour or trance-like excitation. As one seeing eye to eye, knowing as he is known, he utters forth what is in his mind and heart concerning the things of God, and does so in language which appears to have no aim but that of presenting, in the clearest possible light, the grand realities of which it speaks. And there is not, perhaps, in all Scripture a passage of equal length, at once more sublime in its ideas and more purely simple in its mode of expression.

It is in the same way that we are to account for the absence of the poetic element in the speeches and epistles of the apostles. It was not that they had less of the spirit of revelation than the prophets of the Old Testament, but more; not that they occupied a lower place in the divine economy, but a higher—a position from which the truth of God could be perceived as from a better vantage-ground, and through a clearer medium. They needed not to be lifted at set times into the spiritual sphere, in order to apprehend aright such portions of the truth as they were to be made the instruments of imparting. The Spirit abode with them in his plenitude of light and grace, leading them into all the truth, hallowing them as vessels of honour both for its reception into their own minds and its conveyance to the minds of others. And thus, in their habitual frame, they were qualified for uttering the mind of God, and therefore spake, not as moved by fitful impulses, but as possessed of an equable, yet elevated, spiritual feeling.

The poetical province of revelation, then—what may more especially be termed such—belongs to its mid-region. It lies between Moses and Christ, and was proper to men who were select instruments of the Spirit, but chosen at a time when the Spirit was less plentiful in his gifts, and more occasional

in his operations than in the case even of Moses, and of course still more than in that of Christ and his apostles. In so far as a poetical tendency discovers itself in the prophets, it flowed mainly from the manner in which their communications from above were received, namely, when the soul was raised to an ecstatic condition, that it might become capable of holding more special and prolonged communion with the spiritual world; and the ecstatic frame having much in common with the poetic temperament, naturally led to poetic modes of thought and expression. But still, the prophets were not strictly poets. Their lofty calling, as bearers of a divine message, and their strong practical aim in respect to the results of their mission, necessarily tempered and restrained the poetic element. And to throw the prophetical writings into the same category with the poetical, as if in this respect they were substantially alike, betrays a defective critical discernment. In his office, the prophet of the Old Testament was even more closely allied to the preacher than to the poet; and his discourse could only at times, in occasional outbursts of emotion, become properly poetical, when his spirit sought vent to its feelings in solemn dirges, or songs of joy and gladness.

"The prophet," therefore, as justly stated by Ewald, "was not bound by any means to one sort of writing. In the historical portions he could avail himself of the common style, and again, at certain parts of his discourse, could rise to the purely poetic language of song, in at least a few verses; while later writers, who wrote less from amid the activities of life, might even interweave songs of considerable length, Hab. iii. But the one, equally with the other, was an exception. And the proper form of speech, which, as an image of serious oral discourse, must constitute the broad ground of a prophetical writing, had a quite peculiar mould and structure. It had, on the one hand, to maintain such an elevation in matter and diction as might prevent it from sinking to common prose; and yet, on the other, it was too much directed to the immediate working upon the life to admit of its departing so far from that as to assume the full poetical form. It therefore fluctuates between the two in such wise that, by its internal bent and striving, it would be ever reaching toward the height of poesy, while in reality it moves in a freer and more customary style of address, in order to exercise a more direct practical bearing, yet without losing the proper oratorical fulness and flexibility. From the intermingling of these two impulses has arisen its quite peculiar form, which is essentially of a middle sort."—(Die Propheten, p. 46.)

One has only, indeed, to glance over the prophetical books to see that such is the case. Large portions of Isaiah, still more in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, differ little from the style of

common narrative or serious discourse ; while in Daniel, Jonah, Haggai, Zechariah, it is the prevailing form.*

The poetical tendency could find proper scope for its development only in those compositions in which the writer acted the part of a representative man, a servant of God, indeed, but one who uttered lessons of truth and duty as from the treasures of his own experience, or from the bosom of the sacred community. While, in such cases, the things poured forth contained a divine word or message, it was not by disclosing some new thought, or bringing some fresh communication from heaven, but rather by reflecting again what had been brought, giving forth the impressions produced by it, with the view of awakening a sympathetic sense of it in the minds of the community. The psalmodic poetry of the old covenant is the highest example of this ; it was also the most widely diffused, both as to its production and its use, and the longest continued. It began with David, but was transmitted from hand to hand, through successive generations, to the very close of the theocracy in its regal form, though here also, as previously noticed, there are considerable diversities as regards the strength of the poetic element, and the forms in which expression was given to it. But this will appear more distinctly under the next aspect of the subject.

III. *The reason and use of the poetic element in Scripture.*

The more immediate reason and use of the play given to the poetical element in the Hebrew Scriptures must undoubtedly be sought in the nature of the Old Testament religion, serving as a compensation to its defects, and an handmaid to its necessities. And this in more respects than one.

The religion then established was, from the special requirements of the time, of a singularly local as well as symbolical nature. It not only abounded in rites and ceremonies, but connected these with particular times and places, and thereby, as a matter of course, circumscribed men's opportunities of taking part in the more distinctive services of their worship. Long intervals elapsed between the solemnities which drew them around the one altar of burnt-offering and the place where Jehovah, in a more peculiar sense, put his name. Not only so, but when the people assembled, as it was their duty, and must often have been their custom to assemble, at other times and places for purposes of devotion, no special provision was made in the law for such services, and the worshippers were thrown, in a manner, on their own resources. This lack

* The absence of the poetical form, however, did not exclude the poetical element, as (to give only a single instance) in Jer. xxxi. 15, where Rachel is introduced as bewailing the fate of her hapless offspring, when they were going into the captivity of Babylon—a highly poetical idea, though the style of expression hardly differs from the plainest prose.

it was left to the more gifted minds of the community to supply; and one of the readiest, we might almost say one of the most essential, modes of contributing to supply it, was by means of the lofty and stirring notes of sacred song, accompanied by simple but appropriate melodies. How near this was to the better spirits of the community is evident from the frequency with which, even in the earliest periods of their national existence, great events and occasions were turned to account in this direction, as appears from the songs intermingled with the records of their history, to which reference has already been made. These songs were manifestly designed for use in religious meetings, and were sure to be increasingly employed, and to grow also in number, the more a spirit of holy earnestness diffused itself among the people. Accordingly, in the period of revival which was originated by Samuel the prophet, this discovers itself as one of the more distinguishing features. The schools of the prophets, as they were called, companies, that is, of the more spiritual and select members of the community, gathered together into a kind of spiritual brotherhood, under the presidency of a prophet, made such frequent use of sacred lyrics that they had for their proper badges musical instruments—the psaltery, the tabret, the pipe, and the harp, 1 Sam. x. 5. David himself, in his earlier years, was no stranger to these institutions, and not improbably, by what he witnessed and felt in them, had his heart first moved to apply its energies in adding to their materials of devotion. But what he received he repaid with increase. The fine poetical genius with which he was endowed, hallowed as it was by the larger measures of God's Spirit, fitted him in a peculiar manner for giving utterance to the spiritual thoughts and feelings of the people, and even for imparting to these an elevation and a fervour which they had not otherwise possessed. And to him, in his vocation as the sweet psalmist of Israel, it was not a little owing that such associations became, not only sources of spiritual instruction, but centres of religious awakening.

: Nearly allied to this was another service, which the psalmodic poetry, and the writings that were somewhat akin to it, had to render to the religion of the old covenant—one more immediately connected with their didactic character. That religion was predominantly of a symbolical nature; every rite and ordinance had its spiritual meaning. It had this, however, practically, not for all, but only for those who possessed discernment to look through the shell into the kernel. The native disposition of the soul was ever to rest in the outward; and instead of searching into the hidden treasures that lay underneath the symbolical services, to turn the mere ritualism of these into a kind of sacred pantomime, that should work its

effect one scarcely knew how, or inquired wherefore. The proneness of ancient Israel to give way to this unthinking, fleshly disposition comes out with mournful frequency through the whole of their history. And with the view of correcting it, or, as it may be otherwise expressed, for the purpose of providing in this behalf a needed complement to the institutions and services of the old covenant, it became the calling of the more spiritually gifted men, those who, by way of eminence, had "the vision and faculty divine," to extract from them what might be called their hidden essence, to unfold the great truths and principles they enshrined, and by linking them, on the one hand, to the varying experiences of individual and social life, and, on the other, to appropriate scenes and aspects of nature, to invest them with a significance and a power that might be level to every understanding, and touch a chord of sympathy in every thoughtful bosom. This was pre-eminently the calling of David when raised up, after a time of general corruption and backsliding, to be the head of God's covenant people, and of those who succeeded him in the line of reforming agency he initiated. It was to pour new life and vigour into the old religion, not merely by rectifying the partial disorders that had crept into its administration, and promoting the due observance of its solemnities, with the lively accompaniment of song and music—not merely this, but also, and much more, by popularising its lessons in compositions adapted to general use, and providing for the suitable expression of every mood of feeling and sentiment of devotion which its institutions and services, when rightly understood, were fitted to call forth and exercise. What a boon was here provided to the spiritually-minded and pious Israelite! As with a key of heaven's own fashioning, it opened to him the mysteries of the divine kingdom, so far as these could *then* be opened; gathered out for his use treasures of wisdom, such as no other people possessed, applicable to all spheres and conditions of life; and supplied him with an handbook of devotion whereby, even when absent from the temple, his soul might be informed with the spirit of its services, and might feel as a dweller still in the courts of God's house. Had Israel but known to profit, as they should, by the fruits of spiritual activity thus ministered to their hands, how near should they have come to fulfil their calling of a nation of kings and priests to God!

So far we see how the religion of the old covenant needed, and obtained also a compensation for what in it was imperfect and weak. But as in human, so in divine things, the weak and imperfect, in one respect, may be the relatively strong and perfect in another,—and instead of needing, may itself be able to provide a compensation. So it certainly has been here.

The predominantly outward and local nature of the ancient religion, which served too often as a veil to overshadow the spiritual truths that lay within, served also, when the truths were apprehended and became allied to the vivifying spirit of poetry, as a manifold and appropriate cover, through which to give distinct and palpable expression to the things of God. The things themselves are far more clearly revealed now than they could be before "the dispensation of the fulness of times;" but they now stand forth in their naked reality, as things for the understanding to perceive rather than for the imagination to paint—things which mainly belong to the higher region of the unseen and eternal, where imagination searches in vain for forms under which to body forth its conceptions of the true and good. For these it must be indebted to the world of known and sensible realities. And herein stood the advantage it possessed during the continuance of the old covenant, that the religion then established was linked on every hand to the relations of flesh and time: the things seen were at once the theatre and the image of things not seen. The people of God, nay, God himself, had a local habitation, a worldly sanctuary, a land, a history, where all, in a manner, bore on it the impress of Deity—being hallowed with special manifestations of the divine goodness and majesty, and associated with acts of worship or dealings in providence, on which the principles of truth and righteousness were most legibly inscribed. The imaginative faculty had thus provided to its hand the materials of a language—rich in imagery, and replete with interest—in which to set forth spiritual ideas. And with what life-like freshness and power has this been done by the psalmists, and the prophets also of the old covenant, in their more devotional and didactic pieces! If the range of their spiritual horizon was limited, if they could not see into certain mysteries of the kingdom which are now made manifest, and had well-nigh to remain silent respecting its eternal glories, yet within that range what clearness of view! what vividness of colouring! All things spiritual and divine become clothed, in their hands, as with the properties of flesh and blood. Not forms of opinion merely, as too commonly with us, but sensible realities, seem ever present to their view when handling the concerns of the divine kingdom. God himself, though invisible to the bodily eye, was still no intellectual abstraction, dimly apprehended, as dwelling remote in the far-distant regions of space, but a living personality not far from any one of them, with his dwelling-place in Zion, and his effective agency in all the events of life, and all the operations of Providence. They heard his voice; they, in a manner, saw his form; they sent communications to him as to one who could regard and pity, judge, or save them; and

amid the manifold variety of things which were ever evolving around them, as well as in those which filled up the history of the past, they felt and spake as if constantly brought into contact with the indications of his presence, and with the attributes of his character.

It is scarcely needful to point to examples of what is so common, that it must be familiar to every reader of Scripture; but let the 27th Psalm be taken as a specimen of this pictorial, realising, intensely personal spirit of the Hebrew poets. The Psalm is pregnant throughout with life and action. The writer finds himself in the midst of danger and difficulty,—the wicked, as so many rapacious wolves, eagerly watch for their opportunity to seize and devour him; he can even fancy he sees an host encamping around him, and war waged against him by adversaries that breathe out cruelty. Yet he fears not; for on the other side he sees what presents itself to his view as equally real, and amply sufficient to meet the emergency. He sees God at hand as his light, his salvation, the strength of his life; why, therefore, he asks, should he be afraid? Has not this covenant God, in pledge of covenant faithfulness and love, fixed his abode in Zion, dwelling there as in his house? There also the psalmist would dwell; nay, contemplating the Lord, who dwells there, as the ever-present, infinite Jehovah, his one desire and purpose is to be ever in God's house,—to be so, that is, in the feeling and apprehension of his soul; for that, he knows, is all one, as if he carried the house of God with him wherever he might go; and so the glorious and almighty Occupant of its courts could not but be near to hide him in his pavilion, to set him on a rock, to hear his cry in the hour of trouble, and lift up his head above the enemies that might be round about him. Faith, living, realising faith, sees the invisible, and, through the outward symbol, penetrates into the hidden truth it enshrined, so as to derive from it assuring confidence and victorious energy.

Many other examples will readily occur, in which the local relations and symbolical institutions of the old covenant are even more largely employed as helps for enabling the soul to give distinct shape and living warmth to spiritual truths. But there are again others in which no formal account is made of the local and symbolical in Israel. Nothing appears of it but a spirit—supersensual, believing, godly—with which, as the proper offspring of the covenant, for an interpreting guide, the writer looks abroad upon the face of nature or providence, and reads out the lessons they teach, or the aspects of faith and hope they present, for all who were standing within the bonds of the covenant. The 8th, 23d, 103d, 104th, 139th Psalms may be pointed to as among the finest examples of this description,

although many more are to be found in the Book of Psalms, in Job, Proverbs, and certain portions of Isaiah. In such examples of this class, while the wide universe may be said to be the field of thought and contemplation, the writers still shew the results of their training amid the special bonds and relations of Judaism. They spoke as from the heart of the covenant, with all the vividness of perception and individuality of feeling, which was peculiarly its offspring; and, at the same time, with a naturalness and simplicity, a tenderness and pathos, such as might seem to bespeak a freedom from all legal bonds and restrictions, and such as gives to their compositions a place among the most touching and impressive of devotional writings.

Now this service was rendered by the men of spiritual endowments and poetical gifts, not for the members of the old covenant alone, but for those also who should live in Christian times. The church must still in this respect speak the language of Canaan; she has no other to put in its place. As we inherit the promises made to the fathers, and cannot be made perfect without them, so also the earthly relations, the temporal fortunes, and material symbols, amid which, and through which, divine truth came into substantive shape among them; these also are ours for spiritual uses, and neither without *them* can we be made perfect. We need them; the exercised believer needs them; the well-furnished preacher, the well-instructed theologian, each needs them as mirrors wherein to see reflected the sublime realities of the gospel, and the spiritual experiences of the life of faith. And whatever he may find in the revelations of the gospel to carry him, as to clearness of view and reach of comprehension, above the position of the ancient bards and prophets of Scripture, he will be ever repairing to their more concrete and circumscribed, but, on that very account, more life-like and palpable representations, in order to have his faith in God freshened up, and the imperfections of his spiritual sense corrected and improved. The reality, indeed, of the truth, and of the life which grows out of it, we might derive from other sources; but without this we should want, what we so much need, a pattern after which to guide and fashion our thoughts concerning them, and a language sufficiently rich, varied, and expressive, wherewith to tell forth aright these thoughts, whether in prayer to God or in converse with our fellow-men. Cut off what is derived in imagery and diction from the poetical portions of Old Testament Scripture, and how bald should our descriptions of the spiritual life appear! How tame, even, and monotonous our devotional addresses to heaven!

Such appear to be the main reasons and use of the poetical element in so considerable a portion of ancient Scripture. Without, however, noticing these, Mr Taylor lays stress upon two points,

to which we cannot assign the place he does—not, at least, in this connection. One is, the necessity of speaking respecting God and the things of God in terms that are symbolic or purely figurative—as contradistinguished from those which are strictly intellectual or philosophic; it being only through a kind of anthropomorphic symbolism, that the idea of the personal God, with his distinctive attributes, can be brought into felt nearness or close alliance with the human consciousness. This, no doubt, is true as regards the necessity of such a mode of representation, but it cannot be said to be peculiar to the poetical portions of the Bible. It comes out in these more prominently than in other parts—as poetry naturally delights in the emblematical and figurative—but on this point it is the property of the Bible teaching generally. In truth, there is here no alternative; if we are to speak of God so as to convey any distinct apprehension of his being and character, we *must* employ the language of symbolism and figure, using it, however, so as to make one part check and counterbalance another. But so far from being confined to the poetical books of Scripture, some of the most strongly anthropomorphic statements are in the historical passages, such as at Gen. iv. 10, vi. 6, viii. 21, xviii. 21, &c. The most that can be said in this direction is, that, where play was given to the poetical element, there also was a freer and fuller employment of this figurative diction in respect to God and divine things, than was usual elsewhere.

Nor can much more be said in regard to the other point dwelt upon by Mr Taylor,—the connection of the spirit of Hebrew poetry with the indulgence of hope for the world's good. He says (p. 319), "The Hebrew prophet is the man of hope. The Hebrew prophets (poets) and psalmists are the authors of hope in regard to this present mundane economy; and it is they, rather than Christ and his apostles, that, looking on to the remoteness of the existence of nations, see, in that distance, terrestrial good; they see truth, peace, love; and they foretell a social system at rest." He even goes so far as to say, "If, at this very time, such an event might be supposed as a final and formal abandonment of whatever it is in the Hebrew prophetic writings that is predictive of the ultimate triumph of justice and benevolence throughout the world, and of a happy issue of human affairs,—if we were so resolved as to cut off the entail of hope consigned to all nations in the Old Testament, we should quickly be brought into a mood of despair, and should learn to look in sullen apathy at those things which Hebrew prophets regarded with healthful hope. Any such abnegation of good in the future would give a mortal chill to useful enthusiasm; it would be as a poison shed upon patriotism, confining it in its selfishness, and depriving it of its leaven of benevolence."

Now, in this there seems to be a twofold error,—one more immediately connected with the form of the representation, and the other, with its substance. It is not properly as poets, but as prophets, that the writers of the Old Testament speak in hopeful and glowing strains respecting the future of the world. The poetical element, simply as such, may ally itself to sad and mournful occasions, as well as to those of a more cheerful and animating nature; though, apart from materials of faith and hope, it can never reach the higher kinds of elevation, nor in *any* line can continue long to exhibit much of life and productiveness. But one has only to think of such productions as David's lamentation over Saul and Jonathan, the Lamentations of Jeremiah, the 6th, 88th, 89th, 137th, and several other Psalms, to see what freshness and strength of poetical feeling is sometimes coupled in Scripture with circumstances of the deepest sadness and gloom. It is, therefore, as prophets, and not strictly as poets, that the writers in question have been enabled to throw such a radiant and hopeful aspect over their delineations of the future. And so Mr Taylor is obliged, in making the statement, to identify the poet and the prophet of the Old Testament—a mistake on which we have already had occasion to animadvert. The prophetic, or, to speak more definitely, the predictive, might exist altogether apart from the poetical—it actually did so exist in some of its highest manifestations—even in Old Testament times (as may be seen in the prospective delineations of Moses, Lev. xxvi., Deut. iv., xxviii., the prophetic announcements of Elijah, and many others scattered through the historical books, as well as not a few in Daniel and the other prophets). The frequent combination of a certain amount of the poetical element with the prophetic arose, as previously stated, chiefly from the mode in which the revelations of prophecy were usually given—namely, in vision, and while the prophet himself was in a state of ecstasy. But whatever in the revelations themselves might be found of a buoyant and hopeful kind for the future of the world, should be assigned to the spirit of prophecy, from which it directly and properly came; not to the poetical element intermingling with its announcements, which was but incidentally connected with them, and might or might not be found at all.

In regard, however, to the matter itself, or the substance of the statement now under consideration, we cannot but think that the difference presented in it between the writings of the Old and those of the New Testament is greatly exaggerated, or rather, proceeds on a partially mistaken view of the proper bearing in this respect of the writings of both covenants. It is true the prophets of the Old Testament, as a whole, are men of hope, and paint often in glowing and exultant strains

the better times then in prospect for the world ; they speak of such a spread and triumph of light, righteousness, and peace, as should certainly in due time embrace all lands, and issue in a restored and blessed world. They were specially called to hold out such prospects, and give them the benefit of the most assured and lively representation ; for they had themselves to struggle with much that was adverse and discouraging. The interest of God was in their time extremely limited as to the field it embraced ; too often within that field languishing and depressed ; nor were fears wanting in many bosoms that all concerning it might possibly go to wreck. How natural in such circumstances, and how wise also in those who were the more peculiar representatives of Heaven, and who were charged with the burden of maintaining its truth and cause, to make it manifest that they “baited not a jot of heart or hope ;” nay, to pledge the word of God and their own character as witnesses for its verity, that the good should still ultimately prevail, and that a renovated and blessed world, a restored paradise of joy and health, should come forth as the issue of the divine dispensations ! But is it otherwise, in reality, with the prophetic utterances of the New Testament ? It is easy, no doubt, to gather out of these forebodings of evil, intimations of coming trouble, perplexity, distress of nations, yea, and the sure perdition of whatsoever partakes of impurity and corruption. But the same may be found also in Old Testament prophecy. It, too, foretells plainly enough the dissolution of the existing framework and constitution of things—the decay, subversion, disappearance of the great monarchies of the world—the final judgment, and uprooting of all power and authority which is merely human and earthly—that the kingdom which is of God may be established, amid the perennial glory of a new heaven and a new earth. And is not this precisely what is disclosed, with abundant plainness and with frequent reiteration, in what is emphatically the prophetic book of New Testament scripture, the Apocalypse of St John ? Mr Taylor quietly disposes of the bearing of this book on the point at issue by the parenthetical statement, that “it demands a distinct rule of exposition,” (p. 205). It would certainly require something of that sort to make it lend any countenance to the view adopted by Mr Taylor. But no exposition that is just and reasonable can possibly render the meaning of this last, culminating testimony of the spirit of prophecy otherwise than full of hope and gladness for our world. It is at once the closing drama of Bible prophecy and the brightest, most assuring in its announcements. Amid songs and hallelujahs it winds up the prophetic outline of the world’s history. And most fitly does so, because it tells of

the final triumph of righteousness as a triumph contended for and won, not in the regions of distant space, but on this same terrestrial globe; of the kingdoms of this world becoming at length the kingdom of Christ; and of earth rising through all its borders to a participation in the blessedness and glory of heaven.

In truth, the advantage here is all on the side of the New, as compared with the Old; for, though the New says less upon the subject of the world's future, it says immensely more that is fitted to shed a hopeful and cheering aspect over its prospects. The great facts it embodies concerning the world's redemption are, at the same time, inwrought with the lines of prophecy; they contained in their very nature the pledge and ground of all that should be sought or longed for of good. In another manner than ancient prophecy could ever do, they proclaimed that the conflict with the powers of evil had come to a decisive issue, and that it only required time, and patience, and the untiring service of faith and love, in order to see the prince of this world wholly cast out, and all things restored to perfect rectitude and blessedness. The history of the church, too, bears witness to the same. It is from the New Testament era—when the realities of the heavenly world were distinctly opened to the eye of faith—that the day of the world's jubilee begins properly to dawn. Hope and philanthropy, instead of then finding themselves damped in their endeavours or clouded in their prospects, entered on a new career of development, and wrought with an energy and an enthusiasm hitherto unknown. From that moment all was lighted up with a fresh lustre. It now became the very business and calling of the church to conquer the world for Christ,—the highest employment in which hope and philanthropy can engage, the noblest aim to which they can be directed; and never, while belief in the facts of the gospel and the spirit that emanates from them remains, can those twin graces lack either a fruitful soil from which to spring, or an ample encouragement to reward their endeavours.

IV. Lastly, *The bearing of the poetical element on the subject of inspiration* may be briefly noticed.

If the poetical element in Scripture had all the scope and licence which is sometimes claimed for it, we should find some difficulty in reconciling its place with the plenary inspiration of Scripture. This certainly does not require any such intervention of supernatural power as might suspend the faculties of the human agent, or interfere with their free and proper exercise,—the play, within certain limits, of the human element was just as necessary for the purposes of a revelation as the energising of the divine. Still, there are limits; and if

the human, in the fervour of poetic feeling, had been allowed to run out into ebullitions of unsanctified temper, or, in its love for æsthetic beauty and perfection of form, had anyhow done violence to the meaning intended to be conveyed by the Spirit, then it had been impossible to have vindicated the use made of the poetical element in Scripture without foregoing, to some extent, the strictly inspired character of certain portions of the writings with which it was associated. But neither of these allegations can with any justice be made.

(1.) As regards the feelings expressed in the poetical portions of Scripture, almost the only charge that has ever been brought in disparagement of their divine character, has respect to the spirit of revenge which is said to breathe in some of them. It is not quite easy in a few sentences to repel such a charge. But the proper way to meet it is to take duly into account the circumstances and relations of the time to which the passages in question belong,—being such as called for vindications of the truth and faithfulness of God, of a present and palpable kind, in order to prevent his cause from being overborne by the violence and wickedness of men. There is a wide difference—though the ungodly world will ever be ready to confound the two—between personal vindictiveness, or thirst for revenge, and a desire for recompence in the cause of God. The former is not only unchristian, but it is unrighteous; it is contrary to the spirit of the Old as well as of the New Testament; and no Jew could give way to it without setting at naught some of the most explicit prohibitions in his own Scriptures (Lev. xix. 18; Exod. xxiii. 4, 5; Prov. xxv. 21, 22, &c.). So far from deeming themselves at liberty to indulge in such a feeling, the poetical writers of the Old Testament expressly disclaim it. Job declares himself ready to hold all his calamities accounted for if he had rejoiced over the misfortune of his enemy, or so much as wished a curse to his soul (xxx. 29, 30). David, in Ps. vii., even goes so far as to invoke the divine vengeance on his own head, if he should be found to have given way to a spirit of revenge; and once and again, in the most critical moments of his history, when it was in the power of his hand to inflict revenge, and thereby force for himself a way to external freedom and enlargement, he nobly put the purpose away from him as only an iniquity to be abhorred (1 Sam. xxiv. 5, 6, xxvi. 8–10). And can it be imagined he should have breathed forth such a spirit in his psalms—writings composed in his holiest and purest moods, expressly destined for use in the sanctuary of God? It is utterly incredible; and derives its only plausible appearance from the circumstance, which rationalists and unbelievers always contrive to forget, that the enemies of David were at the same

time the enemies of God, and that to seek their discomfiture as enemies was but another mode of seeking the establishment and prosperity of God's kingdom.

Personal vindictiveness is one thing, but a desire for recompence in the cause of God, or of righteousness, is quite another; the one holy men of old, speaking as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, could not indulge, the other they could, and did. As justly said of them by Hengstenberg—

“They wished and hoped that the stumbling-block which the prosperity of the wicked occasions to faith, and the encouragement which it gives to wickedness, would be taken away (Ps. x. 12); that God would vindicate his endangered honour (lxxix. 10); that he would manifest his greatness and his righteousness, and thereby awaken the apprehension of these in the minds of believers, and call the world at large to repentance (xxx. 27, xl. 16, &c.). By the overthrow of the bitter enemies of the church, they sought to have the church delivered from destruction, and along therewith the only party qualified to honour him, and all the spiritual goods committed to her; as when the psalmist prays, ‘Pour out thy wrath upon the heathen that know thee not’ (lxxix. 6); where, according to the connection, by the heathen are to be understood the people who had raged against Israel, and whose destruction was the condition of Israel's salvation,—not the heathen world generally, for which the Psalmists bore a tender love, and whose reception one day into the kingdom and blessing of God they wistfully anticipated.” (App. to Psalms, p. lxxi.)

In short, there is nothing properly peculiar to this portion of Old Testament scripture—nothing different in *kind* from what is found also in the New Testament. There is a difference only in *degree*—a more marked and prominent exhibition of the righteousness of God, as ready to take vengeance on those who not only did not know him, but who set themselves with deliberate malice to injure the cause and trample upon the people of God. For the most part, as matters then stood, it was a trial of outward strength; and if the one party was to prevail, the other of necessity must go down. In New Testament times the conflict has in great measure risen to a higher sphere, and has less to do with carnal weapons of fire and sword, more with those which affect the reason and conscience. There are means now at command for dealing with the enmity of ungodly men, for the purpose of overcoming it, which were altogether unknown in earlier times; means which aim at the conversion rather than the destruction of the adversaries of the faith, and which it has become the more special duty of the Christian church to ply with prayerfulness and diligence. Yet those vindictive psalms, as they are called, have still their use for the Christian church.

"For us, too," as Hengstenberg has again said, "who are so much in danger of being infected by the lax views of sin and holiness, which have arisen from the corruption of the times, they are of special importance; and the more so, indeed, the stronger the current of our natural will runs against them. For this counter will has its deepest ground in the circumstance, that we do not consider the sins *without* us as rebellion against God, as an offence against his majesty, because we do not so regard the sins in ourselves. The example of the holy psalmists is also so far given us for our imitation, as it teaches us not to single out mercy from among the attributes of God, and hold it alone up to view, which cannot be so isolated without losing its essential nature; for the same living conviction of the recompensing righteousness of God, the same hatred against sin—against that primarily, and above all that which dwells in ourselves—is what must inspire us with like zeal for the glory of God, with like fervent love for the prosperity and success of God's kingdom." (App. p. lxxv.)

(2.) To turn, now, for a little to the other point, which has sometimes been deemed at variance with strict views of inspiration—the artificial character of Hebrew poetry—the objection falls away of itself, when the artificiality is reduced to its proper dimensions. This, as already stated, has been greatly exaggerated. A certain measure of the artificial undoubtedly belongs to it; as both in its choice of words, and its structure of sentences it differs from ordinary prose; but there is great simplicity, and comparative freedom, notwithstanding; and the excitation of spirit, and tension of mind, out of which it sprang, rendered the peculiarities of form, so far as they existed, in a manner natural. If it might be said, that the demands of the poetical still of necessity set conditions to the thoughts and feelings of the writers, so may it also be said of prose, of language generally. But as such conditions are in accordance with the natural laws of mental agency, and owe their existence to these laws, so it is the part of the Spirit in his operations upon the soul to conform his working to them; and it is in perfect consistence with all we know of the nature of his agency, that those who were moved by him to indite spiritual songs, and to give forth divine utterances in the glow and warmth of poetic inspiration, should keep within the limits of the kind of composition to which they addressed themselves. What is said of the prophets—that "the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets"—may equally be applied to the poets of Scripture. The divine impetus did not come to destroy their individuality, or to drive them from their specific aim as writers, but rather to assist them in carrying that aim to its proper accomplishment. They had, consequently, to write as of God, and, at the same time, in accordance with the approved forms of poetic composition.

The only thing as to form, in the poetical parts of Scripture,

which might seem to impose an undue restraint on the motions of the inspiring Spirit, is the practice, which appears to have been introduced by David, of giving to the letters of the alphabet a kind of regulating power over the length, and also, to some extent, the meaning of the poem. Psalms were composed of verse-members, or parallelistic sentences, to correspond with the number of the Hebrew letters (22), and sometimes also with their order; each verse beginning with a word, the first letter of which consisted of the letter next in order, from *aleph* to *tau*. The arrangement is varied. Sometimes, and indeed most commonly, a verse of two members constitutes the integral part thus begun; sometimes only one member, or half a verse; sometimes again two verses, as in Psalm 37th; and in the 119th Psalm, so many as eight verses are assigned to each letter, while the commencing word in each verse has for its first letter that particular letter to which the division or part belongs. The alphabetical principle is not confined to the psalms; it is also adopted in the Lamentations of Jeremiah; and in each of the five chapters, though with diversities as to the number of members assigned to each letter, while the fifth observes the principle only so far as to provide a verse for every letter of the alphabet. It was chiefly, we may conceive, as a help to the memory, that such arrangements of this artificial nature were formed; and it was only in certain kinds of poetical composition that the principle could be followed; such, namely, as had for their object, not the handling of any distinct topic, or regularly progressive action, but the throwing together of a series of lessons, or pious reflections, in respect to which the precise order was of comparatively little moment. This is uniformly the character of the productions which are constructed on this plan. To abide by it, therefore, with a considerable degree of regularity, could be attended with very little restraint. But even so, it is not uniformly adhered to; and when the sense required it, the sacred writer did not hesitate to violate the strictly alphabetical form. Thus in Psalm 25th, the second verse, like the first, begins with an *aleph*, instead of a *beth*, the *varu* is altogether wanting, so is *koph*, while two verses begin with a *resh*. Such deviations clearly shew, that the form was made to bend to the sense, not the sense to the form; or that the form was adhered to, only in so far as it could be done consistently with a regard to the sense. That so few deviations occurred, simply arose from the nature of the writings in question, which, as a rule, were of a kind that required no definite arrangement or close sequence in the thoughts; so that these could, for a help to the memory, be advantageously ranged under any artificial plan, if only it were such as might be readily perceived, and easily remembered. And in this there was manifestly nothing at variance with the strictly divine character of the compositions. P. F.

ART. II.—*The Theological System of Emmons.**

The Works of Nathaniel Emmons, D.D. Edited by JACOB INE, D.D.
Boston: Congregational Board. 6 vols.

Memoir of Nathaniel Emmons; with Sketches of his Friends and Pupils.
By EDWARDS A. PARK. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication.
1861. 8vo, pp. 468.

PROFESSOR STUART of Andover once wrote an essay in the *Biblical Repository* to shew that Arminius was not an Arminian. And eminent divines are now busy with the inquiry, whether Dr Emmons was an Emmonsite. Did he really hold to those definite and peculiar views which are popularly associated with his venerable name? Or, are his sharp doctrinal statements to be taken in a feminine rather than a masculine sense? to be called metaphorical and not literal, popular and not exact, Biblical in contrast with scientific? Of course, all that is necessary to make out that Dr Emmons was not an Emmonsite, is to interpret his definite formulas in an indefinite sense, for the essence of his system is its definiteness. Keen logic and exegetical skill can do very much with such a flexible material as human speech. Words are susceptible of a great variety of significations. Interpret all the leading terms in a very general sense, and it can easily be shewn that the most extreme men, when rightly understood, really mean just about what common mortals are always saying. A trifling difference of phraseology is all that is left. And perhaps this is the way in which theological controversy is to come to an end, viz., by interpreting everybody indefinitely. If the whole region is levelled, no mountains are left. But whatever may be in store for us in the indefinite future, it is hard to overcome our prejudices as to the past, and still more difficult to reverse the verdict of history. There are, to be sure, some signal instances of a revision and reversal of contemporary judgments. We might admit, with Hegel, that Aristotle was a profounder metaphysician than Plato; with Müller, that Augustine held to human freedom in its profoundest sense; with Cousin, that Pascal was subject to the torture of doubt; Mohammed may not have been a mere impostor, nor Cromwell a fanatical rebel, nor Henry VIII. a cruel tyrant; but still we must confess that we find it difficult to believe, that the "Wise Teacher and Royal Preacher of New England" (as the Rev. Thomas Williams calls Emmons) did not hold certain very distinct and even peculiar views upon divine

* This article appeared in the January Number of the *American Theological Review*.—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

efficiency, human exercises, submission, justification, and the grounds of the rewards of paradise. And, in fact, it seems to us, that just so far as the peculiarities of his system are explained away, Emmons himself is explained away. Another personage takes the place of that simple, venerable, and rigid form. The three-cornered hat, small clothes, and bright knee-buckles are replaced by a loose coat, flowing pantaloons, and a soft and easy hat of modern material and fabric. Just so far as he is thus modernised, he forfeits the special rank which has been ascribed to him in the development of New England theology. If his distinct and distinctive propositions are reduced to the terms of a less severe system, his reputation as a clear and logical thinker also suffers detriment. For this emasculating process has chief respect to the vital points of his theory, those upon which he thought and preached most constantly and urgently. His "consistent Calvinism" is contained in them. Here he claimed to be Calvinistic, and not merely "Calvinistical" or "Calvinisticalish." It has been intimated, that if he had lived now, he would have expressed himself in the modified modes of his apologists; but the proper business of an expounder of Emmons, is with Emmons as he was, and not with Emmons as he might have been under the light of our "improved" ethics and theology.

We propose, then, in vindication and elucidation of his real system, to present its characteristic features, in comparison and contrast with the earlier and later forms of New England theology, and particularly to shew the conditions under which alone it can be considered as a self-consistent scheme of divinity. Incidentally it may appear, that those cannot be considered as valid Emmonsites, who discard the radical features of his system; and that those who retain only his "exercise" scheme, and who deny his "divine efficiency" theory, deny that which alone made, or can make, the exercise scheme consistent with genuine Calvinism. It is reported that a distinguished preacher once said to the venerable recluse, "Well, Dr E, you and I agree, that all sin and holiness consist in exercises." "Yes," was the quick and searching response, "but we differ as to where the exercises come from."

After the full account given by our valued contributor, Dr Pond, in the last number of this *Review*, we need add but a few words about Dr Emmons' life and his most recent biography. The Memoir of Emmons by Dr Park, exhausts the subject, leaving nothing to be desired in the general portraiture of the man, his ways and surroundings. It is the most entertaining, ingenious, and finished piece of ecclesiastical biography which New England has as yet sent forth in honour of her religious patriarchs. Minute divisions and subdivisions, sections and

subsections, and even the aid of numbers and letters, give an almost mathematical accuracy to the arrangement of the book, as if it were written in the demonstrative method. The details are elaborated with nicety; the lights and shades are handled with consummate skill; the general as well as the particular relations of the theologian and his theology are unfolded and set in their place. Careful logic and practised criticism watch over all the details, and fit each part of the narrative into its appointed place. If the object were to represent the Franklin divine, with needed explanations, as being upon the whole the best type of New England theology, polity, ethics, and practical divinity, that object could not have been more felicitously and acutely attempted. His chief biographer has certainly failed in his main purpose, if the reader is not convinced that Dr Emmons is the Coryphæus of modern Congregationalism, as a system of independency in polity, and as a theory of exercises in ethics. The resources of English adjectives are put to a severe test in the contrasted descriptions, and varied encomiums, of his multifiform traits of character. His idiosyncracies and his large humanity, his habits as a pastor and student, his peculiarities of dress, manner, and conversation, his theological system in all its ramifications, and his style and method as a cogent preacher of divine truth, are set forth in such an attractive exposition, that even those who dissent most strongly from his prominent speculations must still reverence, and admire, and love the man. And even though it may not be made evident that he is a better and truer representative of the substantial orthodoxy of New England, than is Edwards, or Bellamy, or Smalley, or Dwight, or Hopkins, or Woods; all candid readers will confess, that in clearness of statement, consistency of logic, tenacity of phraseology, and especially in sharp and curt sayings, he is surpassed by none of his peers. He defined more sharply, and stuck to his definitions better, than any preceding New England divine. Though he wrote no formal body of divinity, but only sermons or essays in the homiletic form, he undoubtedly had a system thoroughly thought out, and carefully stated to obviate objections. Herein was his superiority; and it is of this very superiority that he is robbed, when he is interpreted as speaking more concisely than precisely, more intensely than plainly, more nervously than perspicuously, on the distinguishing features of his scheme. And to subject him to the metaphorical method of interpretation is peculiarly inapt, for he himself is the most literal of our divines; his main positions are put as tight and tough, as clear and clean, as language can make them. He interprets everybody else in the most literal and obvious sense; he never allegorizes. Scripture he explains with the simplicity of a child, and talks of the most supernatural

things as other people talk about men, and trees, and daily events. He holds to verbal inspiration, and literal interpretation, where others are staggered, or take refuge in a double sense. But he knew nothing about a double sense. He tried to say just what he meant; and if he had meant to say what his interpreters allege, he undoubtedly would and could have used the very words which they substitute for his strict formulas.

Dr Emmons was the keenest of the old school divines of New England, and in some points the forerunner of its new school. He believed in the Divinity of Christ, the Incarnation, and the Trinity—rejecting, however, in opposition to Hopkins, the eternal generation of the Son, and even stigmatizing it as “eternal nonsense.” He carried divine sovereignty to its acme, while he maintained that man has natural ability to frustrate the divine decrees. He pressed the divine efficiency to an extreme which few Calvinists have dared to do, making it extend, as creative, to all events and all the acts of the creature, sin not excepted; and at the same time he held to the entire freedom and responsibility of the creature. So strictly did he believe that the glory of God is the great end of creation, that he also asserted that sin is necessary to the greatest good, and that a willingness to be lost is the chief test of regeneration. His ethical theory enforced an impartial and disinterested benevolence as the essence of true virtue—a benevolence so comprehensive as to include all the good of all beings, and so disinterested that all self-love, if not repudiated, is merged in this universal good-will. Of the “five points” of the Calvinistic system, excepting that of a limited atonement, he was so constant an advocate, that they formed the staple of his Sunday afternoon inferences from his Sunday morning’s discourses. The decrees he declared to be the fundamental doctrine of “the gospel;” he *proved*, that “it is absolutely necessary to approve of the doctrine of reprobation, in order to be saved,” ii. 402. He held that depravity, in consequence of Adam’s sin, is universal and total; that the Holy Ghost literally creates in the renewed a new heart and a right spirit; and that those thus renewed will persevere to the end, obtaining, however, the blessedness of heaven as a reward of their obedience, and not of Christ’s. And thus does Emmons hold, as no one ever did either before or since, some of the extreme positions of both old school and new school. He is a supralapsarian Calvinist in all that concerns God, and the boldest of theorists in all that concerns human activity, carrying ethics and anthropology to the most startling results. He said of himself, at the age of ninety-three:—“I go with the old school of New England divines half way, and then turn round and oppose them with

all my might. I go with the new school half way, and then turn round and oppose them with all my might."

The essential points of his system are contained in three words—*GOD, efficiency, exercises*. The formula of his distinct and comprehensive scheme may perhaps be said to be this—*God by direct efficiency produces all events and exercises for his own glory*. Efficient and final causes are the metaphysical factors of his theory; the material and formal causes (as Aristotle would call them) he neglects or denies. On the one hand is an absolute decree, on the other hand are events and volitions; and the nexus between them is the immediate agency of God. And yet he says volitions are free, because God makes them free—it is their nature to be free; and man is responsible for them because they are his. Each volition is as distinct as an atom; it is, and must be, either wholly holy or wholly sinful; and as holy or sinful, it is inherently worthy of reward or penalty. The moral and personal being of every child of Adam begins with these volitions; and, in fact, all that we know or can conceive about the soul is, that it is identical with its exercises. Some of the theological bearings and consequences of these extraordinary positions will come out in the sequel; but no one read in the history of theology can fail to recognise their peculiar character and scope. They indicate a mind of unusual keenness and penetration, subtle and scholastic, clear and consecutive. Emmons is, in fact, the schoolman of New England divinity; like the scholastics in logical acumen and fearless questionings; like them, too, in shrinking from no possible results of his logic; like them, in neglecting induction, and making deduction the royal road to truth; unlike them in his strong moral convictions and practical vigour of statement and appeal; and yet, again, like some of them—most resembling John Scotus Erigena, in the universality of his view of God's agency, bordering sometimes on consequences akin to pantheism—yet not pantheistic, for no theologian ever had a deeper sense of God's personal being and will, and of his entire distinction from the creature; no theologian ever pressed the idea of creation from nothing more sharply and even exclusively. Some of the recent attempts at elucidating his theology do not adequately emphasize these bolder and profounder aspects of his theory; his apologists seem anxious to smooth them over, to palliate them, to adapt them to the tastes of an enfeebled divinity, to a popular craving for the humanities and ethics—as if the substance of theology were to be found in moral philosophy, its adjuncts and inferences. But Emmons himself had no such weaknesses. He was every whit a theologian; and his moral philosophy and psychology (the latter rather barren at the best)

were the handmaids and servitors of his lordly divinity. Such expounders hardly do full justice to the "grand old man;" they have not caught the inmost spirit and vital sense of his system.

The position of Dr Emmons in the theological systems of New England is worthy of careful consideration. Isolated and peculiar* as he seems to be, his scheme is vitally interwoven with antecedent theories, and it has affected subsequent speculations. Intimate relations of affiliation or contrast connect him with the older Calvinism, with the previous divines of the Edwardean school, and with the subsequent forms of New England divinity. He agreed with the school of Edwards in rejecting the direct imputation of Adam's sin, but he advanced beyond most of his predecessors in virtually resolving all imputation into an abstract divine constitution—a matter of sovereignty rather than a moral procedure. The "covenants" followed, of course, in the same line. He symbolized with the younger Edwards and Hopkins, and opposed the older Calvinism, as to the extent of the atonement—proclaiming it to be universal in its provisions, and recognising in it a satisfaction to the general justice of God; but he is far from resolving it into a means of moral impression—for he says that it was "necessary entirely on God's account;" and that "nothing can make atonement for man's sins, which does not express the *same* vindictive justice of God, which he expresses in the penalty of the law." In contrast, however, with both Edwards and Hopkins, he denied Christ's active obedience in relation to our justification, and identified justification with pardon. In opposition to the whole consensus of Calvinism, and to Edwards, Bellamy and Smalley, and following out sundry hints and speculations of Hopkins, Emmons denied the received doctrine of original sin, and reduced all sin to sinning—making, however, the first sin of each descendant of Adam to be coeval with the existence of his soul, and to be a consequence of the Adamic transgression. Taking up the hypotheses of Edwards and West as to identity and the divine causality (*viz.*, that the identity of any created existence consists merely in the fact that a divine constitution makes it to be the same at each successive moment)—he was led to the inference, that the divine power, by an immediate agency, actually brings into being every event and every

* The late Dr Woods of Andover, in his essay on the Theology of the Puritans (p. 13) says—"Dr Emmons considered himself as an innovator on the settled theology of New England. He professedly dissented from several of the doctrines contained in the Catechism, and Confession of Faith, and in the writings of Edwards. He often mentioned the fact, that but a few, comparatively, embraced his peculiar views. He hoped it would not always be so."

exercise, each distinctly by itself—the most thorough-going atomism, extended to mind as well as matter, surpassing even the idealism of Berkeley,* to which it is near akin. In distinction, too, from the older Calvinism, and in harmony with Edwards, the Franklin divine defined virtue as the love of being; following Hopkins, he called it a disinterested love; combining it with the doctrine of submission to the divine will, he drew the inference, which he supposed Paul enforced, when he declared himself willing to be accursed from Christ, for the sake of his brethren. No mediæval mystic, no French quietist, dared to make a willingness to suffer the tortures of the lost the condition of obtaining the bliss of the redeemed. And this profound mysticism was preached in the baldest prose, and proved by the keenest logic, and inculcated upon men and women in the church on Sunday, and in the conference meetings on other days of the week; and many, many a New England soul, through this torture has found its ecstasy. And this is the ethical theory which some Calvinists even now do not scruple to call—utilitarianism!† Yet, again, opposing the older Calvinism, and in conjunction with the Hopkinsians, he preached natural ability and the necessity of immediate

* Professor Park, in his Memoir of Emmons, "recalls" the statement he had previously made, that Emmons was a Berkeleian, having since heard that Emmons had said he thought he could refute Berkeley's arguments. Emmons, perhaps, did not hold, that ideas are all; but the fundamental character of his system is eminently Berkeleian—the same view of God as immediately producing all that is external—the same individualism—the same nominalism—the same denial of the possibility of finding or conceiving any essence or substance, besides and beyond the qualities and activities of objects, &c. In what the Germans would call their theory of the universe, both Emmons and Berkeley were of the same mind.

† No philosopher ever insisted more distinctly than Emmons upon the "Essential and Immutable Distinction between Right and Wrong" (see his Sermon, thus entitled). "As virtue and vice, therefore, take their origin from the nature of things, so the difference between moral good and moral evil is as immutable as the nature of things, from which it results." "The difference between virtue and vice does not depend upon the will of God, because his will cannot make nor destroy this immutable difference. And it is no more to the honour of God to suppose that he cannot, than that he can, perform impossibilities." In another sermon on the "Moral Rectitude of God," he presents the whole matter in a most felicitous style: "It is the *moral nature* of benevolence that renders it *morally* excellent; and it is the *natural tendency* of benevolence to promote *happiness*, that renders it *naturally* excellent. It is the *moral nature* of selfishness that renders it *morally* evil. And it is its *natural tendency* to promote *misery* that renders it *naturally* evil. The nature of benevolence is one thing, and its *tendency* is another. The nature of selfishness is one thing, and its *tendency* another. The nature of benevolence is *immutable*, and it cannot be altered by the Deity. The nature of selfishness is *immutable*, and cannot be altered by the Deity. But the *tendency* of benevolence, and the *tendency* of selfishness may be altered." He even goes so far as to say, "If it were supposable that benevolence should have a *natural tendency* to promote *misery*, still it would be *morally excellent* in its own nature. Or if it were supposable, that *selfishness* should have a *natural tendency* to promote *happiness*, still it would be in its own nature, *morally evil*."

repentance, in deference to his exercise theory, sharpening the statements on both points; still, however, fighting the Arminian self-determination, and inculcating the strict irresistibility of divine grace. In the theodicy, Calvinism has generally been content with leaving the ultimate ground of the divine permission of sin an inscrutable mystery; but this did not satisfy the restless questionings of the school of Edwards, in their endeavours to fathom the ways of God. Dr West, of Stockbridge, declared that sin was a necessary means of the greatest good. Dr Hopkins wrote a treatise entitled "Sin, through the Divine Interposition, an Advantage to the Universe" (that is, as overruled, and not in its own nature). And Emmons, bolder than the rest, not only, with Hopkins, denied the palliative of "permission," to which most Calvinists clung, but also made God the efficient cause of sin, intrepidly asserting, "that there was the same *kind*, if not the same degree of necessity, in the divine mind, to create sinful, as to create holy, beings," viz., that he might display his justice and his grace. And thus he carried out to its sharpest extreme, in prosaic and logical terms, what even Augustine and Calvin veiled in the language of feeling and of faith:

"O felix culpa, quæ talem et tantum
Meruit habere Redemptorem!"

These general statements as to the historical relations of Emmons, make it evident that he gathered together, and sharpened out, several scattered theories of New England divines on special and important points, in which they somewhat deviated from the Calvinistic tradition, while, at the same time, he pressed certain fundamental articles of the Reformed theology, severed from their organic relations with the whole system, to logical results, from which even the strictest Presbyterians recoiled. He himself says that he early threw away his "crutches," and took to making "joints." The "crutches" were what he also calls the "wens and protuberances" of Calvinism—*e. g.*, original sin, imputation, inability, limited atonement, &c. The "joints" consisted in dove-tailing what remained of Calvinism into the New England speculations about virtue, the will, ability, the atonement, &c. His Calvinism was concentrated into the doctrine of "divine efficiency;" the new elements were, for the most part, brought under the word "exercises." To "joint" this "efficiency" and these "exercises" was the problem. The solution was in the position that the divine efficiency creates the exercises. That is—the divine efficiency is the constructive idea, and the theory of exercises is the regulative factor of the distinctive theology of Emmons.

Before shewing how the two were conjoined, it may be well to add a word upon the relation of Emmons to the older Cal-

vinism; his relation to later theories will best come up by and by. Calvinism, in its historical growth, has assumed a variety of forms; it has been prolific in systems. Running through them all is the theory of the divine sovereignty, or predestination, viz., that the will of God is the source and end of all things. The earlier Calvinism (and Luther, too) was penetrated with this idea. But it was soon modified by the theology of the covenants, which relieved the dogma of the absolute decree, and introduced historical transactions and elements. The plan of God (this is what the theory of the covenants, in substance, said) is not one of arbitrary will and sovereignty; it rather involves, in its essential idea, moral compacts on the basis of right and rights. The Confession and Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly contain both these elements—the sovereignty and the covenants. Emmons discarded the covenants, and constructed his system on the basis of the divine will. Hence he is called a hyper-Calvinist. The Calvinism, too, of this country and of Scotland, has been infralapsarian; Emmons was a supralapsarian—the most consistent form of the unrelieved doctrine of divine sovereignty. And so the Presbyterians, as a general rule, heartily opposed Emmons, both as a hyper-Calvinist and as an Arminian; the former in respect to sovereignty, the latter in respect to sin, ability, the atonement, and related points. No thorough-going Presbyterian was ever willing to say, that God creates sinful exercises; that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; that all sin and holiness consist in exercises; that man has the natural ability to frustrate the divine decrees; and that justification means only pardon. And, whether from a deficiency in logic or piety, or for some other reason, none of them were ever willing to be “lost,” even for the glory of God.

The constructive idea of the system of Emmons is that of the Divine Efficiency. Predestination and decrees are his strong points. Professor Park, in his analytic survey of the “Formative Principles” of this theology, introduces the “Loveliness of God,” as the first characteristic of the system. But such is not the general and most obvious impression made by his writings. The “supremacy” of God, which his biographer states as the second characteristic, would be first suggested to most minds. We are also told, under another distinct head, that his system illustrates “the Duty of Union with God,” and that this is, in fact, “the *principium*” of his teachings; but this idea of union is quite incidental to the main scope of his theorising, and not at all a capital characteristic. The absolute, supreme, irresistible, all-embracing, all-producing, all-sustaining energy of the divine will, making every event and act march to the music of the divine glory, is unquestionably the predominant idea of this

most "consistent" of Calvinists. The emphasis is always upon power, and divine power; God orders all things after the counsel of his own will, for his own glory. And the peculiarity of his theory is in so far identifying the divine decrees and the divine agency, as to assert that what God decrees, he does. The divine agency is always and ever an immediate, productive, creative energy. Preservation is a continual creation. The agency of God, he says, consists "in nothing before his choice, nor after his choice, nor beside his choice. His willing or choosing a thing to exist is all that he does in causing it to exist" (Works, iv. 379). He is the "universal cause." "It is his agency, and nothing but his agency, that makes men act and prevents them from acting" (iv. 272). "He exerts his agency in producing all the free and voluntary exercises of every moral agent, *as constantly and fully as in preserving and supporting his existence*" (iv. 383). All men's "motions, exercises, or actions, must proceed from a divine efficiency" (iv. 366). "Mind," he says, "cannot act any more than matter can move without a divine agency." In short, the divine agency is simply the divine creative energy, at work in all events and all actions. In harmony with this view, the divine providence and government are represented as only the immediate agency of God, producing whatsoever he will for his own glory. God, he says, "governs the moral as well as the natural world, and both by a positive agency, and not a bare permission." Second causes have no efficiency in themselves.

This, now, is a very simple, and a very comprehensive theory. It is also a very mechanical and arbitrary hypothesis. It is taken from the sphere of the natural forces, and transferred without qualification to the sphere of providence. Efficient and final causes are the working factors; and the efficient produces the final cause. The fundamental conception is that of simple causative energy or force, universalised. It rests on the thesis, that the laws of nature (extended by Emmons to the moral world) are solely modes of the divine operation. How Emmons handles the matter is strikingly seen in a "familiar conversation," reported by his biographer: "'Do you believe,' says Emmons, 'that God is the efficient cause of sin?' 'No.' 'Do you believe that sin takes place according to the usual laws of nature?' 'Yes.' 'What are the laws of nature, according to Newton?' 'They are the established modes of the divine operation.' 'Do you approve of that definition?' 'Yes.' 'Put those things together.'" Now all this may be very ingenious; and there are only two objections to it. One objection is, that the laws of nature are *not* merely the established modes of the divine agency; and the other objection is, that sin cannot be said to take place simply according to "the usual laws of

nature." If it did, sin would be as much a law of nature as is gravitation. The theory—supernatural and theological as it undoubtedly is—is strongly naturalistic in its prime postulate. And the progress of the natural sciences, recognising in nature living, organising principles, as well as mere dynamic agencies from without, has dissolved the spell of this Newtonian formula, once so highly prized. Even as a theory of nature it is imperfect.

The biographer of Emmons has another way of explaining the theory of efficiency. Conceding (p. 387), that Emmons says that "God is the only efficient cause;" and that he also says, that "man is not the efficient cause" of his own acts; he meets the difficulty by the assurance, that "efficiency" has an entirely different sense in the two cases. According to this explanation, it seems, that when this "exact" divine says that "God is the only efficient cause," he means by "efficient"—"*independent*;" and when he says, that "man is not the efficient cause" of his choices, he means by the same word, "efficient," something totally different, viz., "*producing a volition by previously choosing to produce it*."* We had no idea that the word "efficient" had such a variety of significations; and the curiosity of the matter is, that in neither of these cases (the test cases of the system) does "efficient" mean anything like what it is usually supposed to mean. In the one case it means "independent," but that does not necessarily involve the idea of power; in the other case it means—an absurdity, a merely fictitious power. This explanation is doubtless well meant; but, as the careful and precise Emmons would say, it is "clogged with gravelling difficulties;" and we do not wonder that the biographer felt compelled to add "that his language on this theme is more nervous than perspicuous, more compressed than precise;" though we are still unable to divine how such use of language is any more "nervous" or "compressed," than it is "perspicuous" or "precise." And Emmons does not merely use the word efficient: he also employs a great variety of kindred terms. For example: "The Deity, therefore, is so far from *permitting* moral agents to act independently of himself, that, on the other hand, he puts forth a *positive influence* to make them act, in every instance of their conduct, just as he pleases." "Positive influence" here means the same as "efficient;" can it be translated by "independ-

* "The objector asks: Does not Emmons affirm that man is not the efficient cause of his own choices? He does, sometimes: but *then* he means by efficient cause, that agent who produces a volition by previously choosing to produce it." "But, rejoins the critic: Does not Emmons affirm or imply that God is the only efficient cause in the universe? He does. But here he uses the word *efficient* as denoting *independent*." (Memoir, p. 387.)

dent?" He adds: "Such a dependent creature could no more produce his own volitions than his own existence." Man's dependence is described as "universal and absolute." In fact, in enforcing this favourite theme, our logical and metaphysical theologian uses all the exact and scientific terms and phrases applicable to the subject. By interpreting his most definite phrases in an indefinite sense, there is some danger of obscuring his otherwise luminous utterances.

Another way in which it is attempted to obviate the objections to this obnoxious doctrine is in the statement that Dr Emmons did not mean to teach "the mode in which God secures the fulfilment of his decrees," but only the fact, that he does secure the fulfilment. But this reply (Memoir, pp. 417-419) seems to overlook the real point of the objection. Conversant as was Dr Emmons with the decrees of the Most High, he would doubtless have shrunk back from the position, that he knew how God creates all events and volitions. But the real objection is, that he identifies the divine agency in respect to all events, and all actions, whether good or bad. *How* he acted we do not know; but Emmons says, that, whatever be the mode, "his agency was concerned in *precisely the same manner* in their [men's] wrong, as in their right actions;" and "that there was no possible mode in which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts." (We were about to underscore these last words, but, upon reflection, think that it is quite unnecessary). Now, though Dr Emmons did not know just how God produces these volitions, yet one thing he did know, that he produces them by his direct efficiency, by immediate interposition, that in short he creates all sinful, as well as all holy volitions. But this leads us to the next topic in order—that is,

The agency of God in producing sin. His theory on this vital question is simply an application of his scheme of efficiency. The theodicy of this single-hearted and single-eyed divine is as simple, straightforward, unambiguous, unshrinking as is his conception of the divine agency. Sin is necessary to the greatest good; God, to manifest all his glory, must produce sin; this he does by creating sinful volitions. If men "need any kind or degree of divine agency in doing good, they need precisely the same kind in doing evil," (ii. p. 441). "He wrought as effectually in the minds of Joseph's brethren, when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared these persons to act, but he made them act. He not only exhibited motives before their minds, but disposed their minds to comply with the motives," (ii. p. 441). In the case of Saul, we have a more definite analysis. After

saying, that there was "a necessary and infallible connection between Saul's actions and motives," he adds, that "this certain connection could be owing to no other cause than a secret divine influence on his will, which gave energy and success to the motives which induced him to execute the designs of providence."* In the same sermon it is said, that "on this theory it is as easy to account for the first offence of Adam as for any other sin," which is undoubtedly a fact. After disposing of all other possibilities as insufficient, he adds: "As these and all other methods to account for the fall of Adam *by the instrumentality of second causes*, are insufficient to remove the difficulty, it seems necessary to have recourse to the divine agency, and to suppose that God wrought in Adam both to will and to do in his first transgression." "Satan placed certain motives before his mind, which by a divine energy took hold of his heart and led him into sin." In the same way it is argued that we can "easily account for the moral depravity of infants." After shewing that depravity cannot be "hereditary," he finds the "easy" solution of the supposed difficulty in the statement, that "in consequence of Adam's transgression, God brings his posterity into the world in a state of moral depravity. But how? The answer is easy. When God forms the souls of infants he forms them with moral powers, and makes them men in miniature. And being men in miniature, he works in them both to will and to do of his good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts, in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists." (By the way, we should like to have a thoroughgoing Emmonsite, if such there be, tell us, whether such an infant, whose sin is coeval with his moral being, has the natural ability to resist this agency of God in producing his first sin? If not, does not the natural ability fail at the fatal and decisive juncture?) In short, his doctrine is that "there is but one true and satisfactory answer to be given to the question which has been agitated for ages, *Whence came evil!*—and that is, *It came from the first cause of all things*," (ii. p. 683). And all these statements, which might be indefinitely multiplied, are reiterated in the most emphatic manner, and personally applied in the famous Pharaoh sermon,† leaving no doubt,

* Sermon on Man's Activity and Dependence Illustrated and Reconciled.

† God, he says, "determined to operate on his [Pharaoh's] heart itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in the view of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to let the people go, God stood by him and moved him to refuse. When Moses interceded for him, and procured him respite, God stood by him, and moved him to exult in his obstinacy. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him, and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions, he did at all times. He continually hardened his heart, and governed all the exercises of his mind, from the day of his birth to the day of

one would think, as to the real sentiments of this plainest and simplest and most literal of preachers—or, as Emmons used the phrase,—of this “sentimental preacher,” meaning a man who, like Paul, preached plainly and metaphysically at the same time. The amount of the matter is this—that he uniformly avoids making any distinctions as to the mode of the divine agency. He identifies that agency in the material and moral world; he identifies it in respect to both sin and holiness. He makes no distinctions upon the points where the theologians of all ages have been most perplexed and most careful, viz., the different modes of the divine operations. God in his view always acts as a sheer creative energy. Sin is the product of the divine efficiency.

But yet we are informed, on venerable authority, that the views of this straightforward divine, who wrote “plain sermons for plain people,” have been, on this point, extensively misunderstood and misrepresented. His general doctrine of divine efficiency, and the natural interpretation of his language, as above cited, undoubtedly favour the current misapprehension. Logic demanded of him to make just these statements; and he made them. But we are told, that he said God “created evil,” because the “Bible” used this phraseology. Is it not rather to be said, that he used the Biblical phrase, because it is so pertinent and exact? He says, “Texts ought not to be adduced to explain *first principles*, but first principles are to be adduced to explain and establish the sense of every text of Scripture;” and the first of all his first principles was undoubtedly that of the divine agency. And why, too, did he not lay equal stress on other words and phrases of the Bible, which suggest an entirely different view of God’s agency in respect to sin? Manifestly, because these phrases were not so congruous with his radical theory. And, yet again, Emmons on this point does not merely quote the language of Scripture; quite as frequently he uses the most precise scientific and metaphysical phraseology—“cause,” “produce,” “make,” “efficient cause,” “positive influence,” “immediate interposition,” “without the instrumentality of second causes,” and the

his death. This was absolutely necessary to prepare him for his final state. All other methods, without this, would have failed of fitting him for destruction.” One of the most ingenious parts of the Memoir is the running commentary given by Dr Park (pp. 409–411) to these hard sayings, transferring them *εις ἄλλα γινώσκ*; interpreting them as Biblical and intense; illustrating one of his own criticisms, that such explanations are “at the expense of Emmons’s immaculate reputation for perspicuity; and also giving point to an anecdote which he repeats, about a preacher who took for his text, “God hardened Pharaoh’s heart,” and announced as the proposition of his discourse, that the Lord did not harden Pharaoh’s heart; and on leaving the church was asked, “Which his hearers must believe, his sermon or his text?”

like. The philosophical vocabulary of his age has hardly a word or phrase, denoting direct causal agency, which he does not apply to the case of God's relation to sin.

We are also assured (Memoir, p. 405), that when this 'ardent' and 'intense' logician tells us, "it is extremely difficult to conceive how he [Adam] should be led into sin without the *immediate interposition* of the Deity," that by "interposition" is here meant only "an interposition of new influences, or a *change* of the former influences." But "immediate interposition" is surely more than "influence;" it is the direct agency of God, which Emmons *defines* "as the willing or choosing a thing to exist," (iv. 379). And so, too, when this "perspicuous" theologian affirms that Adam's sin cannot be accounted for "by the instrumentality of second causes," we are told (p. 405), that "he means the mere *influence of motives, &c., without any attendant and governing agency of God.*" How much the slight "*&c.*" so carelessly thrown in, may be meant to mean, we cannot of course conjecture; but if it does not mean a great deal more than all the rest of the passage, this interpretation reduces "second causes" to a very insignificant affair. Did not Emmons mean to include the will, as well as motives, in these second causes? He himself says, "there is no *possible* way in which God could dispose men to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volition in their hearts." Which shall we believe, the definite dogma or the indefinite interpretation? Such explanations dint and blunt the edge of our acutest divine's sharpest sayings.

Another attempt is made to obviate this fatal difficulty in the scheme of this most "consistent Calvinist," by resolving his theory of divine agency into the more general doctrines of decrees and providence (Memoir, p. 407). Thus, when Emmons says that God makes Adam's posterity sinners "*by directly operating on the hearts of children, when they first become moral agents*" (ii. p. 263), this is interpreted as meaning, that "the divine *agency* keeps pace with the divine *determination*; that the *providence* of God embraces the same *principles*, and has the *same extent*, with the decrees of God; that there is no more objection to the doctrine of divine *efficiency* securing the *occurrence* of all things than to the doctrine of divine *purposes* securing the *certainty* of all things." This seems plausible, until we reflect that it does not touch the point of the difficulty. The difficulty is—that God is said to make men sinners; the reply here suggested is, that there is no more objection to his making them so, than to his decreeing to make them so; which of course is true. There is the same difficulty about his decreeing to make them sinners as about his making them sinners. The real question is, whether

God does decree to *make* them sinners by his own act? Is God's providence simply and solely God's direct agency? In short, if "providence" and "certainty," in this explanation, mean the same with "agency" and "efficiency," the difficulty is not answered, but only re-affirmed; and if "providence" and "certainty" mean any thing more extensive than "efficiency," then the explanation is inconsistent with Emmons's fundamental doctrine.* The turning point about his system is in this very question, whether providence is to be resolved into efficiency, or efficiency into providence. He says the former, and this apology interprets him as meaning the latter. But, "to vouch this is no proof, without more certain and more overt test."

One of the tests of the way in which a system is really held, is the mode in which objections to it are met and answered. The same objections were made to the theory of Emmons, while he yet lived, as are now strongly felt and urged. Did he reply to them as his present defenders reply? If so, he held the system as they defend it; if not, not. Thus we are assured that he "neither used nor tolerated the phrase" that God is "the author of sin."† Though this denial is not contained in

* "None can have a full and just idea of the universality and perfection of divine providence, without considering God as governing all moral agents in their moral conduct, by a powerful and irresistible influence. It is a *gross absurdity* to suppose that the providence of God is more extensive than his agency, or that he ever governs men without exerting a positive influence over them." (Emmons's Works, iv. 372.)

† A venerable and distinguished Massachusetts divine, after reading the article of Dr Pond in our last number, sent us a communication on this point, from which we make a few extracts, omitting some of the quotations from Emmons, which we have already made. "Dr Pond says: 'Dr Emmons is charged with holding that God is, in the strictest and most proper sense of the term, the *author of sin*. But this is an unfounded allegation. That the providence of God is somehow concerned in the existence of evil, he certainly did hold. But he believed that every man is the responsible *actor* or *actor* of his own sin; and the phrase, *God the author of sin*, he never used.' But the English term *actor* is not derived from the Latin word *actor*, though here very shrewdly used as synonymous with it; *author* is derived from *actor*. Let it be, then, that God is not the *actor* of man's sin; yet in the opinion of Dr E. he is the *actor*, the *author*. For what is the meaning of *author* 'in the strictest and most proper sense of the term?' Dr Webster, in his Dictionary, defines *author* as 'one who produces, creates, or brings into being;' also the beginner, former, or first mover of anything; hence the *efficient cause* of a thing.' Now, what is the language of Dr Emmons in respect to the cause of sin? Is it not in its plain, obvious meaning the same, as if he had said, 'God is the *author* of sin?' The following are his words: 'Moral agents can never act, but only as they are acted upon by a divine operation.' (Works, iv. 357, ed. 1842.) 'Adam's first sin was a *free*, voluntary exercise, *produced* by a divine operation in the view of motives.' He represents God as the *efficient cause* of all the wicked actions of men; for he says, 'Whether men have a good or *bad* intention in acting, God has always a good design in *causing* them to act as they do' (iv. 373). 'The Deity is so far from permitting moral agents to act independently of himself, that he puts forth a *positive influence* to *make* them act, in every instance of their conduct just as he pleases' (iv. 381). There can be no mistake of his meaning, that God *causes* the actions of all men, the most wicked

any of his published writings, yet we can readily accept it, because the word "author" is ambiguous; and he uses only unambiguous phrases. Thus he certainly was wont to defend outright, without qualification, the position that "God is the efficient cause of sin;" and the only difference of the two phrases is, that the latter expresses his real idea more definitely. On page 454 of the Memoir is a reported conversation of Dr Emmons on this very topic; and the amount of it is, that instead of retracting or modifying his statements, he reiterates his position in various forms; as, *e. g.*, "God's will is creative;" "he has only to put forth a volition, and the event takes place;" his "will was creative" when he "willed sin to exist." And then, explicitly: "My theory is that *God causes moral evil in the act of willing it.*" Here are certainly no "ambages or circumgyrations;" he marches right up to the mark, and does not qualify by even an "immediate interposition" of "influences," and "motives," and other psychological and providential phenomena. So, too, when pressed by the objection, that if "God produces our moral exercises, then they must be his," he responds, that there is no foundation for this conclusion, since our moral exercises are *productions* of the divine power, and not *emanations* of the *divine nature*;" that is, all that he excludes is pantheism (Sermon on Man's Activity, &c.); he allows that God's power produces them, but says that they are not of the same nature with God—and this is his chief defence. He likewise asserts, that "it is as consistent with the moral rectitude of the Deity to produce sinful, as holy exercises in the minds of men. His operations and their voluntary exercises are totally *distinct*." Undoubtedly; but still he holds that the "exercises," though distinct, are produced by God's "operations." In another passage he meets a kindred difficulty by suggesting that "God's secret will respects one thing, but his

as well as the good, for he said just previously that God must necessarily determine beforehand 'how he will *work* in us both to will and to do,' and 'how we shall will and do through every period of our existence.' Thus, too, he asserts, that 'the criminality of men does not consist in the *cause* of their evil desires, affections, designs, and volitions, but in their evil desires, affections, designs, and volitions themselves' (iv. 374). After reading this plain language of Dr Emmons, and much more in the same strain, as to God's 'being the cause' of all the wicked actions of men, and of the devil and his angels too, for his words as quoted include 'all moral agents' in the universe as being '*made to act*' in every instance '*just as God pleases*'; and after reading also his sermon 'on the Scriptural Account of the Devil,' I feel constrained to remark, that he has written a very good sermon on the devil, but a very bad sermon concerning God; for he well maintains from the Scriptures the personality and agency of the devil; but he ascribes to the agency and efficiency of God the *production* of the sin of the devil and of all the sin in the world, whereas God himself warns us by his apostle James, 'Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God,' and teaches us by his apostle John, 'He that committeth sin is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning.'

revealed will respects another ;" his secret will, whereby he ordains and produces the sin, respects "the taking place of things;" his revealed will, in which sin is prohibited and condemned, has respect "to the moral quality of things." "Sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another" (iv. 292). And he therefore concludes, that God, with entire consistency, can both produce and punish sin. Now, it is indeed true that a distinction can be made between the "nature of sin" and the "taking place of sin;" but no distinction can be made between the act of sin and the taking place of sin—especially on Emmons's theory, which makes all sin consist in act. And, he expressly asserts, that each act of sin is produced by God, and that each act of sin is in its own nature sinful. "Put these two things together." And even though it be alleged, that it is produced by God for his own glory—this only makes the matter still worse. For the glory of God is in his holiness; sin is the opposite of holiness; the opposite of holiness is then necessary to holiness. The distinction at the basis of his argument is illusory. But such argumentation shews what a terrible power there may be in logic to blind the minds of even the best men in respect to the most awful and vital themes. The sharp logician is tempted to mistake an abstract distinction for a real difference. But our object here is not so much to debate this point as to shew how Emmons defends his system, in contrast with the mode adopted by some of his advocates. His defence uniformly presupposes that divine efficiency is ultimate and absolute; his modern defenders suppose that this efficiency is to be explained away. They say that by efficient he means independent, but he says that efficiency is a productive energy; they say his phrases are Biblical, and he defends them as exact; they resolve his efficiency into providence, he resolves providence into efficiency; they suggest a double sense from which his simple common sense would have instinctively recoiled; they interpret his most definite propositions as "forceful rhetorical turns;" and the turns are "forceful," and they are "rhetorical," but they are also strictly logical. Emmons, in short, rests ultimately upon a theological basis, and his advocates upon certain assumed ethical maxims.

And yet it is claimed, that he held to "Exercises" as well as "efficiency." "The Exercise Scheme," says Dr Ide, "is by common consent his." And this leads us to the next point in discussion—the other half of the system. While he brings his Calvinism under the term Efficiency, he defends under the name of Exercises those views in mental and moral philosophy, which the pressure of some New England speculations had led him to adopt. And here are several of his most startling positions; those in which he is at war with the Calvinistic tradi-

tion. He is as strenuous, logical, and dogmatic on this side as he is on the other. He counts his postulates to be axiomatic. He fully believes them to be not only consistent with, but deductions from his stern Calvinism. He does not think that he is holding two schemes, but only one. And our general position here is this—that whoever adopts his Exercise Scheme must, if logical, also adopt his main inferences from it; and that his exercise scheme is made Calvinistic only by his theory of Divine Efficiency. In all this, the Franklin divine is by far the most logical and consistent theologian that New England has produced. In relation, too, to tendencies current in his times, his positions were carefully and consistently taken. He wanted to defend Calvinism equally against Antinomianism, Arminianism, and Universalism. His exercise scheme was to extirpate the Antinomians; while the divine efficiency, in combination with the exercises, was to root out all Arminians and Universalists.

What now are these Exercises on which so much depends? "Exercise" is the generic word, by which Emmons denotes all mental and moral states, or rather acts; for he does not recognise a spiritual state, which is not an activity. Some interpret him as implying, that the soul itself is only these exercises. Each exercise, he says, is simple and single, produced, of course, by the divine agency. The moral exercises, those of the heart or will (which Emmons does not sunder),* are termed Volitions. These volitions, and volitions alone, have a moral character; each one of them is either perfectly holy or perfectly sinful.† There is no character in anything preceding these volitions (in any antecedent taste, bias, principle, or disposition), for the cogent reason, that there is no such taste or bias, about which we can know or affirm anything. Each of these volitions, still further, is created perfectly free; and a man that has them can do as he has a mind to. Volitions, and volitions alone, are the subjects of moral approbation or disapprobation, of reward or punishment. God's moral government knows nothing about anything else.

Such being the character of these voluntary acts—several "interesting" conclusions follow. (1.) There is no original sin, in the sense of hereditary depravity. Adam committed the only strictly original sin that this world ever knew. That is, the only mere man, who, according to the doctrine of the church, had no original sin, is, according to Emmons, the only

* The taste men first made the articulate distinction between the heart and the will. See Burton's *Essays* (a book too little known), pp. 19, 53, 84, *et passim*.

† Hopkins also said (*System*, i. 129): "Every moral action is either perfectly holy or perfectly sinful."

one who ever had any. "All sin is sinning." (2.) There was original righteousness, in the strictest sense, in Adam. God created him holy. "It is agreeable to the nature of virtue, or holiness to be created." (See his Sermon on the Primitive Rectitude of Adam.) He adds, that holiness is "something which has a real and positive existence, and which not only *may*, but *must* be created." "Adam could not be the efficient cause of his own volition." "God not only *might*, but *must* have created Adam either holy or unholy." (3.) There is, and can be, no imputation, either of sin or of righteousness. Each man, or rather each volition, stands or falls for itself alone. Men are indeed "constituted" sinners in consequence of Adam's sin; but solely in virtue of a divine, sovereign "constitution," and not at all as a moral, still less as a legal, procedure; for all that is moral is in single volitions, and not in any generic constitution.* So, too, by the strictest parity of reasoning, there cannot be any imputation of Christ's righteousness—for all holiness is in the individual volitions, and in nothing else. (4.) It equally follows, in the way of logic, that justification is simply forgiveness or pardon, and does not include or involve any title to eternal life. (5.) The theory itself expressly declares that each volition must be perfectly holy or perfectly sinful. This, to be sure, is against all consciousness, and could never be proved, either from Scripture, or by induction. But the logic demands it—and if the facts do not correspond, so much the worse for such very illogical facts. Some other "entertaining sentiments," as Hopkins would call them, might be deduced from this same theory; but these are enough to exhibit the character and bearings of the speculation, and to warrant a more particular inquiry into its grounds and reasons.

Materialists hold that the mind is a modification of matter—matter acting in certain modes—the substance, however, being distinct and distinguishable from its activities. Almost all ancient and modern spiritual psychologists agree in the positions, that the mind or soul is a simple essence, having its proper qualities or faculties, and that its activities or exercises are the manifestation of this essence and these properties. That is, both materialists and spiritualists make a distinction between the substance and its qualities, and between both of these and their activities or exercises; and this seems agree-

* In his own singular phraseology: "By constituting Adam the public head of his posterity, God suspended their holiness and sinfulness upon his conduct. So that his holiness would *constitutionally* render them holy, and his sinfulness would *constitutionally* render them unholy." *Constitutional* here means a sovereign constitution or plan of God. In modern Hopkinsianism, constitution is used for what is human, in old Hopkinsianism for a divine arrangement.

able to common sense and the nature of things. Almost all, too, carry this distinction out in such a way, that they say of any beings or substances, existing in time, that the essence is or may be before the manifestation; that the activity is the product of, and of course is possibly subsequent to, the essence, attributes, or tendencies. Distinguishable in thought, they may also be in the order of time—so far forth as they are finite. The peculiarity, now, of Emmons's metaphysics and psychology on this point is, that he refuses to recognise, or at least to apply, these fundamental distinctions. He identifies the soul with its energies; tendencies with activities; taste or principle with exercises; the heart with the will; the will with volitions; and, in the last analysis, essence with phenomena. The popular and bungling phrase about his theory is, that he maintained that the soul is a chain or series of exercises.* Professor Park (Mem. 412) attempts to shield him on this point from the felicitous and well-aimed shaft of the New Haven professors (cited, *ibid.* p. 420); but all that his quotations prove is—that nobody could use the English language and be consistent with such a theory. And in fact, the theory is demanded by the whole spirit of Emmons's theology. If there was anything which he hated with a pure theological odium, it was Arminianism; if there was anything which he loved with an intense theological affection (next to his moral love for God and his neighbour) it was Efficiency and Exercises—efficiency in behalf of God, and exercises in view of man. Now if he could only contrive to make this love and this hatred work into one system, he might well say, speaking theologically, “I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; henceforth,” &c. Such an accomplishment was worthy of a strenuous theory, even if a point were strained in making it. The main difficulty was in reconciling his love for Exercises, with his hatred to Arminianism; and this on two points. Arminians held, with him, that all sin and holiness are in exercises; they also held, being seduced thereto by common sense, that there is a soul with all its power and tendencies, before the exercises; and, since there is no sin except in exercises, they concluded—being heretics, that such a soul, before it acted, was in an innocent or neutral state. Now it would never do for a strict Calvinist to grant this—and yet, says Emmons, all sin is sinning, and

* Dr Dwight, it is well known, wrote an able sermon on this theme. It is generally supposed that Emmons was meant; but we recollect seeing some years since, a statement that the President of Yale had in mind some body nearer New Haven—the younger Edwards. If this be so, it shews that in the Exercise Scheme, as well as on the Atonement, and the happiness theory of ethics, and the position that man has physical ability to overcome his moral inability, the younger Edwards, unlike his father, was a forerunner of much modern Edwardeanism.

all holiness is active love. Here is the emergency, and "the giant" (as Professor Park calls him) shewed himself equal to the task. He just said—God creates volitions—and the thing was done: Gioberti's formula, *Deus creat existentias*, is not more keen. That is—no tendencies before acts, for if there were, those tendencies must be neutral,* which leads to Arminianism; but, if there may be a soul, before an act, then there may be tendencies before activities—consequently, no soul before an act; but, there must be a soul before an act, if the category of essence and attributes be rational and ultimate—consequently this category must be ignored.† And in all this, Emmons is eminently "consistent." To be sure, a fundamental idea of the human mind is set aside, and one application of the law of causality is slurred over—but what is that, compared with the rout of the Arminians, and the triumph of supralapsarian Calvinism, combined with a steadfast adherence to the Exercise scheme? His theory is, that God creates the soul in creating its exercises; that he brings every descendant of Adam into being a sinner, in consequence of Adam's sin. Man's personal and moral being, and his sinning, are simultaneous. "It is impossible," he says, to "conceive of a corrupt and sinful nature, *prior to*, and *distinct from*, corrupt and sinful exercises." Why not? Not merely, as is now held, because all sin must consist in act; but for the profounder reason, that the very soul consists of activities. He saw that he could not, as a good metaphysician and logician, defend the former position without advancing the latter. Here was his strategic point.

In other words, though Emmons denied original sin, yet he did it in an entirely different sense from that of modern Hopkinsianism. He did it on the basis of a wholly different metaphysic and psychology. Holding that there was no soul except in volitions, he could afford to say, there is no original sin, for the conclusive reason that his theory does not recognise any moral and personal being, of whom such original sin could be predicated. (What might possibly become of the foetus, if it died before it got a soul, is here the unanswered question.) He could very well say, and did say, that as soon

* Hopkins preceded Emmons in the attempt to explain what came before the exercises as a "neutral" ground; but he at last seemed inclined to resolve it into a mere divine constitution. Emmons saw that this was the only consistent course.

† "We are conscious," says Emmons, "of having perception, reason, conscience, memory, and volition. These are the essential properties of the soul, and in these properties the essence of the soul consists; we can form no conception of the soul as distinct from these properties, or as the foundation of them." "All we know about body are its properties; and all we know about mind are its properties."

as there is a real human being, it is sinful, because it is created in the act of sinning—the soul is caught in the very act. And thus his theory enables him to be very strenuous about the connection between Adam's sin and ours. But the whole state of the case was entirely altered, when Berkleianism was supplanted by the Scotch philosophy, and the distinctions between the soul and its exercises, between tendencies and voluntary acts, between the heart and the will, were reinstated in their rational right. The Exercise scheme became another scheme, in its sense, its bearings, and its results. It was cut loose from its Calvinistic moorings; it was divorced from the divine efficiency. The divine element was eliminated, and the human will, in the construction of the system, took the place of the divine will. Modern Emmonism is thus as different from the old scheme as democracy from imperialism, or Congregationalism from the Papacy, or psychology from metaphysics, or ethics from divinity, or the human will from the divine. The same phrases may be used, but there is another sense; there may be, to outward seeming, the same eye-ball, but another soul looks out; the hands feel like the hands of Jacob, but the voice is the voice of Esau.

This same point is also established by Emmons's theory of Natural Ability. He undoubtedly made very sweeping statements about ability. He must do so, if any room was to be left for human freedom and responsibility in face of the divine efficiency. If men would only accept the efficiency, he could afford to talk strongly about their exercises. He emphasized the abstract possibility of a different volition from the one actually created. Thus there was a seeming freedom left. He exaggerated ability in phrases, just as he exaggerated efficiency in fact. But it is after all a shadowy realm. And his attempts at reconciliation are equally ingenious and unsatisfactory. His "joints" are the nice juxtaposition of atoms, rather than the junction of an organism by vital nerves and living bands. Here, too, his formulas are simple and comprehensive: God creates volitions; volitions are in their very nature free. "The Deity, by working in men both to will and to do, lays them under an absolute necessity of acting freely," (iv. 351). God's "acting on men's hearts and producing all their free voluntary moral exercises, necessarily makes them moral agents," (iv. 385). "The first volition of every created agent must have had a cause altogether involuntary;" it "not only may but must be created." Adam, for example, "could no more produce his own volitions than his own existence. A self-determining power is an independent power, which never was, and never could be given to Adam." To objectors he replies thus: "I teach that God creates within

us free moral exercises. Can they say, that exercises which are *created free* are not free? One of my opposers once said in a sermon, that an exercise which is not self-originated cannot be voluntary, and if it is made free it is not free. But this man was by birth an Irishman." Does not the divine who thus replies to the "Irishman" seem to imply, that if *he* says they were "*created free*," that that settles the matter, and the difficulty? His statements in respect to ability, too, are equally emphatic with those about the freedom of volition. "Every sinner is as *able* to embrace the gospel, as a *thirsty* man is to drink water." They are "*as able* to do *right* as to do *wrong*." "Men always have natural power to frustrate those divine decrees which they are appointed to fulfil," (iv. 304). And this he conceives to be consistent with the position, that men "cannot originate a single thought, affection, or volition, independently of a divine influence upon their minds," (iv. 397).

How, now, are these resolute statements about dependence and freedom, ability and inability, to be understood? Does Emmons mean to teach the current doctrine of self-determination, of self-originated choices? He expressly repudiates it as Arminian. Does he mean to teach, that man, before action, has a faculty of will, which is the cause of volition, so that volition is its proper effect? This he expressly denies under two aspects. He, in the first place, identifies will and volition: will, he says, "never properly means a principle, or power, or faculty of the mind; but *only choice, action, or volition*." And, in the second place, he denies the position, that free agency consists in a power to originate voluntary exercises: many imagine that their free agency consists in a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises; but this would imply that they are independent of God" . . . who is the primary cause of every free voluntary exercise in every human heart." And then he adds,—which shews us just how the whole thing stood in his mind: "But this is consistent with man's *having* [not, producing] free voluntary exercises, which is *the essence of free agency*." That is, if we truly *have* them, no matter how we come by them, they are all free. He sharpens this position: "A power to act without choosing to act would be of no advantage to them, if they possessed it. But they do not possess such a power, neither does God possess such a power." The possession of this power is the emphatic point in the modern theories of the will, where it is represented as essential to praise and blame, to holiness and sin. But the metaphysics and psychology of Emmons, as well as his efficiency scheme, are irreconcilable with this view. Freedom with him is simply an attribute of a given volition; given a volition, it is free, whatever

be its cause.* His view of freedom is so low, that he even says, that *animals are free agents*: "*The animal creation are free agents, because they act of choice,*" (iv. 380). That is, free agency is found as really in the natural as in the spiritual sphere. Hence all that is necessary to freedom, is to have a volition produced—no matter how. Hence, too, he could, and did say, that God's producing these volitions lays man "*under an absolute necessity of acting freely.*" He also said, that volitions "are virtuous or vicious in their own nature, without the least regard to the cause by which they are produced," (see his whole argument on Adam's Primitive Rectitude, Works, iv. 447, *seq.*): but some of his disciples say just the opposite, viz., that unless we produce them, with full power to the contrary, they cannot be praiseworthy or blameworthy.

His theory of "physical" or natural ability (not of "power to the contrary") runs back of course into this theory of freedom. He generally uses the word ability in an external sense, as meaning the power of doing as one pleases. Sometimes, however, it denotes with him the abstract possibility of a different choice. But choice itself, he distinctly says, is dependent on something else besides this natural power: "Two things are absolutely necessary in order to men's acting; one is to be able, and the other is to be willing. By being able is meant a natural power to act; and by being willing a moral power to act," (iv. 305). And this "moral power" is what God confers in "producing" the exercises. If both are "absolutely necessary," then the natural power without the moral would seem to be insufficient. But he is not always faithful to this view. He sometimes talks as if the natural power alone were sufficient, or as if the natural ability could produce the moral power.† He presses this point verbally so as to demand the advanced position, taken by some of his followers. His natural ability had in fact no hold, or substance, no background to support it; a possible volition without a real will and a real soul, was a mere abstraction. But as soon as a soul with all its powers and capacities was brought in, the whole

* Hopkins held the same view. "Herein consists man's freedom, and his choice is a choice, or his will a will. Although he be not the cause, original mover, or efficient agent of the choice, yet it is his being produced in him" (System, i. ch. iv). What do modern Hopkinsians say to his position, that persons "may be moral agents, and sin, without knowing what the law of God is, or of what nature their exercises are, and while they have no consciousness that they are wrong?" (i. 339.)

† One sentence strikingly illustrates the curious results to which his novel phraseology sometimes led. "If they (men) were willing as well as able to defeat his (God's) purposes, they certainly would defeat them," (iv. 305). It is usually thought that wicked men are quite willing to, but cannot; Emmons says, they can, but are not willing. What sort of an "ability" is that?

aspect and bearings of the theory were altered. The divine efficiency was driven back. Though Emmons's own doctrines of philosophical necessity and divine efficiency kept him from affirming a self-determining power of the will; yet he so exalted natural power, in theory, that it became proud and boastful, broke loose from the divine efficiency, and set up for itself. In breaking loose from divine efficiency it also broke loose from Emmons. In hypostatizing a real faculty of will, in affirming self-determination, in asserting that natural ability of itself is enough (as simple power) to account for the volition, the new scheme is unfaithful to the real spirit of Emmons; it retains his phraseology and alters its sense; it keeps the exercises and denies the efficiency that produces them. The modern theory demands a pause, as it were, between the divine agency and man's act, so that man may have a chance to choose; while Emmons says, the divine agency makes the volition. The human will, instead of the divine, is the constructive idea of the new system. And yet, it is pretended that the systems are the same on the essential points. Just as if Emmons, and men of his stamp, spent their days in exalting the human will! The difficulty with him was in reconciling human freedom with his main dogma of divine efficiency: the difficulty with the moderns is to reconcile even decrees and providence with their dogma of the power to the contrary. God was the soul of the one system; man is the measure of the other. And as to Emmons' mode of reconciling dependence and free agency, to which two of his most noted sermons are devoted—the process consists in stating clearly and sharply both points, God's universal agency, and the freedom of volitions, and then saying, that the divine efficiency creates the volitions free. In one passage, he also says, that the two truths cannot clash, because they fall under the cognizance of different faculties—the dependence under "reason," and the freedom under "common sense." But this is a merely external remark. The chief solution is in the simple doctrine of efficiency. This is no solution, it is simply assertion. We cannot accept it, even though he also asserts, that the denial of it is "either open infidelity or impious blasphemy," (iv. 386).

The most startling, yet logical, application of the Exercise scheme is, however, to the doctrine of Justification, in relation to the rewards of a future life. The atonement of Christ, it says, directly procured only the forgiveness of sins. Justification consists in this forgiveness. Emmons held indeed to the Protestant doctrine that justification is "the gift of the giver," and not "the reward of the worker;" but he held this just because he limited justification to pardon. Hopkins re-

tained both the active and passive obedience of Christ ; * Emmons not only denied the active obedience, but he also denied that justification confers a title to eternal life. He shrunk from no conclusions, which his exercise theory imposed. Dr Spring of Newburyport, and most of the older New England divines, here parted company with him ; † but he stuck to his thesis (the title of one of his sermons)—*Holy Obedience the Only Title to Eternal Life*—not because obedience “merits” life, for the creature cannot merit anything of the Creator, but because it makes us “worthy of approbation ;” it is a “reward of grace.” There is an “Essential difference,” he says, between the ground of God’s justifying [pardoning] men, and the ground on which he rewards with eternal life.” “He forgives them solely on the ground of Christ’s atonement, but he rewards them solely on the ground of their good works.” The contrary opinion is “not only an error, but a palpable absurdity.” And, on his exercise theory, it is so. For, if all that is moral, all that is the subject of moral judgments, praise or blame, reward or penalty, is in individual volitions, and in these alone, then it is a “palpable absurdity” to say that Christ’s merits can confer on other beings “a title to eternal life.” In logic, “holy obedience is the only title to eternal life.” He is right in saying that “there is no propriety in using the term *merits of Christ*.” This, to be sure, cuts deep into the Christian system ; but it is the inevitable and inexorable logic of the theory. The same definitions that define away original sin are also incompatible with the proper

* Hopkins says : “The law could not be fulfilled by Jesus Christ without his suffering the penalty of it, and obeying it perfectly.” “Atonement consists in fulfilling the *penal* part of the law by *suffering* to provide the way for *pardon* only ; while *meritorious obedience* is such conformity to the perceptive part of the law as procures *positive righteousness*.” The remission of sins, he asserts, would be “a very partial redemption ;” it was therefore necessary that Christ should obey the precepts of the law for man, and in his stead, that by his perfect and meritorious obedience he might honour the law in the perceptive parts of it, and obtain all the positive favours and benefits which were needed.” “When a sinner is justified, he is *pardoned* on account of the *atonement*, and *accepted* as a just one on account of the *meritorious obedience* of his substitute” (System, i., pp. 468, 198–9, &c.) Emmons, on the contrary, was averse to the phrase—“the merits of Christ.”

† In connection with this matter, a good anecdote is told in the Memoir (p. 456) of the following “laconic, magisterial, and patronizing” epistle, sent to Dr Emmons :—“May 1. My dear brother, I have read your sermon on the Atonement, and have wept over it. Yours affectionately, A. B. C.” To which he at once replied.—“May 3. Dear sir, I have read your letter, and laughed at it. Yours, Nath’l Emmons.” The divine who wrote this epistle is understood to be Dr Griffin. We are assured, on direct authority, that there must be some mistake about this anecdote ; that Dr Emmons, on being questioned about it, said, that though he received from Dr Griffin a letter on this subject, he did not reply to it. He also said that the amount of the letter was that the doctrine of his (Emmons’s) sermon on the Atonement “robbed the believer of half his Saviour.”

doctrine of justification. Adam and Christ stand together. If Adam's sin is only the "occasion" of our sin, then is Christ's righteousness only the "occasion" of our righteousness. If there is no moral nexus in the one case, there can be none in the other—on the "consistent" exercise theory. Though Emmons sometimes concedes that Christ's death is the "occasion" of God's granting innumerable favours to mankind, yet, speaking strictly, he says: "God grants regenerating grace to whom he pleases, as an act of mere sovereignty, without any particular respect to the death or atonement of Christ." Such a statement as this, in connection with his view about our "being rewarded solely on the ground of good works," is a sad illustration of the power of an unbending logic, when based upon a partial theory. It emphatically indicates, that Christ has not that central and comprehensive position in this theoretic scheme, which he has in the Scriptures, and in the experience of believers. We say, in the *theoretic scheme*, because we would not for an instant imply that Emmons did not fully believe all that the Scriptures assert about Christ. But his theory obliged him to assign to Christ only the position of removing the obstacle to forgiveness, and then to let a mere moral system (the exercises, as containing all that is moral) run on its own course—having indeed respect to Christ, as, in the divine decree, the occasion of blessings, but not as their meritorious source and ground. The matter lay in his mind thus: the sinner must first get through with the decree of election, and then he may trust in Christ. Thus in his compendious statement of his own views, we read (Memoir, p. 428): "That sinners must exercise unconditional submission to God *before* they can exercise faith in Christ." Love and repentance both come before faith in Christ (Memoir, pp. 366–7). In his dread of Antinomianism, he ran into the counter extreme. As his exercises lacked a psychology, so was his theology deficient in its Christology.

The two other points that characterise the system of Emmons, he shares with the body of the old Hopkinsians, as they are usually interpreted—viz., that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; and that unconditional submission, in the form of a willingness to be lost (damned), is the fitting test of regeneration. As the divine agency is the efficient cause of all events and acts, so is the divine glory the final cause or end of the system; and the ultimate reason for the existence of sin is, that it is necessary to manifest the full declarative glory of the Most High: sin is in this sense the necessary means of the greatest good. And if that divine glory demands our everlasting condemnation, we must be submissive to it: if

need be, we ought to be willing to be condemned for ever. And thus Emmons did not falter or waver in his logic. He was thoroughly consistent with his fundamental assumptions in all their deductions. In apology for his position about sin as the necessary "means" of the greatest good, it is suggested that by "means" he only means "occasion" (Memoir, p. 403). But the word "occasion" seems too indefinite to express his accurate meaning. Though he did not assert that sin is the direct means of good, in its own nature (it could not be this, since it is essentially evil), yet he certainly did maintain that it is necessary to the full manifestation of the glory of God—so necessary, that God created it for this end. His plain position is, "that there is the same kind, if not the same degree, of necessity in the divine mind, to create sinful, as to create holy beings;" that "all the goodness of God in all its branches could not have been displayed if natural and *moral* evil had not existed;" and again, "if God meant to display all his goodness in creation, he was obliged to bring into being objects upon which he might display both his justice and mercy," (iv. 254). Does the indefinite word "occasion" express the sum of these statements? Nor is this all, for he even goes so far in his inferences as to say (iv. 374), that though men are bound to repent of their own criminality, yet, "since all their sinful conduct may be ascribed to God, who ordained it for his own glory, and whose agency was concerned in it, *they have no reason to be sorry that any evil action or event took place.*" He illustrates it by the case of Joseph's brethren, who, when they saw the good accomplished by the selling of their brother, "could not have been sorry for this, without being sorry for God's conduct," &c. This is surely sufficiently explicit, and it shews that he could hardly have used the term "occasion" to express his own position in its real sense. So, too, as to the "willingness to be damned," as the phrase runs. He did not, we are told, really mean, or say, "damned;" he only said "lost"—a milder word of the same import. This theory is also resolved by his defenders into the general duty of submission (the caption under which the Memoir discussed it is, "Harmony of Disinterested Submission to with Love to Self"). Very true—it is submission; but it is submission, not in a general, but in a very definite and peculiar form—at war with the primary instinct of self-love as well as with the benevolence and grace of the gospel. God never demanded of any creature to be willing to be lost. And no ingenuity of deduction can warrant such a terrible questioning and torture of the soul. It is a logical rack, and not a scriptural test. The most ingenious explanation of the theory is that of Emmons himself in his reply to Stuart (Memoir, pp. 397-400); and his argu-

ment shews that he included in this test not only the willingness to suffer pain, but also the willingness to be in a "*future*" state of "disobedience and rebellion." And this settles the matter as far as Christian consciousness and the Bible are concerned. It is a self-subversive and revolting test of a regenerate condition. The test includes a bribe ; for, if we are willing to be lost, we never shall be. And this fearful test is the inexorable logic of the combined efficiency and exercise schemes.

And this rigid and consistent scheme was not confined to the closet of the student, and the discussions of a theological class, but it was enforced as the measure and standard of religious experience; it was made the touch-stone of the new life. Emmons himself, we are told, "adopted the new theology and experienced the new birth at one and the same time" (Memoir, p. 37) ; and the disciples were as the master. In this, too, he was a faithful exponent of some New England tendencies ; the most abstruse and metaphysical dogmas have there been worked into the heart and life, as nowhere else in the world. The abstractions of theological systems have been the turning point in the renewal of the soul. No other people ever passed through such a process. And not more than one generation, even of New England men and women, could bear the scrutiny of the searching dogmas of Emmons. They were too much even for regenerate human nature, as yet sanctified only in part. And if too bitter for saints, what must they have been to sinners, inclined by nature to Arminianism and, by unenlightened common sense, to Unitarianism ? There were in those days other sharp men in New England besides the orthodox. Orthodoxy in their view became identified with the dogmas, that God is the author of sin, that men should be willing to be cast off for ever, and the like hyperboles of hyper-Calvinism. Not only so, Emmons also gave into their hands some of the strongest arguments against the older Calvinism. They took his exercises, and discarded the all-controlling efficiency ; they adopted his ethical maxims, divorced from his rigid supernaturalism. He averred that all that is moral is in exercises, so did they. He denied imputation and the covenants, inability and limited atonement, and they were agreed. He said the rewards of heaven are for our personal obedience, and they thought this very natural. They chimed in with his abstractions, about its being as easy to repent as to walk or eat. He made the essence of virtue to consist in impartial love ; and on this point Channing also followed Hopkins. His theory made this love to be the essence of the new birth, and heterodox men said they had this love, and of course were born again. Emmons brought everything about Christ in his relation to us, excepting pardon alone, under the head of sove-

reignty, and "liberal" thinkers brought pardon, too, under the same category. He subordinated the exercises to the efficiency, and they subordinated the efficiency to the exercises. He believed in the Trinity, the incarnation, the decrees; but they said, if they could only have holy love (the essence of the new life) without these hard doctrines, that they hardly thought them essential to salvation. No Emmonsites reasoned in this way, but there were many in New England, who were repelled from orthodoxy by the logical consequences of the efficiency theory, and who were confirmed in heterodoxy by the logical inferences from the exercise scheme—each, of course, being taken, unfairly to Emmons, by itself alone. But heretics cannot be expected to be comprehensive; heresy, in its etymology, is something "taken"—a part taken—and the whole left.

The truth is, as our whole exposition shows, there were in Emmons two systems, both held in the most extreme and logical form. Sir Emerson Tennant, in his work on Ceylon, says that in the chameleon there is an imperfect sympathy between the two lobes of the brain and the two sets of nerves which permeate the opposite sides of its frame. One side may be fast asleep, while the other side is wide awake; and the poor creature cannot make them act together. There is a like imperfect sympathy between the efficiency scheme and the exercise theory of Emmons. They are not organically unified. They are not really harmonised, but held together, not by a rational idea, but by the force of will—his own will (subjectively), and the will of God (objectively). *Stat pro ratione voluntas*. His conception of the created universe is that of a series of perfectly distinct events and exercises, produced at every instant by an immediate divine energy. It is an atomistic naturalism engrafted upon an extreme and arbitrary supernaturalism. The conception of anything akin to a real organicism, or a proper development, is entirely wanting. The unity of the race is not a real historic continuity, but an arbitrary divine constitution. And then, in constructing the system, all events and exercises are, in effect, parcelled out, doctrinally under the two rubrics of divine and creature agency. One set of doctrines sets forth the divine agency; another set of doctrines sets forth the human activity. And both cover, when they concur, the same subject matter, which is at one time viewed as all divine, and at another time viewed as all human. And the only union between the two, which Emmons knows is found in the divine efficiency itself. He did all that a man of the greatest keenness could do in his attempts at mediation on this basis. But his mediations are unreal, formal, and abstract. Thus, as we have seen, sovereignty and free agency are reconciled by saying that God creates the volitions in

God is defended from the charge of being the author of sin, chiefly on the ground that "sin is one thing," and "the taking place of sin" quite another thing; though God's sovereignty and his moral government are said to cover equally all acts, yet so sharp a distinction is made between them, that it is claimed God as a sovereign can create a moral act, which, as a moral governor, he is bound to punish. By asserting that the same act is, in one aspect, "wholly the product of divine energy," and, in another aspect, "wholly the act of the creature" (being made his), Emmons seems to think that he has solved the problem of dependence and free agency—"a seeming difficulty which runs through the whole Bible," (iv. 371). But this is simply statement and distinction, not solution or reconciliation. He confounds clear, abstract distinctions with the truth itself. A definite, intelligible proposition is his ideal—and also the reality. As if theology, like mathematics, were a science of definitions and deductions! But in such a system, so clear and paradoxical, one of the antagonistic elements must get the upper hand, and the other be subjected with a strong arm; one must be the reality, and the other an illusion. And there can be no question that in the logical results of this theory the reality is in the divine agency, and that the alleged freedom and power of the creature is an unreal and vanishing factor in the victorious and irresistible march of the divine decree. Freedom and responsibility could only be saved by a revolt against his hyper-Calvinistic necessarianism; by a psychology which should give a real human substratum to the volitions. In his theory the volition was made perfectly free, natural ability was strained to the utmost so as to endure the pressure of the divine agency; and the tension between the efficiency and the exercises became so intense, that the two snapt asunder and parted company. His dogma of divine efficiency was left with himself, and his ethical and voluntary exercises went on their way rejoicing, under other auspices. And he himself stands alone in New England theology, to shew us what a great man can do and say when he attempts impossibilities—that is, when he attempts to make both the divine agency and human freedom absolute. If the feat could be performed, it was in the way he attempted it. If anybody wishes to hold the essence of Calvinism—that is, that the will of God is all in all—together with the essence of Arminianism that is, that the will of man is absolutely contingent—it can only be by exaggerating Calvinism into the position that the divine will creates the human exercises. Calvinism must be exalted into hyper-Calvinism, or else the exercises will land us in an entirely different system.

This would be made still more evident, if we could follow

out the system of Emmons, in its influence on subsequent speculations. Our discussion has already been so protracted, that we must here confine ourselves to general and brief statements.

As we have seen, in deference to his ethics and exercises, he parted company with certain traditional dogmas, inwrought into the Calvinistic bodies of divinity—viz., imputation, the covenants, original sin and hereditary depravity (including the organic and moral unity of the race), and justification under the relation of conferring a title to eternal life. Now, it might easily be shewn, that these doctrines, thus excluded (shearing them off as “fag-ends”), are for the most part the very doctrines by which historical Calvinism has endeavoured to mitigate or avoid the pressure and logical conclusions from the strictest theory of divine sovereignty—so that the procedures of God in respect to sin and salvation should not seem to be the acts of arbitrary sovereignty, but the regulated and ordered course of a moral system, intended for the whole race. These doctrines are the ones by which the awe-inspiring decree (*horribile decretum*—in Calvin’s sense, not “horrible” but fearful) was relieved from the stigma, that it made God the author of sin, and, in an equally arbitrary way, of redemption. But Emmons’s “exercises” compelled him to reject all imputations and covenants. Strictly taken, they left no place for any other than a merely moral or legal system—unless the divine sovereignty were enforced with redoubled emphasis. Being a Calvinist, he chose the latter course; and hence, of all Calvinists he is most strenuous about predestination, election, reprobation, and the affiliated doctrines. In short, he made his exercises Calvinistic only by the violent process of representing them as the product of the direct agency of the Most High. He retained of Calvinism chiefly that doctrine which is most easily perverted, and represented it in the form most liable to perversion. Such was his position in relation to the old Calvinism.

But this “giant, with a hundred athletes in his train,” as the Memoir strikingly describes him, also produced a decided effect upon the old Hopkinsian school; he rent it in twain, into the men of Taste, and the men of Exercises (all mighty men); and this provincial phraseology denotes an important distinction. The larger part of the Hopkinsians were not ready to sanction the position, that all that is moral is in Exercises, in Emmons’s sense, that is, in Volitions (volition with him including the affections, and being equivalent to heart). They distinguished between heart and will, feeling and action, the ground or source of the exercises, and the exercises themselves. They held, with Edwards, that there is a “principle” or “foundation” for the exercises or volitions, and that this “taste” or “principle” is the real seat of moral character.

They had a better psychology than Emmons. Here stood Burton, to whom we have already referred.* And this too was the ground of the venerated Dr Woods of Andover, who receded from the peculiar phrases of the school, in proportion to the enlargement of his experience as a teacher of theology. It was a kind providence for the New England churches, that when the violent abstractions of "efficiency" and "exercises" were waging such warfare, and leading to such results, a man like Dr Woods was called to the chair of theology in the seminary at Andover. He is emphatically the "judicious" divine of the later New England theology. He educated a generation of preachers, who had neither crotchets nor airy whims. And Moses Stuart, too, with all his versatility, became a rich blessing to the churches, by training their preachers in the more thorough study of the whole truth, as revealed with open face in the inspired Word.

But the extreme positions which Emmons deduced from both his Efficiency and Exercise schemes led to a more radical dissent and reaction. As we have seen, his "consistent Calvinism" emerged in the three dogmas—that sin is the product of the divine efficiency, that it is necessary to the full manifestation of the divine glory, and that, for the sake of this glory, men should be willing to be "lost." On the other hand, his exercise scheme led to the inferences, that all that is moral is in volitions (excluding original sin), and that man has natural ability to repent, &c. But this natural ability, as we have stated, still needed to be backed up by a soul—and these volitions cried out for a real human nature as a substratum. The peculiarity of the reaction that ensued (chiefly in the New Haven school) consisted, in the first place, in the introduction of such a psychology, giving to the exercises a living source and centre—and, then, in arraying the exercise scheme against the doctrine of the divine efficiency. The Connecticut divines as a whole never favoured the tendency represented by Emmons; Bellamy, Smalley, and Dwight opposed it, and Dr Taylor brought the discussion, in the sharpest way, to direct issues. He adopted the exercise scheme, so far as it asserted that all that is moral is in acts of the will, defined natural ability as implying "full power to the contrary," and made self-love to be the germinant principle of ethics. He not only

* One of the ablest of these Taste men was Judge Nathaniel Niles of Vermont, who, it is said, was the rival of Dr Burton in the honour of being the founder of the Taste school. How strongly the men of this stamp were opposed to the peculiarities of the Emmons school is seen in an acute pamphlet, now little known, entitled: "A Letter to a Friend, who received his Theological Education under the Instruction of Dr Emmons, concerning the Doctrine which teaches that Impenitent Sinners have Natural Power to make themselves New Hearts. By Nathaniel Niles, A.M." Windsor, 1809. It is one of the most valuable relics of this controversy.

reinstated the human soul in its native rights (reuniting the dispersed exercises, the *diaspora*, in a living personal centre), but he also affirmed, with the Taste men, the existence of susceptibilities, tendencies, dispositions, antecedent to voluntary action. But as he also held that all that is moral is in voluntary action, he of course said, that these tendencies and dispositions have no moral character ; and here he left the Taste men. This changed the aspect of the old exercise scheme. He could, and must, now say what the old Hopkinsians never did, or could, say—that a complete human nature exists for a time, be it more or less, in the descendants of Adam, in a neutral moral state. This was the very position which the old Hopkinsians, Emmons included, were always striving to avoid, as utterly inconsistent with the Biblical representation of the effects of the Adamic transgression. So, too, he brought his theory of the will, as essentially the power of contrary choice, to bear against the dogma, that God creates free volitions. His Scotch psychology demanded a pause, as it were, in the direct divine agency, so as to give the faculties of the soul a chance to work out the volition—intellect, feelings, and will preceding the first moral choice. The volition no longer came through the will of God alone, but also through the agency of the human powers coming to the point of decision. And as he made self-love the spring of all voluntary action, and happiness its end, so too he mightily opposed the inculcation of a willingness to be damned ; for in his view this implied the annulling of the primary instinct of human nature. Nor could he consistently hold to the Hopkinsian theodicy, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good ; he levelled against it, not only the precepts of the divine law and the prescriptions of the moral sense, but also, and chiefly, the doctrine of natural ability, transformed into the power to the contrary. He formally denied the old theory, and affirmed that sin is not necessary, but incidental to the best system ; and that it is incidental, because a free agent, having the power of contrary choice, may sin, in spite of Omnipotence. Thus skilfully did this acute theologian bring the exercises of the Emmonsian theology to bear against its dogma of efficiency ; he used its left hand to disable its right hand. He took the attitude of fair and square antagonism to the three main positions of the older theory. The dogma of divine efficiency he confronted with the theory of human efficiency ; disinterested benevolence in the form of a willingness to be damned he opposed by making self-love the root of moral action ; and, so far was he from asserting that sin is necessary to the greatest good, that he affirmed it was better accounted for by saying, that even Omnipotence may not be able to prevent all sin in a moral system. Thus, while

the divine will is the constructive idea of whatever is peculiar in the one system, the human will, moved by self-love, is the constructive idea of all that is peculiar in the other system. The antagonism is sharp and complete on all the main points. The attempt in each scheme is to frame a system on the idea of will—the difference being, that in the old school an omnipotent divine will, and in the new school a contingent human will, is the prime factor. And the result of the whole controversy was to shew the inadequacy of each to the proposed task. Each system led to conclusions at war with the Scriptures and Christian experience, and this, too, on just the points most characteristic of the respective theories. The one could not free God from the charge of being the cause of sin, made sin necessary to the declarative glory of the Holy One, and exacted of man an impossible test of regeneration, at once unreal and full of torture to the soul. The other system so exalted the power of the human will, that it became, in the power to the contrary, an unreal abstraction; it denied the “categorical imperative” of duty, by resolving right into happiness; and it defended the divine permission of sin by limiting the divine omnipotence. Each was strong in refuting, neither in building up. Each shews very clearly that the peculiar views of the other cannot be maintained.

Dr Taylor, in this controversy, took the only consistent course, and did not aim at any unreal compromise. He never thought of representing his system as identical with the one he was opposing, bating a difference of phraseology or emphasis. He knew perfectly well that he could find some of the germs of his own theory in the minor key of the old school; but he did not intimate that they habitually sung their tunes on this key. He knew, too, that the way in which antagonistic systems are developed is almost always just this: that what is subordinate in the one becomes supreme in its opposite. The change of relative position is indeed all; but then, too, it is quite enough. It is the only logical attitude which related thoughts, that suggest each other, can assume even in opposite systems. The contest is always for supremacy, and not for annihilation.

Hence, too, it is possible for modern Hopkinsians to quote many a passage from the old divines, which seems to favour their views, while it is still true that the systems are entirely different in their spirit, methods, results, and sympathies. What an old-fashioned Emmonsian made supreme in the scheme is now made subordinate; and what he made subordinate is now made supreme. That is all. The impression made by the *Memoir of Emmons* is, that he held to exercises definitely, and to the divine efficiency indefinitely; the im-

pression made by a volume of Emmons's sermons is, that he held to both definitely, and subjected the exercises to the efficiency. His propositions about God bear the stamp of inherent life and reality; if there is anything essentially unreal in his system, it is in his propositions about man. He did indeed uphold the three radicals (now so-called) of the New England theology, viz., that all that is moral is in exercises, that ability is equal to, and limits, obligation; he held them, but he held them in check. He spent his toilsome and thoughtful life in elaborating a system to shew, that though God's agency is always creative, yet man may still be free; he had no idea of a system which says, that because man is free, God cannot be the immediate efficient cause of human volitions. The old system affirmed, that God creates all events and acts; that he created Adam holy; that he creates sinful acts; that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; that we must be willing to be lost in order to be saved; it also affirms that there is no soul (conceivable) before the exercises; that the exercises are either holy or wholly sinful; and that holy exercises are the only title to eternal life. Modern Hopkinsianism denies that God creates sin; it denies that he creates holiness; it denies that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; it denies that we must be willing to be lost in order to be saved; and it also affirms, that there must be a soul and tendencies before volition; that this soul is in a neutral moral state; and that it is not luminous to say, that paradise is the reward of our works. And yet it is insinuated that the systems are the same, because both equally hold that all that is moral is in exercises, and that ability is equal to obligation. But to discard all the former positions is to discard Emmonsism; and to affirm the latter, is to affirm, not the essence, but the accidents, of the old Hopkinsian theology. The resemblance is verbal, the difference is radical.

The theological system of Dr Emmons is undoubtedly one of the most original and instructive in the history of theological science in this country. His biographer has led us to love and honour more than ever that simple, noble, acute, and consistent man. He spent his days and his nights in the unwearyed search for divine wisdom. He failed in constructing a complete system of truth; because, with his data and factors, it was a sheer impossibility. With Dr Pond, we may say—"Read Emmons; by all means read Emmons;" but so read him as to see, that neither in the divine efficiency, nor in human exercises, neither in mere sovereignty, nor in mere ethics, can we find the formative or central principle of Christian theology as a science. For the one leads to an arbitrary determinism on the divine side; the other must ascribe an

equally arbitrary self-determining power to man. But no such abstractions, on the one side or the other, however clearly stated, and no definitions based on them, can satisfy the demand for a system of theology, at once scriptural, rational, and conformed to Christian experience. Neither is theology to be sacrificed to anthropology, nor anthropology to theology. The centre of Christian divinity is not in God, nor in man, but in the God-man. Christian theology is essentially a Christology, centering in facts, not deduced from metaphysical or ethical abstractions. Neither God's agency, nor man's will, can give us the whole system; but, as Calvin says, "Christ is the mirror in whom we may without deception contemplate our own election." Above the strife of the schools rises in serene and untroubled majesty the radiant form of the Son of God, the embodiment and reconciliation of divinity and humanity.

III.—*Montalembert's Monks of the West.*

The Monks of the West, from St Benedict to St Bernard. By the Count DE MONTALEMBERT, Member of the French Academy. Authorised Translation. 2 Vols. 8vo. Blackwood. 1861.

"I HAVE no great fancy for monks," said Boileau; and the words of the great French satirist utter the sentiments commonly entertained among ourselves. A monk! the very word calls up, as from a dead age of the world, whose dark doings we are unable to understand or sympathise with, an ungainly figure, that seems worth no better suit than the coarse and dirty serge that hangs about it; a face so forbidding and so dull, except when lightened for a moment by a twinkle of animal cunning, that we see the propriety of the hood, and wish it were always used. To adopt a simile from the pages before us, the monk is at the best treated as a lost species, of whom fossil bones reappear from time to time, exciting curiosity or repugnance, but having no longer a place in history among the living.

Why have so many men been found willing to spend their lives thus? There was no conscription, no impressment, and yet the army increased. The solitudes of Egypt were thronged. The *desert* became an inappropriate term for the wilder parts of the Thebaid; for, as an early writer assures us, the cities scarcely numbered more citizens than the deserts numbered monks. The founder of the first monastery counted his disciples by thousands; and the wonder-working Martin of Tours,

who carried monasticism into Gaul, was followed to the grave by two thousand who called him master and saint. It gives us some idea of the population of the cloisters, when we look at the six ponderous folios which contain the history of one monastic order. We learn that the author of the six folios found it easy to fill other nine with the more notable biographies of this same order. When Europe was a-making, and the now first rate powers were in embryo, then the monks were many and lively. They have played a most important part in the history of the world: in the history of its wars, in the history of its property and lands, in the history of its literature, and in the history of its religion. It was a monk who stirred up Christendom to the crusades, and it was a monk who checked the growing autocracy of the German emperors; the wittiest son of the wittiest nation was a monk, and the most learned man of the most learned age in the history of France had been trained to study by the severe rule of St Benedict; it was a monk who stirred the luxurious and proud Constantinople to its depths, and earned for himself unrivalled fame as a preacher of the truth; and it was a monk who wrote the "*De Imitatione Christi*;" it was by monks the churches of Britain, Switzerland, and Germany were founded, as it was by a monk they were reformed.

We very gladly, therefore, accept these volumes which contain the fruit of twenty years' research into the history of this singular race. Cordially do we greet the author's intimation of his motive and purpose: "Friends and enemies are alike interested to know from whence they come, and whence they have drawn the secret of a life so tenacious and so fruitful. I offer to the one as to the other a tale which shall not be a panegyric, nor even an apology; but the sincere testimony of a friend, of an admirer, who desires to preserve the impartial equity which history demands, and who will conceal no stain that he may have the fuller right of veiling no glory." The spirit also in which he has discharged this labour cannot but provoke the most protestant among us to some tribute of admiration and sympathy. At p. 246 of vol. I., he concludes his introduction with the following passage, which no one will read without owning the eloquence and spirit of the writer:—

"How often, in the silence of night, under the roof of the old manor-house, in which most of these pages have been written, behind the heavy folios in which their acts have been registered by their laborious successors, have I imagined myself to see appearing around me that imposing train of saints, pontiffs, doctors, missionaries, artists, masters of word and deed, who have issued, from age to age, out of the crowded ranks of the monastic orders. I contemplated with trembling these august resuscitated forms of the

glorious and unappreciated past. Their austere yet benevolent looks seem to stray over their profaned tombs, their forgotten works, the despised monuments of their unwearied industry, the defaced sites of their holy dwellings, and then to rest upon me, their unworthy annalist, confused and overwhelmed by the weight of my unworthiness. I heard a voice, noble and plaintive, come forth from their chaste and masculine breasts: 'So many incessant labours, so many evils endured, so many services rendered, so many lives consumed for the glory of God and for the good of men! and behold the return—calumny, ingratitude, proscription, contempt. In these modern generations, which are at once overwhelmed by our benefits and oblivious of them, will no man rise up to avenge our memory?

"Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor!"

No apology, no panegyric; a simple and exact tale; the truth, and nothing but the truth; justice, and nothing but justice; let that be our sole revenge.' And then I felt a thrill of ardent and melancholy emotion run through my veins. . . . 'I have only a cold and sad pen for my weapon,' I answer them; 'and I am the first of my blood who has fought with the pen alone. But, notwithstanding, if it serves with honour it may in its turn become a sword in the bold and holy warfare of conscience and the disarmed majesty of right, against the triumphant oppression of falsehood and sin.'"

The author in these lines opens to us very freely his character; and, while some may think the fervour somewhat misspent, let us not underrate his evident capacity for perusing any amount of monastic literature. This is not a frequent quality even in ecclesiastical historians, and leads us to expect, what in fact we find, a collection of evidence sufficient to enable us to form a tolerably correct estimate of monastic life. The author is ashamed to confess that he once had as little notion of what a monk might be as the most heretical of us all. That an intercourse with their writings and biographies, maintained through a long course of years, has altered, if not corrected, his notions, will be seen from the opinion he now expresses concerning them. "I do not hesitate," he says, "to affirm that the monks, the true monks of the great ages of the church, are the representatives of manhood under its most pure and energetic form—of manhood intellectual and moral—of manhood, in some manner condensed by celibacy, protesting against all vulgarity and baseness; condemning itself to efforts more great, sustained, and profound, than are exacted by any worldly career; and by this means making of earth only a 'stepping-stone to heaven, and of life but a long series of victories.'" This certainly is very different from the popular idea of the monk; but how else can we ascertain to what extent

our notions are to be modified by those of Montalembert, than by following him in the consideration of their origin and their history, their rules and the success of their rules ?

It bodes ill for any favourable view we may desire to take of monasticism, that we find it first taking firm root in Egypt. It was here that, in the year 305, Anthony first collected the solitaries into a monastery. These solitaries, or monks (whose names, our readers will allow us to observe, are etymological equivalents), had for ages been scattered in large numbers over Egypt and the southern parts of Palestine. Christians in religion, they adopted this practice of retiring for devotion and contemplation from the Jews and the heathen. They were fond, however, of tracing their lineage through John the Baptist to Elijah and the Rechabites of Old Testament history. They were not satisfied with having the testimonies of Pythagoras, Plato, and Epictetus to the excellence of the life of contemplation ; but, in their desire to obey, found express commands of our Lord enjoining this life upon his followers. But availing themselves of the distinction between "evangelical counsels" and "precepts," current among the Gnostics, they dexterously, and with one stroke, defended and exalted their position. They did not think of making their condition the rule for the frail and common herd ; but justified their own course, and flattered their vanity by proclaiming monastic seclusion the highest reach of Christian life. When duty comes in this form, there are always plenty prepared to accept it. And were there no other inducements to monastic life but this, we would still be at no loss to account for its popularity. The desire to be something superior to ordinary mortals, and, if that cannot be attained, the satisfaction of being at least different from others, lead perhaps one-half of mankind, and would lead them to caverns and cells, just as readily as to studious garrets, or thronged council-chambers, or bloody fields of battle. But joined to this desire, there were other intelligible reasons on the side of retirement from the world. How have these words, "O for a lodge in some vast wilderness !" become so common, but by expressing so common a longing ? A longing, it is true, not entertained in earnest by many among us ; but still growing up so strongly at some periods, and becoming so predominant in some natures, that few have any difficulty in understanding one fertile source of monastic customs. The author of these volumes touches a sympathetic chord in our heart when he says, "Who has not dreamt of a future in which, for one day at least, he might say of himself with the prophet, '*Sedebit solitarius et tacebit* ?'" But the man who may excusably "dream" of "one day's" taciturn solitude and meditation, we condemn as morbid when

he actually commits himself to the life of a recluse. And there is considerable inconsistency in the attempt Montalembert makes to hide this conclusion or ward off its consequences. He says that all of us have a longing for solitude, and therefore we should not blame the monks for having the same. We do not blame them for possessing this longing, but for suffering this longing so to possess them as to drive them from obvious duties. And our author himself knows this ; and therefore elsewhere affirms that it is only in romance that we find disappointments, grief, and melancholy leading to the cloister ; that the cloister, "so far from being the asylum of the feeble, is the arena of the strong." If we may venture to correct one who has formed his opinions on so extensive a knowledge, we would say that what gave the monastic institution its first and strongest hold in the world, was just that it afforded opportunity for the Christians to lead a distinct yet safe life. This forms no apology for the monks of the west, but it sets the conduct of the eastern originators of monasticism in a less offensive light. It enables us to understand how the leaders of the early church could not only permit but practise the customs that seem to us so opposed to common sense and well-balanced human nature. We cannot wonder at nor blame men who fled from persecution to the peace of the desert. In the early ages the life of an eremite was not only in some cases excusable, but was often proper and praiseworthy. And if the huts they threw up gradually increased into a Laura or little eremite village, it was not in this that there was anything objectionable. The very title by which these hermits were known leads us to believe that it was something very like necessity that drove many of them to the desert. They were called anchorets, or anchorites, or anachorites ; that is, men who had *retreated* from the world ; finding its rage too ferocious to endure, or perhaps in some instances finding its wickedness too seducing to withstand or too grievous to behold. Probably many parents, living in heathen towns, sent their children to be reared and confirmed in the Christian faith by those who lived remote from the temptations by which they themselves had been almost overcome. It is still a question among ourselves whether a boy should be carefully guarded from or exposed to those temptations which he is certain to meet in after life. That in many cases the early Christians came to a wrong decision in the matter may be cause of grief, but scarcely of blame.

Its consequences were inexcusable. The martyrdom which the anchorets fled from at the hands of others they proceeded to inflict upon themselves. To wear heavy chains, and very little other clothing ; to invite madness and disease by want

of food, and sleep, and employment ; to injure the body and stultify the mind by long-continued and uniform discomfort ; these became at Nitria and the surrounding hermitages the chief end of monkish man. And we believe that if the calmest and most sensible of men passed a year or two in utter exclusion from their fellow-men ; if they spent their days gazing abroad on a wide expanse of plain, dotted only now and then with a wild beast here, and far off there with a cluster of palms ; if they nightly lay down on the bare floor of their solitary cave, echoing to the throb of their own heart, their ear bursting with the awful stillness, their spirits unstained by bodily vigour and uncheered by the face of man, tortured by the desolation and melting through fear ; if they could thus spend a year or two, "remote, unfriended, melancholy, slow," they would be found at the end, some dreamy, some wild, but all useless enthusiasts. The man who is never alone has much to learn ; the man who is always alone makes himself incapable of learning. Too much solitude and too little are both so detrimental, that it is of less consequence to ascertain which has the greatest efficacy of destruction. Contemplation is very well in its place, but no human brain can feed itself eternally. Abstraction prolonged, as these monks prolonged it, becomes torpor ; and proves that there is such a thing as having too little connection with the world as well as too much for the good of the spirit. Neither can the man of thought nor the man of action say the one to the other, "I have no need of thee ;" but in the intercourse and contact of the ordinary enjoying of the world, each finds the counterpoise that keeps his mind and his life balanced. The wiser founders of monasteries anticipated that even in the speculative East all men would not be found to possess the gift of contemplation ; that it would become mere dreaminess, and an excuse for the indolent ; and that indolence would open the door of the empty mind to the devil, who is always knocking, and supplicating, and pushing at such doors. Having no desire that their foundations should become mere dormitories, they allotted so many hours to manual labour. Not that they judged labour to be a good thing, but the less of two alternative evils. They were accustomed to say that he who works has indeed one devil to fight, but he who does not work has an infinite number attacking him. But all were not equally wise, or were at least not equally ready to obey the dictates of wisdom. There was one sect, the Euchites, or praying monks, who attempted the literal fulfilment of the apostolic injunction, "Pray without ceasing ;" and had therefore to neglect the other precept, "Provide things honest in the sight of all men." This, however, was not so popular a sect as that of

Scrapion and his followers, who provided not only for themselves, but also for many of the poor of Alexandria. Many a monastery was nothing more nor less than an hospital for the sick. One was set apart for the reception of sick children, another for the cripples, and those which were open to the lepers never lacked an ample and faithful staff of hooded nurses and physicians. Then every monastery had its xenodochium, where the stranger or the wayfaring man might count upon finding shelter and refreshment; and, above all, each monastery was an asylum for those whose vices the world could not pardon or forget,—an asylum where none might despair of being received, since Pelagia the Pearl had found admittance.

But besides these virtues, which, however excellent, it was plain that men might practise in the world as well as separated from it, they had to add some virtues peculiar to themselves. To keep up their pretension to a higher morality than man can attain in civil life, they created a new class of virtues competent to themselves only. And strange enough these virtues are. Lord of the earth, man is successful enough in earthly inventions; but not being lord of the conscience, he has most lamentably, and yet most ludicrously failed in his attempts at invention in this department. To stand on a pillar sixty feet high for thirty years, to pass forty days and nights without food, to surpass the absurdities of the Indian fakirs, were virtues worthy of canonization. He was a good man who lived on boiled cabbage, a better man who lived on raw cabbage, and the best man of the three who lived on the earth's unsolicited produce. The rule that guided their estimate of character was, the more flesh, the less spirit. Obesity is simply wickedness. A fat man must be worthy of the lash, unless, like St Benjamin (a most estimable man), he be dropsical. Some ludicrous stories, illustrating this characteristic of the solitaries of Egypt, are told by Sulpicius, in a chapter he writes in sincere eulogy.

The love of the marvellous and the extravagant was begot by monasticism from its very childhood. It is not easy to discover how far Montalembert credits these stories. On the one hand, he says, of similar tales which he narrates, that "these pious traditions are confirmed by the most authentic narratives;" on the other hand, he disavows all pretension "to assign the degree of certainty which belongs to them." Perhaps his sentiments may be gathered most readily from the following passage. He has just recorded a series of marvellous anecdotes of monkish wonders wrought among the Gallo-Franks, to whom "the miracles seemed one of the most

ordinary and simple conditions of the action of God upon the world," and he goes on to say (p. 352, vol. ii.):—

"The dignity of history loses nothing by pausing upon these tales, and the pious trust supported by them. Written by a Christian, and for Christians, history would lie to herself if she affected to deny or ignore the supernatural intervention of providence in the life of the saints chosen by God to guide, console, and edify his faithful people; and by a holy example, to elevate them above the bonds and necessities of terrestrial life. Certainly, fables are sometimes mixed with truth; imagination has allied itself to authentic tradition to alter or supersede it; and there have even been guilty frauds which have abused the faith and piety of our ancestors. But justice had been done on those by the jealous and learned criticism of those great masters of historic science, whom the religious orders have furnished to the world, long before the systematic disdain and adventurous theories of our contemporary authorities had profited by some inexactitudes and exaggerations, to throw back the whole of Catholic tradition into the rank of those semi-historic, semi-poetic mythologies which precede every incomplete civilization. . . . The church, however, could not be answerable for those errors or falsehoods which have crept into some legends. She obliges no one to believe any of these prodigies, even the best verified which we find related in them. But when such events are recorded by serious authors, and especially by contemporaries, the church, herself founded upon miracles, acknowledges and commends them to the admiration of Christians, as a proof of the faithfulness of His promises, who has said of himself, that 'he will be glorified in his saints;' and that 'he that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do.'"

But while there may be some difficulty in presenting any logically consistent theory as that which guides our author in his researches, his practice is to receive without reluctance whatever marvels are handed down by 'those great masters of historic science.' In one instance, indeed, we find him rejecting a story on account of its chronological difficulties; but at the interval of a few pages, he tells us of St Anthony preaching to Gauls, Spaniards, Britons, and all, in short, who came, with no word of an interpreter, no hint of a gift of tongues, nor attempt of any kind to account for this facility of communication. His style becomes enthusiastic and rhetorical when he speaks of the miracles of Benedict, and the narrative which records how he restored the peasant's son to life, needs, with this his latest biographer, no more confirmation than the fact of his own death. Until a historian learns the difference between the miraculous and the providential, the extravagant and the extraordinary, the ostentatious and the useful, and (let us add) the divine and the childish, it is vain for him to offer his

guidance in the investigation of historical documents, even though he protest in preface and notes against travesties of historic truth.

The influence of the monks of the west was much more powerful and enduring than any possessed by the inhabitants of the wilds, that hid the "silver roots" of the Nile. At the call of Cyril, a wild and fanatic mob might pour its ferocity through the gates, and sweep the streets of Alexandria; but they that use the sword, perish by the sword; and when force met force, monk had no chance with both of them. But in the hand of the Italian Benedict, the mob became an army, wielding more effective weapons than clubs, stones, or javelins. Benedict became to monasticism what Augustus was to the empire. It is to his rule we must attribute the rapid extension of monasteries, and the power that was at once established wherever an abbey reared its spire. The disturbed state of Europe may have induced the timorous to seek sanctuary in the convent, the novelty of the life may have attracted those who had drunk to the lees all other sources of relief from disquiet or ennui, the children who grew up in the schools attached to the monasteries, must often have devoted their mature years to the service of their foster parent; but whatever causes contributed to swell the numbers, and lend importance to the position of monastic institutions, it is to the powerful intellect of Benedict they owe the organization which gave them the force and permanence of union. Last scion of the Lords of Nursia, he forsook, at the age of fourteen, his family, his fortune, and all the promise of his life. He was not long suffered to lead the life of a solitary; for though he had chosen a retired and uninviting gorge as his hermitage, he was soon surrounded by many of the higher, as well as of the lower orders, who were attracted by the fame of his piety and miracles. Patricians and barbarians thronged the thickets of Subiaco, until at the end of thirty-five years, he found himself superior of twelve monasteries. In the year 529 he left Subiaco for Monte Cassino, where, after fourteen years' labour and devotion, he died standing by the opened grave of his sister, with hands stretched to heaven, murmuring his last vesper. Familiar as the name of Monte Cassino has become in the annals of monasticism, and renowned by the verse of Dante, it was at Subiaco that, seven centuries later, St Francis of Assisi prostrated himself before the memory of his great predecessor; and instead of the Benedictine briers, by which the saint had subdued his too clamorous passions, planted "on that glorious battle-field," the Franciscan rose trees. It is to Subiaco that Montalembert traces all the life of western Christianity.

"It was from this tomb," he says, "where the delicate son of the last patricians of Rome buried himself alive, that the definite form of monastic life—that is to say, the perfection of Christian life—was born. From this cavern and thicket of thorns have issued legions of saints and monks, whose devotion has won for the church her greatest conquests and purest glories. Thence came, and shall still come, all whom the spirit of the great Benedict shall inspire with the impulse of opening new paths, or restoring ancient discipline in cloistral life. The sacred site which the prophet Isaiah seems to have pointed out before-hand to cenobites, by words so marvellously close in their application—'Look unto the rock whence ye are hewn, and to the hole of the pit (*cavernam laci*) whence ye are digged,' is there recognised by all. We lament for the Christian who has not seen this grotto, this desert, this nest of the eagle and the dove, or who, having seen it, has not prostrated himself with tender respect before the sanctuary from which issued, with the rule and institution of St Benedict, the flower of Christian civilisation, the permanent victory of the soul over the flesh, the intellectual enfranchisement of Europe, and all that charm and grandeur which the spirit of sacrifice, regulated by faith, adds to knowledge, labour, and virtue."

The Count de Montalembert will have a good deal to do in the way of lamentation. But if Christian life was to perfect itself in the cloister, no more promising process could be adopted than that prescribed by the code of Benedict. So excellent was this "rule," that many eminent men have not hesitated to affirm its divine inspiration. It is characterised by Gregory the Great as "*discretione præcipuam, sermone luculentam*," and no one who has occasion to speak of it, passes without leaving his little tribute of commendation. It quickly supplanted the rules of Anthony, Pachomius, Basil, Athanasius, and all who had tried the difficult task of forming a perfect monk. In the East there had been almost as many rules as there had been monasteries; and Benedict, like a monastic Justinian, adopted whatever was good in any of them. Some parts of conventual life had already been regulated by canons of the church, and these the rule of Benedict does not touch. Otherwise it is full and dictatorial. The rules of other orders add little to what is contained in or suggested by its injunctions. And in the ninth century, when the other orders were mostly extinct, every corner of civilised and many regions of barbarian Europe were swarming with one or other branch of the populous society that had sworn to the rule of St Benedict. And then each new century gives birth to some new species of Benedictines; Carthusians and Cluniacensians, Præmontensians and Grandimontensians, Cistersians and Camaldulensians, and many another with longer name; each starting with great show of respectability, condemning the profligacy of the pre-

ceding sects by returning to the rigidity of the original rule as practised by the monks of Monte Cassino under the watchful eye of the founder himself. In the words of Montalembert, "Thirteen hundred years have passed since the hand of Benedict traced all these minute regulations, and nothing has been found more fit to strengthen the religious spirit and monastic life. The more admired and effectual reforms have scarcely had any other aim than to lead back the regular clergy to a code of which time has only confirmed the wisdom and increased the authority."

But why, we are driven to ask, was it only by continual reforms that this code could be adhered to? That it was so is admitted on all hands; monks charge monks with immorality, and with all variety of backsliding from the manners of the first Benedictines. Each new sect, that rises to put the others to shame by a stricter adherence to the code, in its turns grows lax, until poor Benedict himself is heard out of Hades indignantly exclaiming—

" My rule
Is left a profitless stain upon the leaves;
The walls, for abbeys reared, turned into dens;
The cowls, to sacks choked up with musty meal."

So far did they depart from their original severity, that even their ordinary services were neglected, at least those that involved inconvenience. The nocturnal matins were in many convents unattended, though, as one of their writers with a fine simplicity remarks, the bells still chimed "*pour l'édification du peuple*." We think that this is sufficiently accounted for by the peculiarity of the Benedictine rule, the vow of stability or perpetual residence. This vow, sworn in the most solemn manner, and under the most terrifying of sanctions, was required by no former rule. In former monasteries the dress which the novice had exchanged for the scapulary and the frock of the monk was carefully preserved, that he might if at any time it so pleased him, return to the world he had abandoned. The requirement of this vow has been termed a "happy and productive innovation;" and is justly styled "one of the principal guarantees of the duration and strength of cenobitical life." Yet we believe that as this vow was the cause of the rapid increase of the monks, so it was the cause of their rapid decay. It was the cause of their numerical increase, because it threw around their order the attractive interest which naturally attaches to a pledged, consecrated society. Moreover, it supplied, as has been constantly observed, what is always in great demand—deliverance from the anxieties and cares of self-government. A vast number of all classes of men will always be found willing to abdicate the

dignity of self-control. To be "handsomely rid of free agency," is the strong desire of multitudes. (The easy supply of our own army and navy to some extent illustrates this.) Thus ridding themselves of responsibility, they rid themselves of fear and of much that might keep them from being good servants; but by the same act they rid themselves of much that would help them to be thoroughly good men. They give up their own will, and, as far as they can, their own conscience also. They give up, that is, the sense of individual responsibility to God, which is the only foundation of a rightly-built human character. Benedict succeeded in making the perfect monk, and thereby shewed the world that the perfection of manhood is not to be found in the monastery. Whatever be the path to perfection for man, it does not lie through the novitiate of any hitherto founded order. We do not fear the threat of those who mourn the recent suppression of the monasteries, "You will have to build prisons with the ruins of the convents you have destroyed." We would not either retort that these prisons would be needed for the same inmates as the convents had sheltered or restrained. We know that a man may spend a Christian life in a monastery as a man may be healthy at the Bight of Benin or vigorous in the tropics. But these are not the localities where we expect to find the firmest constitutions and the best developed physical frames; and just as little is a monastery the school from which we expect to issue the ripest saint or most vigorous athlete of the cross. The whole history of the several orders proves that it is most difficult (and there has been nothing to prove that it is not impossible) to preserve such retreats of piety from the most fatal abuses. State after state has become convinced of this, and in one country after another they have been limited, if not abolished. Thirty years ago there were suppressed three thousand monasteries; and whoever advocates their revival has not only to shew us that once they afforded an excusable if not a necessary retreat—not only to fill pages with the names of towns the monks have founded, and tell of the forests they cleared, the schools they taught, and the light-houses they built and tended—not merely point us to the stupendous monuments of the literary industry of the fraternity of St Maur, and recount the fatigues and hazards of their missionary expeditions—he must shew us what there is to be done at the present day which none but a monk can do, and he must prove that the advantage to be gained by this justifies the monastic vows and the risk every man runs who takes them.

Had the masterly rule of Benedict never been promulgated, it might be pleaded that the best form of monasticism was yet

to be discovered and tested. But they have had their day. If "old experience" ever may "attain to something of prophetic strain," it may very safely be affirmed that they will never again have the influence they had in the middle ages. Monastic influence was at its strongest when the power of the Monks of the West, matured, and consolidated, and directed by the rule of Benedict, was opposed to the tide of barbarism that swept over the tottering empire. He who views the monks during this period sees them at their best, and must at least acknowledge that then they served some good purposes. It is not by their miracles that the monks have deserved well of posterity, nor for the manner in which he has recorded these miracles that Montalembert has any claim to our admiration as a historian. The great interest and value of his work consists in the full and intelligible account which he gives of the influence of the monastic institution upon society during the sixth and seventh centuries. To this the whole of the second volume is devoted; and nowhere is there in so accessible a shape, material so sufficient for forming a right estimate of the relation of the church to society during that difficult and critical period of the history of Europe. His knowledge of the most primitive forms of law and government, and his extensive though unenviable erudition in monastic lore, qualify him to trace the transition of society from refined weakness to rude strength. And whatever may be thought of the prejudices of the author, all who read must admire the industry of his research, and will be carried on by the generous and lofty tone which breathes through the whole.

The transition from the old world to the new was not easy. There was need of fresh northern blood to revive the worn-out nations of the civilised world. But the first result of the infusion of the manly energy of the Germanic tribes, was to crush beneath it all it came to strengthen. The repeated invasions of the south by the vigorous races from beyond the Alps, became a benefit to after ages by breaking up and scattering all that had been. It was a great flood, that meanwhile devastated and depopulated, and only after subsiding revealed fresh soil and new seeds. The church alone remained stable, bishops became the only powerful rulers, and monasteries were safer asylums than palaces or walled cities. In the three great departments of agriculture, letters, and religion, the monks sheltered from the successive waves of barbarians much that is now enjoyed by ourselves. In agriculture we know that the Germans were no proficient. Tacitus tells us that they judged it "*pigrum et iners sudore acquirere quod possis sanguine parare.*" But the motto of the monks was "*Cruce et aratro.*" Historians tell us that wher-

ever they came they cleared the forest, drained the morasses, and turned the barren moor into a garden. If now we see the abbeys pitched in the fattest spots and on the loveliest sites, we are to remember that when the monks pitched them they had all before them where to choose, and that it is to their toil the richness of the surrounding country is in great part due. One so bright spot they fixed upon, and cultivated with such skill and care, that they seem to have restored all of Eden but the Eve; for what with the mild and equal climate, the delicious sighing of the breezes that floated over their gardens, and the invigorating exercise they found in their culture, they grew old with unabated strength, and at last had to forsake the spot in which they had passed but not spent their lives, declaring that there "they could not die." One of the most recent authorities in ecclesiastical history declares, that "our own annual agricultural meetings, with their implements and their prizes, their shorthorns and their long speeches, must carry back their economic genealogy to those husbandmen who, with dismal aspect, brawny arms, and compressed lips, first taught the conquerors of Rome the science in which Columella and Virgil had instructed the ancient Romans." As for literature, in the very earliest rule it was enjoined by Pachomius, "Omnino nullus erit in monasterio qui non discat literas, et de Scriptoriis aliquid teneat." And every one knows that if much was buried in the monasteries, it was in them was preserved all we have of classical and patristic literature. In the darkest ages there were always such men as Bede, Alcuin, Lanfranc, and Anselm receiving the treasure from those that had gone before, and passing it down to us augmented. There was always the Scriptorium and its staff of skilful copyists; and there were always those who, for the good of their souls, were increasing the number of New Testament manuscripts. It was in vain that, in later times, De Rancé, the father of the famous Trappists, strove to make the monks renounce learning as inconsistent with their profession. He was answered by the Benedictine Mabillon in a treatise, or more strictly speaking in three treatises, which not only proved that learning was quite competent to the monks, but that he himself had made good use of the privilege. And as for religion, though the amount is more to be admired than the quality of what they propagated, yet in the mere externals of missionary achievement the monks have not been surpassed. What they believed they taught, and no region was inaccessible to their zeal. Without homes, without ties, without prospects or plans, without possessions, they were prepared to go, without reluctance or preparation, wherever their superior ordered. And though we cannot commend the

vow of obedience and of celibacy, and though the vow of poverty has its dark as well as its plausible side, yet who can deny the independence of the unattached monk, who has worn his feet to a tough pair of shoes, and who smiles superior at the boxes and stores of a foreign outfit, and the closely-packed libraries and preserved dainties of the modern traveller. This was the man who, from the dull monotony of conventual life, would see attraction where others saw terrible danger. It was an excitement competent to a monk to explore the wildest regions, with the chance of being sacrificed in wicker-work to a bloodthirsty idol. Wherever paganism could be found, thither monks were ready to go, ready to suffer and die if need be. The monastery of Benedict himself was a pagan temple, a shrine of Apollo, which his eloquence robbed of its worshippers; and in many another instance did the idolatrous groves fall before the axes of the dauntless monks, aided by their converts of yesterday. All these services we frankly remember and think upon; and whatever good deed or word Montalembert has excavated we gladly accept as something more to set over against the dark records of history, and as something more to teach us that where we see much to condemn, we find something to put us to shame. And as we lay aside these volumes, we retain the belief that the monks have been because the Great Superior, the Supreme, had need of them; and amidst the darkness of the cloisters he has noted many a life of service and death of hope.

ART. IV.—*Power in the Pulpit.**

WHEN God called Aaron to the office of high-priest, he said, as a reason, "*I know that he can speak well.*" The reason was weighty. Speech is a mighty power. It is God's chief instrument in salvation. God's word at first created the world, and his word, from the lips of his servants, is to re-create it. *Ministers* are speakers by profession. With them, therefore, power of speech is of the highest moment. It was never so needful as now. The churches want many things, but nothing so much as increased power in their pulpits. It is an era of progress; and if other agencies have increased power, the pulpit must have it or lose its supremacy. It is an active, busy, noisy age; and if the pulpit would be heard, it must lift up.

* This article, from the pen of the Rev. Dr Fish, Newark, N. J., is extracted from the *Christian Review* (American) for January 1862.

its voice like a trumpet. It is a pretentious age ; and if errorists will obtrude their false views and theories, then must the pulpit meet and explode them. It is a wicked age ; and if the current of vice is to be arrested, then must the pulpit be foremost, with the soul-penetrating dispensations of the word.

But let us do honour to the Holy Spirit. The preacher, while, like other speakers, he has power to inform and excite an audience, has not power, in himself, to compass the great aim of preaching. The aim of preaching is different from that of other public speaking. It looks deeper. It would renew and cleanse the heart. If it fails here, it fails entirely. And fail it will without the accompanying "power from on high." The renewal of the soul is what no man, with all the wealth of learning and scholarship, and of cultivated taste and oratorical power, can accomplish. It is "not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit," saith the Lord. A sermon may be constructed after the best models ; it may conform to all the rules of Homiletics ; the text may be suitable and fruitful ; the plan may be faultless ; the execution may discover genius and judgment ; there may be accurate analysis and strong reasoning ; proof and motive ; solidity and beauty ; logic and passion ; argument direct and indirect ; perspicuity, purity, correctness, propriety, precision ; description, antithesis, metaphor, allegory, comparison ; motives from goodness, motives from happiness, motives from self-love ; appeals to the sense of the beautiful, the sense of right, to the affections, the passions, the emotions ; a sermon may be all this, and yet that very sermon, even though it fell from the lips of a prince of pulpit oratory, were as powerless in the renewal of a soul as in raising of the dead, if unaccompanied by the omnipotent energy of the Holy Ghost. But while the power which gives preaching success is supernatural, there are efficient modes of preaching the gospel, and inefficient modes. There are laws of persuasion ; rules for influencing the mind. And these are appointed of God. Is it too much to suppose, then, that the influences of the Holy Spirit are more likely to be given in *respecting* these laws, than in the violation of them ? Of Paul and Barnabas, it is said, in a particular instance, "They *so spake* that a great multitude, both of the Jews and also of the Gentiles, believed." Though a sovereign, yet the divine Being is not an arbitrary sovereign ; and it cannot be denied that there is a general connection between the means and the end in the operations of grace, as well as in those of nature. What, therefore, would affect a man *without* the Spirit, we might expect to be employed *by* the Spirit to carry conviction to the heart. Otherwise, the kind of preaching were a matter of entire indifference.

Our object, then, is to determine the best methods of influencing men; or, in other words, to ascertain what are the conditions of power in the pulpit, in its human aspect. These conditions may be classified under three heads—the *matter*, the *manner*, and the *man*.

I. THE MATTER. If we are to influence the mind, we must have something to do it with. And to do this successfully, we must use *truth*—must speak according to *facts*. The mind assents to what it perceives to be true. Its constitution requires this. It is adapted to what is true, and is moved by it, as is the lock by the key. And it refuses to be moved by perceived untruth. If there is mistake in the statement, or fallacy in the reasoning, and this is seen, argument is useless. Speech has then no power.

But in preaching, *religious* truth is the instrument. The preacher is the appointed student and teacher of God's word. And if he would have power, he must "preach the word." A peculiar energy attends that word. It is the "sword of the Spirit;" the "fire," and the "hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces." It is "quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword." It is "perfect, converting the soul," and "making wise the simple." Human philosophy, the wisdom of the world, has never converted a soul. It tried, and tried in vain, even to subdue the passions, and reform the life. But where the gospel goes, it demolishes the heathen temples, and sets up the reign of God. It proves itself to be "the power of God unto salvation." Strong preachers have ever been Bible-preachers. The old Reformers drew their weapons from the heavenly armoury: The sermons of Bunyan, and Baxter, and Flavel, and men of their stamp, were full of God—instruct with living doctrines. Their very garb was after the Scripture pattern. Whitefield, as a custom, read the Bible with Henry's Commentary, day by day, on his knees, praying over every sentence, line, and word. Edwards and Davies were mighty in the Scriptures. Of Chalmers, it has been said, that his sermons "held the Bible in solution." Preachers who saturate their sermons with the word of God never wear out. The manna which they bring is pure, and sweet, and freshly gathered. It never cloy. God's word is deep, and he who studies it will ever have something new. He will never be dull, for the words of the Bible are strong, living words, and its images and descriptions are very flowers of elegance. Apt citations clench the passages of the preacher's discourse, and give sanction, dignity, positiveness, authority to it. And they shed light into his subject, like windows in houses, while to most of his hearers, certainly to the pious of them, these "very words" of the Holy Spirit are delightfully

edifying. They come like sweet-throated birds with a melody to the soul. "I dearly love the sound of Scripture in a sermon," said an old minister. Who does not? We recall some of the fathers in the ministry—men of one book—the scriptural element of whose sermons (faulty in some respects) made them very gardens of spices. The people loved to hear them preach, because their discourses had the smell of the myrrh and the cassia in them.

Few preachers would not be more weighty if more scriptural. A writer asks, "Do ministers read the Bible much?" The question itself is startling. It is said of George Müller, author of the "Life of Trust," whom all admit to be at least a man of God, and whose preaching has been greatly blessed, that "he rises early, enters his closet, shuts the door, opens his Bible, offers a short prayer, especially to invoke the guidance of God's Spirit upon the reading and meditation of his holy word, then reads and meditates verse by verse, chapter by chapter, till his soul becomes wholly impressed with God's presence and impregnated with God's teachings." Let those who would have power in the pulpit, pursue a similar course.

But mere scripturalness does not make a strong sermon. Otherwise the recitation of inspired passages were sufficient. There must be *thought* as well. Men like to be made to think. They go to church to be instructed. The preacher, then, as a prime condition, must have something to say. It will not do to be always

"Dropping buckets into empty wells,
And growing old in drawing nothing up."

A great want of most sermons is want of matter. 'In this age of mental activity and general intelligence, vigorous thinking, solid sense, are absolutely necessary to permanent pulpit success. Humanity is on the move. The very forces of nature seem at work fabricating and stimulating ideas, and they are taken up by everybody, as it were by absorption. Even plain folks, in our day, can tell the difference between a good sermon and a poor one. If the preacher depends on oratory or rhetoric, without thought, he will ultimately want a congregation. Intelligent people will tire of words, words, words, and demand *ideas*, and be apt to go where they can find them.

And again, as to matter in preaching, he who would have power must dwell much upon the two great, all-comprehensive doctrines of the Scriptures—*man a SINNER, and Christ a SAVIOUR*. Hence, the *law* will be used as an effective instrument; for "by the law is the knowledge of sin." A full conviction of sin, says John Owen, is "a great and shaking surprisal unto a guilty soul." This "shaking surprisal" is the first thing to be gained. One must weep because of the

"curse" with which the Old Testament closes, or his eye will not be caught by "*the book of the generation of JESUS CHRIST*," with which the New Testament opens. He must be taken by the hand and led up to the top of "stormy Ebal," or he will never be ready to fly to the "sun-lit height of Gerizim." The law must therefore be preached: it is indispensable to the authority and cogency of the pulpit—but not so much the law as the *Gospel*—chiefly the *Cross of CHRIST*. It was unto "the *gospel of God*" that Paul was "separated." SHILOH is the great attraction, and to "*him shall the gathering of the people be.*" "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." The heart will yield to the power of the cross, when it will yield to nothing else. We are told of an old emblem in the shape of a lock, constructed of rings, on each of which was a letter, and which would unlock only when those rings were so disposed as to spell the word JESUS. Apt emblem of the human heart. Was one *ever* known to open except to the name of JESUS? Chalmers was not the only preacher who had spent years in laboriously describing vice and virtue, and urging men to be better, and all to no effect, simply because there was no "cross" in his preaching. And it is undoubtedly a chief defect in the sermons even of evangelical pulpits, that there is not enough of CHRIST in them. Pious people complain of this, especially in the sermons of those just from the "schools," and not without cause. The criticism of a certain theological professor upon the trial sermon of a student in the Seminary, would apply to a multitude of the *moral essays* read from our pulpits. "Young man, an educated *heathen* could write just as good a sermon as that!" It is a historical fact, that the most successful ministers, in any age or country, have been those who determined, with Paul, to know nothing "save Christ and him crucified." Beyond question, Flavel was right: "The excellency of a sermon lies in the plainest discoveries and liveliest applications of Jesus Christ." He who makes Christ prominent cannot go wrong in the matter of his preaching. It is Pascal who suggests that as there is one, and but one indivisible point from which any picture can be rightly viewed, every other point being too high or too low, too near or too distant, so is there in theology, one, and but one, right point of observation, and that point is the Cross of Christ. The preacher, therefore, who takes his position there, commands a view of all revealed truth, and will be sure to present truth and duty in their just relations and proportions.

II. THE MANNER.—From the *matter* of preaching, let us now turn to the *manner*. The word manner is here used both as to the *structure* and the *delivery* of a sermon.

1. Pulpit power is affected by the *composition* of a sermon.

There is a right way and a wrong way of doing or saying any thing. Every one knows that the form of a communication affects its strength. A writing containing the same matter may be either weak or strong, attractive or repulsive, eloquent or tame. And without being minute as to all the features of effective discourse, it will be found true that *plainness*, *simplicity*, and *directness*, are its prime qualities. The first thing is to be *understood*; to have the words and sentences intelligible. Paul had rather speak "five words with the understanding," *i.e.*, so as to be understood, "than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue."

Some men are not plain from ignorance and indolence. It is much easier to be unintelligible than intelligible. "Ah, my brethren," said Archbishop Usher, "how much learning it takes to make things plain. And, we may add, *labour*, too. Some are not plain from pride of learning. Some are not plain from a desire to tickle the fancy and excite the imagination. And so they covet a "sky-rocket brilliancy," and delight in rain-bows, and meteors, and earthquakes, and waterfalls, and blooming trellises, and showers of gems, and torrents of fire, and "trooping seraphim," and the "silver chiming of the spheres," and the "weltering chaos of demolished worlds." Some are not plain from a false taste and a faulty training. They think when they enter the pulpit they must be mounted on stilts; and so they give themselves laboriously to seeking out "great swelling words," and constructing cumbrous sentences; and hence become puffy, pompous, bombastic. If there is any nourishment in their productions, it is so absorbed in sponge and fungus as to be indigestible. And some are not plain from a fondness of the abstruse. From inclination or habit, they have come to deal much in what is hidden, and remote, and difficult to be comprehended; and to present things in a blind, circuitous manner. Possibly they would like to be called "intellectual" preachers; writers of "great" sermons; men of a "logical grasp" of mind. Hence their sermons are to a great extent metaphysical disquisitions; efforts

" to sever and divide
A hair 'twixt north and north-west side."

Common truths are tortured into obscure propositions, and plain terms are eschewed for those that are professional. The mind is entertained with the difference between the "immanent" and "eminent" volitions; the "relations of the infinite and the impossible," and the like. The sentences bristle with scholastic technicalities, and you are compelled to hear of "divine causation," and the "self-determining power of the will," and the "objective" and "subjective," the "governmental"

view of the atonement, and of "supralapsarian" and "sublapsarian" theories; as if the production were an essay for the class-room, rather than a sermon for the pulpit.

What folly all this! CHRIST did not preach in this manner. He was the plainest preacher in the world. Nor did the apostles, who used "words easy to be understood," and avoided things which "minister questions rather than godly edifying." Nor did the earnest men of God in any time. Ask Luther how he preached—whose words were "half-battles"—and he will tell you it was not in a way to suit the "learned men and magistrates," of whom he had many as hearers, but for "the poor, the women, and children, and servants," of whom he had many more. See how the staunchest of the old Puritan divines of the seventeenth century preached, and it will be found that it was in the homely dialect of the common working people. One may read pages, and find scarcely a word of more than two syllables. Learn how the founders of Methodism preached, by Wesley's direction, "use the most common, little, easy words in the languages." It is a rule that may be everywhere observed, that whatever God makes is simple, plain, elementary. Man only complicates and obscures. The nearer we reduce things to a naked simplicity, the nearer we approach perfection. And the last place for complication and obscurity is the pulpit.

"I seek divine simplicity in him,
Who handles things divine."^{*}

A man who cannot make things plain is not qualified to fill a pulpit. First of all, let the preacher think out his subject so thoroughly that his ideas shall lie clear and distinct like crystals in his own mind; and then let him remember that "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points," and speak accordingly. What right has he to use an involved and tortuous manner when declaring the great things of God?—"darkening counsel by words without knowledge?" What right has he to come before plain people in the straight-jacket of professional dignity, and talk of "volition" instead of will, and "intellectual processes" instead of thinking, and "moral obligation" instead of duty, and the like, as if the very use of language were, as Talleyrand suggests, "to conceal one's thoughts?" What right has he to give his hearers the hard stone of metaphysics, when they are dying for the bread of heaven? What right has he to bring forward profound disquisitions and curious speculations, when the command is,

^{*} It was a maxim of Roger Ascham, that "we ought to think like great men, and speak like the common people;" and Milton well said that "the very essence of truth is plainness and brightness: the darkness and crookedness are our own."

"Preach the preaching that I bid thee?" And what right has he to hide that Christ whom he is to make known, amid flowers of rhetoric, as Verelst, in his portrait of James II., virtually hid his majesty in a profusion of sunflowers and tulips? When the late young preacher, Erskine Hawes, was dying, he said, "I wish to live to *preach the gospel more simply.*" How many at death's door have felt as he felt?

We would not be understood to discourage the utmost care in the construction and preparation of sermons. Man is an organ, and skill is required to touch rightly the keys. *Method* is important. "The preacher," it is said, "sought out and *set in order* acceptable words." Thoughts, however good, and words, however plain, may be thrown together in such a desultory and irregular manner as to make no impression.

"Checked reason halts, her next step wants support;
Striving to climb, she tumbles from her scheme."

The mind was not made to take in and hold a mob of ideas, a mass of unshapen materials. The thoughts of a discourse, therefore, must be "set in order." *Attractiveness*, too, is important. If the enemies of truth sweeten the edges of their poisoned cups with all the charms of an elegant style and lively composition, why may not ministers win men in the same way? There is force in beauty and in every variety of wise and earnest speech. The good sense, and the taste, and the imagination of hearers are not to be ignored, but rather turned to advantage. Words wisely chosen are often images of things, awakening at once many ideas, and so coming with a wealth of beauty and meaning. Christ's preaching was attractive. His discourses are gemmed with beautiful metaphors and analogies, taken, however, not from the arts, but from nature, and familiar to all. Let style, then, be cultivated. More attention might well be given to it in our schools and seminaries; especially to the acquisition of skill in converting abstract truths into glowing images, and in the use of "picked and packed" words, as Bunyan calls them, and of bold, idiomatic, nervous, terse, laconic sentences.

What is complained of is *devotion to paragraphs and periods*; the cultivation of elegance of imagery and felicities

* I am tormented with the desire of preaching better than I can. But I have no wish to make fine, pretty sermons; prettiness is well enough when prettiness is in its place. I like to see a pretty child, and a pretty flower, but in a sermon prettiness is out of place. To my ear it would be anything but commendation, should it be said to me, "You have given us a pretty sermon." If I were upon trial for my life, and my advocate should amuse the jury with his tropes and figures, burying his argument beneath a profusion of the flowers of rhetoric, I would say to him, "Tut, man, you care more for your vanity than for my hanging. Put yourself in my place—speak in view of the gallows, and you will tell your story plainly and earnestly."—*Robert Hall.*

of diction, at the expense of simplicity and pungency. "Pretti-ness is *not* in place in the pulpit."

It is *not* the highest ideal of a sermon that it is precise and dignified, and offends nobody's taste. Foster complained of Blair, that he kept his thoughts so long standing to be dressed, that they were chilled through before leaving his hands. Sermons may be elaborated till they are spoiled. They may be so "perfect" as to be perfectly worthless!

"They may be correctly cold and correctly dull!
Faultily faultless, icily regular, splendidly null."

Tholuck would call these literary proprieties, "dried sweet-meats in a glass jar." Such sermons are good enough to lay away as embalmed beauties, but they are totally unfit to be preached to a living congregation. Souls never cry out under them. When ministers are full of the Holy Ghost they do not preach thus. They cannot do it. The moment they are in earnest they preach in any way rather than this.

The eloquence needed for this age is that of Pericles, which "left stings behind." Most hearers know enough; they want to be made to *feel* and to *do*. The defensive outworks of Christianity are pretty well raised; we now need to advance on the enemy, and "shell" him out from his entrenchments, by shooting fires into the souls of men. It were a blessing to some ministers who have so much "dignity" to support, and who are so "proper," and so "precise," as to break nobody's heart with the hammer of truth, if Claus Harms were to cry out in their ears, as to some of the "fine writers" of his day, *Speak negligently and incorrectly!* A discourse had better be like a hetchel with the tow pulled out, than like a damask cushion for the hearer to lean a sleepy head upon. Better like lightning, darting zig-zag, and piercing, and tearing, and splitting the object it strikes, than like a letter despatched without a direction (to use John Newton's comparison), addressed to nobody, owned by nobody, and if an hundred people were to read it, not one of them would think himself concerned in its contents. Sermons are wanted now which are made and meant to *do execution*—sermons which grasp, and make bare, and wield some one mighty idea, holding it up, and turning it around, and repeating it, if need be, as does Demosthenes the one main point in his oration on the crown, until it becomes a palpable thing, and the audience *feel* its form and pressure—sermons having the "agonistical," the *wrestling* element in them, as Aristotle calls it—sermons put together on the principle that "force in writing consists in the maximum of sense with the minimum of words," whose sentences are pounded together until they crack, and where figure, trope, allegory, metaphor, antithesis, interrogation,

anecdote—*anything* that can awaken interest and deepen impression is resorted to—sermons supported and sinewed with the “thus saith the Lord,” and then charged with living truth, and aimed *directly at the conscience and the heart*, singling out each hearer, and saying, “*Thou art the man*,” and “I have a message from God unto thee,” and then making pursuit after that man, in clear, rapid, concentrated utterances, and pressing upon him, and narrowing his way, and hemming him in, and smiting him down with terrible volleys, until, quivering and breathless, he crouches “between the law that condemns and the cross that saves.”

These are the sermons most needed to give power to the pulpit.

2. Upon the *delivery* of sermons, but little can here be said. God's wisdom is seen in giving prominence to *preaching*—to the *oral* communication of his word. And he did not ordain preaching to do what the printing-press could do as well. He designed that *men* should utter the truth, with the advantages of intonation, gesture, look. And they reflect upon God's wisdom who undervalue a good manner. It is easy to sneer at oratory, and inveigh against the study and practice of the art of elocution. But why not denounce art in *singing*, as well as in *speaking*? If all must be left to nature in one case, why not in the other? Nature does not despise art. It is the office of art to lead back to nature. The rules of oratory are all drawn from nature, if they are right rules; and he who practises upon them is only conforming to nature. It is time the vulgar prejudice against ministers learning how to be public speakers were done away with. In a very important sense *manner is matter*. And instead of less attention being given to this in ministerial training, there ought to be very much more. Neglecting this is like teaching cadets in a military school how to make powder and swords, but not teaching them how to *use* them. Many a minister fails, not from want of ammunition (for he has plenty of that), but because he cannot “discharge” with effect the well-loaded weapon. His sword (to change the figure) is of the true metal, skilfully forged, and tempered and polished, but he does not know how to stand up and wield it. Let two ministers preach precisely the same sermon. In one case the hearers are cold, unmoved, inattentive. In the other they are attracted, convinced, melted. The difference was in the delivery. Who then will deny that, in some sense, *manner is matter*?

What power is there in the *voice*, when skilfully managed! M. Bridaine, a French missionary, and a peer of the most renowned orators of that eloquent nation, preached a sermon

at Bagnole, at the end of which he lifted up his arms, and thrice cried in a loud voice, O Eternity ! At the third repetition of this awful cry, the whole audience fell upon their knees. During three days consternation pervaded the town ; and it is recorded that, in the public places, young and old were heard crying aloud, " Mercy ! O Lord, mercy ! " It has been said of Whitefield that his " Hark ! hark ! " could conjure up Gethsemane with its faltering moon, and again awake the cry of horror-stricken innocence ; and an apostrophe to Peter on the Holy Mount would light up another Tabor, and drown it in glory from the opening heavens. All the authorities agree that a principal source of Whitefield's wonderful power was a voice of the richest compass, subject entirely to his control. Much may be done towards the acquisition of a distinct, strong, sonorous, flexible voice, where it is not natural ; and too much attention cannot be given, in its training, to the modulation, or inflection, or varying of the voice, to avoid monotony, and make it the docile and faithful interpreter of the thoughts. It is certainly a sacred duty of every minister to bring to their highest perfection the organs of speech.

There is power, too, in a *smile*, or a *frown* ; in the "sweet, silent rhetoric of persuading *eyes*," and in the glow of the *features*, or their solemn sadness. Doubtless, it was not with the same expression of countenance that He who spake as never man spake, cried, " Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! " and " If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink. " There is power in *gesture*, to help the eye to anticipate each rapid utterance, and to deepen its effect. There is power in an *animated* manner. One's whole appearance in preaching may be either inspiring to an audience, or absolutely soporific ; and we agree with another, that nothing can be more indecent than to hear " a dead preacher speaking to dead sinners the living truth of a living God. " *

* Sydney Smith thus comments on the dead and formal style too often witnessed : " Why are we natural everywhere but in the pulpit ? No man expresses warm and animated feelings anywhere else, with his mouth alone, but with his whole body ; he articulates with every limb, and talks from head to foot with a thousand voices. Why this holoplexia on sacred occasions alone ? Why call in the aid of paralysis to piety ? Is it a rule of oratory to balance the style against the subject, and to handle the most sublime truths in the dulllest language and driest manner ? Is sin to be taken from men, as Eve was from Adam, by casting them into a deep slumber ? Or from what possible perversion of common sense are we all to look like field preachers in Zemble, holy lumps of ice numbed into quiescence and stagnation, and mumbling ? There is, I grant, something discouraging at present to a man of sense in the sarcastic phrase of " popular preacher ; " but I am not entirely without hope that the time may come when energy in the pulpit may be no longer considered as a mark of superficial understanding ; when animation and affectation will be separated ; when churches will cease (as Swift says) to be public dormitories ; and sleep be no longer looked upon as the most convenient vehicle of good sense. "

So is there power in an *affectionate* and *winning* manner—a fine example of which was the late Robert M'Cheyne. And *whatever* pertaining to delivery, that is excellent and of good report, should be earnestly coveted, as among the "best gifts."

III. THE MAN.—We now come to those conditions of pulpit power which pertain to the *man* himself—to his inner or essential being. It is common to suppose that eloquence is a thing to be put on, that it is an outward affair. No mistake could be greater. In impressive public address, it is not so much the mouth that speaks as the soul; not so much the manner as the sentiment and the thought which creates the manner. The power consists in the action of the speaker's *soul* on the soul of the hearer. Longinus, after describing the sublime, tells us that this sublime is "the echo of inward greatness;" and hence we ought, says he, to "spare no pains to educate our souls to grandeur, and impregnate them, as it were, with generous and enlarged ideas." Style in writing is simply the inner being shewing itself externally—the sentiment and the thought becoming visible. And the same may be said of delivery. The elocutionist cannot make a preacher. The *man* must be made first. Behind what he can touch must be something to *beget* eloquence, or he might as well attempt to train an automaton. The foundation for successful public speaking, then, lies in the man himself. *What is this foundation?*

Goodness must lie at the bottom. The word is used in a broad sense to include piety, and moral excellence, and uprightness. The ancients had a maxim that no one could be eloquent but a good man. "An orator," said Cato, the censor, to his son Marcus, "is a good man skilled in speaking." And we read in another of the ancients, "Every man speaks as he lives," "A minister's life," says an old divine, "is the life of his ministry." The explanation is obvious. Weight of character (depending on real goodness) gives weight to words; while supposed insincerity, and known inconsistency of conduct, neutralise all that one can say. To the minister of Christ, then, pre-eminently, should apply the principle of Pope's couplet upon Longinus:—

"His own example strengthens all his laws,
And is himself the great sublime he draws."

Knowledge also lies at the base of pulpit power. How can one teach unless himself taught? How can he accomplish his persuasion without acquaintance with language, and its relation to thought, and a delicate perception of the laws of association, by which what is said shall suggest "that richer part of wisdom which must for ever remain unsaid?" A novice

cannot even command respect. It is indispensable that a minister be well instructed in the *Scriptures*, and he should not be ignorant of the *sciences*. He should know *men*, too, as well as books. Many ministers are altogether too "bookish." They fail of influence from not knowing the material they have to operate upon. The heart of man must be interpreted, as well as the word of God, by him who would have power over an audience. He must be thoroughly acquainted with human nature—must know the feelings of men of all classes and conditions, and all the springs of action, and avenues to the soul. He is the best preacher, says one whose own success ought to qualify him to speak, "who has the best knowledge of human nature—not of the philosophy of mind in the abstract, though that is important—but of the wants, the susceptibilities, the struggles, the temptations, the reasonings, the shifts of individual minds in regard to religion." So, also, should the preacher be able to scan the material world with a keen, discriminating eye. Mr Spurgeon affords an example of the advantage of sensibility to the visible creation. Having occasion not long ago to prepare a sketch of his life, a note was addressed to him with this question: Where were you educated? To which he answered, "Nominally at divers schools in New Market; really by *summer rambles*, hard *private* studies, and *close observation*." And no one can read his sermons without seeing everywhere the fruits of those summer rambles and that close observation. The prayer of Elisha for his servant might most profitably be prayed over the head of many a scholarly man in the sacred office, or about to enter it, "Lord, open his eyes that he may *see*!" Of analyses, and criticisms, and propositions, and "doctrines beaten out by dialectic hammers," he is not ignorant; but he is wholly insensible to the glory that encompasses him, and, by consequence, but half-educated.

Courage in a preacher is necessary to pulpit power. It was when the people saw "the boldness of Peter and John" that they marvelled, and "took knowledge of them that they had been with Jesus." And Paul desired his brethren to pray that he might open his mouth "boldly" in preaching the gospel. Our Master taught "with authority." Authority is inherent in truth. We expect one who knows he is in the right to speak with boldness; and Vinet, in his *Homiletics*, remarks, with truth, that the accent of authority is welcome to almost any one. We are prepossessed in favour of men who, in this world of uncertainty and perplexity, express themselves on a grave subject with confidence and command. Some preachers weaken their messages by an indecisive mode of statement, giving the impression that they are either careless, or timid, or half-persuaded. They qualify and guard everything, as if

somebody would take exception. Instead of this, they should come saying, "We are the servants of the Most High! These are *his* words—not ours; and not one jot or tittle will we abate from them, nor give subjection to opposers, no, not for an hour!" Men dealt with thus fearlessly acknowledge the preacher's power. His courage energises and inlocks his thoughts, and gives to them decision, majesty, strength.

Experience is necessary to an impressive preacher. There are different ways of learning things. Some of our knowledge is intuitive, or ideal—a matter of pure reason. Some is speculative, gathered by deduction or inference. Some is the result of reading; some of instruction. But another kind, and quite different from all this, is that which we acquire by experience. And this knowledge is deepest and most actual. It is "burnt in," and becomes a part of our energies and powers. Now preachers want this kind of knowledge. It is needful that they be able to say, "We have seen and felt; *therefore* we believe." "We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen." It is an old saying, that the wounded is the wounding heart. One always speaks most strongly of what he has felt. Indeed, in successful discourse, one cannot go much beyond that. When the preacher is ready to cry out with Elihu of old, "I am full of matter; the Spirit within me constraineth me; I will speak that I may be refreshed"—then look out for a torrent of irresistible utterance! Could Luther have been the giant he was in the conflict with hell, had he not felt beforehand the cogs of his terrible experience, striking him through and through, and well nigh tearing him asunder? He *knew* what he talked about. Those inward torments, compared with which the tortures of the stake were as nothing, were an essential part of his education. Hear what Bunyan says about the way he preached: "I preached what I felt; what smartingly I did feel; even that under which my poor soul did groan and tremble to astonishment. I went myself in chains to preach to them in chains; and carried that fire in my own conscience, that I persuaded them to be aware of." And it was equally true of the blissful experiences which he describes. To take an illustration outside the profession: Could Byron have described the pangs of an accusing conscience with such awful vividness as he has done in his writings, had he not *known*, in his own *experience*, that

"No ear can hear, no tongue can tell,
The tortures of that inward hell?"

And could Baxter have written his "Saint's Rest" except for that long and weary sickness of his in a solitary chamber in Derbyshire? It was a transcript of his own heart, and hence

it had, as he says, "the greatest force on the hearts of others" of all his writings. Hence we see that a minister must draw from the depth of his own soul if he would have power in the pulpit. And this is why God lets so many candidates for the ministry struggle and suffer as they do. "It is of difficulties that miracles are born," says La Bruyere. And so God environs with inward and outward difficulties his young servants, that they may grow strong and know something for themselves! And this amazingly helps them to preach. Their discourses are apt to be woven and wrought out of a feeling heart, and to have definite points in them, and to come home to men's bosoms.

Industriousness lies at the base of pulpit power. We use it here as equivalent to *hard study*. Ordination does not bring omniscience. The pulpit has no magic to infuse wisdom. And previous culture is not a stock for a lifetime. One may have a transient popularity without study; but the cistern soon runs out, and the people get tired of drivelling and sediment. It is too late, now, to talk of God's helping those who do not help themselves. Though he made the beast of Balaam to speak, he will not countenance men in laziness. If he does not need our wisdom, he certainly does not our stupidity. It is an insult to God to go idly up and down all the week (or all but *Saturday*!), and then on Sunday bring an offering to the Lord "which cost us nothing,"—"the blind, the lame, the sick,"—"a corrupt thing for sacrifice," and ask God's blessing upon it. How can such preaching have power? * "Give attention to *reading*;" "*study* to shew thyself approved," says Paul. Without this, a Samson in native talent will soon lose his locks. A strong preacher *must* keep his mental powers in working order. He *must* be a man of rigid, unremitted diligence. He *must* plough, and cross plough, and subsoil his own mind, that it may yield nourishment to other minds. †

Sympathy is an element of strength. We want to see a *brother* in one who undertakes to do us good: hence if a man is persuaded that you really *love* him, you can do almost any thing with him. And sympathy is necessary to make one a *man of his time*. With all the allowance that ought to be made, there is much truth in the criticism of a foreign Review. "The pulpit is out of gear with the age; it is a piece of machi-

* Live for your sermon; live in your sermon. Get some starling to cry Sermon! sermon! sermon! The best discourses are the efflux of a man's best thoughts and feelings during the week.—*J. W. Alexander*.

† "If the minister labours not to increase his stock, he is the worst thief in the parish. It is wicked for a man trusted with the improving of orphans' estates to let them lie dead by him; much more for a minister not to improve his gifts, which I may call the town-stock given for the good of the souls of both rich and poor."—*Gurnall*.

nery wheeling away, apparently for the mere pleasure of wheeling, with its teeth fitting absolutely into nothing." There is not enough of the actual grappling of the pulpit upon society. It is too far away from the people. It does not speak enough of what concerns men, and meet them as it should, in their every-day living. It deals too much in dry theories and smooth abstractions. If those who stand in the pulpit were more skilful and ready to touch the plane of actual life in their preaching, and less given to "reaching vaguely after an indefinite something that very few can comprehend," the complaint that ministers "do not get hold of the people" were less frequently made. The preacher ought to be so much a man of his time, as really to feel the pulsations of the great heart of animated society throbbing in his own heart. Is it reasonable to suppose that men intensely interested in their pursuits, and in daily occurrences, can be reached and influenced by preachers who know nothing (or care nothing) of what agitates the common heart; whose ideas, sympathies, instincts, bearings, all belong to the *fossil* period? The men who are to move this age, adopting the motto of the Roman actor, "I am a man, and whatever concerns man concerns me," must lock in with the age, and be every whit awake, and make the gospel everywhere felt.

Enthusiasm is essential to power in the pulpit. Every eminent man is an enthusiast in his profession. He thinks there is no calling like it. And he who would not esteem it a self-degradation to exchange his pulpit for a throne, is not fit to fill a pulpit. Said the venerable William Carey, when the Rangoon government had placed his son in a dignified and important office, "My son is shrivelled from a missionary into an ambassador." The dignity and magnitude of the preacher's calling should so rise upon his vision as to shut out all else. He should live, and move, and have his being for one thing—to magnify his office, to fulfil his ministry. Thus enthusiastic, he cannot be tame. Handel caught the idea of one of his great choruses from the ring of a blacksmith's hammer and anvil. Talma, the tragedian, took a hint from the impassioned, but restrained conversation, of a group of men, which changed the entire style of theatric delivery. Chalmers riding on a stage-coach, and seeing the driver whip one of the horses to prevent his taking fright at an object in the distance, resolved the matter into a principle, and upon it developed his famous sermon on "*The expulsive power of a new affection.*" These men were enthusiasts, each in his profession, and everything subserved their ends. And so it will be found with any minister who is thoroughly absorbed in his profession. He is learning out of the study as well as in the study. When he goes

abroad to breathe God's sweet air, and survey his beautiful world; when he mingles in society, and watches what is going on in the world, he is adding to his stock of ideas. Everything is feeding the sources of eloquent thought. Like the bee, he is gathering honey wherever he rambles, to bring back to his pulpit-hive. Each day of the week he is preparing to feed his flock, and not the least thing, in his reading or observation, that can add to the requisite material, is allowed to escape untreasured. Thus from a living enthusiasm he waxes strong.

Earnestness, an element, closely allied to the latter, is also requisite. The earnest man is intent on carrying his point. He has an *aim*, and his hearers *feel* it when he comes in contact with them. It was this that wrung from the lips of Agrippa, "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian." It was this that extorted sighs, and sobs, and groans from men of all ranks when Loyola was preaching. Eminent orators are always earnest speakers. When Dr Mason returned from Scotland, he was asked wherein lay Chalmers' strength. "In his blood-earnestness," he replied. A simple Scotch woman's description of McCheyne's preaching told the secret of his effective appeals: "He preached as if he was dyin' a'most to have ye converted." What an increase of pulpit power if all preachers spoke with a like earnest purpose! We need men more like Christ, whose soul was all sensibility; more like Paul, who "travailed in birth again" for immortal souls; men after the stamp of good John Welsh—son-in-law of John Knox—whose weeping would sometimes awaken his wife, whose surprise he relieved by saying, "O woman, I have the souls of three thousand to answer for, and I know not how it is with many of them!" men who could say to their flocks with Rutherford, "My witness is above, that your heaven would be two heavens to me, and the salvation of you all as two salvations to me;" and with Brainerd, "I cared not where or how I lived, or what hardships I went through, so that I could but gain souls to Christ. While I was asleep, I dreamed of these things, and when I waked the first thing I thought of was this great work." A new day will dawn upon the churches, when, in answer to their prayers, a race of ministers thus earnest shall come into possession of their pulpits.

Passion is essential to the greatest effectiveness. Deep feeling is contagious. It melts and wins its way. Sermons from burning hearts set others on fire. One of the best definitions of eloquence is, "to have something to say and to *burn* to say it." If the eloquence of art be not the eloquence of the heart, it is of little worth. Sermons fabricated in the furnace are very different from sermons constructed with the cold-chisel and file. Preaching should by no means be purely emo-

tional; nor yet should it be purely intellectual. Paul will not be suspected of mental imbecility, nor of fanatical weakness; but mark what he said to the Ephesian elders: "Remember that by the space of three years I ceased not to warn every one of you, night and day, *with tears*." Let cold, heartless, "intellectual" preachers ponder this statement of Paul! It is manly to weep. It is a manifestation of the child-spirit, and all great men have the child-spirit in them. Quick sensibilities are of immense value to a minister. They are "the electric fluid that pervades the region of the heart, throwing its subtle influence upon the springs of thought, and shooting its lightning through every channel." Other things being equal, a man's force in this world is always just in the ratio of the force of his heart. A full-hearted man is generally a powerful man. As a rule, no man can be a great preacher without great feeling. His message, like the dart of Acastes, must kindle as it is shot forth. Examine the past and the present, and the men of mark will be found to be men of the mighty heart. Let those, then, who would have power in the pulpit, aim at a high degree of subdued passion. Let them see that their altar-candle, besides being orthodox and straight, is made to *burn*; —that their production, besides having body, has also *soul*; and in delivering it, let them be sure that the heart palpitates on the paper.*

Prayer is necessary to pulpit power. It is said of Pericles, that he never ascended the rostrum without invoking the gods; much less should we without prayer. It was the deliberate opinion of an eminent minister, that even æsthetically considered, one hour of prayer is a better preparation for sermon-writing than a whole day of study. One *cannot* make an edifying sermon while the heart is motionless. He *must* have the internal instruction of the Spirit, granted in answer to sincere supplication. "We will give ourselves to *prayer*, and to the ministry of the word," said the apostles. Prayer, as one argues from this passage, is one-half of a man's ministry; and it gives to the other half all its power and success. It is incredible how much of light, vigour, strength, sprightliness, will come to the mind from a few moments, direct communion with God. Rightly spake Payson of ministers: "It is in the *closet* that the battle is lost or won."

* Says Longinus; "The heart is the source of all true eloquence." Goethe has thus paraphrased the thought:

"Persuasion, friend, comes not by toil or art;
Hard study never made the matter clearer;
'Tis the live fountain in the speaker's heart,
Sends forth the streams that melt the ravished hearer.
Would you then touch the heart, the only method known,
My worthy friend, is *first to have one of your own*."

Faith is essential to powerful preaching. "We *believe*," says Paul, "*therefore* we speak." He who believes implicitly, will feel deeply and speak forcibly. Chrysostom, to help him in composing sermons, imagined the communion rails around the pulpit crowded with listening angels. Charles Simeon kept the picture of the flaming Henry Martyn hanging in his study, that it might seem to say to him, "*Be in earnest! don't trifle! don't trifle!*" and the good Simeon would gently bow to the speaking picture, and say, "Yes, I *will* be in earnest; I will *not* trifle: for souls are perishing, and Jesus is to be glorified." But to the man of faith, there is present more than listening angels, or a sainted martyr, even the omniscient MASTER himself; and his voice *is heard* saying, "Be thou faithful! Work while the day lasts! Entreat with all long-suffering and tears!" and under its influence, *how can* he loiter? how can he preach but with the tenderest importunity? Summerfield, on his death-bed, exclaimed, "Oh, if I might be raised again, how could I preach! for *I have had a look into eternity!*" But faith affords such a look into eternity. Future things become present. The very surges of *eternity* seem beating against his study-door. The Judge is actually coming! The worlds are burning! The heavens are departing! The throne is set! The books are open! The questions are being put—to *him*, and to his *flock*! and the angels are placing *these* on the right hand, *those* on the left! *There* is heaven with its rapturous songs, and myriads of shining ones; and *there* is *hell*, with its

" groans that end not, and sighs
That always sigh, and tears that ever weep,
And ever fall, but not in mercy's sight:"

and with all this before him, it is impossible to be unmoved. His spirit is stirred within him, and he exclaims—"No! these souls shall *not* commit suicide!" And, after first crying to God on his knees, he goes into his pulpit, and cries out to *them*; and there is nothing that is strong in argument, or sweet in entreaty, or thrilling in appeal, that he does not seize upon, and appropriate to his mighty theme. Thus does faith give him power.

Holiness is essential to pulpit power. This is placed last because most important. Our blessed Lord said to his apostles, "Ye shall receive power *after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you*;" and he gave command that, when he should be taken up from them, they "should not depart from Jerusalem, but *wait for the promise of the Father*." They were not qualified to preach until the Divine Spirit, *in a special sense*, had come upon them. Neither is any one. This alone can bring the preacher into such relations to God, and to men, and

to his work, as will ensure success. The holy soul, only, is in close communication with the Almighty, whence all his help must come. "The secret of the Lord is with them that *fear* him, and he sheweth *them* his covenant." He who lies in God's bosom draws from "the hiding-place of his power," both the wisdom to know, and the strength to wield, the word of truth. God teaches him the deep things of the kingdom, and clothes him with superhuman energy. Some can readily be recalled who have walked among us in other days, as burning and shining lights, because of their peculiar sanctity. In one sense, they were not learned and eloquent; in another sense they were. Their fellowship was with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ, and they were most acceptable and useful preachers. Their sermons were fetched up from the depths of their souls. They were fresh and entertaining. Even the texts they quoted seemed new, from having been steeped in their own experience. And with what unction, and pathos, and subduing goodness they delivered their messages!

It is common to disparage the present as compared with the past; but still it is a question worthy of the most serious consideration, whether the holiness of the pulpit in other days can be found among ministers now. Is there a man living that would not name, as the *first* requisite to increased pulpit efficiency, "a new baptism of the Holy Ghost?"

How many men, now weak and common-place ministers, would become mighty in word and doctrine, if only "filled with the Holy Ghost!" The people would wonder at them, as if made anew. Much as they who preach need many things, they need nothing half so much as more communion with God, more sympathy with Christ. They are comparatively feeble as *preachers*, because feeble as *Christians*. Their lips are not touched with "the coal from the altar;" *therefore*, the hearts of the people do not "burn within" them.

Let it be remembered, then, especially by those coming to the ministry, that the very first principle in the philosophy of *doing* good is to *be* good; that if one would have power in the pulpit, he must stand in the light of God's countenance, as the angel in John's vision stood in the sun. Let them be particularly watchful against a *professional* piety. It is easy to *appear* religious, to speak the language, and do the duties, and exhibit the feelings of religion, when it is merely *ex officio*, shadowy, mechanical. Awful thought, but true! Constant attention to religious subjects, and religious offices, is liable to induce insensibility. Professional duty becomes one's *business*, and spirituality in its performance is lost. Because engaged in holy things, the minister is esteemed holy; and he persuades himself that he is holy, and so lives on in this way, *forgetting*

that a holy office does not make one holy ;—*forgetting* that he may be spiritual in his pulpit, and not in his closet ;—*forgetting* that he may be the keeper of others' vineyards, without keeping his own ;—*forgetting* that it is easier to declaim against sins in *others* than to mortify them in *himself* ;—aye, forgetting that he may be the instrument of grace to others, and yet himself be *lost* !

Let ministers take heed to these things. Let the startling language of Dr Owen ring in their ears—"He that would go down to the pit in peace, let him obtain a great repute for religion ; let him preach and labour to make others better than he is himself, and in the mean time neglect to humble his heart, to walk with God in a manifest holiness and usefulness ; and he will not fail of his end." And these still more startling words from Swinnock—"It is a doleful thing to fall into hell from under the pulpit ; but, Oh ! how dreadful is it to drop thither out of it." Let all who minister in holy things see to it, that they are thoroughly *honest* men, without *hypocrisy*. Let them taste the word before they distribute it, and be able to say with the devoted Shepherd, "I have never preached a sermon to others, that I have not first preached to my own soul." In so doing, they shall magnify their office. "Clothed with humility," "nourished up in the words of faith and sound doctrine," and "filled with all the fulness of God," it shall not be so much they that speak as Christ who dwelleth in them ; and their words shall most surely be "with the demonstration of the Spirit, and with power."

ART. V.—Dorner on the Sinless Perfection of Jesus.*

IN directing our attention to the above-named subject, with a mental reference, though not always expressed, to recent literary productions, it is important for our purpose that the words and narratives in the life of Jesus which bear reference to his moral character have, in point of credibility, well-nigh passed unchallenged ; and we are therefore relieved from entering into preliminary questions of that nature. Apart from *a priori* grounds, the assaults on the sinlessness of Christ are in fact rather passages derived from the New Testament itself, which even the opponents hold to be faithful and credible as to the

* This important and valuable article, from the pen of Dr Dorner of Berlin, appeared in the January number (1862) of the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*. —Ed. B. & F. E. R.

moral appearance of Christ, and the impression which it produced. The following discussion will impose upon itself a further limitation. It will refrain from entering upon the question of the POSSIBILITY of a sinless and yet true human life; and also from drawing inferences from the sinlessness of Jesus as to his origin and inner nature, and rather adhere strictly to this question, Whether we hold, on good historical grounds, and with a good conscience, the REALITY of the sinless perfection of Jesus as an historical fact. Let me only remark as to the possibility of the thing, that those who regard human nature as so good that they do not need to seek a Redeemer, are wont to fall into striking self-contradiction when they speak of the sinlessness of Jesus; for this, on the very contrary, is next doubted because evil is a power not to be thoroughly overcome in any man by his own powers. Let a man deal in earnest with the latter experience, without playing false with conscience and its problems, and he will feel that the claims of Christianity deserve a hearing; and that just because sin is such an invincible power in us, Christ must have been sinless, in order to be able to cope with sin in us. Were we, on the other hand, content with that power of evil over us as an inevitable destiny, it would amount to the assertion of an essential contradiction in our nature,—a self-contradiction to the idea of the morally good; and therefore of a dissolution of this idea at once, since it unconditionally demands the very thing which is absolutely denied by reason of its impotence physically. Faith in the unconditional rectitude and the unconditional goodness of the morally good, involves in it that this is the only true reality, not to be withstood by anything physical,—not an empty, impotent “thou shalt;” but the principle of all that truly is.*

I. THE TRUE HUMANITY OF JESUS IN RELATION TO HIS SINLESS HOLINESS.

We approach every man with the assumption, which never fails us, that however great the moral differences of various individuals, yet there is none free from sin. This is not an experience of yesterday; for the formation of this opinion the high intellectual culture of a later age is not required. It prevailed in the time of Christ, and was applied even to Him. There were not wanting some who, in this point, considered Jesus only at best in degree different from others. The

* Among recent writings on our subject, along with Ullman's classical work “The Sinlessness of Jesus,” 6th ed. 1854, we may mention some writings in the English language, especially Young's, “The Christ of History;” Schaff's, “The Moral Character of Christ.” Among French works on our subject, may be named, on the one side, Edm. de Pressensé, “Le Rédempteur” (“The Redeemer”); on the other, the most acute hostile work, Pécaut, “Le Christ et la Conscience.”

Pharisees regarded him as a sinner, because he did not observe their Sabbath commandment; because he did not share the reverence for the temple; because he did not enjoin on his disciples the laws of purification, fasting, and much prayer, according to their notions; because he did not place the claims of the external Jewish theocracy and its independence above that of the Roman state, whose money they had accepted; not to speak of his testimony that he was the Son of God. They sought to persuade themselves that they did God service in persecuting him. In like manner Judas Iscariot thought himself justified in taking offence at the anointing of Jesus by the sister of Lazarus, and called to interest himself in the supposed waste of what might have been given to the poor. To this is added his treachery, whether it was that before committing it he cherished the suspicion that Jesus wanted courage to proceed with the establishment of his Messianic kingdom, and therefore needed an impulse by which he must be driven forward, if he would not fail; or whether he fancied that, in spite of his testimony regarding himself, he wanted an actually divine call, as he neglected all those appliances which, in Judas's opinion, were needful for success.

On the other hand his disciples, especially the eleven, unexpectedly received and preserved that impression of a wonderful elevation and greatness in his person and moral character, which even Judas Iscariot did not at first resist; their soul is ever more indissolubly attached to him, and ever more and more filled with admiration of him, even to adoration.* For they were imbued with the deepest conviction, which they afterwards sealed with their blood, that every human measure that could be applied to him was too narrow and too contracted. They who enjoyed the most confidential intercourse with him, who must have observed and known him most intimately, proclaim to the world that a sinless Saviour has arisen among mankind, who is the Redeemer, the fulfilment of the law and the prophets; and that to suffer and die for him is gain, and only the grateful reciprocation of his love. And this preaching of him has founded the church, gathered out a world of redeemed ones, and placed a boundary line as clear and manifest as any event in general history between a perishing, lost world and a world restored and becoming green again.

The eleven were not utterly inaccessible to the offence which the Pharisees, Judas, and others took at Jesus; for the power of moral traditions over what is good and pious, goes to an immeasurable extent; especially if, as in Judea, they mingle

* It is worthy of remark, that sinless holiness was not one of the features of the then prevalent conception of the Messiah.

imperceptibly with national patriotism, and error has assumed an embodiment and organization, and found a system supporting itself on holy Scripture, and ruling life down to its minutest details. The more we weigh it, the higher must we rate the spiritual power influencing not only the understanding, but the conscience of him who raised his disciples high above these stumblingblocks lying so near the national mind, and enabled them to found their soul's salvation upon him in opposition to the prevailing Judaism. If he was not pious and upright after the ideal of the Jews, there must have been something else to supply this want, something higher, the view of an original holy purity and goodness, which attached their consciences to him, so that they were ready, in virtue of this impression, to allow themselves and their inherited moral and religious conceptions to be formed and remodelled by him, instead of seeking to measure and to judge him by them.

Even his enemies the Pharisees, however, betray the impression of a quite original and wonderful elevation. For though they regarded him as a sinner and despiser of the law, from the view-point of their inherited moral and religious axioms, yet they could not stop short at this, and view him as an ordinary sinful man, or teacher of error. Rather, he appeared to them in the very estrangement in which they had placed themselves towards him, so much one possessed of power (Matt. vii. 29; John vii. 46), so wonderfully firm, strong, and great of his kind, that they were obliged to attribute to him a superhuman power of evil, after they had resolved not to concede to him a superhuman power of good.

The coat of mail, the outward scaffolding of those once powerful Jewish traditions about moral and religious things, is burst through by Christianity. There are no longer any who share in those Jewish stumblingblocks. On the contrary, it has become the triumphant general conviction that Jesus again evoked the source of the original moral and religious consciousness from the rubbish of dead forms and institutions. What was then a stumblingblock to many, so that they only believed on him in spite of them, or wholly came short, is now to us rather a sign how high he towered above his time in moral wisdom and virtue, a sign that has now become an argument to attract to him, and to awaken confidence. It may be that in a state of more advanced knowledge, those very stumbling blocks or doubts (afterwards to be discussed), occasioned by other, and these, perhaps, heathen views, may have a similar application, and that mankind may just discern in these very points peculiar revelations of his moral elevation and of his divine originality. At least, there will ever be the same alternative, to which the suspicion against his moral purity and perfection must come, viz., that if he

is a sinner at all, in spite of his testimonies regarding himself, he surely cannot any longer be called pre-eminently **PIOUS** and **PURE**; but only the dilemma remains which was presented to the Pharisees, when they reached the verge of the sin against the Holy Ghost, "singularly and marvellously superhuman either in evil or in good."

But, according to the Evangelists, whom we must hold to be worthy of belief *pro* and *contra* in this matter, if we would speak of it in general, does not Christ himself acknowledge a perfect equality with mankind? Does he not himself, by word and deed, as it were, repudiate for himself perfect goodness?

Certainly his identity with us in his ethical nature may not be abridged or curtailed. He was not merely in a physical and intellectual, but in an ethical, point of view, not perfect from the first. He learned obedience. He first, proved and maintained his sympathy with us in its fullest power only when he was rejected by mankind. He grew in favour, not only with men, but with God. Growth points back to previous defect, or, which is the same thing, forwards to an absolute goal, to which reality approaches only by degrees. Now, if defect in perfection were identical with sinfulness, then certainly real humanity and sinfulness would be identical. But the ethical goal of perfection sets before it gradual attainment, and excludes the finishing stroke from the beginning. Absolute normality consists well enough with the reality of progress. If the complacency of God rests on every stage of a normal progress, it surely may also be said that it rests upon it in a higher degree, the nearer it has come to the goal of perfection, because abnormal possibilities are already just so much the more overcome, and the condition of immutable confirmation, of the absolute union of the ethically free and of the ethically necessary is already advanced so much nearer. This leads to a **SECOND** thing which we must attribute to real humanity, the liability to temptation, the passage through conflicts and temptations.

Jesus says himself that he had been in *temptation*, not once only, in what we are accustomed to call **THE TEMPTATION**, but also on other occasions, and subsequently (Luke iv. 13; xxii. 28). Some, as Schleiermacher, seek to weaken the force of this, by admitting in him only conflicts with outward foes, but not temptations at all, in order to guard his sinlessness. Others view in this a proof that not even Jesus continued free from sin. Both agree in this, that any resistance of one side of man to the good is an evil lust, though only in germ. Hence the petition in Gethsemane, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," and the temptation in the wilderness, are either no historical facts, as Schleiermacher contends, or prove that even in Jesus there were stirrings of the germ of evil, though, as Men-

ken and Irving maintain, it was always held in check, and never penetrated into the personal life which was to regenerate and transform our assumed sinful nature. This last view is so far correct, that Christ had a real moral task, not only external to himself, but in himself, which could not be solved from the beginning, if he was to be like us; that his corporeal nature had not of itself spiritual impulses and discipline in its subjection to the will of the spirit; that it had not by nature the same law of life with the spirit, but was first only loosely connected with spirit, and its unity with the spirit as a promptly ministering organ, consenting even to the self-sacrifice to which it was called, could only be the result of an ethical process; that this union of the spirit with the physical and bodily life was a real labour, and might become a conflict. But the opinion is wrong, that this loose connection, which was gradually to attain perfect unity, or that the assumed bodily nature, as such, is evil in itself. That the bodily and physical nature of man shrinks from suffering and death, is not evil, but belongs to its (metaphysical) goodness. The opposition which its natural inclination makes to suffering and death is perfectly innocent, and so very proper in its place, that a longing on the part of the sensitive human nature of Christ for suffering and death would rather have been un-natural, and would have deprived his self-sacrifice of its value. It would have converted it into a seeking of his own. Moreover, to this innocent conflict in Jesus were added traditions, hallowed by antiquity, and by the authority of his dearest relations, as well as by the Messianic anticipations of the whole people, above which he could not, from his birth, be exalted,* but only by the severe toil of acquiring knowledge and fathoming the true will of God; and as these traditions and still more the temptations of the prince of this world might lead him to flee from suffering, or to a wrong use of that conflict, which was innocent in itself, but capable of leading to sin, we have grounds enough for discerning the necessity of a severe conflict prepared for him, while we have no warrant to infer sin from the fact of such a conflict; as, on the contrary, the cessation of this struggle would furnish a proof that the ethical process imposed on him had come to a dead lock.

It is true we have not, before his baptism, any trace of such conflicts and temptations. Though we may not question the severe toil of Jesus up to the time of his baptism, the discipline in obedience towards his parents,† in silent persever-

* Though this supposition and the following one, that sin might have ensued, are no uncommon conclusions in the German theology, they are out of keeping with right views of the Incarnation.—ED. B. & F. E. E.

† His obedience to his parents is expressly mentioned for the period also after his twelfth year, Luke ii. 51. The record of his first visit to a feast is by

ance, notwithstanding the sharp contrast between his higher self-consciousness, as it manifested itself since his twelfth year, and his mean condition,* yet the harder struggles were spared for the last years of his life. His earlier life of retirement bears, in comparison with this, as it seems to us, the character of an even, clear mirror, of an untroubled, quiet stream, in which the approbation of man at such an harmonious youth, as well as the complacency of God, was reflected, Luke ii. 52. It was no disorder in him, but the disorder and sin without him, which occasioned him the contests, temptations, sufferings, which filled his official life. These later conflicts were only assigned him because he remained the pure One, had become the morally harmonious one in the midst of moral anarchy; but they became, notwithstanding, inward and personal struggles in him; for he must introduce the power of his harmony and his sufferings, in order to overcome the disharmony in the world. He, the righteous one, must, as it were, in a way of suffering, take upon himself the disorder and disharmony, must live

no means recorded as one of an act of disobedience, or of mistake on the part of the boy Jesus. Jesus knows nothing of the departure and anxiety of his parents about him; and, summary as the record is, it nevertheless shews that the child-like certainty possessed the mind of Jesus that he was not staying in the temple against the will of his parents, but that his pleasure in the holy things would rejoice them, and that they would make no effort to tear him away from them until he had refreshed and satisfied himself. Only the unfounded assumption of an omniscience of the boy Jesus, whereby he would have had knowledge of the pain of his mother, would make the matter difficult. Such, however, does not consist with his questioning the teachers.

* Forebodings of his conflicts, which the history of the temptation announces, might, in this respect, happen in the period before the baptism, when the divine seal and testimony of God's approbation was stamped on his former life. After his twelfth year he knew God to be in a special sense his Father; and as the difference of his pure nature from that of other men could not escape him, so his wish to serve and help the world and his people would as certainly be excited in him, as his heart was full of love. Just as we cannot assume that he had a definite consciousness of his calling as Redeemer while still a boy and youth,† when his task was rather personally to be about his Father's business, and to be, both at home and in the temple, absorbed in divine things, so this, his calling, must certainly have dawned upon him before his baptism. On this occasion, however, he is said to have sought and found the divine seal to it, the Father's answer to the question awakened in the heart of the Son regarding the work of his life. The superficial opinion of Strauss, Pécaut, and others, that this coming of Jesus to baptism proves his consciousness of sin, would then only be worthy of regard if the baptism of John, historically viewed, could be proved to have had the exclusive design of working repentance. But, according to the gospels, it had the more comprehensive design to prepare for the dawn of the kingdom of God, and to invite men to the resolution, to which Jesus had also in his way dedicated himself, ver. 12, to subordinate and sacrifice everything to the kingdom of God. Thus Jesus apprehended his baptism, as he places it in closest connection with his submission to suffering, and with his sacrifice for the world, Luke xii. 50; Mark x. 38, 39. Compare my article on the Baptism of Jesus in Piper's *Evangel. Kalender*, 1860.

† Christ's own language, when a boy of twelve years (Luke ii. 40), would seem to imply the very opposite.—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

through it, and taste it, in order to establish a power which is not only harmonious in itself, but so potent in harmony as to take the disharmony into itself, master it, and transform it into harmony.

The impression that the labours and the conflicts of his PUBLIC life were not, in the ordinary sense, an ethical conflict in Jesus himself, but only upon him, because his ethical self-cultivation had come to its goal at his baptism, has constantly pressed itself on men's minds from an ancient date. It is not purity defending itself against a possible disharmony, and ever more and more excluding that possibility; but it is virtue seeking the disharmony without, and taking it up into itself, which forms the character of his public life; and in this direction his entire somatic and physical organism must follow him, in spite of the natural and just resistance that health offers to sickness, life to death, purity to the touch of impurity. To this promptness in following the organism was to become accustomed, not that Jesus might thus acquire purity and personal virtue, but that he might lead personal virtue officially through self-sacrifice.

It is an inadequate view, if we put this manifestation of his moral perfection as something so different from what is the universal problem, that we assume as the basis of it a divine freedom, bound to no law, in which also his humanity participated. He is, it is said, the free Son of God, whose moral duty was no such self-sacrifice. He is Lord of the law, and therefore did not need to fulfil it for himself. Whatever moral arbitrariness appears in this phraseology is blameworthy. Such a freedom from the law as would be the mistress of it, and is said to be derived from the *Communicatio idiomatum* to the humanity of Jesus, which, without detriment to the moral perfection, might act as it pleased, simply according to its own choice, is a misconception.* Arbitrariness dwells not with God. Such a super-ethical elevation would rather be a falling below the ethical—because belonging to the category of absolute authority, nay, subject to it; and the real humanity of Jesus, its natural identity with ours, would not be consistent with it. If he be the sinlessly Holy, he is certainly also the Free, and high above the level of the law, but only in such a way that law has become life and reality in him. He does not first become good and virtuous through his calling, he but executes it in the power of his own virtue; yet his calling, normal as it is in

* The old divines before Piscator held that Christ's humanity was not necessarily under the law on his own account, and that he did not obey the law for himself. This is not here overthrown or refuted. The question which they correctly decided was not, Did Christ require to obey, as all creatures must? but, Must Christ be under the law on his own account, or to win a right easiness to us? And they correctly said, To win it for his people.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

every man, is so thoroughly interwoven with his person, that he can only maintain himself in the position he assumed at his entrance on his mission when he responds to his calling, and yields to the new sacrifices which the will of God imposes upon him in it—sacrifices which, as above mentioned, touch the innermost constitution of his harmoniously-ordered personal character, imposing certain inward experience of the disharmony without him. But however unique and peculiar his mission, and however thoroughly free and devoted his love, so far as we had no legal claim to it, still it was not his at his discretion, if he were morally perfect, to be and to exercise such love. There was a higher moral necessity for him; without it he would not have been morally perfect; and however different the measure of his powers was from that of others, he could only satisfy that love which acted in him as divinely free and divinely wise, by placing all these powers entirely at its service, just as this same thing is also our higher law of life.

Hence, because he was and remained genuinely human in his calling, however unique, we are not to conclude that he exhibited a different moral behaviour than passes current among men; that he was elevated above the moral obligations of the family, the moral duty of obedience to authorities, and the moral right of property; that he used to regard all these only as far as he pleased, and that he might violate general human duties in these respects in the interest of his higher calling, and in virtue of the greatness of his person.* In the moral domain

* My excellent friend, the late Professor Bonifas, in Montauban, whose early loss I bitterly lament for myself, and still more for science, especially in the French Church—for, after his beautiful first fruits, distinguished service was to be expected from him—has said many beautiful things in his article in the *Esperance*, on Pécaut's writing, in which I perfectly concur. But when he explains some facts in the life of Jesus, in the way that the usual moral laws incumbent on us were not incumbent on him, this appears to me hazardous and superfluous to his object. Hazardous, because then Christ would not have exhibited our morality, and into it would have entered what Christologically borders on Docetism, and morally borders on Antinomianism, and which would subject to question the universal, eternal, and absolute character of morality. The consequence would be the necessity of instituting a purely empirical or positivistic origin of ordinary morals. But no such expedient is necessary. As to the objection that Jesus damaged the Gadarenes, Matt. viii., it would be pertinent only if he had either willed this injury or known it beforehand. There is no ground for the first supposition; rather, it is certain enough that the accident which closed the Gadarenes to him happened without his will.† Certainly this issue of the affair would at once have occurred to any one, if we put the matter as is so often done: Jesus permitted the devils to go into the swine. But that is not the statement of the evangelists; and if any will not believe their narrative, they must not seek to derive argument from them against the sinfulness of Jesus. They record that the demons prayed him not to banish them back into the abyss, but to be permitted to go

† The language of Jesus, *ὡνάρετε*, is plainly a permissive imperative; and it is more natural to regard the event, with Lisco, as an act of punitive discipline upon the Jewish proprietors driving a trade not in harmony with their Jewish religion.—Ed. B. & F. E. E.

the higher includes the lower, preserves and confirms it IN ITS PLACE. The opposite would lead to various species of the morally good, according to Roman Catholic views, and would introduce inner contradictions and caprice in the moral world. But it is certainly only *in its place*. God is the highest good; without him, or contrary to him, nothing may be loved or spared.* Thus everything depends on understanding what is

with the herd. Jesus does not COMMAND them to do that; he only permits them, as he does not banish them, as they feared, into the abyss. Since he does not do this, they retain liberty, not immediately, it is true, but yet mediately to do damage to men. This liberty they use in such a manner, that they seek by means of it to damage the cause of Jesus. But we have no right to demand that it belonged to the official prescience of Jesus to prevent what they would do in the herd of swine, or that his power should ward off damage to property, which may come equally by storm, tempest, or pestilence. Compare Trench, Notes on the Miracles of our Lord, ed. 5, 1856, pp. 161-180. The same thing holds good of the cursing of the fig-tree, in which it is not at all certain that damage was really done by it; an unfruitful fig-tree being no better than barren wood. The action of Jesus, however, is no epideictic miracle, whose object was annihilation, but a symbolical action, the object of which was an awakening warning of the people and city of Jerusalem for their repentance unto life, a warning of impending judgment; for Israel is the unfruitful fig-tree, which cumberers the ground, and which is cut down, because it does not improve, is only rich in leaves above others, promising, pretentious, but disappointing hope (in the fig-tree, leaves certainly warrant us to look for fruit, because the fruit comes before the leaves). (Compare Luke xiii. 6-9; Trench, p. 489.)

* When Jesus (John ii. 4), with a severe word, directs his mother to the exercise of patience, and permits her not to interfere with his calling (as he deals with Peter similarly (Matt. xvi. 22), he gave her something which she needed, if she was to come to faith in him. He faithfully observed the duty of a son, even in his last words on the cross (John xix. 2). But for Mary (as in a less degree for his brothers) it was, from obvious reasons, more difficult than for others to subordinate herself to him as her Redeemer, on whom she, as well as others, must believe. Hence love to her, which could not be without truth, could not otherwise evince itself than by the fact that he could concede nothing more to her than to others, when he was acting and speaking in his office. By placing her in the position becoming her, which she feels at once (John ii. 5), he lightens and facilitates faith to her as much as possible, and imparts a counterpoise to the customary intercourse of life. He honours her as his mother, but not at the expense of his Father, of his office, and of true love to her soul. Things which in themselves do not possess moral necessity and utility, and belonged only to conventional propriety, Jesus did not allow when he foresaw that there would grow out of them danger and violence to the salutary and decisive step in life which was just on the point of ripening. Thus he addresses him who would first go bid farewell to those who were at home at his house, before he will follow him, "No man having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." And to him who would leave him again, in order to bury his father, he said, on the one hand, that the dead body of his father would not lack burial, and that his presence was not required for the last honours to be paid to it; and, on the other hand, he calls him away from the over-estimation of a service to the dead, which to Jesus himself is only a single symbol of a spiritually dead existence, to the divine fountain of life, to fellowship with God, to whom even the dead live (Luke xx. 38), and who, little as he desires outward sacrifices and gifts from children at the expense of the necessity of parents (Matt. xv. 4-6), will as little permit a filial love which places the soul

the truly, the divinely good, not, however, the conventionally moral—not that certain moral representations of a particular age or nation are, without examination, to be made a rule by which to measure Jesus, instead of first rectifying our own views of the moral, as we have seen above in relation to the Pharisees. But a word about this below.

But does not Jesus himself say to the young man, "Whycallest thou me good? No one is good save God alone," (Matt. xix. 16, and following verses). Some have desired to interpret this as a reproof, that the youth regarded him as a good human master, instead of the Son of God. Certainly Jesus meant not to point him away from himself to God—to a God who had nothing to do with the sending of Jesus—as if the youth had no need of Jesus. It is true he does not say to him, Thou hast not kept the commandments, as thou thinkest, from youth up; but tells him that he is not perfect, and invites him to follow him, which would discover to him more. Nor are the words of Jesus to be understood as implying that voluntary poverty would be his perfection, for the demand to renounce his goods is only the negative side of the summons to the following of Jesus, which

in the background, but claims the heart of man, and infuses into it a still higher than natural love to parents. The hating of fathers and mothers (Luke xiv. 26) is manifestly to be understood *cum gravo salis*, and cannot be taken in any other sense than the hating of our own life, demanded in the same place. Everywhere zeal and conflict with natural affection is demanded, when it idolatrously and self-contentedly interferes with the higher love; but the self-denial and the struggle against such ungodly love which is here demanded is itself again only a condition of true life and of the resurrection of true love (Luke xvii. 28; Matt. xix. 29; Luke xiv. 26). With regard to the decisive step which Christ demands, viz., to seek first the kingdom of God, and leave all other goods behind, and to count as gain all loss in money, property, honour among men, the reference is, of course, to the period of Jesus's sojourn on earth, the outward disruption of previous employments and relationships being a condition of following Jesus, which is no more the case. Jesus, in whom the kingdom of God was contained, could only be in one place at one time; and, consequently, all who sought the kingdom of God must also join his train, and break old relationships. After his exaltation, the gospel of the kingdom has more and more omnipresence—nay, it works as a leaven on earthly relationships. Hence, in order to draw near to Christ, it usually requires only the separation of times for retirement and self-recollection, rather than a change of place or calling. The exposition just given explains a list of passages which on a superficial consideration have given offence, or which do not seem to harmonize with pure moral conceptions, because many found in them the opinion that the true following of Christ is inconsistent with the pursuit of an ordinary calling, with riches, or the administration of fortune, or even with entrance into the marriage relationship. (Compare Matt. ix. 9, 5, 29, and following verses; vi. 25, and following verses; x. 37–39; xii. 48, and following verses; xvi. 24–26; xix. 21; Luke vi. 24; xvi. 1, 19; xviii. 23; xii. 88.) Connected with this, it is also worthy of observation, that the first limitation of the kingdom of God to local boundaries, from the very necessity of separation from house and home to follow Christ, won for itself the means of overcoming those limits by numerous labourers in the mission service, and thus procuring room and material for a second stage of the kingdom of God, the systematic, ethical elevation of earthly relationships.

he would no longer need, if he had already kept the law from his youth up, or should have earned for himself a supererogatory perfection by his voluntary poverty. Verse 23 shews plainly that in Jesus's eyes the youth was outside the kingdom of God, to which he had only approached by the inquiries made at Jesus. Thus there is no doubt that the design of Jesus was to keep him near himself, not to send him away to God without Christ; and equally certain is it that he would have led him to the true knowledge of Jesus himself in due time. But the first thing needful for him, as Jesus perceived from the light and liberal use of the word "good," was self-knowledge, not the preaching of Christ's mission and dignity, for the comprehension of which the pre-requisites were still a-wanting; and upon these Jesus, according to the method which he evidently followed in other cases, was silent. He thought that he had done with the task of the law, and inquired after a new one, since the law gave, indeed, temporal promises, but not the promises of eternal life. To attain self-knowledge, he required to have awakened a sense of the holy God, who alone is good, to discern the difference or contrast between God and the world, which he, in relation to goodness, was disposed to place so near to God, that there would be no absolute necessity for a perfecting as well as a restorative revelation of God. The intention of the passage, therefore, is not to deny the goodness of Christ's person, or positively to declare what he was, but to reprove the thoughtless ascription of goodness to a master at the expense of the fear of God, the source of good, and to tell the youth in one striking sentence, fitted to win on his heart from its very humility, his fundamental error—namely, that he was dealing too lightly with goodness. That Jesus meant to assert sinfulness of himself is impossible, as his other declarations concerning himself and office as the Redeemer in the synoptical gospels, as well as in John, and the position which he assigns himself in reference to the kingdom of God, would not harmonise with it. The evangelists, as well as the primitive church, never understood the Word in that sense. But certainly Jesus could hardly say there is none good save God only, if he had not distinguished himself, the man, with the goodness belonging to him from the divine Being himself, and that, too, not only so far as God is the original source of all goodness, for the perfect cause might also have a perfect effect, but because all earthly creature-goodness cannot be called perfectly good, as it is not yet perfected or raised above temptations and mutability. Hence the passage bears testimony anew to the complete real manhood of Christ in his ethical character, but not to any participation on his part, even the least, in human sinfulness. For his participation in the misery of human sin, there is place, according to the

evangelists, only in the sense that his love permitted the disharmony without him to exercise an influence on his emotional nature, (see above). Hence the Christian mind will ever view it only as a profanation of his love, when his soul-agony in Gethsemane, and his sufferings on the cross, even to desertion by God—sufferings which his own self-forgetting love brought upon him, and which is the brightest manifestation of his pure divine soul—are explained as a confession, an admission of his sinfulness.

He was perfect man in his growth and increase in stature, in his temptations, and conflicts, but without any historical trace of a flaw or blemish in his life. He was in all points made like to us, without being necessitated to become like us as sinners. For sin is the negation of the truly human. He laid claim to no exception-law for himself, as a privileged individual, but subjected himself to the universal human moral law. With this he was satisfied, but this, in its purity, depth, and fulness, he fulfilled. He knew nothing of, and would have nothing to do with, a super-moral religious genius. His religion is moral, his morality religious.

It is true, in one respect, it may seem that he wanted that which all other men have—viz., the peculiar INDIVIDUALITY of virtuous character. His moral character, as it addresses us in the gospels, bears not the impress of any particular time or nationality, but reveals the eternal beauty of general morality, of the generally human in the deepest sense, refreshing, humbling, and yet elevating the inmost heart of every age, and race, and century to which his image is unveiled. It is a prerogative of everything classical, and even of classical ethics, that there breathes in it an air of the eternal—an air of unfading ideality. His portrait, as the evangelists sketch it for us, with the emphasis of artless simplicity, the strength of which lies in its truth, places before every susceptible mind a historical phenomenon, in the splendour of a moral idea and moral truth, in the loveliness and power of reality. In the contemplation of him, the seeker after a living knowledge of human good stops to breathe again; here he rests, for every one's conscience shouts, as it were, exultingly to him, as to the ultimate appearance of THE MAN, or as to the conscience of mankind now become an objective and living reality. Moreover, what he carried on as his CALLING did not lie as with us, on a single region of human existence, but it is directed to what is central, to the setting of mankind right in their relation to God, and to the truly human in man generally, whence the renewing life-blood flows into all the regions of human existence. In this, too, lies the marvel of his character, that his acting and discourse do not run into the vague and the abstract; his character does not leave the impression of the

flat, the feeble, the tame, the monotonous. Rather, we must say, so far as one understands by individuality, the opposite to the undefined and undeveloped, that he exhibits the most definite and clearly marked character. His peculiar distinguishing individuality just lies in this, that he exhibits in his own person the essentially and the truly human, and, that, too, in a manner fraught with saving power. The delusion is common that the good in itself would be monotonous and tame, and that it is indebted for its loveliness and colour, not to its creative power and originality, but to the evil, its opposite. The picture of this life-full finished character is the triumph over the dead opinion, which makes good the eternal debtor of evil, and evil and death the dispenser of life.

Thus he lived then as an individual, just like others, and along with them; but there was in him the power of the universal. He was **THE MAN** absolutely, for whom the enlightened part of mankind waited, a Plato as well as the prophets. And hence his calling is "the calling of callings," the central calling, touching the principle of life in humanity, on which depends the power and the imperishableness of all individualities. For they win eternal life only as they incorporate into their individuality the essentially good, which is at once the divine and the human, and was real in his individual person. He is the Son of Man.

II. THE HISTORICAL KNOWABLENESS (ERKENNBARKEIT) OF CHRIST'S SINLESS HOLINESS.

If the holy, sinless character of Jesus is perfectly human, it is then also **KNOWABLE**, a revelation of the ideal of the truly human, not in doctrine only, but in fact. It is not a mere mystery, believed on foreign authority; but a historical certainty of his sinlessness and moral perfection is attainable. There are, in my opinion, many errors abroad in this respect. Too much is usually conceded to those who deny the historical knowableness of Christ's moral perfection; and it is forgotten withal that a revelation which does not really reveal, and cannot give a certainty regarding itself, would be no revelation, but a mere mystery, the purport of which men perchance presuppose, according to some agreement.

Yet let us hear objections to this knowableness. It is said, we lack sources of information as to the early years of Jesus's life. The early life of Jesus therefore cannot with certainty be pronounced sinless. We reply, the credibly reported purity of his later life guarantees the earlier. All the errors of earlier life leave scars in us, of which in Jesus we observe none. And if those who associated with him from youth up, as Mary and even his at first obstinate brothers, subsequently became, as no one denies, sincere believers in him as their Redeemer, have

we not in this a weighty testimony that sin was never detected in him, and that they received from him a deep impression of his holy life? From this point of view, the passage in Luke ii. 51, 52, which without doubt goes back to the source of the holy family itself, like the entire narrative of the first visit to the temple, receives a high significance. What his relations perceived was obedience to his parents, growth in wisdom and in favour with God and man. Further, it is said the sources of information for the time of his public life are imperfect. We have indeed the words and deeds of Jesus; and however important for forming a judgment as to his moral character, still we want his demeanour and gesture, the glance of the eye, the tone of the voice; all that is wanting to us, so that a sure judgment is not possible. To this finally it is added, that in morals everything depends on the heart, which always remains hidden from human gaze. With regard to the first of these statements, we certainly have not sensible observation which the disciples had; but we know from them what impression his character produced. We hear them speak of the gracious words which proceeded from his mouth; of the eye which lingered lovingly on the rich young man, which shed tears at the grave of Lazarus, and as he gazed on Jerusalem; of the heart-piercing glance which revealed to Peter the pain of denied love, and with irresistible power filled him with bitter repentance. On the other hand, we hear of the power of his discourse, and of the dignity and majesty of his appearance, "We saw his glory, a glory as of the only begotten Son of the Father, full of grace and truth." We have thus enough in this respect to know that demeanour, gesture, tone were not in contradiction, but in perfect harmony, with the divine nobility which beamed from his speech and action.* With respect, however, to the

* Even in the purification of the temple, at which Pécant takes great offence, the result cannot be understood by a passionate, uncontrolled vehemence on the part of Jesus, but only from the awe-inspiring, majestic impression made by his person, for which uncultivated, rough servants shewed more susceptibility than highly-cultivated but spiritually-blunted minds (John vii. 82, 45, 46). When Pécant presumes to censure the purification of the temple, whether it be on formal or material grounds, it is astonishing that he combats the authority of Jesus, which those whom it concerned did not dare to do. For certainly they would willingly have punished him; but they must have had good ground to let the matter drop, after a feeble protest, in which their conscience convinced them of grossly-neglected duty. How important was this act of Jesus when taken in connection with the current accusation against him on account of the temple! He performs it as a token how deeply he loved the people of God and his sanctuary, and how truly conservative his action was! Just before it he had wept over Jerusalem, while he was flooded round with Hosanna-cries, and knew beforehand the ruin of the temple. But he works while it is day; he gathers and warns as long as possible. The desecration of the temple is the precursor of the profane treatment which they would inflict on him, the antitype of the temple. He reproves

alleged necessary concealment of his heart of love, it is forgotten that the ethical, the more inward it is, has an essential and intimate relation to reality, and will reveal itself actively, passively in it, and that it would be tantamount to asserting the impotency of the ethical idea, and of the ethical power, if it were said that, to manifest one's self, to let the heart as it were be gazed into, is indeed the highest necessity of love, but cannot be effected by the invisible character of the ethical; or what amounts to the same thing, by the incapacity of the material, corporeal world to express and exhibit the truly moral.*

The opponents of miracles in former days often appealed to their want of evidence, and thus sought to make them worthless. The sinless perfection of Jesus would be equally in vain—nay, would not have been perfectly real—if it had not evidenced itself. Of the miracles this much is to be said, that their opponents, desirous to ground their impossibility on their contradiction to all the perceptible laws of nature, just assert, by this very circumstance, that they are very easily distinguished from ordinary events, and also that they receive their light in connection with their cause and their divine end, and establish their connection with the higher world. Still closer is the connection between the sinless perfection of Jesus and its manifestation. For that love is not love which remains shut up in itself, and which has nothing for others. If it is the essential predicate of light that it is for the eye, and will illuminate itself and all things else; or of mind, that it is for mind; it is still much more the essence of mind in its truth, i. e., in its loving character, to aim to be for others, that a fellowship of love may be formed. Redeeming love cannot perfectly satisfy itself without this real self-revelation of its inmost heart, as all our salvation is based upon the knowledge of being loved by the prevenient love of God in Christ.

Earthly material is not so intractable as to be incapable of expressing the ideal. Falsehood, it is true, can attempt to speak the language of love and truth; selfishness can, for its purpose, borrow or purloin the expression of the heart, or its noble sign-language. But that only proves, that we must observe whether the language of love is borrowed, but not that there is no language or expression of love; for, were there none, it would occur to no one to borrow it from love.

The assertion of the self-manifestation of the holiness of Jesus implies certainly the acknowledgment of the possibility of deciding with historical certainty (not indeed with mathematical

that desecration, because whoever approves it will much more easily mistake his holiness and sin against him.

* Compare the profound word of the mystic master (Suso), "To whomsoever inwardness grows into outwardness, to him inwardness becomes more inward: for to him inwardness grows in inwardness."

certainty, the acknowledgment of which can be wrung from the most morally insensible, provided only he has understanding) whether the deeds and words of Jesus were really the expression and revelation of his heart, or hypocrisy and dissimulation.

We mean not to lose the word, whether Jesus was a hypocrite and liar. Even Pécaut, the acutest and most open opponent of the sinlessness of Jesus in modern times, readily concedes to Jesus a high degree of moral perfection. But he should see that he has thereby given up the right to appeal from the moral character to the invisibility of the heart in behalf of the theory of non-manifestation ; for the picture of high moral perfection which he sees in Jesus does not permit the assumption that Jesus sought to reveal one thing in word and deed, while another, a worse, was in his heart. But if Jesus was as sincere and pure as Pécaut will have it, then hypocrisy was far from him, as it was his deepest abomination ;* and these we have in all the outcome of his life-revelations, the revelations of his heart.

For us, however, the same thing comes out still further, from another consideration. Where falsehood and hypocrisy seek to assume the appearance of goodness, it always happens that, being inexperienced in the region of love and truth, it attaches itself involuntarily to custom, mimics what is in some circle regarded as exquisitely pious or strictly moral, be it even in the inventing of new artistic or striking forms, which suit the prevailing moral tone on the one hand, and excite astonishment on the other, but has neither courage nor strength for the simplicity of moral originality. For where would be the desired success of the deception if one did not, perhaps in an exaggerated way, use and pay his way with the sign-language or coin which was already current ? Now we perceive that, in this very department, Jesus broke with the customary views and hopes of whatever was just, and pious, and good, and with the representatives of them ; that he came into violent collision with them, and that he, with creative originality, set forth in his teaching, life, and suffering, a view of the good, directly opposed to the prevailing one, appealing to the primitive moral sense in man, commending itself to susceptible minds (much like a genuine work of art), and over-mastering them. That was only possible if he himself was possessed and filled by the glory of the truly and essentially good, which he knew and brought to light, seeking nothing but its victory and prevalence.

We say then, far from love being powerless to reveal itself in this earthly world, and amid its chaotic and distracted relations, this world is the very place where its glory may manifest itself most brilliantly. The earth is so clothed with corruption

* Compare, for instance, Matt. xxiii. 6, 2, 5, 16 ; vii. 5 ; xv. 7 ; xvi. 8 ; xxi. 18 ; xxiv. 51 ; Mark. vii. 6 ; Luke xii. 1 ; xiii. 15.

and sin, that the outward majesty and power of the Son of God continued just the more concealed and in mystery, and could not be revealed, at least in their fulness; while, on the contrary, his sinless, holy love could nowhere more clearly manifest itself than just in that conflict with the world's sin on the behalf of righteousness. We add, *HAS* revealed itself, but *ONLY* to *SUSCEPTIBLE* minds. There were and are blind persons who do not see this glory, much like as harmonies pass over the unmusical unheard, or like a dispersing volume of sound.

Christ's sinless perfection is objectively knowable. It had the will and power to make itself knowable or manifest, as that which it really was in its essence. He who calls it unknowable, lays the blame, as usually happens, on optical delusions, on the object, and not on himself. In opposition to coarse empirism of every form we take for granted, that it is not merely in the sensible and palpable that there is truth—rather the palpable itself cannot be apprehended and understood without mind, spirit, and mental principles; that, on the other hand, we are not limited in our knowing to the naked mental forms of logical or mathematical principles, and so shut up in thought within ourselves. But as it is given to the will, without losing itself, to have a being beyond itself in love, so is it given to knowledge; more precisely, it is given to the spirit of love to be self-conscious or in itself, and yet, at the same time, to have a being in its object. True knowledge or wisdom is the love of thought, love incorporated with *THOUGHT*; as the ethical and the good is love incorporated with the *WILL*. As in contemplating a work of art, we seize the idea of the beautiful but *IN* the reality, so we maintain that in *THE* life which stands before us as the highest ethical work of art, that is, in the life-portrait of Jesus, the idea of the good is capable of being apprehended by every one, as it is presented to every one, though not every one can appreciate it without some mental preparation; and it is presented there life-like, not as mere thought, but as reality. As we have this figure before us only in written documents, it may indeed be asked, Is it reality or is it fiction? That we here find an exhibition of the very ethical idea in its glory is perhaps conceded. But is this exhibition only the objectivisation of the moral idea in the guise of reality, or mere poetic legend, whether it be intentional or unintentional; or is it the historical record of a real life lived upon the earth? To this the simple counter question might suffice, Where, in general history, is there a historical figure which has drawn such deep furrows in the inmost nature of mankind, as Jesus of Nazareth, whose historical existence no one doubts? But, still more directly, the historical evidence can strictly evince that the moral phenomenon of Jesus is historical reality, not fiction.

As we shewed above, that the suspicion that Jesus' repre-

sentation of himself exhibited something better than perhaps was personally in him, or that the doubt as to his inner truthfulness must be proved or rebutted by the purport of his own statement, and by the activities of his life; so it is these activities again, and their nature, which will furnish a decision on the point whether his character is a myth or historic reality.

In now addressing ourselves to the consideration of these activities of his life, we believe we may answer for the assertion, that the contemplation of the life-picture of Jesus awakes in every true conscience the lively concrete idea of absolute purity and unsinning perfection. We believe, too, that it can be proved on historical grounds that Jesus awakens this idea by his life recorded in the gospel, and not merely by his words and deeds; and further, that his followers did not invent his portraiture, but found it and looked upon it; that they did not create it, but described it as well as they could; but we are far from the assumption that real faith in the union of the ideal and the historical can be attained by demonstration. On the contrary, we reckon it as belonging to the reserved rights of the Head of the church and to his majesty, that it perpetually evinces itself as creative, and that he commits it to none but himself to reveal himself to his own, and to give them the assurance that he knows and loves them. His knowableness is his perpetual self-manifestation, an essentially inherent power and virtue in himself, without which he would not be the Redeemer, just as the holy Scripture could no more hold its position in point of principle, if we ceded its *perpicuitas* or *semet ipsam interpretandi facultas* to any other court.

III. ON THE MORAL ACTIVITIES THAT FILL UP THE LIFE OF JESUS (SITTICHEN LEBENSGEHALT).

If we cast a glance into the moral activities that fill up the life of Jesus, the question does not hinge on making a catalogue of virtues,* and in this way proving, as by a sum in addition, his moral perfection. In this way we should not arrive at any lively idea of his moral character, nor have any guarantee for his perfection. For all virtues attain their perfection only by unity and harmonious symphony, and this exists only when they all proceed from the totality and fulness of the one principle of virtue. This unity of his virtue, by means of which all his virtues are harmoniously dovetailed, cannot, it is true, be brought into full view without the concrete and without the detail. But the main point is to view together the most distant elements which his moral character unites, and to shew in the concrete that one spirit harmoniously regulates and orders all according to one great law of life. Therefore, we shall not dwell on that which

* Schmid Bibl-Theol., N. T., A. 2, SS. 80.

other distinguished characters approximately exhibit of moral excellence, or on that which is willingly conceded to Jesus by those who regard him as a morally distinguished man (which none without profanity can deny), while they wish to deny him sinless perfection. Let our view be specially directed to this point, What is there in his moral character which tells of an unexampled uniqueness, distinguishing him from all the great moral characters whom we know, and to be understood only on the supposition of his inward sinless perfection?

Painting is, in certain respects, better for this than words; for it places the figure before the eye in its unity and totality, while human speech strives to bring it into full view in separate sentences, parted from each other. The verbal representation demands the power of mental combination. The reader or hearer must in this case put all together by an exercise of mind, while in the other case it is presented to the view without effort. On the other hand, language has the advantage of precision and clearness; for much that language easily expresses can only be slightly hinted by a picture without words. It is plainly the words of holy Scripture, and the word in the church more especially, by which Christ's portrait is most vividly and clearly preserved in the hearts of men.

The church has nourished itself for many centuries on the life-portrait which the gospels have drawn of Jesus; but long as she has already explained this life in her literature and in her life, every age beholds new sides, new nuggets of gold, in the simple and chaste gospel narratives. She is ever discovering new beauties in Christ's character the further she advances; and after so long a time she feels as little need as primitive Christianity to look about for another model than that which has appeared in him. On the contrary, the more it is understood, the more unconditionally and all-sidedly does the portrait of Jesus lay claim to a regulating power with the growing consent of conscience. For whatever unveils itself to view of all that has been realised in Jesus, has also the power of evincing its inner truth and excellence in every human breast. Hence we must say that the work of no one individual can supply an exhibition of the character of Jesus in his totality and purity; and that it is the business of the whole church, the business of her contemplation and life, in a course of growing imitation, to make him ever more and more fully understood. On the other hand, this great common work of the church can only progress by every age doing what it can to bring out the pure figure of Jesus with greater precision and all-sidedness. The evangelists themselves have each exhibited an individual portrait of Jesus; hence the necessity of a merely individual, nay more, of a limited apprehension of it, which our nature imposes upon us, must not deter us from the task. Here the individual apprehension, if

it is only not erroneous, will fit into the whole that stands before our eyes, and lives in the heart of Christendom.

The gospels, instead of supplying a complete picture of Jesus' character, or an enumeration of his virtues, rather gives us histories of the doings, the sayings, and the sufferings of Jesus; and in doing so, refrains almost from all reflections of their own, only narrating, objectively and chastely, what they learned or saw,—only, from time to time feeling overmasters them, and then they break out into words in which they strive to give expression to the combined impression made by his person. So John i. 14; xiii. 1, and fol. ver.; xii. 44-50; 1 John i. 1 and fol. ver.; Matt. xi. 27-30; xii. 18-21. The great difference of their narratives—which, however, marvellously harmonize for the purpose we speak of—is a guarantee for the historical reality of the original character. It could not have become so by collusion,—that is proved by its diversity; while the inner harmony of the features shews that this portrait has not flowed from the invention of the individual evangelists as its source, but that it owes its origin not to poetry, but to historical reality. On this, we trust, opinion will be more firmly established by the sequel.

The selection of historical material is different according to the aim, design, and profile selected by each, particularly by Matthew, Luke, John. But so far as Jesus shewed himself, as a morally perfect character in small things as well as great, there lives in all details the unity and totality of his character, and hence there needed only a true repose, and the harmony with which the gospels complete each other was supplied of itself. On this impossibility of inventing the character of Jesus, Channing ("The Evidences of Revealed Religion," p. 78) has spoken beautifully;—a Unitarian, it is true, but one who, by the love and devotion with which he sounds the character of Jesus, surpasses many a more orthodox delineation, and leaves them far behind. Let us consider then, first, the different ways in which the image of Jesus is reflected in each of the four evangelists, that we may add some things which may shew how the details which they narrate, and which they divide among them, supplement each other, so as to form a complete historical unity; more particularly, to place in their true light some sides of what is characteristic and unique in the character of Jesus.

MARK gives least of what is peculiar. In him, the miraculous deeds and displays of power on the part of Jesus preponderate over discourse and over the record of his conflicts; he comes, therefore, only more mediately into our present consideration, the words, and deeds, and sufferings of Jesus being in a new light, and raising themselves on the background of the consciousness of power and *ἐξουσία*; for lowli-

ness and condescension have their moral value only as voluntary self-abasement. With this are connected many additional features, important for the true humanity of Jesus,—*e. g.* xi. 13; xiii. 32.

To MATTHEW, again, Jesus is the fulfilment of prophecy—the promised king of Israel, and hence destined to be the light and king of the Gentiles. He sketches the portraiture of Jesus (xi. 27 and fol. ver., xii. 18 and fol. ver. in connection with Isa. xlii. 1 and fol. ver.) in the following way. He states that he represented himself as the servant of God, the righteous one, fulfilling obediently the will of God, the law; as the promised crown of the Old Testament, the beloved Son, in whom God is well pleased; that he should not strive nor cry; that he would rather be quiet, meek, and lowly in his dignity, full of sympathy for the bruised reed and the smoking flax, bearing on his own heart the griefs and sorrows of mankind before he healed them. His scope and object are silent, deep influence on the heart; not public display, nor authoritative dominion. But this quietness, calmness, and patience, and condescension, are not, in his mode of working, weakness. The Spirit of the Lord is upon him. He brings the crisis upon nations; conscious of victory and assured, he perseveres in seeking the lost in this silent lowly way, till he brings forth "judgment" to victory. It is just this course that ushers in the sure decision in a spiritual way—that ripeness for judgment which is his victory in relation to foes and friends. Matthew next exhibits the courage and the divine self-forgetting zeal of the Son. As the truth of Israel, he comes into honest conflict with the false hood, deterioration, and corruption of Israel, and testifies against those who have established themselves in false traditions and ideas, paradoxes and manners, with all faithfulness, and with terrible earnestness (*e. g.* Matt. xi, 21 and fol. ver., chap. i. 23); for the most part in vain, especially among the rulers, but saving what was to be saved. He has not recourse to measures of authority or power against his enemies, and desists not from his work, but patiently suffers the people whom he loved to reject him and deliver him to the Gentiles. But it is just by such humiliation that his judgment is "taken away." He permits, in his person, sin to execute its judgment on itself, and conducts his work to victory through the most manifest and deepest endurance of wrong.

In LUKE, the physician and helper of the apostle of the Gentiles, we find in an especial manner features of the tender and pure humanity of Jesus, which was far above all Jewish narrowness. He mentions the gracious discourse in Nazareth, (iv. 22); the repast in the house of Simon, (vii. 36–50); and in the house of Mary and Martha, (x. 38–42). He records the raising of the youth at Nain, (vii. 11); the healing of Malchus,

(xxii. 51); and of the ten lepers, (xvii. 11-17). He narrates those words of Jesus after his rejection by the Samaritan village, (ix. 52-56), in which he contrasts the spirit of the New Testament with the spirit of Elias, and impresses on his disciples that he did not come to destroy, but to save. Luke mentions the tears of Jesus over Jerusalem, (xix. 42, xiii. 34), and his words to the daughters of Jerusalem on the way to his death: "Weep not for me, but weep for yourselves and your children," (xxiii. 28). He mentions the look of Jesus which he cast on Peter, (xxii. 61). He communicates the parables of the prodigal son, (ch. xv.), of the rich man and Lazarus, (ch. xvi.), and of the good Samaritan, (x. 30-37), just as he also specially notices, too, the love of Jesus for publicans and sinners, (xv. 1, and fol. ver.; xviii. 9-14; xix. 2-10), (Zaccheus). Luke mentions with particular frequency the prayers of Jesus, and that he spent nights in prayer, (iii. 21, iv. 42, v. 16, vi. 12, ix. 18-28, xi. 1); that he prayed for his disciples without their knowing it, (xxii. 32); that he prayed on the cross for his enemies, (xxiii. 34-46). Luke has the sweet exhortation to prayer, (xviii. 1, and following verses). He mentions the word of promise to the malefactor, (xxiii. 43), and his walking and talking with the mourning disciples on the way to Emmaus, (xxiv. 13-45).

In JOHN, again, there is vouchsafed to us a deeper insight into the inner life of Jesus. Jesus knew his oneness with the Father as his constant possession. Thus his consciousness is an eternal one, elevated high above time. Standing in a calm, clear, in-being in God, he looks out from the world's true centre into the complications, and conflicts, and darknesses of the world, with an imperturbably firm mental clearness. But not only does he look into the unhappiness and unquiet of the world, he suffers himself to be in contact with it on every side; he enters into the unhappiness of the world with the feeling heart of the most sympathetic love, ever promptly following the Father's voice, which he hears within, ever doing what he sees the Father about to do. He does not stand above the world, in the cold abstraction of a merely negative liberty, whether it be in resignation or in indifference and estrangement, nor with that sadness which is powerless to lend a helping hand, nor with that irony which will not attempt it, which leaves the wayward to its own self-destructive contradictions; but that inner dignity of nature is united with the tendency to enter fully into men's real position, to penetrate into the deepest sense of every influence, to bring out the everlasting side of it, and not only in a contemplative way to place everything in the divine light, the light of eternity, but to pass through every influence with full force of mind and spiritual power, and in its connection with all the phases of life. And yet, in thus entering into the world and time, he remains

himself,—entire master of himself. Hence the infinitely rich application of what he says and does. In the details, when rightly apprehended, there always appears again the *ensemble* of his power and nature, and thus every detail wins a more general and typical signification appropriate to all times, to the individual and to the church.

In attempting to place before our view, in at least some of its features, the peculiarly great and unique truth in Christ's character, according to the gospel narratives, we do not wish to speak of the extent of his views and of the depth of his mind, nor of the proofs which he has given of fidelity to his friends,* of his truthfulness when confession surrenders him to persecution,† of his mildness,‡ and justice;§ nor shall we speak of his other virtues which come to light in every page of the sacred narrative. We shall only dwell on three characteristic features of him, all intimately connected together, and pointing to a heart peculiarly constituted. The first at which we pause is the PERFECT HARMONY of his whole being. The second, his FREEDOM by which in this universe he knew himself to be a Son in the Father's house. The third is his SPIRIT OF SACRIFICE, or his love.

The harmony in Christ's nature is not evinced in such a way that everything energetic and strong in feeling and mood, in words or deeds, was toned down to a mediocrity, feebly and monotonously avoiding the impression of disharmony only by the fact that there should be no character or well-defined individuality. On the contrary, the harmony which we here perceive is the most life-like and active, appearing not as the laborious product only wrung from an adverse mass of thoughts, and feelings, and desires, but as the natural expression of an inner harmony, conscious of itself indeed, and maintained by a vigorous will; that is, the expression of a harmoniously-balanced, holy, and inward character.

Let us pursue this point in some of its aspects. The life of Jesus, considered as a whole, makes on every one the impression of calm greatness (see Matthew), which bears a truly marvellous character when we reflect that this calm greatness has entered more deeply into general history, and wrought greater and more lasting effects in it, than any one of the heroes of humanity. His heroism is not a mere natural courage, which has as its auxiliary material power, or the world of resources beyond itself, by which its ends shall be realised. He is solitary, without connection and without outward rank and position, nay, born in mean condition, a member

* *E. g.*, John xviii. 8; xix. 25, 26; Luke xxii. 32, 49, 61.

† John vi. 15, and 27-36; Matt. viii. 20; xxvi. 64.

‡ John viii. 1-11; Matt. xi. 19-28.

§ Luke xii. 13; John xviii. 36.

of a nation despised and hated by the Gentiles, of a decayed family, yet laying claims to be the King of a kingdom, the Saviour of the world, the Ruler of hearts and minds. With the consciousness of this his design he was constantly possessed. But even the outward power which he had or might have he does not employ for outward ends.* As his designs were of an ethical kind, he knew well that no power could exercise any decisive result, and he will not have it, nor rely on it. His heroism was consecrated to a work which was first of all purely spiritual, and which could not be accomplished by man's co-operation. He takes it entirely on himself, with the clear foreknowledge of the contradiction and hatred of the whole world,† and conscious only that he is not alone, for the Father is with him.‡ Great projects are made and executed by great men. God has given to mankind many heroic spirits who were benefactors, as princes, lawgivers, patriots, and sages. But there is none who has even conceived the thought of the great work which Jesus proposed to himself and executed. The salvation, the redemption of a world, which he proposed as his life's task, as it is the most necessary and daring, so is it the most unshowy and noiseless work, the *ἥσυχος* absolutely, the work of works. It is the fundamental work, the necessity of which the heroes of mankind did not often recognise, not to mention that they dared not think of realising it. It is the work which was accomplished in the deepest silence, covered by the hatred and murderous hostility of the world; and only after it was finished by Jesus, and by him alone, did it enter into men's consciousness as an unveiled mystery of a new and heavenly world of love, which now became the loud and triumphant message of the gospel. Only after it was finished did the world learn how it must have served to evolve this work by its hatred and oppression of innocence, and how the triumphant power of sacrificing love had, in its calm hero-power, converted evil into an instrument for the accomplishment of its work; for it is the power of Christ's calm greatness that it combined majesty of character with humility in an absolute inner confidence and self-repose. Even in the most dazzling times of his ministry he is fully aware of the necessity of passing through suffering, and even in his sufferings he holds fast the assurance of victory; and as to the future, he is as certain of glory and of the perfecting of himself and his kingdom through the depths of his sufferings as of his being despised and rejected. That is no heroism which in this world still hopes for victory, or makes sacrifices for the sake of personal glory, or dreads death as an enemy of its work. Forgetting himself and undaunted, he offers his life to his work and calling. It is a heroism of

* John vi. 16.

† Luke iv. 28, John ii. 19.

‡ John xvi. 32.

faith.* Other heroes manifest their power in action, or, though more rarely, in suffering. We must call him, in virtue of his invincible power of will, a truly manly person in the full sense of the word, but we must not on that account place his characteristic peculiarity in manliness, in as far as opposed to the feminine, for he evinces also the entire softness, tenderness, and purity (we may add, too, the power of suffering and patience) of woman's nature. This FORCE OF WILL and purity is accompanied by his high MENTAL ENDOWMENTS; but it would be absurd to designate him on that account as predominantly subtle or profound, ingenious or imaginative, for he exhibits all these gifts, but none of them alone. We observe in him, besides, various MOODS of mind, cheerfulness without care, pensiveness and a melancholy mood, exquisite sensibility, and perfect equanimity, painful sorrow again, and then joyous elevation. But we should consider it unsuitable to ascribe to him, on this account, a temperament in the ordinary sense of the word, for all that is handed down to us concerning him makes the impression of a thoroughly healthy, harmonious blending of mental disposition and a natural succession of mental moods.†

This succession is of such a sort that it on the one side assumes the purity of his nature, the healthy tendency of his faculties, and on the other side maintains and verifies the strength of character and force in will, by bringing the most opposite sides or tones into living, harmonious expression.

It is Luke and John particularly that shew us that there was in him the most tender sensibility, a susceptibility for the emotions of joy and grief, vivacity and strength of affection, and ever with full self-possession. We can perceive how the affections of joy and sorrow were sanctified in him, and were ever kept in such a pure equilibrium that, far from clouding his mental clearness or weakening his self-control, they only revealed in full measure the power of his inner harmony. This lofty harmony, or rather this strongly-marked power of harmony, evinces itself most strikingly in this, that he always interweaves with his affections of joy and transport a consciousness of the solemnity of his work, and conversely with the affections of sadness and pain, the joy and the sure consciousness of his union with God, and of the glorification to be realised by his sufferings. There is no monotonous, stiff immobility of inner life, no dead ataraxia, no stoical apathy; but, far from pride and severity, he is humanly moved by everything human. And there is also never a one-sided prominence of one side of his moral nature, isolated from the *ensemble*; but before a vital movement terminates, or is rung out, it is always made apparent

* Heb xii. 2.

† Comp Ullmann, p. 68, Martensen's Dogmatik, § 141, and his sermons. Schaff's Moral Character of Jesus, Chambers, 1861, is to be compared.

that, to the more momentary and single mood of mind, there is not wanting the full complement of all the rest, but that they are inwardly present, co-operating and preserving each movement in its equilibrium, and he thus preserves the unity and totality of the character which unites these contrasts in itself. Let us consider this in some examples.

In the frame of joyful elevation we find interwoven the consciousness of the solemnity of his career, from which he must not deviate even in thought. When the Nazarenes are full of joy at the gracious words which proceed out of his mouth (Luke iv. 22), he adds immediately, as it were to arm them and himself, "Ye will surely say unto me this proverb—Physician, heal thyself." (Luke xxiii. 35, John ii. 19)* In his joy at the faith of the Samaritan woman he at once thinks of his end (John iv. 35–38). When the multitude will make him king (John vi. 15), he points immediately, in a lengthened discourse, to his death. The joy at the first fruits of confession, on the part of Peter, passes at once into the thought of Judas' menacing treachery, and into the warning on account of it (vi. 70, 71); nay, he takes occasion from it to announce his own rejection by Israel as the Christ now recognised by the apostles, and summons them to prepare themselves to deny themselves, and to take up their cross and follow him. They have recognised his dignity in the spirit, which is only a token to him that his disciples are now ripe to be spoken with freely on the subject of his rejection, and to be prepared for it (Luke ix. 20–23, Matt. xvi. 20 and fol. ver.). The first thing which he sought to impress upon his disciples after his transfiguration on the mount was, that he must suffer many things and be rejected (Matt. xvii. 12, Luke ix. 31–44). The honour of anointing him reminds him of his burial (John xii. 7, 8). The arrival of the Greeks who desired to see him was a token to him of the diffusion of the gospel beyond Judea. He celebrates and he signalises this prospect by the allusion to the corn of wheat which must fall into the earth and die that it may bring forth much fruit (John xii. 20–24). With the full consciousness of his origin and destiny as portrayed in John

* If Keim ("The Human Development of Jesus Christ," 1861), had considered this passage, which carries us back to the beginning of his Galilean ministry, he could not have placed the expectation of his suffering so far down in Jesus' life, with which there is much else, too, that will not harmonize, even if one permits himself to arrange and order the sources according to *a priori* grounds, the historic evidence of which is disputed. That Jesus expected and desired a kingdom of suffering before the kingdom of glory is plainly shewn by the sermon on the mount (Matt. v. 10–12, vii. 22, viii. 11, ix. 18, x. 25–28); that belongs to the elements of his Messianic calling and his knowledge of mankind—above all, to his knowledge of the nature of sin and divine holiness, by which there was imposed upon him the calling to become, through suffering, the stoning "high priest before God."

xiii 1-3, and which on that evening so filled him that his appearance in word and look was indelibly impressed on his disciple, he proceeded to the ministering office of washing the feet of the disciples, which was to be to them a pattern and symbolical pledge that his near-approaching shame and humiliation were a voluntary self-abasement, a service of love for them (John xiii. 4-19).

The reverse of this does not less regularly occur. The woe pronounced on Chorazin, Bethsaida, Capernaum, (which is not a curse,* but as Luke vi. 25 and fol. ver., and Matt. xxiii. 13-16, 23-39, an expression of righteous sorrow, pain, and sadness, and warning), passes into a joyous thanksgiving (Matt. xi. 25-27) for the babes whom the Father had given him, nay, even of contentment that such things must remain hid from the wise and prudent of this world, from the intellectually cultivated, for the pearl of the gospel is too good for all those who will not give their all, give their heart for it. The abasement of Jesus, the consciousness of the worldly contempt and rejection, awakens in him the consciousness of his dignity (John viii. 28, compare xii. 32, iii. 14, viii. 40, and xlii. 52 and 58). While at Mary's anointing of him he regarded himself as already dead, and permitted his body to be treated as a dead body, he speaks in the assured tone of one who has power to assign immortality to any one by name to whom he will, and he utters the great word so consolatory to many, and expressive of his confidence that his work would outlast him,—“Verily, I say unto you, that whosoever this gospel shall be preached in the whole world, there shall also this, that this woman hath done, be told for a memorial of her” (Matt. xxvi. 13). And thus, too, to those solemn words, touching his approaching fate, to Peter the confessor (Matt. xvi. 22, 27, 28), he immediately subjoins the majestic words, “The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, and then he shall reward every man according to his works.” In like manner, after he had realised, by the entrance of the Greeks, that he must be rejected by the theocracy, and thus be delivered to the Gentiles (John xii. 27), he is seized indeed with a deep horror and agitation of mind at the ingratitude of his people, but he closes (ver. 28-31, fol. ver.) “Now is the judgment of this world; and I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men (Jews and Gentiles) unto me.” Splendid results thus did not dislodge in him thoughts of his death; these again, and his sufferings, did not shake in him the assur-

* There is a sensitive shrinking on the part of Dorner from the supposition that Christ ever acted with judicial severity; and to the same purport it has been said in hymns, “No weapons in his hand are seen, or voice of terror heard.” But that is a one-sided view. Why may we not have in words a statement of what he will do at the judgment, and actually does in his mediatorial dominion? (comp. Rev. ii. and iii.)—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

ance of his victory. Standing as prisoner before Pilate, he says, "Thou sayest it; I am a king: to this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth" (John xviii. 37 and fol. ver.). And when he was judged, and stood as the accused before the high priests, he speaks with the authority and dignity of a judge to them (Matt. xxvi. 64); nay, when he hung on the accursed tree itself, ostensibly forsaken of God, he adjudges paradise and his own fellowship to the malefactor (Luke xxiii. 43).

The same confidence and harmony, the same symmetry of character, may still farther be traced on many other sides; in holy anger against sin along with sympathy toward sinners, which are both perfectly united in him (John ii. 13, Matt. viii. 23-27); in courage, action, and energy, along with endurance and patience. All his public acting is attended with suffering (Matt. viii. 17), and all his suffering is also action, the revelation of a higher power, or, to speak with John, the revelation of his *δύναμις*. His greatness does not lie merely in the sphere of his sense of God or of the world, nor in the sphere of action alone; rather, both are united in him. He is neither a predominantly moral, nor a predominantly religious character, for he is perfectly imbued with both; and thus, to employ Ullman's happy expression, he exhibits the perfectly holy; for in his hands and in his mouth everything is consecrated to be the symbol of the spiritual and divine; nay, to be the initial, typical, or promiseful expression of it. The harmony of his mind—one with nature, with history, and with the laws of life which regulate them—saw everywhere what was cognate or prefigurative or preparatory to the kingdom which he was to found, however conscious he was, on the other side, of the novelty of the gospel which he had to bring. With nature and its kingdoms, that of plants and animals, &c., as with home and family—with the state and the history of mankind—with all he is in harmony. What he wishes is, to be in everything at unity with the divine law of life, and the inexorable foe only of that which disfigures, and perverts, and desolates creation.

This leads us to the SECOND of the points indicated. What is the root of this marvellous yet lively symmetry, which does not shun to go into the most stirring agitations on both sides, and yet remains so sure of returning to a pure and perfect moral harmony within? What is the root of this calmness in the highest excitement, this mental serenity that enters into the complication of finite and sinful affairs, yet contracts no stain, but, as it were, moves above it like its mistress? It is perfect SELF-POSSESSION and LIBERTY. By means of these he stands there. He is perfectly unique and apart. Here lies the historical guarantee for his sinless perfection.

The men around him were either slaves of lust and sin, or self-righteous slaves of the law. The most advanced had a knowledge of the universal bondage to sin, a sense of their separation from God, a longing after liberty, but scarcely a presentiment of their true state. Thus their life was one of fear and hiding from the nearness of the Holy God, for they lacked the atonement, peace with God.* What an impression then must have been made upon the disciples by Jesus, whose spirit was full of peace and serene cheerfulness, never exhibiting a trace of having achieved this inward peace by a laborious effort or a conflict with sin! Here is a man in whom there is no trace of remorse, regret, or repentance, a man without care about his soul's salvation, for he stands already in eternal life, he lives as in heaven. There is no prayer for forgiveness of sin for himself, no shrinking from going into the society of publicans and sinners. It is clear, in the most decided moments of his life, that he is conscious of no sin. That his self-consciousness was really of such a sort that his conscience never accused him of any fault or error, is the firmest and most indisputable historical fact, explain it as we may. That he imposed upon himself as his life-task the salvation and reconciliation of the world; that he was conscious, too, of being occupied with the solution of this problem, in suffering even to the cross; and that he died in the full consciousness of having solved the problem, as well as of unbroken communion with God, is just as undeniable as that it would have been an insane and absurd thought to wish to redeem and reconcile others, if he had himself been conscious of needing redemption himself. Now, however (to speak with "the German theology") it is only God and the devil that have no (accusing) conscience. Men in whom the Satanic wickedness does not yet reign, have the consciousness of sin. Jesus evinces, in his entire life and character, the deepest aversion to evil, and especially of hypocrisy, in which pride and falsehood are mated, just as he passed judgment, more severely on the Pharisaic spirit than on publicans and sinners. How then can the phenomenon be explained that He, to whom even sceptics do not deny the rarest measure of purity and clearness of mind, stands before us without being conscious of a single sin, or of the necessity of conversion and amendment which he requires of all others; if not in this way, that he was CONSCIOUS of no sin because he WAS not a sinner. He was, though perfect man, like God in sinless perfection; and though not, like God, incapable of being tempted, nor perfect (in degree) from his birth, and therefore not holy in that sense, yet holy in the preservation of an innate purity and holiness, and

* Comp. *ex. gr.*, Luke v. 8, the words of Peter, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."

by a fully normal development, in which the idea of pure humanity is finally realised in order that the ultimate end of the world might not be unfulfilled. Yes, the impression which he gives us is that of a being **FREE**, the true Son of Mankind. He needs no regeneration, but is by nature the new-born Man, who needs no remedy, and is conscious to himself of having power to be the Physician of sick humanity. But let us enter somewhat into detail.

How does he feel and conduct himself toward nature as a Son in the Father's house, when he lingers in it with a free and open sense for nature; beholding there the laws of the great house of this world, and revealing them in their concord and harmony with his work; or when he stands intrepid amid the storm of the sea, amid his trembling disciples, well knowing that God has his hand upon him even while he slumbers. As his free Son he stands before us in his self-possession, freely ruling his own nature and its powers, using everything just as a performer strikes the strings of his instrument, with a mastery over himself, and an adaptation to the higher end and mission of his life. He stands before us free, and independent of the world's means and possessions. He seeks no outward possession in it, even when it might serve his objects, but without being careful for the morrow, rests contented with what is before him, knowing that he who feeds the fowls of heaven does not forget the children of men. "The Son of Man hath not where to lay his head." He is homeless and poor, for his mission is not to be the founder of a family or the director of earthly goods, though he highly commends a faithful steward, and never designates the casting away of fortune as a merit or as anything good in itself. He can be rich and can be poor (John xix. 23, xii. 3; Matt. xxvi. 3-14). There is nothing there of ascetic spiritualistic virtue (Matt. xi. 9). And he has to exhibit what is the main condition of all fidelity in earthly things, and also in a stewardship, viz., the weaning of the heart from all vain property, which rather makes us bondsmen in mind and body, which enslaves us instead of enriching us, which is not worthy of being called ours because it affords an illusory satisfaction, and cannot truly be assimilated to our true nature, or be imperishable and for ever our own. He seeks to sever us from what is foreign that we may be capable of inheriting that which alone can be ours, and which corresponds to the idea of property. He renounces outward property to realize the idea of property as is competent to the Son (Luke xvi. 12). He who has been made free, severed from the illusion of earthly possession or the desire of it, carries within him the eternal treasure, he only will be able to become a true administrator of the riches that fall to his lot without necessarily being

seduced by deceitful riches. Jesus walks about, as it were, in paradisaic freedom from care, at once poor and rich, not careful for the morrow, not longing after outward glory, and also not rejecting anything which is the expression and sign-language of love, when a superfluity exceeding the measure of necessity is offered to him. (John xix. 23, xii. 1, and following verses.) While he has nothing he can yet call all his own, for the Father gives him what he needs, and disposes and regulates all so as to be conducive to the centre-point of his counsels, and which governs all. Now this centre is the work of redemption, the realisation of the idea of humanity in Christ. Hence Jesus stands before us as the **FREE ONE** in the presence of human powers, a faithful Son of his people, obedient to the law, honouring its authority and Israel's right, typically to prepare the way for his kingdom; honouring, too, the heathen magistrates, and their demands for service; and in heart far beyond the typical economy, knowing himself to be personally free from the obligation of the temple service, and from care on its account, for he had nothing to receive from it, and could not, without untruth, recognise in the temple and its economy the ideal to which he had to give tithes. (Comp. Heb. vii. 4, and following verses; Matt. xii. 6; *ἐν τῷ ἱερὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἰσχύς ἰδεῖν ἁγία*, 4-5).^{*} And yet he presently adds, after he had spoken of the temple tax, "Nevertheless, lest we should offend them, go thou, and pay for me and thee" (Matt. xvii. 27).

This unique position of perfect liberty becomes more manifest when we compare it with John the Baptist, and consider the position of Jesus to the law and to the Old Testament in general. His doctrine of law corresponds entirely to his own self-consciousness in reference to the law; his teaching is thus but an expression of his own self-conscious life, as on the other hand his life is doctrine as it reveals the principle of his life.

Jesus felt that he was inwardly at one with the Old Testament. That is actually attested by his entire relation to the Baptist, in whom he sees the greatest of all the prophets, and the summary of the Old Testament, of the law and the prophets.

^{*} To his disciples he here gives a hint which they, without doubt, understood at a later time. When that is brought to light which is still only inward and hid beneath the veil of the legal economy, they will also be discharged and set free from the temple and its service. For by the plural and by the communicative tone of the entire address (*οἱ υἱοὶ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμεν ἱερεῖς ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν ἐν ἡμῖν*), Jesus represents this free position towards the sanctuary as one that would belong also to his disciples. This passage, with others, having reference to the temple (Matt. xii. 6; John ii. 19), proves, therefore, that we are not to conclude, from his silence regarding the abandonment of the temple service and the synagogue, or from Matt. v. 24, xxiii. 19, that the Spirit of Jesus was not elevated above the Jewish economy. But more concerning this presently.

He comes to him for baptism, that the New Testament may, as it were, receive its sanction from the Old, and be ushered in by it (Matt. xi. 10, and fol. verses; iii. 13, and fol. verses). Jesus takes up John's preaching of repentance, and of the nearness of the kingdom of heaven (iv. 17; compare iii. 2.) He finds already in the law the *ἐντολὴ μεγάλη*, in which all the commandments are comprehended (Matt. xxii. 36-40); and he who has the knowledge of this *ἐντολὴ* is not far from the kingdom of God (Mark xii. 34). The contents of the law remain inviolably in the new covenant (Matt. v. 17; Luke xvi. 17). It is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one tittle of the law to pass away. Whosoever shall break one of the least of these commandments, shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven (Matt. v. 18; compare Matt. xxiii. 2, 3). Hence it is manifest that all precipitate breaking with the Old Testament, all reform from without, and not from within, is repudiated; with which we must connect the fact that he nowhere gives his disciples a commandment to forsake the sacrifices and temple-service, or even to separate from the synagogue, or to drop the Sabbath-law. Hence several representatives of the recent Tübingen school have believed that their hypothesis of the Ebionism or Judaism of primitive Christianity could be historically established by the gospels.

But to the passages which prove that Jesus was conscious of being at one with the Old Testament, there are opposed a multitude of others, which so strongly declare the NEWNESS of the gospel, that Marcion, on the contrary, thought he could maintain that, according to primitive Christianity, the gospel entirely broke with the law.

These two opposite extremes are indeed at one in this, that they explain a whole series of sayings and narratives as the interpolations of a later time, and hold as non-authentic what the others regard as genuine, and *vice versa*, without reflecting how far such conduct makes them guilty of historical arbitrariness. Rather, as it belongs to the privileges of intellectual greatness to unite the remote, the mental elevation of Jesus is the only satisfactory explanation of the seemingly opposite statements as to the Old Testament.

The novelty of the gospel in relation to the Old Testament is as strongly expressed by Jesus as we find it anywhere in Paul. Unity with the Old Testament is not sameness. The Baptist is not Christ; he baptizes with water, but not with the Holy Ghost (Matt. iii. 11; Acts i. 5). He came *ἐν ὕδατι βαπτίζων* (Matt. xxi.-xxii., 3, 1), neither eating nor drinking; he fasted much, and so too did his disciples; he lived according to a rigid asceticism (Matt. xii. 18). Jesus came eating and drinking; he did not shun the society of sinners; he demands

no outward asceticism, but leaves fasting as only the natural expression of the state of mind, but not as a law. The law and the prophets reach down to the Baptist; with him as the last and greatest of a series or grade, a period of universal history closes; with Jesus a new one begins (Matt. xi. 11; Luke xvi. 15), that of the gospel (v. 16). The least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than the greatest of the pre-Christian age (Matt. xi. 14). As to the law itself, Jesus ascribes to himself divine authority to determine what is the will of God. Such is the scope of this—the six times repeated *ἐγὼ λέγω ὑμῖν* (Matt. v.), with which he plainly enough places himself formally far above Moses, who does not thus speak in his own name. On the other hand, Jesus regards what he gives, not as something foreign or contradictory to the Old Testament, but as the development of its pith and marrow, or as the fulfilment of its promises and shadows. With a view to delineate the true righteousness of the kingdom of heaven, he goes back to the essence of it in such sort that he forbids many things hitherto tolerated by the law, if not commanded, as an oath, divorce, the right of retaliation,* and he forbids them in virtue of what is already demanded in the Old Testament, the principles of truth and love. Of special importance is his position towards the laws of purification, of sacrifice, and of the Sabbath. The Old Testament still considers man indefinitely as a unity, without expressly distinguishing between outward and inward PURITY. It is true it says, "Ye shall be holy, for I am holy." But the laws of purification refer only to the holiness of the body. Jesus (Matt. xv. 11-15; Mark vii. 15-23) lays down the principle, that it is the impurity of the heart which defiles the man in soul and body; and that outward (ceremonial) impurity, unconnected with that of the heart, defiles no man. The body and its unholiness, it is true, were by no means treated as something indifferent. Jesus himself calls his body a temple: it should be sanctified by us, but from within outwardly. Hence, of course, the Levitical ordinances of the Old Testament, as means of keeping man holy, fall to the ground as a secondary, powerless attempt to exhibit the idea of the undivided holiness of the entire man. But this idea itself remains; nay, is now only to be realised. It is similar in regard to the SACRIFICES to be brought to God. Jesus did not forbid these outward gifts; but in themselves they have no value. Love, mercy, and obedience are better than sacrifice; i. e., the sacrifice of our own will and heart, the sacrifice which is the man himself is the true sacrifice (Matt.

* The personal, with the revenge attached (Matt. v. 39, and fol. verses). He does not thereby dispute the right and duty of the State (Matt. xxii. 16-22; John xviii. 18-38; vi. 16; Matt. xxvi. 52.)

xii. 7; xv. 1, and fol. verses). Finally, his liberty and his position, as elevated above the legal stand-point, evinces itself particularly in relation to the SABBATH-LAW, in his doctrine and in his practical conduct. "The Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath." "The Sabbath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath" (Mark ii. 27; Matt. xii. 1-13; Luke vi. 1). God does not need on his own account that men should offer to him a portion of time for himself, to honour him thereby. The Sabbath is instituted for man, for his spiritual and physical nature, as a gift and a blessing, in which Jesus himself rejoiced, though personally Lord of the Sabbath. But it would be selfishness, nay, hypocrisy, to use a blessing given us for the promotion of goodness, as an occasion to abstain from good works. There is nothing more frequent in the gospels than the collisions into which Jesus is brought with the Jews on account of the cures wrought on Sabbath, which he might have avoided could he have prevailed upon himself to omit anything good in itself, on account of an offence which was to be foreseen. Whoever considers the power exercised by the traditions respecting the Sabbath, and that the observance of them was regarded as a pillar of piety, will fully dismiss the thought that Jesus aimed at a show of peculiar piety among his countrymen; for then he must have acted quite differently as to fasting, asceticism, the Sabbath, and prayer. Rather we discern in him the courage which acts out among men what he knows to be good and true, in a firm and self-consistent, free and intrepid way, unconcerned about good report or bad report in the world.

Yes, Jesus exhibited both in doctrine and life a connected and entirely new mode of understanding the law, and man's relation to God. They who regard the law of God as only an external thing, and not within them, never escape, as repeated experience shews the apparent collision of duties, and the morbid scrupulous conscience, because it is but formally bound by the revealed will of God, but has not come to a free knowledge of its own of what is good (John viii. 32), and falls into an endless casuistry, by which one commandment is turned against another, till everything dissolves into moral scepticism or probabilism which puts outside itself the knowledge of what is good, and permits a foreign conscience to be implanted in it, if it does not fall into entire indifferentism. Now the characteristic trait of Jesus is, that HE IS QUITE ABOVE THE LEGAL GRADE on which every one stands and must stand, when conscience is awakened without reconciliation to God, peace and immediate living communion with God. Now, it does not suffice to say, Jesus the first man truly reconciled to God. For where is there trace of his needing conversion or reconciliation to God? Whether the breath of an unearthly peace breathes through his

whole life ; nay, there was in him the power of communicating this peace to those around him. This peace he could have, however, only because he was the free man, free from the curse of guilty feeling and of sin, free in reference to the law, inasmuch as by the fulfilment of the law he trod and lived above* the law on the ground of the liberty of the children of God. He had in himself a knowledge of what is good, and of the will of God, while the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth. Standing in the law, and the law or the will of God having become a living reality in his knowledge and will, he had the simple direct look of a child or son, which leads back the mind to the simple, to that which is from the beginning, away from the division of the principle of goodness into a distracting multiplicity, the parts of which are independent of each other, and away from the confusion of Jewish casuistry and its moral collisions. Now since he does not stand before us as a servant subject to the law (though he was conscious of the fulfilment of the prophecy of the servant of God, Luke v. 18), but as the Son of the house standing IN the law, so is he THE man who has open access to God, and cultivates free and uninterrupted fellowship with God. Therefore he, the free Son, regularly calls God Father and not merely Lord ; nay, "his Father," as if unconsciously describing his unique relation to God. And because he lives entirely in the law, the law as it were revives in him, he himself becomes the exhibitor of it, the living law, according to which all shall be judged (John v. 27, Matt. xxv. 31-41). Hence, too, judgment upon all belongs to the Son's rights, of which he is conscious. On the other hand, he will share his Son's rights with those who through the Son have God as their Father, and are made sons of God through the first-born brother. Here again his peculiar dignity and freedom evince themselves. To the Father indeed he desires to lead back all fallen brethren, to himself he will draw all (John ii. 32). But he alone is the bridegroom (Matt. ix. 15), mankind is the bride ; he is at the right hand of the Father (Matt. xxii. 44), and as the Son glorifies the Father by the work of man's redemption, so the Father glorifies the Son, for he is not a mere MEANS of redemption, but also his own proper object, and it is the Father who prepares the marriage for the Son (Matt. xxii. 2 ; xxv. 1). And it ever continues to be his joy to make his disciples partakers of his peace and joy.

In the nature of the thing those who neither anticipate nor seek this peace, cannot rightly know what is meant by the fact

* The import of Dorner's words is plain enough, and not deserving of challenge, when taken in connection with what precedes. But as to the essence of the moral law as such, Christ, so far from being above it, had "the law within his heart." (Ps. xl. 8 ; Heb. x).—ED. B. & F. E. R.

that Jesus, by the fulfilling of the law and prophets, brought peace and a new stage of life, nay, a new era to mankind. They can speak perhaps of the peace of a landscape, of a piece of music, of sentimental or æsthetic feeling, which they confound with the peace which passes all understanding, and which is not of an æsthetic but of an ethical and religious nature. They must, if they think logically, regard the stage of legal life as the highest stage of humanity, and as one that is not to be surmounted, and assign to Jesus his place within this platform ; and just because they have no need of a higher, they cannot see why Christ is to be thought sinless, why a high degree of moral excellence may not suffice. But we have shewn that we cannot stop short at this. Either they must permit this phenomenon to awaken their moral sense, and to awaken the necessity of atonement, in order to find, by means of faith on him, a peace which is neither transitory nor delusive, and new activity for all life ; or Jesus must become to them less than he was. They must regard him amidst the contradiction of conscience, and of the impression which he cannot fail to make even on them, as a profaner of holy things, and a fool blinded as to his sin by unprecedented spiritual pride. The church of the Lord, just because some justify the Jews in condemning Jesus, will not cease to receive from his person the impression of unparalleled innocence and power—a phenomenon not of this world ; full of a different, new, and holy spirit ; so unique and lofty, and towering above all others, that it would involve new self-delusion not to recognise it. He who has any moral sense knows by experience that the archetype of the good is presented to us in Jesus. This archetype, where it is known, commends itself by its excellence, and attests its own proper truth in every human breast. But it is not true that this archetype is in the heart of every man ; it lives only in Christendom, in which the historical portrait of Jesus lives and reproduces itself, but nowhere beyond it.

This obviates, too, the opinion that this figure is a creation of the apostles' mind. How completely different their wonted Jewish mode of thought and feeling was from that of Jesus, into which they could enter only with difficulty and by degrees, is certain and beyond doubt. How they reached their subsequent disposition to imitate him—how they should have come to their ethico-religious stage of life—is absolutely inexplicable if we take away the only natural ground of explanation, which lies in his sacred and marvellously attractive person. We should surround ourselves with a world of enigmas if we despised the only solution of the enigma. We must still further maintain that the image of the new free humanity within the old could not have arisen of itself, without a divine communication of the

Spirit, as indeed the essential idea in this figure is just the union of man with God, the real and perpetual fellowship with God. None can speak, as is done in the gospels, of God as the Father but he who has experience of it, whether immediately as the Son, or mediately as those who, through faith in him and not otherwise, are reconciled to God, and made partakers of his peace. Hence, in every instance of transmuting the person of Christ into a myth there is a great *petitio principii*, if not a denial of the new thing that is in the gospel, and which to the church of the Lord is inviolably certain. There lies in it this opinion, that there cannot be anything higher than what the gospel terms the platform of the law, and that this cannot be surmounted; in short, that the absolute religion is Judaism, after divesting it, perhaps, of the national and the particular, but also of the promise. That, however, cannot be the absolute religion which leaves room for conceiving the possibility of a higher and more perfect one; which leaves unfulfilled, or suffers to be extinguished, not only among the Jews but also among the Gentiles, the holiest aspirations of the human heart, as well as their most glorious anticipations and promises.

If we have hitherto considered the Son of man as a unique phenomenon, since he alone stands before us as the Free One, as against sin and law in relation to God and the world, to nature and the human race, as well as in relation to himself; we must now look still further at the GROUND and SOURCE OF THIS LIBERTY. Thus only will the contrast between him and all his contemporaries—not excepting the disciples—fully appear, and the impossibility of inventing his character will be manifest. It is sacred love; it is, to express it in the language of a distinguished English theologian, the GREAT LAW OF SACRIFICE, consciously and energetically carried out to the end—which distinguishes his entire life in the most peculiar, foreign-looking, yet world-subduing way.

Christ's character is purely incomprehensible on the principles of ordinary human nature, or from the mode of thought, motives, and impulses of his nation and age. He has his origin in a higher region; in true humanity united to God. All other men we see moulded, in a certain measure, by the spirit of their age and nation. Even in him we do not deny all influence of companions and of history; but the inner nature of Christ, and his moral life, do not leave the impression of the period in which he lived, or of any particular age in general; it has an everlasting tone. He is in this sense, too, the free one. He belongs to no particular age, and yet to all ages at once; for he is the expression of the everlasting life. His appearance is the direct opposite of that which even the pious Israelites had hoped and pictured to themselves: to destroy the

myth of the Messianic advent which they had sketched for themselves was his hard task ; and just because he would not, and could not, realize this eschatological myth, he earned hatred and rejection on the part of his carnally-minded contemporaries. On his disciples, after he had drawn them to him, we see him unweariedly labouring, with calm wisdom and patience indeed, as they were able to bear it, but also with a constantly equal clearness, fearlessness, and confidence ; first, to destroy their dearest Messianic hopes, that he might next make room for the directly opposite, viz., that which he had directly to demand and give. The same ground which forbade him to meet their wishes and expectations from the very first—expectations of the still unbroken natural heart, though trained by the discipline and order of the theocracy—had also not permitted the Spirit of God in the prophets to communicate more than they could bear. But Jesus has from the beginning unveiled, in his life, and progressively too in his doctrine, love, as the great law of sacrifice—to him his life's law of liberty, and to his disciples the fundamental condition of their regeneration from the death of natural life into that which is spiritual, and of their share in his liberty and blessedness.

We shall only indicate, by a few strokes, what we mean by this ; for the theme is too rich and too deep to be exhausted.

Jesus did not at first wish to bring in or gain a worldly reform and a worldly kingdom.* Moreover, he did not in the beginning count on a general, religious, and moral revolution in the people of Israel.† He knew his people and the human heart too well, and had too early to experience obstinate resistance,‡ to yield to the illusion that the mere power of his doctrine, or the impression of his deeds, would at once effect the reform, nay, the new birth of men's hearts, which was his aim. From the beginning, his work was planned with more depth, grandeur, and daring ; that is, in such a way that he should not give up his people and men, though they should reject him, as he foresaw they would, (Mark xii. 32) ; that he should not cease to love them ; and that his very sufferings at their hands, and for their sakes, should only be turned into the clearest proof of his disinterested love, which sought not himself, but their good. The purity of his self-forgetting, self-sacrificing love was to kindle up the last spark of human feeling which still glimmers in the hardest sinner's heart, and

* Matt. iv. 9, 11 ; Luke iv. 19, &c. ; Matt. xi. 4-7 ; v. 8, 4. 11, and following verses ; x. 16 ; John ii. 19 ; iii. 8.

† Compare the sermon on the Mount ; Luke iv. 24 ; John iv. 44.

‡ John ii. 19-24 ; iv. 1, comp. 8 ; Luke iv. 29.

by awakening contrition and shame, to make room for his spirit of love.

Human scorn may defy its might and power, or bend before it only outwardly and reluctantly. To the doctrine of divine wisdom, man may oppose his own wisdom, may arm himself against its assaults; the example of a blameless life before one's eyes may leave entire the self-righteousness of the human heart, nay, provoke it to maintain the good opinion of its own excellence by suspicious and uncharitable falsehood; condemning words, however just they may be, might darken still more a heart alienated from God. Jesus did not think that his deeds of power, or the doctrines of his wisdom, and his blameless life would bring the decision and crisis for hard hearts. He knew, on the contrary, that, though all this did not pierce the heart, he was in possession of another power, which could operate only after his death, that is, the power of his death itself, as a sacrifice of love to a world rejecting him. That he fully gave himself up as a voluntary, defenceless, and disarmed victim, only not giving up the love which embraced his people and mankind, and which, when dying, prayed for his enemies—this disarmed the enmity, the pride, the falsehood, and the resistance of the insolent, complacently-wise, and self-righteous heart in a far other way than even reproof and condemnation could do.

How absurdly he seems to act, and contrary to all the usual rules of life! He is full of the kingly spirit; he wishes to become a king, as he is the Lord of minds, the King of souls; but he is so only by the circumstance that he entirely surrenders himself, and gives himself up, only not giving up love, and not giving up faith in the power of suffering, dying, disinterested love.

He wishes to win the victory over all enemies, visible and invisible. He wishes the dominion which, he knows, is fore-ordained for him; but he will have this by subjecting himself to the shame, nay, to the death, of a malefactor, and he consciously and voluntarily gives his enemies their will, by means of which he falls. From the curse, and what is worthy of the curse, he will draw the blessing, and from death the life. It is a thought so grand and bold,—a faith full of marvellous divine originality, in all the calmness of power, a patience and moderation without enthusiasm, purely formed in free obedience to the Father's known will, and carried out to the last breath of life—that nothing but stupidity could deny the impossibility of such a character being invented by his disciples. The disciples themselves, though belonging to the poor in spirit, and not indifferent "to righteousness," had, without him, no idea of the law of sacrifice, of the spirit and power of

suffering love. They clung to the hopes of an outward Messianic glory with a tenacity of self-will which caused Jesus the hardest toil, and more than once extorted sighs. True, they knew that the Messianic kingdom was to be a kingdom of righteousness, but they will have that so suited to their darling hopes that, averse as they were to sacrifice, they will expect the moral reform, so far as they acknowledge its necessity, on the easier path of the alluring and terrifying, judicial and dividing power of the Messianic glory. Sacrifice, the cross, and self-denial were to them nothing else than scare-crows, against which they protected themselves with might and main. How should they, how could they, have invented or created the character of Jesus?

But how did this very thing, so thoroughly repugnant and offensive to the apostles, and which seemed a sufficient reason to reject him, how did this divine folly of self-sacrificing love approve itself as divine wisdom, as an unveiling of the mystery which contains the unique and conquering power—power of dissolving all the world's disharmony into harmony, nay, the power of uniting the countless often self-conflicting powers of the world into the unity of the kingdom of God? All the strife and discord in the world springs from nothing but the spirit which flees from sacrifice, the happy death of selfish nature. The solution of the deepest enigma of the human breast includes in it the mystery of innocent sacrifice, which unfolded itself in the whole life of Jesus in an increasing measure till he came to Golgotha.

The entire life of Jesus was a SACRIFICE OF LOVE; he regarded true greatness as consisting in self-abasement for men's good; serving them, but with a high sense of liberty, which can be all things in itself, high and low, poor and rich, nay, which is inwardly of the royal sort, but accepts and uses everything just as the spirit of sacrifice or of love demands. Requiting hatred with love, far from a feeling of revenge and judging, seeking enemies as lost brothers, and consuming himself in such love, he verified that divine self-forgetfulness, from which nothing can be taken, because it seeks and retains nothing for itself, and to which, for this reason, everything belongs, and hearts must yield. Such loving, in truth, is the emanation of the eternal divine life. It proves itself an absolutely immortal inextinguishable flame, by its power converting what opposes it into what feeds the flame, so that its fire burns the brighter. This view breaks even a rocky heart in two with shame, contrition, and penitence; melts the ice of the natural heart, which only sought itself and loved itself in poor delusive pride; and displays in "the having nothing" of

love, the having of all things, the true property, the true riches, the liberty which none can take away. This love is the power that can move the world, raise it from its hinges and fetters, heal its distractions, and thus insert it anew into the divine centre. Not of this world, it yet enters into the world, rejoicing with the joyful, weeping with those who weep, in order to serve it, and by serving to conquer it, and by conquering to vivify, and glorify it.*

This love, this spirit of sacrifice, cannot, indeed, be in us, in the copy, WITHOUT OUR BEING FIRST RECONCILED and experiencing the peace of God; and, as we need expiation above all things, burdened as we are with sin and guilt, therefore the pure love of Jesus, bearing mankind upon his heart, with the fullest sense of the justice of the divine curse, and of the displeasure which lay heavy upon us, must needs make our cause his own by sympathy. His love must, according to his office, take the direction of bearing our weaknesses and diseases on his priestly heart (Matt. viii. 17, ix. 36, xiv. 14, xv. 32, xxiii. 37, xx. 28), and thereby be made a surety for us to the satisfied justice of God, so that God can regard the world as reconciled in him, the righteous one. But though he stands before us unique in his calling, in virtue of his sinless holiness, yet our entire life may be, and ought to be, a sacrifice on the ground of atonement, a priestly service in which we sacrifice to God everything impure to which our heart clings, self-will and all self-seeking, and dedicate and devote ourselves to him without reserve in the sacrifice of faith, and thank and praise him in the sacrifice of love, which at one time streams forth in childlike words of prayer to the Father, and at another occupies itself, with all its powers, in self-forgetfulness for the good of the brethren, simply seeking another's good, and thus dying the progressive death of love, which is ever a self-renewing life.

Jesus, as he is historically attested, stands before us in the world as a **MIRACLE**; not as a miracle deranging the orderly connection of the world, but raising the true image of humanity, which is the end of creation, and restoring the world, which

* From this point, a number of features in the life-picture of Jesus come into the light of a great connection. We name them, but refrain from carrying them out. So Matt. v. 3-7, 9-12, 12-25, 38-48, 29, 30; vi. 24; viii. 21; ix. 11-18, 15-17; x. 16-28, 32-39, particularly 38, 39; xi. 25, 26, 28-30; xii. 7, 8; xii. 16-21; xiii. 4-8, 11-16, 45, 46; xv. 11-20; xvi. 21-25; xvii. 24-27; xviii. 1-5, 8-11, 15-17, 21-35; xix. 14, 21; xx. 20-28; xxii. 2-10; xxiii. 5, 10-12, 28, 29-28, 34, 37; xxiv. 9-18; xxv. 29; and the parallels, Luke xxiii. 34; John i. 14; iii. 8-6, 16, 17-19; iv. 22, 32-38, 48; v. 17-20, 30, 35, 38-47; vi. 27, 46-47; vii. 17-19; viii. 32, 42-50, 54; ix. 39-41; x. 11-18; xi. 9, and following verses, 35, 51-52; xii. 22-28, 32, comp. 8-28, 37, and following verses; xiii. 1, 4-17, 31, 32, 34, 35; xiv. 31; xv. 16; xvii. 19-25; xviii. 30, 37; xx. 29; xxi. 15-19.

had become a moral chaos, to the *κόσμος*, and undoing its moral jars everywhere where room was given him by the power and example of his sacrifice. As to the eternal higher life of the Son of man, John specially instructs us. It is his being one with the Father, whose voice and will he constantly heard, whom he always saw working, and whose face he beheld. Standing constantly, and without intermission, in this oneness, perfectly united to the Father in love, he becomes himself the revelation of the Father and of his love. It is the absolute ethical communion with the Father, and, by consequence, also the ontological, or mental, communion with the Father, in virtue of which he is what he is, and lives as he does. How such a personage would arise in a sinful race, how his first earthly origin is to be understood, are considerations that lie beyond the limits of this inquiry. It is enough for our purpose if we have succeeded in proving that the sinless perfection of Jesus is an historical fact, which sober history has to accept as certainly as any other historical fact, and if we have been able to exhibit it in some of its aspects in its entire originality.

IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS FOR CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

Every mentally-quicken'd age sees new sides in the person of Christ; the sides which possess power to heal the evils which have recently arisen in society, and to overcome new popular errors. To the church's own enrichment and self-confirmation these attacks must contribute. They arouse her from the slumber of traditional custom, which supposes that it holds possession of that which can have a living presence only in the course of constant study, and which can be only as it is a living present, a complete, harmonious, and secure possession. It is the privilege of the gospel that its opponents are obliged to confirm the disciples' gaze on that by which they themselves may be overthrown, *i.e.*, won.

In the earlier centuries there was among mankind a more lively sense of God, or at least a more lively craving for God, than is, in many ways, to be found at present. The old world's despair of itself was the end of its mediate or direct deification of the world. The general decay of human things, and misery, drove the heathen world to God, and to his revelation in Christ. In this revelation it was THE DIVINE for which it had most directly an open eye; more precisely, it was the divine on that side which distinguishes it most from the human, in its perishableness, its chaos, and its misery; that is, it was the might and majesty, the glory and blessedness of God; and the most intensive piety of the first century was more a fleeing from this world as a vain show to God, than a use of the present world, animated by Christian principles.

To this characteristic trait of ancient Christianity, which had to fix its seat amid expiring nationalities, there seems to have been a contrast in the youthful world of the migratory northern hordes, and their onward exploits among mankind. But the latter enjoyed what I would almost call the natural blessing of youth, at least among the young peoples historically most important,—the lively sense of God, and the craving for God; and entered willingly into the school and the discipline of the ancient church, according to which, men and virgins who had devoted their lives to God took rank above knights and noble matrons; nay, chivalry and imperialism became in part, even spiritually, the church's arm, by their vow of obedience. Not only was wholesome discipline established; not only were the wild shoots of these hardy children of nature pruned; but the church made an incision into the normal and divinely-constituted life of nature, as if it were theirs to annihilate the human, that nothing but the divine might be current. Not only were the earthy and moral spheres of life depreciated, and robbed of independent significance,—all the value, nay, all true reality being placed solely in the church, which sacrificed to God or transubstantiated all that is earthy; but revelation itself, and above all, its consummation in Christ, was divested of its HUMAN character; the omnipotent majesty of Christ and his legislative and judicial holiness being alone in their thoughts. The human friendship and the human tenderness of his nature were transferred to Mary and the saints.

So long as this immediate, and as it were natural, but pretty indefinite sense of God, fed by the devotional life of the church, preponderated among mankind,—the feeling of general and deep reverence for God's holy, annihilating, omnipresent majesty, before which all finite being is valueless and as nothing,—there were in the prevailing mood of mankind grounds which (where Christianity must needs be proved by arguments) had a lively sense for the evidence of miracles. The mind was prepared to see miracles breaking forth at every moment and everywhere, and to see in them the omnipotence and majesty of God, and in this mood willingly believed the credibly-reported miracles of Scripture. What they proved in their own nature was, indeed, nothing but the majesty and POWER of GOD exalted above the powers of mankind and of nature, but this passed for the divine *καρ' ἑξῆς*, and the defect perhaps felt as to the certainty of the testimonies from antiquity for miracles was richly compensated by the belief in the miracles continued in the church.*

* The proof from prophecy, too, in its usual acceptance, was properly nothing but a proof of the POWER of God as opposed to accident, and revealed so little the unity and constancy of God's chief end in the world that, on the

What a wholly different turn the matter has taken in the last centuries, and how much has the feeling altered, especially in the Protestant world! How many believing Protestants who hold fast the miracles of Christ have come to faith in Christ, not BY his miracles, but, so to speak, IN SPITE of them; because the more the philosophical sense has been cultivated, the more (that is, so long as they were considered acts of omnipotence, but not equally acts of a disposing divine wisdom, and unconnected with the ultimate and absolute scope of the universe), the more did miracles stand opposed to the whole weight of the firm and regular laws of nature, nay, to the entire position of the sons of this age, which sees in the visible universe a well-ordered and momentous reality with its own life, its own meaning, and not a mere cover of a miracle-world lying behind and discovering itself as a world of arbitrariness.

One has a good right to call the nearly dominant mode of contemplating the world in the physical researches of the day a dead mode denuded of God, wanting ideality, and narrow. But it cannot be denied that, on the other hand, it has a more concrete, truer insight into the connection of the powers of the world, and of their operations and laws, than the old, and, so to speak, one-sidedly theological survey of the universe. Whoever now stands true in the Christian faith, denies no actual fact to defend the faith. It is rather the infinite elasticity of Christianity to derive advantage from every real advance of human knowledge, and to apply it as an impulse to purify man, and to reveal new sides of the glory of the gospel. The world-despising idealism has, as Oetinger already perceived, done so much damage to true theology, and so much does it obstruct even to this day, the historical view of Christianity, that theology may well see in it a summons to give greater significance to the actual world; and the recent change of idealism into materialism, which would hardly have been effected had the importance of matter and of the terrestrial world founded *more* correct appreciation in theology and philosophy, points to the same task. To this we are summoned also by the undeniable fact, that the divine work of the Reformation is closely connected with that revolution, and with the advance of the physical sciences.

It is true that FAITH, the sternum of the Reformation, soars beyond the visible to find its rest and its life in the living God, revealed in Christ. It seeks and finds its true citizen-

contrary, the most trivial occurrence in detail appeared to lend more stringency to this proof than what is most important and indispensable to God's chief end in the world.

ship in heaven. But heaven is to it no longer a remote thing *in eternity*, as it was to the middle ages : it has heaven open, nay, faith has heaven already *IN* itself. It is only by a death that this heaven can be entered, and not by penances unfriendly to life which fill up this life and a vast part of the future ; but, by **REPENTANCE** and **FAITH** ; and a commencement of the resurrection to a new life falls already into time. Though faith, moreover, in this world, “ possesses as though it possessed not,” as far as it is directed to a future goal, the city of God, the new Jerusalem which is above, yet the whole value for it does not lie in eternity. Since heaven has descended into the heart, and Christ has made believers his own members, these know that something valuable is already to be found upon earth. The very character of the man in whom Christ’s Spirit dwells is already in this world something that is ennobled by the divine love, and has thus a truly immeasurable value in the eyes of this love—a value not by transmutation into the divine and by loss of character, but, on the very contrary, by the perfecting of creation already begun in time. What importance man’s earthly life, or the time-side, has won in this point of view, and what importance anthropology has gained alongside of theology, which previously well nigh discerned in God nothing but the majesty of holy power, is self-evident. In the Reformation view of faith, there lay the germ of a new view of God ; but this did not at once obtain free development. On the contrary, mind in the Protestant world cast itself with all its aspirations and power upon the knowledge of man and salvation for him, of mind and physical nature, and upon the investigation and mastery of the stage here given to our race as a possession.

It is true, I repeat, that the study of nature, and the entire empirico-realistic direction taken by science has in part assumed an ungodly character. Forgetting the whence and the whither, it has shut itself up in a self-created prison, and praised and extolled it as the land of liberty. It has forgotten that it is the gospel by which mankind was raised erect again in Christian nations, and the power was recovered by which even secular opinion subsists in its progressive culture. For the life-principle of human culture is worship. Still it remains true that, since the Reformation, the eyes of mankind have opened to the present world, to its history and its nature, in a measure unknown before, and that it takes possession of the world with a success never before equalled in intellectual knowledge and practical conquest. This turn in universal history cannot be wrenched back. Our business is to adapt ourselves to it, and turn it to account as the gospel intends.

In the opinion of antiquity, the world still hovered between

being and non-being.* A world not yet feeling eternal life in itself, though bearing a religious breath in it, could not yet attain to the firm persuasion that it was a real quantity having a relative independence in relation to God: men's minds could not fully deal in earnest with the thought of a real creation, when the intensest mystic piety ever afresh substituted unconsciously that annihilation in God is the world's final goal. The God of majesty, the God of absolute power, was always akin to this mode of thought, and viewed predominantly as nothing but holy power, which, as "*summum liberum arbitrium*," could any moment break, suspend, annihilate any order, any existence, any law (even according to some the moral law, which he had given to us).

Now our men of physical science, who everywhere must needs seek constancy, law, and order, and are conscious of perceiving in all this what is truly divine and worthy of God, come into keen conflict with this conception of God, with which unhappily a large section of evangelical theologians long continued satisfied. Nay, they turn away from the living God of the gospel as a God of arbitrariness and disorder. Thus the very thing that was specially asserted as a proof of the divinity of Christianity—namely, miracles†—appeared to them more and more as something unworthy of God; nay, even if the fact of miracles could be conceded as something contrary to God, as a sign of a disorderly power, of a liberty which would rather be arbitrariness, while the rising natural theology was conscious (and in one respect justly so) of possessing a higher conception of God. Certainly this God of natural theology, wanting an absolute historical end, could only become the dead iron law in which the world-machine ends, or (where men will have a more lively idea) the essence of the living world itself, in a pantheistic sense; and thus men returned to the heathen doctrine of materialism. But the heathen have no hope. Were it conceivable that a people should lapse again into naturalistic pantheism, this world would again become to them a chaos, without form and void, so that the dreams of their essential divinity would perish just as in the old heathen world before Christ; and instead of finding in themselves the true satisfying reality, they would long for nothing so much as for death, or to throw away

* Let the reader recall the doctrine of creation by Augustine, Anselm, and even Thomas.

† Dorner, with many of his countrymen, puts the difficulties as to the miracles of the gospel, seen in the light of the divine immutability and the divine order, much more strongly than was to be expected from him. He ignores the fact that the world and physical nature are under the bondage of corruption (Rom. viii. 20), as well as men's bodies. If they are no longer in their normal state, and Christ is the Deliverer, his miracles are not a disorder, but a begun restoration of order, and a pledge of that perfection of order, when he shall make all things new.—ED. B. & F. H. R.

their existence, in order to reach the divine, just as we notice this still in millions among the Brahmanical and Buddhist heathen.

But if the Reformation emancipated man's mind, so as to view the world, and enter it as into a reality which has a value and end in itself even in time—if the Reformation has effected this, that mind, passing from the position of childhood and bondage, can go on its way freely, and, according to its own decision, it is particularly incumbent on the church of the Reformation to direct this decision to the right goal. This she can only do by the unfolding more and more fully of Christian truth; and only where she neglects this, and as far as she neglects it, will the antichristian tendencies, which, under the guise of progress, are ever a falling back to pre-Christian platforms, assume an alarming compass and character.

In the treasures of the gospel, which are the property of the Reformation faith, and of which it has the key, are contained, as we have said, the weapons of offence and defence, even for this new disposition of mind. Had the new doctrine of God hid in the reformed principle been earlier disengaged, had the idea of man as made in the image of God been on all sides worked out agreeably to it, theology could hardly ever have seen the highest element in God's omnipotence and sovereign power; it could hardly have seen in the miracles of power as such the brightest seal of the divine; it could hardly have come into such serious collision with the powerfully-awakened philosophy, nay, with the idea of the divine order and wisdom.

The Reformation point of view places not the **MIRACLES OF POWER**, but the **MIRACLES OF LOVE**, in the centre of its contemplation, (not, however, without giving their due place and their due elucidation to the former, as far as they are historically attested); and in these miracles of love the actual world, mankind needing redemption and called to holiness, directly and immediately share. These miracles cannot give rise even to the appearance of calling in question the reality of the world, and the good and regular order of the word; they are the affirmation and the confirmation that the world of mankind is the ultimate end of God's love.

What evangelical faith learns is this: that the power of God is not the inmost centre of his being, but that his holiness and LOVE is the power above his omnipotence, and that it wisely employs this power for an end absolutely good—the creation of a real world of love. To an intelligent faith, God inwardly manifests himself, not simply as he does to the heathen, as the power on whose will it absolutely depends,—nor simply as a Lord and ruler who, as a holy Lawgiver and Judge, demands our services,—but as holy communicative love, which proposes

to itself, even at the creation of the world, another thing as its end, and that loving persons made in its image; and hence entering into the world constantly and immutably, and yet as the source of all, he orders everything to one supreme goal, and withholds arbitrariness, and an empty display of power without good cause. Thus no order and no law can prevent the manifestation of the inward and outward physical miracles of God's holy and wise love. Rather, everything must ultimately minister to this one unalterable end, for the sake of which the world itself exists, and to the power of which it is indebted. Everything, whether as a higher or a lower order of the world's laws, must be incorporated in this world-plan. Thus evangelical faith is by no means unfriendly to miracle. It teaches us to appreciate the value of the real earthly world-order, and to engraft it into a higher order, the world of absolute aims. It thus recognises the true foundation of miracle in the absolute, *i. e.*, the ethical world-plan. But on this account, outward physical miracles can no longer form the foundation by themselves. They await the confirmation of their own possibility from the higher, the ethical world, though the attested records of their reality serve to extend and elevate the narrow earthly sense of the natural man.

Man, however, corresponds to the end for which he was created, while he, conscious of his reconciliation to God, allows room and place within him to the spirit of love, so that he honours God not merely on account of his benefits—even the heathen honour the gods for the sake of expected benefits—but thanks and praises him as the God and Father of all; offers himself as a means and instrument for his glory; seeks him and his kingdom as the end, as God first sought man's salvation and glorification. While the Christian, reconciled and saved in Christ, learns to regard himself as the personal instrument of God, nature, too, wins for him its true position: he habituates himself to view it as the instrument to be made his own, as a means to the ethical world-plan of God.

Thus jointed into the TRUE ground-plan of the world, the notion of nature is capable of obviating the dislike of miracles, and the desire of miracles.

By the tendency of men's minds to Anthropology, to the actual world, and to nature, dating from the Reformation, the intensity of the natural sense of God has certainly suffered an interruption. Self-consciousness gained strength in sobriety and clearness. Reflection, the life of rational thought, began and departed away from the traditional piety, and destroyed its *naïveté*. But the loss may be, and ought to be, repaired. Self-consciousness, diving into its depths, becomes self-knowledge, in a moral and religious respect. The CONSCIOUSNESS of alienation from God is a higher stage, and one

more accordant with the truth than a superficial and but seeming union with God; and it was superficial as long as it was pre-dominantly nothing but a consciousness of absolute dependence on God's POWER, little mindful of the existing disunion and the ethico-religious problem. While the generally human impression of God's power and majesty, before which we are but dust and ashes, and without any real, firm being has interwoven into it the moral consciousness which results from the persuasion of an ideal personal destination, (from the *ἡθικὴ συνείδησις*), the difference between God and man, in the first place, is certainly deepened. By God's holiness we find ourselves MORALLY ANNIHILATED, rejected, and unworthy of blessed union with God. But this beginning of the ethical knowledge of God, on the ground of an awakening conscience, leads further, through the operation of the Spirit of God. If the holy LAW is dividing, cold, exacting, judging, the GOSPEL, on the other hand, reveals God's ethical nature in all its fulness; and now there begins, for the first time, a deeper and more intense fellowship with God, including personal holiness, as God's end, and the outer world as its means. The most divine element in God, if we may say so, now shews itself at once as the most humanly accessible, and as the nearest; while mere holy power appears to the carnal mind as indeed the highest, but in itself it can only cast us into a fruitless feeling of impotency and distance from God.

The appearance of Christ is the divine miracle of love absolutely, but so formed that the miracle appeared as true nature, as a HUMAN LIFE OF LOVE, to lead us through itself to its inner divine source. By other means, indeed, than by himself — *e. g.*, by miracles of knowledge or of action—he sought to draw us to himself; but yet he mentions Himself as the way absolutely leading to Him as the truth and the life, to Himself and his whole personal appearance, (John xiv. 6). Hence it stands most intimately connected with the history of evangelical theology and with its deepest interests, that the recent theology fixes its eye specially on this personal appearance of Christ and on his entire ethical character; and from this point of view finds for an active conscience, a surer transition to the knowledge of his divine dignity and to his office as Redeemer, than in the proof from miracles, *e. g.*, from the resurrection (the favourite mode in England), or in Prophecy, and the Inspiration of Scripture, or in the perfection of his doctrine. The ethically holy, reaching to heaven in its depths, nay, into the department of divine ontology, has in it, on the other side, the charm of being the most humanly interesting, the most melodious and the most resistlessly attractive, even for the susceptible minds who are still without.

ART. VI.—*The Greek Testament of Webster and Wilkinson.*

The Greek Testament, with Notes, Grammatical and Exegetical. By WILLIAM WEBSTER, M.A., Assistant Master in King's College School, late Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge; and WILLIAM FRANCIS WILKINSON, M.A., Vicar of St Werburgh's, Derby, late Theological Tutor of Cheltenham College. Vol. I. containing the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. London: John W. Parker & Son, West Strand. 1855.

THIS valuable work, as it has been the labour of years, so will it increase in estimation the longer it is before the world. It brings together a large mass of information, devoid of the cumbersome pretentiousness of larger undertakings of this kind. The authors do not load their notes with references to German authorities, neither do they altogether withhold the names of those who have preceded them in these fields of learning.

Even here, however, as in Alford and Ellicott, we cannot but regret to discern a too great deference to the authority of the present age, as though it had immeasurably distanced all the labour and the learning of the past. We demur to this. The result is an unreasonable unsettling of the landmarks, even of grammar itself; an introduction of conjectural refinements in criticism, particularly visible in the works of Mr Ellicott; and a perversion of the critical judgment of the young student, which can be rectified only by advanced experience. Hence the labours of Beza, Grotius, and Wolf, are either under-rated or wholly ignored. Even Scott and Liddell's *Lexicon* must be distrusted by those who, with the modern school, interpret the New Testament by the guidance of Donaldson.

As an exegetical handbook to the New Testament, the now disused work of Dr Valpy was not without its merits. Bloomfield heaped together an undigested mass of learning, the very unconnectedness of which soon made him unpopular. He latterly, indeed, has laboured with considerable usefulness in the field of textual criticism. Dr Burton's was rather the shadow of a commentary than a commentary itself, and his theology was stunted to the meagre proportions of the day. Trollope, again, with a great array of names, left an impression of unsatisfactoriness and indistinctness upon the mind, whensoever the inquirer consulted him. Alford from the first shewed marks of haste and rashness, a mutability not confined to him in this department solely. At first he advocated a Hebrew origin for St Matthew's gospel, on the plea of the unanimous consent of Christian antiquity. Afterwards he found himself obliged to confess that he had misunderstood the testimony of the fathers. He never could have fallen into error here if he had consulted Whitby's masterly exposition of the evidence of antiquity, given

in the 5th, 6th, and 7th sections of his "Prefatory Discourse concerning the Four Gospels in general, and the Gospel according to St Matthew in particular."

To elucidate this point, where an astonishing amount of rash assertion has been hazarded by almost all the modern continental critics, it may not be unimportant to mention the conclusion to which former investigators in England had arrived. Every one must have been astonished at the extraordinary credulity evinced in reference to the tradition about Papias by those who are free-thinking enough in reference to Scripture itself. The follies that are handed down to us under the name of Papias are such that we might incline to question their authenticity. All that we know with certainty respecting Papias is, that he lived before Irenæus. On the authority of Jerome, it has been said that there was a personal acquaintance between Papias and Irenæus.* Irenæus was living in the second half of the second century. Papias was, according to Eusebius, a person of great learning but of little judgment. He probably accumulated much information, but indiscriminately, and without a correct estimate of its value. The indefatigable Dr Burton has shewn that he probably died Bishop of Hierapolis, in Phrygia, in A.D. 163.† Weismann, the very able Lutheran Church historian in the last century, would question the unfavourable opinion of Eusebius on the general ground of Papias having been a bishop at so early a period of the Christian Church.‡ He has been often said indeed to have been contemporary with the apostle John, and to have derived some of his anecdotes and traditions from him. But whosoever will consult Eusebius will see that that historian concludes, with great reason from the fragments of Papias himself, that he had not enjoyed the intimacy of the apostles, but had gathered his reports from such as had heard them. We refer our readers to the 39th chapter of the third book of Eusebius. Guericke, in his admirable *Einleitung in N. T.*, concludes that St Matthew's gospel was written before A.D. 66.

Papias then delivered that "Matthew wrote his oracles in the Hebrew tongue, and every one translated them as he was able."§ He was followed by Irenæus toward the end of the second cen-

* Epist. 75, 3, vol. i. p. 450, apud "Dr Burton's Lectures upon the Ecclesiastical History of the Second and Third Centuries," Lect. 18, p. 141. Oxford, 1838. Hence Professor Jeremie, in his "History of the Christian Church in the Second and Third Centuries," p. 86, "He received instruction from Papias and from Polycarp, both disciples of St John the Evangelist." Republished from the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* by Griffin & Co, 58 Baker Street, Portman Square, London.

† Lect. 18, p. 138.

‡ Hist. Eccles. N. T., tom. i. p. 145. Halæ, Magdeburg. 1746.

§ L. iii. c. 39, p. 116.

ture. But Irenæus added that "the Ebionites used that very gospel according to St Matthew which was writ in Hebrew ; this he saith twice, without any intimation that it was interpolated or corrupted by them."* He quotes Grabe, the learned Lutheran editor of the Septuagint, saying in his *Spicilegium Patrum Primi Seculi*, p. 21, and *Nat. in Irenæum*, l. ii. c. 26, "And so they easily imposed upon Irenæus and other fathers ignorant of the Hebrew language, so that they believed that they made use of that same gospel of Matthew." Grabe, of whom much curious and interesting information may be seen in Dr Bliss's *Extracts from the Diary of Thomas Hearne*, conjectured that the Ebionites used an interpolated gospel, and also that Eusebius, Jerome, and our modern writers, were mistaken in making the gospel to the Hebrews which the Nazarenes used, and the gospel which the Ebionites used, one and the same. "And yet," adds Dr Whitby, "Epiphanius expressly saith of the Ebionites, they used only the gospel of St Matthew, and called it the gospel according to the Hebrews, as it truly is. So that either Eusebius, Epiphanius, and St Jerome must be mistaken in this matter, which is sufficient to invalidate their testimony, or Irenæus must be himself mistaken ; and then he much more might be so, in speaking of a language he understood not." A specimen of the judgment and credibility of Papias may be seen by the English reader at pp. 51-57 of the third edition of a small volume by the late Bishop of Chichester, entitled "Not Tradition, but Scripture."†

* Whitby, a Prefatory Discourse, &c., p. lxiv.

† Printed for J. G. F. and J. Rivington. London, 1839. Considering that from Papias was probably derived the doctrine of the Millennium as it was held by some of the early fathers, it may not be an unfit opportunity to introduce this relic of antiquity. If true, it is indeed a fragment of Holy Scripture, but the style of it speaks for itself, and betrays it. "As the elders remember, who saw John the disciple of the Lord, that they heard from him what the Lord taught about those times, and said, 'The days shall come in which vines shall exist, each containing ten thousand shoots, and in each shoot shall be ten thousand arms, and in every true shoot shall be ten thousand branches, and on every branch ten thousand clusters, and in every cluster ten thousand grapes, and every grape, when pressed, shall give twenty-five firkins of wine ; and when any one of the saints shall proceed to gather a cluster, some other cluster shall exclaim, "I am a better cluster ; take me, and bless the Lord through me." In like manner, a single grain of wheat shall produce ten thousand ears, and each ear shall produce ten thousand grains, and every grain shall afford ten pounds' weight of fine pure flour ; and all the other fruits and grains and herbs shall abound in the same proportion, and also all animals feeding upon those kinds of food which spring from the earth shall be tame and loving to one another, and in all things subject to the accommodation of man.' He added also, 'These things are credible to the true believers.' And Judas the traitor, not believing this account, and asking him in what way shall all these productions be brought about by the Lord, our Lord replied, 'Those persons shall see them who shall partake of them.' It was in anticipation of these things that Isaiah prophesied, saying, *The wolf shall dwell with the lamb,*" &c.—See Grabe's *Spicilegium*, sec. ii. p. 26.

Irenæus followed Papias ; and respecting his critical judgment and the value of any traditions traceable to his authority, Bishop Shuttleworth, in his "Not Tradition, but Scripture," very justly observes as follows :—

"But, perhaps, if there are any points to which proximity of time would appear to give the primitive Christians an advantage over ourselves with respect to the means of better information, it would be those simple historical facts, unconnected with doctrine, which at least might naturally be supposed to descend unaltered through several successive generations. And yet upon these very points, at how comparatively early a period do we find traditional accuracy fail us ! Irenæus was, we know, the disciple of Polycarp, who, again, was the disciple of St John. Surely a plain, single, historical circumstance, which had to pass through only two intermediate hands, may be supposed to have reached him unaltered. We can scarcely imagine a more direct channel of communication than that which must have conveyed to him the broad and obvious events of our Saviour's life. And yet we know that he has asserted (for no better reason, so far as we can understand, than for that of supporting a fanciful theory respecting the several divisions of human life, and of illustrating very unnecessarily a text in Scripture (John viii. 57), that our Lord must have reached nearly the fiftieth year of his age at the time of his crucifixion ;* in order to make out which circumstance, he gratuitously inserts, contrary to the express declaration of the four evangelists, a period of upwards of fifteen years between his baptism and the commencement of his ministry."†

Origen, according to the twenty-fifth chapter of the sixth book of Eusebius, in his ecclesiastical history, is the third witness. Matthew having, says Origen, published it for the Jewish converts, wrote it in the Hebrew ; but as Dr Whitby observes, "he doth not say it was written either first or only in that tongue. Thus, therefore, I am willing to compound the matter, that the gospel of St Matthew being written for all nations in the Greek, as a tongue common to most of them, was also given, for the use of those Jews who only understood their mother tongue, in Hebrew.‡" At p. 48, Dr Whitby explains himself as intending not a double original gospel from the hand of St Matthew, but that the Jews translated for themselves from the Greek original, "and perhaps with the same liberty of making additions to it from tradition which we find in the Chaldee Paraphrast and the translation of the Septuagint ; which version the primitive Christians among the Gentiles, who were ignorant of that language, finding in their hands, they, from the likeness of the thing, and the pretensions of the Jews, *might think it an original, written for their use.* Thus, some of them, upon the

* Adversus Hæres, lib. ii. c. 89.

† Pp. 68, 69.

‡ Prefatory Discourse, p. 45, 6th ed., 1744.

same account, inform us that *the epistle to the Hebrews was first written in Hebrew, and was translated into Greek by Clemens* or St Luke*; and yet, that in this matter they were mistaken we learn from Jerome telling us for certain that the whole New Testament, excepting only the gospel of St Matthew, was first writ in Greek."

Guericke conjectures that the gospel used by the Ebionites was the Hebrew, or rather Aramaic, gospel of St Matthew, corrupted with those interpolations which are specified in the works of Jerome (which may be seen in the latter part of the fifth section of Whitby's prefatory discourse), and collected by Fabricius in the first volume of his *Codex Apocryphus*, N. T., and by Grabe, at p. 25 of the first volume of his *Spicilegium Patrum*. See also Jones's well-known work on the Canon of the New Testament.† Both Grabe and Mill regard this gospel as a very early composition, to which the name of St Matthew was afterwards appended.

Eusebius, in the twenty-fifth chapter of his third book, says, of the Hebrew gospel of St Matthew, that by some it was also ranked with the spurious works, the Acts of Paul, the Pastor, the Revelation of Peter, the Epistle of Barnabas, and the Institutions of the Apostles.‡

This subject is fully discussed, not only by Whitby, but by that learned editor of the Apostolical Fathers and writer on ecclesiastical history, Thomas Ittigius, in the seventh chapter of the first section of his *Dissertation on Heresiarcha*.

Respecting Jerome, who is also called in as a witness to a Hebrew Matthew, the observation in the second edition of Rumpæi (*Commentatio Critica ad Libros*, N. T., in *Genere*) is conclusive that, if he had regarded the copy which he had been shewn as authentic, he would have used it, and not have adhered solely to Greek manuscripts.§ Neither is it immaterial to this question that the learned have concluded that the Syriac version itself bears marks of being indebted to Greek copies.|| Why translate at all, if they had an Aramaic original?

There is, moreover, great reason to conclude that Greek was familiar to those amongst whom occurred the far greater number of the circumstances and discourses related by St Matthew. This, which is admitted by both Hug and Guericke, and, amongst ourselves, by the present eminently learned Bishop of St David's, Dr Thirlwall, in his introduction to Schleier-

* Clemens Alex. apud Euseb. H. Ecc., l. vi. c. 14, and l. iii. c. 38. Theodoret Proem in Ep. ad Hebr. Hieronymus. Vide Paulus.

† Part ii. c. 31. See Professor Jeremie's *History of the Christian Church in the Second and Third Centuries*, p. 119.

‡ Euseb. p. 100, ed. Schwegler.

§ Prefatio in Quatuor Evangelia ad Damasum Rumpæi Comment. p. 78.

|| Rumpæi Comm. p. 79.

macher's Essay on Luke; by Mr Birka, in his *Horæ Evangelicæ*; and by the late Duke of Manchester, in his anonymous Chapter on the Harmonizing Gospels, published at Dublin in 1854; was also affirmed in the first half of the last century by Dr John Olearius of Leipzig, in his *Treatise de Stilo Novi Testamenti*, published at Coburg in 1721; *Quid quod ipsi Judæi Græcam linguam in Judæa pro vernacula quasi habuerint, ac in recitandis phylacteriis alicubi usurparint, quæ præ omnibus aliis rebus Hebraice recitanda in Judæa merito opineris, uti ex utroque Talmud erudite probat Joh. Lightfootus* Hor. Hebr. ad Matth. i. 23, p. 192.*

Hug, as quoted by the late Duke of Manchester, remarks that, "the Syrian, Phœnician, and Jewish coast throughout, to the borders of Egypt, was occupied by cities either entirely or half Greek. The Israelitish east, from the Arnon upwards, Gilead, Bashan, Hauran, Trachonitis, including Abilene, was entirely Greek towards the north, and towards the south, mostly in possession of the Greeks. In Judea and Galilee there were several cities wholly, or at least in great measure, inhabited by Greeks."†

Bishop Thirlwall, in the dissertation alluded to above, observes, "The result of the inquiry seems to be that, in the time of Christ several towns of Palestine were exclusively inhabited by Greeks; that Greek was the medium of intercourse between the Romans and the Jews; that the knowledge of it was very general in the cities, and amongst the more educated classes; and that, on the whole, *the number* of those who knew no other language was greater than that of those who understood only the vernacular tongue of Palestine."‡

The scope of the late Duke of Manchester's very interesting and important essay is as follows: that in those parts where Greek was the more prevalent language, or when our Lord was addressing a mixed multitude, among whom the Greek was the most generally familiar language, and the apostles being scrupulously faithful, and intending to write their histories in the language which obtained throughout the world, preferred recording those events, and relating those discourses, in which the very words of our Lord, and not mere translations, could be preserved. Now, were two or more ear-witnesses to record a conversation, the probable, nay, under ordinary circumstances, the inevitable consequence would be that, whilst the very words or expressions which were not of uncommon occurrence might be recorded by one, yet by another they would be con-

* Olearius de Stilo N. T., p. 195.

† Hug's Introduction, part 2, c. i. § 10, p. 339, Fosbrook's ed.

‡ Introduction, p. ci.

veyed in synonymes, but rare and singular expressions would be recorded by all, and such we find to be precisely the case with regard to the verbal resemblances in the discourses of our Lord, and we need no other theory to account for the phenomena. In like manner, if our Lord was discoursing in Greek, he would most probably have quoted from it, rather than from the Hebrew. This idea accounts for *by far the greater portion of verbal identity in the gospels.**

Jerome relates that in the Hebrew or Aramæic gospel which he saw, the quotations were taken, not from the Septuagint, but from the Hebrew.†

But, to return to the work before us, we must regret that the compilers of the work under review have thought it requisite to their plan "to omit altogether the department of textual criticism."‡ This edition of the New Testament appears, from a preceding observation, to be designed for the use of educated laymen. Such would have greatly valued an accurate and succinct review of the most important passages that are affected by the department of textual criticism. And we cannot but think that some of the information introduced in the notes is not of so essential a kind as to take the place of subjects of which the college student should have at least some knowledge sufficient to guide him to the completion of his critical investigations at a later period. It is, on the other hand, true that a mere array of various readings is an encumbrance rather than a help to the student. Alford has in this portion of his work, as in others, been compelled to retrace his steps. For our own part, we require a less precipitate judgment to lead us in such inquiries. The editors of this edition of the New Testament very justly, and as seasonably, say: "Modern rationalists find that they cannot support their views by any fair application of Biblical criticism. These can only be maintained by a subtle, non-natural mode of interpretation, to which common sense and common honesty are equally opposed."†

The text followed in this edition is substantially that of R. Stephens, 1550, adopted by the late Professor Scholefield, and printed under his care at the Pit Press, in the University of Cambridge, in 1836. Occasionally, as in Matthew ix. 36, they have indeed commented in the notes upon what they regard as the true reading, retaining the usual reading in the text. The true reading here is *ἰσχυλμένοι*; fatigati, and this is followed in Luther's Bible. It is adopted by Matthæi, Scholz, Hahn, and Tischendorf. We find, also, a valuable note upon the narrative, in the eighth chapter of St John, on the woman taken in adul-

* A Chapter on the Harmonising Gospels, p. 14.

† See his *Catalogue*, under the name *Matthæus*. ‡ The Introduction, p. iii.

tery. The editors refer to Dr Wordsworth's *Lectures on the Apocalypse*, Lect. i. pp. 12-15. We cannot now refer to that work—(a work of considerable worth, and accepting the old Protestant view of that sublime book)—but in his *Commentary on the Gospels*, Dr Wordsworth has unwisely, surely, conceded to the spirit of the age so far as to sever this memorable narrative from St John's gospel, and to treat it as an apostolic fragment. The remarks of the editors respecting the difficulties this passage presented to some of the fathers are very pertinent, and lead to an excellent observation upon the far greater difficulty of supposing the narrative an interpretation in the period of the cursive MSS. and later uncials. We only except to the remark that our Lord's conduct was in this instance "obviously liable to be misunderstood." We should rather have said "to be *misconceived*." This would at once throw the blame upon the unpreparedness of heart in those who misconceived of it.

"At the same time, his treatment of the accused woman was obviously liable to be misunderstood, and would present many difficulties to the earliest commentators on the New Testament. Their views of the nature and object of Christ's mission, and of the distinction between the covenant of the law and the gospel, were imperfect and limited. This was the result of the prejudices of their philosophical and religious education, whether Jewish or Gentile, and they were all more or less imbued with the spirit of that Gnostic asceticism, which afterwards so extensively prevailed. Hence this passage would be a stumblingblock to them which they would be glad on any pretence to remove. To say the least, its omission by them is much more easy to be accounted for than its introduction at a later date. For if the story appeared improbable, from moral considerations, to expositors of the third or fourth centuries, it would appear far more so, on the same grounds, to those of the seventh and eighth."

It would have been well for the editors to have noticed such a notable omission as that of our Saviour's agony and bloody sweat in the *Codex Vaticanus* and the *Codex Alexandrinus*, at Luke xxii. 44. Such an instance is worth volumes to prove the corruptness of those celebrated manuscripts.

In the sixth chapter of Matthew, we have a note setting aside the doxology as an interpolation. Here we would refer our readers to the vindication of this passage in our last Number, p. 412.

The editors defend the genuineness of the last chapter of St Mark's gospel, from the 9th verse to the end, in a note on the 8th verse, at p. 232.

They express their obligations to Dr Burton, and Dr Kitto, also to Mr Birks in his *Horæ Evangelicæ* and *Apostolicæ*, and inform the reader that their remarks on the Parables in the three

first gospels have been derived to a great extent from the popular work of Dr Trench, the Dean of Westminster, on the Parables. And these again may in some instances be traced, through Rosenmüller, up to the very valuable folio of Natalis Alexander on the Gospels, Paris, 1703. Rosenmüller has made ample and intelligent use of Grotius and Wetstein.

The editors also acknowledge their obligations to Alford and De Wette, to Dr Major on Luke, and to Dr Hastings Robertson, and the Rev. W. G. Humphrey on the Acts of the Apostles. They recommend to teachers to take up the gospel of St Mark before that of St Luke, and have accordingly annotated upon that gospel more fully than is the custom.

They disavow an over-scrupulous attention to chronology and to the harmonising of the gospels.

On the difficult phrase on which so much has been written, both formerly and in our own day, St Luke, vi. 1, *iv σαββατω δευτεροψαυτω*, they say, "They first Sabbath after the second day of the Passover. A second opinion is also given, but without comment, "that, as we have a first, second, third Sunday after Epiphany, Easter and Trinity Sunday, so the Jews had a first, second, third Sabbath after the Passover, the Feast of Pentecost, and the Feast of Tabernacles. According to this view, *δευτεροψαυτων* is the first after the Pentecost." The first of these opinions is adopted by Dr Robinson in the notes appended to his Harmony of the Four Gospels in Greek, probably the best Harmony that has ever appeared. And so also Fischer's edition of Stockii Clavis Novi Testamenti, p. 284, where will be found a host of references to the most eminent authors of the 17th and 18th centuries. According to Surenhusius, this is the second day of the Passover, on which the sheaf of the first fruits was offered, Lev. xxiii. 12. The Feast of the Passover consisted of *many Sabbatic days*. Hence Matt. xii. 1, *Jesus went on the Sabbath day through the corn*. But the first which was proposed by Joseph Scaliger in his *De Emendatione Temporum*, l. vi. p. 557, and in his *Canones Isagog.* l. iii. p. 255, also in his *Scaligerana*, p. 346, is followed by that excellent author on Jewish antiquities, than whom none have brought together such an ample store of learning, John Gottlob Carpzov, in his *Apparatus Historico Criticus Antiquitatum Sacri Codicis et Gentis Hebrææ*.*

On the time of the last passover we have the following too concise remarks, at Matt. xxvi. 20.—

"*ἑψιας*. On the evening of Thursday. Some think that our Lord anticipated the proper day for the observance of the passover, but perhaps it would be more just to conclude that the Pharisees deferred its celebration a day, in accordance with their traditions. It

* P. 418, Francofurti et Lipsiæ, 1788.

is natural also to conceive that this is a point on which the Jews would follow the interpretations of different rabbis, so that what one party considered the fourteenth of Nisan would to another be the thirteenth."

This is a condensation, indeed, of a much more explicit notice of this alleged diversity of custom in Rosenmüller at Matt. xxvi. 17. But we cannot enter at large into this subject here, or adduce all the opinions that have been propounded by the modern Germans, many of whom do not scruple irreverently to charge on the evangelists an irreconcilable discrepancy and error.

The remarks of the editors upon the *STYLE* of the New Testament are such as will be now accepted by all competent scholars. They quote Valcknaer as exhibiting the just medium on this subject; that the writers of the New Testament were neither models of elegance nor, on the other hand, deficient in their knowledge of the Greek language. The earlier dissertations on the style of the New Testament, in favour of the purity of the New Testament Greek, namely, those of the celebrated Henry Stephens, Beza, Pasor, and John George Straub, were collected and republished in 1703, at Amsterdam, by Van den Honart, in his *Syntagma Dissertationum*, who introduced it by an epistle, claiming for the sacred writers a style of Greek not inferior to that in use amongst Greek authors in their time.* This, the view now generally adopted, was also that of Gataker, in his elaborate discourse, *De Stylo Novi Testamenti*, London, 1648; of Gerard John Vossius and Salmasius. The application of the term Hellenistic, as indicating the influence of the Septuagint upon the Greek of the New Testament, in opposition to the doctrine of the purity of its Greek style, has been traced to Scaliger, in his *Animadversiones in Prologom. Hieronymi*, and his notes on the Chronicle of Eusebius, pp. 124 and 134. This view was taken up and elaborately defended by Daniel Heinsius, in his *Exercitationes ad Nonnum*, his *Prolegomena ad Exercitationes Sacras*, and his *Exercitatio de Hellenistis et Lingua Hellenistica*. This distinction was received at once by Grotius (on Acts vi. 1), John Conrad Danhauer (*Hermeneutica Sacra*, art. x. p. 181), Lightfoot (Acts vi. 1, and on c. ix), Bochart (see *Claud Sarravii Epist.* 15), Louis de Dieu (Acts vi. 9), Richard Simon, in c. xxvii. and xxviii. of his *Critical History of the New Testament*, and Christopher Matthew Pfaff, in his notes on St Matthew, lect. iii. This new appellation, however, was opposed by Salmasius, in his preface to his treatise *De Modo Usurarum*, and in his Commentary on the Hellenistic Language. He was followed by Olearius, John Henry Boecler, John Michael Lange,

* See Rumpsi Comment., p. 59.

and Dr John Henry Michaelis, in his *Dissertation de Textu N. T. Græco*, able and distinguished scholars in the early part of the last century. The editors give their views, and those of all sound scholars, on the style of the New Testament as follows:—

“If we bear in mind that the inspired writers were overruled to employ language suitable for transfusion into all tongues, for transmission to all ages, we shall see that, consistently with these objects, the peculiarities, and even the niceties, of Greek usage are observed as closely in the writings of the New Testament as in any other works of that age.”*

They very reasonably plead that if in *Æschylus*, only after a year's sojourn in Sicily and residence in the court of Hiero, some Sicilian expressions, nay, not a few such, entered into his style, without depriving it of its character, so, neither should the New Testament be excluded the pale of Greek literature because of the occurrence of Hebrew idioms, Syriac terms, and Latinisms. Those who have adopted a narrower view will, they add, be surprised to find that many of the peculiarities of syntax, as laid down in W. E. Jelf's edition of *Kühner*, and put prominently forward in various recent works by T. K. Arnold, Donaldson, Jacob, and Wordsworth, are accurately observed by these Hellenists, who are said never to have learnt, or soon to have lost, whatever especially characterises the Greek tongue.

“Among these,” add the editors, “we may mention the various forms of hypothetical propositions, the differences of *ὡς* with the indicative or infinitive, the mutual change of *εἰς* for *ἐν*, the force of various prepositions and their cases, the forms of the imperative present and subjunctive aorist in forbidding, the employment of words apparently, though not really, synonymous, of *μὴ* after verbs of restraining, of the participle after verbs of ceasing, the insertion of the subject of the dependent clause as the object of the principal sentence, and points of like nature, of which it is often ignorantly assumed that the writers of the New Testament had no knowledge whatever.”†

The editors have, it is evident, been at considerable pains in illustrating the language of the New Testament by quotations from the classics. They observe how early this practice was adopted.

From some of our preceding observations, it will be seen that we, to a great extent, dissent from the assertion of the editors at p. xvi., that our Lord did not speak in Greek, but in Aramæic.

The editors vindicate the use of the term Protestant as no merely negative appellation, but as indicative of the great truths of our common Christianity.‡

* P. xiii.

† P. xix.

‡ P. xxiii.

It may be seasonable to set before our readers, in this place, the doctrinal character of this volume. On *thou shalt call his name Jesus*, we have the following succinct and complete interpretation: "Spoken absolutely of Jesus as the only deliverer from the guilt and penalty of sin, from its present dominion and future curse." But we cannot agree with the editors in following Bishop Pearson in regard of the derivation of Jesus. Jcshua, the original of Jesus, is correctly given in that still very valuable work, Stockii Clavis Veteris Testamenti, as simply *he shall save*, being altered from *Oshea*, which is *save thou*. Pearson, on the other hand, includes *Jehovah* in the name *Jesus*. The meaning of that name is necessarily, indeed, there, from the nature of the salvation to be effected by the Redeemer, but not the name itself.

On John iii. the editors regard the *water* as the sign of the grace of the Spirit maintaining the indispensable necessity of a truly spiritual regeneration. "There must be the outward open change intimated by the baptism of repentance, that is, acknowledgment and renunciation of sin, and the inward secret change caused by spiritual baptism into Christ, that is, renewal of the divine image in the soul." And on ver. 8: "The spiritual birth and life cannot be traced to perceptible causes of origin and maintenance, yet manifest their reality by intelligible, sensible proof."

On John xiii. 18, *I speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen*, they remark, "This cannot mean 'whom I have chosen to the apostleship,' (for Judas, whom he here means to except, as not chosen by him, was an apostle), but 'chosen to salvation.' The distinction will be evident by a comparison with vi. 70, where Judas is expressly included in the choice to the apostleship."*

On John vi. 51, they observe, "*καὶ ὁ ἀφρός ἐγώ*, 'And moreover. This is a new truth to which he has been gradually advancing. It involves the mysteries of the incarnation and the atonement, and shews their inseparable connection with each other. What our Lord said at this time, he afterwards expressed in a permanent form of the sacrament of his body and blood. He is not here alluding to that sacrament; but what he here teaches, and what he afterwards taught by it, are the same.†

In what follows we cannot but think that there is an over-refinement which is positively erroneous. Upon ver. 53, *Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you*,—the editors remark, "It is by the human nature and manifestation of the Son of God, not by his actual body, and by his sacrificial death, not

† P. 482.

his actual blood, that we obtain spiritual and eternal life and salvation." Now his body is an essential part of his human nature, and the shedding of his blood is inseparable from his sacrificial death. We cannot but greatly regret this excess of dogmatic caution, as it is really *injurious to the simple verities of our Lord's incarnation and atonement*.

Upon John x. 27-29, the exegesis is defectively concise. There are other instances which we similarly regret. And we cannot but feel at times an absence of that devotional fervour which should never be absent from a collection of notes upon the record of His life and death, who is our *all*, if he is *anything* to us.

Upon Matt. xvi. 18, we, without, we trust, any controversial bias, prefer the exposition of St Augustine, that our Lord called St Peter from *himself*: "Upon *this* rock I will build my church." The church was built upon Christ only as the rock. The distinction between *πίρος* and *πίρα*, called "untenable" by the editors, is nevertheless undeniable. There is an emphasis in the use of the singular number that vindicates Augustine, Chrysostom, and others of the fathers, in laying down what is now known as the Protestant interpretation. In the Septuagint, 2 Sam. xxii. 2, *the rock* is the name of Jehovah, and so it appears to be used in this passage by our Lord of himself.

John xv. 5: *Without me ye can do nothing*. The editors observe that it is *apart from me*, in contrast with *abiding in me*, "not *without my help* in each particular instance."* This is, we think, again, an over-refinement. For it means, "cut off from me, ye are spiritually dead." Of this there can be no doubt. And this surely justifies the remark of Augustine, "Non ait quia sine me parum potestis facere, sed nihil potestis facere."† The Romish commentator Natalis Alexander himself strongly condemns this as a gloss of Grotius, and not without reason.

We desiderate a clearer exposition of the state designed by *paradise* in Luke xxiii. 43. We believe that the early fathers themselves, Cyprian and others, did not entertain the notion that paradise was a different place from heaven. This arose from the Jewish theology, not from the teaching of our Lord and of his apostles. St Paul looked to go at once from this world to the Lord in glory. And we should naturally conceive that in the twelfth chapter of his 2d Epistle to the Corinthians he intended the same by *the third heaven* in the second, and by *paradise* in the fourth verse. And of paradise we read that the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, Rev. xxii. 3.

Under the second chapter of St Matthew, the editors give

* P. 499.

† Tr. in Joan. 81, 548, tom. 9, Lugd. 1862.

both the more natural assumption that the visit of the wise men took place immediately after the presentation of our Lord in the temple, i. e., on the forty-second or forty-third day after the nativity, and the less probable tradition of Epiphanius, that St Luke records the *first* departure from Bethlehem at chapter ii. verse 39, and St Matthew, in his second chapter, the events of the subsequent year. This view, indeed, is supposed to be countenanced by the terms of Herod's bloody order for the slaughter of the infants "from *two* years old and under," ver. 16. Natalis Alexander infers from the use of *behold* in Gen. xxiv. 15, and xxix. 9, that the force of this particle is to usher in a recent event, and therefore concludes against the report of Epiphanius. In Gen. xxix. 9, *behold* is found in the Vulgate and in the Septuagint, as also in the Hebrew, though omitted in our version. It usually connects circumstances as present together, and therefore the remark of Alexander must be admitted in this instance as conclusive against those who would sever the birth of our Lord from the coming of the wise men by the interval of a year.

Matthew v. 21. Grammatically, we might render either "*by*" or "*to* them of old times;" but the connection points to the former rendering, as Wolf very clearly shews in his *Cura Philologica*, for the whole discourse is directed against the corruptions by which the Pharisees had overlaid the purity and original design of the law of Moses. This may be seen from the remarks of the editors themselves on ver. 33: "The Pharisees limited the application of the third commandment to oaths in which the name of God was expressly mentioned." And so at ver. 38: "The law (Ex. xxi. 24, Lev. xxiv. 20) sanctioned the principle of retaliation, under the direction of the magistrate, for the satisfaction of the injured party. *The Scribes explained it as authorising private revenge.*" Accordingly, Beza renders "*a veteribus.*"

Matthew vi. 28. Here we think that the editors might very reasonably have adopted the opinion of Dr Kitto, that the allusion was to the *Amaryllis lutea*, a yellow flower common to Palestine.

On Matt. vi. 30, we would suggest a reference to the use of *ai* with the indicative, as pointed out by Alt, in his *Grammar of the New Testament*, p. 153.

On Matt. vii. 16, we would suggest a reference to Alt, p. 216, as an instance of *μήν* to be taken interrogatively, with the expectation of the answer being in the negative. Matt. viii. 1. The repetition of *αὐτῶ* is remarked by Alt as an Hebraism, who here (at p. 58) refers to Gesenius, sec. cxc. 1.

Matt. viii. 2, 3. We regret to see the editors following Alford in the assertion that there is no solid foundation for the opinion that the leprosy was contagious. On the other hand, Dr Kitto

following the younger Michaelis, in his Commentaries on the laws of Moses, has very amply illustrated the various kinds of leprosies, and distinguished between those that were and those that were not contagious. We refer our readers to his very interesting and important note upon the subject of leprosy, at Levit. xiii. v. 39. The above work of Michaelis has sometimes been too hastily condemned. It most ably vindicates the laws of Moses against one and another superficial but imposing objection of infidelity, and nowhere is its worth more conspicuous than in this very instance. "Michaelis," says Dr Kitto, "well remarks on this case (Levit. xiii. 39), that all this should be found exactly to hold at the distance of three thousand years from the time of Moses, ought certainly to gain some credit for his laws, even with those who will not allow them to be of divine authority." "For want of discrimination," adds Dr Kitto, "of the different forms of the disorder, similar to that which the Hebrew legislator established, in countries where leprosies are common, this uncontagious form of the disorder *usually* separates the person afflicted with it from the common intercourse of life, and deprives society of the services he might continue to render." Dr Kitto has brought together a variety of information respecting the history of the leprosy, and the laws and customs relating to the exclusion of lepers in various parts of the world, under the fifth chapter of Numbers.

Alford refers to Lightfoot, as a voucher that the leprosy was not regarded as contagious. How inconsiderately he has made use of the name of this great scholar may be seen from the more accurate remarks of Dr Kitto on Luke xvii. 12—"Ten men that were lepers." This was in a village, and lepers were not excluded from villages. We are indebted to Lightfoot for the information, that neither was the law for their exclusion understood to exclude them even from any towns, but such as were already walled in the time of Joshua. To all which were afterwards built, they had access. But, *under all circumstances*, they were expected to keep their distance from persons who were clean, as well as from those who were unclean from any other cause than leprosy. A leper who transgressed the rules, or intruded into towns or places forbidden to him, was punished with forty stripes save one. Lepers might even enter the synagogues of such towns as we have mentioned; but they remained apart within a railed enclosure, and were the first to enter, and the last to depart."

The editors of Luke v. 12, note "the seclusion of lepers as mentioned by Herodotus and in Cook's voyages. There seems to be no foundation for the general opinion that the touch was contagious." Such general references are all but worthless. More serviceable surely is Dr Kitto's notice of Herodotus, in his

illustration of Num. v. 2—*Put out of the camp every leper.* "The exclusion of the leper from society was not, even in ancient Asia, a practice peculiar to the Jews. A similar usage among the Persians attracted the attention of Herodotus. He says that a leper was forbidden to enter a town, or to hold intercourse with other Persians; and if a foreigner appeared to be infected with this disease, the mob expelled him from the country," (Clio, 138). Wesseling, in his notes to this chapter of Herodotus, also adduces Plutarch (Symp. iv. p. 670, F.), saying, that "above all, the barbarians have a horror of the leprosy."

Alt points out Matt. xiv. 3, as an instance of a class where the aorist is to be rendered by the Plusquam Perfectum.

At Matt. xiv. 20, we have an excellent note by the editors from the late Professor Blunt's best work—his *Scriptural Coincidences*.

"The four evangelists concur in calling the twelve baskets (Matt. xiv. 20), *κέραιαι*. St Matthew and St Mark, who alone relate the miracle of feeding the four thousand, call the seven baskets then used, *στυγίδες*. And in relating the subsequent conversation of our Lord (Matt. xvi. 9; Mark viii. 19), they both accurately preserve the same distinction—the five loaves of the five thousand, and how many *baskets* (*ἄρθρα κοφίνους*); the seven loaves of the four thousand, and how many *baskets* (*ἄρθρα στυγίδας*). In the authorised version this remarkable undesigned coincidence, noticed by Professor Blunt, cannot, of course, be observed, in consequence of the employment of the word *baskets* in every case. It is the same in Luther's version. In the French version of Osterwald, *κέραιαι* is uniformly translated '*panier*' (a basket), and *στυγίς* '*corbeille*' (a bread or fruit-basket). It would also appear from the difference in the number of baskets, that the *στυγίς* was the larger. And that a large kind of basket was called *στυγίς*, is evident from Acts ix. 25, where it is said that St Paul was let down by the wall, *ἐν στυγίδι*. Such minute circumstances of agreement establish the historical reality of the second miracle, in opposition to the view adopted by most German critics of the Rationalist school, that it is an excrescence upon the gospel history which has grown out of the miracle of feeding the five thousand."

Respecting apparent redundancies in the New Testament, Alt seasonably observes that such passages as might at first sight seem to belong to such a class are, in reality, but instances of the graphic style natural to narrative. Such are Matthew xvii. 8—"And when they had lifted up their eyes, they saw no man." In verse 6 we read, that just previously "they fell on their face, and were sore afraid." So at Luke xvii. 19—The grateful Samaritan, we read, *fell down on his face at his feet, giving him thanks*. There is an allusion to his thus falling prostrate before him, in our Saviour's words,

"*Arise* (rise up), go thy way; thy faith hath made thee whole," verse 19.

At Luke xiii. 8, the editors remark of *ανάψω* (*till I shall dig about it*), "This word does not necessarily mean a spade, which was not generally used in vineyards. In Isaiah v. 6, vii. 25, the word rendered digging is the same which in 1 Chron. xii. 33, 38 signifies *keeping in rank*. We are probably to understand ploughing between the rows, as in *Georg.* ii. 357." According to Wolf, it indicates a digging about the roots, that whatsoever twines around and impedes them may be taken away. The same interpretation is given by Rosenmuller. "The process here suggested," says Dr Kitto, "was applicable to several other fruit-trees. It is one of the few passages which convey some slight information as to the mode in which the Jews treated their fruit-trees. The additional information afforded by the following citation from the Gemara is useful—'They lay dung in their gardens to moisten the earth. *They dig about the roots of their trees*; they pluck up the suckers; they take off the leaves; they sprinkle ashes; and they make a smoke under their trees, to destroy the worms.'"

On Matt. x. 32, 33 the editors observe, "These verses are not generally adduced as proofs of our Lord's divinity, but the propriety of the language can only be justified by acknowledging that the speaker was God manifest in the flesh." We have long felt that such passages as these which form the indirect and incidental evidences of our blessed Saviour's Godhead, are to minds open to simple Scripture proof, the most irrefragable of arguments. And nowhere have we seen this kind of testimony so ably classified, and so convincingly arrayed, as in a prize dissertation, translated from the Dutch, and written about the time of Dr Priestley's unhappy notoriety, entitled, "A Demonstration of the true and eternal Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, in opposition to the attacks of the present age; by Dionysius Van de Wynpersse, D.D., late Professor of Philosophy, Mathematics, and Astronomy, at Leyden;" a new edition of which appeared in 1831, published by Waugh & Innes, Edinburgh. Messrs Wilkinson and Webster have indeed been very observant of those very numerous passages which bear witness to this great truth. Their volume is thus rendered an exceedingly efficient help to those who would consult it for the higher purposes of the Christian ministry. It is impossible that a work comprising such an infinity of subjects should be without some blemishes and defects. But its excellencies are more than sufficient to commend it to those who really have neither time nor inclination to ponder over the immense mass of materials compiled by Alford and others, on no certain principles, either literary or theological.

Returning to points of detail, we incline to read John v. 39 with our version, "*Search*," not "*Ye search the Scriptures*," and would refer our readers to a valuable dissertation in behalf of the received reading in Deyling's *Observationes Sacrae*, p. 250. Leipzig, 1735. It is not true that the Pharisees revered the authority of the Scriptures. They set themselves, their own interests, and the reputation and claims of their own party, above it. The Sadducees equally undervalued them, as our Lord pointed out, when he said, *Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures*, Matt. xxii. 29. It was no small part of his mission to restore that reverence to the word of God which the opposite errors of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees had both contributed to undermine. The Syriac version, Erasmus, Bellarmine, Father Simon, disunited in a variety of points, and all swayed by a different critical bias, unite in reading the words in the imperative, and so Casaubon and Le Moyne. Whitby, who gives no opinion as his own, refers to Origen in the first and fifth chapters of his *Philocalia*, Chrysostom in his 24th Homily, and 37th on Genesis, and to St Augustine, as confirming our version; and before Augustine, Tertullian had applied the same interpretation to this passage. In fine, may that Lord who has left us this commandment, *Search the Scriptures*, bless the volume we have now reviewed, to the edification of all who shall take it into their hands. Most assured we are, that those who find delight in searching the Scriptures are laying up a foundation for the purest enjoyments even of the eternal world.

ART. VII.—*Rougemont on the Primitive People—their Religion, History, and Civilisation.*

Le Peuple Primitif—sa Religion, son Histoire, et sa Civilisation. 3 Vols. Par FRÉDÉRIC DE ROUGEMONT. Genève. JOËL CHERBULIEZ, Editeur. 1855-1857.

Melchisédec, on les trois Périodes de l'Histoire de l'Humanité; Etude Biblique et Historique. Par F. DE ROUGEMONT, Neufchâtel. MEYER, Editeur. 1861.

As the name of the author who appears at the head of this article, is probably unknown to most of our readers, a few words of introduction respecting him may not be out of place. He says of himself: "The public is determined to make a theologian or a professor of me. I am neither; I have not gone through the theological studies requisite for the ministry; and, until the revolution of 1848, I was engaged in public business." His father was President of the Council of State at Neufchâtel, and his own studies were directed towards the

bar, to enable him to pursue the same career. But, at that time, the celebrated Carl Ritter was professor in Berlin, and young de Rougemont, who attended his lectures, says: "History and geography gained the day over jurisprudence, and a new world seemed opened up to me." Immediately on his return to Neuchâtel, the revision of a Manual of Geography, which had been translated from the German for the use of the public schools, was entrusted to him. Instead of the revision, he handed in for inspection a description of Africa, after Ritter's method. This was unanimously adopted, and the author continued his work, and published, in 1831, "A Compendium of Comparative Geography;"* and a few years later, "The Geography of Man."† Out of these he drew up two manuals, which were translated into German, with a recommendation by Ritter, and have become the classic manuals of several German States, particularly Wirtemberg, as well as of the Russian Provinces of the Baltic, and the German College of Odessa. The "Geography of Man" has been translated into Swedish, and is the only text-book used in the higher schools of that country.

M. de Rougemont is also the author of valuable commentaries upon Ecclesiastes‡ and the minor prophets.§ His works have been received with much greater favour in Germany than in France, owing, perhaps, to a certain massiveness of style which does not suit the fastidious taste of our public, and perhaps still more to the little interest taken, even by the religious part of it, in serious and conscientious works. The only French journal which has favourably noticed the "Primitive People" is *Les Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, the editor of which, M. Bonetti, is an Ultramontane.

One of our author's latest works, "Christ and the Witnesses" (which we hope to be able to notice more particularly at some future time), was hardly taken notice of by our orthodox journals, while it was received by the *Lien* and the *Strasbourg Review* with shouts of indignation. In Germany it was favourably reviewed by Hagenbach in the *Protestantische Blätter* of Bâle; and by Lange in his great *Bibelwerk*; quoted at the Kirchentag by Fabri, director of the Barmen Mission-house, and recommended to their students by Dorner, Tholuck, and Oehler.

The "Primitive People" is an attempt to reconcile revelation

* Précis de Géographie comparée. Neuchâtel, 1831.

† Précis de Ethnographie, de Statistique, et de Géographie historique, on Essai d'une Géographie de l'homme, 2 vols. 1835-38.

‡ Explication du livre de l'Ecclesiaste. 1844.

§ Explication des douze derniers livres Prophetiques de l'Ancien Testament. 1841-45.

and mythology, to reconstruct, by the comparative method, the history of humanity during the first two thousand years of its existence, and thus prove that all the myths and traditions that have come down to us are more or less coarse and deteriorated copies of one and the same model. The sacred text declares positively that the first two thousand years of humanity belong to all people universally, and to none in particular. M. de Rougemont brings to his task all the erudition of the German, tempered by the solidity of the Swiss mind, which renders him a safe guide. He keeps his imagination under control, and, when he is obliged to tread on hypothetical ground, he is careful to indicate it to the reader. "I am venturing, I know," he says at one place, "on the quicksands of hypothesis, and exposing myself to its mirages, which may be deceiving me." But what particularly entitles him to our confidence is, his deep reverence for the inspired Word. If, at times, he may make the most of what seem but obscure indications (for instance, when he finds in the name Mehujael, *stricken, destroyed by God*, the indication of a great drought, the result of the curse pronounced against Cain on account of his fratricide; and in Methusael, *man of God*, an indication that until then there had been no worship of any kind established among the Cainites), and if, founding his argument upon a few words of Philo of Byblos, he concludes that the God they then began to adore was the sun. We never find him putting myths and traditions on the same level as the sacred text, or treating its statements otherwise than as worthy of unbounded confidence.

In the little publication entitled "*Melchisedec*," M. de Rougemont gives us his idea of the philosophy of history. During the infancy of humanity, while nations, with their different idiosyncrasies, were not yet formed, the three offices of prophet, priest, and king, were vested in the patriarch or head of the family. Melchisedec is the last representative of this first economy. He meets with and blesses Abraham, the founder of the second economy. The human family has branched out into three races, and these races into tribes, henceforth the patriarchal economy becomes impossible. How does God act during the time of dispersion and general division? He fixes his free, sovereign choice on one nation, and with it he makes a special covenant, not that he has forgotten the rest of the world, but in his divine wisdom he adapts his method of education to the new wants of humanity. The three powers are now divided; the legislature of Sinai distinguishes between them in the clearest manner. Aaron became the high priest of Jehovah, and the head of the sacerdotal family. The prophecy was less a charge than a gift of divine grace; the royalty,

which Jehovah had at first reserved for himself, was afterwards confided, not to a high priest nor to a sacerdotal family, but to David, who descended from Judah. The third and last period is one of reunion; the true Melchisedec has appeared—he in whom all things are to be gathered together in *one*. The covenant, of which Jesus Christ is the Alpha and the Omega, cannot be followed by any other, because it is to bring all things to perfection.

“*Unity!* Surely that is the great object of all the regrets and all the desires of the present generation! The golden age which encircles the cradle of humanity with its mild lustre is nothing else than the age in which man was *one* with himself, one with God above him, one with his brethren around him, one with nature beneath him! All is now disunited and broken; the wheels of society creak or turn alone; the members break off from the trunk, as if they could live alone; the idea of *oneness* has disappeared. We must try to find it again. The political world may be saved from anarchy by the authority of one; the intellectual world can only be saved through conviction, which is the true sovereign authority. How to return through conviction to unity appears to us to be the enigma of our times, and the key to the future.

“Our wish, then, is to aid in solving this enigma, and in smoothing the way to the science of unity. To convince undecided or erring minds that unity, which is the criterion of truth, is to be found only in the God of the gospel, because he is wisdom and holiness, light and strength; and to prove that the true method of philosophy, that of assimilation (which is the synthesis of deduction and of induction), and which we would call *conduction*, leads to this by a logical necessity; to unroll the annals of history in explaining them by the *triune* light of the revelation of Eden, Sinai, and Golgotha, and to shew how the destinies of mankind are all light with Christ, and all darkness without him; to attempt in this manner, through the reasonings of philosophy, and the facts of history, to bring our generation to respect, to love, to seize hold of the gospel of peace, which may be summed up in these words,—‘A perishing world, a Saviour God! Such is the labour of our life. We know but too well that it infinitely surpasses our strength; still, it is gain to fail in such an enterprise.’—(“*Peuple Primitif*,” introd., p. xxxi.)

Such being his aim, our author then goes on to explain the method by which he seeks to attain it. He places at the basis of his argumentation the psychological fact, that man is essentially a religious being; that, in spite of himself, he is pursued by the idea of God; that he feels above him, far from him, or near him, a mysterious and Supreme Being, from whose hand there is no escape. But the light of his reason is full of dark-

ness, and though he can make use of his different faculties at will, he in general makes abuse of them.

“Desiring good, he does evil, and in so doing ruins himself, society, and nature; thirsting after holiness, he quaffs draughts from the impure cup of the passions; seeking for love, he seems to delight in selfishness and hatred; longing after truth, he feeds upon errors and lies. Conscience cites him to the bar of an invisible Judge. He finds in himself no moral strength for the performance of duty; nay, he may not desire strength, for duty is importunate, and he has shaken off the yoke. However that may be, in vain would he seek it from the entire universe. It exists in God alone, the one source of all righteousness, and comes down from heaven only in answer to repeated and fervent prayer. But man flees from this holy God, who pursues him in his flight, and stops him by suffering. He then asks for pardon; and no sacrifice would be too costly to obtain it. If it is granted, the conscience becomes calm, peace re-enters the soul, the joy of salvation overcomes the sufferings of earth, death itself loses its terrors, God becomes the sovereign good, and his love is shed abroad in the heart.

“‘Psychology is confirmed by history, which attests that religion, like language, is older than the state; that its origin is intermingled with that of humanity itself, while atheism only appears sporadically, in times of the complete corruption of a people.’ But the feelings which form the human element of faith and religion would have lain dormant in the heart of man without a direct manifestation of the presence of God—a revelation of his power and wisdom in creation, his goodness in the temporal joys with which he loads us, his holiness through the voice of conscience, his justice in the evils that afflict us, and the efficacy of his Holy Spirit in inspiring sublime actions, holy thoughts, resplendent truths, poetic creation, marvellous inventions and discoveries, would have been insufficient without a direct revelation, for we should have believed them to be our own did we not know their true source. ‘It was therefore necessary that God should reveal himself to us in person, that he should give us direct and immediate proofs of his existence, and that he should let us know, in a formal and precise manner, what he requires of us.’”

Having thus shewn the necessity for a revelation, our author proceeds to give an account of the dogmas disclosed to the primitive people. “History,” he says, “teaches us that all the religions of antiquity rest upon the Genesac vision of the creation and the Protevangel, as upon two brazen pillars which remained standing when the temple of the primitive religion fell into ruins.” In the vision God revealed himself as the Lord, the Creator of all things, who has brought the present world out of chaos by a slow and gradual process, and whose will is, that on the seventh day man should suspend his labours to worship and bow down in his presence. The Protevangel, which cannot be separated from the accompanying words of condem-

nation, reveals the justice of God in punishing the violation of his laws with death, and still more his mercy, which, in order to lead to repentance and to revive hope in the sinner, offers to his faith the image of the woman's seed overcoming the serpent, and, though wounded, destroying the empire of evil.

These two immediate revelations of God the Creator, and of God at once a Judge and a Saviour, were completed by the divine teachings of nature and history. The heavens declared the almighty power of God, and the deluge taught the criminals that their Sovereign did not recoil from the thought of swallowing up the whole human race in one common tomb. The primitive people knew also, by revelation or inspiration, that in heaven God is surrounded by angels, a part of whom have rebelled against him; that after death he judges the souls of men, and consigns them to abodes of suffering or of peace; and that he will destroy the existing world by fire.

The historical fact of a revelation being laid down, in accordance with the psychological fact of the nature of man, our author proceeds to deduce from them that the true method he has to follow must consist in taking into serious consideration every pagan religion, even the most extravagant and uncouth, seeking in it, first of all, those sentiments of adoration, without which it would not be a religion, and determining how much of the primitive religion has survived in its traditions, and only then measuring the ravages produced in the feelings and doctrines of mankind by sin. He then points out three different ways by which truth becomes deteriorated. First, *Tradition* becomes a *legend*. By tradition, M. de Rougemont understands the exact remembrance of the ancient fact that has been preserved among a people. This remembrance, becoming more or less obliterated and disfigured in the course of ages, though not so much so as to change its nature, turns into a *legend*. Sometimes fabulous beings are joined with the historical personages who figure in the legend; it then becomes a *mythic legend*.

Second, *Metaphors*, or *symbols*, and personifications have given rise to *myths*. The religions of antiquity abound in symbols, the universality of which prove their existence prior to the dispersion. Still, says our author, "though we do not hesitate to trace the symbolical language of antiquity to the Noachides, we dare not affirm that the fictive beings men or gods, which abound in the pagan religions, are like the symbols anterior to the dispersion. It is worthy of remark that the Malays of the numerous archipelagos of the Pacific Ocean, from New Zealand to the Sandwich Islands, have everywhere the same legends, and the same name for the supreme God, while their numerous divinities have entirely different names

in the different groups of islands, and even from one island to another."

Polytheism would thus be of later date than the tradition, the symbols, and the dispersion. But the symbols of the primitive world, once transported into a new world, soon became obscure, and lost their true sense. The imaginary personages, passing into the domain of reality, were so disfigured as not to be recognisable, and hence arose fables and myths. Every myth is a symbol or a fictive being, whose true signification has been lost.

Third, The *personification* of the Deity produces *polytheism*. God is infinite. Do not twenty names express his innumerable perfections better than a single one? But each of these names, taken alone, is sufficient to designate him; and the one God, who is at once wisdom, love, justice, has invisibly been divided into a God wisdom, a God love, a God justice. Again, though in himself invisible, God has revealed himself under a sensible form, and sends his Spirit into the whole universe. Would it not be a good thing to distinguish him under different forms? But if God is everywhere present, he lives in all. He is all. He has not an existence out of, and independent of, all. Thus, after the *division* of God, comes the *divinisation* of the world.

"The greatest evil," continues M. de Rougemont, "that sin has done to the soul is, that it has deprived it of its moral strength, by breaking its connection with God—that is, breaking the powerful bond of faith, by which all its faculties were united in one bundle. The fallen soul is in pieces. The reason lies on one side, the feelings on another; the imagination wanders through the air; the will lies grovelling in the mire. But, once the moral unity of the soul is destroyed, that need of unity, which is the fundamental law of our understanding, is weakness; his voice, originally all-powerful, now but feebly asks for unity in God, and man is thus brought to give himself many gods, as he had, in a manner, given himself many souls."

Still pursuing his work of polytheism, he next went on to divinise his faculties, his perfections, his virtues, and then followed hero worship, ancestor worship, and infernal divinities. But if the idea of one God was too vast, too high, too weighty for human strength, broken down by sin, how could the spiritual worship of an invisible God have been retained in its purity? Would not an imperious want be felt to represent the divinity by palpable signs, and thus recall his presence to the heart so prone to forget him? Hence *idolatry* or *image worship* in its most general sense.

Still history attests that the worship of images in many places was not introduced until long after that of false gods

and that, in some countries, it never was developed at all. The worshippers of Ormuzd held all representations of the gods under a human form in abhorrence. And, long before Zoroaster, idolatry was equally unknown to the Arians of the Indus. The Rig-Veda does not appear to contain any allusion to visible representations of the gods. In Greece, the polytheist poets preceded the sculptors of idols by many centuries. In China, idolatry dates from the introduction of Buddhism about the Christian era.

The author then concludes that the pagan edifice rests, not upon priestly lies, nor on the seductions of Satan, but on the innate wants implanted in the human mind of adoring an all-powerful, invisible being. But the time had come, "in which," according to Paul's expression (for we must take him here for guide), God "suffered all nations to walk in their own ways." He was still their God; but he now only spoke to them in their hearts and through nature. Nevertheless, he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave *them* rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling *their* hearts with food and gladness." At the same time he "manifested in them,"† by the greatness and beauty of his works "that which may be known of God; for the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead." But the pagans did not see them, "so that they are without excuse." Not that they did not admire with their whole soul all the splendour of heaven and earth, not that they did not *know* God,‡ and knew very well that out of, and above, nature there exists an eternal Being, who is the author and the sovereign Lord of all things. But, instead of bowing down in all humility in his presence, in the feeling of their nothingness and unworthiness, instead of glorifying "him as God" by their adoration, and being "thankful" for all his benefits," they became vain in their imaginations," (wandered into vain reasonings,) upon his one, triple, and multiple nature, upon the propriety of personifying his different perfections, upon the communication of his divinity to nature and to man, "and their foolish heart was darkened; professing themselves to be wise, they became fools." Such was their first step towards the darkness of false religion. But their vain imaginations were not long without producing outward acts; they "changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." God punished them for their blindness in

* Acts xiv. 16-17.

† Romans i. 19. to the end.

‡ David speaks, in Psalm ix. 17, of "the nations who forget God."

giving "themselves up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts." The symbolical and idolatrous worship of the true God was thus the second great step they took away from the primitive truth; but it was not the last, for the road of error leads to lies. They "changed the truth of God into a lie," or the true God into false gods, "and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator. For this cause God gave them up unto their vile affections." These wretched pagans, who had changed God into his contrary, made their own nature undergo an analogous degradation, in changing "the natural use into that which is against nature," and "as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient," although they knew "that they which commit such things are worthy of death." And even more, they "have pleasure in them that do them," and it may be said of them that they "hold the truth in unrighteousness." The prince of such a world, the members of which rival each other in effrontery and crime, could not continue to be the holy God, but the father of lies and murder; and the temples, where gods guilty of every species of crime were worshipped by votaries whose hearts were full of guilt, were certainly fit haunts for legions of the impure spirits of hell.* Still, even at the time of its greatest corruption, paganism numbered sheep of Christ's fold, who were to be united with those of Israel,† "children of God, scattered abroad,"‡ who, in the divine foreknowledge, already belonged to the body of the church; and the most guilty among the worshippers of false gods was more a man than are our Socialists, who are dead to the want of worshipping. Paul could not have said to them that they are "too superstitious" (too careful in religion, *δυσιδαιμονιστάς*), nor "declare unto them the Unknown God, whom they ignorantly worship."

After these general considerations, M. de Rougemont treats of God. Among the Shemitic pagans, the names applied to the supreme God signify *power*—*Baal*, *Melech*, *Elion*, *El*, *Il*, *Allah*, &c. The Indo-Celtic or Japhetic races, in whom the spiritual nature is less developed, and whose sense of dependence is greatly weaker, use names for God which speak more to the intellect than to the heart. The most widely spread is *Deus*, *Dieu*, which etymologically signifies *light*, he who is light, who has produced light, and who illuminates bodies and minds. The eminently religious German races use the name God,—*Gott*, *Gud*, *Kot* (*Tueton*), from good, *gut*, the *good* being. The Hamite races do not seem to have preserved any name for the Supreme Being, which, by its wide extension, would indicate their common origin; their religions are, however, but

* 1 Cor. x. 20, and following. † John x. 16. ‡ John xi. 52.

little known. The fundamental characteristic of these religions would seem to be the feeling of apprehension that the guilty conscience has of the wrath of God, and the need of appeasing him at any cost, even that of innumerable human sacrifices. M. de Rougemont next passes in review the traces of the triune God found in false trinities, *Triads*, the *Trimourti* of the Hindus, &c., among the pagan nations.* He then endeavours to find their ideas on the Word and the Spirit of God moving upon the waters, after which he enters into a detailed explanation of all the different symbols relating to the divinity.

His next book is devoted to the chaos, with its symbols; and "here," he says, "ends mere error, and falsehood begins. Henceforth nature is associated with Jehovah, spirit with matter, gods with goddesses. Upon the throne of the universe, side by side with the only true King, is seated a Queen, his equal; a queen who, like him, has neither beginning nor end, and who tries everywhere to make him pass for her son. The eternity of matter, the adoration of nature, that is the great Opprobrium of pagan antiquity."

It is Lucian, the infidel scoffing Lucian, who lets us into the secret of the beginnings of idolatry and the worship of nature.

"His little tract on *The Syrian Goddess*," says M. de Rougemont, "not only confirms the Mosaic account of the deluge in its principal details, but gives an explanation of postdiluvian idolatry so simple, and we may even say, so biblical, that we could not desire a better. Thus divine Wisdom baffles the projects of mortals, and seems to take a pleasure in making her blinded adversaries assist in hastening forward her triumph.

"The Syrian goddess of whom Lucian speaks was that of Hierapolis, and was called *Atergatis* or *Derceto*. The temple of Hierapolis was regarded by the ancient Syrians and Phœnicians as the greatest and most august among their sanctuaries. After describing the temple and the secondary divinities, Lucian continues, 'In the sanctuary, which was raised a little above the rest of the temple, and where the priests only had leave to enter, were three gilded statues. One of them was standing: it had no very definite form, and no other attribute but the dove on its head: on its right sat the form of a god, and on its left that of a goddess. Borne by bulls, the god could only be likened to Jupiter, of whom he had the features, the vestments, and the position. The goddess, who was reclining upon lions, had the attributes of a great number of divinities: in her hands she held the sceptre of Juno and the distaff of the Fates; on her head were the rays of Apollo, the turreted crown of Rhea,

* Those curious on this subject will find in the appendix of Dr Thomas Balfour's interesting work, entitled, "The Typical Character of Nature," a full statement of the pagan ideas on the Trinity, which corresponds in all points with our author's chapter on the triune God.

and a precious stone, which like the moon only shines at night; and lastly, she wore the zone of Venus.’”

The god, says M. de Rougemont, is Belus of the Euphrates, the Lord and Master (*Baal*) of all things, the *Amoun* of the Egyptians, whose name none dare pronounce. At Hierapolis “the daily sacrifices in honour of this god were offered in profound silence; the priests did not sing nor play on any instrument. With such deep respect and fear did his presence fill the souls of mortals.

“The worship of the goddess, on the other hand, was noisy and joyous; the air resounded with the songs that accompanied the flutes and cymbals.” This goddess was the personification of nature as a whole, the invisible laws, the stars in the heavens, and the earth, with man and the cities.

The statue in the middle, says Lucian, was that of Deucalion or Semiramis. The dove reminds us of the ark; Deucalion is Noah; Semiramis represents postdiluvian humanity.

What does this group signify? That since the deluge man is advancing between God and nature, both of which are seated, that is, immoveable, immutable.

What a brilliant light this sanctuary of Hierapolis sheds upon the history of primitive humanity, and particularly on the origin of idolatry! It was only after the terrible cataclysm that man learned to fear the Lord, his judgments, his holy displeasure, and to feel himself surrounded on all sides by the Divinity. But it is hard work for the inhabitant of earth to keep in his heart the habitual feeling of the proximity of an invisible Being. Therefore some of the pretended sages of the primitive world will have wished to come to the aid of human weakness, by representing the Lord under a visible form; and as Adam was created in the image of God, he will have given God the figure of a *man*. But soon the contemplation of the magnificence of nature will have turned the human mind away from the invisible God; the creation, divine as regards its Author, will have come to be looked upon in the same way as regards its essence; and the bounties which God showers down upon man through her means will have seemed to come directly from herself. Therefore men will have begun to worship her, and they will have imagined a complex and symbolical statue, which should group together all her various characteristics. Thus we have nature advanced to regal dignity, seated side by side with her great Creator, and only subordinate to him, as the woman is to the man. Lastly, some priest will probably have wished to complete the mute picture of the religion of his times, by placing man (postdiluvian man), whose whole life is filled with the divine worship, between the statue of the invisible God (who, placed ever at his

right hand, fills him with a secret dread) and sweet smiling nature on his left, continually inviting him to joy. Such is certainly the origin, concludes our author, of the postdiluvian worship of *human* figures; and, thanks to Lucian, we are enabled to dig into the wall, and see the abominations of young humanity in the chambers of imagery.

M. de Rougemont's third volume contains the *History* of the primitive people deduced from a careful comparison of the traditions of the Babylonians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Chinese, Egyptians, the Arians of Persia and India, and the peoples of Asia Minor, with the first eleven chapters of Genesis.

Having already reached our prescribed limits, we intended closing here, but we feel as if it would be out of place at the present moment, to pass over in complete silence the controverted subject of the Babylonian chronology, and the earlier dynasties of the Egyptian kings. We would therefore crave the indulgence of our readers a little longer, while we endeavour, in as few words as possible, to lay before them the results of M. de Rougemont's investigations, and his answer to those *savans* who prefer any basis for their chronology to that of the Bible. Our author candidly tells us the difficulties he had to encounter before he was able to thread the windings of the Egyptian labyrinth. The dynasties with their proper names, and the number of years of each reign, the authority of such writers as Lepsius and Bunsen, greatly embarrassed him for a time, till a ray of light pierced the gloom, and at once illuminated the whole subject. This gleam of light was the diluvian myth of *Nitocris*, to which we shall have occasion to return.

But to begin with the Babylonians, our author says that, by reason of their common descent from Arphaxad, their traditions ought in a measure to correspond with those transmitted to us by Moses in Genesis. "Others before us," he adds, "have already pointed out the conformity of Berossus's first ten kings with the ten Sethite patriarchs, and we hope to be able to ground this opinion on irrefragable proofs. The name of each of these kings is in fact a synonyme of that of the corresponding Sethite, or else it expresses his characteristic feature as shewn by the Bible and the Jewish traditions concerning him." The first king is *Alorus** *Al-Or*, the man *light*, light being the universal symbol for truth, purity, joy; the innocence and felicity of Adam in Paradise could not have been more strikingly expressed.

* M. de Rougemont believes that *Al*, in the names of several of the Chaldean kings, is the article *Al*, still used in Arabic, but lost by assimilation in Hebrew, Chaldean, and Aramean. The names beginning with *Al* would thus go back to a time when this particle was common to all the four languages or dialects.

Alorus was succeeded by his son *Alasparus Al-Sapher*, the *writer*, the writing or *cyphering* man. According to the Jewish tradition, Seth invented the alphabet. "Here, then," says our author, "we have this tradition, to which we had not dared to trust, confirmed by a Chaldean testimony of the remotest antiquity, and it is so much the more precious, because he who gives it is not aware of its immense importance." In Aramean, the letter *T* takes the place of the Hebrew *Sch*. Seth would therefore be pronounced *Teth, Tet Atet*. *Athothis* is the second Egyptian king. *Thoth* of the Nile is the *Thuaath* of Phœnicia, whose father is *Misor* the *just* = Adam. And Plato speaks of a *Theuth*, son of *Thamus* = Adam. Now *Theuth, Thaaath, Thet, Athothis, Alasparus* all invented writing; therefore we cannot doubt they are all one and the same person—*Seth the writer*.

Next on Berosus's list comes *Al-melon* or *Amillar*, who ought to correspond to *Enos*, the *unfortunate*, the *sickly*. M. de Rougemont gives several roots for *Al-melon*, signifying to be cut or mown down, to droop, to languish, or to labour painfully.

The son of Enos is *Cainon*, translated by *possession*, or to *build one's nest on high*. The corresponding Chaldean king is *Ammenon*, in Hebrew *Amon* means *architect, builder*.

The fifth king is *Amegalarus* = *Mahalaleel, the great praise of God*. This name is little changed. It may have been slightly altered by Berosus or his copyists into the Greek word *Megalarus*, which may mean *great speaker*; the man who cries or sings loud.

The meaning of the name *Jared*, the sixth patriarch, is contested. It may either be the *dominator*, or *he who descends*, perhaps referring to the decadence of his race. It is strange that the corresponding Chaldean king's name *Daonus, Davonus, Daos*, is susceptible of the same two meanings, for in Hebrew *down don* signifies *to be low, (Ang. down) and din dan to reign over*.

The seventh king is *Edoresch (Daresch, to seek)*, he who seeks = *Enoch* the initiated. His identity is placed beyond doubt by the Arabian tradition, which gives Enoch the name of *Idris*, which is *Edoresch*. The successor of *Edoresch* is *Amempsius* or *Methurselah*. The Biblical name is very obscure, but as far as can be judged, the two would seem to have a similar meaning.

To *Lamech* = *The strong** corresponds *Otiartes* from *Arits, powerful*; and lastly comes Noah = *Xianthrus, Xisithrus*,

* M. de Rougemont does not give his reasons for deviating from the common interpretation of this name, *humbled, low*.

Sisithrus, under whom the Deluge took place. His name might signify, the man from whom *all springs and buds forth anew*, (*Siach*, to produce, to shoot out buds), and *he who is left remaining alone*, (*Ith'rah*).

M. de Rougemont goes on to shew how wonderfully the tradition of the flood had been preserved, and he then quotes Berosus's allusions to the tower of Babel and to Abraham. "In the tenth generation after the flood, there lived among the Chaldeans a great and righteous man, well versed in celestial science." But surely the great Ethiopian hero Nimrod, the son of Cush, had not passed entirely out of the Chaldean tradition. Our author recognises him in *Chomasbelus*, son of *Evechous*. *Ev* is the pronoun *Hon*. There remains *Echous*, *Cousch* (*Cush*) the *Ekosch*, or *Etosch* of the Egyptians. *Chomasbelus* means *the violent and oppressing (Chamots) Lord (Baal)*. In this tradition we find that the greatest exactitude has been preserved in regard to the facts. How then are we to account for the fabulous computations accompanying them? Berosus gives 432,000 years for the reigns of the ten antediluvians. Our author finds the key to this chronology in the Babylonian cycles. 60 years made a *sosse*; $10 \times 60 = 600$, a *nere*; $60 \times 60 = 3,600$, a *sare*; the great year, therefore, in this system could only be $10 \times 3,600 = 36,000$ terrestrial years. The 432,000 antediluvian years are twelve great years, or 12×10 sares.

The way, then, in which the Chaldeans reached this monstrous figure must probably have been that they looked upon the 1600 years that preceded the deluge, not as the first period of the history of humanity, but as a distinct world—a world comprehended between two chaotic periods; and they, therefore, adopted a figure which should border on the infinite, and at the same time awaken the idea of an entirely accomplished period. The year has twelve months; and so they stopped at the number of 432,000 terrestrial years, because it contained twelve great periods of 36,000 years, or 120 sares.*

After the deluge, Berosus gives the reigns of *Evechous*, *Chomasbelus*, and eighty-four other Chaldean kings, 34,080 years. Alexander Polyhistor says this figure represents 9 sares, 2 neres, and 8 sosses, or 9 sares 28 sosses.

The intention of the Chaldean priests seems to have been

* The fact of some fabulous computation being found in India, China, Egypt, and Greece, and the almost constant confusion between Adam and Noah, shews plainly that the idea of an entirely new world, or new order of things, possessed the minds of the ancients. In Chinese hieroglyphics we find that *descendants*, with 8 or 2, signifies *posterity*, as if the origin of man is to be counted from the 8 in the ark, equally with the first 2.

to close this great year, which began at the deluge, with the fall of the Persian empire, and to begin a new one with Alexander the Great.

Berosus continues his list thus :—

8 Median kings,		224
11 other kings,		(48)
49 Chaldean kings,		458
9 Arab kings,		245
Semiramis, and 44 Assyrian kings,		526
Pul,		1501

After Pul, the fragments of Berosus only contain isolated figures. But according to the Bible and the profane historians, we have 223,234, or 241 years from Pul to Cyrus; and from Cyrus to Alexander's arrival in Babylon, 205 years; which, added to the 1501 years of the former dynasties, would give from 1929 to 1947 years; but if we knew the number of years that Berosus counted from Pul to Cyrus, we should in all probability find the exact number to be 1920 years, which, added to 34,080, would give 36,000 years from Evechous (Cush) to Alexander the Great.

It is plain that there are errors in the lengths of the different reigns; but we have already seen that this is quite compatible with great exactitude as to the facts.

But we must hasten on to the Egyptian tradition. Eratosthenes gives a list of thirty-eight kings, whom he calls *Theban*. But the first of these is *Menes* of *This*. By Theban kings, therefore, we must understand, not those who reigned at Thebes, but those whose memories had been preserved at Thebes. This observation is of the utmost importance to our subject.

That our readers may have a clearer idea of the different explanations, we have copied out M. de Rougemont's tables of Eratosthenes's thirty-eight kings, and of Manetho's first eleven dynasties. (See p. 670.)

The first seven kings on the list of Eratosthenes correspond by their etymologies to the eight of Manetho's first dynasty. *Menes* is certainly Adam, the *Manou* of the Indians, the *Mann* of the Germans; our *Man*, or being endowed with a *reasonable soul* (*Manas*, in Sanscrit; Latin, *Mens*; Greek, *Menos*); or, according to the Coptic etymology, the *permanent, eternal* man, who was never to die. *Menes* perishes by means of a hippopotamus, that is, *Typhon*. Adam became mortal through Satan, the true Typhon.

The successor of *Menes* is *Tet*, *A tet*, *Set*, or *Athothis*, according to our two tables. But *Athothis* is succeeded by *Athothis II.*,

or Kenkenes. These two Athothis are Seth, under two different aspects. Athothis I., son of Hermes Seth, *writer* and *physician* (or Seth, representing Hermes on earth). Athothis II., or Kenkenes, both of whom reign thirty-two years, are Seth, musician; *Kenken* (*Lyre*, according to M. Seyffarth). The Chinese Seth = Chin-nong, invented music.

Instead of proceeding from father to son, Eratosthenes gives as his fourth king *Maebaes, the friend of the bull*; *Cain*, the agriculturer, the man-bull, who first yoked oxen to the plough. But Manetho gives him three names, and his fourth, fifth, and sixth kings all seem to point to the same person, viz., Cain.

The two lists then return to Enos = *Sempsos*, or *Semempaes*.* Eratosthenes tells us that he was the son of Athothis, not of Maebaes. He is said to be born of Hercules. Hercules in Egypt was called Chora, which is the Shemitic name of Saturn = Sev-Egyptian. But Saturn is Elohim, the living God; and *Sempsos*, son of Saturn = Hercules, is a son, a man of God, which agrees perfectly with what is said of Enos in Genesis, that in his time "began men to call upon the name of the Lord."

Manetho's last king of the first dynasty is *Bieneches Obienthes*—Ou bi en ako, *He who brings ruin*. The sixth and seventh of Eratosthenes have nearly the same sense. *Toobes Enaake, the great revenger*, succeeded by his son, *Skæchus, the brutal, insensible warrior*, are not these the personification of the Cainites, one of whom, Lamech, speaks only of vengeance?

Manetho's third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth dynasties bear the name of dynasties of Memphis. Let us now proceed backwards. Take Manetho's six last kings of Memphis, compare them with the Nitocris of Eratosthenes, and the four preceding kings.

Manetho.		Eratosthenes.
Othoes reigned 30 years	=	Mosthes, 33 years.
Phios reigned 53 years	=	Pammes, 35 years.
Methousonphis reigned 7 years.		
Phiops reigned 100 years	=	Apappus, 100 years.
Menthesonphis reigned 1 year	=	Seveches, 1 year.
Nitocris reigned 12 years	=	Nitocris, 6 years.

Nitocris is a queen, a goddess, and her name signifies *Neith, the victorious*. Here is the key of the Egyptian labyrinth:

* The same confusion is found in the Chinese traditions; they are as remarkable, says M. de Rougemont, for their authenticity as for their confusion. The Chinese chose five of the principal patriarchs (Adam, Abel, Seth, Cain, and Enos) to preside over an element a season, &c.; but, wishing to honour Adam, they placed him at the zenith, and Abel and Seth at the north-east and north-west, so that he came after his sons, and Abel became the first emperor.

Nitocris represents the deluge. Herodotus gives the details of the myth, in which the main features of the flood are visible, though in miniature. Nitocris = Neith = Nature drowned the Egyptians to revenge the murder of her brother. Is it Abel, or the Sethites slain by the Nephilim? She destroyed the murderers unawares, says the myth. "They were eating and drinking," says Jesus Christ, "and knew not, until the flood came, and took them all away." Nitocris, continues the myth, had invited the principal authors of the crime to a feast, in a hall which she had constructed underground; and while they were at table, she let in the waters of the Nile upon them by a great secret channel. The antediluvians did not know that they were, in a manner, beneath the level of the sea, and the great secret canal seems to figure the "great deep which was broken up."

The predecessor of Nitocris, Seveches = Saturnian, so called as if to signify that his reign closes the times of Saturn = Sev = Sevec, *i. e.*, the antediluvian world. And to indicate that during his reign the whole of humanity was precipitated into hell, Soccaris, the name of Osiris, as king of Amenthes = hell, has been added. Manetho calls him Menthesonphis, (or Amenthesonchis,) the man of *hell*, or of Amenthes, and of Sevec = Souchis = Saturn.

The reign of Phiope = Apappus is distinguished from that of the other kings by its long duration, 100 years, except an hour. Is not this Giant = Apappus Methuselah, asks our author, and do not the 100 years, minus one hour, mean the 1000 years of his life, minus thirty-one years. According to the Hebrew text, Methuselah died the year of the deluge, and may not the one year's reign of his successor figure the short time that elapsed between his death and the cataclysm?

The third and fourth Memphitic dynasties correspond with Eratosthenes's eight kings, (seven to fourteen). Manetho's list is fuller than that of the other historian, but doubtless, as in the case of Seth and Cain, epithets are often put for proper names. Chuonbus = the goldsmith, is the son of Chryses = Chrysor = Tubalcain, the inventor of sharp instruments, (*choresch.*)

Beyond Nitocris we find a *seventh* dynasty, which lasted *seventy* days, the figure seven marking perfection; this dynasty signifies by its double seven that it completes the history of the primitive world, and the symbolical genius of the people of the Nile has substituted the mystic number 7×10 days for the year of the deluge. The eighth dynasty contains no names, and probably comprehends the times between the deluge and the dispersion.

The fifth is the Elephantine dynasty, and containing nine

kings, whom M. de Rougemont identifies with the eighth of Eratosthenes (24 to 31). The three reasons he gives for their identification are that, first, the fourth king in both lists reigned seven years; second, *Rathones*, the name of Manetho's sixth king, has etymologically the same sense as *Peteathyres*, the eighth of Eratosthenes; third, the last of Manetho, and the seventh of Eratosthenes, are both called *Onnus*, or the warrior *Onnius*.

Myrtaios, who succeeds Nitocris in Eratosthenes, is Mizraim, and he figures a second time after the eight kings of whom we have been speaking, under the name of *Ammenemes*. Myrtée is designed as *given by Amoun*, so that Ammenemes is simply a surname. In Manetho we shall see that he succeeds Nitocris. The eight kings of Eratosthenes and the Elephantine dynasty are then a second edition of antediluvian history. This will be seen by comparing the meaning of their names, as given in the table with those of the first fourteen, *Tosemaris*, strong as the sun; *Menes*, the immortal; *Sethinclinus*, he who has increased his father's strength; Seth replacing Abel; Enos, called in the one list Sempson, in the other Semphoncrates; Cain, in one list the Bull, in the other the friend of the Bull; Chuonbus, the goldsmith, is here the favourite of Vulcan, the god of smiths; the friend of Venus is in the other list a debauchee, a personification of the increase of corruption.

The eleventh or Theban dynasty contains sixteen unnamed kings, probably a third tradition of the antediluvian world, after whom comes *Myrtaios* = *Ammenemes* = Mizraim. The ninth and tenth dynasties are those of Heracleopolis. They contain twenty-three kings, and but one proper name, that of Ochthoës, of whom Manetho says that he was the cruellest tyrant that had ever yet lived; that he overwhelmed Egypt with woes; that at last he went mad, and was destroyed by a crocodile. This tyrant is probably a personification of the Nephilim. The crocodile symbolises the deluge. He seems to be the same as Mosthes of Memphis, or Othoës, and corresponds also with Onnus of Elephantine and Soik-Onnius, so that we have all the four antediluvian histories thus united—*Mosthes* = *Othoes* = *Soik-Onnius* = *Onnus* = *Ochthoes*.

There now remains but the second or Thuite dynasty, the most ancient tradition of all, which seems to be another variant of the antediluvian history. Our author thinks Flas must be Athas = Idris, = Enoch, —Chræs, is the Cheres of Elephantine Chryses, Chuonbus of Eratosthenes Chrysos = Tubalcain.

Binothris, "under whose reign women were admitted to regal honours," might personify the times of Naamah, the graceful, the seductive, when woman assumed a new place in

society. Under Nephhercheres, the Nile ran honey for eleven days. Honey and bees are a universal and primitive symbol of the renewal of the world in the great diluvian crisis. Days have been substituted for months. Nephhercheres would then be the diluvian king in the most ancient tradition; in the later ones he has given place to the idolatrous myth of Neith = Nitocris. If this interpretation be well grounded, the next ought to be a postdiluvian king, and our author thinks that in Sesochris he can recognise Sesostris, the third king of the twelfth dynasty.

The two lists of Manetho and Eratosthenes would thus seem to be identified, except the three kings of Eratosthenes Cheops, Chefren, and Mycerinus. The names of Cheops and Mycerinus are distinctly read on the pyramids, but excepting them, no other king of the list of Eratosthenes, nor of Manetho's first eleven dynasties, has left any known monument or trace of his existence.* Herodotus says the Egyptians would not pronounce the names of the shepherd kings—those odious tyrants who had shut up their temples and constructed the pyramids. Still, these edifices, built by foreign oppressors, were the finest ornaments of Egypt. When the intercourse with Greece had become more frequent, and the Egyptians had at length passed under the Macedonian yoke, the priesthood will have determined to wipe out of their country's history the stain attached to the pyramids, and to attribute the construction of these colossal edifices to native princes. They have, therefore, transformed Cheops, &c., into Pharaohs, but have taken care to transport their names into the olden times, where the falsehood was likely to be hid in the darkness of the origin of Egyptian history. That it is not an injustice to accuse the Egyptian priesthood of falsifying their annals, through national vanity, we know by their not telling Herodotus of Necho's great defeat by the Chaldeans, at Carchemish, and by the care that Manetho has taken to wipe out almost all trace of the Assyrian domination over his country.

One question still remains, which might throw some doubt on our author's interpretations. It is, the shortness of the reigns of the different kings. Had the Egyptians, then, so lost sight of the longevity of the antediluvians that no trace of it is to be found in their history, except in the single reign of one hundred years of Phiope-Apappus? But, having mingled the Cainites and Sethites in their souvenirs, transported the kings of the pyramids beyond the deluge, taken epithets for proper names, they had twenty-three generations instead of the ten we

* Herodotus and Diodorus place them after the flood. How, then, do they figure on the list of Eratosthenes?

find in Genesis. Afterwards, when they wished to arrange their historical traditions, they took the same events for different ones, and instead of making them into one whole, they put them one after the other, and thus had four or five histories of the primitive world to bring into their Sothaic period of 1460 years; for Manetho's chronology is entirely founded on astrological calculations. However, we see that the Egyptians had retained a pretty correct remembrance of the duration of the primitive world, for the last year of their cycle corresponds wonderfully nearly with that of the flood—1656 after the creation.

Our author gives a detailed explanation of the reigns of the gods, or the mythic history of the world before the flood, ending with Sevee = Saturn, whose symbol was the crocodile. After this mythological history, he says, we should expect to find Amyrteus = Mizraim, but there was the human history to be given, and Manetho has interpolated it between Amyrteus and the last of the gods.

The demi-gods, who reigned	.	.	1255 years	} 5212
Other kings,	.	.	1817 "	
30 kings of Memphis,	.	.	1790 "	
10 kings of This,	.	.	350 "	
Manes and demi-gods,	.	.	5813	
				11,025

Who are the thirty kings of Memphis? Consult Manetho's dynasties. 7 in the 1st + 9 in the 3d + 8 in the 4th + 6 in the 6th—30. And the 10 kings of This? Menes, of This, + the 9 of the 2d dynasty.

The other kings and demi-gods must be those of the 5th or Elephantine dynasty, the 9th and 10th of Heracleopolis, and the 11th of Thebes.

But what have these manes, these shades, to do here, after the Memphitic and Thinite kings? The solution of the enigma seems to be this—the first 10 dynasties reigned before the flood, and the flood peopled the uninhabited earth with manes, who reigned there alone until the times of the dispersion. "As for the duration of the reigns of the gods, demi-gods, and manes, which is 24,837 years, M. Boeck has, in our opinion," says our author, "demonstrated that this figure is nothing else than 17×1461 , which is that of the Sothaic period. Here, as in Chaldea, we believe ourselves to be in the solid domains of chronology, while we are entirely in that of astrology."

TEXT OF ERATOSTHENES.	CORRECTIONS.	COPTIC ETYMOLOGIES.
1. Menes from This,— διωνιος.	αιωνιος, Hernel (Jablonski).	Men,—to subsist always.
2. Athothes, born of Her- mes.		Hermes — Thoth.
3. Athothes.		
4. Diabies, φιλειταιρος,—	φιλειταιρος,—who loves his com- pagnons (Seyffarth and Scaliger). Maebaes, φιλανιαυρος,—who loves the bull (Bunsen).	Mae,—to love ; Mas,—calf.
5. Pemphos, — son of Athothes, born of Hercules.	B. Sempos, ...	Hercules — Sev.
6. Toigaramachos, Mom- chieri,—of Memphis, της αβδρος περισσο- μιλης.	<i>Bunsen</i> effaces Toigaramachos, reads Momcheiri Sesorcheres (Sosor,—chief, and ἡγησανδρος, —same meaning). <i>Hoffmann</i> has seen that the transla- tion of Mompheiri (for Momcheiri) is Memphite, son of Memphis (Mompheiri).	<i>Seyffarth</i> reads : Tahojoer,—who re- tires from battle (Taho,—to cease : joer,—strength), and αμαχος,— not warlike. I read with Scaliger : τισανδρος,— revenger, and for Toigaramachos. Toobes (to avenge oneself) : ensaake (great)—the great avenger
7. Stoichos,—son of the preceding. The in- sensible Mars.	I propose Skoichos. (According to B. Toichares,—estab- lished by the sun.) (According to Sff., Ou-sat ako,—he who sows ruin.)	Schoij,—warrior : doubtless with the idea of insensibility.
8. Gosormies, — ἱρησι- παντος.	Gosochmies, αἰρησιπαντος,—he who addresses petitions to Pan, ac- cording to Hofm.	Kes,—to serve zealously, and Khen = Pan.
9. Mares, his son,—the king given by the sun.	(Sff.—Skoeis-r-hba.	Master of trouble. Ma,—gift ; Re,—sun.
10. Anouphis, or επικωμος, —who lives in feast- ing and debauchery.		An,—not. Noufi,—good.
11. Sirios,—the son of the pupil of the eye, or, who cannot be bewitched by the evil eye.	The son of the sun.	Sche, schi,—son ; iri,—eye : pupil —iris. Sche, Re.

FIRST BOOK OF MANETHO.

FIRST DYNASTY.

- | | |
|---------------|------------------------|
| I. | 1. Menes of This. |
| II. | 2. Athosis at Memphis. |
| III. | 3. Kenkenes. |
| IV. | 4. Ouenephas. |
| V. | 5. Ousaphædas. |
| VI. | 6. Miebidus. |
| VII. | 7. Semimpes. |
| VIII. | 8. Bienechas. |

THIS.	MEMPHIS.	ELEPHANTINE.	HERACLEOPOLIS.	THEBES.
dynasty. Beothus or Bochus, Kœochos or Chous, Binothis or Biophis, Tias, Sethenes, Chæres, Nepherche- res, Sesochris, Cheneres.	3d Dynasty. 1. Necherophes. 2. Tosorthrus. 3. Tyreis. 4. Mesochris. 5. Soyphis. 6. Tosertasis. 7. Achæes. 8. Sefhouris. 9. Kerpheres. 4th Dynasty. 10. Soris 1. 11. Souphis 2. 12. Souphis 3. 13. Mencheres 4. 14. Ratoises 5. 15. Bicheris 6. 16. Sebercheres 7. 17. Thamphthis 8.			
		5th Dynasty. 1. Ousercheres. 2. Sefhres. 3. Nephercheres. 4. Sisires. 5. Cheres. 6. Rathoures. 7. Mencheres. 8. Tatcheres. 9. Onnus.		

TEXT OF ERATOSTHENES.	CORRECTIONS.	COPTIC ETYMOLOGIES.
12. <i>Chuonbos, Gneuros, Chryses</i> , — son of Chryses.		Hannoub,—goldsmith; Chnoub-iri, —son of Chnoub or of Gneur.
13. <i>Rauosis</i> ,—head chief.		Hr.: Ouasch,—Dominus Imperator; Sff.
	B. Ragosis, ...	Ra,—sun; Sesur,—dominion.
14. Bigres,—(not translated).		
15. Saophis,—the debauched, or, who makes his fortune.	Choufou, Chéops.	
16. Saophis, or Sensaophis.	Chnémou-Choufou, Chephren,	
17. Moscheres,—given by the sun.	B. Mencheres, Mycerinus.	Mas-Jor,—child of the Almighty.
18. Mosthes.	Othoes. (B. Mencheres II.)	
19. Pammes, <i>αρχωνος</i> , chief.	(B. Chaphres.)	Ape-ma,—given by the chief, by the head.
20. Apappus,—mighty one.		Apop,—giant.
21. Echescosocaras.	Seveches (ὁ) Socaris, Hf.; (B. <i>σχισκος ως Αρης</i> .)	Jevec = Saturn; Socaris,—name of Osiris as King of Amanthes.
22. Nitocris,—victorious Minerva.		Neith and Oker.
23. Myrtaios,—given by Ammon.	Amyrtee.	Amn-her-ta,—given by Amoun-Horus.
24. Tyosimares—the strong one (sun).	(B.) Tosimares. (Sff.) Ouosimares.	Meri-taa,—given by the light. [(B.) The powerful place of the sun.—(B.) Ouoesche mere keibe,—powerful gift of the sun.
25. Sethinilos,—who has increased the strength of his father.		
26. Semphroucrates,—Hercules Harpocrates.	(B.) Semphoucrates.	Jom p. re masch,—Hercules, powerful sun.—(Sff.) Harpocrates is Har-phe-chrout,—Horus, the child. Hercules is Sev or Jom Chon; Semphoucrates must be Sev or Jom-phe-chrout,—Sev, the child. Chou,—to reign; Ter,—name of a God.—(Hf.)
27. Chouter,—bull, tyrant.		Ma,—iri.
28. Meures,—who loves the pupil.		Kahimeï Ptah,—earth loved by Phtah, or Vulcan.—(S.)
29. Chomasphta,—world loved by Vulcan.		Ken,—to pierce; S'ken,—sword (?).
30. Soikounios (or Sukounios) Ocho,—tyrant.	(B.) Soikounis,—tyrant like Ochus. (Sff.) Souchi-n-souchi.	The cruellest of the cruel; the crocodile of crocodiles. But Souchi is the crocodile of Sevec, and not that of Typhon
	(Hf.) S'hak Onnos.	S'hac,—to reign; Onos,—corresponding king in Manetho's list
	Soik Onos Othoes.	Scholtj,—warrior; Onos and Othoes,—corresponding kings in Manetho's list.
31. Peteathyres.		The man of Hathor = Venus.
32. Stammenemes I.	(B.) Ammenemes I.	
33. Stammenemes II.	(B.) Ammenemes II.	
34. Sistosichermes,—powerful Hercules.	(B.) Ssaortosis.	
35. Mares.		
36. Siphos, or Hermes,—son of Vulcan.	(B.) Siphthas.	Mei Re,—loved by the sun. Sche Ptah,—son of Phtah.
37. Phrouora, or Nilus.	(B.) Phouora.	Phe Ior, or Iaro,—the river.
38. Amouthartaïos.	(B.) Amun phra-taios; or Amaunti-ma-ïos.	Given by Amoun, the sun; or Beloved by Amoun, the wife of Amoun.

THIS.	MEMPHIS.	ELEPHANTINE.	HERACLEOPOLIS.	THEBES.
	6th Dynasty.			
	18. Othoes 1.			
	19. Phius 2.			
	20. Methousouphis 3.			
	21. Phiops 4.			
I.	22. Menthesouphis 5.			
	23. Nitocris 6.			
	7th Dynasty.			
XIX.	70 (or 5) Kings.			
	8th Dynasty.			
to CXLVI.	27 (or 5) Kings.			
			9th Dynasty.	
II. to CLXV.			Ochtoes and 8 (or 18) Kings.	
			10th Dynasty.	
I. to CLXXXIV.			19 Kings.	
				11th Dynasty.
XV. to CCI.				16 Kings and Ammenemes.

ART. VIII.—*Mr Buckle's Philosophy of Mind.*

History of Civilisation in England. By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE. Vol. I.
Second Edition. London. 1858.

History of Civilisation in England. By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE. Vol. II.
London. 1861.

SOME months ago a new grievance was discovered by the *Times*, and in discussing it, the question was asked, "Can Mr Buckle, or Mr John Stuart Mill, or some other of our profound 'thinkers,' suggest a remedy?" What is meant by a deep *thinker*? The expression is constantly used, familiar in every one's mouth as a household word, and always used in a complimentary sense. It is always supposed to denote the highest class of talent, and the strongest power of discovering truth. And yet, there is no word in our language used with so much vagueness and confusion. That few men should be able to define the meaning of their words is, perhaps, not to be wondered at. It is not of this we complain. A word may be used clearly enough by men who can give no scientific account of its meaning. The Athenians, who were so unpleasantly convicted by Socrates of not being able to tell what they meant by justice, or wisdom, or prudence, nevertheless, understood perfectly the significance of the words, and in practice never misapplied them. To hold men responsible, in this way, for the meaning of all their words would be as hard a case as to ask the rifle volunteers, at the annual tournament, to prove the accuracy of their aim by explaining the properties of the parabola which their balls describe. But, in the use of the term we are speaking of, the looseness is not apparent, but real. It is applied to two dispositions of mind which are not only different, but opposite;—so opposite, that they are scarcely ever found in combination; so opposite, that the strength of the one implies the weakness of the other.

The fact that we have but one term for both is more than a verbal inconvenience. It is an error of *things*; an error so practical that it bears fruits, and fruits anything but wholesome. If the confusion were confined to that class who are confessedly not "thinkers" themselves, it would be of much less consequence. Unfortunately, it prevails among writers as much as among readers, and, as we shall presently shew, has misled one, at least, of the two authors whom the *Times* puts forward as the impersonation of deep thinking. We shall now point out the distinction between these two inverse types of thought.

The first is practical and direct. It goes straight to the finding out of something that is sought. In technical language, it

is *synthetic*, or *constructive*. The end it has in view is only the discovery itself. With the "how," or the "why," of its own discovery it has nothing to do. To make our meaning clear, we shall take an example from one of the sciences; any of them will serve our purpose, since this type of thinking is common to them all. A political economist proposes to himself the question of free trade. His purpose is, to find out whether it is beneficial. The investigation may lead him very far. He may have to consult and analyse many tables of statistics. Among many fluctuating elements he must detect those which fluctuate together, so as to connect them as cause and effect. He may also have to take account of questions of abstract justice, and of necessary evils, and, having brought them all together, to weigh them in the balance, and shew on which side lies the heavier weight. There may be room in all this for a great deal of "thinking." Sagacity, comprehensiveness, clearness in inferring, may be required at every step. But the thinking is, throughout, direct. It has always one end in view, and that end a practical one. The object is the thing to be done, and not the doing of it,—the *πᾶγμα*, and not the *πρᾶξις*.

Let us take another example, from a science which seems to be very different—physics. It would seem as if this had nothing in common with social science. It has certainly nothing to do with human happiness or misery. It has nothing to do with human desires, or the statistics of human actions. We have only to trace out the hard, uniform, inflexible laws of nature. We watch the variations of a magnet, to detect in them some law. Capricious as they seem, we know there must be *something* on which they depend, if we could only find it out; whether it may be the hours of the day, or the seasons of the year, or the spots on the sun, or the changes of the moon. Such an inquiry appears at first to require a different species of thought, and a different type of mind, from that which delights to investigate commercial treaties, and statistics of wheat and barley. Nevertheless, both come under the same general class. To borrow the language of natural history, they are not different species, but only different varieties of the same species. They are both constructive; in both, the thinking is direct and practical; in both, the end in view is the thing to be done; the *πᾶγμα*, and not the *πρᾶξις*.

We shall take one other example, and that from the science which seems most of all remote from common life and practice,—pure mathematics. Even here, the thinking is still of the same type—synthetic. When we wish to find out the sum of three angles of a triangle, we go direct to the finding of a certain truth. If we find the right track, it is of no consequence at all how we came to be led into it. We had one definite end

in view, and nothing else. It was always a thing to be done, and not the doing of it. Different as it may seem, mathematics is therefore, in the most general classification, of the very same nature with that of the social and natural sciences.

Apart from all these, there stands another type of thinking, which requires a science for itself. In this, the mind is not an actor, but a spectator. It does not hunt the game, but looks on while it is hunted. To drop the metaphor, its object is not to use the intellect as an instrument for finding truth, but to inspect the instrument itself, and observe its method of working. This exercise of thought is *reflective* or *analytic*. It does not erect any buildings, nor seek to erect any, but curiously examines its own workmanship in those it has erected. Therefore, it has no special science for its province, as far as its object-matter is concerned. All the other sciences are equally its province. It is the science *of* the sciences; that is to say, philosophy proper. Its aim has been expressed with singular beauty and accuracy by a French philosopher, in the phrase, "*se rendre compte*." To analyse, to "give account to itself" of its own achievements, to observe and record the phenomena of mind itself,—these are its proper and only work. It proposes to itself the investigation of no definite question, the discovery of no definite truth; but, it contemplates the method of discovery of all truths. By whatever name, then, it may be called—psychology, metaphysics, or philosophy,—it cannot be ranked as a science co-ordinate with the other sciences, differing from them only as they differ from one another. It forms a class by itself, standing alone on one side while all the other sciences stand on the other side. Its method and purpose is precisely the inverse of theirs. It looks on while the architect builds; not with the view of assisting, but of taking the work to pieces, to see how it was done.

The speculations of this science, as to the *modus operandi* of the intellect in its working, are by no means necessary to the progress of the work itself. In general, the architect knows less of the subject than any one else. The very effort he makes to attain his ends turns away his thoughts from himself. His eye must be fixed on the work he has to do, and not on the instrument in his hand. And therefore he is less qualified to "give account" of his work than any attentive spectator. Homer wrote poetry much better than Aristotle could have done, but Homer could never have analysed the laws of his own compositions as Aristotle has done it for him. Mr Ruskin could not paint as Titian painted, but Titian could not have written the science of his own art as Mr Ruskin has written it. And the same thing is true of all the arts and sciences. The inspiration of the sybil would be lost if she were forced to

gather up and classify the leaves on which her own oracles are written.*

It is to this exercise of the intellect that the name of "deep thinking" more properly belongs. For besides that it is a far rarer faculty, and requires more subtilty and delicacy of thought, it is concerned with finding the foundations of the edifice of science, and not with the extending of its limits. It traces the roots of the tree of knowledge, but cares nothing for the increase of its leaves or fruits.

It is, however, a question of words to which the attribute of *depth* more properly belongs. The essential point is the fact that these two types of thinking are, in their nature, not only different, but antagonistic. The bent of mind which leads to the doing well of one, in the same proportion leads to the doing ill of the other; and the training which fits the mind for excelling in the one, to the same extent unfits it for excelling in the other. The strength and quickness which are all essential for the sciences themselves, are even worse than useless in that which is the science of the sciences. The difference is very nearly coincident with that which is so celebrated in Locke's Analysis of Wit and Judgment. The former perceives likeness, the latter perceives difference. In analytic thinking the faculty required is delicacy of observation *alone*. The work is the work of a naturalist examining flowers or insects with a microscope. His problem is to adjust the object with such delicacy, that it may be seen and studied in every part. It is a work of observation, 'pure and simple.' In submitting to the mental microscope that most subtle of all objects, the mind itself, the difficulty is sometimes exceedingly great. It requires patience, it requires delicacy, and it requires slowness. It was first remarked by Dugald Stewart, that the faculty of swiftness of thought, which in other things is so essential, is here absolutely fatal. The difficulty is to make the thoughts move so slowly that we may have time to make a clear observation as they pass. Whoever has tried the experiment of analysing a spontaneous or a voluntary act of his own mind, must have become conscious at once of the nature of that problem with which philosophy has to deal. He finds that the object cannot be made to remain for an instant within the "field of view." He finds it perish in the very act

* Some of our readers may remember a circumstance which practically illustrated this. Some years ago the meaning of a passage in one of Mr Tennyson's poems was the subject of a discussion in *Notes and Queries*. In course of the discussion it was suggested that, as the author was living, he was himself the most competent authority to decide what was his own meaning. Mr Tennyson, however, on being appealed to, declined to degrade the dignity of a poet by acting as commentator on his own works; and the passage remains a mystery still.

of touching it. He finds it like quicksilver, slipping through the fingers in the very act of grasping it ; or like the lightning

" which has ceased to be
Ere one can say, It lightens."

Nothing can be more certain than that swiftness and slowness of thought are qualities absolutely at variance. And yet, as we have said, in language they are always confounded. And what is still worse, they are confounded in thought. Kant and Cuvier are spoken of, indifferently, as "deep thinkers." Plato and Newton are classed together as men of "reflecting minds." And yet the bent of mind in each case, so far from being the same, is precisely and diametrically opposite. The intellects of Kant and Plato were analytic and reflective. The intellects of Newton and Cuvier were constructive or synthetic only.

The word *reflection* has itself great part of the sin of this confusion to answer for. It is in truth a kind of living fallacy, for by universal custom it has come to imply, not only that species of thought which is properly a reflecting of the intellect, but any laborious exercise of the mind whatever. The case of Newton exemplifies this better, perhaps, than any other, for, firstly, the abstract nature of the science on which he was engaged, makes it, of all others, the one in which the error is most readily made ; and secondly, we happen to be possessed of some facts in his history which make it specially clear that it is an error. At first sight it would of course be said that Newton was, eminently, a man of reflecting mind. Engaged through his whole life on the most abstract of sciences, he must, we should say, have reflected very deeply indeed. And in one sense, no doubt, his was the most reflecting of minds, and his thinking the profoundest of thinking. In the proper sense of the word, however, his mind was given to anything but reflection. It was, on the contrary, the very type and ideal of the *unreflective*. It was employed only in the direct search after truth, in discovering, in building up. His intellect never paused in its work to make the reflex act. He never waited to analyse the associations that suggested the various steps by which he was led to his immortal discoveries. When he conceived the idea of finding the Precession of the equinoxes by imagining a ring of matter adhering to the earth at its equator, it was enough for him that the conception would answer his purpose ; he never waited to ask himself how he came to think of it. The strength that bore him along with such eagle speed was the very thing which prevented his scrutinising the course he was passing over. And in his case we happen to possess direct proof that he was himself almost the last man who was

competent to "give account" of his own mental processes. It is well known that, in his first study of Euclid, he read over the enunciations only, omitting the proofs. Of this he himself afterwards informed Dr Pemberton, remarking, at the same time, that the propositions had seemed to him self-evident as soon as he apprehended the meaning of the enunciations. And this was all the account he could give of how he had learned Euclid. Yet nothing is more certain than that, in every theorem, he must have gone through precisely the same train of ideas by which an ordinary learner is led to the conclusion. But through his mind the train passed so swiftly that it left no trace in his memory. And because the mental act was instantaneous, the proposition seemed to be self-evident.

These two types of thought are too antagonistic to be combined in much perfection in the same intellect. Strength and swiftness are opposed essentially to delicacy and slowness. To some extent, no doubt, an average mind may succeed in either, or in both together, but not to the highest excellence. A moderately good horse may be made to do duty either as a carriage-horse or a cart-horse, or both by turns. Considered as a good horse simply, he is fit for either work. But, so far as he is a good carriage-horse, he is a bad cart-horse; and, so far as he is a good cart-horse, he is a bad carriage-horse. An average mind may, in the same way, be trained to either analytic or synthetic thinking, or to both. But the amount of training in each type is, so far, unfavourable to the development of the other. And to attain the highest excellence in both is practically impossible.

To this the whole history of science furnishes but a single exception. That exception is Aristotle. In him the rival faculties were found not only combined, but combined in unrivalled strength and excellence. "Disdaining the conquest of particular provinces, he boldly invaded the whole empire of philosophy;"* and even to this day "his seal is upon all the sciences." Yet the marvel is not that he excelled in each of the separate sciences, but that, in addition, he took the lead in that science whose method is the inverse of all the rest. Not only did he use the human intellect with a giant's strength in every work in which it could be used, but he turned it also to the far more delicate task of examining its own structure, and giving account of all it had accomplished. But in this, as we have observed, Aristotle stands altogether alone. He has had neither equal nor second, and his example is no precedent for our imitation. With as much reason, we might hope to imitate Shakspeare. In him also, two rival faculties were developed

* Gillies.

—the faculties of tragedy and comedy—and both developed in supreme and unapproachable perfection. But no one thinks of making Shakspeare a precedent for himself.

Mr Buckle, we fear, has grievously misconceived these "first truths," and has, in consequence, done great injustice to himself and his subject. Not content with his claim to be the founder of a new era in social science, he has attempted also to reconstruct the whole philosophy of the human mind.

Of his social theories our readers have heard enough, probably, to satisfy them, at least till the appearance of another volume. We are anxious to take advantage of the interval to call attention to his philosophy of the mind. This part of his work has hitherto almost entirely escaped criticism. It is worth examining, however, if only as a curious illustration of the doctrine we have been asserting—the extent to which studies like his can destroy the faculty of analytic thought. But it deserves examination much more on its own account. The truth is, Mr Buckle's fatalist philosophy, and his covert sneers at Christianity, have had much more influence than is generally thought—more, perhaps, than any other part of his treatise. What gives so much effect to his metaphysics and ethics, is the marvellous assurance with which he writes. He speaks uniformly of humanity in general as lying in gross darkness, a few only having had the courage to shake off the tyranny of prejudice and priestcraft, and seek truth for its own sake. He always associates his doctrines with "Progress," with the discoveries of "Modern Science," and the improvements of the nineteenth century. Of other explorers in the philosophy of mind he speaks in a tone which we are really at a loss to describe. He has taken their measure to an inch. He has weighed them all in his balance, and found nearly all wanting. As they pass before him in review, each receives his sentence—a sentence meant to be without appeal. For Mr Buckle gives judgment, not assigning reasons like mortal men, but with authority. Sometimes the sentence is only contempt; sometimes it is a qualified approval—a patronising admission that the writer has, on the whole, done rather creditably, considering. Stewart, for example, is not of sufficient importance to receive a sentence, but only a clause of a sentence—"when, moreover, we find Dugald Stewart, who though a somewhat superficial thinker, was, at all events, a careful writer, supposing, &c,"—a good creature enough, who tried to do his best. Cudworth is one degree better; a failure, indeed, yet "not that he was devoid of genius, though he holds a rank far below," &c. Reid "had neither the comprehensiveness of Smith, nor the fearlessness of Hume. The range of his knowledge was not wide enough to allow him to be comprehensive, while a

timidity," &c. On the whole, Reid "cannot take high rank as a philosopher," and his system "will not live." Archbishop Whately, "though not well acquainted with the history of formal logic," and though "he fell into the old Academic error of supposing that all reasoning is by syllogism," is still allowed to have done creditably as an expounder of elementary logic. And so on.

This style is sufficiently "impressive" with ordinary readers. They believe that he who can weigh and measure all others with so much authority and ease, must himself see very far into the secrets of nature. So that they are half inclined to submit from sheer terror when he announces, as a proved result of modern science, his favourite doctrine of ethics—a doctrine very accurately sketched by Edmund in *King Lear*, "that we are villains by necessity; fools by heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves, and treachers by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence; and all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on." We should have expected Mr Buckle to treat a little more ceremoniously, if not contemporaries, at least—

" the great of old,
The dead yet sceptred sovrans, who still rule
Our spirits from their urns."

The reason is, we fear, that he has omitted to read their works.

We shall take a single specimen—his criticism on Reid. This is something more full than others; for we are given not only the sentence, but a sketch of the reasons for it. The charge he brings against Reid is as follows:—Reid's whole system is an attack on Hume's philosophy, on the ground that it was built on hypotheses, or principles not proved. Yet, in constructing his own system, Reid himself builds on first principles, of which he gives no proof; and even proclaims unblushingly that no system of truth can possibly have any other foundation. Now this, Mr Buckle declares, is a great inconsistency.*

A great inconsistency, indeed. It is as if Burke had stood up to impeach Warren Hastings for oppressing a subject province, and based his argument on the principle that it is the duty of all governors to oppress all subject provinces. If this was really the philosophy of Reid, Mr Buckle has not only justified his sentence that he "cannot take high rank as a philosopher," but might have remarked on the culpable negligence of his friends in not having him placed in a private mad-

house. It is strange it should not have occurred to Mr Buckle to look twice before charging such absurdity upon one whose writings are universally confessed to be "the best result of Scottish speculation." The blunder is all Mr Buckle's own.

Reid did, indeed, charge Hume with founding a system on principles not proved; but these principles were such as admitted of proof, and required it. If a physician, for example, constructed a system founded on the assumption that all men with blue eyes were scrofulous, the world would certainly ask for some proof that his first principle was true. The "first principles" of Reid are something very different—as different, indeed, as light from darkness. They are those primary truths which all men must believe, whether they choose it or not. They are truths which *cannot* be proved, because they are themselves the foundation of all other proofs. I know, for example, that I have a book before me, because I see it. But if you ask me to prove that I ought to believe in what I see, I have nothing to say, except that I see it. This is one of Reid's "first principles." I believe that I was alive yesterday, because I remember it. But if you ask me to prove that I ought to believe what I remember, again I have nothing to say, except that I remember it. This is another first principle; and the rest are of the same nature. Misled by a verbal resemblance, Mr Buckle has mistaken hypotheses, or principles assumed without proof, which may, therefore, be untrue with first principles, which, being self-evidenced as true, can admit of no proof beyond themselves. A reader, not familiar with the speculations of modern philosophy, and the prominence given to this very question of first truths, cannot easily conceive the magnitude of this portentous error. Let him imagine an author coming before the world with a new treatise on astronomy, announcing the discovery of a fatal objection to the notion held by Newton, that the world was round, because he had forgotten to consider that, if it were true, the men on the other side must be walking upside down. This will serve to give an idea of Mr Buckle's startling discovery concerning Reid.

We proceed to Mr Buckle's positive philosophy, the system he has constructed for himself. The principal part of this is prefixed to his first volume, and forms an introduction to the whole work. Its object is to resolve such inquiries as these:—Whether the faculties of the human mind can be trusted? Whether it is possible to know anything? Whether the will of man is free? Whether there is really such a thing as social science? and, if there be, whether it is possible to construct it?

All these questions may be in themselves highly interesting,

but we naturally ask what concern they have with the proper subject of his treatise. If the question concerning the truthfulness of consciousness is worth discussing, it is manifestly a question which applies to all sciences and to all treatises alike. In a certain sense, indeed, all inquiries possible or conceivable must build upon this foundation. All of them take for granted that the faculty of knowledge is not itself a mockery and delusion. All of them assume that consciousness is trustworthy. And if its authority is suspicious, the thing ought to be established separately and once for all. If it be true that

“All that we know is—nothing can be known,”

let it be proved, and let us give up all science and all knowledge together. But if consciousness is trustworthy, and its character can be established once for all, it ought to be left above suspicion. Surely it is absurd if each separate treatise is bound to examine such fundamental questions afresh. It is like calling on a judge to produce the patent of his own appointment, for discussion at every fresh case he is to try. Even the question of the freedom of the will is out of place in a treatise on the history of civilisation. Such discussions are only speculative, and require a separate study and a separate treatise. They are questions, moreover, which have employed the whole attention and the whole strength of such intellects as those of Plato and Hume, and Kant and Fichte. It is therefore scarcely to be supposed they can be satisfactorily disposed of in a cursory dissertation, prefixed to a treatise on social science. Their introduction reminds one strongly of the interesting prefaces of the historian Sallust. Having proposed to himself to relate the history of Cataline's conspiracy, he commences by giving his readers some information concerning the constitution of things in general, how that beasts have been formed “prona,” and “ventri obedientia,” whereas man has been formed upright, with his head pointing to the heavens; with other philosophic observations; all of course very profitable and interesting in themselves, but having no more connection with Cataline than a treatise on the Persepolitan inscriptions.

Mr Buckle, however, finds a plea for the introduction of his metaphysics by supposing an objection raised to the very conception of a social science. The imaginary objector is made to assert that there can be no science, because there is nothing to discover. For the will of each individual man is supposed to be free, and therefore his conduct cannot be made the subject of law. And the same being true of the masses, their conduct can be guided only by “chance.” Their actions therefore can contain no laws or uniformities, and there can be no science of civilisation.

Now, if such an objection were worth answering at all, the proper answer is the discovery of the laws themselves. We are, of course, speaking of the case of one who professes to have ascertained such laws (as Mr Buckle professes to have done). When the law has been actually found, and can be shewn, it is superfluous to give an abstract proof that it can be found, or that it exists. Once it has been discovered as a fact, the most specious reasoning could never hold its ground against that inexorable logic. A detective policeman might bring arguments to prove that a thief can be discovered, before the search has begun. But he wastes no words about possibilities, if he has found him, and can produce him. The Eleatic Zeno proved with rigorous logic there could be no such thing as motion. But it has always been admitted that, however insoluble his argument, it was for all practical purposes sufficiently answered by his friend walking round the room. If Mr Buckle, therefore, has actually discovered uniformities in human actions, it is not in the least incumbent on him to commence his exposition by proving that such things exist.

Mr Buckle has, however, we think, entirely over-estimated the scepticism of the age concerning the existence of social laws. Even in the conduct of individual men—which he admits to be a much stronger case than that of masses—every one admits the existence of certain laws or uniformities. Of course, such laws are not laws in the same sense in which we speak of the laws of space. They do not pretend to have such rigorous universality. They are not, to our conception, *necessary* truths. But they are uniformities sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes of life. That they are known to exist, even by those who believe in the freedom of the will, is shewn, among a thousand other things, by the use of proverbs. For what are proverbs but the expression of uniformities in human conduct? Does not "*A soft answer turneth away wrath*" express a uniformity in human conduct? and "*Set a beggar on horse-back,*" &c.? Nor is there any nation in the world that has not framed proverbs for themselves. There may, indeed, be some incredulity among men, not as to the existence of such laws, but as to the probability of finding them out where masses are concerned. Thus in biology, though no one doubts that here, as in everything else, there is causation and uniformity, still we may well despair of ever being able to construct a science, from the extreme complexity of the conditions under which the laws must work. But scepticism of this kind also, if it exists in social science, is of course removed by the ascertaining of the laws themselves. A recent occurrence supplies us with a good example. The Registrar-General, some time since, shewed that there is a certain law which determines the vari-

ation in the rate of marriages. If there is anything in human conduct which at first sight we might pronounce so subject to caprice as to be governed by no law, it would be this. The Registrar-General, however, as we have said, has established the fact. But, more prudent than Mr Buckle, he attempted no proof that, in the nature of things, such a law existed, or might be found. He simply found it. He simply pointed out the *fact* that marriages vary with the price of corn. No one after that ever thought of inquiring into the possibility of finding it. The actual discovery proved both that it existed, and that it could be found.

Mr Buckle has therefore gratuitously undertaken to answer an objection which did not lie in his way. His metaphysics and psychology are therefore, on his own plea, superfluous. But this is far from being their worst fault.

The great question with him is concerning the manner in which events are produced. And this he divides into two cases, the case of external nature—the world without; and that of mind—the world within.

In the outer world, we are told that there are just two theories concerning the production of events. One is the doctrine of Chance, the other the doctrine of Necessity. The doctrine of Chance is that which is adopted by the unlearned savage in the infancy of civilisation. The doctrine of Necessity is that which is held by mankind in the state of civilisation and experience. The savage, according as his experience increases, throws off his false doctrine of Chance, and, observing that things are linked together by invariable laws, he comes to adopt the true doctrine of Necessity.

These doctrines, however, have never been held as opposite theories by any nation, civilised or uncivilised, Pagan or Christian. To say that the cause of an event was "Chance," is a doctrine which we are safe in saying was never held by either savage or philosopher, because it is a doctrine without meaning, and therefore a doctrine which *cannot* be held. Chance is only a word to denote our ignorance of the true cause. In this way it is used both by the "learned" and the "unlearned," and by both with perfect propriety. When a dice box is shaken, we say it is a chance whether the ace or the deuce turns up. Our ignorance leaves us so completely in the dark that we have no cause to expect one more than the other. And therefore we say it is an even chance. But, while using the word, we are fully conscious that the whole thing is done according to fixed laws. The die strikes the sides of the box with its edges, and the impulse causes it to rebound and rotate. The number which turns up depends on the way in which it struck the box, and the time it had to rotate. We never doubt that

from the moment it is put into the box till it falls on the table, it follows rigorously the mechanical laws of motion. If we took the trouble to measure exactly the shape of the box and the size of the dice, and observed exactly the direction and velocity of the shake, we could calculate with unerring certainty the position in which the dice must fall. The calculation would no doubt be difficult and complex, especially if the box was shaken more than once. But in itself the calculation is capable of as much exactness as the calculation of an eclipse.

To say, therefore, that a thing happens by chance, means only that it happens through causes which we do not know. That it happens by fixed laws we do know, although we are not in a position to predict it by means of those laws. There is no other meaning of the word "chance" but this. It cannot, therefore, be opposed, as a doctrine, to the doctrine of necessary connection. One is an account of how things take place in the outer world: namely that they take place according to fixed laws; the other expresses our ignorance of how those laws are combined. So far from being opposing theories, both may be held, and both are held, by the same persons and at the same time. It is true that many things which are only chance to the savage, are predicted with certainty by us. But still there are many things which are only chance to us. It is a chance what kind of weather we shall have on the 1st of January 1863. But future ages may be able to predict the weather a year in advance, as we can predict a transit of Venus.

There is nothing very difficult of comprehension in this. Yet, strange to say, in Mr Buckle's philosophy chance is made to be a thing objective and external to the mind, a positive producing cause, a principle,—“an arbitrary and irresponsible principle!” And the savage is represented as holding it to be a system which *explains* the phenomena of nature!

Between the philosopher and the savage there is indeed a wide difference, but it is not a difference of principle. It is only a difference in the extent to which a principle is carried out. The savage is persuaded equally with the philosopher, that like antecedents will be followed by like consequents. (For on what other principle should a burnt savage child fear the fire?) But the savage has not taken the trouble to ascertain which among the antecedents are essential to the result. To take a well-known example, suppose he has been cured of some disease by drinking water from a certain fountain. When he wishes to produce the same result a second time, he is careful to go to the same fountain, to use the same cup, and stand in the same position to drink. In this there is nothing scientifically absurd. For all these were among the observed antecedents when the effect was first produced; and he is not

warranted, as yet, in pronouncing whether or not they are *essential* antecedents. It is only after a series of experiments, after eliminating some of the antecedents by successive "exclusions and rejections," that he is justified in omitting them as unnecessary. A few, of course, he omits from the first as plainly unessential,—for example, the fashion of his dress, or the cut of his beard. The difference between him and the philosopher is, therefore, a difference only of degree. They are advancing along the self-same path, but the one has advanced on it much farther than the other ; and he, in his turn, shall soon be left behind. The savages of Central Africa stand in the same relation to Mr Buckle, in which he perhaps may stand to the enlightened philosophers of the twentieth century.

Having constituted the principles of chance and necessity into two conflicting systems of the world without, Mr Buckle proceeds to erect on this foundation his theory of the will. This theory, he submits, has at least the merit of novelty. The scheme is as follows. Chance and necessity originally had reference to the outer world alone. From this they were, in course of time, transferred to the inner world of thought. And thus two other conflicting systems were produced to explain the phenomena of mind. The doctrine of chance, thus transferred to the inner world, reappeared as the doctrine of free will. And the doctrine of necessary connection was transformed into predestination.

This theory is recommended indeed by the merit of novelty, but not, we fear, by the merit of truth. Freedom and predestination were not derived from the systems of chance and necessity ; and secondly, in whatever way they were derived, they are not opposing doctrines at all. That the system of freedom was not a transformation of the system of chance is sufficiently evident from what we have already proved, viz., that chance is no system at all. And that the doctrine of predestination is not the opposite of that of freedom, is equally evident. In strictness, predestination is not a *philosophic* doctrine at all, and can have no place in a discussion like the present. In so far, however, as it involves a doctrine of philosophy, it is anything but the reverse of that of freedom. It even founds upon and involves the truth of that scheme. For the sum and substance of the doctrine of freedom is this, that in the nature of things it is possible there should exist a free, uncaused determination of the will,—an absolute and unconditioned commencement. Now predestination, in making all things to depend on an act of will of the sovereign Ruler, makes His will to have been independent and free. It, therefore, assumes that there *can* be a free volition ; in other words, it assumes the doctrine of freedom.

There is, moreover, an inconsistency in the scheme itself, so manifest, that it seems strange it should have escaped Mr Buckle's observation. Of the two conflicting doctrines, as he thinks them to be, of chance and necessity, he makes one to be absolutely true, and the other absolutely false. And yet of the two corresponding doctrines, which are only transformations of them when applied to mind, his finding is, that *both are false!* No explanation is offered of this anomaly. And the reader, having been taught that both the theories of mind are false, is left to find out something better for himself, without any hint from Mr Buckle as to whether *he* has anything to offer in their place.

But the reader need not perplex himself with endeavouring to comprehend this multifarious system. The whole conception of the fourfold scheme is a delusion, a phantom of Mr Buckle's imagination. There are two ways possible, and only two, of accounting for the beginning of changes, whether in mind or matter.

Firstly, we may reason that every event must have a cause,—it could not take place without *something* to cause it. This something must, for the same reason, have been caused by something else, which again, in its turn, was caused by something else. Thus we are forced into an infinite chain, of which every link is connected necessarily with the link before it. All things therefore, in mind as well as matter, are necessary effects, and nothing could have been other than it is. Thus there emerges the doctrine of fatalism or necessity; and we seem to have proved that no man can be evil or good, except as fate has appointed.

But, on the other hand, experience contradicts this edifice of the reason. Experience shews us, as a fact, a change which is not an effect. The will is perceived to be free,—that is to say, its acts are uncaused, and originate with itself. This is implied in the very notion of making a choice. Thus there emerges the doctrine of liberty; and we are forced to conclude with Iago, that

“’Tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus.”

Under whatever forms or names they may appear, these two exhaust all possible explanations of “how things begin to be.” There must be either an infinite series or an absolute commencement;—there must be either necessity or freedom. They cannot certainly be called far-sought theories, nor yet, as Mr Buckle says of one of them, “barren hypotheses.” They *must* present themselves as the only possible alternatives to the mind of every one who thinks of the subject at all. A thoughtful Hottentot or Caffre sees as readily as the most experienced student of the Kantian antinomies, that between these rival

claimants his election must be made. And between them, accordingly, the whole thinking world has in every age been divided. "Hypotheses" neither of them can in any sense of the word be called ; for so long as we confine our attention to either alone, its evidence seems to be irresistible. Nor can it be (as Mr Buckle says concerning freedom and predestination) that both are wrong. On the contrary, the one only thing in the controversy which we know with absolute certainty, is that one or other of them *must* be true. They are, in the strictest logical sense of the term, "contradictories ;" and of contradictories, one must be true and the other false.

Again, Mr Buckle thinks that the "hypotheses" found acceptance only from the fact of their being so easily comprehensible :—"These opposite doctrines of free-will and predestination do no doubt supply a safe and simple solution of the obscurities of our being ; and as they are easily understood," &c., &c.*

Whatever else may be said for these doctrines, they certainly are not "simple" or "easily understood" in the sense in which Mr Buckle is speaking, that is, as throwing light on the obscurities of our being. In fact, they are celebrated for the reverse—for being both alike incomprehensible and inconceivable. It is strange that Mr Buckle, who has given several quotations from Kant, should not have known that this lies at the very foundation of the whole critical philosophy. Of the philosophy of the unconditioned, too, with which he seems to have some acquaintance, the sum and essence is that both schemes are alike inconceivable, notwithstanding one or other of them must be true. Instead of "throwing light on the obscurities of our being," they only shew us where its obscurities lie hid. If they add to our knowledge, it is in this sense, that they shew us the infinite depth of our ignorance. They only conduct us to the limit, beyond which all is mystery, the blackness of darkness, ignorance without remedy or hope.

Having disposed of what he thinks the origin of the adverse theories, Mr Buckle proceeds to another question connected with them. Whatever doubt there may exist as to their origin, there cannot be, he asserts, any dispute as to the foundations on which they are now *actually based*. The foundations on which they are now actually defended are, he tells us, as follows : The theory of liberty is based on a metaphysical "hypothesis," that of predestination on a theological "hypothesis."

With predestination we have at present no concern, since it is not the opposite of freedom, and is besides a question, not of philosophy, but of revealed religion. But when he says of

free-will that it is a hypothesis, or "based on" a hypothesis, Mr Buckle very curiously and exactly reverses the truth. Nothing can be imagined more precisely the reverse of a hypothesis than the defence "actually" put forward for it. A hypothesis is, of course, a supposition. It may seem absurd that we should state such a thing, yet we are forced to state it. The vortices of Descartes were a hypothesis. The wave theory of light is a hypothesis. In each case we are reasoning about things where there is no evidence at all as to the *fact* of their existence. But in the doctrine of freedom, as "actually" held, there is no supposing at all; and what is more, there is even no reasoning. Not a single link of inference is used in deriving it. The proof offered is the simple fact. Its advocates do not even profess to shew the error in the reasoning of the fatalist. They simply answer, Your reasoning must be wrong because it contradicts the fact. They say, with Bolingbroke, that "no man can deny his freedom without lying." They say, with Dr Johnson, "Sir, we know our will is free, and there's an end on't." If Mr Buckle calls this "actually basing" it on a hypothesis, "hypothesis" must, with him, stand for something very different from a supposition.

As might be expected, he brings no quotation in proof of the assertion that philosophers now defend this doctrine by a hypothesis. He attempts, however, to prove a second assertion, namely, that it tacitly assumes, not one hypothesis, but two. In this, however, he is no more fortunate than before.

In the first place, the doctrine of freedom, he asserts, tacitly assumes that consciousness is a *special faculty*.

Now the testimony of consciousness is precisely the same whether we think it to be a special faculty or not. In giving evidence as to facts in the phenomena of mind, it is always the "common man," the man without theories or science, who is supposed to be the witness. The philosopher only examines the evidence and passes the sentence. Now the common man always gives his testimony that he knows, as a fact, his will is free. Whether consciousness be a special faculty he neither knows nor cares. It was as a common man, and not as a philosopher, that Dr Johnson spoke, when he told Boswell that "we know our will is free, and there's an end on't." If he had imagined that before this summary testimony could be accepted, it was necessary to decide the subtle and vexed question, whether consciousness be a faculty, he could scarcely have said, "there's an end on't." In that case, indeed, it is highly probable there would never be an end on't. And the same testimony with his would be given by any intelligent Bushman or Red Indian, though he has never heard of consciousness, and does not know the meaning of a "special faculty."

Nor will it avail Mr Buckle to appeal, on this point, from common sense to philosophy. Philosophers do not seem to be aware, any more than others, that we cannot believe in the freedom of the will without, at the same time, holding consciousness to be a faculty. We may take Sir William Hamilton as a specimen, for he surely was a philosopher. As an advocate of liberty, it would be hard to find any one more strenuous. But it never occurred to him to suspect that he could not receive the doctrine unless, at the same time, he believed consciousness to be a special faculty. And in fact, he always taught the very reverse—that it is *not* a special faculty. He even takes Reid, his favourite author, most severely to task for holding this very opinion about consciousness, and makes it the occasion of giving an elaborate proof that it is not a faculty at all.

The most marvellous part is still to come. Even were the former point to be conceded, Mr Buckle tells us, there remains yet a second "hypothesis," which the doctrine of freedom involves, and which must prove fatal to its claims. This assumption is nothing less than the taking for granted that we possess the power of knowing—of knowing *anything*! We are indeed conscious, Mr Buckle confesses, that our will is free, but how are we to know that consciousness is not deceiving us, for it has never been *proved* that consciousness is trustworthy? And so the doctrine of freedom founds on a hypothesis, seeing it assumes that we really feel what we are conscious of feeling.

Here, for the first time, Mr Buckle is right as to the facts. The truthfulness of our faculty of knowing has never been proved, and the doctrine of Free-will does take it for granted. But if this be a defect in the scheme, it is a defect which it shares in common with all other branches of human knowledge possible or conceivable. Mr Buckle would probably himself admit that the equality of the square of the hypotenuse and the squares of the sides is not hypothesis, but a proved truth. Yet on his own principles it can only rank as a hypothesis. For how can he know that he is not deceived? He may say that at each step in the proof he perceived its truth; consciousness was his warrant. But then he is pressed with his own difficulty *quis custodiet ipsos custodes*? How is he to prove that his consciousness does not deceive him?

A witness comes into a court of justice to give evidence. He swears that he saw a murder committed. He saw it with his own eyes. Would Mr Buckle, sitting as chief justice, refuse to accept the evidence as founded on a hypothesis? Would he instruct the jury that it was worth nothing because the witness "assumed" that he really saw what he was conscious he saw?

In fact, Mr Buckle, in impeaching the veracity of consciousness must annihilate all his own convictions and his own book together. He is conscious that in political bias he is a Whig. If consciousness is an untrustworthy witness, how can he be sure that he is not a Tory without knowing it? He is conscious of having written a book on the History of Civilisation; how can he be sure that it is not a treatise on Egyptian antiquities? He believes that he has written against the doctrine of Free-will. How can he know that consciousness has not been deceiving him, and that he has not been advocating the truth of the doctrine?

It has been so often pointed out, that it is almost superfluous to repeat it here, that when we demand a proof that our faculty of knowing is trustworthy, we demand an impossibility. For in attempting to prove it we must make use of that faculty itself, the very faculty whose truthfulness is in question.

Although Mr Buckle rejects the doctrine of Freedom, he does not in so many words pronounce for that of Fatalism. It is this doctrine indeed which he practically teaches, and to which he everywhere tries to lead his readers. But that which he expresses when he comes to state his own opinion in form is certainly not Fatalism, however much he may have meant it for Fatalism. In order to render it more acceptable he has transformed it into a shape in which he thinks no man of the least candour can refuse to accept it. In this attempt he has been rather too successful. In his anxiety to throw it into an acceptable form he has unconsciously reduced it to nothing at all. It comes out a mere truism as enunciated by him; an assertion as much past the possibility of denial as Hamlet's discovery "there's been a villain dwelling in all Denmark; but he's an arrant knave." Here is the theory in his own words:—

"When we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some motive or motives; these motives are the result of some antecedent; and therefore, *if* we were acquainted with the whole of the antecedents, and with all the laws of their movements, we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results."[†]

This is an evident truism. For what is the meaning of knowing the "laws of the movements?" It means of course to know what results will be produced. So that when Mr Buckle says—If we know the laws, we could predict the results,

* The intelligence of Mr Buckle's death at Damascus has just reached this country. The writer of this article, which was prepared two months ago, speaks of him as alive, which he was at the time.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

† Vol. i. p. 17.

he is only saying that if we know what must be the results, we can tell what the results must be,—

There was a maid that ate an apple,
When she ate two she ate a couple.

Mr Buckle forgot the little circumstance that the whole question is whether the "laws of the movements" in a voluntary agent *could*, in the nature of things, be thus predicted beforehand. In saying "*if* we knew them," he assumes the very point that forms the whole question at issue.

Mr Buckle considers, as we have just said, that the mere enunciation of his theory is enough to commend it to every candid mind. He goes on, nevertheless, to give reasons in support of it. And on a cursory reading it seems hard to believe that there is nothing in it at all. The language throughout is so full of the gravity and sombreness of philosophic dignity. Long and flowing periods, thick-set with scientific terms, are fenced about with notes full of references, and quotations in Greek, Latin, English, German, and French. But still, when reduced to their simple meaning, when stripped of the *ιστορίαι καὶ σημειώσεις καὶ παραδείγματα* they turn out one and all pure identities. There is always an *if* quietly thrown in, which reduces the whole fabric to nothing. Here is a second specimen—

"If I were capable of correct reasoning, and (*if*) at the same time I had a complete knowledge both of his disposition and of all the events by which he was surrounded, I should be able to foresee the line of conduct which in consequence of those events he would adopt." *

Past all denying. If we know a man's disposition completely, we can tell how he will act. For what is the meaning of knowing completely his disposition? It is to know how he would act under any given circumstances. So the assertion comes to this, If we could ascertain how a man would act in every possible case, we could in every possible case tell what his conduct will be. Thus the proof, as well as the thing to be proved, comes out a truism. Both are spoiled by an *if*. Considering the nature both of premises and conclusion, we are strongly tempted to think Mr Buckle must have taken for his model here the reasoning of the gravedigger in Hamlet, "If the man go to this water and drown himself, it is will he, will he, he goes—mark you that: but if the water come to him and drown him, then he drowns not himself: *Argal*, he that is not guilty of his own death shortens not his own life." †

* Vol. i. p. 17.

† Such as it is, however, Mr Buckle's transformed Fatalism is not his own. It is directly transferred (without acknowledgment), in some places almost

Such is Mr Buckle's *Philosophy Regenerated*. It is a complete and hopeless failure. So far from throwing new light on the science, he has failed to understand even its elementary principles, even to comprehend the meaning of the questions it proposes.

We should strongly recommend Mr Buckle to omit from future editions the whole of his philosophy of mind. The subject is one for which he is plainly unfitted, both by nature and habits. With his industry, and his facilities for collecting and arranging facts, much might be effected in his proper line, and English history might yet owe something to his researches. With metaphysics it is different. Improvements here are not to be expected from mere industry, combined with the facilities of the British Museum and its unlimited supply of learned quotations. Even supposing his dissertations to be as profound as they are superficial, they would still be wholly out of place. The introduction especially would remain only as an unsightly excrescence. It would still be the cypress which Horace told the Pisos, might be a fine thing in itself, but ought never to be seen on the same canvass with a shipwrecked sailor. With the proper subject of his treatise it has no concern whatever. History and social science are practical things. They stand on their own foundations, and ask no help from theories about the mind. Both studies are good, but they ought to be rigorously kept apart. As this is a subject of great practical importance, and one which has often proved a fruitful source of confusion, we make no apology for devoting a few words to it specially.

From its very nature analytic thinking can have no practical purpose whatever. It examines the mind, as we have before remarked, as an instrument, and watches its method of acting. But its doing so is a mere speculation—a mere question of curiosity. The most perfect knowledge of the instrument, the most exact analysis of its composition, cannot help us in the least to use it. The instruments we must work with are faculties which nature has given us ready-made, and a knowledge of their composition helps us no more to use them than the knowledge of the composition of a sword helps to make a good swordsman. There is a great deal of difficult theory involved in the flight of a bird through the air; but the knowledge of the theory, if we could suppose the bird to acquire it, would not improve its style of flying. A child balances itself on its feet as skilfully as the mathematician who knows that the equilibrium depends on the vertical through his centre

word for word, from the *Logic* of Mr J. S. Mill (see his "*System of Logic*," vol ii. p. 486, 2d edition). This is not the only instance of silent appropriation from the pages of Mr Mill.

of gravity falling within the edge of his foot. Nature is full of analogies of the same kind,—analogies not shadowy or fanciful, but so exact as to amount to proofs. And yet the contrary is continually taken for granted. Mr J. S. Mill, among many others, considers it too plain to require any proof, that a true theory of induction is useful in making discoveries by induction. Even Lord Bacon—he who overthrew the philosophy of words and thorns, to bring the philosophy of “works and fruit”—seems to have given much more than its proper weight to theoretic analysis. Lord Macaulay has discussed the whole question, so far as Bacon is concerned, with singular force and clearness of thought. In his famous example of a plain man discovering that mince pies were the cause of his illness, he has shown that induction is a process natural and spontaneous; that in its natural form it is as perfect as in its scientific form; and that the process is performed by the unlearned as frequently, and as accurately, as by the learned.*

Considered as a mere speculation, the reflex study of the intellect, and metaphysical questions in general, are, undeniably, of the highest interest, and ought to form a part of the education of man as such. Notwithstanding their speculative nature, they must always strike us as being, in a certain sense, among the most exalted employments of the human mind. Aristotle even went so far as to pronounce the contemplative the most proper function of man, and essential to his perfect happiness. And besides its interest as a question of curious knowledge, it may indirectly conduce to some practical end. There is, indeed, one practical use which it may always be made to serve; that of an intellectual gymnastic,—what Aristotle calls, in technical language, an *energy*, having no end in view beyond the exercise and strengthening of the faculty itself. Nor is it possible to assert beforehand that it might not, incidentally and indirectly, serve some other uses of a practical kind. And, if Bacon's precept be a just one, that we ought to seek the *luminifera* more than the *fructifera*, we are bound to pursue the study, if only on the chance of such practical uses happening to turn up. But what we insist on is, that

* Sir David Brewster apparently had something of the same kind in view, in his vindication of Newton's philosophy from the imputation of having been the offspring of the Novum Organum (“Life of Newton,” c. xix.). In his anxiety to vindicate Newton, he has, however, been led to do injustice to Bacon, and greatly to misconceive the object of his philosophy. “The process of Bacon,” he tells us, “was never tried by any one except himself.” With far greater truth, Lord Macaulay declares that there never was any one, either before his time or since it, by whom it was *not* tried. Passing notices to the same effect may be found in some writers before his time; e. g., the following from Reid,—“His [Bacon's] *regula philosophandi* are maxims of common sense, and are practised *every day* in common life” (“Inquiry,” c. i. sec. 1).

such uses are *only* indirect and accidental; and that the study is useless, as far as concerns the thing analysed. The study of the eye does not assist us in the act of seeing. That act was performed in the fullest perfection before anything at all of its structure was known. Yet the study of it may be of practical use in other ways; and we know that it actually led Dolland to the construction of the achromatic telescope. But this was an advantage accidental and unforeseen. So, likewise, may the study of mode and figure be useful, but not in the practice of reasoning. The analysis of the inductive process may be useful, but it does not teach us to discover. The dissection of moral emotions may be useful, but it does not generate virtuous habits. Such subtle analyses resemble Cassio's soldier-ship,—“mere prattle, without practice.” The action of this “working-day world” must be made, like ambition, of sterner stuff.

Fortunately, it is only in universities and among the very learned that there is much danger of mischief, from such an error. In common life, and with unscientific men, there is a strong consciousness—given by nature herself—that the practice has no dependence on the theory. A policeman sees a boy on an orchard wall, and knows there is something wrong. He takes him into custody at once, though he has never reflected whether he ought to believe, with Cudworth, that right and wrong are ideas ultimate and underived, or, with Hobbes, that they are founded on law, or, with Paley, that they are phases of self-love, or, with Hume, that they are fictions of the imagination. A candidate, in training for the championship, knows that the event depends upon impulse and muscular contraction; but he never thinks of devoting his time of training to a course of lectures on the muscles, or to the study of Poisson's treatise, “On the Impact of Solid Bodies.” Even a child, after burning his hand, keeps it out of the fire; and he does so with as much firmness as Mr Mill or Dr Whewell, though he cannot shew that his induction was made in accordance with the rules, and has no idea whether it was derived by the method of agreement, or the method of difference, or the method of concomitant variations.

These two branches of knowledge should, therefore, always be kept apart. The practice may go on towards perfection, without waiting for the theory. Mr Buckle has attempted not only to combine them, but to build the practice upon the theory. In so doing, he has staked its existence, and wantonly staked it, on the fate of a metaphysical speculation; going out of his way to build his house on the sand, when it was far more easy to build it on a rock.

The introduction of his metaphysics is only one instance of

a general characteristic of Mr Buckle's mind. His weakness is omniscience. In his last volume he gives us hints of being engaged upon a universal science, the very conception of which is portentous and almost frightful in its greatness; a science which is to combine and swallow up all other sciences that have been or shall be. "To solve the great problem of affairs;" "to build up afresh the fabric of our knowledge;" "to detect the hidden circumstances which direct the march and destiny of nations;" "to unite into a single science all the laws of the physical and moral world;"*—these are a few of the hints concerning what we may expect from this entire and perfect chrysolite. Unfortunately, it exists only in Mr Buckle's brain. What is *the great problem of affairs*? If such a problem there were, Mr Buckle might, perhaps, solve it; but there is not. The sum of human knowledge can advance only by the progress of its several parts. Such is now the conviction of all philosophers worthy of the name. Such, for example, is the principle on which the British Association has been framed; dividing and sub-dividing the field of knowledge, and assigning to every one his part, that no single corner may escape the most searching scrutiny. Whoever will succeed as a discoverer, must be content to work on this plan; and little can be hoped from Mr Buckle while he is haunted by the phantom of a universal science.

IX. FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS for 1862.

GERMANY.

1. *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie*, by Dr Niedner. No. 3 contains the following articles:—5. Dr RIFFOLD, Henry Nicolaes and the house of love; a monographical sketch of part of the sect-history of the Reformation period, together with a contribution to the history of the development of the Anabaptist, Antitrinitarian, and Antinomian doctrines. First article: Life of Nicolaes. 6. Appendix to the history of Henry Nicolaes; Henry Jansen and his identity with Hiël. 7. EBRARD, Do we possess the complete text of Hieronymus de vivis illustribus? 8. Dr SACK, History of Wöllner's ecclesiastical ministry. 9. Dr BURKHARDT, Printing and sale of Luther's works. The Jena edition, 1553–70.

2. *Theologische Studien, und Kritiken*. No. 3 contains the following articles:—1. ULLMANN, Recollections of Umbreit; 2. RIEHM, Umbreit's literary labours, a sketch of his chief productions; 3. HAUCK, exegetical essay on Gal. iii. 15–22. Next, in the division of the Review designated thoughts

and observations, we have—1. Bäumlein on Gal. v. 23; 2. LINDNER, thoughts and observations on certain passages of the New Testament; 3. SCHREIBER, criticism of the Epistle to Diognetus; 4. V. RUDLOFF, some observations on the question of Traducianism and Creationism. The reviews of books in this number are—1, Sack's review of AUBERLEN on Divine Revelation, and Bähr's review of Tümpel on the Liturgical Relation of Thüringia.

3. *Theologische Zeitschrift, von Dr Dieckhoff und Dr Kliefoth* for March and April (Lutheran). The articles in this number are :—1. Præpositus E. SALFELD, the labours of Deaconesses in Evangelical Christendom; and 2. Dr G. REICH, the ascension of Christ as a saving fact. The remaining portion of the number is occupied with a lengthy review by Dieckhoff of Professor Kahn's "Lutheran Dogmatics," a work which in many points has deviated not merely from Lutheran orthodoxy, but from Biblical doctrine.

4. *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Lutherische Theologie und Kirche*, by Dr Rudelbach and Dr Guericke, No. 2. There is an announcement on the cover that Dr Rudelbach, so long known in connection with this Review, died on 3d of March. The articles of this number are the following :—MEISNER, the children of Edom according to Scripture; W. FLOERKE, exposition of the Apocalypse; A. ALTHUIS, a postscript to the previous article on opposite, that is, on anti-millennarian ground; PESCHKE, the Counter-Reformation in the Duchy of Krain; STRÖBEL, reflections on Stahl's 'Lutheran Church and Union.'

5. *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, No. 1. As No. 2 has not come to hand, we may notice that this number (from which we have extracted Dörner's article on the sinless perfection of Christ) contains, and that the Review is now intended to contain, reviews of all the more important theological publications. We may notice specially DÖRNER's review of the late Dr Schmed's (of Tübingen) "Christian Ethics," a pendant to his important work on Biblical Dogmatics; the review of Knobel on Numbers, Deuteronomy, and Joshua; of Keil and Delitzsch on Genesis; of Hengstenberg on the gospel of St John; of Gess on prayer in the name of Jesus; of Otto's Theophilus of Antioch; of Baur on the Christian Church of the middle period; of Uhlhorn's Urbanus Rhegius; of Auberlen's Divine Revelation; of Kahn's Lutheran Dogmatics; of Wuttke's manual of Christian Ethics; of Döllinger's Church and Churches—Papacy and temporal power; of Ziese on the return to apostolic preaching; of Richter on King Frederick-William IV. and the constitution of the Evangelical Church; of Harless, and of Bräunig, and of Merz on marriage and divorce; and of Stoy's Encyclopædia of Pädagogik.

6. *Evangelisch Reformirte Kirchenzeitung*. The *Reformirte Kirchenzeitung* has for several years been edited by Pastor Birkner of Erlangen, assisted by Stähelin of Basel. The former is recently deceased. The "Vorwort," this year by Stähelin, seems to have been suggested by the question whether it were still to be desired that the reformed churches in Germany should continue to be represented by a periodical of their own. Reverting to the time when this journal was called into existence, Stähelin

says the reaction that set in after the revolutionary year '48 was in full force, the watchword was "Authority;" an objective force must be sought for to stem the tide of revolution: in the province of religion that must be the church, among Protestants, as represented by "the confession and office." Without judging how far confessionalistic tendencies might be justified at the time, he points to the fact that the newly-awakened zeal for the Lutheran confession seemed to put in jeopardy the very existence of the scattered reformed churches. The adherents of the latter confession felt that something must be done. The words, "Hold fast that which thou hast," were felt to be spoken to them with peculiar force. It was resolved to start an organ of their own for their protection. While the *Reformirte Kirchenzeitung* has never aimed at holding a high place in connection with theological literature, it has, to a large extent, accomplished the ends for which it was undertaken, and no one who knows the state of matters can deny that, during the last ten years, the position of the German Reformed Church has, in many respects, changed for the better. The writer maintains that, whatever judgment may be passed on the confessional tendencies above referred to, the event has shewn that they merely belonged to a certain party then in power, that they were artificial, and never had any hold on the public sentiment of the age. Now the characteristic feature of the time is a most decided tendency to give prominence to the Individual in all provinces of the inner life, to recognise and follow nothing else than the conviction of the Individual, grounded on his own knowledge and experience. The watchword now is not "Authority," but "Freedom."

He finds it impossible to deny that the demand for freedom is at once an evidence and a necessary result of the advanced stage attained in the development of the race; at the same time, he sees much that is very alarming. What is sought is, "not a freedom in God, but a freedom from God," not "a freedom from all human authority, so as to walk in the Spirit, but a freedom from all restraint whatever," not "freedom for conscience, but freedom for the flesh." The question arises, How is this false freedom to be met? By the high hand of authority, church and state combining to bring a formidable force into the field against it so as to crush it? This were the readiest and most comfortable way, requiring no self-denial, and demanding no earnest grappling with the difficult questions, now forced on attention; but he answers decidedly "No!" The longing for freedom, now so universal, is a part of God's plan, and to fight for him by crushing it, because it has taken a wrong direction, were really to fight against him (Acts v. 39).

He enforces his view by referring to the lamentable results of the attempt to put down freedom by mere authority. Far from excusing the bitter and passionate opposition to all earnest Bible Christianity on the part of the "free thinkers" (Freisinnigen) of our day, he yet says, if anything could excuse it, it would be, "This mode of resistance, which denies freedom altogether, and in every case, as a matter of course, takes its place on the side of the oppressor. Thus the gospel of salvation is made to be an engine of warfare against the freedom of civil life, the freedom of science and freedom in politics. Condemnatory judgments are hurled against the sins of the ruled, while the injustice of the authorities is pronounced good and right." "Much of the

opposition to Christianity, which is to be met with among the educated classes in Germany, is to be traced to this. How different is the case in countries where Christianity and freedom go hand in hand, instead of in opposition to each other !”

Going on to the question, “What then has the Christian to do” he answers, It must be shewn, that the freedom of the individual and the claims of the gospel to supreme authority are not contradictory, but the very reverse. Having shewn in a passage, which we should have gladly inserted had space permitted, that the only true liberty is to be found in obeying the gospel, he says, We must present the gospel in this light and avoid pressing it “as a binding yoke, as a law laid on from without,” and above all, the living Redeemer himself must be preached to a people, straying like sheep without a shepherd ; awakening consciences, ready to satisfy the longing for a peace which the world cannot give, manifesting a love that was unwearied even to death.

Turning to another branch of his subject, the opposition of science and philosophy to the gospel, he desires a more thorough and comprehensive treatment of “Apologetics” in connection with theology. He has some excellent remarks, pointing out the duty of theologians and of those, who are actually in the ministry, to make it their object to attain a clear view of the present state of science, so as to be able to enter into the feelings of those who are perplexed with doubts and difficulties.

After further urging the necessity of employing more largely than hitherto the public press in defence of Christian truth, he says, there are still two desiderata to which we will advert.

The first concerns the relation of the Christian to civil political life. He finds a curious illustration of the present state of things in this respect in a statement of one of the journals of the day, that Von Bethman Hollweg, the well known Prussian statesman, occupies a peculiar position : on the one hand, joining in the struggles for the development of the freedom and unity of the German people ; on the other hand, holding in religious questions principles throughout opposed to free thinking, and in heart attached to the men of the “*Kreuzzeitung* party” (the Prussian reactionists or ultratories), the meaning of this is just, he is a positive, believing, biblical Christian, which the “*Kreuzzeitung*” men generally profess to be. “Such a position,” says the journal, “is solitary, almost abnormal, and seldom to be met with.” This last remark, Stähelin says, is true, too true, that it has become almost a dogma, that the duty of a Christian is to be conservative, to uphold all existing things, and especially to justify and support the traditional or revived claims of princes. Passing in review a number of reforms, for which there is cause to be thankful, such as improvements in the criminal law, introduction of religious toleration, &c., &c., he says, he must with shame confess, that the church has not advanced but hindered all these reforms. With the exception of a few faithful chaplains, she has passed over with silence, or with bare flattery justified, the excesses of princes. Nowhere in Germany has she satisfied the deeply wounded moral feeling, by a decided testimony to the truth, that God’s law has like force for all ranks, as did John Knox in Scotland before Mary Stuart, or the French Synod in reference to the immorality of Henry IV.

After speaking of the mournful results of this servile position so generally taken by the church, he says:—"Unhappily there is only one country in Europe that affords historical proof of the justice and importance of the wishes just expressed—the British Isles. When did the Anglican Church, which indeed might in general pass for the type of conservations, ever enjoy more largely the universal esteem and attachment of the English people, than in those memorable days of James II., when her bishops, notwithstanding their royalist predilections, took their stand openly for the liberties of the country, and contended for them even to prison and the judgment hall." After shewing how salutary an influence the conduct of the ecclesiastical leaders at that time had, alike in the state and the church, he adds, "And now the Church of Scotland! What church even now preaches the gospel with greater earnestness, strictness, and authority, some might perhaps say in a way not conciliatory, one-sided, and directly opposed to the spirit of the age; yet notwithstanding, where is there a church that works with greater success, and that enjoys more unlimited confidence, more hearty esteem, and deeper influence, an influence against which no opposing efforts can prevail? Whence this, to us continentals, almost inexplicable phenomenon? Mainly, doubtless, because in all the struggles of the people against tyranny and arbitrary government, that church has not only gone hand in hand with them, but has even taken the lead, so that the whole history of the people has, as it were, grown up with the history of the church." On the continent it may, perhaps, be thought that she has sometimes gone too far. "But the Scottish church has proved, that even errors of excess are nowhere so little dangerous, and nowhere so little likely to lead to actual revolution, as where they are joined with the acknowledgment, that the Lord in heaven is the King, and His word the supreme law." His last desideratum is expressed in the words of the Lord, Matt. v. 16, "Let your light so shine."

AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS for 1862.

1. *The Biblical Repository and Princeton Review*. Edited by CHARLES HODGE, D.D. January 1862. The number for January contains the following articles:—1. God and revelation, a review of Mansel's limits of thought; 2. Memoirs of Philip de Mornay; 3. The human body, as related to sanctification; 4. Bilderdijk, the Dutch poet and literary man; 5. Are there too many ministers? 6. England and America. The number for April contains the following articles:—1. Remarks on the ethical philosophy of the Chinese; 2. The philosophy of the absolute; 3. The history and theory of revolutions; 4. The doctrine of Providence; 5. Bilderdijk; 6. The nature and effects of money, and of credit as its substitute; along with book notices.

2. *The Presbyterian Quarterly Review* for 1862. The January number of this organ of the new school Presbyterians contains the following articles:—1. The permanent in Christianity; 2. The progressive tendency in knowledge; 3. The Holy Spirit; 4. John Bunyan, the prose poet; 5. War for the Union; 6. The Okavango river; along with theological intelligence and notices. The April number contains the following articles:—1. Jeremy Taylor; 2. Preaching; 3. Worship in sanctuary service; 4. Symbols of

thought; 5. The lost ten tribes; 6. Some thoughts about Pennsylvania; along with theological intelligence.

3. *The Southern Presbyterian Review*, conducted by an association of ministers in Columbia, South Carolina, for 1862. The January number, which found its way to us amid the commotions of the country, contains the following articles:—1. Inaugural address, by the Rev. James Woodrow, Theological Seminary, Columbia; 2. Address of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America to all the churches of Jesus Christ throughout the earth [a vindication of their slave-holding position]; 3. The art of conversation, by Dr Palmer, New Orleans; 4. Timothy's office, by Dr Moore Richmond; 5. The victory of Manassas Plains, by Dr Smith, Charleston; 6. The General Assembly at Augusta.

4. *The American Theological Review* for 1862, edited by Drs Smith, Hitchcock, and others (a Union review). The articles in the January number of this excellent review are the following:—1. the review of Emmons which we have extracted; 2. Ante-Nicene Trinitarianism, by Professor Hitchcock; 3. Memorial volume of the first fifty years of the American Board of Missions; 4. The two schools of philosophy, by Dr Lewis Schenectady, in which the writer replies to the review of Dr Hickok's "Rational Psychology" which appeared in the October number of the *Princeton Review*, reprinted in the January number of this review. Though we introduced the *Princeton Review* with a remark which is resented a little, we did not intend to meddle with the discussion beyond putting our English readers abreast of it; nor has Dr Lewis in this article, or Dr Hickok in the April number, said anything to lessen the repugnance which we feel to the language of Pantheism, even though called Bible Pantheism. Till the discussion adjusts itself to the doctrine of sin, which it has not yet done, it is still away from the main point of a harmony with Christianity. Art. 5. A sketch of Dr Spring, whose works are published in ten vols.; art. 6. The beauty of holiness. The April number contains the following articles:—Dr Hickok, modern philosophy pantheistic—in which he contrasts his pantheism, which acknowledges the personality of God, with that of Germany, which does not; 2. Religious instruction in colleges, where the necessity of it is nobly advocated; 3. Swedenborg's theory of the divine-human; 4. The Homeric doctrine of sin, by Professor Tyler; 5. The perpetual observance of the Sabbath, by Professor Smith; 6. The origin of idolatry; 7. Passaglia, Guizot and Döllinger on the Roman question.

5. *The Christian Review*, by E. G. Robinson (Baptist). The articles in the January number are these:—1. Early modern Baptists in their relation to Pædo-baptists; 2. Montalembert's "Monks of the West;" 3. Steudel on the inspiration of the apostles, translated; 4. Democracy on its trial; 5. Power in the pulpit (which we have reprinted); 6. Baptism for the dead. The April number contains the following articles:—1. Growth and relations of the sciences; 2. The Chinese Coolie trade; 3. The righteous dead between death and the resurrection, by Rev. G. Clarke [maintaining a Hades]; 4. West India missions; 5. Recent ministerial biography; 6. The religious system of the Chinese pretender.

6. *The American Quarterly Church Review* (Episcopal). The January

number contains the following articles :—1. Anti-Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, in reply to the recent Socinian publication of Dr Lamson ; 2. The American Board of Foreign Missions and the Oriental churches ; 3. The provincial synod of the province of Canada ; 4. Early annals of the American church ; 5. Motley's history of the Dutch republic ; 6. Chrystal's modes of baptism ; 7. Bishop Bowman ; 8. The two regenerations.

FRENCH THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS.

Revue Chretienne. The quarterly supplement of this review is of a more theological character. In No. 2 of this supplement for 1862, we have the following articles :—J. F. ASIZE on Vinet as a theologian ; F. LICHTENBERGER on the idea of God ; E. ARNAUD on the theses of Montauban. This review is interesting, as bringing out the present transition stage of French Protestant thought. The ordinary monthly parts have, during some months, had articles on Macaulay and Milton, and on America and its condition.

DUTCH REVIEWS.

De Vereeniging : Christelyke Stemmen Hoofd-Redacteur O. G. Heldring. 1862. This excellent and interesting periodical, while it does not ignore the present phases of thought in Holland, but combats its erratic course, fixes attention specially on practical interests and church life.

X.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

THE PURITANS.

Nichol's Standard Divines. Adams' Practical Works, Vol. III. ; Ward's Sermons ; Sibbes's Works, Vol. I.

Among the works of which a reprint is rapidly issuing from the press in Mr Nichol's valuable series, the authors just named are particularly welcome. Ward and Sibbes are important accessions to our available Puritan reading, and they certainly were much esteemed in their own memorable period. Of Ward it is said, that he would probably have been "the phoenix of British preachers." Sibbes's works, to which in this issue there is prefixed an interesting memoir, by the Rev. A. B. Grosart of Kinross, have long been the favourites of exercised and bruised souls, and, we doubt not, will continue to be so. On several accounts, and particularly on account of the matter of his sermons, we are happy that they are made accessible to the reading public of our day ; for there is a harmony between his topics and those which our time is seeking after. We refer to the fact, that he chiefly preached (See Brooks' Lives of the Puritans) on the fundamental truths of the gospel, particularly the incarnation of the Son of God ; and there is scarcely one benefit flowing from it, or one holy disposition it ought to excite, which he did not sweetly unfold and apply ; and it is added by his biographer, that the source of his own deep humility was drawn from Christ's humiliation. We cannot doubt that, if readers can learn to feel at home in that past age, and readily transplant themselves to

the tone then prevalent, which was just the age of Shakespeare, that they will reap a reward from the study of these works.

The Works of John Howe, Vol. I With a General Preface by HENRY ROGERS. London : Religious Tract Society. 1862.

We consider this as decidedly the best edition of Howe's works which has yet appeared. The recognition of Howe's genius, and of the lofty Platonic cast of thought, instinct with all that is truly Christian, that may be called his peculiarity, is now so general, that it would be something like painting the lily to commend him—wasteful and ridiculous excess. As we may dispense with setting forth his claims on the reader's attention, when one voice commends him wherever the English language is known, we perhaps do our part as reviewers most fitly when we call attention to the merits of this edition issued by the Religious Tract Society. Mr Rogers's preface, elegant and interesting, as was to be expected, is confined to remarks bearing on the former mode of printing Howe's works, as contradistinguished from the form adopted in this edition. As to Howe himself, he refers us simply to "the life of Howe." The type is large and clear, and must be agreeable to any reader; the improvement in printing is obvious; and the volumes are offered to subscribers at a price so very reasonable, that it only saves the Society from loss. We are sure that every admirer of Howe will welcome this edition.

We cannot leave these Puritan reprints without calling attention to the fact, that some of the most important and valuable treasures of the Puritan age have never yet been touched. In this year of the bicentenary commemoration of the Puritans, we think special attention should be called to their commentaries. Their expository works range over almost every book of Scripture; and, with all their prolixity, we are prepared to shew that, while their verbal criticism and their philology are not equal to the modern works, they are commentaries of no common order in everything that develops the thought of the sacred writer and elucidates the mind of the Spirit. As attention is at the present moment turned to exegesis all over Christendom, they at least who speak the English tongue owe something to what is already in their language. With little effort, a *Puritan Library of Commentaries on the New Testament* might be reproduced at once.

Church and State Two Hundred Years ago, from 1660 to 1663. By JOHN STOUGHTON. London : Jackson, Walford, and Hodder. 1862.

This is a book much needed, and which will have also an important use. Mr Stoughton is already well known as an enthusiastic and faithful investigator in this most memorable period of British history. This book, meant to fit in to the bicentenary commemoration of 1662, is not of temporary interest, but has an independent value, as throwing a fresh light on all that is connected with the Act of Conformity. He shews that Neal, while trustworthy in general, is really inaccurate, as well as superficial, in his account of this Act, and that fresh materials have been brought to light in the State Paper Office. The author, who has had the use of these papers, and been allowed to have careful copies of the Act as it is preserved in the Parliament rolls, has been able to throw more light on these three years of our ecclesiastical history than has ever been done before, and to bring out the aims, the discussions, and the actings of the parties who had a share in that critical period which gave rise to English Nonconformity. His sketches are lively and exact in manner, though not possessing all the breadth of the historian. He delineates the king's return, the Savoy conference, the Act of Conformity, the crisis, and the persecution; and, in an appendix, several of the documents to which reference is made in the work are given in full.

DOGMATICAL THEOLOGY.

An Attempt to Explain and Establish the Doctrine of Justification by Faith only. In Ten Sermons. By J. T. O'BRIEN, D.D., &c., Bishop of Ossory. Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. Second edition.

Dr O'Brien's work on justification has been so well known to divines for nearly a generation, that it were a work of supererogation to do more than announce that we have now the second edition of it, with various additions to the notes. The avidity with which this work was sought for, and the price to which it rose during the interval between the first and second editions, may be taken as a sufficient testimony to its value. It is a noble expression of the common doctrine of our Protestant faith. Its value lies in this; and the author at its first publication said, what the event confirmed (p. 21): "I do entertain some hopes that what I have done will be found sufficient to convince all who are accessible to evidence upon the point; that ALL Protestant Churches, however separated by differences in discipline and doctrine, and ALL early Protestant divines to whom any reverence is due, whatever were their differences upon other points, agreed in maintaining the doctrine of justification by faith alone, as it is maintained in these discourses."

We regard the appearance of this new edition as very seasonable at this time, for these reasons. The author bases his positions on a far safer view of the atonement than has been current for some time among several evangelical denominations—putting the great question of justification in such a connection with Christ's atonement (just as the Reformers did), that they stand or fall together. On this account we anticipate from it the best results. It may be asked of our modern Refiners, from Dr O'Brien's point of view, how they propose to fill up the blank in their doctrine of justification, since they have no material basis, no work of vicarious obedience on which the sentence of justification may proceed. Again, the author unites Christ's death and obedience as ONE work. Thus, speaking of the danger of separating the obedience and suffering of Christ, he says (p. 432):—"I would say that these different declarations of Holy Writ, one of which ascribes to his death the same efficacy that the other ascribes to his obedience, only appear to be at variance when his mediatorial work is divided into obedience and suffering; and that when these are regarded as UNITED, so that his death was the CROWNING ACT OF HIS OBEDIENCE, all opposition between such declarations disappears. This view of the atonement is explained in Sermon iii. p. 89."

We can so cordially put our imprimatur on this work, that we have almost nothing to find fault with in it; and certainly we do not know a volume more fitted to be a text-book for students on the subject of justification; it is very much for our day what Owen's work was for his. The additions are chiefly in the notes; and we would call special attention to the discussion on the righteousness of Christ. S.

The Outlines of Theology; or, the General Principles of Revealed Religion briefly Stated. Designed for the use of Families and Students in Divinity. By the Rev. JAMES CLARK. 3 vols. London: Ward & Co. 1862.

These three volumes appeared at intervals; the work is now complete. It is a series of sermons, such as is often delivered by ministers in Scotland, and called a series of lectures, or sermons, on the Shorter Catechism. The sermons have been twice preached to different congregations, and bear marks of having been carefully prepared for the press. The system is good, the divisions clear, the treatment plain and simple. The author is a Baptist, but there is very little about baptism. He is an In-

dependent also, and there as is little about independency. He holds universal atonement. He distinguishes, by words that seem to us to have, or that ought to have, the same meaning, atonement and redemption. Viewed Godward, he says, the death of Christ is atonement; viewed manward, it is redemption: in the one sense it is universal, in the other it is limited. It is comfortable to note that the author forgets his own theory always in his preaching. It seems provided only to help him over a difficulty, and then it is dropped. From the books he reads and quotes, he is evidently familiar with a better theology than this would indicate. Our author also propounds, in reference to "the last things," a second coming to judgment as the final winding-up of this world's life-drama. He is modest withal, and does not rate his labours too highly. His preface to the second volume tells us that it is "designed especially for the benefit of the young;" and he is happy to know that a copy of his work is placed in a library, "for the consultation of Sabbath and day scholars, with their teachers, of home missionaries, of lay preachers, and the junior members of the church." With the drawbacks we have stated, the volumes are well fitted for such purposes. A

The Circle of Christian Doctrine: a Handbook of Faith, framed out of a Layman's Experience. By LORD KINLOCH. 2d Edition. Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas. 1861.

This book is receiving, and it deserves, a favourable reception from the reading public. The layman's experience is that of a Bible Christian, who is brought under the sanctifying power of Christianity, and then calmly reflects on its doctrines in themselves, and as they are set forth in current modes of representation. The writer has, in no small measure, the true theological gift, though he has not dealt with theology scientifically, after the manner of divines; and the freshness of the presentation, and its liberty from professional forms, as well as the depth and beauty of the book, must commend it to thoughtful Christian minds in the community generally.

The volume consists of twelve chapters, embracing such points as natural religion, the Trinity, original sin, predestination, the atonement, faith, assurance, Christian morals. It is, in a word, a compendious outline of the Christian system of doctrine; and the writer having evidently thought much, and with a practical end in view, upon these various topics, we might select passages of particular value. Such, for instance, are the remarks on the atonement (p. 48):—"I thus attain to a clear and practical view on the subject of the atonement. I obtain it by the simple expedient of always considering the atonement in connection with mediation, never abstractedly. Christ the sacrifice is contemplated simultaneously with Christ the intercessor, who pleads his propitiation on my behalf. I do not thereby displace the doctrine of the atonement from its rightful position in the gospel scheme. I only combine it with an equally authoritative doctrine, to open thereby a clear way to its practical application," &c. Lord Kinloch complains (p. 57) that the doctrine of the atonement "is frequently expounded without prayer being mentioned from beginning to end of the exposition." He might have put it more generally and better in connection with returning to God, of which the cry of prayer is only one expression.

ECCLESIASTICAL RESEARCHES AND BIOGRAPHY.

Syriac Miscellanies. By R. H. COWPER. London: Williams & Norgate. 1861.

Mr Cowper is favourably known by persons labouring in the compar-

tively little frequented field of Syriac literature. The volume before us will develop his well-won reputation. He has in it accumulated a large variety of extracts, some of them important, and all of them interesting. Considering the extent of the Syriac element at the period of the greatest theological activity and ecclesiastical influence of the Oriental church, it is desirable that a greater measure of attention should be directed to research in this direction. The volume is well edited. In the difference between the divisions in the list of the fathers assembled at the first two general councils, we have an interesting proof of the ever-shifting, political grouping, of the different parts of the vast empire, a circumstance which prevents any ancient map from being more than an approximation to the truth in its boundaries. The extract from Dioeles (p. 51) seems to us to bear proof of late origin. Mr Cowper has not told us that the extract from the *Stromata* of Clem. Alex. does not occur at the end of the eighth book, as we have it. We have searched in vain for any passage like the one he gives. The extract from George, an Arabian bishop (p. 65), in professedly quoting from Theodoret E. H., refers to a wrong chapter of his second book, and transposes the personages there mentioned. It is only the careful editing of the volume in general that has induced us to take these exceptions. We quite concur with Mr Cowper in protesting against the High Church bigotry that would discourage all Syriac research on account of Monophysitism. Even were that charge truer than it is, it would be interesting to know the way in which the followers of Eutychus developed their views. We hope to meet Mr Cowper on future occasions in the department of Syriac research. H.

Memoirs of the Life and Works of Bishop Andrews. By the Rev. A. T. RUSSELL, Vicar of Whaddon, Cambridgeshire. Cambridge. 1860.

He who desires to obtain a deep insight into the ecclesiastical and theological relations of England during the latter part of Elizabeth's and the whole of King James's reigns will find a repository of information in this volume. To the investigator in ecclesiastical annals it is invaluable. They who weary of details and who wish historical perspective will think the author too minute and too exact in the literary history of Andrews, and of all that bears on the illustration of the subjects that occupied the Bishop's pen. But it is such a work of research that truly enables us to comprehend a period; and we owe a debt of gratitude to the man who goes through the labour to do it for us. The references to books and to the discussions of that age are immense, and have a deep interest for us; but as a history, it moves on too slowly, and picks up all that will interest only those who have the same enthusiasm in the subject as the writer.

On one point this work is of essential service, viz., in New Testament criticism. It shews not only the character of our English version of the Scriptures, but also the critical value of the *textus receptus*, from which that version was made by Andrews and the other translators associated with him. The writer has paid more attention to this point than many of the recent editors, who have come to a too precipitate and ill-judged depreciation of the *textus receptus* in favour of another text by Griesbach, or Lachmann, or Tischendorf, or Tregelles. We wish that they who are in danger of having their opinions unhinged on this point by Alford and others, would consider well the more sober and conservative views brought out in this work in connection with the text from which the English version of the Scriptures was made. Yet there is no superstitious over-estimate of the *recepta*. The volume before us has its greatest value in this department, where the author is manifestly quite at home. (See p. 268-350.) In conclusion, we wish that we had some more monographies of the same research and fidelity taking up other periods of our history.

The Life of Edward Irving. By MRS OLIPHANT. London : Hurst and Blacket.

[This is an exceedingly able and interesting memoir. The biographer has succeeded admirably in delineating Mr Irving's character as a man, not only of genius, but of thoroughly benevolent disposition, and earnest devotion. The reader cannot but admire the man, even when he feels constrained to condemn his opinions. The authoress has not been equally successful in her representation of his character as a theologian. She very properly repudiates the idea, which some have entertained, that his peculiarities proceeded simply from vanity, and love of singularity ; but she fails of bringing out in sufficient relief, that inordinate love of the mysterious, by which he was induced to envelope the doctrines of the gospel with a cloud of imagery, bright and gorgeous as those which surround the setting sun, but still a cloud that concealed their due proportions, and bewildered the mental eye. It was the same love of the mysterious that led him in his latter days to give himself up to those strange delusions, which threw so dark a shade over his closing career. Edward Irving, with all his talent, and all his earnest devotion, is to be regarded as a warning, rather than an example. B.

Memorials of the Rev. Rob. Craig, A.M., Free Church, Rothesay. Glasgow : Bryce. 1862.

This is a memoir of an excellent Scottish minister, who has recently passed away to his reward. The appearance of a volume occupied solely with the memoir of a quiet country pastor, whose life glided along without much of incident, except that of the Disruption, may at first seem unsuitable. But on a perusal of it, it will be found to be full of deep interest, as well in the scenes of his pastoral labours, as in the incidents and details of his sojourn abroad.

Brief Memorials of the late Rev. Charles Green, M.A., Missionary to India. London : Rivington.

Mr Green was born in 1829, and died 15th August 1861. His public life was both short and void of incident. It is all summed up in three stages :—first, curate at Folkestone for three years ; then a three years' curacy at Lambeth ; and then a ten months' residence and missionary work at Bombay. This little volume gives a few glimpses into his inner life. With the exception of a very slight tendency to High Churchism, manifest here and there, the memorials are of one whose work and ways are highly to be commended. The narrative is very readable and profitable, and is really worth the study. How mysterious are God's ways ! Mr Green was just beginning to preach, had preached his first native sermon, when his tongue became silent for ever here below, and he was taken up to swell the song of the glorified above.

Sunsets and Sunshine ; or, Varied Aspects of Life. By ERSKINE NEALE, M.A. London : Longmans. 1862. Pp. 376.

This is an odd sort of book, to be commended in one way, and condemned in many ways. It is to be commended as a good gathering of out of the way, as well as generally known, biographies, sixty-three in number ! Brief sketches, often without beginning or apparent ending, and of all sorts of people. It is to be condemned as without visible aim or purpose ; without order or arrangement of any visible sort. The most ordinary arrangement of males and females, of alphabetical division of character and dates, is all despised, and the sixty and three "strange bedfellows" are dragged together, and fastened down here, like the dead lying in a London churchyard, which contains lords and beggars, and all between. Still it is worth its place on

the shelves, as an introduction to the knowledge of sixty-three people, all of whom had some small fact or other about them worth knowing and worth remembering, if anybody's memory were capacious enough to hold the wonderful farrago.

Biographies of Good Women, chiefly by Contributors to "The Monthly Packet." Edited by the Author of the "Heir of Redclyffe." London: Mozley, 6 Paternoster Row. 1862.

Whatever "The Monthly Packet" may be, this book is a vigorous book, very unlike the last noted. It has a purpose which we cannot approve indeed—for there is a tone that pervades it all through, the nature of which the reader can easily gather from this brief extract from the beginning of the sketch of "Lady Grisell Baillie:"—"The whole kingdom of Scotland had from the time of the Reformation, been unfortunately set against both bishops and a prayer-book! . . . And in the time of Charles II. the minds of both parties had become so much inflamed, that great crimes were committed on either side; and we have the pain of finding the church (!) upheld by harsh and cruel persons, who really injured her cause by their violence; while, on the other hand, many pious men were strongly set against church teaching (!) and did not shrink from plots and conspiracies against the government." That is a specimen of the history (!) to be found in the book. The volume is ably written, though full of misrepresentations and perversions of the truth.

PROPHECY.

The Great Exodus; or, the Time of the End. By Rev. J. A. WYLIE, LL.D., London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

Dr Wylie's work does not profess to be a rigid and formal opening up of unfulfilled prophecy. He makes it historically concrete, and dilates in his own interesting style on the historical fortunes of the nations which have adhered to the papacy, and the inevitable doom which has befallen all who bade away from them the Protestant Reformation. The work will have much interest to all who give themselves to trace the course of God's moral government among men and nations.

The method of interpretation which Dr Wylie adopts, is the historical, which beyond all doubt has, in comparison with other modes, most to plead in its favour. It is somewhat precipitate, however, to call any method "the Reformation Scheme," because the Reformers of the first age were careful to avoid an Apocalyptic method, or to identify their movement with any particular scheme of prophetic interpretation. And this was fortunate. Calvin indeed has been praised, because he refused to touch the Apocalypse, and left it unexpounded.

Dr Wylie pursues the historical method with all his well-known ability and eloquence, and has furnished us a very pleasant edifying volume. He is more confident of having found the key to the Apocalypse than many are who will read his book with pleasure. Amid Preterists, Futurists, and Historicalists, many are at the present time in a state of doubt whether the key to the Apocalypse is in any man's hands, or is ever likely to be, till Israel are restored, and the veil is lifted off from this grand foreshadowing of the world's drama. This feeling of doubt is only increased when the Apocalyptic symbols come to be identified with petty little events, and as petty characters, in some obscure nook of European history, of which the Christian natives of Tahiti or Amoy, to whom, of course, the Apocalypse is as much addressed as it is to us, probably never heard, and probably may never hear.

But whatever view may be entertained of the method pursued, and of the details of interpretation, there can be but one opinion of Dr Wylie's book. It

is as an elegant and attractive exposition of the fate of nations who have wedded themselves and their fortunes to the mystic Babylon. The principles of the divine moral government on which he expatiates are strikingly brought out, and applied in this connection.

Thoughts on the Kingdom of God. By the Rev. WILLIAM NIVEN, B.D.
London: Hatchard and Co., 187 Piccadilly. 1862.

Mr Niven is a premillenarian. In this volume he gives a brief outline of his system of prophetic interpretation. Our readers will hardly expect us to say, we do not agree with him. But it is pleasant differing from one who clothes his sentiments in so modest and graceful a garb. There is one thing we greatly admire in Mr Niven's book: his constant use of Scripture; and another thing we as greatly admire is, his constant desire to be practical. Mr Niven gladly leaves a theme when it goes forward into a vague cloud-land, and comes back and home, with an evident and unmistakable relish, to the practical urgencies of present duty. A full and free gospel pervades the whole book. We can safely say, that this little volume contains as safe an exposition and treatment of the premillenarian system as we know; and its style is chaste, classic, and free from all tawdry ornament. The meek and quiet spirit, which is above all price, runs through the whole, and permeates the matter everywhere.

THE EXEGETICAL AND EXPOSITORY.

An Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews. By the late Dr JOHN BROWN.
Edinburgh: Oliphant and Co. 1862. In two volumes.

We are happy to see another, though the last, of that series of evangelical and erudite expositions that came from the pen of the late Dr John Brown. We are told by the editor, that this work was prepared before any of the other commentaries, except that on the Galatians; that it had several times been delivered to the students in the course of his prelections; and that though a posthumous work in point of time, it was thoroughly prepared for publication, and paraphrased, as well as provided with its table of contents, by Dr Brown himself.

Every one acquainted with Dr Brown's other expositions, will be prepared to expect the same peculiarities, and the same excellencies. He endeavoured to unite the teaching of the chair and the teaching of the pulpit. The amount of practical matter which he combined with his commentaries, giving them the aspect of pulpit discourses, fully as much as Exegesis properly so called, strikes one at first sight as a defect; and undoubtedly it is so, because the two elements will not coalesce. But, at the same time, a closer scrutiny brings out the fact, that in his hands the practical part of the commentary, aiming as it does to expand the thought of the sacred writer, and to exhibit it in its relations to the Christian mind, adds materially to the elucidation of the passage. Of one thing we are always forcibly reminded that, along with the original thinking of the expositor—and that is more than is allowed him—a vast amount of thought, supplied by previous commentators, has passed through his mind, and been assimilated to it in the most natural manner. He seeks out, too, the connections of thought very diligently. One of the most valuable parts of this commentary, indeed, is the exhibition of the structure of the epistle, and the connection of its parts converging to one point. We may add, that when the reader examines the work more in detail, he finds that it grows in his estimation.

In his brief prolegomena, Dr Brown ascribes the authorship of the epistle to Paul, and its destination to the Jewish Christian Church in Jerusalem. He speaks with more hesitancy, we think, than there is any room for, as to the date and place of the epistle, attaching little weight to the phrase, "They

of Italy salute you" (chap. xiii. 24) as a proof that it was sent from Rome by Paul. As a specimen of the manner in which he sketches the scope and division of the epistle, we quote the following passage. After stating that the epistle divides itself into two parts, he says: "The first is by far the larger division, reaching from the beginning of the epistle down to the eighteenth verse of the tenth chapter. The second commences with the nineteenth verse of the tenth chapter, and extends to the end of the epistle. The superiority of Christianity to Judaism is the great doctrine which the epistle teaches; and constancy in the faith, and profession of that religion, is the great duty which it enjoins. The superiority of Christianity is illustrated by shewing that Jesus Christ, who is not only the author, but the great subject of that religion, is superior—first, to the angels, through whose instrumentality the law of Moses was given; secondly, to Moses himself; and thirdly, to the Jewish high priest. These were the great objects of the admiration of the Jews; and the author of the epistle shews that Jesus, the angel and Mediator of a better covenant, the apostle and great High Priest of our profession, infinitely transcends them all. The comparison with angels begins at the fourth verse of the first chapter, and ends with the conclusion of the second chapter. The comparison with Moses begins with the third chapter, and ends at the thirteenth verse of the fourth chapter. The comparison with the Jewish high priest begins at the fourteenth verse of the fourth chapter, and ends with the eighteenth verse of the tenth chapter. The practical part of the epistle divides itself into two parts: the first, consisting of a general exhortation to constancy in the faith and profession of Christianity, begins at the nineteenth verse of the tenth chapter, and reaches to the close of the twelfth chapter; the second, consisting of a variety of particular exhortations, occupies the whole of the thirteenth chapter, with the exception of the last six verses, which form the conclusion of the epistle. It is of importance to mark these great divisions of the epistle. The keeping of them steadily in view will be found to conduce materially to the more distinct and satisfactory apprehension of the meaning of the statements, and the force of the argument contained in the epistle." (i. p. 8.)

We might point out the many felicities of exposition found in these volumes. The way, for example, in which he views that key-note of the whole epistle, the phrase, "world to come," of which the apostle speaks, is happy. He understands by it neither the new heavens, nor the celestial state, but both, or the entire order of things introduced by the Messiah, the whole divine administration in its bearing on the salvation of men (i. p. 89). His view of the *anastasis* (chap. iv.), and of being "partakers of Christ," may be noticed as specimens of happy and thorough exegesis. The work is throughout evangelical and edifying. We must notice generally, however, that Dr Brown is here, as in his other commentaries, by far too much under the spell of Moses Stuart's influence. We see this in such expositions as that given on Christ's Sonship (i. p. 25), and on Christ being "Heir of all things," which he makes equivalent to being possessor of all things, which is contrary to the whole idea of Paul, and we absolutely dissent from it.

The Gospel of St. Luke, from the German of Van Oosterzee. Edited by Dr LANGE of Bonn. Edinburgh: Clark. 1862.

The gospel of St Luke, in Dr Lange's theological and Homiletical commentary, was committed to the celebrated Dutch preacher, Van Oosterzee, who here comes before us as an able expositor. It is a judicious commentary—giving a natural, rather than a profound, exegesis. The writer is known as the author of a life of Jesus, a second edition of which, in Dutch, is passing through the press; and this commentary possesses its chief value in the circumstance that it comes from one whose mind has been much led to ponder the life of Jesus, with the further attributes of freshness, flexibility, and condensation of matter greater than was to be expected from the

oratorical cast of his mind. We have incidental allusions to phases of Dutch thought, but fewer of the marked peculiarities of Calvinism than we should have wished—Oosterzee thinking it his duty, perhaps, to keep these in abeyance, while addressing himself to a German public. But, as a commentary, it has merits which cannot be questioned, evincing an intense desire to get deeper into the life of Christ. We see here how much the Dutch theologians are formed by German ideas, for it is all over German. The translation is, in general, faithful and correct.

Discussions on the Gospels. By the Rev. ALEX. ROBERTS, M.A., of the Presbyterian Church, St John's Wood. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

The object of these discussions is to establish that Christ and his apostles for the most part spoke Greek—Diodati's theory "*de Christo Græce loquente.*" The substance of a work published by Mr Roberts three years ago, revised and corrected, is found engrossed in the present volume, in which he has brought together a great amount of learning, and turned it to account with no small ingenuity. He adduces proofs of the general prevalence of Greek in Palestine, during the time of Christ and his apostles; points out the causes which led to this; collects evidence from the inscriptions and coins which have come down to us; and refers to the Jewish writers, who composed their works in Greek. He branches out his argument into what is more general and more special, and has left scarcely any corner unransacked that can supply evidence on the point which he seeks to establish. The arguments are not all of equal value; some are merely ingenious.

We fully appreciate the research of which we have here the fruit, and we cannot but express the hope that the sound scholarship which the author displays will be made available for something less hypothetical in sacred learning. Many go a great way with him. There can be no doubt, as has been pointed out by Hug, that there were a number of Greek-speaking cities and communities along the whole Mediterranean coast, and also in the interior (compare what is said at p. 638 of this number); still, there is a danger in making a too sweeping and a too hasty generalisation. The conclusion would be easier if we could assume a large colonisation of any portion of the country by a Greek-speaking race. As to the fixity of language, the population of Wales, of Ireland, and of the Scotch Highlands, tenaciously retaining their language, from the Roman conquest to this hour, furnish evidence unfavourable to a people changing their language. No doubt, the writer says (p. 261), "The first, and one of the most common, objections is of a purely *a priori* character. It rests on the alleged tenacity of vernacular language, and is usually accompanied by a statement of the special unlikelihood which is supposed to exist in the case of the Jews that any other tongue should have supplanted their ancient national language. I need not remind the readers of this work, that I do not contend that the ancestral language of the Jews had been *supplanted* by any other in the days of Christ and his disciples, but merely that it had been superseded for all public and literary purposes by the general employment of Greek. Hebrew, in a modified form, was still, I believe, extant, and used pretty freely throughout the country—as the Celtic language is, at the present day, in several parts of Scotland, where English is, nevertheless, for the most part employed on all public occasions." The difficulty here is, that a speaker, addressing the hearts of his countrymen, would have a gulf between him and them if he did not appeal to them through the medium of ordinary communication; and the "Ephphathas" (Mark vii. 34), the "Talitha cumi" (Matt. v. 41), and other words, introduced with the phrase "which, being interpreted," would seem to teach that there was the use of Aramaic to a large extent, if not to a larger extent by our Lord, than the use of Greek. The application of this theory to the explanation of the coincidences found in the evangelists

is interesting, and almost identical with that of the Duke of Manchester. He says (p. 437),—"My hypothesis, then, is simply this—the Lord Jesus Christ spoke in GREEK, and the evangelists independently narrated his actions, and reported his discourses in the same language which he had himself employed. This theory I propose as adequate to account for ALL the phenomena presented by the three first gospels, and thus, as marked out by its sufficiency, no less than by its simplicity, from all those that have preceded it." He holds strongly, and we think correctly, that the gospel of Matthew was written in Greek, and that the whole New Testament canon was given to the church in that language.

With regard to this whole theory, we are convinced that no simple solution of the harmonising gospels can be given. The defect of this hypothesis, and of the Duke of Manchester's, if applied as the only explanation of the fact of the harmonising gospels, is, that it wears the appearance too much of a make-shift. We allow its legitimacy as a hypothesis when we are not required to take too much for granted; but it seems, when applied universally, too easy and too short a cut to get rid of the difficulty. And then, it cannot be pressed further than a hypothesis till this prevalence of Greek is established as a fact beyond question. If this hypothesis labours under one defect, so far at least as its universal application is concerned, Mr Roberts's theory of "a twofold authorship" of the epistle to the Hebrews (p. 206) is inadmissible for the very opposite reason—it is too complex and cumbrous.

We discover in this work a deep reverence for the sacred oracles, sound learning, and a manly love of truth, which we fully appreciate; and, having calmly examined his theory, we have to avow that, while it is by no means inadmissible to some extent, criticism must be guarded against coming to positions which may be found afterwards to be untenable, and which, at the best, are a little too mechanical.

Grammar of the New Testament. By the Rev. T. S. GREEN, M.A. London: Bagster & Sons. New edition. 1862.

Among the services which Mr Bagster has rendered to the study of Scripture, the publication of this Grammar, and also of the Lexicon prepared by Mr Green, must be specially mentioned. This Grammar is a scholarly little manual, preparing the way for Winer, the great master of New Testament grammar, and it may accompany, too, the use of Winer. Some of Mr Green's rules are more precise and clearer than the rules as expressed in Winer's language, while the occasional applications of the rules to particular passages are sometimes a brief commentary, and for the most part important.

Thoughts on Holy Scripture. By LORD BACON, compiled by J. G. HALL, Fortplain, N.Y. Edinburgh: Oliphant & Co. 1862.

These thoughts of the great philosopher are felicitous and remarkable reflections, treasures of astonishing wisdom. How far Bacon lived on Scripture as the food of his soul these passages sufficiently shew; and they rise to a region of Christian knowledge, perhaps we should say Christian experience and sanctified wisdom, certainly far beyond what Newton or Locke ever reached in handling the Scripture themes. Proper comments they are not, nor are they even what Bacon calls "first flowings of Scripture." Though some of them are direct and purposed comments upon the Scripture, others are only incidental remarks found scattered in his various papers, and put together by the compiler, so as to give in their present setting the appearance of a sort of commentary upon some portions of almost all the books of Scripture. The publisher has done well to reprint them for readers in this

country. We quote two of the thoughts (p. 272):—"Prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament, adversity is the blessing of the New, which carrieth a greater benediction and a clearer revelation of God's favour." Again, p. 353, he says on Scripture, as if to meet what Jowett says upon the interpreting of Scripture like any other book:—"Notwithstanding, this much must be confessed, that the Scriptures, being given by inspiration, and not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the author, which, by consequence, doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor. For the inditer of them knew four things which no man attains to know, which are, the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all ages."

PRACTICAL EXPOSITION AND SERMONS.

The Last Day of our Lord's Passion. By the Rev. W. HANNA, LL.D.
Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas. 1862.

Though there are passages in this volume not satisfactory, the conception of it is good. It is a series of pictorial sketches, bringing out the events and scenes which fill up the last day of our Lord's passion. The author has to a large extent avoided doctrine, giving the facts. Where doctrinal statements on the subject of the death of Christ have become so full and so numerous that the freshness of the scenes themselves threaten to become less real to the mind, it is well to go back to facts, to the basis of fact on which Christianity rests; and we think Dr Hanna has done well to reproduce the simple facts, and let them speak for themselves. It is a pleasant variety, and it gives vividness, also, to our conception of the Lord's real humanity. But this might have been done equally well and better by a more doctrinal setting. The volume is fresh, and the simple, lucid, and elegant delineation must make it highly attractive to tasteful readers.

If the volume brings out the true humanity of Christ, and how he thought, and spoke, and acted in the various scenes of this last day of his passion, we must add that the testimony to his Deity and to his divine Sonship is equally full. This is evidently dear to the writer's heart, as appears from this striking passage (p. 72):—"Two separate questions were put to Christ, the one whether he claimed to be the Christ, the other whether he claimed to be the Son of God. These were not identical. The latter title was not one which either Scripture or Jewish usage had attached to the Messiah. The patent act of blasphemy which our Lord was considered as having perpetrated in presence of the Council was not his having asserted his Messiahship, but his having appropriated the other title to himself. . . . He heard, and heard without explanation or remonstrance, sentence of death passed upon him, for no other reason whatever but his making that claim. On any other supposition but that of his having been really that which his judges regarded him as asserting that he was, on any other supposition than that of his true and proper divinity, this passage of the Redeemer's life becomes worse than unmeaning in our eyes. There would be something more here than the needless flinging away of a life by the absence of all attempt to remove the misconception (if misconception it had been) upon which the death sentence had been based. If only a man, if not the co-eternal, co-equal Son of the Father, in speaking of himself as he did before that Jewish Council, Jesus was guilty of an extent, an audacity, an effrontery of pretension which the blindest, wildest, most arrogant religious enthusiast has never exceeded. The only way to free his character as a man from the stain of such egregious vanity and presumption, is to recognise him as the Son of the Highest. If the divinity that was in him be denied, the humanity no longer stands stainless."

In portraying the conflict as it thickens, Dr Hanna is generally happy in the setting given to the facts, and in the mode of harmonising them. We might take exception to the sketch of Judas's motives. But the chief defect of the whole is the want of two points necessary to give a correct delineation of these closing scenes—the place which our Lord occupied, and his consciousness of it. Without the introduction of these, the scene of the desertion becomes a mystery and an enigma. Though it was not the plan of the book to enter into the wide field of doctrine, correctness of delineation required the author to point out that our Lord accepted, and was conscious of occupying, the conditions, and obligations, and doom of our humanity, not in mere Docetic semblance, but in reality; that he was conscious of being under the law (Gal. iv. 4), of being made sin (2 Cor. v. 21), and of being made a curse for us (Gal. iii. 13), and yet conscious, amid all that hiding of the Father's face, that he was his beloved Son.

Dr Hanna's explanation of the physical cause of the Lord's death is interesting. It is the same explanation that is given by Dr Stroud, and it is here confirmed by the testimony of three eminent medical men, Drs Begbie, Simpson, and Struthers. Though we would not dogmatise, we as little take exception to this view, which shews in a new light the awfulness of the desertion, and the meaning of substitution.

The Practical Power of Faith; Illustrated in a Series of popular Discourses on part of the 11th Chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. By T. BINNEY. 3d Edition. London: Ward & Co.

It is unnecessary for us to do more than simply to call attention to this third edition. It contains a new preface, but substantially the same matter as the editions of 1830 and 1844. The volume is a pretty fair and favourable specimen, both of Mr Binney's matter and manner. We are far from agreeing with all that he says, but we never find him saying anything that is not both well said and worth saying. Even when we think him wrong, we remember that it is Mr Binney who is going wrong, and he has a power of compelling men to weigh and re-examine their first principles. Mr Binney knows what he is doing, and does not speak at random; he fights not as they who beat the air.

Joseph and his Brethren; "Which Things are an Allegory." By REGINALD COURTENAY, D.D., Bishop of Kingston, Jamaica. London: Hatchard & Co. 1862.

The typology of the Old Testament is an inexhaustible field of labour, and a field that repays all the care and culture bestowed upon it. President Edwards has a valuable gathering of thoughts on the subject of the historical types of Christ; materials, or a collection of materials, with which he evidently intended to commence a building at some future day. This slim little volume, however, is not typology but allegory. Opinions differ widely on the extent to which this allegorical mode of treating Old Testament history is warrantable or safe, and we cannot say that the author has not pushed it too far. But the whole is wrought out with evident care and conscientiousness. We have no objection to a suggestive exposition, but to say that the historical record was meant to teach all that the writer finds in it, gives us pause. The points of comparison are all touched by one who evidently loves his subject. A true book will come to be written some day on this theme.

The History of Joshua Viewed in Connection with the Topography of Canaan, and the Custom of the Times in which he lived. By the Rev. THORNLEY SMITH. Edinburgh: William Oliphant & Co.

In eighteen chapters the author follows Joshua through the whole of his eventful history. The work is carefully and creditably done. The author's

reading is pretty extensive ; he appears to be familiar with the best writers on Palestine. His style is simple and clear, and the volume seems to us to be defective chiefly in one thing only—the suggestion of the truths partly doctrinal and partly also, in some measure, typical—taught by the life of Joshua in its successive stages. With that solitary exception, the volume, so far as we see, is highly commendable.

Sermon on Holy Communion. By Rev. HENRY BELL, Nottingham.
London: Wertheim & Macintosh. 1862.

Twelve short sacramental sermons, with appropriate texts, well and judiciously handled. There is no breadth, depth, or novelty of theological statement. It is the plain ordinary matter, but treated in a way that shews the writer has made the matter his own. Here and there are modes of expression we would prefer to see altered, but, on the whole, we agree with the author, and have found his little book good to the use of edifying, and very suggestive.

The Fall of Man: Five Sermons preached at Cally, N. B., during Lent, 1862. By the Rev. PHILIP F. ELLIOT, M.A. London: Wertheim. 1862.

The same remarks apply to this as to the last-named volume. The statements of truth are cautious, and the author never trenches on forbidden ground, nor seeks to rise above what is written.

The Sanctuary at Home; or, Lord's Day Services and Sermons for Christian Invalids. By Rev. R. DICK DUNCAN, Bread Street. Edinburgh: Oliphant & Co. 1862.

We think this volume a happy thought, and likely to be taken up by many other ministers ; the providing of a Sunday portion for the Christian sick. The execution is successful, as the thought is happy ; the volume providing a savoury religious service for a few Lord's days in succession. The doctrine is sound, forcibly put, and the tone is devotional and spiritual.

New Wine in Old Bottles. By the Rev. J. B. HEARD, A.M., Minister of Fitzroy Chapel. London: Hatchard. 1862.

This little volume is another of the replies to the *Essays and Reviews*, and was first published in the columns of a London newspaper, now extinct. There is much smartness in the style, and many observations that shew a considerable insight into the bearings of theology. But there is also much vagueness about it. The volume contains an added essay, on which the author most prides himself: "An Analogy between the Controversy on the Doctrine of the Person of Christ and that on the Doctrine of Inspiration." If he had said an Analogy between the Eternal Word and the Written Word, and drawn it cautiously and carefully out in the style of Bishop Butler, he might have done good service and established weighty truth. We need hardly say that we do not agree with the author in his analogies, nor in the deductions at which he arrives. It does not at all follow that, although there be an analogy between the eternal and the written Word, there must therefore be an analogy between the controversies that have arisen concerning the one and the other.

Leaders of Revival. By the Rev. J. A. HUIE, Wooler. Edinburgh: Kennedy. 1862.

An admirable sketch of Augustin, Bernard, Rutherford. They are delineated accurately, and with a fine appreciation of their peculiarities, under the general title, "Leaders of Revival"—a term expressive of their true place in history.

* * * Other new works, which our space has not allowed us to analyse, will be noticed in our next Number.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1862.

ART. I.—*Jeremy Taylor*.*

A Discourse on the Liberty of Prophesying. By JEREMY TAYLOR, D.D.
London. John Hatchard & Son. 1834.

Holy Living and Dying. By JEREMY TAYLOR, D.D. Thomas Wardle.
Philadelphia. 1835.

Discourses on Various Subjects. By JEREMY TAYLOR, D.D. In three
volumes. London: Longmans & Hurst. 1807.

Life of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, D.D. By the Right Rev. REGINALD
HEBER. Hartford: F. J. Huntington. 1832.

JEREMY TAYLOR has been called, by one of his biographers, the "most learned and eloquent, most candid and amiable of divines." This is pretty strong eulogy. We cannot endorse it without some emphatic exceptions. But it would be difficult to name another divine of the seventeenth century who combined in himself such a wonderful variety of gifts. His memory was a museum of learning; his fancy rioted in imagery, beautiful, striking, and grotesque; he could scarcely make a syllogism without overloading it with similes or metaphors, and the iron of his logic—for he was at times, withal, a forcible reasoner—is, for the most part, buried out of sight, under a drapery of language as rich in quality and hue as the product of oriental looms.

Nor can any one doubt his piety. His religion may some-

* This article appeared in the April Number of the *Presbyterian Quarterly Review* (American).—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

times run into religionism, and the poet preacher sometimes reminds us of Chateaubriand and Lamartine; but he was not, like the first, a charlatan in theology, nor, like the last, an inspired dreamer over his own woes. With all its lighter adjuncts, his character had a manly basis, and his attainments a solid foundation of studious application.

Jeremy Taylor was the son of a barber, although a lineal descendant of Rowland Taylor, who was Cranmer's chaplain, and a martyr under Queen Mary. He was born at Cambridge, in 1613, and, at the early age of thirteen, entered Caius College as a sizar, a poor scholar. It is doubtful whether he won any college emolument or honorary distinction. In 1633, having finished his university course, he was employed by his chamber-fellow, Ridsen, to supply his place for a short time in the Lectureship of St Paul's Cathedral. Here his graceful person and elocution, and richness of style and argument, attracted the notice of Laud, just made archbishop. Laud praised the sermon, and only objected to his preaching in London on account of his youth. With characteristic vivacity, Taylor begged pardon for that fault, and promised, "if he lived, he would amend it." The archiepiscopal bigot had one merit. He patronized genius, and Taylor was placed by him in the College of All Souls, Oxford.

Here Taylor was in his element. By the kindness of the archbishop, his wants were provided for, and he gave himself up to study. For three or four years, while Hampden was resisting the illegal ship-money tax, and Laud was forcing the liturgy down the throats of Knox's countrymen, Taylor pored over all sorts of literature, the Fathers and the Roman poets, Isaiah and Seneca, Aristotle and St Paul. Busy years these were for him, and the scholar had little leisure or taste to mix himself up in the political turmoil that was fast bringing England to the verge of revolution.

Early in 1638, the Bishop of London presented him to the rectory of Uppingham, in Lincolnshire. He could no longer ignore the great national conflict that was going on. Laud's fatal friendship and the patronage of the ill-fated king, whom he was the first (1642) to join at Oxford, led him to publish his treatise on "Episcopacy Asserted." The king was not ungrateful. He made Taylor a D.D. But the Presbyterians had now gained the ascendancy in the national councils, and Taylor paid the price of his distinction in the loss of his benefice. The rectory of Uppingham was sequestered, and the result was that the young incumbent, with two sons,—he had just lost his wife,—was left without the means of support.

The years that followed were embittered by hardship. He was oppressed with pecuniary difficulties. Some relief came

from his wealthy and powerful patron, Christopher Hatton. But, embarked in the king's cause, and sometimes serving as army chaplain, he was tossed on the waves by which that cause was finally wrecked. "In the great storm which dashed the vessel of the church all in pieces," he was cast, he says, "on the coast of Wales." Here, in his "little boat," he "cast anchor, thinking to ride safely;" but the storm followed me, he says, "broke a cable, and I lost my anchor."

In plain language, Taylor was taken prisoner by the parliamentary forces. He had friends among them, however, who generously and successfully exerted themselves for his release. Perhaps his intercourse with the Independents of the army had not a little to do with the noble views of toleration which are embodied in his "Liberty of Prophecyng." It was not long after his release that the work appeared—a work which, for style, sentiment, and eloquence, holds the foremost rank in an age when Milton held the pen. It was composed under "grievous disadvantages; in adversity and want, without books or leisure;" possibly, at least in part, while a prisoner of the parliamentary army.

But to the author little present advantage came from his book. It pleased neither of the two great parties of the day. It was too liberal for Laud and his school, and the simple fact that it came from the pen of the author of "Episcopacy Asserted," robbed it of favour at the hands of Presbyterians and Independents. Taylor kept school to support himself. He was left unmolested in his retirement, and his leisure was devoted to study. The fruits of his application soon began to appear. His "Great Exemplar" was a decided success. It was extensively popular, and contributed to determine the character of the publications that followed. These were his "Sermons for the Year," consisting of fifty-two discourses, and his "Holy Living and Dying."

In the first of these he advanced novel views on the nature of original sin. The venerable Sanderson, of his own church, deplored with warmth, and even with tears, what he considered Taylor's Pelagian errors. Others were not less grieved. They remonstrated; some of them would have gone farther. Taylor explained, but his explanations were not satisfactory. He professed a desire to be left at leisure to pursue his studies quietly, so that he might "seasonably publish" the first three books of his *Cases of Conscience*. To this end he put forth a laboured vindication of his views. These were such, however, that his biographer, Heber, does not defend them. Taylor was infected with Laud's Arminianism, if not worse than that. He shewed, at least, that the most splendid oratorical gifts and abundant skill in casuistry are not enough to constitute a sound

divine. His vocation was elsewhere than in the field of doctrine. He seems, at last, to have become conscious of it himself; but it was not without some bitter lessons first. Hard things were said of him, or rather of his theologizing, for all loved the man. They galled him sorely. He did not bear them with the equanimity of a philosopher or the patience of a Christian.

Altogether these were hard times for the poor bishop. Domestic calamity embittered his spirit. He buried two sons with the small-pox. He longed for London books and London society, to divert his mind. But he had not the means to escape from his Welsh prison. Once or twice a year he would manage to get to the metropolis, to visit his friends and look after the publishing of his books. These were seasons to him of rare enjoyment. He preached in London, sometimes without being disturbed. There he met his dear friend and correspondent, Evelyn, of the "Diary." There he fell in with Berkeley, Boyle, and Williams, Evelyn's scientific friends, who admired his "rare burning-glass." There he heard rumours that sometimes excited his hopes, and learned what plans Usher had on foot to secure of Cromwell "Liberty of Prophesying." But friends gathered round him. Evelyn's annuity helped him somewhat. His books were gaining reputation, and as he worked on, storing his mind with the treasures of learning, and pouring forth, in strange profusion, the exhaustless riches of his genius, the cloud sometimes lifted, and let in rays of sunshine.

At length there was a call for him from Ireland. At first he declined the invitation, for he was to alternate with a Presbyterian, and he was not disposed "to serve in a semicircle, where a Presbyterian and himself would be like Castor and Pollux, the one up and the other down," But a better invitation presented itself, and he accepted it. His abilities and liberality had made him friends even among the opposite party, and Cromwell gave him a passport, and protection for himself and family, under his sign manual and privy signet. He took up his residence not far from Lisburne, and preached to a small congregation of loyalists in the half-ruined church of Kilulta. Here he enjoyed leisure, poverty, and study. It was a kind of honourable exile, but it enabled him to complete his "*Ductor Dubitantium*," his favourite work. He thirsts for literary news. He writes to London, to know what new books have been brought out. But his mind is at ease, and he little expects the great change that is soon to follow.

A casual visit to London, at the opportune moment, enabled him to set his hand to the loyal address to the king, who was just returning to England. He was thus entitled to notice, and it could scarcely be accounted a *reward* of his fidelity, when he was almost immediately promoted to the see of Down.

and Connor. At Ormond's recommendation, he was shortly after elected Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dublin.

But his constitution had already begun to give way. Trial, anxiety, close application to study, and domestic afflictions rather than the weight of years, had crushed his frame. But even his weakness and feebleness could not repress his energies. He wrought to the last with untiring assiduity; and, while we can scarcely reconcile his harsh dealing toward the Presbyterians with the principles so eloquently advocated in his "*Liberty of Prophesying*," we can doubt neither his piety nor the conscious integrity of his course. He died August 13. 1667, and in him was extinguished one of the brightest lights of the English Church.

Our first emotions, in the perusal of Taylor's writings, are those of surprise and admiration. His thoughts do not generally strike us as by any means profound; indeed, they are oftentimes quite commonplace; but the obvious truism is so adroitly presented, enriched with such gorgeous or novel fancies, or applied in such an unexpected manner, that it is as if the humble Jewish maiden were suddenly transformed into the queen of Ahasuerus. As we progress we are alternately delighted, amused, impressed or disgusted, while the author calls us to revel with him in a domain all his own, where the most surprising beauties, the most splendid images, the loftiest thoughts, and the most quaint, homely, or even repulsive illustrations, intermingled with scraps of learned lore, are flung abroad with a truly oriental profusion. There is no lack of logic, learning, wit, or devotion; and sometimes all seem strangely blended in a single paragraph; but the logic is often almost invisible beneath the flowers of rhetoric; the learning is a conglomerate of pagan and Christian lore; the wit is oftenest struck out by a keen sense of ridiculous incongruities; and the devotion, sometimes breathed forth in the loftiest strains of eloquence, is not unfrequently marred by some odd conceit or ludicrous image that provokes a smile upon the gravest features.

In his wonderful command of language, in his fertility of illustration, in the promptitude with which he can marshal facts and incidents alike from the obscurest and the best known writers, and in the facility with which he can alternate between the loftiest imaginations and the most prosaic, and sometimes even vulgar phraseology, he has scarcely a rival in any, certainly not in his own age. An intellectual balloonist of the most adventurous kind, he bears us at will from the earth, lifts us to the grandeur of Alpine summits, then plunges with us to vales of pastoral simplicity, or drags us along through brush and brake, and again in a moment is climbing the rainbow arch of the clouds, or bidding us look down at the mad play of the fierce lightnings beneath our feet.

And yet, though bewildering us sometimes, he rarely loses his way. He steps down in an instant from the tripod of a wild imagination, takes up the implements of agriculture or mechanic art, and discourses in sentences homely enough for a ploughman, or pithy enough for a Seneca or Franklin. His fancy sometimes sweeps him away for the moment; and he allows it to do so only that, when he has gone abroad and gathered the flowers to deck his thought, he may be drawn back by the tether of his practical design, and mingle the fragrance of their blossoms with the scent of the aloes he is about to administer.

One of his favourite forms of expression, when he is about to introduce some elaborate figure or illustration, has been bitterly ridiculed by South, whose severer taste and laconic energy of speech spurned it as tardy and effeminate. "So have I seen," &c., is his wonted phraseology, when he is about to introduce one of those long paragraphs in which some analogy of nature is minutely traced and poetically described. "So have I seen," he says, designing to illustrate the difficulties of devotion, "a lark rising from his bed of grass and soaring upwards, singing as he rises, and hopes to get to heaven, and climb above the clouds; but the poor bird was beaten back with the loud sighings of an eastern wind, and his motion made irregular and inconstant, descending more at every breath of the tempest than it could recover by the libration and frequent weighing of his wings, till the little creature was forced to sit down and pant, and stay till the storm was over, and then it made a prosperous flight, and did rise and sing as if it had learned music and motion from an angel, as he passed sometimes through the air about his ministries here below. So is the prayer of a good man." And then follows the parallel, scarcely less elaborate than the description of the lark.

In speaking of drunkenness, he says: "So have I seen the eye of the world looking upon a fenny bottom, and drinking up too free draughts of moisture, gathered them into a cloud, and that cloud crept about his face, and made him first look red, and then covered him with darkness and an artificial night: so is our reason at a feast. The clouds gather about the head. . . . It first grows red, and that redness turns into an obscurity and a thick mist, and reason is lost to all use and profitableness of wise and sober discourse."

In his sermon on the duties of the tongue, he speaks thus of the blessedness of its right use: "So have I seen the sun kiss the frozen earth, which was bound up with the images of death and the colder breath of the north; and then the waters break from their enclosures, and melt with joy, and run in useful channels; and the flies do rise again from their little graves in the walls, and dance a while in the air to tell that there is joy

within, and that the great mother of creatures will open the stock of her new refreshment, become useful to mankind, and sing praises to her Redeemer. So is the heart of a sorrowful man under the discourses of a wise comforter ; he breaks from the despairs of the grave, and the fetters and chains of sorrow ; he blesses God and he blesses thee, and he feels his life returning, for to be miserable is death, but nothing is life but to be comforted ; and God is pleased with no music from below so much as in the thanksgiving songs of relieved widows, of supported orphans, of rejoicing, and comforted, and thankful persons."

In his description of the early triumph of Christianity over Pagan darkness, he says : " So have I seen the sun, with a little ray of distant light, challenge all the power of darkness, and, without violence and noise, climbing up the hill, hath made night so to retire that its memory was lost in the joys and sprightfulness of the morning ; and Christianity, without violence or armies, without resistance and self-preservation, without strength or human eloquence, without challenging of privileges or fighting against tyranny, without alteration of government and scandal of princes—with its humility and weakness, with tolerations and patience, with obedience and charity, with praying and dying—did insensibly turn the world into Christian, and persecution into victory."

In speaking of the manner in which temptation is sometimes checked, he says : " So have I seen a busy flame, sitting upon a sullen coal, turn its point to all the angles and portions of its neighbourhood, and reach at a leaf of prepared straw, which, like a bold temptation, called it to a restless motion and activity ; but either it was at too big a distance, or a gentle breath from heaven diverted the sphere and the ray of the fire to the other side, and so prevented the violence of the burning till the flame expired in a weak consumption and died, turning into smoke, and the coolness of death, and the harmlessness of a cinder. And when a man's desires are winged with sails and a lusty wind of passion, and pass on in a smooth channel of opportunity, God oftentimes hinders the lust and the impatient desire from passing on to its port and entering into action, by a sudden thought, by a little remembrance of a word, by a fancy, by a sudden disability, by unreasonable and unlikely fears ; . . . and after all this, the very anguish and trouble of being defeated in the purpose hath rolled itself into so much uneasiness and unquiet reflections, that the man hath grown ashamed and vexed into more sober counsels."

In illustrating, in the funeral sermon of Lady Carbury, the contrast between the strength of a calm devotion and bluster of a more demonstrative piety, he remarks : " So have I seen a river deep and smooth passing with a still foot and a sober

face, and paying to the *fiscus*, the great exchequer of the sea, a tribute large and full; and hard by it a little brook, skipping and making a noise upon its unequal and neighbour bottom; and, after all its talking and bragged motion, it payed to its common audit no more than the revenue of a little cloud or a contemptible vessel: so have I sometimes compared the issues of her religion to the solemnities and famed outsides of another's piety. . . . For religion is like the breath of heaven; if it goes abroad into the open air, it scatters and dissolves like camphor; but if it enters into a secret hollowness, into a close conveyance, it is strong and mighty, and comes forth with vigour and great effect."

In his "Holy Living and Dying," he makes the most of the flower as the emblem of human life. "So have I seen a rose newly springing from the cleft of its hood, and at first it was fair as the morning, and full with the dew of heaven as a lamb's fleece; but when a ruder breath had forced open its virgin modesty, and dismantled its too youthful and unripe retirements, it began to put on darkness, and to decline to softness, and then symptoms of a sickly age; it bowed the head and broke its stalk; and at night, having lost some of its leaves and all its beauty, it fell into the portion of weeds and outworn foes. The same is the portion of every man and every woman; the heritage of worms and serpents, rottenness and cold dishonour, and our beauty so changed that our acquaintance quickly know us not."

The triumph of divine grace over the greatest obstacles is thus set forth: "So have I known the boisterous north wind pass through the yielding air, which opened its bosom and appeased its violence by entertaining it with easy compliance in all the regions of its reception; but when the same breath of heaven hath been checked by the stiffness of a tower or the united strength of a wood, it grew mighty and dwelt there, and made the highest branches stoop, and made a smooth path for it on the top of all its glories. So is sickness, and so is the grace of God: when sickness hath made the difficulty, then God's grace hath made a triumph, and, by doubling its power, hath created new proportions of a reward; and then shews its biggest glory when it hath the greatest difficulties to master, the greatest weaknesses to support, the most busy temptations to contest with. For so God loves that his strength should be seen in our weakness and our danger."

Not the least striking of his illustrations of this character is one in which he attempts to set forth the insidious progress of sin from small beginnings. "For so have I seen the purls of a spring sweat through the bottom of a bank, and intenerate the stubborn pavement till it made it fit for the impression of

a child's foot, and it was despised like the descending pearls of a misty morning, till it had opened its way, and made a stream large enough to carry away the ruins of the undermined strand, and to invade the neighbouring gardens ; but then the despised drops had grown into an artificial river and an intolerable mischief. So are the first entrances of sin, stopped with the antidotes of a hearty prayer, and checked into sobriety by the eye of a reverend man, or the counsels of a single sermon. But when such beginnings are neglected, and our religion hath not in it so much philosophy as to think anything evil so long as we can endure it, they grow up to ulcers and pestilential evils. They destroy the soul by their abode, who, at their first entry, might have been killed by the pressure of a little finger."

One other passage we must cite, and one in which the beauty of the thought is paralleled by its devotion. "And so have I often seen young and unskilful persons sitting in a little boat, when every little wave sporting about the sides of the vessel, and every motion and dancing of the barge seemed a danger; and made them cling fast upon their fellows, and yet all the while they were safe as if they sat under a tree, while a gentle wind shook the leaves into a refreshment and a cooling shade ; and the unskilful, inexperienced Christian shrieks out whenever his vessel shakes, thinking it always a danger that the watery pavement is not stable and resident like a rock ; and yet all his danger is in himself, none at all from without, for he is indeed moving upon the waters, but fastened to a rock ; faith is his foundation, and hope is his anchor, and death is his harbour, and Christ is his pilot, and heaven is his country ; and all the evils of poverty, or affronts of tribunals and evil judges, of fears and sad apprehensions, are but like the fond wind blowing from the right quarter, they make a noise and drive faster to the harbour ; and if we do not leave the ship and leap into the sea, quit the interests of religion and run to the securities of the world, cut our cables and dissolve our hopes, grow impatient and hug a wave and die in its embraces, we are as safe at sea, safer in the storm which God sends us, than in a calm when we are befriended with the world."

Scattered through Taylor's writings may be found not a few passages in the highest strain of eloquence. Some of them are marred by an ostentation of learning or some odd conceit, but others occur which will endure the test even of such a critic as South. His description of Christ, as the "man of sorrows," is evidently one of his most elaborate passages, and could scarce fail to leave an abiding impression. "He entered into the world with all the circumstances of poverty. He had a star to illustrate his birth, but a stable for his bed-chamber, and a manger for his cradle. The angels sang hymns when he was

born, but he was cold and cried, uneasy and unprovided. He lived long in the trade of a carpenter ; he, by whom God made the world, had in his first years the business of a mean and ignoble trade. He did good wherever he went, and almost wherever he went was abused. He deserved heaven for his obedience, but found a cross in his way thither. But after he had chosen to live a life of virtue, of poverty and labour, he entered into a state of death, whose shame and trouble was great enough to pay for the sins of the whole world. And I shall choose to express this mystery in the words of Scripture: He died not by a single or a sudden death, but he was the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world ; for he was massacred in Abel, he was tossed upon the waves of the sea in the person of Noah ; it was he that went out of his country when Abraham was called from Charran, and wandered from his native soil ; he was offered up in Isaac, persecuted in Jacob, betrayed in Joseph, blinded in Samson, affronted in Moses, scorned in Isaiah, cast into the dungeon with Jeremiah ; for all these were types of Christ's suffering. And then his passion continued even after his resurrection ; for it is he that suffers in all his members. It is he that endures the contradiction of all sinners ; it is he that is the Lord of life, and is crucified again, and put to an open shame in all the sufferings of his servants, and sins of rebels, and defiance of apostates and renegades, and violence of tyrants, and injustice of usurpers, and the persecutions of his church. It is he that is stoned in St Stephen, flayed in the person of St Bartholomew ; he was roasted upon St Lawrence's gridiron, exposed to lions in St Ignatius, burned in St Polycarp, frozen in the lake where stood forty martyrs of Cappadocia. . . The sacrament of Christ's death is not to be accomplished but by suffering all the sorrows of humanity."

His sketch of the early triumphs of Christianity is one of his finest passages. "Presently it came to pass that men were no longer ashamed of the cross, but it was worn upon breasts, printed in the air, drawn upon foreheads, carried upon banners, put upon crowns imperial ; presently it came to pass that the religion of the despised Jesus did infinitely prevail ; a religion that taught men to be meek and humble, apt to receive injuries, but unapt to do any ; a religion that gave countenance to the poor and pitiful in a time when riches were adored, and ambition and pleasure had possessed the hearts of mankind ; a religion that could change the face of things and the hearts of men, and break vile habits into gentleness and counsel ; that such a religion, in such a time, by the sermons and conduct of fishermen, men of mean breeding and illiberal arts, should so speedily triumph over the philosophy of the world, and the

arguments of the subtle, and the sermons of the eloquent, the power of princes and the interest of state, the inclinations of nature and the blindness of zeal, the force of custom and the solicitations of passions, the pleasures of sin and the busy arts of the devil ; that is, against wit and money, nature and empire, which are all the causes in this world, which can make a thing impossible ; this, this is to be ascribed to the power of God, and is the great demonstration of the resurrection of Jesus. Everything was an argument for it, and improved it ; no objection could hinder it, no enemies destroy it ; whatsoever was for them, it made the religion to increase ; whatsoever was against them, made it to increase ; sunshine and storms, fair weather and foul, it was all one as to the event of things ; for they were instruments in the hands of God, who could make what himself should choose to be the product of any cause ; so that, if the Christians had peace, they went abroad and made converts ; if they had no peace, but persecution, the converts came in to them. . . . And quickly it was that the world became disciple to the glorious Nazarene, and men could no longer doubt of the resurrection of Jesus, when it became so demonstrated by the certainty of them that saw it, and the courage of them that died for it, and the multitude of them that believed it ; who, by their sermons and their actions, by their public offices and discourses, by festivals and eucharists, by arguments of experience and sense, by reason and religion, by persuading rational men and establishing believing Christians, by their living in the obedience of Jesus, and dying for the testimony of Jesus, have greatly advanced his kingdom, and his power, and his glory, into which he entered after his resurrection from the dead."

The light of salvation dawning upon the darkness of human apostasy, affords him a fine theme for declamation, although, before he closes, his botany outruns his theology. "We looked for a Judge, and beheld a Saviour ; we feared an accuser, and beheld an advocate ; we sit down in sorrow, and rise up in joy ; we leaned upon the rhubarb and aloes, and our aprons were made of the sharp leaves of Indian fig-trees, and so we fed, and so we were clothed ; but the rhubarb proved medicinal, and the rough leaf of the tree brought its fruit wrapped up in its foldings ; and round about our dwellings was planted a hedge of thorns and a bundle of thistles, the aconite and the briony, the night-shade and the poppy ; and at the root of these grew the healing plantain, which, rising up into a tallness by the friendly invitation of heavenly influence, turned about the tree of the cross, and cured the wounds of the thorns, and the curses of the thistles, and the malediction of man, and the wrath of God."

The good man's security is graphically presented: "The godly man is timorous, and yet safe; tossed by the seas, and yet safe at anchor; impaired by evil accidents, and righted by divine comforts; made sad with a black cloud, and refreshed with a more gentle influence; abused by the world, and yet an heir of heaven; hated by men, and beloved by God; loses one house, and gets a hundred; he quits a convenient lodging-room, and purchases a glorious country; is forsaken by his friends, but never by a good conscience; he fares hardly, and sleeps sweetly; he flies from his enemies, but hath no distracting fears; he is full of thought, but of no amazement; it is his business to be troubled, and his portion to be comforted; he hath nothing to afflict him, but the loss of that which might be his danger, but can never be his good, and in the recompense of this he hath God for his Father, Christ for his Captain, the Holy Ghost for his supporter; so that he shall have all the good that God can give him, and of all that good he hath the Holy Trinity for an earnest and a guage, for his maintenance at present, and his portion to all eternity."

We may not endorse Taylor's views of the relation of Church and State, but we can admire the beauty of the style in which he illustrates his view of it. "So doth the humble vine creep at the foot of an oak, and leans upon its lowest base, and begs shade and protection, and learns to grow under its branches, and to give and take mutual refreshment, and pay a friendly influence for a mighty patronage; and they grow and dwell together, and are the most remarkable of friends and married pairs of all the leafy nation. Religion of itself is soft, easy, and defenceless; and God hath made it grow up with the empire, and lean upon the arms of kings, and it cannot well grow alone; and if it shall, like the ivy, suck the breast of the oak, upon whose body it grew and was supported, it will be pulled down from its usurped eminence, and fire and shame shall be its portion."

Here is what he has to say of the delusiveness of worldly hope: "Learn to despise the world, or, which is a better compendium in the duty, learn to understand it; for it is a cozenage all the way; the head of it is a rainbow, and the face of it is flattery; its words are charms, and all its stories are false; its body is a shadow, and all its hands do knit spiders' webs; it is an image and a noise, with a hydra's lip and a serpent's tail; it was given to serve the needs of our nature, and, instead of doing it, it creates strange appetites, and nourishes thirsts and fevers; it brings care, and debauches our nature, and brings shame and death as the reward of all our cares. Our nature is a disease, and the world does nourish it."

It would be difficult, in the compass of our religious litera-

ture, to find a passage which, in the solemn, dirge-like music of its flow, or in funeral beauty, surpasses this : "A man may read a sermon, the best and most passionate that ever man preached, if he shall but enter into the sepulchres of kings. In the same Escorial, where the Spanish princes live in greatness and power, and decree war or peace, they have wisely placed a cemetery, where their ashes and their glory shall sleep till time shall be no more ; and wherever kings have been crowned, their ancestors lie interred, and they must walk over their grandsire's head to take his crown. There is an acre, sown with royal seed, the copy of the greatest change from rich to naked, from ceiled roofs to arched coffins, from living like gods to die like men. There is enough to cool the flames of lust, to abate the delights of pride, to appease the itch of covetous desires, to sully and dash out the dissembling colours of a lustful, artificial, and imaginary beauty. There the warlike and the peaceful, the fortunate and the miserable, the beloved and the despised princes mingle their dead, and lay down their symbol of mortality, and tell all the world that when we die, our ashes shall be equal to kings', and our accounts easier, and our pains for our crowns shall be less."

Subsequently, speaking of the "all times for his own" of death, he says : "Death reigns in all the portion of our time. The autumn, with its fruits, provides disorders for us, and the winter's cold turns them into sharp diseases ; and the spring brings flowers to strew our hearse, and the summer brings green turf and brambles to bind upon our graves."

Taylor's tendency to diffuseness and excessive verbiage is sometimes checked, and he repeatedly throws off sentences terse and striking enough for the pen of a satirist. Sometimes in a word he paints a picture, or condenses the emphasis of a whole paragraph. Urging perseverance in prayer, he says, "Fall upon your knees, and grow there." Absalom's sin, committed by the advice of Ahithophel, was "to secure him in the possession of hell." By offering tempting allurements to sin, a man "kills his neighbour like a gentleman." In such a case our civilities are direct treasons to the soul. "That you may be kind to your guest, you step aside and lay away the Christian. Your love cannot be expressed, unless you do him an ill turn, and civilly invite him to a fever." The folly of sinners is depicted by shewing them to be "as greedy of the world as children of raw fruit." Counterfeiting sickness, he speaks of "a trap-door to fall into it," as in the case of Cœlius, who pretending to the gout, found that "his arts of dissimulation were so witty, that they put life and motion into the very image of the disease," so that the very picture itself was made to "sigh and groan."

Not a few sentences we meet with in which a sound philosophy or a striking thought takes the form of a proverb. Here are a few specimens: "A sacrifice without a heart was a sad and ominous presage in the superstitions of the Roman augurs; and so it is in the service of God." "Although a little wound upon the finger is very curable, yet the smallest prick upon the heart is mortal; so is a design and purpose of the smallest disobedience, in its formality as malicious and destructive, as in its matter it was pardonable and excusable." "High speculations are as barren as the tops of cedars, but the fundamentals of Christianity are fruitful as the valleys or the creeping vine." Vice, grown into a bad habit, is a tyrant; but Taylor illustrates the truth by saying, "He that feeds a lion must obey him, unless he make his den to be his prison." Setting forth the spirit of the law, he says, "There is a homicide in the tongue as well as in the heart; and he that kills a man's reputation, by calumnies or slander or open reviling, hath broken this commandment." "Felicity," he tells us, "is not a jewel that can be locked up in one man's cabinet." Again, "All our trouble is within us. . . . No men sleep so soundly as they that lay their head upon nature's lap." "He that despiseth his preacher is a hearer of arts and learning, not of the word of God." "God hath opened no gate to heaven but the narrow gate, of which the cross was the key." "A prosperous iniquity is the most unprosperous condition in the world." "Fame or honour is a nice thing, tender as a woman's chastity, or like the face of the purest mirror, which a foul breath, or an unwholesome air, or a watery eye can sully, and the beauty is lost, though it be not dashed in pieces." "He that, without any end of charity or institution, shall tell lies, only to become ridiculous in himself, or to mock another, hath set something on his doom's-day book, which must be taken off by water or by fire—that is, by repentance or a judgment."

There is no little practical wisdom compressed in many of his aphorisms. "Nothing can describe light so well as its own beams." "A good life is the strongest argument that your faith is good; and a gentle voice will be sooner entertained than a voice of thunder." We decidedly prefer Taylor's sentence, "It matters not what religion a man be of, if he be a villain," to the perverted sense of the more common maxim which substitutes "a good man" for "villain." There is matter for reflection in the statement, "More men look upon the sun in an eclipse than when he is in his beauty."

Again, we are told, "Counsels and wise discourses, applied to an actual distemper, at the best are but like strong smells to an epileptic person. They may raise him, but never cure him." Rebuking drunkenness, as by no means consistent with

wisdom, Taylor tells us, "Since Joseph's cup was put in Benjamin's sack, no man hath a divining goblet." Here are memorable sentences: "Virtue scorns a lie for its cover. But to hide a sin with it is like a crust of leprosy drawn over an ulcer." "There are some vices that carry a sword in their hand, and cut a man off before his time."

Sometimes the sentiment is completely overlaid with what may be called Taylorisms. "God remembers mercy, and makes the rod medicinal, and, like the rod of God in the hand of Aaron, to shoot forth buds and leaves and almonds, and hopes and mercies, in the day of restitution."

"If a grammarian should speak solecisms, or a musician sing like a bittern, he becomes ridiculous for offending in the faculty he professes. So it is in those who minister to the conversion of souls; if they fail in their own life, when they profess to instruct another, they are defective in their proper part, and are unskilful to all their purposes. . . . Good counsel seems to be unhallowed when it is reached forth with an impure hand."

Again, "That is a burning shame and an intolerable wickedness, that a minister should be like Marcotia, or the statue of Mercury—shew the way to others, and himself stand still like a painted block." The following is terse enough: "A repentance upon our deathbed is like washing the corpse; it is cleanly and civil, but makes no change deeper than the skin." "Nothing rules a man in private but God and his own desires; and they give laws in a wilderness, and accuse in a cloister, and do execution in a closet, if there be any prevarication." "Anger and lust are like fire, which, if you enclose, suffering it to have no emission, it perishes and dies; but give it the smallest vent, and it rages to the consumption of all it reaches." "A man by sin is made a slave; and like the dog in the fable, we suffer chains and ropes, only for a piece of bread." "Whatever you put into a man, it will smell of the vessel; it is a man's mind that gives the emphasis, and makes your argument to prevail."

Taylor's writings abound in words and sentences, sometimes excessively quaint, but often pithy and striking. They give us not a little good sense in an odd shape, although the wantonness of the fancy sometimes detracts greatly from the gravity of the thought. The new law of the gospel, we are told, is written, as at first, on the hearts of men; "indeed, with a new style, with a quill taken from the wings of the Holy Dove." The prayers of the unclean are described as "reekings of the Dead Sea and clouds of Sodom." A man of only ordinary piety "is like Gideon's fleece, wet in its own locks, but it could not water a poor man's garden." Men who enwrap superstition about their religion are "like dark lanterns, in which a

candle burns bright, but the body is encompassed with a crust and a dark cloud of iron; and these men keep the fires and light of holy propositions within them, but the darkness of hell, and the hardness of a vexed heart, hath shaded the light, and makes it neither apt to warm nor enlighten others, but it turns to fire within; a fever and a distemper dwell there, and religion has become their torment." Fasting, divested of its holiness and sanctification, is "like the walls of a ruinous church, where there is no duty performed to God, but there remains something of that which used to minister to religion."

In animadverting upon the radical measures of the Puritans, who, to reform the establishment, would overthrow it, Taylor tartly remarks: "The woman who lost her groat, *everrit domum non evertit*, she swept the house, she did not turn the house out of doors. That was but an ill reformation which untiled the roof and broke the walls, and was digging down the foundations." In preaching before the Irish Parliament, he urged them so to act "that it should be esteemed more against the honour of a gentleman to be drunk than to be kicked—more shame to fornicate than to be caned." In speaking of the two great sins of pride and covetousness, he says: "They have infected the greatest parts of mankind, and yet no man thinks himself to be either covetous or proud; and, therefore, whatever you discourse about these sins, it never hits any man, but, like Jonathan's arrows to David, they fall short or they fly beyond." He holds up to eulogy the "scorning to steal a victory, and preferring the glory of a sharp sword to that of a sharp wit." The minister who deals in large and obscure expressions, "talks of essences and existences, hypostases and personalities, . . . may amuse himself, and find his understanding, like Peter's, on Mount Tabor, at the transfiguration; he may build three tabernacles in his head, and talk something, but he knows not what." To the hireling preacher he says: "Thou dost but sell sermons, and give counsel, at a price, and, like a fly in the temple, taste of every sacrifice, but do nothing but trouble the religious rites." In case the minister should take upon him his holy calling for covetous or ambitious ends, "he had polluted his hand and his heart; and the fire of the altar is quenched, or it sends forth nothing but the smoke of mushrooms and unhallowed gums."

His argument for contentment with little is put in his own peculiar vein. "Is that beast better that hath two or three mountains to graze on, than a little bee that feeds on dew or manna, and lives upon what falls every morning from the store-houses of heaven, the clouds, and providence? Can a man quench his thirst better out of a river than a full urn, or drink better from the fountain when it is finely paved with marble,

than when it swells over the green turf?" His description of the soul dressing itself for immortality, "first untying the strings of vanity," then knocking "off the fetters of pride and vainer complacencies," is too extended and elaborate for insertion here.

There is a peculiar quaintness in his allusions to what is either impossible or incongruous. There are those to whom you might speak of the impolicy of their sin; "tell them these and ten thousand things more, you move them no more than if you should read one of Tully's orations to a mule." Again—"To support martyrdom, or the duty of sufferings, by false arches and exterior circumstances, is to build a tower upon the beams of the sun, or to set up a wooden ladder to climb up to heaven."

Illustrating the importance of using adequate means to the attainment of great Christian ends, he says: "No wise man will sail to Ormus in a cock-boat, or use a child for his interpreter; and that general is a cyclops, without an eye, who chooses the sickest men to man his towns, and the weakest to fight his battles." The mercy of God, we are told, is seen in his separating men from the occasions of their sin, the neighbourhood and the temptation; "for if the hyena and the dog should be thrust in the same kennel, one of them would soon find a grave, and, it may be, both of them their death. So infallible is the ruin of most men, if they be shewed a temptation; nitre and rosin, naphtha and bitumen, sulphur and pitch are their constitution, and the fire passes upon them infinitely, and there is none to secure them." The process by which men reconcile themselves to their iniquity, by dealing with it piece-meal, is thus described: "They have minced the case of conscience into little particles, and swallowed the lie by crumbs, so that no one passage of it shall rush against the conscience or do hurt, until it is all got into the belly, and unites in the effect." The transitoriness of vain pleasure is such, that "when the minute is gone, so is the pleasure too, and leaves no foot-step but the impression of a sigh, and dwells nowhere but in the same house where you will find *yesterday*—that is, in forgetfulness and annihilation, unless its only child, *sorrow*, shall marry and breed more of its own kind, and so continue its memory and name to eternal ages." In setting forth the folly of finding fault with the truth that exposes our deformity, Taylor says: "When we are told that our liver is inflamed with lust or anger, that our heart is vexed with envy, that our eyes roll with wantonness, and though we think all is well, yet we are sick, sick unto death, and near to a sad and fatal sentence—we shall think that man that tells us so is imprudent or uncharitable; and yet he hath done him no more injury than a deformed man daily receives from his looking-glass,

which, if he shall dash against the wall, because it shows him his face just as it is, his face is not so ugly as his manners. And yet our heart is so impatient of seeing its own stains, that, like the elephant, it tramples in the pure streams, and first troubles them, then stoops and drinks, where he can least see his large deformity."

The imperfect Christian is pourtrayed in no very flattering style: "But so it happens, in the mud and slime of the river Borborus, when the eye of the sun hath long dwelt upon it, and produces frogs and mice, which begin to move a little under a thin cover of its own paternal matter, and if they can get loose, to live half a life, that is all; but the hinder parts, which are not formed before the setting of the sun, stick fast in their beds of mud, and the little moiety of a creature dies before it could be well said to live. So it is with those Christians who will do all that they suppose lawful, and will do no more than what they think necessary; they do but peep into the light of the Sun of righteousness; they have the beginnings of life, but their hinder parts, their passions and affections, and the desires of the lower man are still unformed; and he that dwells in this state, is just so much of a Christian as a sponge is of a plant, and a mushroom of a shrub; they may be as sensible as an oyster, and discourse at the rate of a child, but are greatly short of the righteousness evangelical."

As might be expected, the quaintness of Taylor sometimes passes beyond its proper limits, and verges on the ludicrous. He thinks vice may be communicated by the nurse: "Natural distemperatures may pass in the rivulets of milk, *like evil spirits in a white garment.*" The sermons of godless doctors—as in the ancient temple where Christ listened—he compares "to the spoils of beavers, sheep, and silk-worms, designed to clothe others, and made the occasions of their own nakedness and the causes of their death." "Mental prayer," he says, "when our spirits wander, is like a watch standing still, because the spring is down; wind it up again, and it goes on regularly; but, in vocal prayer, the words run on, and the spirit wanders; the clock strikes false, the hand points not to the right hour, because something is in disorder, and the striking is nothing but noise." He compares husband and wife quarrelling for want of a full table and a rich wardrobe, to "two mill-stones which set the mill on fire when they want corn." Those who are greedy to receive a scandal, have "natures like sponges or sugar, whose utmost verge, if you dip in wine, it drowns itself in the moisture it sucks up, and is drenched all over." "They suck it up to the dissolution of their whole religion."

Weak heads cannot endure great heights. Taylor illustrates it by telling us that "Lucifer and many angels, walking upon

the battlements of heaven, grew *top-heavy*, and fell into the state of devils." "The pleasure of revenge," he accounts, "like the pleasure of eating chalk and coals. A foolish disease made the appetite, and it is entertained with an evil reward. It is like the feeding of a cancer and a wolf." Occasionally an illustration borders on vulgarity. "You may as well tie a wild dog to quietness by the guts of a tender kid, as suppose that most men can do virtuously, when they may sin at a great price." "A man must resolve to be a fool, a rash, inconsiderate person, or he will feel but little satisfaction in the enjoyment of his sin. Indeed, *he that stops his nose*, may drink down such corrupted waters." Of covetous parents he says: "If they heap up for their heirs (like the mice of Africa hiding the golden ore in their bowels, and refusing to give back the indigested gold *till their guts be out*), they may remember that what was unnecessary for them, is as unnecessary for their sons. The uses of affliction are illustrated by a "classical" reference: "Plutarch reports concerning swine, that their optic nerves are so disposed to turn their eyes downward, that they cannot look upwards nor behold the face of heaven, unless they be thrown upon their backs. Such swine are we; we seldom can look up to heaven till God, by his judgments, throws us upon our backs." As to the genealogy of fanatic error, he is specific enough almost for an antiquarian. "The will furnishes out malice, and the understanding sends out levity; and they marry and produce a fantastic dream; and the daughter, sucking wind instead of the milk of the word, grows up to madness and the spirit of reprobation." If we give countenance to sin, "we are like tortoises and the ostrich, hatching their eggs with their looks only." The amiabilities of natural character have little positive worth in the scale of virtue. "They tie a stone at the bottom of a well, and that's more than needs. The stone will stay there without that trouble." Some men turn their very trials into profit. Taylor says: "We kill the viper, and make *treacle* of him—that is, not only escape from, but gain advantages by temptations." We recollect to have heard of a veteran clergyman who suggested to his hearers, that some of them, if they had fallen in with the plundered man mentioned in Scripture, would, instead of pouring in oil and wine, "have stuck a tract under his nose." Taylor would undoubtedly have endorsed the suggestion. He says: "When the wolf in the fable went to school to learn to spell, whatever letters were told him, he could never make anything of them but *aguns*; he thought of nothing but his belly; and if a man be very hungry, you must give him meat before you give him counsel." We imagine that few countenances in Taylor's congregation would have been able to restrain a smile, as he proceeded to shew how

one sin either occasions or discovers another. "I remember," he says, "that in the Apologues of Phœdrus, it is told concerning an ill-natured fellow, that he refused to pay his symbol, which himself and all the company had agreed should be given for every disease that each man had, he denying his itch to be disease; but the company, taking off the refuser's hat for a pledge, found that he had a scalled-head, and so demanded the money double; which he pertinaciously resisting, they threw him down, and then discovered that he was broken-bellied, and justly condemned him to pay three philippics. One disease discovers itself by the hiding of another, and that being opened discovers a third; he that is almost taken in a fault, tells a lie to escape; and, to protect that lie, he forswears himself; and, that he may not be suspected of perjury, he grows impudent; and that sin may not shame him, he glories in it, like the slave in the comedy, who being torn with whips, grinned, and forced an ugly smile, that it might not seem to smart."

Sometimes the ludicrous and the serious are strangely blended: "He that is no fool, but can consider wisely, if he be in love with this world, we need not despair but that a witty man might reconcile him with tortures, and make him think charitably of the rack, and be brought to dwell with vipers and dragons, and entertain his guests with the shrieks of mandrakes, cats, and screech-owls, with the filing of iron, and the harshness of rending of silk, or to admire the harmony that is made by a herd of ravening wolves, when they miss their draught of blood in their midnight revels. The groans of a man, in a fit of the stone, are worse than all these; and the distractions of a troubled conscience are worse than those groans; and yet a careless, merry sinner is worse than all that." There is little value in many laboured speculations; but Taylor, not content with this simple statement, expands it thus: "Men's notions are often like the mules, begotten by equivocal and unnatural generations, but they make no *species*. They are begotten, but they can beget nothing. They are the effects of long study, but they can do no good when they are produced." Again, explaining a prophecy, he gives it a broad moral application, in a style that would be apt to be remembered even for oddity, if nothing more: "Babylon shall be the possession of a hedge-hog—that is, a sinner's dwelling, encompassed round with thorns and sharp prickles, afflictions and uneasiness all over. So that he that wishes his sin big and prosperous, wishes his bee as big as a bull, and his hedgehog like an elephant." The secure content of poverty is thus set forth: "No man goes about to poison a poor man's pitcher, nor lays plots to forage his little garden, made for the hospital of two bee-hives, and the feasting of a few Pythagorean herb-

eat^{ers}." The vanity of outward forms it is very easy to assert. Taylor, however, cannot present it in any ordinary way. "The soul," he says, "can no more be changed by a ceremony, or an external solemnity, than an angel can be caressed with sweetmeats, or a man's belly can be filled with music and long orations."

In his use of ridicule, in attacking the Puritans, Taylor is unsparing; but when he turns against the Quakers, he is not less bitter, though he tempts us to smile, while we pity the victim. After shewing the abundant provision made by God for supplying instruction to his church, bestowing prophets, apostles, evangelists, &c., not forgetting Scripture, expositors, and tradition, he proceeds: "And after all this, to have a fungus arise from the belly of mud and darkness, and nourish a glow-worm that shall challenge to outshine the lantern of God's word, and all the candles which God set upon a hill, and all the stars of Christ's right hand, is to annul all the excellent, established, orderly and certain effects of the Spirit of God, and to worship the false fires of the night. He, therefore, that will follow a guide that leads him by an extraordinary spirit, shall go an extraordinary way, and have a strange fortune, and a singular religion, and a portion by himself, a great way off from the common inheritance of the saints, who are all led by the Spirit of God, and have one heart and one mind, one faith and one hope, the same baptism, and the helps of the ministry, leading them to the common country, which is the portion of all that are the sons of adoption, consigned by the Spirit of God, the earnest of their inheritance."

Among Taylor's comparisons, there are some hastily drawn and incongruous; but there are others which are exquisite. His sermon on the marriage-ring contain several. Here is one: "Celibate, like the fly in the heart of an apple, dwells in perpetual sweetness, but sits alone, and is confined, and dies in singularity; but marriage, like the useful bee, builds a house, and gathers sweetness from every flower, and labours and unites into societies and republics, and sends out colonies, and feeds the world with delicacies, and obeys their king and keeps order, and exercises many virtues, and promotes the interests of mankind."

Not less striking is his illustration of a false repentance, while we still hug the sin: "He certainly is very much in love with sin, and parts with it very unwillingly, that keeps its picture and wears its favour, and delights in the fancy of it, even with the same desire as a most passionate widow parts with her dearest husband, even when she can no longer enjoy him; but certainly her staring all day upon his picture, and weeping over his robe, and wringing her hands over his children, are no

great sign that she hated him. And just so do most men hate and accordingly part with their sins."

In another place the "effigy" of humility and *Æsop's* picture are finely compared: "Humility is so noble a virtue, that even pride itself puts on its upper garment; and we do like those who cannot endure to look upon an ugly and deformed person, and yet will give a great price for a picture extremely like him. Humility is despised in substance—but courted and admired in effigy. *Æsop's* picture was sold for two talents, when himself was made a slave at the price of two philippics."

The benefits of our religious duties are thus set forth: "Our duties towards Him being like vapours ascending from the earth, not at all to refresh the region of the clouds, but to return back in a fruitful and refreshing shower." The life of Christ is described as being, not like a picture in the chamber of pleasure, to entertain the eye, "but, like Egyptian hieroglyphics, where every feature is a precept, and the images converse with men by sense and signification of excellent discourses. "An Egyptian, who acknowledged fire for his god, one day, doing his devotions, kissed his god, after the manner of worshippers, and burnt his lips. . . . Just such a fool is he who kisses a danger, though with a design of virtue, and hugs an opportunity of sin for an advantage of piety." "Anger," we are told, "is like the waves of a troubled sea; when it is corrected with a soft reply, as with a little strand, it retires, and leaves nothing behind it but froth and shells—no permanent mischief." No wise man ever lost anything by cession; but he receives the hostility of violent persons into his embraces, like a stone into a lap of wool. . . . But a stone falling upon a stone, makes a collision, and extracts fire." "When a man does evil that good may come of it, or good to an evil purpose, that man does like him that rolls himself in thorns, that he may sleep easily; he roasts himself in the fire that he may quench his thirst in his own sweat." The rich man, laying up wealth for "he knows not who," is compared to "the ass carrying wood and sweet herbs to the baths, but was never washed or perfumed himself; he heaped up sweets for others, while himself was filthy with smoke and ashes."

Of other comparisons more extended, which are to be found in the writings of Taylor, some are exceedingly striking and beautiful. One of them is in his "Holy Dying," where he takes the bubble as the emblem of human life. Another is that in which the sinner, heated by passion and rage, is compared to "the bold trooper" who never feels the smart of his wounds till they are cold.* And still another, somewhat more

* Sermons, i. 89.

fanciful, is that in which prayer is set forth under the figure of a rivulet.*

Perhaps, in none of his writings, does Taylor's peculiar genius find fuller scope, than in his sermons on the tongue. Here he is, by turns, eloquent and matter-of-fact, quaint and satirical, discriminating and denunciatory. His keen sense of the ridiculous, his ludicrous imagery and striking illustrations, his odd fancies, genial humour, varied learning, and biting invective are all brought into play. "There are some persons," he tells us, "so full of nothing, that, like the strait sea of Pontus, they perpetually empty themselves by their mouth, making every company or single person they fasten on, to be their Propontis." "The talking man makes himself artificially deaf, being like a man in the steeple when the bell rings."

And yet one may go to the opposite extreme. Against this also Taylor protests. There is "a morose and continued silence" which "makes amends for committing many sins by omitting many duties; and, instead of digging out the offending eye, plucks out both, that they might neither see the scandal nor the duty."

His cure for loquacity is plausible: "Great knowledge, if it be without vanity, is the most severe bridle of the tongue;" and, in confirmation, he adduces one of his most ludicrous illustrations: "For so have I heard that all the noises and pratings of the pools, the croaking of frogs and toads, is hushed and appeased, upon the instant, by bringing upon them the light of a candle or torch. Every beam of reason and ray of knowledge checks the dissolutions of the tongue."

And yet the disease of the inveterate talker is admitted to be a desperate one. Upon him scarce any medicine will stick. Plutarch advises that such men should give themselves to writing, that making an issue in the arm, it shall drain the floods from the head; supposing that if the humour were anyway vented, the tongue might be brought to reason. But the experience of the world hath confuted this; and when Ligurius had written a poem, he talked of it to all companies he came in; but, however, it can be no hurt to try,—for some have been cured of bleeding at the nose by opening a vein in the arm." In spite, however, of all proposed remedies, some men, Taylor assures us, with a mock gravity that would have done honour to Dean Swift, "will never be cured without a cancer or a squincie." He does not forget, however, to remind his readers, in this connection, that "Ælian tells of the geese flying over Mount Taurus, that, for fear of eagles, carried stones in their mouths till past the danger."

* Sermons, i. 244.

The forms of evil speaking furnish him a theme on which he expatiates with evident relish. He notes how, "at every corner of the mouth, a folly peeps out, or a mischief creeps in;" nor does he forget the irritations of petty disputes, "which are like flies and gnats upon the margin of a pool; they do not sting like an asp, or bite deep as a bear, yet they can vex a man into a fever and impatience." Foolish jesting comes in for its share of rebuke. "A penitent and a jester, is like a Grecian piece of money, on which were stamped an Helena on one side, and an Hecuba on the other; a rose and a deadly aconite, a Paris and an Æsop; nothing was more contrary." But jesting with sacred things is not only incongruous, but impious: "He that makes a jest of the words of Scripture, or of holy things, plays with thunder, and kisses the mouth of a cannon just as it belches fire and death. He stakes heaven at Spurn-point, and trips *cross and pile*, whether ever he see the face of God or no. He laughs at damnation, while he had rather lose God than lose his jest; nay, he makes a jest of God himself, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son to become ridiculous."

As to profane swearing—upon which, by way of preface, he states that St Chrysostom expended twenty homilies—he pours out upon it a full tide of burning invective. "It is a foolish vice, but hard to be cured; infinitely unreasonable, but strangely prevailing; almost as much without remedy, as it is without pleasure; for it enters first by folly, and grows by custom, and dwells with carelessness, and is nursed by irreligion and want of fear of God. It profanes the most holy things, and mingles dirt with the beams of the sun—follies and trifling talk interweaved and knit together with the sacred name of God. It placeth the most excellent things in the meanest and basest circumstances; it brings the secrets of heaven into the streets, dead men's bones into the temple. Nothing is a greater sacrilege than to prostitute the great name of God to the petulance of an idle tongue, and blend it as an expletive to fill up the emptiness of a weak discourse."

But Taylor does not forget to note the ludicrous features of profanity. While it "changes every trifling lie into a horrid perjury," it puts "fierce appendages to every word, like great iron bars to a straw basket, or the curtains of a tent."

As to altercation, "it makes men troublesome, and intricates all wise discourses, and throws a cloud upon the face of truth; and while men contend for truth, error, dressed in the same habit, slips into her chair, and all the litigants court her before the divine sister of wisdom." "People," moreover, "who contend earnestly, talk loud; anger rides upon noise as upon a horse; still the noise and the rider is in the dirt." Slander, moreover,

comes in for a rebuke. "The detracting tongue, like the smooth-tongued lightning, will break your bones when it kisses the flesh." "A false tongue is like a poisoned arrow; it makes the wound deadly, and every scratch incurable." The parasite or flatterer, is not flattered in his portrait. He "is a beast that is all belly, looking round with his eye, watchful, ugly and deceitful; and, creeping on his *teeth*, *they* feed *him*, and he kills *them* that reach him bread, for that is the nature of all vipers."

Yet Taylor is no enemy of cheerful conversation, and his description of it is in strong contrast with his portraiture of the abuses of the tongue. "Cheerfulness and a festival spirit fills the soul full of harmony; it composes music for churches and hearts; it makes and publishes glorifications of God; it produces thankfulness and serves the end of charity; and when the oil of gladness runs over, it makes bright and tall emissions of light and holy fires, reaching up to a cloud, and making joy round about." "If a facetious discourse, and an amicable, friendly mirth can refresh the spirit, and take it off from the vile temptations of peevish, despairing, uncomplying melancholy, it must needs be innocent and commendable. And we may as well be refreshed by a clean and brisk discourse, as by the air of Campanian wines; and our faces and our heads may be as well anointed, and look pleasant with wit and friendly intercourse, as with the fat of the balsam tree, and such a conversation no wise man ever did or ought to reprove. But when the jest hath teeth and nails, biting or scratching our brother, when it is loose and wanton, when it is unseasonable and much or many, when it serves ill purposes, or spends better time, then it is the drunkenness of the soul, and makes the spirit fly away, seeking for a temple where the mirth and the music is solemn and religious."

One fault which will often suggest itself, in perusing the writings of Taylor, is his diffuseness. His stream of speech, sometimes rapid and compressed, often overflows its banks, and spreads far and near over the broad meadows. He will amplify a thought, and expand it out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance. But however thin his material is hammered, it is so often *gold* foil, that we are reconciled by the beauty of the result to the rhetorical defect. Instead of characterising anger as simply rude, unmannerly, and provoking, he says: "He that would not have his reason confounded, or his discourse useless, or his family be a den of lions—he that would not have his marriage a daily duel, or his society troublesome, or his friendship formidable, or his feasts bitter; he that delights not to have his discipline cruel, or government tyrannical, or his disputations violent, or his civilities unman-

nerly, or his charity to be a rudeness, or himself brutish as a bear, or peevish as a fly, or miserable upon every accident, and in all the changes of his life, must mortify his anger."

Instead of simply saying that if the heart is wrong, the whole life is wrong, he says: "There is so much falseness and iniquity in man's heart, that it defiles all the members; it makes the eyes lustful and the tongue slanderous; it fills the head with mischief, and the feet with blood, and the hands with injury, and the present condition of man with folly, and makes his future state apt to inherit eternal misery."

In speaking of the relation of the intention to the life, he dilates thus: "Holy intention is to the actions of a man that which the soul is to the body, or form to its matter, or the root to the tree, or the sun to the world, or the fountains to a river, or the base to a pillar; for, without these, the body is a dead trunk, the matter is sluggish, the tree is a block, the world is darkness, the river is quickly dry, the pillar rushes into flatness and a ruin, and the action is sinful, or unbenefitable and vain."

Instead of saying that the angels rejoice over the arrival in heaven of redeemed spirits, he says: "There is no blessed soul goes to heaven, but he makes a general joy in all the mansions where the angels do dwell, and in all the chapels where the angels sing." He is not content with simply speaking of the world as deceptive; he bids us learn "to despise the world, or, which is a better compendium in the duty, learn but truly to understand it; for it is a cozenage all the way: the head of it is a rainbow, and the face of it is flattery; its words are charms, and all its stories are false; its body is a shadow, and its hands do knit spiders' webs; it is an image and a noise, with a hyena's lip and a serpent's tail; it was given to serve the ends of our nature, and instead of doing it, it creates strange appetites, and nourishes thirsts and fevers; it brings care and debauches our nature, and brings shame and death as the reward of all our cares. Our nature is a disease, and the world does nourish it."

And yet we might easily cite passages in which Taylor speaks with a conciseness and brevity sufficient to meet the demand of any critic. Occasionally he is terrible in his descriptions, and overwhelming in the force of his language. He vies with Baxter in depicting the doom of the secure sinner. "He that, because he sits uneasily when he sits near the 'King that was crowned with thorns,' shall remove thence, or strew flowers, roses, and jessamine, the down of thistles and the softest gossamer, that he may die without pain, die quietly and like a lamb, sinks to the bottom of hell without noise; this man is a fool, because he accepts death, if it arrests him in civil language, is content to die by the sentence of an eloquent judge,

and prefers a quiet passage to hell, before going to heaven in a storm." His description of the tongue is vigorous enough for commentary on the language of James: "The tongue is a fountain both of bitter waters and of pleasant; it sends forth blessing and cursing; it praises God and rails at men; it is sometimes set on fire, and then it puts whole cities in combustion; it is unruly, and no more to be restrained than the breath of a tempest; it is volatile and fugitive; reason should go before it, and when it does not, repentance comes after it; it was intended for an organ of the divine praises, but the devil often plays upon it, and then it sounds like the screech-owl, or the groans of death: sorrow and shame, folly and repentance, are the notes and formidable accents of that discord."

The folly of finding fault with the admonitions of Providence is thus forcibly expressed:—"That Italian gentleman was certainly a great lover of his sleep who was angry with the lizard that waked him when a viper was creeping into his mouth. When the devil is entering into us to poison our spirits and steal our souls away while we are sleeping in the lethargy of sin, God sends his sharp messages to awaken us, and we call that the enemy, and use arts to cure the remedy, not to cure the disease."

In dealing with some subjects, Taylor can employ a homely plainness of speech, level to the weakest understanding. Speaking of the atheist, he remarks:—"The thing framed says that nothing framed it; the tongue never made itself to speak, and yet talks against Him that did;" and, in idolatry, "the devil hath infinitely prevailed"—"not only making God after man's image, but in the likeness of a calf, of a cat, of a serpent, making men such fools as to worship a quartan-ague, fire and water, onions and sheep. This is the skill man learned and the philosophy that he is taught by believing the devil." The degree of poverty in which some exercised the virtues which prosperity interfered with is set forth by the fact that they had but "one broken dish, and no spoon." Of excuses for wrongdoing he says:—"Sin hath no wiser reasons for itself than these, the same argument that the fly hath to enter the candle, the same argument a fool hath that entereth into sin. It looks prettily, but rewards the eye, as burning basins do, with intolerable circles of reflected fire."

In urging the duty of immediate repentance, Taylor commits a mistake, not infrequent with him, of mixing up odd figures with solemn appeals. Repentance being, he says, "a duty of a great and giant-like bulk, let no man crowd it up into so narrow room that it shall be strangled in its birth for want of time and air to breathe in. . . . Will any man hunt the wild boar in his garden, or bait a bull in his closet? Will a woman

wrap her child in her handkerchief, or a father send his son to school when he is fifty years old?"

Taylor is a voluminous writer, and not a little might be struck out of his volumes, without in the least detracting from their value as a whole. His diffuseness, superfluity, and excessive verbiage overload his pages, and the "Holy Living and Dying" might have judiciously been reduced to at least half its present bulk. Nor is he always equal as a writer. Not a little that is dull and prosaic is mixed up with not a little of the reverse. Some of his writings might be regarded as fairly cancelled by others, diverse in scope, if a fair balance were struck.

Yet his general aim is plainly to instruct and edify. Of his "Life of Christ," he says:—"I pray God this may go forth into a blessing to all that use it, and reflect blessings upon me all the way, that my spark may grow greater by kindling my brother's taper, and God may be glorified in us both."

In his "Holy Living and Dying" are not a few passages which a judicious taste would have excluded, some which, with many readers, would be regarded as most decidedly interfering with the propriety of an indiscriminate perusal of the book. Yet the author, evidently with an eye to these, says:—"If any man will snatch the pure taper from my hand, and hold it to the devil, he will only burn his own fingers, but shall not rob me of the reward of my care and good intentions." And subsequently, expressing the humbleness of his aim, he remarks:—"It is enough for me to be an under-builder in the house of God, and glory in the employment. I labour in the foundation, and therefore the work needs no apology for being plain, so it be strong and well-laid."

It is not pleasant to dwell upon the faults of the man; but they are as obvious as the faults of his style. There is not a little that is excellent, while there is also much that is incongruous in both. His policy was too much shaped by the emergency. His days of hardship were his best days. We esteem him most while his position is humblest. He is dizzied by his elevation. He forgets or ignores the better principles which he had first avowed. And yet, except in his treatment of dissenters, and the intolerant spirit into which he lapsed, we recognise much in his later writings which is worthy to stand by the side of his earlier productions.

In an intellectual point of view, Taylor was a prodigy. He had genius rather than talent. He amazes rather than impresses us. His broadsides are altogether too much pyrotechnic displays. He has logic, but it is overladen by rhetoric. He has plan, but his genius is too wayward always to abide by it. He will go out of his way to pluck a flower more repulsive than

dulness, or pick up a scrap of history or antique legend that is only an incumbrance to his argument.

But in the realm of fancy he brooks no rival. Vast as the stores of his learning must have been, widely as they may have been gathered, his fancy roams over a broader field. His images are drawn from the wide domain of nature and of art. He is sagacious to discern analogies, rather than discriminating in their application. Hence he often blunders. Some of his similes are strangled in their birth by newly discovered analogies. Surprising others, he is himself taken by surprise, and yields unresisting to the temptation of the novel thought. Bound on his voyage, he often drops the helm to cast the net or gaze on the grandeur of the sea, its waves and its foam, its icebergs and its dolphins. His march is like that of an oriental army, laden alike with the richest splendours of royalty and with baggage waggons, and yet constantly enlivened or excited by the skirmishes of flying scouts. His learning is more abundant than accurate, and lies, for the most part, unassorted in his capacious memory. Great historic facts, legends, minute incidents, ludicrous occurrences, are all jumbled together in promiscuous heaps; and, although sometimes selected and applied with great tact, that seems to be often snatched up which is nearest at hand, and for no other reason than that it is so.

His style is strangely unequal. Sometimes it rolls along in an even, stately march, composed and majestic. Sometimes it pours like the torrent from the hills, gathering up sticks and straws as well as golden sands, and breaking ever and anon in glittering cascades. Sometimes it chafes its way over the stones, and wraps itself, as it grows more composed, with froth and foam. And yet, again, it seems to plod along through the meadows, lingering among the bogs, or covering itself over with pond-lilies. The most beautiful thoughts alternate with what would be accounted by a severe taste vulgar, if not repulsive. Mud and stars, flowers and brambles, are strangely commingled. We have scarcely caught the scent of a rose, before we are scratched with a thorn, or nauseated with muck. The very sentence that promises to lift us to the clouds may be followed by one that precipitates us to the gutter. The terms we meet shew almost equal familiarity with the vocabulary of the philosopher and the ploughman, the scholar and the tinker.

With less genius, Taylor might have been a better reasoner, and with less learning, a better writer. His pages are overloaded with superfluities. His resources are so abundant, that he feels that he must display them; and to him it is sometimes immaterial whether they are drawn from the armoury of disciplined thought, or a Chinese toy-shop. His gifts and

attainments are too lavish for his control, and his taste is too ill-regulated to reject anything that strikes his fancy.

Admirable in select passages, unsurpassed in rare beauties, Taylor yet affords us no model. Whoever should attempt to imitate him would only succeed in making himself ridiculous. The mould of his thought could not be transferred safely to the hands of another man. None ever wrote like him, and, it may be added, none ought to endeavour to do it. We read him, and are often captivated, but an imitator of him would be contemptible.

It is difficult to classify such a man as Taylor among his contemporaries. Strange as it may seem, some of his faults are precisely those which mar Baxter's writings. But Taylor lacks the nerve, and rude, homely vigour of the diocesan of Kidderminster parish. There are passages in his writings which are worthy, for keenness of ridicule and crushing denunciation, to be placed alongside the pages of South. But the renegade Puritan, who had once praised Cromwell, and atoned for the weakness by pelting him ever after with Attic mud, had in his nature a rancorous venom and an obduracy of spite to which Taylor could make no pretensions. John Howe has some fine passages which would be accounted as gems even in Taylor's writings, but the serene composure and sustained grandeur of the one find rarely any counterpart in the surprising elasticity and quick transitions of the other.

Taylor stands among his contemporaries, solitary in his peculiarities. In his own distinctive sphere, he has absolutely no rival. His literary remains are represented to us, not by the classic statue, not by the symmetry of the Capitoline Jove, but by the picture of the wrestler who contends, or stands ready to contend, for each Olympic prize. They entertain us not in grand majestic halls, where no decoration affronts a primitive simplicity of taste, but in a gorgeous Alhambra, amid gushing fountains and the sombre shadows of rich sunlight, where each scene is one of oddity or enchantment, and every step presses a tessellated mosaic of the richest marbles and the coarsest stone.

As a theological teacher, Taylor is quite unreliable. On some points, and those which would generally be regarded as most important by the Laudian school, he was not only sufficiently, but somewhat fiercely orthodox; but on others he is given over even by Heber as quite unsound. He had departed materially from the standard doctrines of the Reformers of the English Church, and the moderate Calvinism of Usher must have been too strong meat for him. His sermons on justification are theological curiosities. He does not seem to understand even that which Luther called the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesie*. He says, indeed, "We are saved not by

works, ... that is, by an exact obedience, but by faith working by love, by sincere, hearty endeavours, and believing God, and relying upon his infinite mercy ;” * and yet he maintains “ that no man should fool himself by disputing about the philosophy of justification, and what causality faith has in it, and whether it be the act of faith that justifies or the habit ; whether by inherent worthiness or adventitious imputation.” Faith, he declares, will not justify alone, “ but works must be an ingredient.” “ No man,” he says, “ is actually justified, but he that is in some measure sanctified.” “ Justification and sanctification cannot be distinguished but as words of art, signifying the various steps of progression in the same course.” “ No man is justified, that is, so as to signify salvation, but sanctification must be precedent to it.” Upon the Nonconformists, whom he represents as making all religion to consist in faith, he heaps unsparing ridicule.†

Taylor, on many points, shews himself Arminian ; on others he goes to the Pelagian extreme. The fall of man was with him but of little account, contributing but a rill to the stream of depravity, instead of being the fountain-head. No one, he thought, would be damned for original sin alone. His horror of Calvinism was extreme, and he could not believe that by one man’s sin the whole race was brought under the curse. The fall of Adam was no more than a return to man’s natural condition.‡ The depravity that succeeded it was not total. The doctrine of the Westminster Assembly on this subject was so repugnant that he felt impelled to attack it : “ A man cannot naturally hate God,” he said, “ if he knows anything of him.” It is, however, worthy of note, that in Taylor’s devotional works his obnoxious doctrinal views are rarely prominent. The piety of his heart rose above the errors of his head.

In one of the few passages in which he refers to predestination, he misapplies the term, and speaks of the “ infinite mercy” of God, that he “ should predestinate all mankind to salvation by Jesus Christ ;” and yet in another he asks, “ Who but a madman would trouble his head with the entangled limbs of the fantastic chain of predestination ?” In his *Liberty of Prophesying*, he betrays a strong sympathy with Origen ; and, in his sermons, he shews that his views of future punishment were loose and incoherent : “ For it is,” he says, “ a strange consideration to suppose an eternal torment to those to whom it was never threatened, to those who never heard of Christ, to those who lived probably well, to heathens of good lives, to ignorant and untaught people, to people surprised in a single crime, to

* Sermons, ii. 495. † Sermons, iii. 60. ‡ Heber’s Life of Taylor, 24.

men that die young in their natural follies and foolish lusts, to them that fall in a sudden gaiety and excessive joy, to all alike; . . . and that this should be inflicted by God, who infinitely loves his creatures," &c.* He speaks, in another place, of "that mercy which God reserves for the souls of many million of men and women concerning whom we have no hope," and asks, "What shall become of ignorant Christians, . . . people that are baptized, and taught to go to church, it may be, once a year? And yet that an eternity of pains shall be consequent to such an ignorance, is unlike the mercy of God; and yet that they should be in any disposition towards an eternity of intellectual joy, is nowhere set down in the leaves of revelation." We should rather hope, in behalf of "heathens and prevaricating Jews," "that they have a portion in the secrets of the divine mercy."†

It is easy to see that on many points the views of Taylor were quite loose and indefinite. On others he was, to his credit, inconsistent with himself. Toward Calvinism, in nearly all its aspects, he maintained a negative position. He did not understand it, and he did not wish to understand it, while he had a remarkable facility of persuading himself of the truth of what it was his interest or his desire to believe.

Utterly unsafe as a theological guide, he is far more acceptable as a devotional teacher. Many of the prayers in his *Holy Living and Dying*, and elsewhere, are utterly lacking in simplicity. Some of them are rhetorical and inflated beyond all parallel. But there are others which glow with the spirit of genuine penitence and humility. In his dissertations on duty, he is, as a general thing, quite practical, although his taste for casuistry sometimes leads him astray from the directness of his design, and the minuteness of his specifications reminds us of one who should attempt to count the sand-grains of a mountain, to estimate its grandeur. But, in spite of all this, there are passages where he lays hold, with a strong

* Sermons, i. 60.

† On the subject of baptism, Taylor's views were peculiar. Nor does he seem to be always consistent with himself. He says, "Either infants cannot go to heaven any way we know of, or they must be baptized." Baptism "takes off the evils of original sin," "the guilt" of which "signifies nothing but the obligation to the punishment, and he that feels the evil consequent, to him the sin is imputed." "Baptism," he holds to be "a state of repentance and pardon for ever." He urges that unless our children are in a present capacity for a blessing, that is, either by receiving the Holy Ghost immediately, and the promises, or at least have a title to the sacrament and enter by that door, they have no privilege beyond the children of Turks and heathens. "If they have only a title to the water of the sacrament, then they shall receive the promise of the Holy Spirit, the benefit of the sacrament; also their privilege is none at all but a dish of cold water, which every village nurse can provide for her new-born babe."—(*Life of Christ*, pp. 257-264)

grasp, on our religious sympathies, where he stirs the soul to its very depths, where he draws the curtains of sense and unveils before us, in overpowering sublimity and grandeur, the things that are unseen and eternal. Not rarely he violates good taste. Sometimes he repels by vulgarity, or ludicrous images, which put seriousness, for the moment at least, to flight; but, ere long, he has recovered himself, and discourses with the humility of a penitent or the fervour of a seraph. He is just as likely to quote Plutarch or *Æsop*, as Isaiah or John; yet we never doubt his supreme reverence for the word of God. His Latin quotations are abundant, and no stray scrap of learning or antiquarian fragment ever comes amiss to his ready hand; but though we regard with alternate admiration and amusement his tessellated mosaic of learning and legend, of fact and of fancy, we rarely fail to find something to remind us that the author is more than a scholar, more than a casuist, more than an orator, and that underneath all the fantastic shrubbery that lines its banks, there flows a deep, strong current of genuine devotion.

It would be well, indeed, for Taylor's memory, if, on the great question of religious and civil liberty, his name could stand associated only with his noble and eloquent plea for "Liberty of Prophesying." That work is the only one of the age that can for a moment claim a place by the side of Milton's magnificent "Plea for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." It shews, not that Taylor had apprehended the real merits of the question, but that he had made an advance toward its solution, beyond most of his contemporaries. But it was written when episcopacy was under the frown of the civil power, and when it counted simple toleration, without an establishment, a great favour. Taylor spoke earnestly and boldly in behalf of himself and his suffering brethren; but at length the times changed, and he changed with them. His former arguments were forgotten, trampled on by his own invective; and his treatment of Irish dissenters is reported to have been a fitting comment on his recreancy to the principles he had once fearlessly and manfully avowed.

The "Liberty of Prophesying" was written at just that period when Cromwell was grasping the sceptre, when the universities had passed from Episcopal control, and the cathedral churches were given up to the preaching of "Dissenters." A Presbyterian establishment was threatened, and the interest of both Episcopalians and Independents urged them to strive to avert the evil.

Taylor took up his pen. He contends, at the outset, that it is vain to attempt to repress differences of religious opinion. In his own expressive phraseology, they who had tried this

remedy "did like him who claps his shoulder to the ground to stop an earthquake."* He maintained that, "if the church make that to be necessary which was not before, by so doing she makes the narrow way to heaven narrower, and chalks out one path more to the devil than he had before."† To believe the fundamentals of religion was enough to constitute a man a Christian, and minor differences were to be met in a spirit of forbearance and charity. Before a man is bound to yield to human authority in matters of religion, "it must first be made evident that his understanding must be submitted to men."‡ "Relying upon the judgment of man . . . intrenches upon that duty which we owe to Christ, as an acknowledgment that he is our great master, and the prince of the catholic church." "Neither must superiors prescribe to others without sufficient authority, evidence, and necessity too; and if rebellion is pride, so is tyranny."§

Such was the style in which Taylor then wrote. Three or four years later the Protectorate was fully established, and his views remained still unchanged. Meanwhile he had produced his "Holy Living and Dying;" and in the preface to that work, addressed to Lord Vaughan, he declared, with a liberality worthy of John Howe, that "if we be members of Christ, we are of a church, to all purposes of spiritual religion and salvation." And after presenting a list of the Christian virtues, to which the most inveterate dissenter could take no exception, he adds, "If my brethren in persecution, and in the bonds of the Lord Jesus, can truly shew these marks, they shall not need to be troubled that others can shew a prosperous outside, great revenues, public assemblies, *uninterrupted successions of bishops*, prevailing armies, or any arm of flesh, or less certain circumstance."

This surely was liberal enough. It shews that Taylor, under the Protectorate, was at least a very moderate Episcopalian. He occupies the same platform with Archbishop Usher. But the Protectorate came to an end. The king was restored, and Episcopacy was again in the ascendant. Unfortunately for the purity of his fame, Taylor was made a bishop, and the diocesan of Down and Connor unsays what the chaplain of Lord Carbury had eloquently argued.

Heber, in vindication of Taylor, rebukes Orme for charging him with recreancy to his principles, on the ground "that he was a member of the privy council of Charles II., from which all the persecuting edicts against the poor non-conformists proceeded." He asserts that he was but a nominal member of the

* Liberty of Propheying, p. 6.

† *Ib.*, p. 21.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 40.

§ *Ib.*, p. 41.

council, and that there is no reason to suppose that he took any part in the measures of the administration. But this vindication is quite insufficient, when taken in connection with the measures which he is said to have adopted towards dissenters, and his own language especially, employed in his sermon before the Irish Parliament. Taylor was now a bishop, and his disposition forbade him to sacrifice one iota of the episcopal prerogative. He contends, with the most inveterate high churchmen, for the broadest claims of apostolic succession. He asserts, "the apostles were the first stewards, and their office dies not with them, but must be for ever succeeded in."* "Though the twelve apostles are dead, yet the apostolical order is not."† The old Jewish establishment was the lineal predecessor of the Christian. "Christ made no change but what was necessary, . . . and the whole religion was but the law of Moses, drawn out of its veil into clarity and manifestation. The government which Christ left was the same as he found it; for what Aaron and his sons and the Levites were in the temple, bishops, priests, and deacons are in the church."‡

"No church without a bishop," was now part of his creed. "The bishops," he said, "preserve them (the churches) in being."§ "The episcopal order is the principle of unity in the church."|| Nor is this all. "Episcopacy is the great stabiliment of monarchy, . . . the great ornament of religion;"¶ and moreover there is "no unity in religion without kings and bishops."** Nor has he longer any doubt as to the fact of superior authority in matters religious—inherent in the civil and ecclesiastical rulers—which it is a sin to withstand. "If one man's conscience can be the measure of another man's action"—a position which he had once vigorously combated—"why," he asks, "shall not the prince's conscience be the subject's measure?"†† So far he had progressed toward the servile *jus divinum* of the first Stuarts.

Nor was this doctrine the ebullition of the moment. It is elaborately presented, in all variety of shapes. It is conjoined with the praise of the royal tyrants, and the bitter abuse and ridicule of the "dissenters." He spoke of the princely profligate who held the sceptre as "just to the greatest example, and merciful beyond all examples." He styled his royal father, James I., "the best man and the wisest prince in the world." He does not forget the "great excellencies" of "that glorious instrument, the Earl of Strafford," whom "God raised up." Bramhall, the Lord Primate of Ireland, is warmly eulogised, for he pressed conformity to the English model, taking "away

* Sermons, iii. 90.

† Ib., 92.

‡ Ib., 92.

§ Ib., 104.

|| Ib., 109.

¶ Ib., 110.

** Ib., 140.

†† Ib., 135.

that Shibboleth which made this (the Irish church) lisp too indecently ; or rather, in some little degree, to speak the speech of Ashdod, and not the language of Canaan," while he succeeded in regaining for the establishment, as reported to the Archbishop of Canterbury, "thirty thousand pounds a year."

In dealing with the dissenters he was full as bitter as South, and his words are scarcely less venomous. They "follow Absalom, and in weakness hide their heads in little conventicles and places of separation, for a trifle." "Certain it is that the biggest part (of them) in the whole world are criminally disobedient, and it is a thousand to one but that authority is in the right against them, and ought to be obeyed."* Theologically they were reprobates, and politically they were rebels. Their religion was to "rail against bishops and the Common Prayer-book." The time was, he says, when "a man was not esteemed a saint for disobeying his bishop or an apostle, nor for misunderstanding the hard sayings of St Paul about predestination. To kick against the laudable customs of the church was not then accounted a note of the godly party, and to despise government was but an ill mark and weak indication of being a good Christian. Now we are fallen into another method ; we have turned all religion into faith, and our faith is nothing but the productions of interest or disputing ; it is adhering to a party, and wrangling against all the world beside ; and when it is asked what religion he is of, we understand the meaning to be, what faction does he follow—what are the articles of his sect?—not, what is the manner of his life ? And if men be zealous for their party and that interest, then they are *precious* men, though otherwise they be covetous as the grave, factious as Dathan, schismatical as Corah, or proud as the fallen angels."†

No one can mistake the target of this invective. The Puritans were the guilty party. Their Calvinism and republicanism made them doubly reprehensible. These were kindred crimes ; and, in the bishop's esteem, were to be classed together. Hence he says, "When the men of Geneva turned their bishop out of doors, they might easily have considered that the same person was their prince too ; and that must needs be a strange religion that rose up against Moses and Aaron at the same time ; but that hath been the method ever since. There was no church till then was ever governed without an apostle or a bishop, and since then they who go from their bishop have said very often to their king too *nolumus hunc regnare*."

Nonconformity to the Established Church was a crime, to-

* Sermons, iii. 134.

† lb., 74.

ward which no lenity was to be shewn. Those guilty of it need not plead that they had the Spirit. They would be told that "God's Spirit . . . is the Spirit of humility, and teaches no pride. He is to be found in churches and pulpits, upon altars and in the doctors' chairs, not in conventicles and mutinous corners of a house."* Nor, if they employed in their behalf the plea suggested by the author of the "Liberty of Prophecy"—the lack of conscientious conviction—would they be apt to fare any better. The Bishop of Down and Connor is ready with his reply, without a blush for his inconsistency. "There are amongst us such tender stomachs that cannot endure milk, but can very well digest iron; consciences so tender that a ceremony is greatly offensive, but rebellion is not; a surplice drives them away as a bird affrighted with a man of clouts, but their consciences can suffer them to despise government, and speak evil of dignities, and curse all that are not of their opinion, and disturb the peace of kingdoms, and commit sacrilege, and account schism the character of saints."

"This talking of passive obedience," he says, "is but a mockery," although he had once talked of it himself. "If you make a law of order"—so he addresses the Irish Parliament—"and in the sanction put a clause of favour for tender consciences, do you not invite every subject to disobedience by impunity, and teach him how to make his own excuse?"† But it might be suggested that intolerance was impolitic. Men might leave the kingdom when their religious rights were withheld. But the bishop would not allow the weight of such an objection. "The kingdom," he declares, "has no need of those who know not how to obey. . . . A child is never happy by having his own humour." "We are as much bound to obey our superiors as to obey an angel," he says; nor does he allow us—as he links king and bishop together—to doubt whom he intends. "You have," he asserts, "no other way of peace, no better way to appease and quiet the quarrels in religion, which have been too long among us, but by reducing all men to obedience, and all questions to the measure of the laws. . . . Let no man dispute against your laws. . . . If you suffer the authority of the king to be lessened, to be scrupled, to be denied in ecclesiastical affairs, you have no way left to silence the tongues and hands of gainsaying people. But so it is, the king's authority is appointed and enabled by God to end our questions in religion."‡

To this point of high church intolerance had Taylor come at last. His principles, whatever his interest, were broad enough in their application to cover all the persecutions of that or any

* *Sermons*, iii. 175.

† *Ib.*, 124.

‡ *Ib.* 141.

other age. Claverhouse's dragoons might have taken them for the vindication of their bloody career, as the High Commission or Privy Council might have adopted them for their platform. Do we need, to describe Taylor's recreancy to his original views of toleration, anything more than his own language? "They preach toleration, when themselves are under the rod, who, when they got the rod into their own hands, thought toleration itself to be intolerable."* And does he not pourtray his own course when he says, "Some other good men have propounded one way yet—a way of peace rather than truth—and that is, that all opinions should be tolerated, and none persecuted, and then all the world will be at peace."†

Thus, in tracing the career of Taylor on this subject, we seem to come in contact with two different men; one in penury and hardship, pleading with a rare eloquence for principles of toleration far in advance of his age; the other, the titled official, a parasite of power, a flatterer of tyrants, repudiating his earlier and better sentiments, and advocating principles worthy the bigotry of Laud, or the insolence of Jeffries. The chaplain of Lord Vaughan had deprecated for all believers, not only harsh treatment, but harsh feelings, complaining, "We have come to that pass, we think we love not God except we hate our brother."‡ The Bishop of Down and Connor responds, addressing the Irish Parliament, "Suffer no evil tongue to speak against this truth," (Episcopacy). The schoolmaster of Cardigan had urged, "the whole business of submitting our understanding to human authority comes to nothing." The Irish diocesan, jealous of mild measures, replies that tolerance of rulers "is to last no longer than till the ignorance can be cured, and the man taught his duty." Plain Jeremy Taylor had said, "We are not certain if we believe any company of men, whom we call the church, that therefore we obey God or believe what he hath said." The Irish bishop retorts, "The laws and decrees of a national church ought, upon the account of their own advantages, to be esteemed as a final sentence in all things disputed." The author of the "Liberty of Propheying" maintained that "whosoever persecutes a disagreeing person, arms all the world against himself, and all pious people of his own persuasion, when the scales of authority return to his adversary, and attest his contradictory, and then what can he urge for mercy for himself or his party, that shewed none to others?" The preacher before the Irish Parliament, with his eye directed toward "disagreeing persons," insists, "God hath blessed us with so good, so just, so religious, so wise a prince, let the sentence of his laws be our last resort." The devotional writer,

* Sermons, iii. 161.

† Ib.

‡ Liberty of Propheying, p. 6.

teaching "holy living and dying," asserts, "If we be members of Christ, we are of a church to all purposes of spiritual religion and salvation." The Bishop of Down and Connor controverts it in the declaration, "He that is not with the bishop is not in the church."

Such is the self-contradiction and inconsistency of the man. For his own sake we regret it. For the sake of his noble plea for the "Liberty of Prophesying," we regret it. For the honour of religion, and the cause of civil and religious freedom, we regret it. But regrets will not change the fact. Heber's well-meant apology does not suffice to excuse it. Taylor's invectives against dissenters, and his diffuse and elaborate pleas for the enforcement of conformity, are not to be explained as the hasty utterances of a man provoked by opposition, and forgetting himself for the moment. His life might be split into two parts, one of which might find a parallel in Archbishop Usher, and the other in Archbishop Laud. The eulogist of Strafford and the Stuarts is quite another man from the chaplain of that moderate Episcopalian, Lord Vaughan. The Bishop of Down and Connor, transplanted from his school to his diocese, seems to dispute the truth of Horace's line—

"Cœlum, non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt."

He who had once contended, with an eloquence and force of speech and argument second only to Milton's, that "force, in matters of opinion, can do no good, but is very apt to do hurt," and that "understanding cannot be restrained, neither punished, by corporeal afflictions"—who had declared, "you may as well cure the colic by brushing a man's clothes, or fill a man's belly with syllogisms"—employed all the resources of his genius and all the persuasions of his rhetoric to enforce principles which are a stain upon his memory, and a disgrace to his age, which filled English prisons with Quakers and Puritans, and let loose on Scotland a horde more savage and cruel than her own Highlanders. It is vain to say that Taylor was only a nominal member of the Privy Council, or that he took no active part in the administration. He hounded on the pack. He ignored the principles and sentiments of his better days, and, while the terrible work of intolerance went on across the Channel, never breathed the first lisp of dissent against the harsh proceedings. His name must go down to posterity covered with the infamy of recreancy to the cause of which he once promised to be the peerless champion. His sin cannot be excused as one of ignorance. Years before, he had written, in words truthful and eloquent, "*It is a part of Christian religion that the liberty of men's consciences should be preserved in all things where God hath not set a limit and made a restraint ; that the soul of man*

should be free, and acknowledge no master but Jesus Christ ; that matters spiritual should not be restrained by matters corporal ; that the same meekness and charity should be preserved in the promotion of Christianity that gave it foundation and increment."

If this be so, then Taylor, as bishop, sacrificed what he had once pronounced "a part of Christian religion." The office corrupted the man. He foresaw the danger, but was oblivious of it when it came. "It is lawful," he had said, "to desire a bishopric, . . . but yet it were well if we remember that such desires must be sanctified with holy care and diligence in the office ; . . . and he that believes his own load big enough, and trembles at the apprehensions of the horrors of doomsday, is not wise if he takes up those burdens which he sees have crushed their bearers, and presses his own shoulders till the bones crack, only because the burdens are wrapped in white linen and bound in silken cords." If any man was ever crushed under the burden he coveted, it was Taylor. The author of "Liberty of Prophesying" is fairly annihilated under the weight of "burdens wrapped up in white linen and bound in silken cords."

Taylor himself has abated the force of what might be urged in his behalf by reference to the character of the venal age in which he lived. It is true, he was surrounded on all sides by examples of corruption and apostasy. Strafford *had been* a patriot. Charles II. had once promised to be a good Presbyterian. Among his minions were not a few who only worshipped the rising sun, and who in adversity would have abandoned him as readily as Monk did the Protectorate, or as South did the Puritans. Among his bishops were those who were content to endorse the royal example of renouncing Presbyterianism by their own sycophancy. But Taylor knew all this as well as any man. Indeed, he has described it all to the life, only he would make the description extend to cover the opposing party. Allowing for the exaggeration which was necessary in his case, there is only too much truth in his words :—"We do not live in an age in which there is so much need to bid men be wary, as to take care that they be innocent. Indeed, in religion we are usually too loose and ungirt, exposing ourselves to temptation, and others to offence, and our name to dishonour, and the cause itself to reproach ; . . . but in the matter of interest we are wary as serpents, subtle as foxes, vigilant as the birds of the night, rapacious as kites, tenacious as grappling-hooks and the weightiest anchors, and, above all, false and hypocritical as a thin crust of ice spread upon the face of a deep, smooth, and dissembling pit ; if you set your foot, your foot slips, or the ice breaks, and you sink into death, and are wound

in a sheet of water, descending into mischief or your grave, suffering a great fall or a sudden death by your confidence and unsuspecting foot. There is an universal crust of hypocrisy that covers the face of the greatest part of mankind. Their religion consists in forms and outsides, and serves reputation or a design, but does not serve God. Their promises are but fair language and the civilities of the piazzas or exchanges, and disband and untie like the air that beat upon their teeth when they spake the delicious and hopeful words ; their oaths are snares to catch men and make them confident ; their contracts are arts and stratagems to deceive, measured by profit and possibility ; and everything is lawful that is gainful ; and their friendships are trades of getting ; and their kindness of watching a dying friend is but the office of a vulture, the gaping for a legacy, the spoil of a carcass ; and their sicknesses are many times policies of state, sometimes the design to shew the riches of our bed-chamber ; and their funeral tears are but the paranymphs and pious solicitors of a second bride, and everything that is ugly must be hid, and everything that is handsome must be seen."

Certainly it is a singular spectacle to see a man with such an estimate of his age, so little disposed to appreciate the real integrity and conscientiousness of many of his opponents. It is not a little strange that one who felt that the matters in controversy were so trifling as to warrant him in speaking of them as "*the fringes of the garment of the body of religion*," should have been so bitter against his "*discontented brethren*," cautioning every good man "to be careful that he do not mingle his devotions in the communions of heretical persons and in schismatical conventicles." His whole course of intolerant teaching in Ireland is refuted by his own previous declaration :—"If the sword turns preacher, and dictates propositions by empire instead of arguments, and engraves them on men's hearts by a poniard, that it shall be death to believe what I innocently and ignorantly am persuaded of, it must needs be unsafe *to try the spirits, to try all things*, to make inquiry ; and yet without this liberty no man can justify himself before God or man, or confidently say his religion is best."

For ourselves, we prefer to forget the bishop of Down and Connor, and remember only the author of "*Liberty of Prophecy*" and "*Holy Living and Dying*."

ART. II.—*Guizot on the Signs of the Times.*

The Christian Church and Society in 1861. By F. Guizot. London. 1861.

THE leading position of M. Guizot in this little book is a paradox. The veteran philosopher and statesman is a sincere Protestant, an evangelical Christian, a well-trying friend of civil liberty and constitutional government; yet the primary design of the book is to protest against the national movement in Italy, to vindicate the temporal sovereignty of the popes, and to demand that France shall no longer lend her countenance, or the support of her arms, to the attempts that are being made, in the name of the Italian nation, to strip the papal see of that part of its dominion. There is, we are aware, in Paris a small group of literary men, some of them, like Montalembert, persons of note, who strive to be at once ultramontane and constitutional, popish in religion and liberal in politics. One is not astonished to hear that they denounce in Italy the constitutionalism which they applaud at home; but even in their hands the position is inconsistent and indefensible. In the hands of M. Guizot it is simply paradoxical.

It was, we believe, on the 24th of January last year, that M. Guizot first publicly announced his opinion. When receiving, as president of the French Academy, Father Lacordaire, who had been elected a member, he took occasion to advert to the events which agitate Italy, and spoke as follows:—

“ We have, for nearly half a century, beheld Italy a prey to commotions, invasions, and disorders, resembling those which display themselves there at this moment; but then, at least, they displayed themselves in their true character and features. A man who enjoyed much public reputation, and whom the liberals designated their chosen publicist (Mr Benjamin Constant), when speaking of these and many other similar facts, qualified them as ‘the spirit of usurpation and conquest,’ and under that title, wrote a work in their condemnation. Have the same facts ceased to deserve the same name? Have they changed their nature because it is no longer France who openly accomplishes them on her own account, and appropriates the fruits to herself? Or, rather, have their violences become lawful, because, to-day, they are exercised in the name of democracy, and in virtue of what is called its will?”

Three months later, on the 20th of April 1861, when he found himself in the chair which he has been accustomed to occupy with so much honour, at the public meeting of the Society for the Encouragement of Elementary Education among the Protestants of France, he returned to the subject. Advert-

ing, as was natural on this occasion, rather to its religious than its political aspect, he said :—

“A lamentable perturbation infects and afflicts a considerable portion of the great and general Christian Church. I say, a lamentable perturbation, and by this phrase I express, and am anxious to convey, my individual sentiment. Whatever may be our disagreements, and even our separations, we are all Christians, and the brethren of all who avow the Christian faith. The security, the dignity, the liberty, of all Christian Churches, closely concern Christianity in its extended sense. Christianity at large suffers when the leading churches suffer; the entire Christian edifice feels the blows directed, in these days, against any of the prominent buildings of which it is composed. Under such trials, the whole of the great Christian Church demands our sympathy.”

It is unnecessary for us to spend many words in protesting an entire disagreement with these opinions—our entire concurrence in the vehement disapprobation with which they were met on the part of the whole Protestant community to which they were addressed—our sympathy with the “affectionate regret” with which they were listened to, as he himself tells us, by some of his most intimate friends in that community. They affront the deepest instincts of the Protestant heart. We do not indeed make light of the conception embodied in the phrase, “Christianity in its most extended sense.” We believe that the equivalent term Christendom embalms a most precious truth; that the communities which bear the Christian name are endowed with a moral life distinct from, and superior to, that of the outlying world of Pagan and Mahomedan nations; and that the Romish communion pertains in such a sense to the Christian Church that its members are not excluded altogether from the great promise of the gospel—the promise of the Spirit. The fruits of the Spirit are not unknown within that communion. The Reformers cherished this persuasion, and we have not abandoned it. Nevertheless, we cannot embrace the Church of Rome as a sister church; we cannot regard it as, in its corporate capacity, a true church of Christ at all. It fatally lacks the essential notes of a true church laid down in Scripture, the only authority to which we can bow in this matter. And as we cannot look upon the Romish Church, although containing many of Christ’s people in its bosom, as a member of the sisterhood of Christian Churches, still less can we look upon the papacy as a Christian institution. It may have been employed by divine providence to accomplish beneficent purposes in former times. We believe it was; but so was Mahomedanism itself. The papacy we hold to be not Christian but anti-Christian, the very Man of Sin usurping the throne of Christ in his own temple.

Without here adverting more particularly to the arguments by which M. Guizot has endeavoured to fortify his position, we hasten to say, that although the subject is important, we do not know that we should have thought it worth while to devote an article to the little work in which it is discussed, if the author had not embraced the opportunity afforded by this public appearance to communicate his views and impressions on other topics which to us are invested with a more absorbing and vital interest. The book is not unworthy of its title. It is really a survey of *Society and the Christian Church in 1861*, at least, as seen by one whose point of view is Paris. It is the author's testimony regarding the Signs of the Times. This has constituted its attraction for us, and will make it be received with cordiality and no small satisfaction in quarters where the views expressed in regard to Italy and the papacy will meet with no sympathy.

The character of activity and incessant change which distinguished the half century ushered in by the French Revolution, bids fair to distinguish also the half century which is now upon the wing. All things are questioned: all creeds, all institutions in church and state. Religious interests, as in the seventeenth century, are more and more occupying the prominent and influential position due to them. Infidelity, within the pale of the church as well as beyond it, is unceasingly forging new weapons; and if it is not so gross in its manifestations as in the preceding age, is not less bold and dangerous. Attacks are directed against Christianity both as a system of doctrine and as a social institution; in other words, both against the faith of Christ and the church of Christ.

We refer the reader to an interesting chapter entitled, *The two Gods*, for a striking exposure of a subtle error by which the faith is being assailed in many places. The leaven of pantheism is working within the Christian community, and, in M. Guizot's judgment, the result is nothing less than the bringing in of a new God, more allied to the vanities of the Gentile idolatry than to the God of the Bible and of historical Christianity. The God of the Bible is a Being throned above, and distinct from, the world and man; a person; a being whom we can address, whom we can love, and worship, and trust. The God whom we are now required to accept is "an idol of human invention, for he is no other than man and the world confounded and erected into God by a science which believes itself profound, and would fain not be considered impious."

Passing from this error, which is not so prevalent, perhaps, in this country as on the Continent, we notice, with special commendation, the chapter devoted to **THE SUPERNATURAL**. M. Guizot has perfectly realised the unspeakable importance

of this subject for the present times. It is the key to the whole Christian position ; the main point, towards which converge the assaults of all who, whatever their name, belong truly to the unbelieving camp. Few, perhaps, are aware how seriously the thinking of the age among ourselves is tinged with a secret or avowed—a conscious or unconscious—disbelief of the supernatural. In the paper on the Study of the Evidences, contributed by the late Baden Powell to the *Essays and Reviews*, he assumes it as a point beyond question, that the dominion of natural causes is absolutely universal ; so that the miracles, which have been hitherto insisted upon by the apologists as constituting one of the main supports of the edifice of Christianity, must now be regarded as constituting one of the principal difficulties to be obviated,—one of the elements of Christianity for which we must seek some extraneous support. And that essay must, we fear, be taken as one out of many symptoms of a widespread tendency. The position of the question on the Continent is well described in the following sentences :—

“ All the attacks of which Christianity is at the present day the object, however they may differ in their nature and degree, proceed from one point, and tend to the same end,—a denial of the supernatural in the destinies of man and of the world ; the abolition of the miraculous element in the Christian religion, as in every other ; in its history, as in its dogmas.

“ Materialists, pantheists, rationalists, sceptics, scholastic critics—some openly, others with reserve—all think and speak under the dominion of this idea,—that the world and man, moral and physical nature, are uniformly governed by general, permanent, and necessary laws, the course of which no special will has ever interfered with, or ever will interfere with, to suspend or modify.” (P. 16.)

The denial of the supernatural is, of course, the denial of Christianity. Eliminate from Christianity the supernatural element, and you have removed everything distinctive of it, everything to which it owes its sway over the consciences of men. Not only was it cradled in the supernatural, its appearance on the earth having been signalled by a glorious effluence of miracles ; but it is, in itself, a supernatural economy. Its characteristic facts belong to a sphere quite distinct from that which is subject to the dominion of natural laws. Forgiveness and regeneration, conscious intercourse with God and Christ, the communion of the Holy Ghost,—these, surely, are the facts peculiar to, and distinctive of, the Christian religion. How shall we reduce them to the dominion of permanent and necessary laws ? The Scriptures uniformly teach us to associate with them, not only the idea of will, personal will, but the idea of *grace*, which is will in its most emphatic expression. “ We are saved by grace.” This is the doctrine of Scripture, and it

meets with a cordial response from the consciousness of all true Christians. How then shall these two doctrines—the dominion of necessary causes throughout the universe, and the reign of grace in the economy of salvation—be harmonised? To our minds, they appear absolutely antagonistic and irreconcilable. The fruit of a natural and necessary cause cannot be also the gift of free grace,—a benefit bestowed by the will of God, freely exercised in mercy. To suppose that, in the facts of salvation—the facts which we have enumerated as characteristic of Christianity—there is no exertion of free will on the part of God, is absurd: it destroys the proper nature of the facts. In the hands of the anti-supernaturalist, therefore, the life of the Christian facts is evaporated, and they must be either rejected altogether, or if that would be too rude a shock to the conscience, and some vestige of them must be retained, it can only be a few vapid phrases which may mitigate the desolation of the heart.

If the supernatural is an essential element in living Christianity, it is scarcely less essential in a true philosophy. The philosophy which can find no place for it is shallow indeed, and leaves out some of the most obvious phenomena of human life and consciousness. On this point we quote M. Guizot:—

“In all places, under all climates, in all epochs of history, under all degrees of civilization, man carries within himself this sentiment—I should rather say, this presentiment—that the world he looks upon, the order in the bosom of which he lives, the facts which succeed each other regularly and constantly around him, do not comprise, within themselves, everything; in vain does he make, from day to day, in this vast whole, discoveries and conquests; in vain does he observe, and learnedly verify, the permanent laws which preside there; his imagination does not confine itself within this universe submitted to his science; the spectacle fails to satisfy his soul, which plunges beyond it; it seeks and obtains a glimpse of something else; it desires, both for the universe and itself, other destinies and another Master.

“Voltaire has said that ‘beyond all these heavens the God of the heavens dwells;’ and the God who is beyond all the heavens is not nature personified; he is the supernatural in person. It is to him that religions are addressed; it is to place man in relation with him that they are founded. Without the instinctive faith of men in the supernatural, without their spontaneous and invincible impulse towards the supernatural, religion could not exist.

“Man is the only being in this lower world that prays. Amongst his moral instincts, there is none more natural, universal, and unconquerable than that of prayer. The child inclines to it with eager docility. The old man returns to it, as to a refuge from decay and loneliness. Prayer ascends spontaneously from the infant mouth which can scarcely murmur the name of God, and from the dying lips which no longer retain strength to utter it.

"Amongst all nations, whether eminent or obscure, civilised or barbarous, we meet, at every step, acts and forms of invocation. Wherever human beings exist, under particular circumstances, at specified hours, under the empire of certain impressions of the soul, eyes are raised, hands are joined together, knees are bent, to supplicate or to return thanks, to adore or to appease, with ecstasy or apprehension, publicly or in the recesses of the heart;—man ever turns to prayer as to a last relief, to fill up the voids in his soul, or to enable him to bear the burdens of his destiny; when all resources fail, he seeks in prayer a support for his weakness, consolation for his distress, and hope for his enduring constancy.

"No one denies the moral and innate value of prayer, independently of its efficacy in its immediate object. From the act of praying alone, the soul derives relief, tranquillity, and strength; it experiences, in turning towards God, that feeling of a return to health and repose, which expands over the body when it passes from a heavy and stormy air to a serene and pure atmosphere. God comes in aid of those who implore him, before they can know, and without their knowing that he has listened to their supplications.

"Will he listen to them? What is the external and conclusive efficacy of prayer? Herein lies the mystery, the impenetrable mystery, of the designs and actions of God on all his creatures. We know that, whether in reference to our external or internal life, it is not we alone who regulate it according to our own thoughts and wishes. All the names that we apply to that portion of our destiny which comes not from ourselves—chance, fortune, star, nature, fatality—are nothing more than veils thrown over our ignorant impiety. When we speak thus, we refuse to see God where he is. Beyond the narrow sphere within which the power and actions of man are restrained, it is God who reigns and acts. There is in the natural and universal action of prayer, a natural and universal faith in this permanent and ever free action of God over man and his destiny. 'We are labourers with God,' says St Paul,—labourers with God, both in the work of the general destinies of the human race, and in that of our individual destiny, present and future. This is what prayer reveals to us, on the tie which unites man to God; but here our light pauses: 'God's ways are not our ways;' we walk in them without knowing them; to believe without beholding, and to pray without foreknowing, is the condition which God has prescribed to man in this world, with respect to all that exceeds its limits. Faith and a religious life consist in the conviction and acceptance of this supernatural arrangement." (Pp. 17–20.) *

These eloquent and touching words—so luminous, so full of thought, so fragrant with Christian piety—recall to us reflections which have sometimes been awakened in our minds by the perusal of the "*History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*." Gibbon certainly did not write his great work under the influence of a theological bias. He did not sit down at Lausanne to the study of the events, whose magnifi-

cent evolutions glow with imperishable splendour on his canvas, with the predetermination to deduce from them illustrations of the divine government. His predetermination was all on the other side. If he could have excluded the thought of God he would gladly have done it. But Gibbon's intellect was endowed with the true genius for history,—the historical *sense*. He was skilful to divine the motives of men and the secret springs of events. Accordingly he finds himself, at many a turn in his progress, surprised into a recognition of the divine mind. It would be easy to cite instances in which he finds himself constrained to make explicit acknowledgment of a moral purpose in the events which lie before him. Thus, in one of the chapters relating to the lower Greek empire, he enters upon a new episode with the observation:—"I shall not, I trust, be accused of superstition; but I must remark that, even in this world, the natural order of events will sometimes afford the strongest appearances of moral retribution," (vol. xi. p. 346). Such formal acknowledgments, coming from such a quarter, are sufficiently impressive; but we have been more deeply impressed with the tacit recognition which pervades much of the book. Gibbon perceived that the events which met his eye were not a succession of incoherent, meaningless fortuities. He saw that they proceeded according to a plan, a foreordained purpose,—that they naturally arranged themselves into an edifice of epic symmetry,—and that they were full of moral signification. An eye less keen, a mind of less comprehensive grasp, might have failed to remark these things; but it was impossible for Gibbon to overlook them. How, then, were they to be accounted for? Who was the Architect of this great edifice and hall of doom? In what mind was the idea of this harmonious epic conceived? Who was the moralist whose soul's abhorrence of unrighteousness expressed itself in the retributions of events? The answer to these inquiries was not to be discovered by looking round on the human actors in the decay of Rome, for they did not so much as understand the work on which they wrought. The historian found himself confronted by a higher Mind, and he was constrained to do homage to it,—if not under the Name which is above every name—the Name which is loved in the Church of God (Gibbon's knee had never, alas! been taught to bow at that Name), at least under the names of Destiny and the Angel of death. It is possible for minds of a high order to bestow profound study on the *physical* sciences, without becoming sensible of a personal God: the pantheistic dream seems not inadequate to meet the exigencies of the phenomena. These sciences, accordingly, are the chosen ground of the "positive philosophy,"—the ground on which it loves to en-

camp, and from which it delights to fulminate its arrogant denial of the living God and his moral government. It is even possible for *some minds* to expatiate in the domain of history and the other moral sciences, without becoming sensible of God's presence, or recognising a divine purpose in the marshalling of the procession of events. But this is possible, we apprehend, only for minds of inferior capacity,—impossible for minds like those of Gibbon or Guizot—at least, impossible for them when engaged in the actual contemplation of history. The philosophy which can discover no trace of a personal will, shaping the destinies of men and the world; the philosophy which reduces all under the leaden sceptre of necessary laws, thereby betrays its own blindness to the truth of facts.

In surveying the signs of the times in their religious aspects, M. Guizot does not confine his view to movements which belong strictly and purely to the province of faith. He has studied history too attentively to have overlooked the fact, that religion is concerned in the fortunes of Christianity as a social institution, as well as in the convictions which are entertained regarding Christianity as a system of belief. Church questions, therefore, are not ignored by him, as if they were insignificant. He is, of course, careful to avoid the opposite extreme, into which the secular historian is apt to fall; the extreme, we mean, of regarding doctrinal questions as of secondary moment. He beholds in creeds a motive power of the highest consideration. According to his view, a church without a creed is an impossibility: the idea of a church is “a common religious creed in which souls unite,” and “confessions of faith are only the expression of that union.” But the truth of these aphorisms does not derogate from the importance of church questions in their own place. If a joint recognition of the truth is the soul of a church, the organization and other external conditions form its indispensable tabernacle of flesh.

For a full view of the sentiments of the author respecting the church questions agitated at present among the Protestants of France, we must refer to the book itself. In even the shortest notice of these, it was impossible to omit the cardinal question respecting the union of Church and State; for our French brethren are about as much divided on that head as we are ourselves. Our author adheres to the union, and zealously defends it against the dissident brethren; and we can promise the reader that, whether he agree or not with the arguments advanced, he will find them well worthy of consideration. It is freely conceded, we ought rather to say, it is earnestly contended, that the terms on which Church and State have been hitherto united in the various countries of Christendom, have been open to grave objection. The State has, in

some instances, robbed the Church of its inherent rights ; and conversely the Church has, in some instances, invaded the rights of the State. But these abuses, it is contended, do not prove the union itself unlawful or inexpedient. On the contrary, M. Guizot strongly advocates the maintenance of it under improved conditions. He pleads for the union, not solely or chiefly because he regards it as necessary to the dignity and repose of the Church, but also because he regards it as necessary to the moral elevation of the State, ever too apt to sink under the dominion of sordid aims.

We attach uncommon value to the opinions thrown out on the subject of RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. Attentive readers of the Lectures on the History of Civilisation, will recollect the evidence they furnish of a thoughtful investigation of the whole question of the relation of the civil power to religious opinion and religious societies. The present work brings the principles there indicated to bear on the state of affairs in France in our time ; and we do not hesitate to affirm, that the views unfolded shew a correctness and maturity of judgment rare everywhere, and which we should think unexampled among the philosophic statesmen of France and Germany.

We can scarcely acquiesce in the way in which M. Guizot, at the outset, apportions the meed of praise to laical and clerical society for their respective contributions to the establishment of religious liberty. "I know," he says, "and I acknowledge the fact with regret, that religious liberty, the conquest and treasure of modern civilisation, was not introduced and established by believing Christians." He commemorates, indeed, the fact that eminent Christian divines have, at all times, been found ready to maintain and defend it. He mentions St Hilary of Poitiers, and St Martin of Tours, as having raised their voices against religious persecution in the fourth century ; and he might have added Luther among the reformers, and Dr Owen among the Puritans, as witnesses in the same holy cause. But he goes on to say, that "the Christian Church has not achieved liberty by its innate virtue and exertions ; it is the human mind which, elevating and enfranchising itself, has also enfranchised man's conscience ; it is laical society which, by seeking justice and freedom for itself, has bestowed, or I might say, imposed, the same privileges on religious society." This account of the matter, we presume to think, is not characterized by the author's usual fairness. The phrases, laical and religious society, are ambiguous. If by "religious society" be meant the clergy, then, indeed, it may be admitted that not to it, but to civil society, is due the credit of giving effective establishment to liberty ; but, even in that case, the fact that Christian divines were the first to assert the principle of tolera-

tion on its true basis goes far to equalise the balance. It may well be questioned, moreover, whether it is fair to blame the clergy for not having been the earliest to effect what, after all, did not lie in their province so much as in that of the civil power. If by "religious society" be meant Christian society (and the connection seems to necessitate this interpretation), then we submit that the statement is altogether injurious, and must have been made without due consideration. If we could suppose, indeed, that M. Guizot had, for the moment, forgotten that France is not Europe, the mistake would be easily explained; for, in truth, toleration was first introduced into France by infidel society. The abrogation of the old intolerant statutes was the fruit of the labours of the Encyclopedists. But where, we ask, did the Encyclopedists learn the doctrine of religious liberty? Was it the daughter of their philosophy? By no means. It was one of the importations from England which abounded in that season of Anglomania on the continent. The French philosopher learnt it from John Locke. And where did Locke acquire it? Did he imbibe it from some unbelieving fountain? On the contrary, he learnt it from Dr John Owen, the great Puritan.* Taking all these circumstances into account, we feel ourselves warranted to claim for religious society a larger share of the praise of establishing Toleration, than our author has felt himself at liberty to accord to it.

In the opinions announced on the general subject of religious liberty, there is much which deserves very emphatic commendation. We would make special mention of M. Guizot's exposition of the PRINCIPLE of religious liberty; and his statement of the COMPASS of it, or the elements which must concur before it can be regarded as complete.

Great mischief has been done to the cause of freedom by placing it on a wrong basis. When one turns to the pleas for toleration which have proceeded from secular pens, how often are they

* Young Locke was a student at Oxford, when Owen was Vice-Chancellor of the University; and any one who will be at the trouble of comparing the Letters on Toleration with Owen's Treatises on the same subject, will be at no loss to discover where the philosopher learnt the principles which he inculcated with so much success. In asserting that the germs of Locke's arguments may be found in Dr Owen, we state simply what we have ourselves ascertained by a comparison of the writings of both; but, as we may be suspected of partiality, it may not be amiss to adduce the concurrent testimony of no less an authority than Sir James Mackintosh. In his Essay on the Philosophical Genius of Locke, the following statement occurs:—"By the Independent divines, who were his instructors, our philosopher was taught those principles of religious liberty which they were the first to disclose to the world." And he adds in a note, "It is an important fact in the history of Toleration, that Dr Owen, the Independent, was Dean of Christ's Church in 1651, when Locke was admitted a member of that College, under a fanatical tutor, as Anthony Wood says," (Mackintosh's Miscellaneous Works, i. 326, 327).

found to resolve themselves into a sceptical, perhaps a contemptuous assumption that truth, at least in the spiritual domain, is unattainable by man. We are condemned to listen to an endless iteration of Pilate's question, What is truth? All religions being alike uncertain, are, it is argued, alike the object of the disdainful tolerance of a wise legislator. Even divines of note—Jeremy Taylor is an example—in asserting the Liberty of Prophesying have, to some extent, prejudiced the cause by asserting it on the ground of the uncertainty which hangs over the interpretation of many parts of Scripture. This is really to betray the cause; if this is the true basis of liberty, then the magistrate may force upon others whatever he perceives to be clearly and certainly true; he is not bound to tolerate unless where he sees fair room for doubt. Guizot is more wise. So far from basing liberty on scepticism, he has a shrewd distrust of the support which the latter is sometimes so forward to proffer. "Nothing," he well observes, "assimilates less than respect for conscience and contempt for faith, religious liberty and irreligion;" he rebukes those as falling into confusion "equally frequent and fatal," who "hold as naturally united and almost inseparable these sentiments which are so totally incompatible" (p. 65). What then is the true principle of religious liberty? It is, he says, "*Not that of mental indifference, but of the incompatibility and absolute illegality of force in matters of faith.*" "*The authority of mind alone over mind, and the right of human conscience not to be governed in its relations with God, by human decrees and punishments*" (p. 52). This is without doubt the true principle—the only principle which will abide the fire.

Still more important is the testimony of the author with regard to the Compass of religious liberty. This is a cardinal point. With more or less cordiality all civilized countries may be said to yield a theoretical assent to the doctrine of toleration; but in practice it is scarcely anywhere carried out. None can be more profuse than the French in acknowledging the rights of conscience, yet the National Protestant Church has never once, since its restoration by Napoleon, been permitted to convocate a general synod according to its ancient constitution; and the dissenting community who have assumed the title of the Union of Evangelical Churches, after having been permitted for some years to meet in their synod, were last year informed that they must henceforth dispense with that assembly, although it is absolutely essential to the united action of the churches, and no charge has ever been whispered against them of having trespassed upon the field of politics. When we pass from France to Germany, and the Scandinavian kingdoms, we find the same recognition of the doctrine of religious liberty asso-

ciated with the same practical denial of the rights included in it. The established churches are bound hand and foot, and the organization of dissenting churches is either forbidden or hampered with vexatious restrictions. It seems to be imagined that the rights of conscience are tolerably guarded if individuals are emancipated from the obligation to profess assent to the doctrines established by law; and that they are abundantly honoured if liberty is given to congregations to meet for worship according to their convictions of duty. It seems to be thought that churches as such, organized communities of Christians, have no rights; and that no right is denied, no privilege of conscience is violated by compelling them to submit to the dictation of the state in the administration of their affairs. We are glad to see that M. Guizot speaks out on this subject, and that he has attained to an adequate appreciation of the true bounds of liberty. His opinions will immediately become known in influential quarters which are inaccessible to the writings of theologians, and they will be all the more likely to obtain a favourable consideration when it is perceived that it is not in the interest of religion only, but of civil liberty also, that he advocates the right of churches to independence in the spiritual province. With a fine appreciation of the practical working of institutions, he recognises in the free action of Christian churches a potent hindrance to the domination of absolute power. We must quote here at some length.

“What are the different rights comprised in and conferred by the principle of religious liberty?”

“The right, as regards individuals, of professing their faith and of exercising their worship, of connecting themselves with any religious association they may prefer, of continuing with or of leaving it.

“The right, as regards different churches, of organizing and governing themselves internally according to the maxims of their faith and the traditions of their history.

“The right, both for the followers and the ministers of the different churches, of teaching and propagating by moral and intellectual influence, their faith and worship.

“In common with all other rights, these are susceptible of abuse and encroachment; they may, in the contact of opposite creeds within the bosom of the same society, mistake their limits, and reciprocate attacks. The State ought to watch over their exercise, and should the necessity arise impose on them certain securities for the public peace. But judging things in themselves, and abstracting all local or casual circumstances, it is indisputable that individual liberty of conscience and worship, the liberty of the internal organization and government of churches, the liberty of religious association, of religious teaching, and of the propagation of faith, are inherent in the principle of religious liberty; and that this principle becomes

real or nominal, productive or barren, according as it bears or fails to bear these various consequences, as it receives or fails to receive these opposite applications." (Pp. 32, 33.)

"I have said, and facts declare more loudly than my words, that religious liberty does not solely consist in the personal and isolated right of every man to profess his own faith. The internal constitution of the society in which men unite religiously, that is to say, the church, its mode of government, its relations with its ministers and followers, the rules and traditions which preside over it, form an integral portion of religious liberty; and wherever this liberty is proclaimed, it can only be real and complete when the established church and the different churches enjoy it equally with individuals." (Pp. 54, 55.)

The promulgation of such views by the most eminent of the living masters of the philosophy of history, himself an eminent statesman, we regard as a remarkable and most hopeful sign of the times. It heralds, if it does not denote, immense progress in the sentiments of the publicists of Europe. When Grotius gave to the world his treatise *De Imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra*, there can be no doubt that the general opinion of the great civilians of the age approved the gross Erastianism that he advocated; they could see no middle way between Erastus and Hildebrand—between the exclusive domination of the State and the exclusive domination of the Church. On one point, it will be observed that M. Guizot differs from what seems to be the general sentiment in this country. The friends of complete religious liberty are, for the most part, disposed to contend solely for the rights of dissenting communities; and have nothing to say against those who, with Mr Hallam, maintain that "the supremacy of the legislature is like the collar of the watch-dog, the price of food and shelter, and the condition upon which alone a religious society can be endowed and established by any prudent commonwealth."* M. Guizot, it will be seen, insists that equal measure shall be meted out to all; that the established church shall have the same liberty of corporate action which is accorded to others. In this opinion, he is, in our judgment, undoubtedly right. All invasion of the spiritual province by the civil power is in all cases to be condemned as unjust and mischievous—unjust in principle and mischievous in its effects.

In proportion to the cordiality with which we hail the clear and emphatic statements of this little work in regard to the principle and the bounds of religious liberty, is the bitterness of our sorrow that they should have been promulgated in circumstances which render it difficult to give them an unembarrassed hearing. Most unfortunately they are presented in connection with an argument for the protection of the Papacy

* Constitutional Hist. of England, iii. 384.

in that temporal^{*} sovereignty which has long blighted the fairest portion of Europe. M. Guizot, looking, as we cannot but think, with a prejudiced eye on the national movement in Italy, and the support accorded to it by the Emperor of the French, beholds in them a serious violation of the law of nations, and an assault on religious liberty.

This position we ventured to describe as paradoxical, to be defended by such a person as M. Guizot. The air of paradox has not been removed by a reiterated study of the arguments by which the position is fortified. Let us endeavour to state them as shortly as possible.

The charge of a violation of the law of nations is grounded on the conduct of Piedmont in expelling the royal and princely houses of Naples, Tuscany, Parma,—a procedure which ought not to have been countenanced by the voice of Europe or the arms of France. The only plea advanced in its defence, namely, that the removal of these rulers was necessary to the independence of the peninsula, and the liberties of the Italian people, is summarily rejected. It is maintained that the independence of the peninsula, and even the liberty of the populations, would have been better secured by such a confederation as was stipulated for in the treaty of Villafranca; and, at all events, that the kingdom of Italy, founded on the violation of national rights, will assuredly find itself unable to secure the liberty that it promises.

The liberties of the Catholic Church have, it is argued, been violated in the attacks made and threatened against the Papal territories. The Papacy is an essential element in the Catholic system, the indispensable crown of the hierarchy. As Protestants, we are not called on to approve of the system; but we cannot overlook the place which the Papacy occupies in it. Now the Papacy being equally related to all Catholic nations, cannot, without manifest inconvenience, be fixed within the territory of any one of these nations. A small temporal sovereignty is necessary to the independence and moral power of the head of Catholicism. Our author seems to have no sympathy with the opinion entertained by many devout Romanists, that the destruction of the temporal power may leave the spiritual power unimpaired, or may even infuse new life into its veins. If it be true that the temporal power is an essential part of the Catholic system, it follows irresistibly that Piedmont has aimed a deadly blow against that system; and all Catholic communities throughout the world are in danger of being hindered in that spiritual subjection to the Roman See, which they regard as a paramount religious duty. The Catholic Church, in short, will no longer enjoy the liberty to which she is entitled, if her crowning institution is thrust out of the position which

has been consecrated to it by the possession of centuries, and which is indispensable to its unimpeded action.

Such is, in substance, M. Guizot's argument; such the grounds on which he summons the Protestants of Europe to unite with him in a protest against the invasion of the Papal territories, and the threatened occupation of Rome.

That the Papists of Europe should condemn the Italian policy as an injury inflicted on their religious feelings, and a violation of their consciences, we can well understand. But the mere circumstance that they so regard it is surely insufficient to entitle them to the sympathy and assistance of the religious world. Conscience, perverted by an erroneous belief, has often thought itself bound to set up and maintain institutions entailing wrong upon others; and such we hold to be the case with the Popish conscience at the present moment. We have already testified how entirely we agree with M. Guizot in the belief that Christian churches possess the right to organise themselves, and to administer their internal affairs without being called in question by the civil power. They have a right to complete independence in the spiritual province, and this we maintain to be the only adequate and consistent doctrine of religious liberty. If, therefore, the Papists of Europe can shew that the Italian government, overstepping the boundary between things civil and spiritual, has intermeddled, to the disturbance of their consciences, in matters strictly spiritual, we are prepared to unite with our author in offering them our sympathy. The religious public of this country may claim credit for sincerity in asserting the rights, even of the Church of Rome, for they have repeatedly of late years remonstrated with governments like that of Sweden, which have so far forgotten themselves as to trespass on those rights. But till an invasion of the spiritual province has been demonstrated, we must refuse our sympathy. We are told, no doubt, that the Papacy is a spiritual institution, being as essential in the ecclesiastical system of the Church of Rome as the General Conference in the ecclesiastical economy of Methodism, or the General Assembly in that of the Scottish Church. But, unfortunately for the analogy, the Papacy is a temporal sovereignty also, and being thus an institution partly temporal and partly spiritual, must be content to suffer the inconveniences which accompany both spiritual and temporal power. In so far as it is a temporal power, it must accept the treatment appropriate to such a power. The doctrine of religious liberty is seriously compromised when it is represented as a shield broad enough to cover with its inviolability a temporal Sovereignty.

There is another aspect of the question which must not be overlooked. The Italian nation has its rights. Since the fall

of the Roman empire, the peninsula has been a prey to divisions, which have nullified its weight in the scale of nations, and have produced the most mischievous intestine discords. The union of the whole population under one government is obviously desirable, and if the possession of the Papal territories be necessary to such an union, nothing but a very strong and unambiguous plea of injustice will hinder the friends of Italy from rejoicing in it. M. Guizot freely admits this necessity, not only in regard to the provinces which have already been occupied by the Piedmontese army, but in regard to Rome itself.

"I admit, let the suggestion come either from Count de Cavour or M. Mazzini, that the new Italian State it is intended to found, whether kingdom or republic, requires possession of Rome,—that Rome should be its capital. Rome is the moral metropolis of Italy, the only city in favour of which the other historic capitals of the different states can abdicate their title and surrender their pride. Unless the sovereign of the new Italian kingdom resides at Rome, he will not be looked upon as king of Italy: Italy will be a single state, without its natural and only capital. To render Italian unity real in the eyes and opinion of the world, Rome must be its seat. To become really the head of Italian unity, Piedmont is condemned to dethrone the Papacy in Rome." (P. 109.)

Such being the case, what have the Roman Catholics of Europe to say against it? "Our spiritual father has had possession of Rome for ages. The cessation of his rule would afflict our consciences with a lamentable perturbation. It would hinder the freedom of our access to his throne. Even if his government were transferred to some other honourable seat, the disturbance of our holiest sentiments would not be prevented: a rude shock would still be inflicted upon those feelings of veneration that we cherish towards him, as the successor of St Peter, and the occupant of his apostolical see." We can understand such language, but we must think it strange that any one who is not a very thorough-going Papist should attribute to it any weight as a claim of conscientious right. The shield of religious liberty ought not to protect any society in the wanton violation of the rights of others. It is to be remembered that there are other places besides Rome which possess fascination for consciences. The occupation of the hoary summit of Moriah as a place of Moslem worship is enshrined in the conscience of the Mahomedan world, and has been consecrated by the possession of many centuries. The removal of the crescent from the mosque of Omar could not fail to "affect and afflict with a lamentable perturbation" the disciples of the false prophet, from Constantinople to Zanzibar, from Delhi to Morocco. Is, therefore, the Moslem occupation of the site of the temple to be invested with the inviolability of a spiritual right? When

Jerusalem becomes once more the capital of a Christian state, will it be impossible to dislodge the Mahomedan worship without trampling under foot the rights of the Mahomedan world? It appears to us that the Papal occupation of Rome is to be judged by the same rule. The Italians are entitled to disregard the scruples of the Pope's foreign friends, and to say, in reply to their remonstrances, Your conscience demands to have a visible head to your Church, and to have him seated on neutral ground, away from the overshadowing influence of any one catholic power. Well, we have no wish to come between you and the realisation of your desire. Only we have rights also. We have the right to administer the temporal affairs of our country, according as we judge best for ourselves and our children. We find that the substitution of the King of Italy for Pius IX. at Rome is indispensable. You must therefore either be content to have a subject of the King of Italy for your spiritual head, or look out for some other seat of the Papacy, where it may exercise temporal sovereignty without detriment to our civil rights.

We have already quoted M. Guizot's unambiguous admission regarding the necessity of Rome to Italian unity. He has made other admissions (for no man could well be more free from any taint of falsehood or disingenuity), which appear to weaken more and more his position, and to strengthen that of the Italians. He freely allows that the popes can never become constitutional sovereigns, so that a reform like the one which was attempted by Pius IX. at the commencement of his pontificate is hopeless. He allows, moreover, that the new movement has already effected much for the cause of religious liberty.

"It must be acknowledged that a specific and precious liberty—freedom in religious faith—has made, and is at present making, in Italy, remarkable progress. It was very recently unknown, and roughly rejected when first attempting to appear. Italians were not permitted to be Protestants, and even foreign Protestants were only allowed to exercise their worship in certain districts, and under many restrictions. Consciences are now emancipated beyond the Alps; no one is any longer compelled to advertise a faith he does not follow, and Christians of different communions can assemble and pray according to their creed." (Pp. 96, 97.)

The impression which such facts are fitted to produce might be weakened, we do not think it would be neutralised, if it could be shewn that there is fair hope that the papacy may be brought to a good understanding with liberty, accepting frankly and unreservedly the principle that force is inapplicable in matters of faith and worship. M. Guizot informs us that he has sometimes permitted his imagination to picture to itself the effect which such a revolution of opinion would produce on

the aspect of Christendom. But we presume he will scarcely allow that reasonable men would be safe to permit a prospect so uncertain and remote to enter into their calculations, so far as practical ends are concerned. Ever since the Reformation, the Papacy, he admits, has been the constant ally of despotism ; no approximation to toleration was ever attempted by Pius IX. in his reforming days ; the resistance of the clerical party in Italy to the constitutional movement is associated with undistinguishing resistance to every form of liberty ; with the exception of a few individuals in Paris, the friends of the papacy everywhere sympathise with, and bestow their support upon, the cause of absolute power. With these facts in remembrance, the adherents of civil and religious liberty have little reason to expect the conversion of the papacy to their views ; and even if events should constrain it to adopt a liberal programme, they would be warranted and bound to look upon it with suspicion, as a concession extorted only by necessity, to be recalled whenever circumstances permit.

We have perhaps devoted more space than was due to opinions which are too obviously inconsistent to influence many Protestant minds, either in France or among ourselves. We can only plead for apology the profound esteem in which we hold M. Guizot, both on account of what he is, and on account of the services he has performed to historical science and the cause of regulated liberty. Previous acquaintance with his historical writings and the recently published Memoirs of his public life, had prepared us to expect from him a more favourable estimate of the Romish system than we can approve ; but we were not prepared to meet with the opinions now reviewed. We cannot but suspect that other influences must have operated upon his mind besides the force of the considerations which he has here adduced, that his judgment must have been biassed by the sympathies and antipathies of his political career. What may have been the special influences which have been able to pervert a judgment so admirably calm and self-possessed, we do not presume to inquire. We may allude only to a single point. It comes out incidentally that the scheme of an Italian confederation, which was so summarily rejected by the Italians after it had been stipulated in solemn treaty between Austria and France, was originally devised by M. Guizot, and was the ultimate aim of the Italian policy of the government of Louis Philippe during his ministry. It is scarcely possible for the calmest mind to remain unaffected by the summary rejection of plans long meditated and sincerely believed to be the best.

We are unwilling to conclude without, in a word or two,

noticing the beautiful chapter in which M. Guizot reproduces sentiments which he put in writing in 1855, for the encouragement of his friends, depressed on account of the state of affairs in France. It is admirable for its strong faith in God, and its confidence in the steady advancement of the cause of righteousness and real liberty in Europe, notwithstanding temporary and local refluxes of the tide. M. Guizot is too much of a Christian, and is too earnest in his patriotism, to indulge in the common vice of flattering his age and country. In expounding his explanation of the failure of free government, both in 1789 and 1830, he gives great prominence to the defective morality of French society. We can afford space for only one extract; it relates to the fatal error of the revolutionary age.

"In 1789, there was a general confidence that man is naturally virtuous, desirous of good, and almost always disposed to do good, if, instead of leaving him free, the vices of social institutions and the abuses of power were not incessantly interfering to irritate, bewilder, or corrupt him. Philosophers asserted this, the public believed it. I once heard a man of intelligence, a fervent and sincere disciple of that school, affirm seriously that the forest-keepers were the principal cause of rural crimes. The offences as well as the misfortunes of subjects were laid to the charge of government, and it was no longer the individual man, but general society, which had to answer for all.

"While believing himself, in 1789, essentially good, man also fancied himself powerful, almost omnipotent. With the sentiment of his inherent malignity, the conviction of his weakness also disappeared. If evil is only an accident, produced by external causes, and not an inherent fact, belonging to the nature of man, it belongs to man to avoid or repair it. If the miseries of the human condition, and even human vices, are only the result of bad institutions and of the abuse of force, why should not man be able to abolish them? Wisdom can cure the consequences of error, science those of ignorance, just and well-organised force those of selfish and brutal power. Man did not create evil, but it rests with him to repair and reform it, to reconstruct human society. Chaos is before him; it is his privilege, as he has the means, to instil into it light and order. Impressed with boundless ambition as with unlimited esteem for humanity, our fathers, in 1789, believed that they sought nothing but good, and that they had the power of effecting all the good they sought.

"They felt, moreover, for their own age, an admiration full of pleasure and hope. It was an epoch of new lights, rapid progress, and expanded civilisation. Manners were softened, minds developed, ideas propagated visibly and generally, life became for all easy and animated; throughout society there was a lively and fertile excitement, a kind of eager and universal blooming, as occurs in nature at the breath of spring. What a powerful seduction was there in the triple faith of believing that man was good, and powerful, and

had reached the day for displaying his goodness and power for the general advantage.

"A seduction replete with error and danger ! Error and danger which, since 1789, experience, from year to year, places in clearer light.

"The truth, as regards man's nature, is in the Christian faith ; it is in man himself that evil resides ; he is inclined to evil. I do not wish here to enter on theology, but I use these terms without hesitation, as the most precise and clear ; the dogma of original sin is the religious expression and application of a natural fact, the innate propensity of man to disobedience and licence. I hold this fact as evident to the eyes of every one who examines himself with sincerity. To surmount it, man requires two restraining powers ; an internal check, faith in God and in his moral laws ; an external one, human laws, and an authority capable of making them respected. Where one of these checks is wanting, the other is insufficient ; the force of human laws alone is powerless to regulate and bridle men in whom the moral law is deficient ; and to preserve its empire over men, the moral law requires the aid of human laws. Given up entirely to its own bias, whether internally or externally, the human heart forgets and loses itself." (Pp. 165-169.)

There are quarters where it needs no self-denial, no overpowering sense of responsibility to God, to utter such a testimony as this, so humbling to human pride. But the literary society of Paris is not such a quarter. All honour, then, to the man who, in one of the most eminent places of that society, is not ashamed of Christ and his words.

ART. III.—*Hengstenberg on the Sacrifices of Holy Scripture.*

Hengstenberg on the Sacrifices of Holy Scripture. Clark's Foreign Theological Library.

It is not needful now to enlarge on Hengstenberg's qualities, position, and services in the church of Christ. As a kingly man, largely endowed and highly cultivated, he has been honourably used by Him "who holds the stars in his right hand," for buffeting the scorn, as well as meeting the arguments, of the rationalists. The very conservatism of feeling which makes him unpopular as a political thinker, and haughtily distant in demeanour, may have served to mould him for God's work as a theologian who should stand, mainly at least, in the old paths, and battle for the truth without sense or sign of fear. But his abilities, his courage, the preponderance in him of evangelical sentiment, and the great influence he wielded, combine to render his departure from the "form of sound words" in any

case doubly mischievous. A few pages will not be wasted in attempting to shew that there is power of harm in this essay on "the sacrifices of Holy Scripture."

Let us first, however, note a few instances, among many, of good and profitable remark. "Every one who presented a sin offering confessed, by the very act, that he had deserved death by his sin, and thus contradicted, most strongly and glaringly, that view of sin as a bagatelle, as a peccadillo, as a trifling thing, to which the natural man is so strongly inclined."

One purpose "served by sin-offering was to naturalise the idea of substitution in the congregation of God." Even in the midst of what we must reckon very questionable and somewhat too dogmatic exposition, there occurs such good theology as this: "Good works presuppose not only the finished propitiation, but also that consecration of the whole person signified by the burnt-offerings. Good works can only be performed by him who is justified, and who is in the state of sanctification. It is entirely a fancy of the corrupt reason of the natural man, that a beginning may at once be made with meat-offering." These are "foolish dreams of virtue." Again: "That which distinguishes the church from the world is the blood of atonement." "A consideration of the Old Testament sin-offering will force us nearer and nearer to Christ and his cross, and bring us into more intimate union with him who loved us, and washed us from our sins with his own blood." Further: "Rationalism knows not God. Its god, like itself, is remiss in love and remiss in anger." "The best union for the salvation and protection of one's country is a union for the offering of burnt-offerings, a union for the surrender to God of our whole body and soul. Our patriotism should be measured by our devotion to the Lord." It would bring life and healing to Germany, and advance both her religious character and social welfare, were these truths to take possession of the heart and intellect of her people. But it is not needful to present more of this substantial orthodoxy. So much has been given for the double purpose of presenting an impartial estimate of this production, and of exhibiting grounds for legitimate rejoicing, that truths like these are poured from high places into the ears of proud, irreverent, and unspiritual students and speculators in divine doctrine.

Let us proceed to point out first, what seem to us to be instances of inaccuracy in the statement of some minor details, and then a grievous disorder and defect on the more general question regarding the idea and definition of a sacrifice.

(1.) "The expression, 'for the good pleasure of the Lord,' elsewhere so common, was never employed in connection with the sin-offering." - This same statement is made with equal

confidence in an anonymous volume entitled, "Notes on Leviticus." The statement is a mistake. In Lev. iv. 31, we find these words in reference to a sin-offering: "And he shall take away all the fat thereof, or the fat is taken away from off the sacrifice of peace-offerings: and the priest shall burn it on the altar for a sweet savour unto the Lord." The words in the original are the same as occur in connection with the meat-offering in Lev. vi. 21, and the burnt-offering in Lev. i. 9. The argumentative weight and bearing of this mistaken statement may come again under our consideration. In the mean time, it is enough to give it a place here in the list of errata.

(2.) "It is of significance that the flesh of the sin-offering, in cases where the blood thereof did not come into the holy place, was eaten by the priests." The destruction of the sin-offering can prove nothing at all, unless, as seems to be the case, it is brought forward to establish a difference between it and the other offerings. But no such difference exists. The trespass-offering, meat-offering, peace-offering, ram of consecration, were treated in the same way.

(3.) "The eating of the flesh of the sacrifice by the priest was one of the rites of divine service. It rested on the supposition that the impurity of the sinner had as it were passed over to the sacrifice, and on the idea, that in order to its complete removal, there was a necessity for its being brought into a closer relation to the priesthood instituted by God. Through this closer relation, the impurity was represented as consumed by the holiness with which the order of the priesthood was endowed." So then the offering was polluted in its presentation, and to be purified must be eaten by the priests! A singular notion, and so far as we can see, altogether destitute of scriptural support. The only ground on which the idea can possibly rest, is the expression of Moses when reproving Eleazar and Ithamar: "Wherefore have ye not eaten the sin-offering in the holy place, seeing it is most holy, and God hath given it you to bear the iniquity of the congregation, to make atonement for them before the Lord." On this ground Hengstenberg rests it; and at first sight the foundation, it must be confessed, looks somewhat secure. But a little closer examination of the whole circumstances of the case, suffices to overthrow the notion of consummating purity by eating. When Moses says, "God hath given it you to bear the iniquity of the congregation," he contrasts *this* sin-offering with that presented for the priests themselves, which was not eaten, but burnt (Lev. iv. 11). In the next verse he contrasts this offering also with another presented for the people, the blood of which was brought into the holy place, and the body burnt (Lev. iv. 21). Viewed in the light of these two laws, the meaning of

the verse comes out clearly enough: "This sin-offering ye should have eaten, for (17) it was the offering *for the people*, and therefore commanded to be eaten, not the sin-offering for yourselves, which is not eaten; besides (18) the blood of this offering was not brought into the holy place, and the divine ordinance is that all such be eaten." Moses states the general use and design of the offering, not the effect of its consumption by the priests, when he says, "it is given to bear the iniquity of the congregation." The same conclusion is abundantly confirmed by the very description of the offering as "most holy." How it could be so, and at the same time be "impure," and needing priestly manducation to hallow it, must surely be somewhat of a difficulty even in Germany. Beside all this, we have the conclusive fact, that the pollution of the sin-offering passed away in its preparation for food, Lev. vi. 28; that whatever touched the flesh of the sacrifice was holy, and that it stood on precisely the same ground as the other offerings in so far as the priestly eating of them was concerned, Lev. vi. 17, &c.

(4) "Sins of weakness can be atoned for by sacrifices. Intentional sins, on the contrary, cannot be expiated by sacrifice." Is this correct? Let us see. "If a soul sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and lie unto his neighbour in that which was delivered him to keep, or in fellowship, or in a thing taken away by violence, or hath deceived his neighbour; or have found that which was lost, and lieth concerning it, and sweareth falsely, &c., he shall bring his trespass-offering," &c., Lev. vi. 2-6. Is *lying* a sin of weakness? Can a man *cheat* his neighbour without knowing it? Are deliberate *deceit* and *perjury* *unintentional* sins? In the high-handed and presumptuous sin of the Old Testament, and the wilful sin of the New, there is more than conscious deviation from law, there is also deliberate, fearless, and contemptuous disregard of the Lawgiver.

(5) "According to Lev. v. 11, sin-offerings were never allowed to be conjoined with meat-offerings." It is true that the meat-offering was connected specially with the burnt-offering, sometimes with the peace-offering; but this is not a truth "according to Lev. v. 11," which merely prohibits the mingling of sacrificial elements. The "fine flour" which God in considerate kindness permitted the poor to offer instead of the usual sin-offering, was markedly distinguished from the meat-offering, by wanting both oil and frankincense. But in this very case a singular proof is given that the sin-offering and meat-offering were not so irreconcilably at a distance from each other; this very sin-offering "flour," on which no oil or frankincense came, was actually turned into a meat-offering; "the remnant shall be the priests' as a *meat-offering*."

(6.) "The trespass-offering, and the recompence-offering, were expressly prescribed only for a limited number of cases, such, namely, as specially awakened the desire to offer a compensation." There is here an unwarranted separation of offerings into two classes. It is a mis-statement, besides, to make the above affirmation regarding trespass-offerings. Such offerings were presented for concealment of swearing, touching an unclean thing or person, and the swearing of an unwitting oath; whatever we may understand this last-mentioned offence to have been. Moreover, a trespass-offering was presented for the cleansed leper (Lev. xiv. 12). Where can the idea of compensation find place here, when no one has been harmed? In fact, Hengstenberg's statement on this point is but one instance among many, of affirmations made *generaliter*, which are only true *secundum quid*.

(7.) "It is a characteristic fact, that never more than one single animal could be presented as a sin-offering." This statement is made too absolutely. Two sin-offerings were employed on the day of atonement; though, indeed, one of them was the scape-goat. On two occasions (Ezra vi. 17; ix. 35), twelve he-goats were offered. At Hezekiah's great purgation, "they brought seven bullocks, and seven rams, and seven lambs, and seven he-goats for a sin-offering" (2 Chron. xxix. 21).

(8.) "Burnt-offerings were repeated at every act of worship; no one could appear without a burnt-offering." It is greatly easier to make this statement than to prove it. We affirm, (1.) That such a rule would have prevented many poor from approaching as worshippers at all. No allowance is made for offering flour in burnt-offerings, yet this (Lev. v. 11) might be the only thing in the possession of the worshipper; (2.) That in the directions given regarding the meat-offering, the peace-offering, and the sin-offering (Lev. ii. iv.) no mention is made of the necessity of having a burnt-offering besides.

(9.) "Every presentation of a sin-offering was obliged to be preceded by an open confession of the sin which was to be expiated (Lev. v. 5; Num. v. 7)." It is very singular that the only two passages adduced in proof of this allegation, refer not to the sin-offering proper, but to the trespass-offering. It is equally singular, in contrast with this broad and unqualified statement of Hengstenberg, that no mention is made of any such confession in the case of the sin-offering for the priest, or the sin-offering for the congregation, or the sin-offering for a ruler, or the sin-offering for one of the common people (Lev. iv. 1-35). Nay more, on the great solemnity of the day of atonement, the only confession of sin made at all was made over the head of the scape-goat, not over the head of the victim slaughtered in the usual way as a sin-offering.

(10.) In speaking of the trespass-offering, he says: "The sin was submitted to a valuation, and by means of the sacrifice a compensation or recompence was brought, having ideally the same worth as the robbery which had been committed on God." This, we believe, is incorrect. Trespass-offerings embraced two clearly distinguishable classes of offence, viz., (1.) Such as admitted of no reparation, *e. g.*, concealed knowledge of swearing, contracting of ceremonial defilement, and unwitting oaths; (2.) Such as did admit of compensation. Of this class there were two divisions, viz., robbery of God, that is, of the holy things, and robbery of man by deceit or violence. In these cases the original value, and one-fifth more, was given to the priests, or to the private individuals injured. Besides this compensation a sacrifice was required. By this double provision the wise God guarded his people against superficial impressions, and his law against Antinomian perversion. Sacrifice was needed, for the Holy One was offended; reparation was required, for justice had been violated. But the spheres of the two provisions were unmistakeably distinct. We deny that "the sin was submitted to a valuation." Sin stretches far beyond all weights and measures. Offences against property are ponderable quantities so far as amount of damage is concerned. To this alone the valuation referred, while the sacrifice had reference to the moral stain, the just liability to divine displeasure and punishment.

Such are specimens of inaccuracy in statement in connection with the sacrificial apparatus at work among the Hebrews. They are surely slips of greater bulk and import than might have been expected. Although they touch not for harm the vital meaning of that most solemn, imposing, and instructive ritual, yet it becomes us, when dealing with a divine institution, to be in all our studies as patient, and in all our statements as accurate, as the heavenly Framer of it has been distinct and definite.

The general idea of sacrifice comes now under discussion. A few short extracts will shew Hengstenberg's view. "The foundation of the custom and necessity of sacrifice is contained in the words, 'appear not before me empty.' Impiety says, who is the Almighty, that we should serve him? Godliness, on the contrary, is driven by an irresistible impulse to seek its origin and source, and knows that so certainly as man is created in the image of God, even so certainly may he not appear empty before his Creator." "The duty and impulse to make sacrifices or offerings become stronger in proportion as God's prevenient gifts are greater." "The false assertion that atonement is the fundamental idea of sacrifice in general, has created very much confusion." It cannot "be proved, that shedding of

blood is the root and fundamental feature of all sacrifices. But so far from this being the case, we find alongside of the bloody also bloodless sacrifices. And even as regards bloody sacrifices the shedding of blood was the principal matter only in the case of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings."

A sacrifice, then, in its radical idea is nothing more than a gift, a presentation, a rendering of tribute, a grateful acknowledgment of the bestowments of heaven. Now, in arguing against this as a correct statement of the true fundamental principle of sacrifice, we must in fairness declare that the author is perfectly sound, as we count soundness, in regard to the import of one part of the sacrificial ritual. He by no means excludes the idea of propitiatory import. Nay, while asserting it strongly in connection with sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, he admits it in regard to the others to such an extent as, in our estimation, to invalidate his own definition. The production evidently labours under the difficulty of maintaining its integrity and consistency on this point. In these circumstances, it might appear to some as if we were setting ourselves to combat what is, after all, but an error in definition; but though there had been nothing more than a deviation from the acknowledged and accurate expression of the truth, it would still lie on us to shew cause for holding fast the form of sound words commonly received among us, lest haply the precious substance of truth should receive ultimate damage. We are persuaded, however, not only that there is error in definition, but that the error penetrates some way into the body of truth. The arguments against the view presented here shape themselves in some such way as this:—It is indefinite and inept; it involves or leads to distorted representations of truth; it is opposed to the natural probabilities of the case; it expresses altogether inaccurately the relation between God and his human creatures; it contradicts the general strain of Scripture statement on the subject.

(1.) It is indefinite and inept. The definition does not fit close upon the thing. All the elements are not included, and that which is excluded is the weightiest and most special. "Man is a creature." That is correct enough, but it is not worth much as a definition or a description, for it leaves him in the same category with the grass of his fields and the dust on which he treads. "Man is an animal:" correct again, and more closely descriptive, but of little value, for it leaves him on the low platform of the beasts that perish, a fellow of the worm, the toad, and the serpent. "A sacrifice is a portion of material property:" very good, but nothing to the purpose. "It is a portion of property offered to God:" better, but radically defective as a statement of the real nature of a sacrifice. The broadest common element is not the fundamental quality, the

governing and distinctive attribute. Neither the word 'sacrifice,' as commonly employed, nor the preponderating quantity of ritual indicated by it, will admit the idea of gift or presentation as an adequate expression of its contents.

The two kinds of offering spoken of in the Old Testament naturally separate into BLOODY and UNBLOODY ; but the latter without the former would have been utterly and promptly repudiated as acceptable material of worship. They were not sacrifices in the true and proper meaning of the word, and the reigning idea in them could never be correctly applied in exposition of the meaning contained in the other. The place of the unbloody offerings was not only far in the rear, but out of the line of the bloody. There was, indeed, in these latter something of the idea of a presentation, but it was weak, influential, lying in the background, present mainly as the necessary condition of the offering ; and the whole history of Israel proves it to be one of nature's evil tendencies to dwell proudly on that inferior idea, to exaggerate its importance, to draw from it material and occasion for the nourishment of its self-righteousness. But God has no need of gifts. In that grand Theophany (Ps. 1.) in which God comes forth to rehearse the commands of Sinai, to adjust the disordered relations of moral law and ritual observance, he repels the idea of being put under obligation to his creatures by the presentation of sacrificial gifts. That which is at once the pepper-corn of allegiance and the offering of gratitude is always transformed by our pride into the means of meritorious working. If there be not in our worship something far deeper, keener, more humbling than thankful acknowledgment, that acknowledgment has lost its value, and is hastening to change its character. The separation of the publican's spirit from the Pharisee's prayer made his loud "God, I thank thee" both an offence and falsehood. To exclude from the idea of sacrifice all acknowledgment of sin, confession of it, apprehension of some medium of pardon for it, is to perform a palpable evisceration of meaning, to weaken and degrade a most solemn, impressive, and instructive institution.

(2.) *It involves or leads to distorted representations of truth.* Among these may be ranked the arbitrary generic separation of sin-offerings from all the other bloody offerings, and such statements as make "sin-offerings and burnt-offerings represent the person, peace-offerings a particular gift of the person." But still more pertinent are the following :—"All the sacrifices instituted and approved by the Holy Scriptures are *self-sacrifices*." "Under the image of an animal, man himself is offered." How this consists with the above distinction, which makes peace-offerings represent *gifts*, we are not careful to know. Certainly, it would be nearer the truth to say that in

sacrifice man himself is *saved* from being offered. But let us hear a little more :—"In his burnt-offering, Noah offered himself for a new obedience on the renewed earth. By the burnt-offering of devotion which the church presents to him, the earth is to be secured against new judgments of universal destruction." Alas! for the security that hangs on such a tenure. The next we hear of this man is a drunken exposure. We repel this interpretation as an utter perversion. It was expiatory blood that consecrated and blessed the earth as it emerged from its awful baptism; and the obedience which the Holy One savoured was far different from that which Noah yielded. Amid the sights of blood and flame, the Father saw that beloved Son in whom he is well pleased. The smile of God, the covenant-bow, the grant of new security and of the perpetual return of seasons to "fill our hearts with food and gladness," rested on Immanuel's finished work.

Again, "Abel's sacrifice was a self-sacrifice. In his offering he presented to the Lord a heart full of faith, and love, and thankfulness." "The difference between the two brothers lay rather in disposition than in the objects or matters offered." There was a radical difference between the two brothers; but this difference consisted precisely in the fact that one trusted in atoning blood, and came forward under its shield, while the other felt no need and made no use of it. The offerings were as different as the offerers.

Faith made the bloody sacrifice of Abel as superior to the bloodless gift of Cain as he was himself superior; but it was faith apprehending a mediator dimly revealed in the gospel promise, not faith considered as an inherent grace, and forming, along with "love and thankfulness," the acceptable qualities of a self-sacrifice. Faith, so interpreted, is rent from its place in the orderly economy of salvation, and, instead of an instrument without worth or power, is turned into a meritorious agent, and put to work with other inward graces, as the winners of acceptance with God. Where, then, stands "Christ, the end of the law for righteousness to every one who believeth?"

(3.) *It is opposed to natural probability in the case.* If the burnt sacrifices were at bottom, in their deepest meaning, nothing more than offerings of thanksgiving, then the Levitical system was chargeable with the useless expenditure of animal life. This double purpose could be as effectually secured by the presentation of objects taken from the vegetable kingdom. There is no reason cognisable by us why any part or kind of human property more than another should be taken to serve the purpose, or be supposed to possess higher power to serve it. And as all natural feeling runs strong towards the sparing

of life, the inanimate productions of nature, the fruits of the earth, would form the likeliest objects of presentation. This, as is obvious, assumes that the Maker of nature and man would not, without a commanding reason, prescribe a kind of offering which should go directly in the face of an innocent and commendable natural tendency. So much must at once be conceded. Nay, more, if we are to apply human thought at all in the apprehension or exposition of the divine character, we must take for granted that the glorious Supreme himself would not cause unnecessary waste of the life of his own creatures. Is it conceivable that he who, in his wonderful tenderness, stooped to legislate for the safety of a bird's unfledged brood, and who is described as marking the fall of every sparrow and feeding the ravens when they cry, should prescribe so lavish an outpouring of blood as we find characterising the Mosaic economy, unless something were expressed by it deeper and more vital than the rendering of thanks or tribute? "Almost all things are by the law purged with blood." They are *purged* with blood. This we can understand. In this we see awfully expressed his unapproachable purity, and our utter sinfulness, his provision of an all-covering atonement, and our safe shelter under it. But if it be a presentation only, not a purging, containing no acknowledgment of sin, and exhibiting no piacular virtue, or containing them only as subordinate things, where is the propriety, the utility, the humanity of this blood-marked ceremonial? Even as it is we are sometimes surprised, almost staggered, by the record of vast hecatombs slaughtered in sacrifice, as when Solomon offered twenty-two thousand oxen and one hundred and twenty thousand sheep, at the dedication of the temple. These were, no doubt, offerings in which the gathered people shared. But why there should be a consecration of all these victims, a sacred recognition of them as appropriate media of worship, and acceptance of their blood as a hallowed thing, if they were nothing more or higher than tokens of homage and thankfulness, we think absolutely inexplicable. It is saying nothing to the purpose to affirm that Jehovah was their king, and the holy place his palace. He was *such* a king, who demanded *this sort* of offerings, and the explanation does not carry us on one hair's breadth.

Further, if these innumerable victims, bleeding and burning daily in the sacred courts, set forth nothing more emphatically than God's claim, and man's acknowledgment of it, then surely such scrupulous care regarding the most minute and apparently unimportant particulars cannot justify, or rather, let us say, explain, itself to our sense of propriety. God is tender, as we have seen; and this leads to the confident belief that he

would not waste even inferior blood. God is also wise ; and we as confidently conclude that he would not expend divine care in contriving, divine words in unfolding, or divine authority in so impressively enforcing, an apparatus of worship so complicated and so nicely adjusted, without some more delicate, peculiar, and, so to speak, *recondite* purpose than to regulate the mere presentation of tribute.*

(4.) *It expresses inaccurately the relation between God and man.* That relation is not now one of Creator and creature simply, but of offended Creator and offending creature. A great gulf yawns between, across which no accepted prayers can pass from earth, or fatherly blessings descend from heaven. The first necessity is to have that gulf closed. Infinite grace has done it ; we are "brought nigh." But it is "by blood." The basis of all worship is the shedding and presentation of blood. The dishonoured King, whose law was broken and claims disallowed, demanded as of right, while in matchless grace he furnished, a means of propitiation. And now, any human creature who comes into his presence ignoring his own utter corruption and fearful guilt and penal distance from God, ignoring also the merciful provision for expiating sin and propitiating God, is doing him fresh dishonour, and committing an act of criminal and most appalling presumption. In this world of the fallen, whose hearts are all stained with pollution, filled with ungodliness, and occupied with trifles, whose very thanksgiving pays tribute first in flattery to self before it is offered to God, no worshipper dare approach with his gifts without the penitent acknowledgment of sin and employment of the means of reconciliation. What rebel against this world's monarchs would expect a welcome at court for himself and his gifts while still wearing the badge and wielding the weapons of rebellion ? Till his crime is expiated, and himself reconciled, his approach would be deemed an insult, and his presents be indignantly refused. The same thing in substance holds in the heavenly kingdom. And surely to call

* These remarks have been made on the supposition that sacrifice is of divine origin. This question is not formally discussed by Hengstenberg ; but there are certain statements, the whole current of which runs strongly towards the negative. "In accordance with the tendency to symbolism characteristic of ancient times, with the need so deeply felt by men in an age when fancy and the perception of sense were all-prevailing, to see in an outward shape that which inwardly stirred their souls, prayer took to itself a body in sacrifice." Again, he speaks of the "impulse to make sacrifices or offerings." It is quite in consistency with his view of the nature of a sacrifice to hold its human origin. If the fundamental idea be the presentation of a gift, we shall not dispute man's power of originating *such* a worship. If, on the contrary, the deepest, the ruling principle in a sacrifice be its relation to man as a sinner approaching a holy but gracious God, then does it seem, on this ground alone, impossible to maintain for sacrifice an origin and authority less than divine.

that the fundamental idea of a sacrifice which is not admissible at all except on the supposition of another prior idea, deeper and more special, is to abuse all language and subvert all right notions of the real relations of things. It is true that Hengstenberg fully admits the expiatory significance and power of the sin-offering—to the detriment of his own consistency. But his manner of presenting the main principle of sacrifice is fraught with pernicious tendencies. We charge upon it these two evident conclusions: (1.) That it represents the great preponderance of outward arrangement and symbolical expression in the Levitical economy, as having no special reference to man's guilty, estranged, and unholy condition as a fallen being; and (2.) that it represents unbloody, and therefore unpropitiatory, offerings as, even in our fallen state, admissible in their own right, and as acceptable without relation to other offerings. The greatest mass of sacrificial matter and prescription was connected with burnt-offerings, peace-offerings, and meat-offerings. But these, according to Hengstenberg, are not in their ground idea, or in their essential nature, propitiatory. The first two have this element in them; but so shrunk and shrivelled, that it would not render them inappropriate offerings for a holy being! This is strange doctrine, and surely somewhat new. One wonders whether such a notion has really found lodgement in such a mind, and how it effected an entrance. But here it is, "Burnt-offerings, peace-offerings, and meat-offerings might have been brought by man even before the fall, as certainly as it was his duty to devote himself to God, to thank him for his benefits, and to vow to walk in his ways." So then the uncursed soil of Eden might have been dyed with blood, and its pure air darkened with the smoke of consuming carcasses! The second charge brought against this view rests not so much on specific statements as on general tendency. We gladly admit again that in some parts of the essay the truth on this point shines out full and clear. But what shall we make of such remarks as these regarding Cain's offering: "The attempt has been vainly made to reduce the different results of the sacrifices of the two brothers back to a difference in the objects or matters offered. . . . Cain's sacrifice was a selfish investment. His heart he kept back for himself and for sin;—the father of all soulless worship so far overcame his selfishness as to offer to his Creator a small portion of the fruits of the earth by way of compensation."

This is manifestly a misdirection of blame. The difficulty of making the charge fasten on the selfishness is clear from the employment of the word "*small*." It is not in the record even by insinuation. There is no question here of amount; the indictment comes in full sweep against the quality of the offering.

It is not selfishness that is involved as the head and front of offending ; but self-righteousness, pride, and unbelief, operating together to make him confidently trust in himself, and despise or dislike both the idea and the revealed medium of propitiation. The offering was the dictate and the reflection of the feeling ; an insult and a falsehood, a mockery of God, a denial of the fall, a repudiation of the atonement. To call the two offerings the same is to nullify all evangelical worship.*

(5.) *It contradicts the general strain of Scripture statements.* The primary and most important bearing of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, was that of symbolic expiation. Other aspects were superadded, but they rested on this. Up to the time of Moses no sin-offering, so called, was heard of, except in the disputed case of Cain ; they were sometimes peace-offerings (Sebach, however, not Shelamin), but mostly burnt-offerings. If the only approach to God be through expiation, and if no other sacrifice for this end existed, who shall deny that through all these ages the ruling element in the burnt-offering was one of expiation ? We have seen how Hengstenberg ignores this element in the sacrifice of Noah. It is vain labour ; even though he succeeded, his work is not done. The covenant-blood with which Moses sprinkled the people, the altar, and the book, was the blood of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings (Exod. xxiv). And yet this blood is referred to by Paul as an undoubted emblem and means of atonement (Heb. ix. 18-20). Nay more, in the same context the apostle passes over to the sin-offering without the smallest hint, or apparent consciousness of entering a region of symbolic meaning, differing in the smallest degree from the other (Heb. ix. 24-28). Further still, in the same chapter the apostle refers also to the "ashes of an heifer" which were mingled with water to form the "water of purification," and refers to it evidently in the same connection. Yet the sacrifice of the heifer was in substance a burnt-offering, though in many of its characteristics it ranked with the sin-offerings—in fact it seemed a sort of meeting-ground between them. But, omitting the red heifer offering, we find the inspired writer ranging freely and without suspicion over the field of piacular representation from sin-offering to burnt-offering, and back to sin-offering again. Paul on the types does not discriminate as does Hengstenberg on sacrifice.

But when the Mosaic cultus came into operation did the expiatory significance gather itself up and depart from burnt-offering and peace-offering, or shrink into such littleness, and

* If Gen. iv. 17, "sin lieth at the door," means, as we hardly doubt, "a sin-offering lieth at the door," then we have at once a divine settlement of the question.

retire to such distance, that it was lost behind the higher meanings of self-devotement in the one, and thankful joy in the other? One or two facts will furnish the reply. When God promises specially to *meet* Israel, to speak with them, to dwell among them as their God, it is in the tabernacle as hallowed with perpetual burnt-offerings (Exod. xxix. 42). The arrangements regarding the burnt-offering present these circumstances: imposition of the offerer's hands on the victim's head; the blood sprinkled on the altar; the offering "accepted for him, to make atonement for him;" God smelling over it a sweet savour. Let any one say whether there be annihilation, dwarfing, or concealment of expiatory meaning indicated there. To this add these other considerations: The propitiatory power is often ascribed indiscriminately to sin-offering and burnt-offering; the sin-offering is not mentioned from the time of Moses to that of Hezekiah, so far as we have observed, yet there are frequent notices of burnt-offerings, and that too in circumstances in which the propitiatory and precatory significance of sacrifices must have been the uppermost, *e. g.*, when Israel was smitten by Benjamin (Judges xx.); when David stayed the plague with his offerings (2 Sam. xxiv. 25); and when Solomon dedicated the temple (1 Kings viii).

We must conclude. The ritual now examined was a most impressive one, instructive, awful, profound, yet rich in grace and brimful of Christ. We hold it as one main defect of this Essay, that it *withdraws the divine Surety* too much from the largest part of the symbolic apparatus. In all its provisions He is actually, and should be shewn to be, enshrined and glorified. When the period of law came, with its clearer light and deeper condemnation, the kinds of offering were multiplied, and the mass of meaning spread out among them. The basement idea in all being that of atonement; and the grand aim being to set forth the true Sin-bearer's qualifications, sufferings, and success, room was made under the arrangements of the sin-offering, for depicting in sacred symbols the foulness of sin, and Christ made sin for us; in the burnt-offering, the victim's thorough and total consecration to God, and God's acceptance of him "a sacrifice for a sweet smelling savour to God;" in the peace-offering, the marvellous meeting of heaven and earth, the sinner and his propitiated God in perfect harmony over the peace-maker's finished work; in the meat-offering, the consecration to God of all man's powers and earth's produce by connection with the holy Sufferer. Christ first, afterwards they that are his—crucified with him, like him devoted wholly, sharing with him the feast of love, and consecrating their whole powers and substance to his service.

P. R. .

ART. IV.—*Steudel on the Infallible Inspiration of the Apostles.**

THE spirit of the present age, even in those who love Christianity, repudiates the old doctrine of inspiration as superfluous, and appeals to the words, "*the letter killeth, the spirit giveth life*," as conclusive proof of its unsoundness. Indeed, the upholder of that doctrine is charged with closing his soul to the proper meaning of the gospel; for while the gospel treats of appropriating the *Christian life*, and forming the whole character by this life, he is insisting upon the value of single words, the exact import of which is of small consequence. The present age has also discovered that too narrow a meaning has been assigned to truth; as if only one setting could correspond with this gem. How paltry is the attempt to ascertain the *one* right expression, instead of deciding, as the case requires, that *every* expression is right! How irksome to seek for the only true doctrine; to turn from the sweet custom of wandering at will in the wide fields of floating undetermined truth, and tread a prescribed path with the modest spirit of a disciple!

Yet we may certainly imagine that the soul of many a Christian has found the simple *word* to be the power of God unto salvation; so that he cannot be indifferent to the security of that word; so that fidelity to the *spirit* of Christianity requires him at least to examine the question, whether the word is *true in itself* or not; whether it *gives* truth to him who apprehends its teaching, or first takes the *stamp of truth* from the mind of the receiver!

The points to be considered may perhaps be suggested by the following question: *Do the doctrines of Christianity differ, not only as to form, but also as to substance, from the doctrines of the Bible?*

It is evident, we think, from the nature of the case and from the plain sense of the Holy Scriptures, that we are not authorized to modify or complete, from the contents of our own experience, the Christianity delivered to us by the apostles in the New Testament. This fact has been overlooked by many, because they conceive of true religion as a matter of *feeling*,

* This paper, from the pen of Dr. Steudel, appeared in the "*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*," some years ago. The present article, and another of a more historical character by Rudelbach, have been much referred to as the ablest discussion of the subject by the modern Germans, on what we believe is the only tenable ground, viz., infallible and plenary inspiration. The translation is supplied by the *Christian Review* (American).—ED. B. & F. E. R.

and not of knowledge. The writer cannot endorse this conception. A knowledge of truth underlies, conditions, and determines feeling, and the same truth will not produce opposite and yet equally binding convictions. It may, however, produce different forms of *life*, according to the individual peculiarities and circumstances of those who receive it. Hence it must be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the truth by studying the phenomena of the life produced by it. This difficulty might perhaps be overcome, if man were liable to no perversity in appropriating and expressing Christianity, and were raised above mistakes in comprehending his own spiritual life.

Christianity demands, first of all, *faith* in what is offered to the mind as truth by the Holy Scriptures. But faith, which is a voluntary consent to the purpose of eternal love, clearly presupposes a *knowledge* of that purpose. And if mere knowledge without life is of no value, it by no means follows that life can exist without knowledge. The New Testament chiefly urges the value of Christian life, yet it is far from indifferent to the character or value of Christian knowledge. As there were many things which Christ could not reveal before the completion of his work on earth, and as these things were to be made known to the apostles by the Holy Spirit, we may expect that the apostles declared the whole purpose and plan of God revealed to them by the Spirit. We may, therefore, find the reason why many things transmitted in the Scriptures do not commend themselves to us, in the fact that our Christian life is not yet sufficiently matured to receive them, rather than in the view that the apostles have been guilty of errors. Every genuine Christian has learned by experience, that by an advance in the divine life many a doctrine, once dark, has become clear; a modest estimate of ourselves will, therefore, deter us from charging the apostles with doctrinal errors.

Although Christ did not give his disciples the truth in a connected system, yet the sum of what he taught may be readily ascertained and formed into a system. It is certainly an excellence of the Bible that it lays open to us the nature of Christianity by means of the life of its founder; no formulas of belief could have been so instructive as the record of that life. But while the apostles were careful to exhibit the nature of Christianity, they refused to recognize various doctrines broached in their day, as expressions of the Christian life, and fought against them as pernicious error.

Moreover, it was *doctrine* which the reformers sought first of all to restore. They would have deemed it criminal to add anything to the sacred record or to take anything from it. And it will ever be the task of genuine orthodoxy to set forth biblical truth in its eternal validity, but in such ways as the

changing necessities of the times and the peculiarities of individuals require. The ideas contained in the Scriptures have a dress belonging to the times in which they were written, and this dress may perhaps be capable of modification; but the substance, the contents of biblical truth, need not and must not be changed. That which is Christian remains Christian; it can neither be increased nor diminished. The exigencies of the times may require that certain elements be brought into the foreground or left in the background; but the substance of Christian doctrine is ever the same. No part of it begins now to be true, no part can ever cease to be true. Hence the importance of maintaining that *truth only* has been laid down in the New Testament (for of this we shall speak particularly), has not vanished away before the increasing light of the times, nor become a matter of indifference to the true Christian.

It will not, therefore, do for men, setting aside the obvious doctrines of the New Testament, to determine from their own spirit what is the spirit of Christianity. Their own spirit will consent to that part of Christianity only which pleases it. All else they will be in danger of rejecting as of the *letter* and not of the *spirit*. To appropriate the spirit of Christianity as revealed in the New Testament, I must renounce my own natural inclinations, and give a sincere and real consent to all which the word presents as true. The more faithfully I cleave to the word, the more perfectly shall I enjoy the spirit in its purity. The spirit contained in the word makes alive—yet only as I give the word, enclosing within itself the spirit, its full authority.

The great Reformation succeeded by cleaving to the word; and one lesson of that epoch is this, that the word is sure; and only as this is sure, is the spirit of Christianity, which is from God, secure from the spirit of man, which ever turns and strives against what God has verified as his word. If, then, we cannot withstand the power of God's wisdom revealed in his word, why not make a full surrender of our spirit to the truth? Why refuse homage to just that part of the divine wisdom to which our own imperfection, or better, our own depravity, cares not to consent?

Looking now at the history of the doctrine of Inspiration since the time of Luther, we may perhaps discover many mistakes in the method of stating and defending the truth; and these mistakes may excite a smile of pity, but the noble purpose and aim of those who made them should command our respect, for with singleness of heart they strove to obtain a principle, which, logically applied, would preserve the word, and thus the spirit of Christianity, from arbitrary treatment.

They may have been over cautious in their theory, but they were perfectly correct in believing that human caprice cannot *augment* nor *diminish* the contents of biblical truth, without threatening its entire destruction.

Far be it from us to cast reproach on those who have shewn the defects of a slavish theory of inspiration, and who think they have outgrown their dependence on the word. But they should not forget that the other party has some degree of intelligence and ability to comprehend the spirit of the age. At the time of the Reformation it was commonly felt that the true spirit of Christianity was lost, and this feeling drove men to the original word as alone of binding authority. A general survey of the Record led them to derive from it the central doctrine of justification by faith in Christ. So clearly was this presented to their minds, and so manifestly was it the only safeguard against the error then universally prevalent, that we cannot wonder if a *Luther*, possessed and controlled by it, refused assent to many things in God's word, which he was not yet in a position to reconcile with that essential doctrine. But when, in obedience to his impetuous nature, he hastily rejects a part of God's word, shall we look upon his example as one to be imitated or avoided? How distorted would have been the development of the newly discovered truth, if Luther himself, or the other promoters of the great Reformation, had *wholly* rejected that part of Holy Writ which their own want of Christian maturity made to appear incompatible with the most essential truth! It was Luther's *natural spirit*, and not the *appropriated spirit* of Christianity, that occasioned his hasty sentence of rejection. But if, even in the hands of such a friend of God and Christ as Luther, the principle of appropriating the spirit of the holy Scriptures to the rejection of whatever does not accord with our own spirit at its present stage of Christian growth, would have been destructive to the development of truth, how hazardous must it be to place this principle in the hands of such as we, who are far inferior to Luther in reverence for God! But the right to reject anything from Holy Writ, on merely subjective grounds, was inconsistent with the character and object of the great Reformation. Accordingly, the friends of the work soon began to look after the evidences or defences of revelation. And if the theory of inspiration which they adopted was imperfect, it by no means follows that they were wrong in defending the jewel when exposed to danger, even though it were with poor weapons. Due honour to the early combatants! And although the contest was marked by many an error, and here and there a side was left exposed which should have been defended first of all; although many a man may have shewn

his valour where it was needless and useless ; yet the cause for which the contest was waged is not unworthy of still another battle.

With these remarks we approach a new assailant of plenary inspiration ; one who is certainly sincere in his earnest attempt to remove what is untenable from the doctrine, while he desires to hold fast whatever is adapted to secure the spirit of biblical truth. I think that the men to whose party he belongs will gladly acknowledge him as the proper champion for that view which they have failed to set forth with equal fulness and with equal support from passages of Scripture. Hence it is most convenient to fix our eye upon him as representative, and ascertain whether the reasons which he urges are convincing, that hereafter in ascertaining the treasures deposited in Holy Writ, no appeal can be made to the *word*, but only to the spirit of Scripture. This representative is *Mr Repetent Magister Elwert*, the author of a work entitled, "*On the Doctrine of Inspiration as regards the New Testament.*" He is a young scholar of great merit, and I engage in a controversy with him on so important a subject the more willingly, because of our cordial friendship and of our perfect agreement as to what constitutes the chief good of the Christian. The question on which we differ is not, what truth is the all-essential and all-conditioning object of Christian faith ? but, what is the way and manner in which we are to believe that the providence of God *has secured* the safe-keeping of this truth as a divine revelation ? and the compass of the circle which comprises what is revealed to us by God ?

We will, in the first place, allow the author himself to state the leading principles of his theory, in their connection.

"1. The sacred penmen were by no means in a purely passive state when composing their writings, but they were rather in the full enjoyment of their natural powers and capacities, and they left on those writings the unmistakeable impress of their individuality.

"2. The apostles had the Holy Spirit just as other Christians have, though in a far higher degree, corresponding with the work assigned them, and with their peculiar relation to the original revelation in Christ.

"3. The influence of the Spirit did not consist in a suggestion of fully formed thoughts and ideas, still less in a dictation of words ; but it wrought within them a genuine *faith*, by which they appropriated the revelation of Christ ; and then, from this revelation, through the medium of their faith, were developed in the natural way of reflection, their own thoughts and conceptions.

"4. The action of the Holy Spirit is not in general to be referred primarily to particular truths, but to the entire mental state of the

apostles, in whom he dwelt as an abiding principle. The old theory is right in assuming his action in every part of the process—in the purpose of writing, in the production and general statement of thoughts, and in their selection and arrangement; but it is wrong in referring the action of the Holy Spirit to all points equally and immediately. For,

"5. Everything but faith participated in the action of the Spirit *only* in this sense, that the Spirit was the principle which guided the apostles through the living power of faith.

"6. The claim of absolute infallibility for the apostolic writings is, by this theory, relinquished, yet without destroying the security of the Christian faith. They are infallible inasmuch as they, and *they alone*, lead the spirit with unerring certainty to the life in Christ, and set forth in a perfectly reliable manner the truth most essential to this life and to redemption—truths the ignorance and misconception of which must affect that life in Christ. But, on the other hand, we are not to expect infallibility in historical details, in non-essential points connected with the development and presentation of doctrine, and generally in anything connected as mere form with the *ground* of faith, viz., the *spirit* of the holy Scriptures.

"7. This form springs from the life of the apostles, as moulded by individual peculiarities, and by the spirit of the times. Every age must appropriate and systematise Christian doctrine in its own form. When this form is pervaded by the spirit of Christianity, it matters not how manifold it may be, for the Spirit is wont to reveal itself in various ways. And since it is the spirit of an eternal revelation, it can be fully and perfectly expressed by no finite spirit, Christ excepted."*

If we select from this theory that which seems to us correct, it will be the following: We are certainly to regard the action of the divine Spirit as an influence and teaching which does not suspend human action nor obscure the individual qualities of those who make the revelation. Our view of the human spirit would be no less unsatisfactory than our view of the divine action, should we conceive of the latter as overpowering and destroying the natural spirit of man, instead of directing and employing every faculty of it; for we should thereby represent the human soul as so estranged from God and opposed to him, that it must be annihilated, rather than quickened and invigorated, in order to enjoy his influence. Whatever God gives to a man, he makes it the man's own, to be taken into and appropriated by his entire spiritual nature. And as it finds a response in the universal and deeper qualities of human nature, which are themselves consistent with the peculiarities of individual humanity, so likewise is this gift consistent with

* These seven points present the substance of what is commonly held by the best and most pious part of the Schleiermacher school in Germany, and in other countries.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

those peculiarities; indeed, it cannot be represented and expressed otherwise than by means of them. Hence these peculiarities of the individual are by no means destroyed, but are brought into the service of God's Spirit in presenting the most fitting sense, and in selecting a form best suited to the occasion.

Thus we cannot believe that the action of the divine Spirit upon man will rob him of his natural peculiarities, but rather that it will purify and elevate them. The action of the entire spiritual life and power of man is necessary in order to the enjoyment of the Spirit. And as to a man thus under the influence of the Spirit, particularly where this influence is a permanent thing, as it was promised to the apostles, I cannot make any division, ascribing to the directing power of the Spirit the man's ability to perform one part of his divine-appointed calling, while another part of this calling is to be regarded as lying without the circle of the Spirit's action.

In this respect—to anticipate what is said below—the choice of form is also to be referred to the workings of the Spirit. Yet, on the other hand, although *his* work, it might have a particular value for only one age or place, and hence should be clearly distinguished from the truth itself, which it clothes. A recognition of the fitness of the form, and a correct apprehension of it, will also greatly facilitate the separation of the substance from the form. But it is unnecessary to ascribe the choice of form to the human organ.

Yet this action of the Spirit, although regarded as all-pervasive, certainly does not necessitate any injury to moral freedom. While the adaptation of a man to make a revelation from the divine Spirit presupposes in him a degree of moral ripeness, without which this could not be made; yet the power which relates the human spirit to God, and qualifies it to receive a revelation from him, together with the inviolability of this feature of genuine humanity, secures this result, that the man, though raised to a higher plane in ability and spiritual character, does not cease to be the one who himself wills and acts. The work of the Spirit in him is a *gift* only; to receive and use this gift is the work of the man himself. Thus far, at least, the possession of the Spirit by the apostles did not differ in kind from the participation of it by other Christians; only the gifts (the modes of its action) certainly differed in individuals as the wants of the church required. Hence as the church was in want of the apostles at its foundation, a peculiar gift might be needed by them, or a gift acting in a peculiar way, fitting them to fulfil their calling—we mean the gift of inspiration.

But we now come to the points on which we disagree, and which will require a more detailed examination.

1. Infallibility can be predicated of the apostles as to the fundamental truths only, but not as to the form of exhibition. And here, it must be remembered, the word "form" does not refer to *expression* merely, but also to the *contents* of doctrine connected with the ground-truths.

This leading proposition is supported by the two following :

2. The religious opinions and conceptions of the apostles were developed from faith as a root or principle, by the natural process of reflection, so that an immediate teaching by the Spirit is excluded.

3. Whatever pertains to form in the wide sense here employed, may be varied indefinitely without fear. The times, ever-changing, occasion this variation.

These propositions lay down the principle that the farther any doctrine lies from the central ground-truths, the less need there is of supposing the apostles were correct in their view of it: *e. g.*, when Paul, to elucidate the merit of Christ's death in respect to us, draws a parallel between the *loss* coming through Adam, and the *gain* coming through Christ, what he asserts of Adam may be regarded, without hesitation, as erroneous.

It may be premised that a separation is here attempted, which, without assuming any influence of the divine Spirit in communicating a religion, we should hardly permit ourselves to make, when the question was on the authority and reception of the religion. We should, without doubt, subject all its statements to our own judgment, and might, of course, observe that some of them seemed to us to be true, and others to be false. But where a religion is composed of truth and falsehood, *the element of falsehood would prevent us from yielding our assent to that religion.* The truthfulness of certain elements of that religion might impress me with a regard for it; but, while rejecting from my consciousness other elements acknowledged and taught by it, I should guard against proclaiming myself a professor of this religion, and even against allowing myself to be so regarded.

Thus, without assuming anything peculiar in the authors of the New Testament, we should judge of the Christian religion by *what it is, as laid down in the book*—the first and purest fountain—and by what it is as taught by those who first introduced Christianity among mankind. And were we to find that it claimed a divine origin, then with still greater emphasis should we declare, either: I find in Christianity only that which it might well set forth as a divine gift; or, I find in it that which appears to be incompatible with derivation from the only true God. The result of our inquiry would doubtless determine our belief, and lead us to confess or reject the

religion thus presented. But if a conviction was forced upon us by these Scriptures themselves, that their authors had not *merely* a historical knowledge of Christianity, a remembrance of what they had heard from Christ, but a higher assistance, giving them the ability to make an authentic and life-giving communication of the same—would it be expected, in view of this additional element of trustworthiness, that an attempt would be made, after eighteen hundred years, to separate the real Christian elements from the merely supposed? that this would be done in case of a religion which claims expressly to be received as a *revelation* from God to man? in case of a religion which refuses point blank to be the peculiar property of the learned, who can distinguish between essentials and non-essentials, and gives itself to all who feel their need of redemption? which in its original character claimed and found admission, not to the wise men of the community, nor to those skilled in culling out the true, but to the simple and childlike in heart? in case of a religion which, by the ever deeper and more living experience of its truth, from the beginning onward, has the more effectually evinced its divine power? As to such a religion, who would have thought that our times would have undertaken to sift the value of its contents part by part? and that it was reserved for our age to ascertain what part of it is truly Christian and what part is not; what is the gift of the Spirit, and what is not?

Without intending by such considerations to decline an earnest and candid examination of the grounds of the modern theory, we think it right and necessary to direct attention to the *facts* of Christianity from this point of view; for thus an estimate may be formed of the importance of the object sought by such an undertaking, and it may be seen what part of the gospel is to be reckoned untrue, if we, in our late day, believe that we can and must filtrate the truth of Christianity. Thus, too, may we become sensible of the responsibility imposed on man's subjective sense for the divine, when we commit to this sense the task of selecting and marking off what is essential in Christianity so perfectly that the view entertained on the present stage of Christian life shall prevent further attempts to search out and appropriate by experience Christian truth; and again, what a far more serious responsibility is voluntarily assumed by him who now ventures from his own imperfect Christian experience, to determine for others what part of the Christianity handed down to us in the Scriptures they may safely reject, and who proposes to guarantee us against any loss, if we satisfy ourselves with what he selects for us as truly Christian, instead of accepting the Christianity delivered to us by the apostles.

Instead of such considerations, without which, it seems to us, an investigation of this kind should not be undertaken by the thoughtful friend of truth, there is laid before us in the treatise of *Elwert* (p. 36 sq.), the preliminary question: "What sort of a writing, even in form, should we expect from authors who were supernaturally guided in the process of writing by the Holy Spirit?" In this case—such is the doctrine of the treatise—we should look for absolute perfection of form. But it seems to us that we should form our judgment on this point partly by the assertion of the sacred writer himself, and partly by the necessities of the case. If Paul calls himself (in 2 Cor. xi. 6) an *ιδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ*, and at the same time claims that his work, notwithstanding his defective oratory, proves itself to be of God and undeniably apostolical, then it is clear that aid from the divine Spirit is presupposed for his preaching, which aid does *not* consist in transforming his discourse, and giving it a literary style and finish, but in clothing it with a power that proves its independence of such qualities as commonly influence men. With this state of the case, how can one insist on the claim that Paul should not exhibit himself in his writings as an *ιδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ*? We do not see why (p. 39) the human features should be removed from thoughts by the immediate divine causality in the production of the writing. The author appears as an instrument fitted to apply genuine divine truth to the heart; why then should the divine causality destroy the peculiarities of the chosen instrument in preparing the same for its task? Shall we not rather hold that when the divine Spirit selects an individual, the ground of this choice lies in his natural peculiarities? Hence these peculiarities are to be regarded as conditioning the form in which the divine causality *will* to reveal itself. Hence that *something* which we may expect as the result of the divine causal action, will not consist at all in the destruction of the human elements, but rather in their purification and elevation for the work to be performed. How else could it be taught that the divine has come near to the human, and will, by means of this nearness, make itself the possession of man? And as the divine Redeemer has offered himself to our apprehension and reception, no otherwise than as man glorified by the indwelling of the divine Spirit, is not a revelation of the divine through the human the fundamental thought of Christianity? It is this union of the divine with the perfect unimpaired impress of the human which has given the New Testament from the first such a blessed hold upon the hearts of men. But if such a revelation is the one best fitted for men, or rather the only one fitted to justify its claim to a divine origin, then this kind of revelation, as it lies

actually before us, is just that which might be expected if the divine causality *should act immediately* on the writers of the Scriptures, provided we make any distinction between mediate and immediate action.

As we now enter upon a more detailed investigation of the reasons which forbid us any longer to admit the infallibility of the apostles, we shall first inquire whether, admitting the action of the Spirit to be such as is here conceived, we necessarily admit the inference drawn from it—that apostolic infallibility was impossible? And whether the action of the Spirit, so explained, justifies us in being any more indifferent to the presumption of infallibility?

To make ourselves understood, we remark, that while in our view the truth received by us becomes, through the power of faith, the fountain of our Christian life, and yet the capacity for a fuller appropriation of the truth is increased by the progress of that life; this modern theory, on the contrary, supposes that our acquaintance with truth results from a consciousness of our Christian life, so that the perfection of the Christian life determines the degree of Christian knowledge and the credibility of one's account of that life. Hence our confidence in such an account of the truth—the basis of the life—diminishes in proportion to the less influence of any doctrine on the formation of the Christian life; or, rather, to its less intimate connection with the fundamental truth, which is seen to be the condition of spiritual life. According to this view, we are to look upon the Spirit's action as simply promotive of the life, while the account which the Apostles give of the ground of the truth belongs to their individual peculiarities. Hence our confidence in the correctness of their exhibition of the truth cannot exceed our confidence in the elevation of their Christian life, and in their fitness to give the ground-truths of that life, without any foreign element. Christ alone enjoyed the Spirit without measure; the apostles, though enjoying it in a higher degree than all other Christians, had the Spirit only in part. Hence in their account of the Christian life imparted to them, they are unreliable in so far as their whole nature was not yet pervaded by this life.

If we were to admit the correctness of the theory of the mode of the Spirit's action in the apostles, I see no sort of necessity for believing that a merely partial impartation of the Spirit, not embracing the entire man, would tend in the least to make its possessor *confound* this partial, with a full communication of it, and therefore act, through mistake, in those respects in which he was not influenced by the Spirit, as though he were thus influenced. If we admit, as we must,

(cf. Phil. iii. 12, 1 Cor. xiii. qsq., Rom. vii. 24), that the apostles were conscious of being not fully conformed as yet to the likeness of Jesus Christ (2 Cor. iii. 18), and were striving after a more complete likeness to him, then we have a *recognition* on their part of that which was not a product of the Spirit in them, of that which the Spirit's action has not as yet reached; so that they certainly do *not* claim apostolic illumination and authority in those respects in which they have no right to claim them. Indeed they make a very clear distinction between that which they enjoin decisively by apostolic authority, and that which they have no right to command in this way (cf. 1 Cor. vii. 10, 12, 25). Hence it is by no manner of means necessary to conclude from this view of the Spirit's action, that in their enunciation of doctrine they would confound the true with the false, mingling with the same stroke of the pen what is the infallible product of the Spirit, and what proceeds from the part of their nature which is still unenlightened by the Spirit. They would have been conscious of the *limit* up to which they were certain of the influence of the Spirit; and therefore, when acting as apostles, they would not have given place to anything not of the Spirit, nor have insisted on it as authoritative. If they were not able to declare all truth, as was Christ, it by no means follows that they must give falsehood for truth, the human for the divine, that which was still hidden from them for something already revealed. Besides, when we have no assistance from a higher power, we understand exactly how to draw the line between that to which our knowledge extends, and that to which it does not. Why then should we suppose that the assistance of the Divine Spirit in the apostles induced such a derangement of their spiritual nature, that they took themselves to be thoroughly pervaded by the Divine Spirit, even in those respects wherein they were not? Must not, rather, the peculiar character of this *as divine* have secured them more than almost anything else from any such confusion, any such erroneous estimate of the extent of their power? Hence, should we admit that the apostles did not reveal the sum total of Christian truth—of which we shall treat further on—because they were not in possession of the perfect Christian life, it would only follow from this that their infallibility did not embrace *absolutely all*, but not that it did not embrace *all which they imparted to us as really Christian doctrine*. What we have received from them might not perhaps entirely *exhaust* the store of Christian truth; but as an explanation and expression of the life ruling within them could contain no error. Truth not yet entirely comprehended is not *error*—an assumption which seems to prevail through nearly all the treatise now under review.

But here we may be confronted with the question, If the influence of the Divine Spirit is such as to prevent the human which is pervaded by it from coming forth in its impurity and perverseness, how can we suppose any development and growth of the divine life? Let us only bear in mind what an effect upon the moral life has from the first been produced by the reception of Christianity. Is not (Heb. iv. 12) "the word of God quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart?" Thus it continually devotes to death that which belongs to death; and although sin still stirs within the believer, yet he is very far from confounding the life of sin with the life of the Spirit. He is painfully conscious of being exposed to the influence of the flesh, while he well knows what would be the fruit of the Spirit. Have we not here an intimation of the way in which the power of the Spirit, when we are subject to it, compels error, *i. e.*, falsehood, to retire, and how one knows, when under the influence of the Spirit, that he is not yet free from all error, any more than he is free from all sin, and sets aside the obscure as obscure, no less than the sinful as sinful? Hence, as a disciple of the Spirit, he who is still subject to error will not hold and vend it as truth. If this were not so—if the error stood in inseparable connection with the truth, what would be the fate of the spiritual life? If error is the proof or evidence of still remaining perversity in the moral-religious life, and hence cannot decrease without a decrease of the perversity, while the continuance of it bears witness to the continued working of this perversity, how is the moral-religious life to improve? The error will not be detected; still less will the moral ground of it. As, therefore, truth and error are mingled and confounded, so also must good and evil be mingled and confounded. But where moral good cannot be distinguished from moral evil, how is a holy life to be developed? The evil will thrive along with the good, and the good is confessedly choked when it grows unseparated from the evil (Matt. xiii. 22). Hence, assuming the correctness of Elwert's theory, we cannot believe that the apostles, while greatly involved in the errors of the day, could present to us the ground of faith in the shape of divine truth worthy of all credence. Nor is it conceivable, either in itself or in view of this theory of the Spirit's action, that there may be upon the outskirts, as it were, a multitude of errors which have no influence upon the central truth. These errors must be connected with the religious character of the apostles, especially on the theory here proposed. An atomic division cannot be effected in the moral nature. One part of the man cannot be perverted while his

inmost nature remains unaffected. Ignorance of this perversion, and a careless indulgence of the same, would be a painful argument for the unreliableness of that which must be received as fundamental truth.

A mind candidly and thoughtfully directed to religion, the chief concern of man, would find, especially if it adopted this theory of the mode of the Holy Spirit's action, but poor consolation in the thought: "Thou hast in the writings of the apostles a correct exhibition of the essentials of Christianity; but whatever is remote from the central truth is of no great importance, and, though you perceive it to be mixed with error, this fact need not impair your firm trust in the central truth." On the contrary, the more inseparable the connection between the life and the truth, the more anxious will he be made by his appreciation of the divine element in Christianity, that no part of this element remain unemployed, or be set aside by something of only doubtful character. If the apostles, as their writings evidently shew, possessed the gift of the Holy Spirit in greater measure than have any other Christians, and therefore taught the essential truth with undeniable correctness, can I, with a moral nature still imperfectly developed, permit myself to censure the written expression of their Christian life, and reject from the same whatever does not suit me at my present stage of development? Or shall I yield to the authority of another man, and set aside what does not suit him in his present religious state? Shall not a recognition of the larger measure of the Spirit enjoyed by them make me careful, rather, to ascertain whether I can appropriate to myself the expression of their Christian life in their writings, whether their account of the living hope within them agrees with mine? And if not, then, in view of the high spiritual life which they enjoyed, I should hardly say to myself, "Whatever thou canst not claim as thine own experience, was in them the fruit of a spiritual life still imperfect;" but at least this would be the safer course, "I will *examine myself* to find the defect, and will endeavour to mould *my life* by theirs." And I should certainly feel no alarm if, as the result of this endeavour, my spiritual state should at length correspond with that of the apostles.

Having examined as far as possible the points involved in the previous questions, and having concluded from this examination that, on the grounds conceded by the other party, we cannot, without great hesitation, consent to dispense with the infallibility of the apostles, we now proceed to consider the main and decisive question:

Whether the theory which forbids us to regard the action of the Holy Spirit as directly affecting the understanding, and

making its insight into the truths of Christianity infallible, can be exegetically supported?

And, in the first place, it is undoubtedly true that when Jesus, after his resurrection, gave the apostles their commission to gain him disciples among all nations (Matt. xxv. 18, sq.), he mentioned no other means along with baptism for effecting this object than the "*teaching*" which required them to observe all things commanded by him. He assures them of his presence as a blessing of which they will never be deprived. Moreover, according to Mark (xvi. 15, sq.), the apostles are enjoined to make known the message of salvation in all the world, and salvation or condemnation is made to depend upon the reception or rejection of the message; while in the case of believers, the doctrine received was to verify itself by the most striking proofs of the special divine presence.

With this prominence given to preaching and teaching as the main calling of the apostles, stands in full and logical agreement the promise made to them on two occasions (Matt. x. 19, Mark xiii. 11, cf. Luke xxi. 15), that in the most trying and decisive moments, when called to answer before magistrates, and those skilled in the Scriptures (Luke xii. 11), the divine Spirit within them should give them the precise answer which the occasion required, and hence they need feel no anxiety about this matter. If we concede that the meaning of this encouragement is exhausted by saying, they were to have no fear lest their whole conduct and mode of defence should be prejudicial to the cause of the gospel, it must at the same time be admitted that an erroneous presentation of the *contents* of gospel doctrine would have been most prejudicial to that cause. Hence, if this promise did not refer primarily to the *contents* of the gospel, as is certainly suggested by the words, *πῶς ἢ τὴν ἀλήθειαν*, this circumstance could have no other ground than the following—that the *truthfulness* of the *matter* taught was *presupposed* as unquestionable. Besides we have in this language a proof that the action of the Spirit would secure the choice of the most suitable *form*, and that the presentation of the truth entrusted to the apostles should be so made as not to fail of its purpose (Luke xxi. 15). The use of the materials in their own consciousness, which by the theory under examination is referred to the unaided faculties of the apostles, is here referred to the influence of the Spirit, and we are not simply to regard *the mode of feeling and of thought in the gross*, as being under the influence of the Spirit, but his action is distinctly pledged for the *particulars*, which must not be gain-said nor resisted. But the more incorrect, even according to the theory of Elwert, is our view of the action of the Spirit, when we think of it as only occasional, the more plainly does

this reference of Christ to the certain support of the Spirit in the most trying circumstances require us to believe that the same was *commonly* enjoyed by the apostles in fulfilling their mission, so that in the discharge of their official duties there was, *in general*, no instance when the influence of God's Spirit was not present to teach them what and how they should speak.

We may now examine the passages in John's gospel, where-in Christ promised his disciples the assistance of the Holy Spirit, who should take *his* place with them, in such a manner (xvi. 7), that our Saviour's departure to the Father, from a visible connection with them, would be a *benefit*, since it would make room for the Spirit's action. If we grant that the Holy Spirit was promised to the apostles as a gift to secure the joy of their souls in redemption; yet by designating him the Spirit of *truth*, a circumstance is marked which deserves our careful attention, namely, that at the time (xiv. 20) when the Spirit should act (xiv. 16, 17) the disciples should know that the Son is in the Father, they themselves in the Son, and he in them; and this indicates unquestionably a disclosure to them of a relation, the closest possible, of Christ to the Father, and again to his own disciples, and hence an insight into the deepest reality and nature of Christian faith. Moreover the teaching of the divine Spirit is placed over against that which the apostles had received from Christ while he yet spake with them. (*ταῦτα λαλῶντα*, xiv. 23, sq.) His action is characterised, partly as reminding them of all which Christ had *said* to them, partly as *teaching* them all things, and hence completing the *doctrine heard*. Just before this promise stands the reference to *his own word* or *words* (ver. 24) as equivalent to the word of the Father. Truly no escape is here offered to an ingenuous, un-biassed mind, or rather, such a mind will seek no escape from the admission, that the assistance of the Spirit was promised, *primarily*, to communicate *instruction*; and since it took the place of *Christ's teaching*, it was promised as *equivalent* to the *teaching* which comes from the *Father himself*. This is not at all contradicted by the language of Christ (John xv. 26, 27), where, referring to the expected coming of the Spirit of truth as a Spirit which would *testify* of him, he expresses the hope that they, when possessed of the gift of the Spirit, will *testify* of him, having been with him from the first. This action of the divine Spirit in testifying of Christ must naturally reveal itself first where intercourse with Jesus himself had already, in the best way, laid the foundation, and prepared beforehand for the ability to testify of him. But evidently the context does not limit the ability to testify of Christ to what had been learned by intercourse with him, but presup-

poses a wider circle for the action of the Spirit in witnessing of Christ ; for in ver. 26 the Spirit is characterized as testifying of Christ, independently of the contribution which their prior personal intercourse with Christ was to furnish.

The language of John xvi. 12, 15, sets the seal to all which has now been said. Here the promise of guidance by the Spirit (ver. 13) undeniably answers to the necessity which the apostles were under (ver. 12) of obtaining still further instruction. Christ had much to *say* to them, which they could not yet bear, which they were not yet prepared to receive. Hence it was not something which should only be brought again before their minds as the words of Jesus, or something which they could have inferred from the life of Jesus, but something which Jesus had still to *say* to them ; this was to be made known to them by the Divine Spirit. Now can we bring ourselves to think of this in any other way than as an enlargement of the knowledge which they already possessed, an addition which the Spirit, *instead* of Christ, would now give them ? And suppose this illuminating work was to have particular reference to the points enumerated in ver. 8, 11, was it not to avail for the whole territory of the truths of Christianity at the same time, and especially for its *details* ? For the general truth was already imparted by the teaching of Christ ; hence the guiding into *all* truth must refer to the particulars comprised in the general doctrine. Indeed, this teaching was to have throughout the same character as it would have, should it come directly from Christ himself as a teacher ; that which the apostles were to receive was to be his own ; but his own is no other than the Father's. I might now ask whether, if Christ had imparted to the apostles the full instruction of which they were still in want, we should then hold ourselves justified in saying that this instruction was infallible only in *essentials*, while the rest might well have been given erroneously ? But if we should not dare to assert this of Christ's own instruction, no more can we venture to assert it of the Spirit's instruction, *which Christ put on a full equality with his own* ; and the less because he has placed the character of the Spirit's action in a light to claim the deepest reverence, by making it equivalent to his own ; for he represents his own, and hence the Spirit's action, as equal with the Father's. In short, the *all-embracing* activity of the Divine Spirit, as a teacher, which the apostles were to enjoy, is put on a level with the *infallible* and *divine* activity of Christ as a teacher. Thus the apostles were placed in so central a position for comprehending the divine purpose, that the *future* was unveiled to their vision by the Spirit, in so far as this was requisite to reveal Christ, and to acquaint them with his full worth and

merit. If we take the promise without refinement, it is simply this: while the apostles, because of present unfitness, had not as yet all needed knowledge, the Divine Spirit was to acquaint them fully with the plan of God and the exalted worth and full merit of Christ; and nothing was to be omitted that would have been revealed by Christ himself, whose teaching was the teaching of God.

It is not a mere *arbitrary* inference, but a logical conclusion which we draw from the above, when we say that Christ promised his disciples the Paraclete expressly to *teach* them, to impart to them *truth*, and that in so far as a *vision* of the *future* was required for an acquaintance with the divine plan in its *completeness*, it was granted; and hence, that we can no more suppose a mingling of error and truth in their teaching than in Christ's. Hence, until the new theory shall prove, by an equally fair and thorough investigation of passages, that it *alone* is correct, it has, to say the least, no right to condemn as a perversion the old exegesis, which gives the most natural interpretation to the words of Jesus, and finds in them a promise that the apostles, as teachers of the gospel, shall not err in respect to matters of faith. Not a groundless adherence to the letter, but a survey of the whole context of these words, which were uttered for the purpose of silencing every doubt, requires such an interpretation of *πάσα ἡ ἀλήθεια* and *πάντα διδάξει*. We can easily grant that *ἀλήθεια*, appealed to by *Elwert*, p. 68, sq., and the designation of the Spirit, as *πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας*, may have a wider reference than merely to accuracy of *knowledge* on any point; but here the question arises: Does the whole context permit us to *exclude* this reference, or to make our own limitations? The right to do this will be denied until the view of *Elwert* is proved to be correct.

Besides, it is perfectly compatible with our view that the Spirit promised to the apostles was *no other in kind* than that which operates in all Christians. But to the really unbiassed man, the language of 1 Cor. xii. offers the simplest and fullest solutions of all doubts, *διαίρεσις χαρισμάτων εἰσίν, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα*. This is afterwards explained as follows: in the operations (*ἐνεργημάτων*) of the Spirit there is diversity, according to the different offices to be performed in the church (*διακονίᾳ*), but the Spirit, God, working all in all, is *the same* in all. If our attention is now directed (ver. 29) to this fact, that not all are *apostles*, must not a certain phase of the Spirit's action be prominent in them, to qualify them for their special service? And since the teaching of Christ was to be introduced to the world through the apostles, must we not admit that the highest interests of the church required that the ground doctrine, as given by them, should not be a compound of falsehood and

truth, rendering it impossible ever after to separate the two elements? If the religious knowledge of the apostles was but partial, and yet they mistook their ignorance for knowledge, shall it be better with him who dares not deny that the apostles enjoyed the Spirit in a higher degree than any other Christians? Well may we ask: Where shall we plant the germ of perfect Christian truth; truth destined to destroy all error, if they who first received this truth in its highest purity have not planted a germ unaffected by surrounding error? Can we nowhere find a pure *germ*? Why then may not an impure growth spring from the impurity of the germ? Besides, if we admit that the action of the Spirit in other Christians as well as in the apostles is for the purpose of imparting truth, can it, if *just the same Spirit*, impart to them as truth aught which differs from and contradicts what it imparted to the apostles? This would presuppose that the knowledge of truth thus imparted embraced nothing objective. But if there is anything objective, *e. g.*, a God of a *determinate character*, a relation *actually existing* between him and man, &c., then the Spirit can only direct the spiritual eye to these objective truths in their inviolable and unalterable nature, and enable it to see them in their unchangeable truth. Hence every *new* revelation of the Spirit, if a revelation of *exactly the same Spirit*, must allow the same thing that seemed to the apostles authoritative truth to seem so still. Hence, what was revealed to the apostles by the action of the Spirit, cannot be revoked by the action of the same Spirit in others; for then it would give the same thing at one time correctly, at another incorrectly, unless perhaps it was given incorrectly each time.

If it is now urged that the theory of Elwert admits that there is no genuine Christian truth outside of the Bible, inasmuch as the term truth is restricted to the ground-doctrine, we will proceed to examine the question: *Whether even the fundamental doctrines of Christianity would be secured as truth, by the theory of Elwert? Whether the determination of the object of faith would not be altogether uncertain?*

According to his theory, we must assume that the apostles were living in an atmosphere of erroneous, sin-distorted opinions, into which the doctrine received from Christ must enter, and be itself obscured and wrongly apprehended. This unfavourable circumstance was not at all, or but partially, remedied by the influence of the Spirit; for he only aimed to secure a vital appropriation of the chief fact of Christianity, but left untouched by his correcting influence those conceptions which were remote from the central fact, how important soever a part they might play in completing the representation of Christian truth. Hence we should have to adopt the rule: "That the

nearer a proposition is to the great truth of redemption, the more certainly may it be known as Christian doctrine; while the farther it lies from that truth, the more possible is it that it belongs to the *form* of doctrine, to the individual shaping of the idea."

It seems to me that great objections to such a criterion present themselves from several quarters; and, first of all, the objection that there is no exegetical foundation whatever for such a rule. If I allow myself, on subjective grounds, to limit the promise given by Christ, I have nothing conclusive to urge against him who rejects such a promise as wholly unreliable, and who does this on the ground of his inability to conceive of any action of the Divine Spirit which gives to man a certain knowledge of truth, or, in general, to conceive of the Spirit's action at all, except as an impulse in man to be ascribed to the divine causality, no otherwise than as everything which takes place is to be referred to that causality. Nay, he will claim to be more logical than I, because he does not arbitrarily limit the range or contents of that promise, but simply assigns to the expression a meaning which he is able to sustain by passages enough; urging especially, with irresistible force, as against the theory of Elwert, that the whole description of the Spirit of God in the gospel of John is borrowed from Jewish forms of speech, and hence belongs to a circle of representations foreign to the new light of Christian truth. If, by making the *Spirit* everything, we relinquish the right to determine the meaning of the *word* in a grammatico-historical way, how can we shew that this Spirit of truth reveals the essential nature of Christianity, and gives a certain knowledge of this, and does not rather point to an ability, *gradually* developing itself in the apostles to know the truth; so that the very *substance* of religious truth, as delivered by the apostles, was unreliable and in need of correction!

But if it be granted that there was an operation of the Holy Spirit which shed infallible light on the essential nature of Christianity, how can we succeed in ascertaining this essential nature? For, in the first place, we come under the influence of Christianity, and examine its contents with a sinful disposition. Will not this so pervert our apprehension of it that the essential nature of Christianity, though handed down to us in the writings of the apostles, will yet escape us? And precisely because the word does not bind us, but the Spirit, while the sinful soul in us has no affinity for what is purest in Christianity, but attaches itself eagerly to that which was made impure by the remaining sinfulness of the apostles. Hence if we suppose the product of the Spirit to have come down from the age of the apostles to our own, with additions from sinful

sources, little will remain of the purity of the original light ; and still less, if we add, in agreement with the theory which we are now examining, that the Christian spirit to be appropriated can be derived from the church only.

Now, God be praised ! the lot of Christian truth is not so sad as this ; though we cannot believe it would have been better had not the power of the *incorruptible word* asserted itself from the first in opposition to the sinful disposition of man. This it has done by virtue of the fact that there have always been souls who have confided in the Spirit as being *truly* represented in the word, and have restrained the sinful bias of their own nature by their firm adhesion to the truth of the word ; yet without being liable to the reproach of a slavery to the letter which unfitted them to apprehend the spirit and life of Christianity. But a glance at the course of our recent theology will afford undeniable proof that a rejection of the binding authority of the word leads to the most dissimilar views of the essential nature of Christianity. The school from which proceeds that theory of inspiration now called in question by us, has indeed aided in bringing again into repute the idea of redemption as the foundation of Christian truth. But opposed to this—although more akin to it in principle than a superficial glance leads one to think—is there not another leading school, which refers the entire conception of a redemption through Christ to the bare form of Christianity, and maintains that adhesion to it is incompatible with a true apprehension of the moral spirit of this religion ? And if we look more closely at the word *redemption*, as used by the former school, is not this taken in a sense which other students of the sacred word have been compelled to regard as entirely wrong and at war with the true meaning of that word ? Is not the sum of Christian doctrine overthrown, when, in respect to those essential attributes of God which have always been deemed most vital and powerful in forming the Christian life, and concerning which but one voice has been heard down through the whole course of the development of Christian truth, a representation is smuggled in, which is the *grave* of all truth hitherto conditioning the Christian life ?

If experience affords such decisive evidence that in an attempt to apprehend the *spirit* of Christianity without a strict regard to the word, this spirit, according to the peculiar dispositions of those who profess to have discovered it, is a self-contradictory one—a circumstance which might have been foreseen at the outset—what method presents itself for deciding the question : Which now is the true spirit of Christianity, this or its opposite ? We really do not perceive how any method can be devised to ascertain what is to be recognised as actually

true, unless the words of Scripture are authoritative. Whoever wishes to understand the spirit of Christianity in a given way, will naturally refer whatever does not agree with his idea of it to that part of doctrine which is unreliable, because remote from the centre of Christianity. And if the frequent repetition of a doctrine is thought to be a reason for assigning it to the ground of faith, some will choose this, and others that book of the New Testament, for the sake of finding what agrees with their tastes, and will affirm of these books, that the recurrence of an unpalatable doctrine in them is due to some idiosyncrasy of the writers, or their efforts to accommodate themselves to particular readers. In this way, many pretend that the whole doctrine of the atonement by the death of Christ, as unfolded in the epistles of Paul, is a perversion of simple Christianity, and others that John's gospel gives a representation of Christ's dignity different from the original and true representation, which was sacrificed by him to a theory. A discovery of truth, even in its fundamental principles, will only then be effected when its natural force is given to every word of Scripture, and when no expression of truth is held to be drawn from the original source which does not weigh every statement of the New Testament pertaining to that truth, and aim to unite and harmonize the whole testimony. Otherwise every man will select that which appears to express what he himself desires to find, and will pass by the rest ; and while the many-sided exhibition of the Christian system given in the New Testament, opposes an effectual barrier to a narrow and partial view of it, this barrier is thrown down by the arbitrary will of him who professes to appropriate the spirit of Christianity, by separating the essential from the non-essential in the word. As beings who are involved in sin, we are in danger of cutting ourselves off, by such a process, from the influence of just those truths of Christianity by which it is fitted to produce the sorrows of repentance, and thus cleanse our hearts from sin. Moreover, by subordinating the letter of Scripture to our own will, we not only surrender the essential principles of Christianity to the caprice of every other mind, but we also make them dependent upon every change in our own mood and bias. From of old, it has been a matter of uniform experience, that faith is now great and strong, full of confidence and joy, and now small and weak, mixed with doubt and despondency. Were only that which is deducible from the life to be acknowledged by the Christian as true and genuine, to what fluctuations, uncertainties, mutilations, curtailments, and additions, would the treasure of truth be exposed? Is not then the *word* given, in order that by resorting to it our faith may be confirmed and rectified? Must there not be in it a power which

goes forth to impart life, rather than one which is put into it by the life? If the latter were true, it would be a poor word for us when we were more in need of its fulness.

Yet, assuming that the Bible has in itself the treasure of infallible truth, and hence that some portion of that truth is to be found in every sentence, it may still be objected that the greatest differences of interpretation have prevailed, and therefore it cannot be rash, in striving to ascertain the spirit of Christianity, to leave out of sight many passages as not really belonging to it. But this objection can hardly be entertained without doing serious injury to earnest and conscientious study of the Scriptures, since every man will congratulate himself on having apprehended the spirit of Christianity, though he pays little attention to statements which to others who interpret them more *profoundly* seem to be of the greatest importance. Examples of this are at hand. If these statements do not commend themselves to him who is penetrated by the spirit of Christianity, and therefore in no danger of being killed by the letter, what else can be the reason save that they belong to a portion of the apostolic teaching which was not affected by the action of the Holy Spirit? I tremble at the thought of all the spirits which will then in the name of Christianity besmear us, at the Christs that will be set before us, if the peculiar spirit of every individual pretending to be moulded by the spirit of Christianity shall assert its own genuineness, and the word shall no longer avail to exorcise it. If the authority of the word is maintained, we shall always be called to examine as to what is Christian truth; while, on the other hand, this spirit, which claims independence of the letter, declines even the labour of exchanging a word in self-justification with the slaves of the letter, and, in harmony with its own nature, *knows* itself to be in full, though not exclusive, possession of the truth. It permits others to enjoy a different creed, but carefully avoids an impartial examination and estimate of their belief. I cannot repress my grief in view of the fact that in our day the *truth* is treated by many who should be its trusty friends, with great assurance and unconcern, as something which can be held and shaped in this way or in that without injury; and this low estimate of the intrinsic value of truth appears to have attracted the authors of the theory of inspiration defended by Elwert, since a God's word, having authority as such, seemed to them to restrain one's own inclination within too narrow limits.

Yet pardon this expression of regret. We now proceed to call attention to the fact noticed above, that although hard-fought battles have been waged in every age on certain points of Biblical doctrine, these have been waged out of regard to

essential, weighty, fundamental truths of Christianity, as the latter seemed to different persons, according to their peculiar tendencies, to lack merely the certainty given by a more adequate doctrinal statement; so that the cardinal truths of the Bible were not assailed at their foundation, and the only mistake was this, that it was not observed how all these statements bore witness to the ground-truth. Thus, *e. g.*, many different views have been entertained respecting the reconciliation which is effected by grace between the sinner and God; but whoever adheres to the word does not doubt the fact that sin involves guilt before God. Only a view which ignores the word can bring out as Christian a theory wherein the idea of guilt, and with it the idea of God's righteousness, retire into the background.

But our own age furnishes proof that it is only necessary to reject, as a prejudice prevailing among Christians, the assumption that what the New Testament expresses is to bind our faith, in order to secure the admission that it is by no means difficult to ascertain its teachings. For scholars who differ most widely from one another in their creed agree very exactly as to what the New Testament *asserts*; but while one party bows to these assertions as authoritative, the other pronounces them unworthy of credence. In this first, unbiassed minds see proof that, independently of Christian experience and particular disposition, *well-defined* views are expressed by the apostles, and that a knowledge of the contents of the New Testament may be gained and *presented* to faith for reception, instead of being *derived* from faith. Thus the free-thinking of our age, of whose worth or worthlessness in other respects we cannot now speak, has done us one service, it has shewn the groundlessness of the charge that it is quite impossible to reach any certain conclusion in respect to the essential contents of Biblical doctrine as such. Hitherto a demonstration of this possibility has been wanting, because every one intended to shew every modification of his subjective belief to be contained in the Bible, while now those who believe the Bible, along with such as repudiate without shame all faith in that book, are led to distinguish the statements of Scripture from their own apprehension of those statements.

Hence they deem it sufficient to shew that their subjective views are in *agreement* with the word of God, while formerly they deemed it necessary to shew that every item of their creed was *alone* grounded in the Bible. Thus, while the domain of the truth laid down in the Scriptures is more perfectly separated from the domain of human additions, the united and faithful labours of those who honour the *word* of holy Scripture and fear to burden that Scripture with anything of their

own, will contribute to bring out more and more fully the genuine contents of the sacred record, and even thereby to justify the same as divine and authoritative.

Thus, *e.g.*, the discussions respecting the Trinity would have led to very different results, if men had consented to hold themselves strictly to the data given in the Bible, and had not insisted exclusively on their own *theory* built on these data. But we can only wonder how (p. 92, sq.) the fate of this doctrine could have been developed along with the proofs of the impracticability of maintaining the word of Scripture. Here the controversy arose from a discontent with the results to be derived from the word of Scripture; of which results a doubt may still remain in many minds, whether *Nitzsch* himself has been successful in giving them a true and adequate expression.

I must also confess my surprise that faith in the entire truthfulness of the statements of the New Testament is opposed (p. 96) to an exegesis which assumes the presence of figurative speech in the holy Scriptures, and is said to imply, logically, that all idealising, every deviation from the verbal sense (he should have said the literal sense) is pernicious. With the crudest theory of the Holy Spirit's action, a theory which makes the apostles rude machines through which he speaks or writes, the use of suitable metaphors to depict vividly the truth would not be excluded. Did not Christ himself often speak in parables? Whatever reasonable idea we may conceive of the teaching influence of the Spirit, will not our reverence for the divine origin of this instruction *logically* dictate the use of all helps, in order to discover, in its purity and substance, the truth, which is given of necessity in a human way? Would not the opposite course, which, instead of finding a *meaning*, satisfied itself with having a word of undetermined import, be illogical and inconsistent?

The stronger our conviction that each and every expression of the Holy Spirit holds a *truth* to be appropriated by us, the more irresistibly shall we be urged to inquire what this truth is, which is contained in certain words, or metaphors, or tropical expressions, as the case may be. Indeed, by such exaggerations and imputations, entirely foreign to the nature of the subject, no correct judgment can be secured on the matter now in debate. So, also, the man who asserts that dogmatic theology, if it aims to be Christian, is not authorised to change the substance of truth laid down in the holy Scriptures, would be strangely misunderstood if his view were said to imply (p. 96) that dogmatic theology must not adapt its form of thought to that of its own time. For he simply wished to assert that the *truth* itself should not be sacrificed to present modes of expression and forms of thought, or that what is at war with Chris-

tian truth—not what departs from the original form in which that truth was imparted—cannot be honourably sent forth under that title. Fully recognising and admitting the fact, that the truth should verify its adaptation to all, and its fruitfulness, by *entering into* the spirit of the age, however expressed, it will be his right and duty to warn men that the spirit of the age, even though provided with somewhat derived from Christianity, is not Christianity, and will not be accepted as such. While that which is Christian has respect to the spirit of the time, enters into it, and selects a form both agreeable and intelligible to it, it will not have to appropriate the *errors* and *misconceptions* which cleave to that spirit. The spirit of the time may indeed be totally irreconcilable with the spirit of Christianity; and when it is so, dogmatic theology must either refuse to transplant it into Christian soil, or cease itself to be Christian. Thus it was no Christian theology when it paid homage to the theory that man must find redemption by and from himself. It might have entered into the language and conceptions of the age, in order to correct the latter, and to shew in what respect there was truth in that theory, &c., but when it honoured the spirit of the age *by accepting that theory*, and adapting itself to the same, it might indeed lay claim to many excellencies, *but that of being Christian it forfeited*. So, also, does that dogmatic theology which gives itself up to the force of the *pantheistic* current forfeit the excellence of being Christian, however amply it furnishes itself with Christian phrases and representations. For, undeniably, the belief in a *holy* God, and hence a God independent of the world, and not identical with it, is fundamental in Christianity. And if we accept Christianity only in so far as it is compatible with this pantheistic spirit of the age, which is hostile to its nature, and our theology is ready, not only to barter away the form, but also the substance of the faith, this theology is no longer Christian. The task of a Christian theology would be to enter into the pantheistic current for the purpose, indeed, of appropriating whatever is good in itself, and in harmony with Christian truth, and also for the purpose of rejecting decidedly whatever is wrong in itself, or incompatible with Christian truths rightly apprehended. The eternal truth of divine revelation is made a servant of the everyday wisdom of the human understanding, when any system whatsoever is first devised, and then Christian truth forced into that system. This truth is fully able to make a system for itself, and to enter into the language and philosophy of the times, not, indeed, for the purpose of accepting these beforehand as true, but for the purpose of elucidating their relation to itself; and this relation may be one of contradiction.

We now proceed to consider our last question, viz., *Whether safe criteria for separating the form from the essence of Christian truth can be given, and so a limit be placed to that which is traced to the form?*

The respectable author whom we have in view seems partly to doubt the possibility of distinct boundaries; and yet in some respects he carries them out farther than can be allowed.

Thus, e. g., he extends the form in which Christian truth is clothed, to the notions of the understanding, which he says (p. 88) must belong to the form or drapery, because the substance of our religion lies deeper than the intellect. Yet (p. 91, sq.) "the spirit of Christianity is not a bodiless phantom, wholly unrelated to religious knowledge; to a certain extent it must be infallible and capable of being derived infallibly from the Scriptures." Such must be the central doctrines, or those truths which are the most obvious and direct expression of the spirit of the Christian religion, while those which lie remote from the centre are capable of a looser statement.

Here again, as it appears to me, we have an instance of confusion analogous to one noticed above. Because the substance of religion lies deeper than the intellect, therefore the conceptions of the understanding belong to the former. Without doubt, as Christians of every age have acknowledged, the essence of religion—meaning by this *piety* in the soul—does not consist in knowledge; but does it follow from this, that the knowledge, which underlies such piety, needs no stability or precision? If a man of small knowledge may have a genuine and fruitful faith, is it therefore immaterial what amount of knowledge is at the believer's command, and certain that he will not be benefited by an increase of well-defined and wholesome truth? If truth, although defective or imperfectly expressed, can effect more in one who truly apprehends it, than a large amount of the same truth, more perfectly expressed, in one who does not truly apprehend it; in other words, if one side of the spiritual nature may be cultivated without an equal culture of another side of that nature, and if the former seems to be of more consequence than the latter, does it follow that what is offered to the other side of the spiritual nature is superfluous, and its character a matter of indifference? If truth imperfectly apprehended is a blessing, must we declare it to be of little importance whether we appropriate truth perfectly or imperfectly? If we bear in mind the intimate connection which subsists between truth and truth, as well as between received truth and awakened life, we shall hardly be able to accept the proposition, that truth, "to a certain extent" infallible, may be asserted as

to the principal fact, but not as to the doctrines remote from that fact. What standard of measurement, I ask, have we for the remoteness of one doctrine from another, and for their want of any relation one to another? Have we these points in our spiritual being, whose influence can be held securely at a distance from other points of the same? Is truth, though mingled with error, so distinguishable from it, that this or that man will not miss the truth which is "to a certain extent" infallible, and mould his views and life by the mingled error? Especially, as every man must already *possess* the true life, in order to have a proper stand-point for separating that which is true from that which is false? Is it not then of the greatest moment, that a perfectly correct image of the truth be set before us in the Scriptures, to which the erring mind may resort for counsel and correction? To admit this, we need not discard the distinction between fundamental and subsidiary doctrines. The former will always be distinguished by this fact, that they are the centre from which the others radiate, as it were. But they are proved to be such a centre only when all the rest lead back to them, as well as proceed from them. Now in finding the central truth, no aid can be derived from a side-doctrine erroneously stated, but only from one correctly stated. Nay, more, these side-doctrines erroneously stated, must tend to hinder the discovery of the central truth. Hence we cannot endorse this atomic separation, which, in spite of the erroneousness of the outer circle of doctrines, remains unconcerned for the safety of the central truth. This would only then be possible, if the single truths of Christianity lay side by side, without contact or connection. But while the spiritual nature of man is a united whole, one truth may indeed outshine another; but the splendour of this brighter truth is dimmed by another lying in darkness by its side. Hence no ground-truth that underlies and conditions the Christian life is safe, unless the illuminating action of the Holy Spirit pervaded the whole spiritual nature of the apostles, so that the doctrines lying beside the ground-truth were set in their proper light, and therefore correctly revealed.

We must also confess that we cannot perceive how the truth, communicated by the Holy Spirit, must of necessity be falsified by entering into the mind of one who shares the opinions of his age, although there may be no little error in the circle of those opinions. May not the Spirit's action be corrective? Just as often a human thought, communicated to us, suffices to change our whole belief, yet without doing any injury to our freedom or distinctive peculiarities. This at least is to be presumed, that the truth brought to man by the Holy Spirit touches the proper centre of spiritual life, and moulds this

aright. Grant that the form of statement which this truth received from the apostles was Judaistic, and modified by their earlier opinions ; it does not follow that their minds were not so controlled by the inspired truth, as to express by means of that form the truth in its purity. Let us take, for example, the ancient prophets, to whom the Spirit communicated the idea of an ultimate union of all nations in worshipping the true God ! If this thought is represented by those dwelling in the land of Judea, under the figure of the coming-up of all nations to the sacred mount in Jerusalem, and by Daniel, under the figure of a kingdom before which all other kingdoms at last disappear ; does the *idea* lose any of its truth or purity by this variety of representation ? Did the manifoldness of the parables, by which Christ delineated so vividly the nature of the kingdom of God, diminish in any measure the purity and truth of the idea to be conveyed to the Jews, or rather tend to correct their former errors ? If the blessing which lies in the atoning death of Christ, is sometimes represented under the image of a love which sacrifices life for the deliverance of a friend, sometimes under the image of a ransom paid for the deliverance of a captive, and sometimes under the image of a propitiatory sacrifice offered to God ; does the truth suffer loss by this variety of expression, or is it not rather, by the use of known conceptions, more distinctly and effectively presented to the mind ? Hence we cannot admit that a writer, by employing the existing modes of thought, must necessarily incorporate in his writings the errors of the time. Least of all do we assume this by conceding that Christianity, had it been planted originally on other than Jewish soil, would have had another colouring. Yet the New Testament and the facts of the case lead us to believe that Christianity, as a work of divine providence and the fulfilment of a prior educational system, could have grown up on none but a Jewish soil, because here alone was found the preparation, not of error but of *truth*, which, according to the purpose of God, conditioned its introduction into the world. Here it found the necessary groundwork of *truth*, which it could preserve without change, into whatever soil it might be transplanted. In no other circumstances could Jesus have asserted and justified his claim to be the Christ, but he never ceases, wherever the gospel is preached, to be the Christ ; and this, because salvation was to be from the Jews (John iv. 22), not because this was a Jewish conception, which might elsewhere, with just as much propriety, have been a very different thing. I am therefore far from esteeming the whole impress which Christianity bears, by virtue of its appearing first among the Jews, to be external and worthless. Judaism, as opposed to heathenism, was *truth* ; and Christianity could never have taken root, save

where the faith in false gods had *given place* to a recognition of the God honoured by the Jews as the only true God. Among the Jews, men were led to Christ by the *acknowledged authority* of the divine revelation possessed by them already ; in all other places, a *surrender of previous faith* was indispensable in order to faith in Christ. There is an unchangeable element of actual fact, which preceded Christianity in the training of the Jewish people, and *could precede in this only* ; and the recognition of this element conditions the reception of Christianity, determines of what people the Saviour should be, and impresses on the religion a Jewish stamp, not to be removed without taking away also the *Christian* stamp. Thus the position that Christianity, had it first appeared on other than Jewish soil, would have taken on a wholly different aspect, cannot be admitted, since the purpose of God, which had from the beginning prepared it to appear on Jewish soil only, could not otherwise have been carried into effect. Hence Christ, although assured of his mission to fix the faith of all nations, more distinctly recognised this as the territory on which he was to make his appearance. That Christianity sprang up on Jewish soil, because here was a treasure of religious truth and history to which it could attach itself, seems to be forgotten by many in our day, who treat whatever religious conceptions were found in being and appropriated by Christianity, as something to be separated from the latter as a foreign element. Since Christianity will take root nowhere save on Jewish soil, even because paganism has no stock for it, but can only, torn from its own stock, be grafted in—as Paul affirms, who wrought most effectually for the reception of the heathen into the fellowship of Christians (Rom. xi. 16–18) ; it is a purely arbitrary treatment of Christianity, not to recognise its fundamental relation to Judaism as being very different from its relation to paganism, but to divest it of its Jewish garb, and ignore its connection with Jewish history.

Hence it is plain that, in so far as Christianity is related to, and connected with, the facts recorded in the Old Testament, these facts cannot be deemed non-essential to it ; yet we do not deny, we rather admit, that Christianity, brought under the influence of different forms of thought and gaining influence over them, will experience many a change. But sad would be the lot of men, deplorable the portion of their spiritual nature, if their subjective needs could only be met by a change, that is, a falsification of truth, or if there could be no appropriation or expression of it by the individual mind, save at the cost of some of its elements. But where is the evidence that the entrance of certain truths into minds diversely constituted, must perforce originate discordant views of truth ?

This theory is based upon a false idea of the reception of Christianity, namely, the idea that truth is deduced from the life or experience; so that from the unity of the life are developed manifold truths, and not from the eternal unity of the truth endless varieties of life; and hence the truth and its exact nature must be referred to mere form. In reality, therefore, the concession that "to a certain extent" the ground-truth is infallible, or that it is not necessarily changeable, is due to some faint and lingering recognition of the absolute value of truth. Let the theory in question be followed out to its natural conclusion, and we can no longer speak of an infallible truth, one that claims sacred authority among men; and indeed the supporters of this theory illustrate the indifference to which it leads in regard to the preservation of any part of Christian truth as for ever sacred.

The ground of this error may be discovered in a failure to ascertain and ponder the nature of truth. The more genuine this is, the more *creative* power is there in it, and the less will it suffer by the necessary diversity of form under which it is expressed; for it creates the form according to circumstances, and not the form it. As we understand the matter, we have no reason whatever to place the conceptions of the intellect so entirely in the territory of form—which may change without injury to the substance of truth—as to affirm that these conceptions may be erroneous without injury; nor have we any reason to say that every peculiarity of expression necessarily involves some error. According to this view, if the light of Christian truth penetrates heathenism, it has power, if appropriated, to make darkness *retire*, instead of being penetrated and at least partially perverted by the darkness. And although this process will and must be imperfect in the individual, yet the truth is laid down in the word for this very reason, that it may in its purity drive the shadow farther and still farther away. A variety of conceptions will indeed be found, in which the truth may be clothed, without vitiating its substance; and this new form may serve an excellent purpose in setting forth and applying the unchangeable truth. In the New Testament itself we have a very precious example of these two facts, that the truth is able to assume a wholly new form, when there is need of it, and that the substance of the truth suffers no injury at all by this process; this example is afforded us in the prologue of John's gospel considered in relation to that gospel itself, and also in this gospel considered in relation to the other gospels. In the prologue we hear a language which is not repeated in the rest of the gospel. Christ, the Son of God, is here brought before us under the designation of Logos; and an image of

him is sketched, which belongs to a mode of speculation no trace of which meets us again in this gospel. Yet we shall all readily admit that the gospel is adapted to just those readers the circle of whose conceptions is entered in the prologue, to give them the details which they needed, and thus to justify as truthful the theory of Christ, which had been brought out in the prologue in their own language and mode of thinking. The gospel then accomplishes, in a satisfactory manner, its purpose. But the prologue employs language such as we never hear from the lips of Christ himself, or from any of his apostles. Yet we cannot shew that any erroneous idea is involved in the form here chosen ; it expresses the truth without any mixture of error. At the same time the readers were relied upon as able to appropriate correctly what was laid before them, though it were given in a language differing from that which must be chosen to relate the historical facts of the gospel ; and as the apostle shewed that he was not restricted, in *imparting* truth, to forms of speech already in use, so his readers were supposed not to be so dependent on their own mode of thought that they could not ascertain the meaning of that which was suitably expressed, though not in their idiom. It was enough to have given them a point of view from which the full and unperverted truth of Christianity could be easily received by them. The prologue, to be sure, did not confirm all their earlier ideas of the Logos ; but correcting their views, it shewed what conception of Christ is formed if the designation Logos is chosen to set forth the correct idea of him. By this designation of Christ as the Logos, John does not bring into Christianity the error which had been associated with this title, and which was foreign to the true idea of Christ ; but by *rejecting this erroneous element*, he shews how the unchangeable truth of Christianity may be put in this form of expression and conception. And at the same time, from the life, teaching, and works of Christ, he unfolds a body of facts, adapted to fix and secure what was true in this representation of the Divine nature, as dwelling in Jesus, and manifested through him. By the selection of facts which John here makes, we come to know more aspects of the nature and working of Christ, or at least to have a more definite view of them, than in the other gospels. But so far is this from proving the account of Christ, in its details, whether in the other gospels or in this, to be erroneous, that the fulness of the truth rather justifies itself by its greater richness and more inexhaustible fruitfulness. We should, therefore, teach our nature to let the one Christ as well as the other—i. e., Christ set forth in this way as well as that—dwell in us ; then

it will be seen how consistent and related is the truth which we have in the one and the other form.

Thus we have proof of the three points which the opposite theory does not seem to admit: (1.) A presentation of truth which has respect to an entirely different circle of ideas, and even enters into the same, need not thereby appropriate anything erroneous; it is rather the function of truth to exhibit error as incompatible with itself, and to reject it as incompatible. (2.) The actual and historical facts of Christianity permit one to make choice of those facts or truths which are adapted to existing necessities, and will correct known errors. (3.) Nothing wrong or ungentle is hereby of necessity mixed with the truth, even in points remote from the centre, according to the chosen form of speech. But the inexhaustible and blessed fulness of the truth will thereby make itself known to the observer.

Hence we are not forced to regard the truth as something cold and dead, in order to prove it capable of being apprehended without error in all its details, and also capable of such an expression that this or that individual shall joyfully submit his own errors to the correction of truth, instead of being bound inexorably to error, and disfiguring truth by it.

We shall not then fix the limit of that which appertains to form, where we are expected to fix it. For we ascribe to form whatever is required or produced by the peculiarities of men, in order on the one hand to receive the truth, or, on the other, to induce others to receive it. The form gives the drapery, or rather is the drapery, under which the truth appears. Should we concede that the form may mingle error with the truth, it is clear that it would no longer be the genuine pure truth, but a spurious corrupted truth, about which the drapery of form would be cast. In such a theory there is manifestly a confounding of the nature with the form. So far is the form from marring the contents of truth, that its proper office is to express the latter in such a way that all subjective difficulties and hindrances to the reception of it may be set aside. The subjective nature will be so controlled by the power of truth as to enter into its service; the form will be shaped by the truth, and not conversely the truth by the form. This can be satisfactorily shewn by the examples alleged in support of the opposite view. If the relation of the two sons of Abraham, Isaac and Ishmael, and of their two mothers, is made use of (Gal. iv. 21), to illustrate the relation of Christianity to Judaism, and the character of each; we may not, it is true, feel any want in our Christian consciousness, should nothing be added to our knowledge by this parallel between the Old Testament dispensation and the New. But we are not the

persons for whom this elucidation of a truth, important to us also, was primarily intended ; and so, of course, we are not the persons whom the form of illustration here chosen especially benefits. Yet it does not therefore contain anything erroneous. The law which God put in operation in his dealings with those personages of the Old Testament, is the same which obtained in case of the two dispensations ; so that the Jews could find the same God ordering and acting in the one as in the other. Hence for them the allegory was purely instructive, foisting in no grain of error.

Similar remarks apply to the Epistle to the Hebrews. If the author had in view readers who were captivated by the splendour of the Levitical worship, and fascinated by its peculiarities, it was his task to set before them the excellence of Christianity in contrast and comparison with Judaism. Hence the chief thought pervading this epistle ; such and such points of the Jewish system you prize ; but in a higher sense, and in a more satisfactory form, which leaves nothing to be desired by you, you have the same also in Christianity. This sort of reasoning, assuredly, neither has, nor can have, anything attractive to our hearts or intellects, because our views and tendencies are totally unlike those of the Jewish Christians at that time. But does it then follow that the chosen form of appeal infused error into their minds ? Was it not perfectly adapted to free them from their errors, and to gain for unadulterated Christian truth an entrance into their mind in the only way in which it could be gained. And if we now search for the ideas which were unfolded and maintained under this form, we can draw from this exhibition of Christianity the most precious and fruitful treasure of unperverted truth. And while we are filled with admiration at the variety of forms under which Christian truth may be brought to the souls of men, we cannot assert that we should have been able (cf. p. 88) to appreciate the blessings of Christianity as highly as we now do, without having this comparison of them with the provisions of Judaism. Besides, *love* is enkindled within at the evidence of the many different directions in which Christianity went forth to victory ; and it will picture to itself how, even in this way, by virtue of its mastery of form, it was fitted to conquer the hearts of men. But we shall also make valuable additions to our Christian knowledge, if we investigate the contents of truth by a comparison of the different forms of speech in which it is clothed, and do not forget the fact, that no expression of Christian truth by its first vouchers can be carefully studied, without finding new aspects of that truth revealed, verifying its authority and proving it to be light as well as life.

Essentially different from these two examples, is a third, which is placed between them, namely, the parallel drawn in Rom. v. 12, sq., between Christ and Adam, where we should lose nothing, it is said, in the doctrine of the natural depravity of man, if it was not traced back to the fall of Adam; nay, more, the way in which Adam's transgression is used to explain what the Redeemer did for mankind, can be recognised by us as no proof of the historical truth of the fact employed. Does not an obvious objection present itself to this view? If the depravity of which we are conscious need not be connected with the fall of Adam, is there any more need of connecting the redemption of which we are conscious, with the work of Christ? Whoever needs no Christ, in order to enjoy the latter, will very properly insist on the inquiry, How can it be proved that the connection of redemption with a revealed Christ is not a product of Jewish modes of thinking, as truly and fully as the connection of human depravity with the fall of Adam? An advantage which has fallen to mankind in the course of history is here elucidated, beyond a doubt, as to its value and meaning, by comparison with a disadvantage which had likewise befallen it in the course of history. Hence this reference to the fall of Adam is not a mere figure, used to make a particular truth more evident and apprehensible; for then the nature of depravity could have been described just as correctly and intelligibly without deriving it from Adam; but this reference is a simple appeal to something actually true or actually false. Whoever makes it the latter, will find it hard to discover any principle on which he can consistently maintain the desert of Christ, as one who has actually appeared to redeem men from sinful corruption, to be infallible truth. Paul refers to difficulties, also, which could only present themselves were the fall of Adam supposed to be a fact, and he solves them likewise, as they might be solved in case, and only in case, the fall were an historical fact. Thus this example seems to me to prove the uncertainty of every Christian truth which rests on a historical basis, if the limits of form are made so comprehensive as Elwert proposes—the form involving error without injury to the ground-truth. Of a truth “*to a certain extent*” infallible, and to be derived infallibly from the Scriptures, we confess ourselves unable to form any idea. Something, *only to a certain extent* infallible, is plainly *not infallible*. And we apprehend that the whole sum of infallible truth to be drawn from the Bible, according to the maxims of our author, might be reduced to the appearance of Christ among men, while every man would be left to form such an idea of his work and merits as his subjective nature approved.

But if the New Testament itself affords incontestable proofs

that the apostles incorporated error in their doctrine, no theory incompatible with this fact can be maintained. Fortunately, however, the proofs alleged in the treatise under review need not, I think, give us much solicitude. For, first, we cannot admit the validity of the statement so often repeated in this work, that it would be illogical to concede errors in the details of history, and yet deny their presence in doctrine. If we suppose that the action of the Holy Spirit, in teaching the apostles, was designed to qualify them to fulfil their *calling*, it was not necessary for this *purpose* to guard against discrepancies like the following. When there were two demoniacs, or blind men, who had desired and obtained help from Jesus, this narrator called to mind but one of them, perhaps the speaker, while another recollected that there were two of them. So, from the history of Christ's resurrection, this and that event might have been narrated to one as of special importance, and he arranges them accordingly; while another directs his narrative to that which had specially arrested his own attention; so that it may now be difficult for us to fix with confidence the chronology of events. So, also, in giving the relation of a certain "taxing" to the time of the governorship of Quirinius, a mistake might be made (especially by a narrator who was not an apostle);* but what connection has all this with the task which the Holy Spirit was to qualify the apostles to perform? Did the Christian *truth*, which they were called to communicate in its purity, suffer in the least by all this? Such apparent contradictions—for it is remarkable that for everything of this kind, so patiently culled out, a resort to conciliation is possible—*possible*, since no instance has been produced where some method of harmonising these discrepancies is not conceivable—such apparent contradictions, I say, are to be estimated and settled at an earlier stage of inquiry, namely, in answering the great preliminary question: Whether the New Testament writers are *trustworthy* historians?—a question to the answer of which we cannot fitly make any contributions in this place. According to the view which ought, in our judgment, to be taken of the influence of the Divine Spirit in qualifying the apostles for their work, we can in no case rationally expect them to appeal to the inspiration of the Spirit, when the question relates to the establishing of historical truth, but only (cf. p. 41), as did John (xix. 35, xxi. 24), to the respect which

* It is remarkable that a little more exact historical knowledge of the period—furnished to us by the classical scholar Zumpt in his "*Commentationes Epigraphicæ*," vol. ii, Berlin, 1854—has completely dissipated the alleged anachronism of Luke's narrative; and many of the other so-called discrepancies will, in like manner, disappear on consideration and farther inquiry.—*Ed. B. & F. E. R.*

belonged to them in the church as trustworthy men. It would have been a suspicious circumstance had they wished to cut off at this point, by an appeal to *apostolic* authority, the right of testing their statements. No less compatible with a correct view of the influence of the Divine Spirit upon them, is the fact that the character of epistles which contain doctrine—infallible doctrine—seems to be dependent on many outward circumstances, *e. g.*, whether they be longer or shorter, be directed to a wider or narrower circle of readers, as is plain from Gal. vi. 11; 1 Thess. v. 27; Col. iv. 16; 2 Thess. ii. 15; Heb. xiii. 22. We should have a very inconsistent idea of an apostle if we should think otherwise. And if, according to 2 Pet. iii. 15, sq., there are in the epistles of Paul many things "hard to be understood," we perceive nothing in this fact which the influence of the Holy Spirit should have prevented. For the readers to whom the epistles were directed possessed different degrees of knowledge; that which some were able to apprehend correctly, and which could be withheld from them only at the cost of checking the growth of their Christian life, others would understand with difficulty, and misunderstand in part, or perhaps misuse. This casts no shadow on the action of the Divine Spirit, for that action does not assume to make all who hear of Christianity alike, so that all truth is for all. It rather qualified Paul "to become all things to all men." Hence it follows that all Christians might not be able at once to receive in a proper manner everything written by Paul. Jesus himself could not communicate to all everything which he communicated to the apostles, and even these were not ripe for all which he had to communicate.

Finally, to uphold our view, we should not hesitate to admit that Paul said of himself (1 Cor. ii. 13) that he spake in words of the Spirit, because he judged that the spiritual belongs to the spiritual, *i. e.*, that it is proper to exhibit a revelation from the Spirit in a form adapted to its character. For this would shew that Paul rejected the oratorical tricks of that age as not suited to the preaching of the gospel, and preferred a simple form of discourse, worthy of the subject. That the Divine Spirit made him successful in carrying out this purpose was not thereby excluded. This very perception and acknowledgment that the form ought to correspond with the spirit may have been itself a fruit of the Spirit. Besides, the meaning of the words, *πνευματικῶς πνευματικὰ συγγράφοντες*, does not seem to be, "adjudging to spiritual (in contents) spiritual (in form)," but rather this, "comparing spiritual with spiritual;" by which means his pleading did not contain the arbitrary thoughts of man along with the truth revealed by the Spirit, but whatever did not prove to have the divine stamp was rejected.

But the cases yet remain in which the apostles were manifestly deceived. Of these, we are told (p. 87, sq.), a great *multitude* occur. But as it was not the plan to carry out this point in detail in the treatise under review, we also have not this great sum to investigate and justify. Besides, we are here referred to that which is pretty uniformly and exclusively brought forward in this connection, namely, the use of the Old Testament by the apostles, and their expectation of the speedy coming of Christ. And these certainly are points which cannot be disposed of by a few dogmatical remarks on the one side or the other. We may, however, remark, without anticipating any exhaustive discussion of this topic, that, so far as the Old Testament passages cited in Heb. i. 5 are concerned, a third, very simple way of justifying them is at hand, without charging the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews with misinterpreting the Old Testament. For, instead of saying to the Hebrews, to whom, according to the whole structure of the epistle, it was not necessary to offer *proof* that Jesus was the Son of God, "To which of the angels has God promised the dignity of being his Son?" the writer might well say, "To which of the angels said God at any time (to which of the angels has God ever addressed such words as we find in this extract from Ps. ii. or 2 Sam. vii.), Thou art my Son; to-day I declare thy filial relation to me;" or, "I will shew myself a father to him, and he shall shew himself a son to me?" Until the incorrectness of this exposition, which may be justified by incontestable analogies from Oriental writers, and also from this very letter to the Hebrews, shall be pointed out, the passages in question cannot be taken as proof of error in the views which are laid down in the New Testament.

As to the supposed expectation of the apostles, that Christ would soon appear for the last time, it must in the first place be shewn that those interpreters are mistaken who do not feel themselves authorised to understand the final coming of the Lord to judgment, to be meant by every coming or appearing of Christ to which the readers of the New Testament are referred. In the Old Testament every solemn manifestation of a divine attribute in history is called a coming of the Lord. Then, in the second place, it must be shewn that, in contrast with the doubtful and contested explanation of such passages as may *possibly* be interpreted of the final coming of Christ in that generation, those passages deserve no attention which declare with the greatest confidence that the gospel, in harmony with its nature, is yet to be possessed by all mankind; and the apostles, *e.g.*, Paul, must have had very just ideas, from their own experience, of the time which was requisite for the achievement of such a victory. If the weight of every

proof-text, upon the one side or the other, were fairly recognised, it would be seen whether it is an artful shift or a truthful response, which denies that the apostles definitely expected the last advent of Christ as close at hand. Furthermore, as Christ had expressly declared that nothing definite respecting the day and hour of his final coming could be known by man, since the Father had reserved this knowledge to himself, the expectation of this event, even if harmless to Christians, was something which did not belong to the illuminating Spirit to produce. The only mistake of the apostles would have been in fixing in their minds as definite, at least to a certain extent, that which is entirely indefinable. But here it might be shewn as psychologically probable, that the understanding of the apostles in respect to their own Christian consciousness—to say nothing of any aid or influence of the Spirit—could not lead them to expect the final coming of the Lord as very near; for, however desirous they were to tarry for a coming of the Lord, he himself had given them a view of his coming, from the destruction of Jerusalem onward, in a more striking and victorious increase of his kingdom.

In view of such considerations, which present themselves to us as fairly requiring us to maintain, not precisely the *letter*, but the *spirit* embodied in the *word* of Scripture, we do not find that theory which assumes the action of the Holy Spirit in the apostles to have excluded error from the *contents* of Christianity, to be refuted by facts. Hence these contents, as laid down in the New Testament, must be regarded and treated as infallible.

In conclusion, we must be allowed to protest against that interpretation of the words: τὸ γράμμα ἀποκτείνει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ, which makes them prove that it is a truly Christian view to conceive of the action of the Holy Spirit in the apostles as permitting error in their doctrine. The opposite of this would be the view which regards every letter of doctrine as infallible. But it is unnecessary for us to shew at length that the words in question have no reference at all to this point. Paul is speaking of two dispensations, the Jewish and the Christian; the former he designates γράμμα, the latter πνεῦμα. Of their opposite character it is said in the words before us, that the one, by making literal prescriptions, brings death to man (or exhibits him in his sinful and condemned state), while the other, by laying hold of the innermost spiritual nature of man, brings life (or exhibits him in a state of salvation and reconciliation to God, through the broken power of sin). Now is there any intimation in this, that in Old Testament times every letter of revelation might and should have been esteemed infallible, while in New Testament times it is a

characteristic of faith to presuppose a mixture of error and truth in revelation? Instead of this, it is Paul's aim to make his readers realize that a view of the purpose of divine love was first made possible by the new dispensation, and to excite in them grateful joy that the full light has appeared in Christ. A reception of him is the power (*ἐνέργεια*) which lays hold of the deepest nature of man, and is therefore (ver. 17) true freedom. This freedom will be gained by us, we believe, if we receive this Christ, and just as the revelation of the Holy Spirit describes him and his work, but not as our own nature, without Christ, and enslaved to sin, may choose to fashion him.

By conceding the authority of the *word*, we hope to enjoy the *spirit in its purity*. We will now, in conclusion, exhibit the results of our investigation, in brief propositions :

1. The influence of the Divine Spirit upon the apostles must not be thought to have impaired the *freedom and individuality* of their human spirits ; these were rather purified, elevated, and made fruitful.

2. This action of the Divine Spirit stimulated the Christian life of the apostles in a very eminent degree, in harmony with the demands of their calling ; and, to make their teaching trustworthy, this action included instruction.

3. The qualification for their work promised to the apostles consisted in a correct view of the *whole* sum of Christian truth, and they bore themselves always as if in possession of such a view.

4. It is in perfect accordance with the psychological laws of the human spirit, that *the life should be developed from known truth*, and not conversely the truth from the life. *Life is manifold, truth by nature one*.

5. Unless it be admitted, that in the *word*, from which, as from a fountain, Christian truth is to be drawn, those doctrines which branch out into *particulars* are a *correct, unperverted expression of Christian truth*, the *essential contents* and very nature of Christianity seem to be left *insecure* and exposed to manifold attacks and injuries.

6. The *bounds of form* must not be fixed, that error is necessarily mixed with truth—though not to the injury of its nature. The form is but a *robe* for the eternal, immutable truth ; and this it would cease to be, if by means of it, *instead* of the pure and genuine truth, a distortion of the same was brought to view. By its creative power the truth takes into its service, rules and shapes the form, and not the form it.

Thus we have given a satisfactory account, as we believe, of the sense, in which (Eph. ii. 12, sq.) we are to be built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ being the corner-stone ; we also hope to be, not strangers and sojourners, but fellow-citizens of the saints and of the household of God.

ART. V.—*Modern Humanitarianism considered in connection with the Infidelities and Errors of the day: a Review of the presently prevailing currents of Thought.*

It is instructive to consider from what an old stock our most modern infidelities and errors spring and grow. "Ye shall be as gods," was the first temptation, but it was a temptation for the human race. On each successive generation it has fastened its deadly hold, and in the present age it is as vital and as successful as it has ever been, cunningly accommodating itself to the altered and constantly altering aspects of modern society.

He who suggested the temptation knew well how to conduct it. A great part of heathen mythology is a signal illustration of the temptation's success. For what are many of the gods of antiquity but only deified heroes, men worshipped as gods? They were famous in their day, men of renown. Their memories were cherished; statues were erected to them; legendary stories gathered round about them; their names were encompassed with an atmosphere of myth, and in process of time they were worshipped.

This system of hero worship prevailed more especially in Greece and Rome. While the more languid and contemplative nations of the East transferred their homage to the sun, and moon, and the other imposing objects in nature, the stirring and chivalrous Greeks and Romans worshipped as gods the kings, and captains, and mighty men—the good and the great who had lived on the earth.

In this way most literally and most extensively was fulfilled the devil's promise, "Ye shall be as gods." This method of fulfilment served its day, and then passed away. It became time-worn and obsolete. But it was withdrawn only to make way for other devices. He who is the author of the temptation is also the finisher of it. His vigilance will always supply the temptation with fresh appliances. And this he has done in the most recent form of infidelity which has for late years been working with modern philosophers among ourselves, and is still working—to wit, pantheism.

The object of heathen mythology was to place men among the celestials. This, a success in its time, would be a failure if tried now. And consequently the object of pantheism is to bring God down to man, and to set man above God. And this pantheism seeks to accomplish, by confounding God and his works. The universe is God, says the pantheist.

Every house is builded by some man, and he who hath builded the house hath more honour than the house; but he that

built all things is God. But pantheism disowns this distinction. It says the house is the builder, and the builder is the house. The universe is God, and God is the universe.

One can easily see that if this is once accepted as sound sense and as sound theology, personal man will soon be raised above an impersonal God. Man with his powers of intelligence is the highest development in the visible universe. He is the lord of all. The interests of humanity become the highest interests for which the universe exists. The universe is the pedestal. Man is the statue. All things are put in subjection under man's feet, and man only obeys the impulse of his position when in all things he acts from himself and for himself, and becomes a God to himself. Thus by annihilating a personal God, and by deifying the universe, does pantheism subtly uplift humanity and its interests above the Deity and his existence.

Such is the last product of "vain wisdom and false philosophy"—this pantheism, an European version of Asiatic Buddhism, formed in German studies amid the cloudy vapours of tobacco smoke, hailed by American and British illuminati, as worthy of their enlightened homage, and bedecked by them with the phrases heretofore employed by spiritual devotion, to the temporary beguiling of unwary souls!

The church, however, still remains. And although infidelity may surge and toss amid its own uncertainties, while the church stands erect, the pillar and ground of the truth, there is hope for the cause of God on earth. The church's work is to witness for God on the earth, but when the church herself is won over, and when, instead of being faithful like her great High Priest in things pertaining to God, she changes her voice, and gives her teaching and her influence, not for, but against God, the light becomes darkness.

It is dismal, but it is true, that such has been the history of the church. In the first and second centuries, evangelism prevailed. From the second to the seventh century, ecclesiasticism prevailed: ecclesiasticism, in its turn, paved the way for the papacy.

Ecclesiasticism, with its pompous and secularizing order of bishops, introduced the *human element*. This element, like leaven, silently and steadily wrought until the whole mass was leavened. Then came popery. And what is popery in its essence but paganism revived? The only difference is, that saints are substituted instead of heroes. Paganism worshipped heroes. Popery worships saints. The darkening cloud of saints, beginning with Mary and terminating with the Japanese martyrs, the latest added to the calendar, interposes betwixt the sinner and the Sun of righteousness, and obscures the Sun

of righteousness, and shuts him out from the sinner's view. Gathering boldness as it grows, popery satisfies not itself with the more ethereal worship of "the spirits of just men made perfect," but completes its antichristian work by taking a poor old man encompassed about with sin and infirmity, putting him in the chair of Jupiter Capitolinus, carrying him to the high altar, taking from off that altar the consecrated elements which they say are the true body of Christ, and which but at that time are never removed, and setting with care, lest he may fall, that old man in the chair on the altar, proclaims to universal popery "our Lord God the Pope." It is but the literal fulfilment of the infallible word, "that man of sin is revealed, the son of perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above *all that is called God, or that is worshipped*; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself that he is God." This old man, with the name of blasphemy, is the head of what is called in the language of Europe *Catholic Christianity*. But it is a misnomer; for popery is not Christianity, it is antichrist, Christ's enemy. Popery is but a preserve for the priest. All its forms and ceremonies are framed with the view of placing the soul under the power of man, and keeping it from direct communication with a divine Saviour.

But, leaving these general views of the subject, let us get within the circle of protestantism, and there will we find the same evil principle at work under different and modified forms. We select a few particulars as illustrations. Take first,

THE DIVINE AUTHORITY OF THE WORD. An intelligent and honest mind will admit as a first principle, that if the Bible is a revelation from God, it is an authoritative standard of faith. The very fact that the truth is revealed, is an authoritative reason why the truth should be received. "God has said it," "it is written," should be enough "to cast down imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and to bring into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ."

Instead, however, of receiving this as a first principle, the main current of modern sentiment is set against it. It is not what God says, it is what man thinks, that carries authority with it. There is an impatience under the external and unchanging authority of the Book. The persevering aim of much of the literature and philosophy of the day is to place human sentiment in the room of scriptural teaching.

There come first, *the advocates of the inner light*. Such persons do not question the inspiration of Isaiah or Paul, but they place the inspirations of genius on the same footing. To them the efforts of the painter, or the fancies of the poet, or the dis-

covery of the chemist, or the invention of the mechanist, or the reform of the statesman, is as much an inspiration as the revelations of the Word. They do not know that the claim of the Book, "all the writing is given by inspiration of God," is conclusive against all other claims.

It is strange what iteration can do. In newspapers, in magazines, in reviews, in lectures, in novels, you are ever meeting with the simperings or ravings of these inner light men, regarding the instinctive emotions of the human heart, the underlying capacities of the human mind, the soaring aspirations of the human imagination, and the endless resources of human invention; and the effect of all their representations, although they do not say so in words, is to lead men away from a sober, practical, reliable, and well-defined revelation to those vague and shadowy speculations. They speak vanity every one with his neighbour, until they impose on themselves and on each other.

Akin to this class of inner light men are *those who declaim in praise of human earnestness*. They look at human earnestness apart from its object and its foundations. They never ask what are the people earnest about, or why are they earnest? It is enough to them that the soul burns with earnestness. This to them is a high moral spectacle, on which they gaze with admiration. They accept human earnestness in the place of scriptural faith.

To such persons Napoleon III., blindly trusting in his destiny, is as high an object of moral approbation as a pious believer, exercising an humble faith for salvation in the sure promises of God. Papist, Protestant, Mahomedan, Hindoo, if they display earnestness, are esteemed alike and encouraged alike. The distinctive characters of Protestantism as a religion of truth, of Popery as superstition, of Mahomedanism as fanaticism, of Hindooism as a degradation, are all sunk in the earnestness of the devotee. It is the human element of earnestness, and not the truth as coming from God, and leading to God, that such apostles of earnestness regard. And yet, after all, this earnestness derives the whole of its moral value, not from itself, but from the object to which it is directed. Paul displayed the same quality of earnestness when he persecuted the church, and when he laboured for it. But in the one case it was the earnestness of a blasphemer, of a persecutor, of an injurious zealot. In the other, it was the holy zeal of an apostle of Jesus Christ.

In this enumeration of the forces which man has set in motion to diminish the authority of the word of God, we must not omit the most recent, which is, *the desire to do away with dogmatic theology*. The partisans of this school are chiefly

young clergymen, whose walk is more that of literature than of divinity. Their wish is to deprive the doctrines of Christianity of their distinctness and precision. They find that these doctrines are the old landmarks which stand in their way, and which mark their own declension from the faith once delivered to the saints, and always contended for by them. It is a broader theology which they want—a kind of Samaritan religion, which can comprehend within its embrace the worship of the God of Israel, and of the other gods of the nations. They wish, as they say, to soften down doctrinal rigidity, in other words, to clear the way for their own speculations.

It may not be denied that favour has been obtained for this school, when their fresh utterances have been contrasted with the dry distinctions of minute and microscopic divines, who cast all they say into a doctrinal mould, and who fatigue and bewilder the mind by their multiplied and wire-drawn divisions. It was one of this class that John Newton heard insisting to weariness, not on some doctrinal principle, but on some doctrinal point, and whom he admonished by telling, "There was one distinction that you forgot to-day. Your people came to be fed, and you forgot the distinction betwixt meat and bones."

By all means, let the dry-bone system of a bare and tedious doctrinal disquisition be guarded against, but equally, and even more watchfully, let us dread the Rationalistic cry, which, when it is leaving Germany, is being lifted up by some in Scotland and in England against articles of faith and dogmatic teaching. Not in vain are we told, "All Scripture is profitable for doctrine." Doctrines are the alabaster box which contains the ointment exceeding precious, and which are needful for preserving both its substance and fragrance.

These instances which I have specified, of a purpose on the part of man of reducing the authority of God's word, are illustrated by persons of refined and lettered minds. But outside of their circle there is the undistinguishing and coarsely pronounced cry, which has been awakened in newspapers, and re-echoed from platforms, and repeated in workshops, Every man has a right to hold what opinions he pleases—let us have liberty of conscience. And these statements, in the minds of those who use them, cover far more than they express. For not only do they mean that no man has a right forcibly to control the religious opinion of his neighbours, which meaning is sound and legitimate, but somehow or other they conduct to the perilous conclusion, that the same freedom which exists betwixt man and man in reference to religious opinion should also exist betwixt God and man, and that man, in the exercise of his personal judgment, may override the clearly announced declarations of Revelation.

Such are some of the cross currents of human thought which are every day in busy action around us, assailing the supremacy of the Word of God.

When we turn from the Word of God to THE CHURCH OF GOD, we find the same perverse disposition on the part of man to bring down the church from its place and position as a divine institute. The simple scriptural view which one receives of the church is, that it is God's ordinance, founded by the wisdom of God, purchased by the blood of God, preserved by the power of God, and employed by the grace of God, for the high moral purposes of witnessing for God in a godless world, of teaching God's truth, and of saving souls.

Yet how seldom are these claims conceded to the church, or rather, how generally and often how rudely are they refused.

There is prominent amongst all, *the judicial abnegation of the church as a divine institute*. The church, as Christ was, is brought before the judges of the land. The church expresses her willingness, because it is her duty to give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, all due obedience in reference to things temporal. But she also asserts, what she can never forego, that she is the church of Christ, deriving her being from him, and her great principles of procedure from him, and bound to yield unswerving loyalty to him. What she asks is a *locus standi* in the land, and freedom as a divine institute, to yield a conscientious obedience, and a scripturally regulated obedience to the revealed will of Christ. No, say the judges of the land, you are an Established church, and by the terms of that establishment your freedom as a church is restricted. Give up your Establishment connection, and then you may enjoy unrestricted all the freedom you ask. When driven to what she believes to be an unrighteous alternative, she gives up the benefit she derives from man rather than yield up her freedom to obey and serve God.

Again is this church brought before the judges as a dis-established church, to defend her own conscientious spiritual actings. But now the voice of judicial authority is exactly reversed. "Had you been an established church," say the judges, "your rights and freedom would have been secured to you by the special act of parliament constituting you an established church; but we do not know you now as a church at all, you are only a corporation of individuals associated for certain objects. It is only in this capacity we can acknowledge you, just as we would acknowledge a banking company, or a railway company, or an insurance company, or a baking company, and we must just judge of your case on the principles of common law."

Anyhow, the church is not to be recognised by the judges of the land as having anything to do with God.

. It is refreshing to turn from such deliverances to the acknowledgment which the laws and constitution of the country give to the church as an ordinance of God. One is reminded of the distinction which the whole history of our nation establishes betwixt judge-made law and constitutional law. The simple reading of only the heading of one of the old acts of parliament, when compared with the speeches and decisions of modern Lords of Session, will illustrate the distinction and the difference. Here is one for instance, "Ratification of acts anent the liberty and freedom of the true kirk of God." Let us live in the hope that there will yet arise, for the sake of our country, a race of jurists with minds and feelings which will enable them to compass the solid views of the lawyer-statesmen of the past, and to enter into the large principles of constitutional jurisprudence.

But leaving the precincts of law, we find prevailing among some modern and eager philanthropists, views of a different kind, but equally opposed to the true notion and efficiency of the church of God. Such persons in their impetuous zeal speak of the church as if it were an obsolete institute, and *as if the true work of God was to be carried on by societies*. It is true, that when the church of Christ was asleep and neglecting her work in this land, God did raise up private Christians who did associate for active works of Christianity. And it cannot be denied, that by means of these societies great good has been done. But it is equally clear that the church is *God's society*, and that if the church had done her work, she would in herself have been Bible society and missionary society, both for home and for the heathen. When the church is developed in her soundness and unity, she will stand forth as a God-made society for the world's regeneration and for the world's well-being.

Competitors will never be awanting for the power and place of the church. Here is another. "*Literature*," says Carlyle, "*is the one modern church*." Our literature is indeed the result of that civilisation which the protestant church has produced. It is the church of the Reformation, which has created that advanced civilisation out of which modern literature has sprung, and by which it is supported. The church does not undervalue the influence of a wholesome literature. On the contrary, she would rejoice in a literature which would develop the truth and prove an handmaid to the truth.

It is literature, as represented by some of its ambitious votaries, which is not satisfied with its own rightful place. It has come of age, as itself thinks, and is impatient for the place of its venerable parent. And so now the church of Christ, with its old-fashioned teachings and forms, is to be voted down as having outlived its day, and modern literature is to take its

place. The church is to be superseded by the lecture and the reading-room. The daily newspaper, the monthly magazine, the railway bookstall, the reading club, are to be the accredited sources of instruction, and public opinion is to discover amid its conflicting elements a self-controlling and regulating power.

The world's experience is too old for the hopes of these votaries of literature. For 6000 years the world has been feeding on the fruit of the tree of knowledge. During all that time the melancholy conclusion has been but reiterated and reiterated, "he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." The knowledge which it yields is the knowledge of evil as much as of good. It is not this tree of knowledge which will medicate the world's evil, and satisfy the world's longings. It is the tree of life that can alone do this, and this tree grows not in the outfield of nature, but in the Lord's own vineyard.

One thing, which they cannot have overlooked, and which must go far to moderate the expectations of ambitious literateurs, is the fact that the influence of the press does not keep pace with its extension. There was, when the press was more limited, a certain measure of respectful attention paid to its every utterance. It was regarded as a more reserved and higher influence than spoken discourses. But every day is depriving it of this character. Its competitions have seduced it to unworthy acts. It panders often to what it should oppose. Its multiplicity is confounding and confusing. By some of those who were its loudest advocates, the press itself is found to be an oppression.

While all these influences from without tend to deprive the church of its authority as a divine institute, *latitudinarianism from within is working in the same direction*. Latitudinarianism accepts all forms of church organisation, and would treat all churches alike, however different their teaching may be. Latitudinarianism accommodates itself to the *status quo*. It takes things as it finds them. A church is a church to it, whether evangelical or anti-evangelical, whether Episcopalian, or Presbyterian, or Independent, or without organisation at all. Whether the church has been originated by the whim, or error, or self-interest of man, latitudinarianism politely acknowledges it. It never inquires, Can this church be tried by the general principles of God's word? Is this a church which God will recognise? These things are out of its sight.

Latitudinarianism thus founds the church, not on what pleaseth God, but on what pleaseth man, and suiteth man. A church thus formed has no authority. It mouldeth not the man. The man mouldeth it. And whenever an individual thinketh that he can give form to a church, instead of submitting and

receiving form from the church, then is the power of that church on the wane.

Latitudinarianism is thus a revolt from God's authority and truth. It is a refusal to acknowledge those general principles laid down in the word, and which, if honestly acted upon, would lead to a marvellous unity in the organisation of the church. Latitudinarianism is a compound of error and ignorance, of indifference and self-interest—a compromise of truth, and a hollow patched-up alliance to respect each others' differences, solely because it is found convenient so to do.

We may notice one other form in which many would set the things of man in the church above the things of God. *Many would employ and support the church as a grand agency for effecting human liberty.* They would cheer the church on in every effort she would put forth for the conquering of freedom, and this such supporters would make the church's chief end.

It is true that the church of Christ, in the great epochs of the world's advances, has acted a prominent and effective part. But this with the church has never been her primary object. Her primary object has been to witness for God and his truth, and it was while contending for this great primary end that, as a secondary result, civil benefits have flowed to the world. Such was the Reformation. It was, in its great features, a struggle for God's truth and man's salvation: while also, in a subordinate aspect, it has proved the great era of modern freedom.

But such results can only be accomplished by the church as secondary results. If the church would attempt to elevate them into primary ones, her failure would be signal. The secondary would devour the primary, as in Pharaoh's dream, the ill-favoured and lean-fleshed kine did eat up the seven well-favoured and fat kine, and the church's power would be ended.

This year is likely to furnish us with an illustration of the truth of the position now enunciated. This year is the bicentenary of 1662, when 2000 godly ministers in England, and 400 godly ministers in Scotland, rather than sacrifice the truth of God as connected with the church of God, suffered the loss of all earthly things. The great object which these men had before them was God's truth. This was the final cause of all their struggles and of all their sacrifices. As a secondary result, benefits have emerged to civil freedom and liberty of conscience. But first and foremost, what they sought was the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and the civil and religious liberty which followed has been added thereto.

It will be a mistake, both historical and religious, if we find the Nonconformists of England placing the less before the greater, the last before the first, and representing the struggles and

sacrifices of 1662 as a contending for civil and religious liberty, and not as a contending for the faith once delivered to the saints. In Scotland, there is as much of the old Presbyterianism surviving as will guard men from the blunder of confounding a religious with a political struggle, and will keep them in remembrance of the fact, that the watchword with the Scottish witnesses of 1662 was, "For Christ's crown and covenant."

And here, in closing these remarks on the church, we may see how a principle of enduring vitality is secured to the Free Church of Scotland, by connecting her very being with the scriptural doctrine of Christ's headship. The question of the rights of the Christian people was a question of importance not to be despised. The question of spiritual independence was a question essential to every active church. But it is as both these questions meet in the headship of Christ that they acquire a higher sacredness; and it is this headship of Christ, both as a source of government and of influence, which imparts all power to the church. "The churches of God are in Christ Jesus," (2 Thess. ii. 14.) The church that remains practically faithful to Christ's headship will, because Christ lives, herself live also.

We now approach THE DOCTRINES OF RELIGION, and we shall see that these doctrines take their shape and form according as men grant to God the things that pertain to him, or according as they overlook what is due to God, and fashion the doctrine to meet their own views and interests.

The great purpose of the gospel is to readjust the relations betwixt God and man. Sin has dislocated these relations. The gospel refits them. The purpose of the gospel is to change sinners into saints, rebels into subjects, enemies into friends. But this great revolution is effected, not certainly by depriving God of what rightfully belongs to him, not by bringing down the claims of Godhead to meet the conditions of fallen humanity, but on the contrary, by granting to God all that pertains to him. That system of doctrine which fully accepts and acknowledges, in all their breadth and mysteriousness, the nature of God, and the character of God, and the law of God, and the government of God, and connects these with the salvation of man, is the only system which can stand the test of truth.

One cannot read the Scriptures, and more especially the apostolic epistles, without seeing how much the claims of Godhead are placed in the front. These claims of Godhead are asserted and maintained in all their magnitude; and it is in connection with these claims of Godhead, and in subordination to them, that the salvation of man is exhibited. The doctrine of Christ hath "received us to the glory of God."

There is but one system of theology which accepts this Scripture mode of exhibiting the doctrines of salvation. It is the

Calvinistic. The Calvinistic system is the only one which looks at these great questions from God's point of view. It is the only one which allows to all God's attributes, and to each of them, their full exercise and working. It is the only one which admits within its creed, as a necessary and indispensable part of it, "things hard to be understood." It is the only one which lays its account with meeting the outspoken enmity of "the natural man," and seeks its reply either in the quiet principle, "the foolishness of God is wiser than man, and the weakness of God is stronger than men," or in the stern repression, "Who art thou, O man, that repliest to God?"

But while this system renders to God the things which are God's, it is abundant, even to overflowing, in its provisions for the restoration and blessedness of downfallen humanity. It reflects the glory of God, but it is in the face of Jesus Christ. It is a glory full of grace and truth. In fact, this system is but a counterpart of the person of Christ, for while the person of Christ exhibits the majesty of God in connection with the tenderness and fellow-feeling of man, so does the Calvinistic system. It displays justice and holiness and truth the most unbending, with grace and mercy the most abounding. With one breath it leads the soul to exclaim, "How unsearchable are God's judgments, and his ways past finding out! Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" With the next it gives expression to the melting apostrophe, "Oh, the breadth, and length, and depth, and height; Oh, this love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, it fills earthen vessels with all the fulness of God!" This system, so much misrepresented, and so much misunderstood, is the only one which fills the human soul with the two opposite principles of fear and hope, and which, as counterbalancing forces, can alone keep that soul in the middle path of safety, alike removed from the Scylla of presumption and from the Charybdis of despondency. It is the power of Godhead working in us to will and to do, and it keeps us working out our own salvation with fear and with trembling.

All other systems take their characteristic features by looking at the things of salvation from man's point of view, and reducing them to the narrow measurement of man's thoughts and man's interests.

Arianism and Socinianism sacrifice to the pride of human reason, by explaining away the special and mysterious doctrines, as the trinity and the atonement. Pelagianism and Arminianism, and modern Morisonianism, again, pander to the pride of human will; and to exalt man's will, would deny will to God, negating the decrees of God, and nullifying the Spirit's influence and special grace.

There is a kind of pathological divinity which a time of religious revival awakens, and which is very apt to deal with the feelings and frames of man, so as hurtfully to hide the great things of God. The great object of the unskilful theologian, or rather unskilful practitioner, is at such a time to bring peace to the agitated and awakened mind. The producing of peace is the main point sought, and from a secondary end, which is its legitimate place, it is raised up into a primary end. This the soul seeks after with a morbid avidity. The great doctrines of the gospel are employed only as opiates and as mesmeric agencies, to soothe the soul. A morbid invalidated spiritual life is the consequence. The spirit, instead of being roused to the contemplation of the glory of Godhead, as illustrated in the salvation of man, and by beholding, as in a glass, this glory of God, is itself changed into the same image in ascending stages of glorious contemplation and gracious attainments, is, on the contrary, reduced to the unhealthy condition of minutely watching and registering the ebbings and the flowings of its own feelings, the rising and the falling of its own tranquillity. Thus the selfish enjoyment of the individual becomes the chief end of the gospel; and to keep this alive, all the doctrines and exhibitions of the gospel are plied with a restless and untiring activity.

We have thus indicated a few of those leading systems of divinity, and have seen that, with the exception of the one Calvinistic or Pauline system, all the others subordinate the matters that concern God to those that affect man. But, outside all systems there is a loose religious opinion which is regulated by no defined principles, whose shape, "if shape it may be called, that shape hath none," you may see dimly outlined in the floating literature and in the novels of the day. It is the world's religion which exults in "the absence of all precision." Its characteristic fancy and wish is that God should always be on the side of the individual, while yet the individual may not be on God's side, that God should hold in abeyance, or even reverse the leading principles of his moral and spiritual government to meet the case of every individual as it may turn up, that the greater should serve the less, that the Creator should serve the creature, that the rightful sovereign should stoop to the rebel, and that the established order and course of law should be suspended at the convenience of the criminal.

It is in keeping with these views of the world that you find men and women represented by each other, both in conversation and in formal biographies, as attaining all excellence, as reaching the measure of perfection, without being in the least indebted to the recuperative power of the gospel. So far as such persons are concerned, there was no need of a Saviour at

all. Christ hath died in vain. Christ profiteth them nothing, because they do not seem to need his aid. Everything with them gets right as a matter of course. The agencies of the gospel, such as redemption, and regeneration, and continued grace, are in their case never called into requisition. Their virtue and their safety are not from above, they are from themselves—earth-born and earthy.

In real life you find persons whose religion is of this type, appealing to God, but it is with the view of getting God's help. It is that God may do them a service. God is made the servant. He is to work so as to promote their honour or their advantage. God is to serve man, not man to serve God. In novels and romances you often see this more vividly illustrated. The hero or heroine, whose sentiments and character have no sympathy with God, is brought into trouble, when God is introduced as coming most markedly to their relief. God's interposition is at the nick of time, and the power of God is placed quite at their service. "Folly is set in great dignity. I have seen servants upon horses, and princes walking as servants upon the earth."

We might specify *the Sabbath* as a farther illustration of our subject. How many are there (and those, too, Christians by profession) who would advocate the claims of the Sabbath on the ground of the secular advantages which it brings to men, while they have no sympathy with the assertion which it makes of its divine authority, and of its demand that the whole day be given to God. They do not hallow it as the Lord's day, claimed by him for spiritual service, and fenced about by the sacredness of a divine commandment. They observe it, and plead for it on the far lower ground that it was made for man, and that it brings temporal blessings in its train.

But, passing on from this, let us close these remarks by calling attention to the noble, the princely, the God-like art of government, for as such it is acknowledged by the spirit of revelation itself. Speaking of those who are invested with the powers of government, revelation addresses them, "I said, Ye are gods." But here, too, we find a practical ignoring of God's law and authority, as incompatible with the progress and management of human affairs. The poet Cowper's saddening reflection is felt to be true: "It is ever the way of those who rule the earth, to leave out of their reckoning Him who rules the universe."

There are three ways of doing this. The king of Prussia illustrates one of them, when he takes the crown and puts it on his own head, and says, "I receive this crown from God." Please, your majesty! when God bestows anything, he always has respect to the legitimate medium of communication. God himself is the source of all government, but the medium of

conveying the power of government is the people or nation who are to be governed. The source connects with the medium, and the medium conveys it to the possessor. But when, as in the case of the king of Prussia, the medium is overlooked and overstepped, we may be left to doubt the rightfulness of the transmission. The truth is, this Prussian monarchical device is nothing else but a transparent plan for consecrating absolutism, and enabling a man to reign by the freedom of his own sweet will, without regard to those constitutional checks and limitations which are necessary to all safe government.

At the opposite extreme of this imposing act of Prussian assumption, we have the Bunkum orator addressing the unwashed mob as the sovereign people, the source of all authority. Here the medium is transmuted into the source. The strand is mistaken for the spring. The pipes, and dirty pipes they often are, which convey the water, are mistaken for the well-head—the fountain which boils up with its pure, and fresh, and life-giving waters.

Of an higher grade than either of these two are the supporters of mixed constitutional government. A constitution which the growth of ages has matured and developed, is the idol of their imagination. This constitution, with its checks, and counter-checks, and practical anomalies, is their all in all. Somehow, nevertheless, this perfect piece of machinery occupies the whole foreground of vision, and shuts out from their sight the great moral Governor, and the unalterable principles of his rule. The constitution is wrought apart from the God of order and of truth, “of whom is all power.” Crooked shifts and expediences thus come into play, rather than the principles of an upright statesmanship. Politics take the place of government. For the sake of a temporary triumph, and of a temporary possession of office, the great principles of the constitution, and even the traditional policy of the party are overborne and trodden in the dust. Such a scene is at present enacting before the eyes of the British nation. The conservative party, the boasted guardians of protestantism, and the noisy defenders of the church, are leaguering themselves with the ultramontaniam of Rome, both on the continent and in Britain, if so be they may thus influence a few elections, and secure coveted place and power to themselves.

It is a melancholy survey which humanity thus presents, seeking to separate itself from deity. It is the wind blowing on the sea—one uncertain element affecting another—human passion contending with human interests—the wind blowing and the sea raging, without any reference to Him whose voice the winds and the waves obey.

The great lesson has yet to be learned upon earth—then

shall ye know that I am the Lord. It is a lesson taught by the Spirit often by the discipline of sorrow and of trial, and after much struggling, when the soul of the individual is made subject to Christ. It is a lesson which churches have yet to learn in its length and breadth, that having learned it themselves, they may be the teachers of it to others. "So the house of Israel shall know that I am the Lord their God, from that day and forward," (Ezek. xxxix. 22). It is a lesson which nations have yet to acquire, and blessed are they who are the first to learn it. But it shall be taught before the time of the end. For the kings of Tarshish and of the isles shall bring presents; the kings of Sheba and Seba shall offer gifts. Yea, all kings shall fall down before him; all nations shall serve him. Even on earth humanitarianism shall strike its flag before Jehovahism.

The glorious manifestation of the truth shall be displayed before the eyes of the universe on that day—a day which knows no morrow, when God shall be all in all, and when the praises of a ransomed world shall be given to him that sitteth upon the throne, and to the Lamb for ever and ever.

ART. VI.—*The Pharisaism and Sadduceeism of Primitive and Modern Christianity.*

WHEN our Lord addressed to the twelve the warning, "Take heed, and beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees," it is probable that he regarded them rather in their official than their personal relation to himself, rather as his apostles and ministers of his word than as ordinary disciples or followers; for this warning was uttered on one of those occasions when he took them apart from the multitude, and when, as we can hardly doubt, he gave them special instructions to qualify them for their mission. And although the same admonition in respect to the Pharisees occurs in the commencement of a discourse delivered in public, as recorded by St Luke (xii. 1), the evangelist expressly states that it was particularly directed to his disciples, that is, the apostles, as distinguished from the rest of the audience; and it is also in close connection with precepts and encouragements immediately relating to the discharge of the duties of the apostolical ministry.

Examination of the words themselves, as well as of the circumstances in which they were spoken, is in favour of this view of their peculiar import. Our Lord bid his apostles beware of the "leaven" of the Pharisees and Sadducees. This is ex-

plained by St Matthew to mean their "doctrine," that is, their teaching, the opinions which they maintained and the practices which they inculcated in matters of religion. The Pharisees and Sadducees differed widely from each other both as to opinions and practices; but all the recognised instructors of the Jewish Church at that time belonged to one or the other of these two parties, or rather schools. Our Lord warns the apostles, as a new class of teachers, against any connection or affinity with either. The figure employed conveys such a warning in a very emphatic and significant manner. Not only were his apostles not to adopt the teaching of either the Pharisees or the Sadducees, but they were to regard it as a "leaven," to beware of it and to avoid it as contaminating and infectious. The truth committed to them would be corrupted, and the whole character of the religion taught by them changed, by the introduction and intermixture of Pharisaic or Sadduceean error.

The history of the church in its earliest and latest age proves the necessity of the warning, and testifies to the divine prescience of him who uttered it. Christianity did suffer corruption from Pharisaism and Sadduceeism even in apostolic times, and the effects of their evil leaven are evident in its deterioration and debasement, throughout a large portion of the visible church, in the present day.

Before entering upon the question of the existence and prevalence of these two systems under the gospel at either period, it will be necessary for us to contemplate them as presented to us in the evangelic record, and in the aspect in which they were actually viewed by our Lord himself, and his apostles, during the season of his ministry. Their characteristics are strongly marked by the denunciations which he pronounced against them. These, as has been often noted, are most abundant and most severe in the case of the Pharisees. Those tenets and practices of the Pharisees which were condemned, or censured, by our Lord require therefore our primary consideration.

In the first place, the term "doctrine," or "teaching," immediately reminds us of the fundamental error in relation to the ground and method of religious instruction for which the Pharisees were so often rebuked by the great Master. They taught by tradition. The "traditions of the elders" were regarded by them as authoritative interpretations of the divine law and word. Precepts of a moral and ceremonial nature, existing only in a traditional form, were in their estimation of equal sanctity and obligation with those expressly inculcated in holy writ. The result was that in their teaching tradition was substituted for Scripture, and became virtually the paramount, or even sole authority. Thus they nullified and contradicted the infallible record of God's will; and, as a consequence, their re-

ligion and worship itself became in God's sight a nullity and a lie. Because they had "made the commandment of God of none effect" by their tradition, therefore God said of them, "In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men."

The traditionary code was a systematic violation of the solemn injunction delivered to Israel through their great lawgiver, "Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish ought from it." This code relaxed greatly the obligations of the moral law, evading or even dispensing with some of its strictest enactments, and reducing all necessary obedience to the outward act, while at the same time it unduly exalted the importance of the ceremonies enjoined in the ritual law, and added largely to their number. Hence the traditionist was led to believe and to teach that a partial and qualified observance of the moral precepts would suffice for his justification before God, and that by a minute attention to the details of positive ordinances, and a multiplication of ceremonial performances beyond the actual requirements of his code, he might attain to a high degree of sanctity, and establish for himself a claim of merit. Thus self-righteousness became a distinguishing feature of the Pharisees. They "justified themselves," they were "the righteous who needed not repentance," the righteous as opposed to the rest of men, who were "sinners." They "trusted in themselves that they were righteous, and despised others."

Connected with the formalism which was the basis of their self-righteousness was a severe asceticism, which elevated it into spiritual pride. Their fasts, both ritual and self-imposed, were frequent and long-continued, and they practised numerous austerities of other kinds. Traces of these are found in the New Testament. A large portion of the early Talmudical writings is devoted to the exposition of their rules and methods of self-mortification.

The Pharisees were very sternly reproved by our Lord for ostentation and parade in religion. They performed in public those religious duties the very nature of which, rightly understood, required retirement or secrecy. They loved to pray standing in the synagogues, or at the corners of the streets. They sounded a trumpet before them when they gave alms. Christ enjoined upon his disciples an opposite course of conduct both in prayer and almsgiving.

Another subject of our Lord's censure in relation to their devotional practices was the excessive length of their prayers. We must understand him to be speaking of their habitual, daily prayers, those in offering which they were seen of men; for he charges them with making them long "for a pretence," or show.

Probably they were the prayers of their public services. Jesus did not mean to condemn protracted supplication in private, or on extraordinary occasions, since he himself gave the example of spending the whole night in prayer to God. What he chiefly intended to rebuke was, doubtless, the assimilation of the prayers of the Pharisees to those of the heathen in the use of "vain repetitions," and in the adoption of the gross error of thinking that they should be "heard for their much speaking."

The Pharisees attached great importance to dress, and to badges borne on the person, as indicative of religious distinction. They "made broad their phylacteries, and enlarged the borders (or fringes) of their garments," perverting in both instances the divine word: in the first, insisting upon the literal interpretation of a command which was clearly to be understood figuratively and spiritually; and in the second, availing themselves of a ceremonial precept to establish their doctrine of supererogatory and meritorious obedience. Both practices were also an exemplification of the manner in which they exaggerated and parodied the symbolism which was really characteristic of the dispensation under which they were placed.

Akin to their regard for ritual and emblematical costume, was the veneration in which they held buildings esteemed sacred, their zeal for their decoration, and their practice, probably their invention, of commemorative ecclesiastical architecture. They "built the tombs of the prophets, and garnished the sepulchres of the righteous." This custom arose out of their affected reverence for the saints and martyrs of former days. They took to themselves credit and merit for labours and expense incurred in their honour, while they cherished the very spirit of superstition, and hostility to the truth, which had animated their persecutors.

"The Scribes and the Pharisees," said our Lord, "sit in Moses' seat." In these words he acknowledged their possession of a legitimate authority. They were the recognised and officially accredited teachers of the people, and ministers of the word. But, at the same time that he so designated them, he charged them with an undue exaltation of their order and office. They "loved greetings in the markets, and to be called of men Rabbi and Father;" that is, they encouraged the tendency of the masses, always observable in times of ignorance and superstition, to pay homage to spiritual authorities. They "loved the uppermost places at feasts, and the chief seats in the synagogues;" in other words, they manifested a desire to assert a precedence for the ministerial or ecclesiastical above every other order in society.

Although there is great doubt as to the correctness of the signification usually assigned to their party name—Pharisees,

viz., *Separatists*, as if indicative of their assumption of spiritual distinction and superiority, yet it is certain that they held in contempt and aversion all who were not of their community or school. Hence their language concerning the Jewish populace, "This people who knoweth not the law are cursed." Hence, too, their evident disposition to regard the Galileans as an inferior class of religionists, and their extreme abhorrence of the Samaritans, and refusal to admit them to ordinary social intercourse. Exclusiveness and intolerance were very decided and distinguishing features of their character.

But, notwithstanding the exhibition of a temper so unamiable and repulsive, they enjoyed great popularity. It is possible that their very harshness and severity may have contributed to this effect by enhancing the general estimation of their sanctity. Their credit and favour with the people were, however, more probably due to the doctrine which they taught respecting the spiritual prerogatives of the Jewish race as the lineal descendants of Abraham. They held that all Israelites, in virtue of their birth in the sacred family of the great patriarch, were the objects of the divine favour, inheritors of the promises and blessings of the covenant, both temporal and spiritual, indefeasibly and eternally. And the claim arising from birth was ratified by the seal of circumcision, which, completing their title to a beneficial interest in Moses as well as Abraham, made assurance doubly sure. It was in stern and vehement refutation of this doctrine that the Baptist denounced the Pharisees and the multitude, though the actual children of Abraham, as a "generation of vipers," bade them abandon all hopes of salvation founded on their genealogy, and even seemed to question the possibility of their escape from the wrath to come. Thus early in the preaching of the gospel were men taught the falsehood and the danger of the system which represented their spiritual relation to God, and the possession of his grace, as dependent upon a succession and a ceremony.

The moral teaching of the Pharisees, though professedly founded upon the law of God, was confused and debased by a subtle casuistry. A remarkable example of this is found in the distinctions which they drew between different kinds of oaths, according to which some were entirely destitute of validity, imposing no obligation upon the conscience of the swearer. The principle of these distinctions is not very intelligible. But that which absolved a man from guilt in breaking his word could not differ much from the principle of mental reservation. Again, the question, "Which is the great commandment in the law?" addressed by one of them to our Lord, indicates that not only was the scale of merit in keeping the commandments, but the scale of guilt in transgressing them, a subject of dis-

cussion among their chief rabbis, and gives countenance to the opinion that they were the inventors of the pernicious distinction between mortal and venial sins.

According to St Luke, on the occasion on which our Lord cautioned his disciples against "the leaven of the Pharisees," naming them alone, he explained that by their leaven he meant "hypocrisy." His words were, "Beware ye of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy." And "hypocrites" is the appellation by which he constantly stigmatises them in his rebukes. But, from the topics of the discourse which followed that caution, and from the subjects of the rebukes thus prefaced, we gather that the signification of the term "hypocrisy," as applied to them, is not to be limited to false pretences of goodness, or the masking of moral turpitude by an appearance of devotion. Many of the Pharisees were doubtless chargeable with hypocrisy in this its usual sense. But the word must be understood as strictly applicable to their doctrine, that is, their teaching and peculiar practices. "The leaven of the Pharisees," said our Lord, "is hypocrisy." His evangelist, Matthew, tells us that by the leaven of the Pharisees he meant their "doctrine." Therefore "the doctrine" of the Pharisees was hypocrisy.

The word accurately describes their system. It was essentially a religion of externals; all outward show, a hollow semblance, without the substance or reality of moral and spiritual truth. It was a series of delusions practised upon the consciences of men, and of frauds practised upon the law and word of God. Undoubtedly, many of the Pharisees were unconscious of the character of their religion, and were self-deceived: like St Paul, when one of them, they verily thought with themselves that they were maintaining the truth of God, while they were exceedingly zealous for the traditions of their fathers. But this was no excuse for them when the errors of their hearts, and lives, and teaching were fully exposed, and denounced in the plainest terms, by the lips of him who spake as never man spake, and with an authority which they could not gainsay nor resist. "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin," said our Lord to his apostles, "but now they have no cloke for their sin." "If ye were blind," he said to themselves, "ye should not have sin; but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth." Solemn words, testifying the insidious nature of their principles, and their power to corrupt the conscience and the judgment, strongly enforcing the warning addressed by him to his apostles, and to the church through them, "Take heed, and beware of the leaven—the doctrine—of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy."

The writings of the New Testament do not supply such copious materials for the illustration of the opinions and teach-

ing of the Sadducees as those which we have by no means exhausted in giving an account of the doctrine of the Pharisees. Probably the reason of this may lie in the nature of their errors, which were those of defect and subtraction, as the errors of the Pharisees were of excess and addition. It is certain also that they were not so zealous as the Pharisees in promulgating their creed, were a far less numerous party, and found but little acceptance, and consequently did little mischief, among the people. The heretical tenets by which they were distinguished, according to the explicit testimony of the gospels, and the Acts of the Apostles, were—disbelief in the resurrection of the dead, and the denial of the existence of angels and spirits, that is, of any spiritual beings except God and men. But we have sufficient proof that the Sadducees of our Lord's time renounced belief not only in the resurrection of the body, but in a future state of rewards and punishments, and in the immortality of the soul. It has been asserted that they disallowed the divine authority of all the Scriptures of the Old Testament, except the Pentateuch. But this statement is unsupported by any direct external evidence; nor has it any foundation in their known opinions. Their unbelief in the existence of angelic beings was as contradictory to the facts recorded in the books of Moses as to any other portion of Old Testament Scripture, yet they certainly admitted the inspiration of those books, since our Lord argued out of them with Sadducees in favour of the resurrection. We may, however, discover in this article of their no-creed—the denial that there is any angel or spirit—connected with their acceptance of the Pentateuch as inspired, the nature of their scepticism with regard to the written word. They must have claimed the liberty of setting aside the historic reality of the supernatural occurrences recorded in Scripture, and therefore of attaching what degree of credibility they pleased to any of its narrations. They may have resolved the facts stated in the Old Testament histories into allegories, or, as is more probable, they may have considered them as myths or fables, the divine truth of which lay in their moral significance; but it is quite impossible that they could have acknowledged them according to their literal and popular acceptance, and in their professed historical character.

Their rejection of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and their refusal to believe in the existence of purely spiritual beings, indicate their adoption of the principles, if not of the system, of a so-called philosophy which had been long established in the Greek and Roman world of science and literature, and which in later times has become prevalent under the titles of materialism and positivism. It is that philosophy, the votaries of which will believe nothing but

what is attested by the evidence of the senses, or by the human experience of which they have personal cognizance or direct information. And since those senses and that experience attest, as they conceive, the existence of no being that is not material or organic, and of no action which may not be accounted for as the result of a material organization, they cannot believe in a life of man which is independent of the functions of his body, or any life at all which is independent of a corporeal structure. The Sadducees, however, did not adopt, perhaps did not perceive, the final and inevitable inference from their principles. They were illogical enough to profess a belief in *one* essentially immaterial and invisible Being.

The accounts given of the origin of the Sadducean school are uncertain and conflicting. But they agree in intimating that its system of doctrine was gradually developed, and that the earliest of its heresies was the disbelief of a future state of retribution. This opinion was possible to those who accepted the doctrine of the immortality of the soul; it was, of course, necessarily held by those who rejected that doctrine. Hence the Sadducees had always been partially, and were in their latest phase absolutely, Secularists. Man's good and evil were limited to this world. Each individual had but to satisfy himself of what was good, and what was evil; and then it would be his interest, by all available means, to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those who had persuaded themselves that virtue was the chief good, and vice the chief evil in human life, were strict and rigid moralists, at least in theory, and correspond to the higher order of Epicurean philosophers. Those, on the other hand, to whom it appeared that pleasure was the only real good, and pain and suffering the only real evil, were as licentious in conduct as they were latitudinarian in principle. They resembled the professors of the later and popular form of Epicureanism, and were probably identical with the Herodians of the New Testament. The confusion which would arise from such different estimates of the main object of life was perhaps partially rectified by a kind of compromise, by which it was agreed that the practical standard of good and evil should be the wellbeing of society. This appears from the fact stated by Josephus, that the Sadducees, as a body, were very severe in the administration of justice. One class would consider it due to the claims of truth to punish those who were perverse enough to mistake moral evil for good. And the other would perceive that neither would society hold together nor could their own principles be possibly acted upon, if every man was at liberty to pursue his own good by inflicting evil upon his neighbour. Both would represent it as a vindication of their system, when charged with removing all restriction on human conduct by the

denial of retribution in a future state, that they recognised, and were for maintaining very strictly, the law of retribution in the present.

In entire accordance with these opinions is the tenet attributed to the Sadducees by Josephus, that man is in his actions and character entirely free from all direct regulation or control of Deity ; that what he does, and what he is, are due to his own choice and determination alone. Nor could they believe that God, by a particular providence, superintended all human affairs. We recognise here again the doctrine of the Epicureans, who represented the gods, in whose existence they professed to believe, as far removed from men, exercising no influence upon the destinies of individuals or of society, taking no part in the moral or physical administration of the world. This phase of Sadduceeism is not distinctly alluded to in the gospels ; but it is very possible that our Lord had in view their repudiation of the doctrine of a particular providence when he so strongly affirmed it by declaring that "the very hairs of your head are all numbered ;" and that he intended to meet their denial of God's continuous action in the management of all things by the assertion, that "not a sparrow falls to the ground without our heavenly Father."

We now pass from the consideration of the doctrines and systems of the Pharisees and Sadducees as they existed in the Jewish Church during our Lord's ministry, and as they are exhibited in the historical portions of the New Testament, to the inquiry into their immediately subsequent manifestations ; their contact, collision, or connection with Christianity during the ministry of the apostles.

The warning addressed to the apostles, "Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadducees," certainly indicates, as has been already observed, that the danger to be apprehended from their doctrine was the danger of infection and contamination. It was equivalent to a caution not to admit in any degree the intermixture of such doctrine with their own.

Judaism, it is universally admitted, was the source of the earliest corruption of Christianity. It was natural, and almost necessary, that this should be the case. All the converts to Christianity, for several years after its institution, were, but with few exceptions, Jews, or professors, in one form or another, of the Jewish religion. Very early "a great company of the priests became obedient to the faith." And these were not only ministers of the Mosaic ordinances, but teachers of traditional Judaism. When the gospel was preached among the Gentiles, still, everywhere, the Jews who believed formed the nucleus, and in many places must have been for a long time the majority, of the Christian community. And their

previous possession and knowledge of the only existing Scriptures, together with their position in relation to the divine covenants, could not fail to secure their precedence in all things, and to invest their opinion with the character of authority. We cannot be surprised, therefore, that this large and important portion of the constituency of the early Church, should retain an attachment to that system of religion in which they had been brought up, and influence extensively their fellow believers among the Gentiles in the adoption of its principles.

But if we may reasonably expect to find Judaism intermingled with the Christianity of the apostolic age, we must also acknowledge the probability of its exhibiting itself, in this connection, under the forms of Pharisaism and Sadduceeism. And, as the party of the Pharisees was by far more numerous and popular and zealous than that of the Sadducees, the Pharisaic doctrine, in its Christian modification, was likely to become more widely diffused throughout the Church than its opposite, and to possess a stronger hold on the minds of its professors and disciples. Such anticipations are substantiated by the facts which disclose themselves to our notice on a careful examination of the Pauline epistles. We find clear evidence of the presence of both Pharisaism and Sadduceeism in the Christian Church, as Jewish importations, and existing, as they did in the Jewish Church, not as separate sects with independent organizations, but as opposite schools, characterised respectively by superstition and scepticism. And, of the two forms of error, the Pharisaic was the more sedulously promulgated, and the more widely prevalent.

Our first example in proof of these statements is the history of the churches in Galatia, as presented in the epistle addressed to them by their evangelist and apostle, St Paul. It will be readily conceded that the false system of doctrine which it was the object of that epistle to counteract and denounce, was Judaism. But it was also, undeniably, the Judaism of the Pharisees. The principal tenet inculcated by the heretical teachers who had visited Galatia was the righteousness of human merit, justification by the deeds of the law, a tenet which we immediately recognise as eminently characteristic of the Pharisaism of the gospels. It had met with acceptance among the Galatian Christians, had, in fact, been adopted by them as a primary article of faith, and is the error which St Paul designates "another gospel which is not another," and to oppose which he employs the full force of his inspired reasoning and his apostolical authority. Connected with this doctrine was the requirement that the Gentile Christians should submit to the rite of circumcision, as

essential to their attainment of acceptance in the sight of God, and a share in the blessings of his covenant ;—a demand identifying these Judaisers with the party which, some time before, on occasion of the report made to the Church in Jerusalem of the conversion of Gentiles, insisted that it was “needful to circumcise them, and to command them to keep the law of Moses.” This party, it is expressly stated, consisted of “certain of the sect of the Pharisees which believed.”

It is evident, from various intimations which occur in the epistle to the Galatian churches, that their perverters had advanced a claim of permanent spiritual superiority over all Gentile believers in favour of the natural descendants of the patriarchs. They alone, they asserted, enjoyed as a birthright the titles of Abraham's seed, heirs of promise, children of God. This principle of the possession of peculiar grace in virtue of a lineal succession marks them as of the same class with those Pharisees and Sadducees whom the Baptist rebuked for maintaining it, and with those professed believers in Christ from among the Pharisees of his time who boasted to him that they were “Abraham's seed,” and “were never in bondage to any man,” and that “God was their Father.” It is worthy of remark that as our Lord disallowed every one of their claims, and pronounced them to be the children of the devil, so St Paul reverses the relative position of Jews and Christians with regard to the Abrahamic covenant, affirms the spiritual bondage of the Jews, and threatens the Judaising faction with that “cutting off,” which he elsewhere terms “delivery to Satan.”

One of the most conspicuous characteristics of the Pharisees, was the exaggerated estimation in which they held the ceremonial ordinances of the Mosaic law, arising, no doubt, from a belief in their justifying efficacy. Among these, they attached the greatest importance to sacred seasons. They were very careful to ascertain the exact time of their commencement and termination, and to determine the nature of their observance. The stringent regulations which they had enacted on these points were some of the heaviest burdens, and the most galling bonds, with which they oppressed the consciences of the Jewish people. It can hardly admit of a doubt, that the introduction among the Galatian Christians of a calendar, formed on the principle of the Mosaic, was due to the influence of Pharisaic Judaism. This was considered by St Paul one of the most flagrant perversions of their Christianity. He directs against it, perhaps, the severest rebukes to be found in his epistle. “How turn ye again,” he indignantly asks, “to the weak and beggarly elements whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage? Ye observe times, and months, and days, and years: I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you labour in vain.”

We discover also, in the apostle's descriptions of the Jewish party which had marred the work of God among the Galatians, the exclusiveness, bigotry, and intolerance which are unmistakeable features of Pharisaism. Those persons were unquestionably members of this party, who, as he relates in the second chapter of his epistle, having come from the church of Jerusalem to the church of Antioch, on a mission evidently of a factionary character, so far intimidated even the Apostle Peter, that whereas, before their arrival, he had held social intercourse with Gentile believers on terms of equality, after their coming he withdrew and separated himself, "fearing them of the circumcision." On that occasion, a complete severance appears to have been made for a time between the Jewish and Gentile portions of the church. "The other Jews," says St Paul, "dissembled likewise with Peter, insomuch that Barnabas also was carried away with their dissimulation" (ἡ ἰστορία). Here was an instance of the leaven of the Pharisees acting even upon apostles, and exhibiting itself morally, as well as doctrinally, under its leading characteristic of hypocrisy. When union was restored, and the erring apostle reclaimed to a sense of his duty by the remonstrance which St Paul addressed to him, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, Peter can hardly fail to have remembered, as on another memorable occasion, the warning words of his Master, and to have resolved that henceforth he would "beware of the leaven of the Pharisees," in his own doctrine and practice, and guard the church against it in the teaching of others. He gave a signal proof of his complete recovery from his temporary seduction into Pharisaism, by his subsequent assertion of the rights of Gentile believers in the council of Jerusalem. The spirit of exclusiveness with which the presence of the Jerusalem Jews had, for a short season, infected the church at Antioch, manifested itself actively in the proceedings of the Judaizers in Galatia. "They zealously affect you," says St Paul to the Gentile constituency of that church, "but not well," that is, dishonourably; "yea, they would exclude you, that ye might affect them." He means, that they were prepared to deny, perhaps had already denied, the church membership of all who would not conform to the Mosaic ritual, shutting them out from church communion, as well as social intercourse, in order to intimidate them into compliance with their requirements. Thus we perceive a striking affinity between these troublers of the church and the adversaries of whom the Lord had given his disciples warning, who should "separate them from their company," and "cast out their names as evil," and exclude them from worship and the sanctuary. Who can doubt that these had been

Pharisees in their former state of unbelieving Judaism, and that they were essentially Pharisees still?

From the two passages of the epistle just considered, it appears, further, that the members, or at least the leaders, of the faction which was endeavouring to enforce the observance of the Mosaic ordinances upon Gentile Christians, assumed a high authority, and were anxious to secure its recognition. It was this assumption to which Peter appeared to succumb at Antioch, when he separated himself from the Gentile brethren, "*fearing them of the circumcision*," and which Paul resisted at Jerusalem, when he would not allow Titus to be "*compelled to be circumcised*," and resolved not to "*give place by subjection*, no not for an hour," to the false brethren who had arrogantly demanded this surrender of gospel truth and liberty (Gal. ii. 3-5). And the assertion of the apostle, "*they would exclude you that ye might affect them*," shews that the object of the threat of exclusion was to induce the Galatian Christians to pay court to them, and honour them, as possessors of high privileges, and sole teachers of the truth. Other intimations occur of their eagerness to secure the applause and submission of men, and of their self-exaltation as the official representatives of orthodoxy. It was from a desire "*to make a fair show in the flesh*," that they, or those under their influence, tried to constrain the Galatians as a church to adopt the rite of circumcision; they "*desired to have them circumcised that they might glory in their flesh*." And the apostle, doubtless, had them in view, when he wrote the admonition, "*let us not be desirous of vain glory*" (Gal. v. 26), that is, "*boastful of vain distinctions*," and when he uttered the severe though simple sarcasm, "*If a man think himself to be something when he is nothing, he deceiveth himself*" (Gal. vi. 3). Are not these the same in character with the Pharisees who loved salutations in the market-place, walked in long robes, took the chief seats in the synagogues, and delighted in being called of men Rabbi and Father?

It is to be remarked, that in a portion of the epistle which most distinctly indicates the Pharisaism of the Jewish disturbers of the Galatian church, and which contains most energetic remonstrances against it, the apostle employs, in a proverbial form, the very same figure which occurs in the caution against the Pharisees addressed to the disciples by our Lord. "*A little leaven*," says St Paul, "*leaveneth the whole lump*." The coincidence, if not an intentional and significant allusion to a well-known designation of Pharisaic doctrine, can only be accounted for by the similarity, in character and operation, of whatever doctrine is thus represented, to that which the Lord himself had already denounced under the same emblem. If

the Christians of Galatia were in possession of Christ's teaching, as we have it recorded in the gospels, they were not less likely than ourselves to be reminded, by these words, of the admonition, "beware of the leaven of the Pharisees," nor less likely to infer from them that the apostle connected, in his own mind, the system of their new teachers with that against which the church had been prophetically warned by its divine Master.

At a later period in the ministry of St Paul, and in two churches unconnected with the church of the Galatians, or with each other, we find indubitable proofs of the existence and the activity of the Pharisaic element of Judaism. The teachers at Ephesus, to control and counteract whom the apostle placed Timothy in charge of that church when he departed into Macedonia, were unquestionably Judaisers. He describes them as "desiring to be teachers of *the law*," though "understanding neither what they say nor whereof they affirm." But the special warning which Timothy had to address to them was directed against "giving heed to fables and endless genealogies." And he himself receives a caution, intimating the infectious character of the system which he was to oppose, when he is charged to "refuse"—excuse himself from hearing (*ἀπαρνησάτω*)—"profane and old wives fables." These anile legends are closely in affinity with the "traditions of the elders," of which the Pharisees in our Lord's time were the zealous conservators and propagators, and examples of which abound in the Talmuds. As Christ charged the Pharisees with having "made the word of God of none effect" through their tradition, so his apostle connects the error of giving heed to fables with the teaching of "another doctrine," one different from that which was "according to godliness." As he reproached the Pharisees with "omitting the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and truth," while they adhered to their own traditions, so St Paul describes the would-be teachers of the law, and promoters of mythical theology, as "swerving from,"—missing, failing to apprehend and inculcate—love, purity, and faith, which are the ultimate object and scope of the gospel commandment. In the epistle to Titus, the apostle represents the "gainsayers," the "unruly and vain talkers and deceivers," who infested the Cretan church, as especially belonging to "the circumcision," and explicitly denounces their false teaching as "Jewish fables and commandments." These were, most certainly, traditions, and interpretations, and additions to the ceremonial law, the work of Pharisaic rabbinism. And let it be noticed, that such teachers, like their brethren in the Ephesian church, are considered as opponents, "gainsayers," although professing Christianity; their "fables and commandments" are those "of men who turn away from the truth." Thus they are again

identified with the Pharisees and Scribes, who were rebuked by our Lord for rejecting the commandment of God that they might keep their own tradition, and to whom he applied the declaration which God made to their fathers, "This people honoureth me with their lips ; but their heart is far from me. Howbeit in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men."

The very words last quoted are employed by St Paul, in the epistle to the Colossians, to express the traditionary character of the mingled Jewish and philosophic system which some had attempted to impose upon the church at Colossæ. "Why," he asks, "are ye subject to ordinances, after the commandments and doctrines of men?" This coincidence with the teaching of his Master, in the actual terms of rebuke, is striking and instructive. It certainly indicates that he was dealing with the same class of opponents. And if we look more closely into the passage, we shall discover that its cautions and denunciations are levelled against opinions and practices which the gospels represent as distinctly Pharisaical. The apostle thus exhorts the Colossian believers to maintain their Christian liberty: "Let no man judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of holy day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days." Here are presented the same subjects which supplied the material of the repeated accusations of the Pharisees against our Lord's disciples, the grounds on which they attempted to bring them into bondage. Soon after, we are reminded of the rigid stringency of ceremonial observance on which they valued themselves, and which they imposed as a burden upon others, by the introduction of the formula or summary of their code, "Touch not, taste not, handle not." And their spirit of censoriousness, and their readiness to condemn, are implied in the admonitions, "Let no man judge you," "let no man beguile you of your reward,"—pass an unjust decision against you (*καταβιβείτω*). Finally, the austerities and self-mortifications of the Pharisees, those affectations of extreme humility, which were in reality exhibitions of extreme spiritual pride, are perfectly delineated in their nature, character, and effects, by the apostle's concluding representation of the asceticism practised by the false brethren at Colossæ, "Which things have indeed a shew of will-worship and humility, and neglecting of the body, not in any honour to the satisfying of the flesh." No doubt can remain in our minds as to the true designation of these heretics, and of their doctrine. They were undeniably members of the Jewish party or faction in the church. They were traditionists. They were ritualists. They were ascetics. What else could they be than Pharisees? And what was their doctrine but that leaven of Pharisaism against

which the great Prophet and Teacher had warned his disciples and his church.

It has been observed that, of the two great perversions of the religion of Moses and the prophets, Pharisaism and Sadduceeism, the former, as the more popular, and the more zealously propagated, was likely to diffuse its infection more widely than the latter among the Jewish professors of the religion of Christ and his apostles. Accordingly, as we have shewn, in no less than four eminent Christian churches this phase of Judaism is plainly discernible as a phase of Christianity, discernible by the light thrown upon it for its detection, exposure, and condemnation. And throughout the apostolical writings indications may be found of the existence of Pharisaic doctrine, and of the Pharisaic spirit, in more or less prominent forms. The expectation that Sadduceeism also, or sceptical Judaism, would manifest itself in the Christian Church, as a leaven of error imported into it by a section of its Jewish members, is fully justified by facts disclosed to us in the epistolary records of the New Testament. And the representations given in the gospels, and the Acts, of the comparatively small extent, and peculiar and limited sphere of its influence in the Jewish Church, are in a remarkable manner confirmed by the phenomena of its reappearance in the Christian Church, as exhibited in the epistles. The sect of the Sadducees in Judea was inconsiderable for number, but it comprised persons of the highest rank in society, and in the priesthood. The prevalence of Christian Sadduceeism is discoverable in only one of the churches to which St Paul wrote his extant letters, but in a church which is distinguished above almost every other for its high position, both social and ecclesiastical, for its religious advantages and responsibilities, and the profusion and excellence of the spiritual endowments of its ministers. This was the Church of Corinth.

It is clear, from various intimations which occur in the two epistles to the Corinthians, that the evils which St Paul wrote to reprove and correct, were principally due to the growth of a Judaising faction, the origin of which was the visit of certain teachers of the Jewish race, but bearing the title and character of Christian ministers, probably soon after the departure of Apollos, who had succeeded St Paul in the administration of the church. These are the persons of whom the apostle speaks in the second epistle (xi. 22, 23), when he asks, "Are they Hebrews, . . . Israelites, . . . the seed of Abraham, . . . ministers of Christ?" Their attempts to re-establish the legal dispensation are counteracted in the contrast which he draws between "the letter" and "the spirit," "the ministration of condemnation," and "the ministration of righteousness," in

the third chapter of the same epistle. They had evidently assumed a superiority over the Gentile Christians, and had to some extent succeeded in getting it recognised by them. "Ye suffer," says the apostle, "if a man bring you into bondage, if a man exalt himself, if a man smite you on the face" (xi. 20). The offensive conduct here described is similar to that of the Judaisers in Galatia, alluded to in language before commented upon, "They would exclude you," *i.e.*, shut you out from church communion, assume the right of inflicting ecclesiastical punishment upon you, "that ye might affect them," *i.e.*, pay court to them as spiritual superiors and authorities. The doctrinal errors, however, which had sprung up among the Corinthians, and which we cannot but attribute to the agency of those upon whom the apostle charges the general disturbance of the peace and faith of the church, were of a very different character from the heresies promulgated by the Jewish party in Galatia. The false teaching, or at least that which most prevailed at Corinth, was not on the subject of justification, but on the subject of the resurrection. Some among them affirmed that there was "no resurrection of the dead." And it was against the denial of this prime article of the faith that the apostle directed the energetic reasonings and testimony of the concluding portion of his first epistle. But if the heresy of denying the resurrection of the dead was imported into the Corinthian Church by a Jewish party, there can be little doubt but that party was composed of persons who had been originally of the sect of the Sadducees. It is difficult, indeed, to understand how any, in the first age of the gospel, after having acknowledged themselves converts to the Christian faith through the testimony of the apostles, and while maintaining the profession of belief which they had made in their baptism, could reject or renounce the hope of the resurrection of the dead. But the difficulty is diminished when we discover that the promulgators of this extraordinary scepticism were Jews, and Jews actually engaged in endeavouring to effect a reconstruction of Christianity upon the basis of previously existing Judaism. We remember that there was a system of Judaism the notorious characteristic of which was the denial of the resurrection, and we conclude that these Jews had been professors of that system, and had retained, or relapsed into, their former special heterodoxy. As we account for the ethnical forms of Gnosticism by the Platonic and other theories held by the early Gnostic teachers before their conversion to Christianity, so may we most reasonably attribute the first appearance of heresy on the subject of the resurrection among Jews and Judaisers, calling themselves Christians, to the fact of their previous maintenance of such heresy under the name of Sadducees.

It has been noticed that St Paul, in writing to the Galatian Church, employed the proverbial saying, "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump," with reference to the Pharisaical doctrine on justification which had been introduced, and was prevalent in that church; and we ventured to affirm the probability that this figurative expression, if not suggested by that in which our Lord's caution to his disciples against the doctrine of the Pharisees is conveyed, would at any rate have the effect of recalling it to the remembrance of persons familiar with his discourses, and so, of connecting the doctrine opposed by the apostle with that condemned by Christ. The same saying occurs in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (v. 6-8), not indeed with direct reference to false doctrines, but as indicating the corrupting and infectious nature of licentiousness, both in practice and principle. In that portion of the epistle, however, in which the apostle denounces and confutes the erroneous teaching of the Sadducean Judaisers on the subject of the resurrection, he distinctly intimates the close connection between their doctrine and sensuality. If the dead rise not, we may as well, he implies, adopt the maxim, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die;" and immediately proceeds to point out the contaminating influence of such a principle,—"*Be not deceived; evil communications corrupt good manners*" (xv. 32, 33). Here we discover the same association between disbelief of the resurrection and worldliness and carnality of life, which was practically expressed in the affinity between the Sadducees and Herodians. And we are reminded that what our Lord, according to one evangelist, designated as "the leaven of the Sadducees," according to another, he also called on the same occasion "the leaven of Herod." It is far from being unlikely that Sadduceeism had actually produced in the Corinthian Church the effects which the apostle evidently considers its natural consequence, that to its influence were due the criminal indulgence shewn by the church in a case of gross libertinism, and the sensual practices with which many were chargeable (2 Cor. xii. 31), and that it was, in fact, the "leaven" which was in process of leavening the whole lump with licentiousness in conduct, following close upon latitudinarianism in doctrine.

Christian Sadduceeism had a hard task to perform. It was opposed both to the national belief of the Jews sustained by many remarkable passages in the Old Testament Scriptures, and to the most explicit assertions of Christ, as reported by his evangelists and apostles; to the whole gospel revelation of life and immortality; and to the fundamental fact of Christianity,—the resurrection of the Lord Jesus. And yet its professors not only maintained that they were genuine Christians, true believers in the gospel, but evidently undertook to reform

Christianity on the principles of reformed Judaism. Their position was only tenable, and their mission only practicable, by the application to gospel promises, and gospel histories, of the system of interpretation by which, as we have shown, they must have explained away the facts and statements of the Pentateuch, and the Old Testament generally, which were plainly adverse to their doctrines. Whatever they did not choose to receive as historically or literally true, they resolved into allegory or parable, or subjected arbitrarily to a process of extravagant spiritualisation. That such was their treatment of every occurrence, or declaration, which might be appealed to in support of the general belief of Jews and Christians in a future resurrection, is an obvious inference from the language respecting that article of the faith attributed to two Sadducean heresiarchs by St Paul. Hymenæus and Philetus, he says (2 Tim. ii. 18), "concerning the truth have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already." They must be understood to have asserted, like the Marcionites of the next age, that the only resurrection promised was a resurrection from error, ignorance, and sin; and probably identified the resurrection, so understood, with the introduction of Christianity, affirming, as the followers of Swedenborg do in our own day, that we are living now in the resurrection-state.

St Paul, in his confutation of the Sadducean doctrines which had been adopted by a portion of the church of Corinth, insists that, in logical consistency, those who denied the general resurrection as an impossibility, must also deny the resurrection of Christ, and with it the whole doctrine of salvation from guilt and condemnation through his sacrificial death and present intercession. "If the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised; and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins." But to deny the resurrection of Christ, was to deny the historic reality of his person, life, and actions; for his resurrection was the culminating point of the evangelic and apostolic testimony, the very key-stone of the arch, without which the rest of the structure had no cohesion or unity. The intercourse which the "witnesses chosen before of God" held with Jesus during his mission was, as they asserted, the designed foundation of their evidence concerning his resurrection. If the statements which they made concerning his resurrection were false or mythical, their statements concerning their previous intercourse with him must have been of the same character. There is reason to believe that the Judaisers, who had too successfully invaded the Corinthian church, consistently rejected both the Jesus and the resurrection of the gospels and apostles. In his second epistle, St Paul, speaking of these intruders, says, "If he that cometh preacheth another Jesus whom we have not

preached, or, if ye receive another spirit which ye have not received, or another gospel which ye have not accepted, ye might well bear with him' (xi. 4). By "another Jesus," he could not mean a second Jesus, another historical personage of the name, for whom their trust and allegiance were claimed, for no other Jesus in this sense ever existed, or was heard of; but he must mean a Jesus other than he preached, Jesus proclaimed in quite a different character from that in which he proclaimed him; that is, Jesus, not historical but mythical, not a person but a doctrine, not a reality but an abstraction. And let it be observed, that he represents this diversity or rather contrariety to his own teaching in their proclamation of Jesus, as connected with a complete revolution in the principles and whole substance of religion. He certainly implies that the same teaching which set forth "another Jesus," would also deny the doctrine of the Holy Ghost as received by the Corinthians from himself, and propose a scheme of Christianity altogether opposite to that which they had thankfully embraced on his introduction. Like the Pharisaic seducers of the Galatian church, these Sadducees taught "another gospel" which was "not another," but a mere perversion of the gospel of Christ.

It is probable that the party which adopted these mythical or sceptical sentiments on the subject of the resurrection, the person of Jesus, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the whole doctrine of salvation, was the fourth of those into which the church of Corinth was divided—the party, the watchword of which was "I am of Christ." For, evidently, this party asserted, by the title which it assumed, its independence of apostolic teaching, or of any derived and secondary authority in matters of religion, as opposed to those who ranged themselves under the names of Paul, Apollos, and Cephas. It appears to have claimed for its leaders, or perhaps for all its members individually, an immediate connection with Christ, a revelation, or mission directly from him, and if so, may be represented by the persons whom, in the second epistle, St Paul designates, "false apostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves into the apostles of Christ." But those of whom he thus speaks are doubtless the same with the preachers of "another Jesus," "another Spirit," "another gospel," to whom he had made allusion just before.

The system of this party may be regarded as an approximation to pure spiritualism, or idealism, which denied and dispensed with all personality and matters of fact in reference to objects of faith. It preceded, and probably gave rise to the heresy of the Docetæ, which accounted for the incarnation and the crucifixion by the hypothesis of a phantasmal illusion. The "false apostles," "deceitful workers," "ministers of Satan," who proclaimed "another Jesus" in Corinth, are certainly of the

same order of misbelievers with the "false prophets," "deceivers," and "antichrists," spoken of by St John at a much later period, who "confessed not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh," and who are generally understood to have been either Docetæ, or their immediate predecessors. We have no means of ascertaining how the "false apostles" disposed of the testimony of the true apostles to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. It is more likely that they interpreted it philosophically, or represented belief in it as unnecessary and a matter of indifference, than that they met it with explicit contradiction. The indecisive, uncertain, negative character of their doctrine concerning Christ, may very well be understood to be referred to by St Paul, when, in the commencement of his second letter to the Corinthians, he calls them to witness that "the Son of God, Jesus Christ, who was proclaimed among them by himself, and Silvanus, and Timotheus, was not yea and nay, but in him was yea." And he perhaps alludes to their attempts to mystify and explain away the chief facts of the gospel, when he warns Timothy, in his first epistle, to "avoid the profane and vain-babbings and oppositions of the falsely named science," for under the same term "profane vain-babbings" he includes in the second epistle the heresy of Hymenæus and Philetus, in asserting an already past, that is, a spiritual, resurrection,—a piece of scepticism which, as we have shown, must have involved the similar treatment of other truths, and those of a historical nature. We may remark, that the expression "profane vain-babbings of science," is singularly applicable to a system which would sacrilegiously convert a divine revelation of facts into a theory of empty abstractions, and substitute an idealistic philosophy for the gospel. And it is to be noticed that the same apostle forewarned the Colossians against a "philosophy and vain deceit," which was "not after," that is, was opposed to Christ, and in direct antagonism to which he places the cardinal doctrine, that in Christ "dwelleth all the fullness of the godhead *bodily*."

The supposition that there was a party in the Church of Corinth which doubted the personality of the Lord Jesus, and rejected the historic basis of Christianity, is, we think, a reasonable inference from the one, and a necessary inference from the other, of the only two positive statements of erroneous teaching which occur in the epistles to the Corinthians. Admitted on the testimony of these passages, it is corroborated by many others, to which, striking and energetic as they are in themselves, the existence of such a heresy adds no small amount of signification, pointedness, and power. Foremost among such passages are the opening paragraphs of the first epistle, which contain the most remarkable reiteration of the

name of our Lord to be found in the whole range of the apostolical writings, the name occurring in its various permutations ten times in as many verses, and in such a manner as to mark most emphatically the reality, personality, and oneness of the object of Christian faith, hope, and love. We come next to the strong and repeated assertion of Christ crucified as the simple single subject of the gospel proclamation, including the apostle's disclaimer of the use of philosophical language in preaching, on the ground that by such a practice the cross of Christ would be made of non-effect (*κενότης*), be deprived of its substantial real character, become a mere emptiness, an abstraction, a non-entity. It is in the way of caution to the teachers who had succeeded him in the ministry of the word at Corinth, that he enunciates that grand elementary proposition, "Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ." He states it as the principal proof of his apostleship, that he had "seen Christ Jesus the Lord;" that is, had received his commission directly and personally from him. In opposition to those who imputed carnality to him, implying a contrast probably with their own spirituality, and who are certainly, as the context shows, members of the party which preached "another Jesus" (2 Cor. x. 2.-xi. 4.), he represents himself in the exercise of his apostolical functions as "casting down imaginations (*λογισμούς*, reasonings, philosophical perversions of the truth), and every high thing which exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought (*πάν ῥήμα*, every opinion or notion, every ambitious and antagonistic display of intellectualism), to the obedience due to Christ." In the same connection,—indeed, in the very next paragraph,—he addresses evidently to the same class of opponents a very remarkable challenge: "If any man trust to himself that he is Christ's, let him of himself think this again, that, as he is Christ's, even so are we Christ's;" that is, if any man, on the ground of a spiritual intuition, lays claim to a peculiar relation to Christ, let him, in virtue of that intuition, acknowledge that I (who have independent testimony to the fact) am in the same relation to Christ. Lastly, the existence of a heresy which revolted against the idea of the Christ of our belief being the actual person who underwent the agony and humiliation of the cross, and which laid claim to spiritual enlightenment and perceptions on the subject of our Lord's personality, contributes some degree of elucidation to the difficult language in which the apostle proposes his double criterion of the possession of the Holy Spirit: "No man speaking by the Spirit of God calleth Jesus accursed, and no man can say that Jesus is the Lord but by the Holy Ghost" (1 Cor. xii. 3). The man who in his doctrine repudiates the personal,

historical Saviour, Jesus the Son of man, is utterly destitute of the divine Spirit, while the acknowledgment of Jesus, the Son of man, as Lord of all, can only proceed from the teaching of the Holy Ghost. The words are a precise parallel to those of St John, "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God; and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God." The errors for the detection and expulsion of which the two apostles proposed these canons were almost identically the same. And indeed it may be safely affirmed, that the doctrinal and polemical portions of the first epistle of St John, and of the epistles to the Corinthians, are devoted to the exposition and defence of the same great truth—the personal manifestation of the Son of God for the purpose of atonement and redemption.

Whatever may be thought of the direct object or bearing of any one or more of the passages adduced, the general statement which our investigation entitles us to make, will, we trust, appear indisputable, namely, that false teaching of a sceptical character existed in the apostolic age; that it is first discernible in the Church of Corinth; that its promulgators were Jews baptized to the profession of Christianity, and ordained as Christian ministers; and that the origin of this early scepticism, and the nature of its principal doctrine (denial of the resurrection), designate it as not only essentially, but distinctively, and almost avowedly, Sadduceeism.

The proof that the warning addressed by our Lord to the apostles, "Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadducees," was intended for the guidance and protection of his church, not only during his ministry upon earth, but in a subsequent period or periods of the gospel dispensation, lies in the fact that it is found clearly and closely applicable to the circumstances of the church in after time. This fact also, on the other hand, establishes the divine prescience of the warning, and so becomes a not unimportant testimony to the truth and inspiration of the record which ascribes it to the author of Christianity. We have seen that doctrines very distinctly Pharisaic and Sadducean in their source and character were taught in the apostolic age, and were met by apostolic rebukes, which breathe the spirit, and echo the language, of the solemn admonition of the great Master as reported by the evangelists. In the sub-apostolic, or ante-Nicene period, many of the numerous corruptions of Christianity which are known under the general names of Gnosticism exhibit the same doctrines in various modifications and combinations. The Nicene age, during which the church was in a great measure purged from the heathen element of Gnosticism, witnessed the development of the Jewish. Catholic Christianity became a system of belief and practice the chief

characteristics of which are unquestionably Pharisaic. And the principles and doctrines of the Sadducees had but too faithful a representation in Arianism. The Romish Church is notoriously and ostentatiously in all outward things a reproduction of Judaism; and a very cursory examination of its tenets and ritual is sufficient to prove that its Judaism is of the Pharisaic form. And there is abundant evidence that during the palmy days of the great apostasy, and especially in the age just preceding the Reformation, the Sadducee was often found occupying high places, sometimes even the highest, in the nominal church. The Reformation, which was, in fact, a protest against the Pharisaic element of popery—its superstition, exhibited the usual effect of a reaction in the production of the opposite or Sadducean error, scepticism. Formal expression was given to this extreme antagonism to the predominating corruption of Christianity, in the truly Sadducean heresy of the Socini, and in some of the sects and systems which may be classed under the title of protestant mysticism. Sadduceeism, keeping up its traditional character of a separate profession or persuasion, has its dogmatic and denominational embodiment in Unitarianism. Regarded as a "leaven," that is, not as having a distinct visible existence, but operating as a diffusive contaminating principle and influence, it is detected in the neology or rationalism of the continental protestant churches.

But perhaps no circumstances of the Christian church, or of any portion of it, have ever more closely approximated to those apparently contemplated in the terms of our Lord's warning, than the present circumstances of the Church of England. The necessity for the warning, and its prophetic character, are, as we have shewn, sufficiently attested by the spread of Pharisaism in one, and of Sadduceeism in another, of the primitive churches. But the language of Christ, 'Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees,' considered both in its construction, and as addressed to the whole company of the apostles, indicates a somewhat closer association of the erroneous principles and tenets against which it is directed. If it were conceivable, we might suppose an intimation to be here given of their amalgamation, or of the profession of them by the same parties. But certainly it is language which naturally leads us to expect their co-existence in time and place, and their simultaneous operation on the same order or community. At least, such a state of things is in exact and literal correspondence with these words; and whenever, or wherever it may occur, they form a divinely constituted provision against it. This is the phenomenon which now presents itself in the Church of England. Pharisaism and Sadduceeism co-exist within her pale. They are, as of old in the Jewish church,

embodied in parties. And they act also secretly and diffusively upon the mass like leaven.

Before we proceed to the proof of the fact just asserted, let us pause to observe that it by no means affects the apostolicity or spirituality of a church. It does not affect its apostolicity, for our Lord's word of warning implies that it might exist in that body of which his apostles were the representatives, and were to become the instrumental founders. And it was a fact which soon had an actual existence in that body. Yet neither the Pharisaism of Galatian Christians, nor the Sadduceeism of Corinthian, destroyed the apostolical character of the churches of Galatia and Corinth. Nor does such a fact affect the spirituality of the church. It might, if the corruption of religion were universal or predominant, as is actually the case in the Church of Rome, and in Unitarianism. But this is a question of degree. While the doctrines of the church remain uncorrupt, and its ministrations have a saving, sanctifying, spiritualising efficacy, it has the essence and proof of spirituality. It is no more despiritualised by the presence of both Pharisaism and Sadduceeism, than was the much smaller community of Corinth by the Sadduceeism professed and preached by some of its members. The church hath, indeed, those who teach doctrines and practices which the Lord of the church hateth, and which "he that hath an ear," may plainly hear the Spirit condemn. But for all that, the candlestick is not removed out of his place; the Spirit is shining and burning still. At the same time, the warning of the evangelic, and the threats of the Apocalyptic record, indicate that erroneous systems and principles existing within a Church, to whatever extent permitted or encouraged, are elements of weakness, and declension, and danger.

We have noticed it as the first and most prominent characteristic of the doctrine or teaching of the Pharisees, that it was based upon tradition—the tradition of the elders. For elders substitute Fathers, and a principal characteristic of a system arrogating to itself the title of the "church system," will be immediately recognised. The upholders of this system, faithfully adhering to the theory of those divines who introduced, or rather revived it, thirty years since, derive their interpretations of Scripture from the writings of the Fathers, esteemed orthodox, of the first five centuries, and find the model of Christian belief, practice, and worship, in the church of the Nicene age. They greatly affect the designation "catholic," and by their use of it plainly intimate that they receive and value a doctrine on the ground that it is catholic, rather than that it is scriptural. What is meant by catholic it is difficult to determine. The term is never true in its absolute sense, as representing the opinion or profession of the universal Christian

community. There was a time when it was far from representing even that of the majority. But it always has the significance of traditionary; it invariably refers to an aggregate of human authority. Catholic consent does not exist; catholic antiquity cannot be defined; submission to catholic teaching is an arbitrary exercise of private judgment; but however devoid of consistency and reality these phrases may be, they have a meaning, they involve one definite substantial idea—reliance upon human authority in matters of religion. The term catholic, employed in such phrases, expresses, therefore, a principle which brings the system of which it is a symbol and shibboleth under the rebuke which our Lord addressed to the Pharisees, “Laying aside the commandment of God ye teach for doctrines *the commandments of men*.” Catholic tradition is either considered as co-ordinate with Scripture, or as supplementary to it. The former view deposes Scripture from its supremacy, the latter deprives it of its sufficiency. Hence results a practical depreciation or disregard of Scripture, identical with that which drew from our Lord the still severe rebuke, “Ye have made the word of God of none effect (*ἠκυρώσατε*) through your tradition.”

The tendency to ascribe undue importance to human teaching of a traditionary character, and to raise it to a level with divine, is manifested in the attachment entertained by so many for the Apocrypha, their jealousy of the neglect or disuse of these writings, and the determined and zealous opposition made to the proposal to discontinue, either wholly or in part, the reading of apocryphal lessons in the service of the church. The maintenance of the Apocrypha in the position rightfully belonging to Scripture alone, a position from which a great majority would gladly see them dislodged, is certainly due to the continued existence of a spirit and principle, generally Judaic, specifically Pharisaical.

Nor can we regard the extravagant language in which some express their veneration and affection for the Prayer-book, and their disposition to exalt it into an absolute and ultimate authority in matters of faith and duty, as other than a modification of traditionism, and so a proof of the abiding prevalence and influence of the leaven of the Pharisees. There is no more mischievous form of evil, than the perversion of what is good. And the most subtle and dangerous kind of perversion is that which exaggerates the importance and efficacy of some great spiritual good, of any of the means of grace, whether, as in this instance, a “form of sound words,” or an ordinance, or a practice, or an order of men. It nullifies its legitimate benefits; it raises a false expectation, resulting in perpetual disappointment or perpetual delusion; and it invariably disparages in

our estimation, or intercepts and hides from our view, some greater good, and so diminishes, or counteracts, or entirely diverts from us its blessings. Such are certainly the effects of the Pharisaism which converts the Prayer-book into a "tradition of the elders," and assigns to it an authority collateral or cognate with that of the Bible.

The personal religion of the Pharisee is generally and rightly understood to have been a religion of self-righteousness. The corresponding article of his doctrinal religion was justification by the works of the law. This leaven of the Pharisees had, as we have seen, spread itself, in apostolic times, through the churches of Galatia, and was infecting that of Rome. We detect it in the former case by the direct opposition and rebuke of St Paul, and in the latter, by the vigorous and copious administration of its specific antidote—the doctrine of justification by faith only, and of the worthlessness and nullity of human merit. It re-appears as an integral element of the predicted apostasy, in the doctrines of the Romish Church on the meritoriousness of good works, and justification by inherent righteousness, as also in her anathemas against the assertors of justification by faith only. We should be uncharitable and unjust if we were to impute to the members of any class among us, professing acceptance of the articles of the Church of England, the self-righteousness of the original Pharisee, the anti-Paulist Judaiser, or the Church of Rome. But the sentiments of many writers, especially favoured by a numerous class which strongly asserts its superior churchmanship, on the subject of good works and justification, are certainly more in accordance with the decrees and anathemas of the Council of Trent, than with the language of the Thirty-nine Articles, or the practical teaching of the Liturgy. Those who are taught to believe, and who are willing to receive the doctrine, that good works, particularly alms-giving, recommend us to the favour of God, and are a means of procuring acceptance with him; and that justification, imparted in the first instance by a ceremony, is maintained, or renewed, or recovered by works of righteousness which we can do, cannot be considered as having altogether escaped the infection of the leaven of the Pharisees.

Formalism was a conspicuous attribute of the Pharisaic religion, as professed and practised in the time of our Lord's ministry. And the Pharisaic character of the Judaism which prevailed in the churches of Galatia, and of that which threatened the church of Colossæ, was exhibited, in both cases, by the introduction of numerous outward observances, and, in the latter especially, by the inculcation of the importance and necessity of fastings, peculiar abstinences, and habits and rules of bodily mortification. It must be acknowledged by all, that

increased attention to forms and ceremonies, and a more precise systematic observance of sacred seasons, within the pale of the Church of England, are among the most prominent signs of our times. It is true also, that if these manifestations are not absolutely confined to a particular school or class, yet there is one to which they, by common consent, appropriately belong, in the midst of which they have arisen, and by all the members of which they are uniformly approved and encouraged. Similar remarks may be made upon asceticism, as exhibited in the strict observance of the fast days of the calendar, in self-imposed fasts, and in various forms of voluntary mortification. These practices have become a fashion in our day; they are recommended as highly conducive to godliness by many preachers and writers; but the divines who inculcate, and the devotees who have adopted them, are all of one well-defined order of religious sentiment. And the connection is seen to subsist still, as closely as in primitive antiquity, between tradition as a rule of faith, self-righteousness in doctrinal and personal religion, formalism in worship, and ascetic exercises and devices in private devotion.

The long prayers of the Pharisees, obtruded upon public notice, offered when and where people in general were necessarily employed in the ordinary business and duties of life, met with no encouragement from him who nevertheless taught "that men ought always to pray, and not to faint." It was evidently not only the spirit, but the form—not only the substance, but the circumstances—of their frequent and protracted prayers, that caused him to speak of them as an example to avoid rather than to follow. May we not discern a parallel to these practices of theirs in the unnecessary multiplication of daily services, in the unseasonable hours at which they are often held, in the perpetual and importunate bell-ringing by which they are announced, and by which they challenge the attention of the passers-by at the corners of our streets?

There is an obvious affinity between the custom of the Pharisees just noticed, and all parade and ostentation in the performance of the offices of religion. It is undoubtedly to Judaism that we may trace the pompous ceremonial, and elaborate and complicated ritual of the Church of Rome. Immediately, indeed, they are the inheritance of the corrupt Eastern and Western Churches, from the Church of the Nicene age, in which, at the commencement of the fifth century, according to the celebrated complaint of Augustine cited in the preface to the Prayer-book, the multitude of ceremonies was so great, "that the estate of Christian people was in worse case concerning that matter than were the Jews." The forms of worship, and various celebrations, which are the subject of his

complaint, were imitations, or rather the perpetuation, of many of the Mosaic ordinances. And, being such, we can hardly attribute their existence in the Christian Church at so early a period, or their introduction into it at a period necessarily much earlier, to anything else but an extensive prevalence of the principles and practices of the party which advocated the continued observance of the ceremonial law of Moses,—a party which, as we have seen in examining the statements of St Paul in the epistle to the Galatians, consisted of Judaisers of the Pharisaic school. Those who have largely introduced the artistic and histrionic element into church services, and converted them, as far as possible, into pomps and spectacles, will probably repudiate the notion, that they have borrowed their system of external worship from contemporary Romanism, and assert that it is derived from ante-papal antiquity. But if so, they connect it more closely and directly with Pharisaism, referring it to an age in which the divine and apostolical warnings lead us to expect that the leaven of the Pharisees would be in fresh and active operation, and which, according to a testimony to which they are accustomed to demand much deference, when it is in their favour, was marked by an excess of ceremonies, in its origin and character clearly Pharisaical.

The Pharisees “made broad their phylacteries, and enlarged the borders of their garments,” “loved to go in long clothing,” “built the tombs of the prophets, and garnished the sepulchres of the righteous.” These were practices associated with their religious profession, not in themselves evil or wrong, or directly significant of any error in belief or doctrine. Yet they are mentioned by our Lord with something like derision, certainly with implied censure, evidently as specimens and indications of the character of Pharisaic religion, and examples of the class of demonstrations by which the genius and spirit of Pharisaism might be known. Such practices were representative or type forms of a religion consisting in externalism and symbolism. The warning voice of the great Master, which has bidden us “take heed, and beware of the leaven of the Pharisees,” assuredly calls upon us to be on our guard against practices bearing resemblance to these, and presenting religion in the same aspect. We have seen in our own time a great increase of attention bestowed upon sacerdotal habiliments, much zeal displayed in the promotion and vindication of the use of a vestment of a particular colour and form on all imaginable occasions, the resumption of ecclesiastical attire and ornament strange to our eyes, and unknown among us for several generations, the introduction of changes and arrangements of dress corresponding with various seasons and services. There is also prevalent an affectation of peculiarity in every-day

costume, which plainly denotes a desire of distinction and observation on the part of the wearers, not only as ministers of the church, but as the professors of a certain order of opinions as to the position and authority of the ministers. Nor is this fondness for sartorial display limited to the investiture of the persons of the clergy; it is exhibited also in the furniture of the church, and especially of the communion-table and its precincts, in elaborately-wrought and varied altar-cloths, and in magnificent carpets. In the advertising pages of every periodical, clerical tailors and ecclesiastical upholsterers offer undeniable testimony to the fact that there exists among us a form of religion distinguished by the importance which it attaches to dress, robes, and drapery. Does it not in outward show present at least a noticeable similarity to that which was characterised by the "broad phylacteries," the "enlarged fringes of garments," and "long clothing?" Again, the value of these habits and coverings, as accessories of religion or worship, consists, as will be acknowledged, in their significance. Like the phylactery and the fringe, they belong to a system of symbolism. Accordingly, they are associated in the practice of those who adopt them with other badges, and devices of a symbolical character. Such are candles and candlesticks, flowers, crosses, emblematical diagrams, postures, genuflexions, turnings, changes of place, and processions. The same class, or school, are the principal promoters of lavish expenditure on ecclesiastical architecture, on the restoration of cathedrals, on the decoration of churches, on memorial windows, arches, porches, and aisles. And in their building and garnishing, and in all their application of the fine arts to the purposes of religion, as religion is understood by them, they bring into conspicuous display the principle of symbolism. Thus do their practices, both in their form and spirit, in action and in theory, present to us the signs and tokens by which our Lord has taught us to detect the leaven of the Pharisees.

Lastly, the Pharisees were notorious for their arrogance, for the factitious dignity with which they invested their order and office, and for the jealous and intolerant exclusiveness with which they claimed high spiritual privileges for the natural Israel, as alone the true children of Abraham. It has been shewn that similar or nearly identical assumptions marked the presence and influence of Pharisaism in the early Christian church. What else but this "doctrine" of the Pharisees is the dogma which limits the character of true Christian ministers to those who possess a certain successional lineage? What else, the exaltation of the Christian ministry into a sacrificing and mediatory priesthood, and the extravagant claims of spiritual prerogatives for that priesthood as the only accredited channel

of divine grace? What else, the exclusion from the church, catholic and apostolic, and the relegation to the uncovenanted mercies of God of all who receive the sacraments from other than episcopally consecrated hands?

Thus we find that Pharisaism is not extinct nor obsolete. Each of its most conspicuous peculiarities is not only substantially but formally reproduced in some practice or tenet adopted among us. The statement of these peculiarities in combination forms a description, which none can mistake, of the profession and character of a great religious party. As a party, it is identified with them all; and although an individual member, or even section, of the party may be distinctly characterised by perhaps one or two of them only, it will be found that there is in every such case a sympathy with those who exhibit them all with the most obtrusive ostentation, an approbation and partizanship which sufficiently indicate community of sentiment and principle. Generally speaking, however, the differences are only of degree. Where one mark of Pharisaism exists, the rest are, for the most part, not wanting, but only more or less plainly discernible.

The sect of the Sadducees, as far as we are acquainted with them by the statements of their opinions given in the New Testament, appear to have been distinguished by no definite assertion of peculiar doctrine. We know them by what they did not believe. Their specialty lay in denial. They have their modern representation, therefore, in the professors of the negative theology. They were the primitive precursors of a school which admits nothing as matter of fact unless it can be confirmed or accounted for by our observation and experience, and which would eliminate all that is supernatural from religion. The disbelief of the Sadducees in the resurrection of the dead appeared without modification in the teaching of the Judaisers at Corinth; its resolution into a mystical doctrine of a past, that is, probably a spiritual, resurrection, belongs to a subsequent period. St Paul argues against this disbelief, as entertained by professed Christians, by showing that its necessary and immediate consequence is the denial of Christ's resurrection, and therefore the nullification and annihilation of the gospel and Christianity. The same result follows from the theory now maintained by certain scientific theologians of the absolute unchangeableness and uniformity of the order of events in the material world, leading directly to the rejection of miracles, as impossible even to omnipotence. If a miracle, as such, is an impossibility, then the resurrection of Jesus was impossible, and the faith that is founded upon it must be a delusion, and the creed which asserts it a lie. They who are forced to this conclusion are plainly reduced to the same bathos

of position, and the same nullity of belief, as the Sadduceean teachers of the Corinthian Church. Are they not the Sadducees of ours?

By a logical necessity, they whose general scepticism on the subject of resurrection compelled them to refuse belief in the resurrection of Christ, while yet they called themselves by his name, and professed faith in him as the Saviour, rejected the testimony of the apostles concerning his personal history. They "preached another Jesus," whom Paul and his brother apostles had "not preached." Modern divinity of the rationalistic school so deals with the accounts of the evangelists, as to bring into question not merely the miraculous, but the ordinary events of the ministry and life of Jesus. Indeed, the attempt to effect a distinction between them, and to construct a narrative of the actual facts out of which the story of the gospels might be supposed to have grown, has proved the most lamentable failure known in the annals of historical criticism. It has covered the past generation of German neologians with ignominy and ridicule, and is wisely abandoned by the present; although, inconsistently enough, they and their English imitators and retailers, adopt its principles and system in the interpretation of the Old Testament histories. Rationalism, in its present phase, as recently exhibited among us, declines to enter into the question of the comparative probability of events or actions recorded in the gospels. It represents it as immaterial whether we reject or believe any of these, or all, as matters of fact. Our faith in Christ is independent of the historical reality of his works or his existence. But, obviously, this negative Christianity, whatever it may profess or disclaim, treats Jesus as a legendary character, the mere embodiment of ideas, the personification of truths, the efficacy of which is due to their own intrinsic value, and unaffected by what we affirm or deny as to the medium of their disclosure. Surely this is "another Jesus" than the Jesus of the gospels and epistles. Such probably will be the candid admission, or rather the open profession of many of the teachers and advocates of modern philosophical Christianity, and of those who adopt the most recent theory of civilisation. Development is the grand and acknowledged principle of their system. The old historical belief had its value, and did good service, in former ages; but its mission is at an end, it must now be displaced and superseded by a Christ-manifestation, more suited to the enlightenment of the nineteenth century. The sentiment finds utterance, and, at the same time, testimony to its wide diffusion and influence, in the words of an eminent poet, quoted with approbation by a scarcely less eminent writer on theology:—

"Ring out the darkness of the land,
Ring in the Christ that is to be."

"The Christ that is to be!" "Another Jesus." The phrases are synonymous. Not the Christ of the past; not the Christ of Bethlehem and of Calvary; but the Christ of the future for a "church of the future." Corinthian Sadduceeism, almost in terms.

And if "another Jesus," then, also, of necessity, "another gospel." To the party at Corinth, which was composed of Sadducean Jews and philosophising Greeks, the "preaching of the cross," the doctrine of "Christ crucified," was a "stumbling-block," and "foolishness." What their substitute was for the simple gospel of salvation by the blood of Jesus, which Paul preached, is not explicitly stated. But it seems to have been a kind of mystic spiritualism, which dispensed with a personal object of faith, made religion entirely subjective, and regarded every man as possessed of a direct but internal revelation. They had "another Spirit," not the Holy Ghost which spake by the prophets of the New Testament Church: but like the foolish and false prophets of old, they "followed their own spirit," deeming it divine. An exalted spiritualism of a similar kind, amounting to a pantheistic claim to participation in Deity, is found in our day in combination with that inveterate, though sometimes disguised, hostility to the doctrine of the atonement by the sacrificial death of Christ, which is characteristic of every grade of rationalism, and strongly marks that which mystifies the person of Jesus. This gospel rejects also that cardinal doctrine of St Paul's gospel—justification by faith, and so, necessarily, its inseparable correlative—the regeneration or renewal of the individual soul by the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost. To an anxious spirit, seeking escape from the wrath to come, earnestly inquiring the way of salvation and eternal life, it presents no assurance of guilt removed, and divine justice satisfied, and righteousness imputed; offers no admission into a covenant of grace and peace; invites to no participation in the benefits of an abiding intercessor, and of communion with an ever-present Lord. In its teaching, all the things that Jesus did, and suffered, and does, and promises, are not substantial realities in which each one of his disciples has a personal interest, directly granted by the Lord himself, and conveyed to the soul by his Spirit; they are but symbols of grace and truth, a vision and a parable of mercy. In the language of one of its recent expositors—"Jesus Christ has not revealed his religion as an historical faith." . . . "The true Christian life is the consciousness of bearing a part in a great moral order, of which the highest agency upon earth has been committed to the church."—(*Essays and Reviews*, pp. 203,

205.) Such sentiments are of the same class with those which, promulgated at Corinth, caused the apostle to fear lest the minds of the Corinthian believers should "be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ." They are only not absolutely identical with them, because they are not perversions merely, but contradictions, of his gospel.

The disbelief of the Sadducees in the existence of angels and spirits is a key to their method of interpreting the Old Testament Scriptures. They must have rejected as uninspired, or resolved into allegories and parables, or regarded as exaggerations, the numerous passages which, as ordinarily understood, afforded direct evidence of the truths which they disowned. The Sadducean Judaisers in the early Christian church, who denied the resurrection, and who preached another Jesus, another gospel, and another Spirit, undoubtedly treated in a similar manner the testimony of the apostles. We have, indeed, sufficient proof that they questioned, if they did not entirely disallow, the inspiration and authority of St Paul. Even so now, those who have given up all belief in any miraculous manifestations, have necessarily ceased to regard the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament as the infallible word of God, free from falsehood or error. In whatever sense they account them divine, they refer to a largely pervading "human element" of mistake, credulity, enthusiasm, or pious imposture, every record of a supernatural event, every statement which presents itself for acceptance as an external revelation. They will acknowledge nothing to be a reality in matter of fact, or a verity in doctrine, which they cannot reconcile with their own ideas of what is physically or morally possible to God. It is difficult to understand what amount of credit they give to the rest of Scripture, or whether they allow any distinction between the inspiration of the writers and that of the reader, or, if any, whether it be not to the advantage of the latter. The Bible is clearly not their rule of faith. Ordinary minds fail to perceive their consistency in maintaining that it is to be accepted as a rule of practice. Rejecting the gospel record of facts, and the gospel statements of doctrine, they claim to be believers in the gospel because they adopt its moral principles and precepts. But "the ethical part of Christianity, the regulative aspect of revealed truth," which they consider capable of vindication, and "the supernatural and speculative part," for which, in their opinion, there is not sufficient evidence (*Essays and Reviews*, p. 297), are presented in the New Testament under the same sanction; they form a whole, for the disintegration of which there is neither authority nor pretext. The presumption which has led them to attempt it, is founded upon mistaken notions of the nature

of a revelation, and the proper province and objects of the exercise of Omnipotence. They are evidently of the class to whom our Lord addressed the rebuke, "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God."

The school which advocates and exemplifies the "free handling" of all matters of religious belief, while maintaining the profession of adherence to the creeds and articles of the church, makes perhaps the fullest exhibition of its liberty in its treatment of the doctrines of creation and providence. Doctors and disciples of this school repudiate any personal immediate agency of Deity in the original production of the various orders of substances and beings in the material world; nor will they allow that the phenomena of the universe are under the present control, subject to the present volition, of the Supreme Intelligence. Here, again, we notice their affinity with the Sadduceean Judaizers of the apostolic age; for not only do they preach "another Jesus" than the Jesus of the New Testament, but unquestionably *another God*, than the God of the Old Testament and the New. The tendency of this tampering with the personality of the subject of revelation and the object of faith is to absolute infidelity. For the next step after the denial of the personal agency of the Deity in creation and providence, must be the denial of his personal existence. And then, if any belief at all in Deity is to be preserved, it can only be by adopting the pantheism of the Stoics and the Buddhists, and of the German theosophy. We may observe also, that the high spiritualism which supersedes the necessity of an external revelation, which teaches that all the reality of revelation is within us—that the Christ and the Holy Ghost of the true gospel are not objective manifestations, but subjective developments, is a primary and fundamental article of the Pantheistic creed. And thus the resemblance of modern Sadduceeism to primitive is completed by its alliance with heathen and infidel philosophy. Most closely applicable to ourselves in reference to it, is the admonition of the apostle to the Colossians, "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ." And how wonderful and divine a provision is made for the refutation of this heresy, and for our protection against its insidious encroachments, in the enunciation of the grand article of our faith with which he immediately follows up his admonition, "In Christ dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."

Our induction of particulars has, we are satisfied, sufficiently established the fact that forms of religious profession exist in our day, and co-exist in the same communion, which are respectively distinguished by all the characteristic fea-

tures of Pharisaism and Sadduceeism. Let any one, familiar with the phases of religious belief and practice now in full exhibition among us, merely re-peruse the statements which we have repeated, or immediately deduced, from Scripture, of the doctrine or systems of the Pharisees and Sadducees, even as each existed before its contact with Christianity, and he cannot fail to recognise the most distinct peculiarities of two conspicuous modern schools. On the one hand is Pharisaism, with its tradition, formalism, asceticism, ostentation, and parade in worship; length, frequency, and publicity of prayers; attachment to symbolic badges and dress; commemorative decoration of sacred buildings; undue exaltation of the ministerial office; exclusiveness and intolerance; exaggeration of the value of sacramental privileges; casuistical interpretation of Scripture; hollow externalism in substitution for spiritual piety. On the other hand is Sadduceeism, with its denial of the resurrection of the body, and of the existence of angels and spirits; its consequent rejection of the authority of Scripture as a record of facts, or a revelation of doctrine; its materialism, its positivism, its secularism. Of these two systems nothing has become obsolete but the names. The intelligent and impartial observer will acknowledge that the counterpart of each, visible and vigorous within the pale of the English Church (nor there alone), bears to its original a resemblance almost equivalent to identity. It is indeed astonishing that the lapse of ages should have effected so little change even in the outward manifestations, the aspect, and the attitude of primary forms of error. It is still more astonishing that these forms should have been preserved, or should be reproduced without attempt at disguise—on the contrary, with zealous demonstrativeness of display—in an age and in a country in which that inspired Word is extensively circulated, read, studied, and honoured, which indicates some of them as signs of the corruption of religion, and brands others with express and severe condemnation. Such a phenomenon corroborates the oracular and prophetic character of the warning uttered by our Lord against these systems, and by consequence, the authenticity and accuracy of the record in which it is reported, and they are described. It must needs also increase the significance and solemnity of that divine warning in our own apprehension. It testifies to us of the strength and subtlety of the evils which are therein denounced, and should alarm us into caution, jealousy for the truth, and strict self-examination. Let it be carefully borne in mind that we are not only admonished to take heed and beware of Pharisaism and Sadduceeism in the aggregate, by the designation of each as a doctrine, that is, a system or discipline, but that, by the illustration of *leaven*,

a figure denoting their infectious and corrupting qualities, is intimated the danger of admitting any portion of either into our creed or practice. The Israelites were commanded to remove every particle of material leaven out of their houses, that they might duly keep the feast that represented the grace and salvation which are ours in Christ crucified. If we would realise for ourselves, and for others, "the fulness of the blessing of the gospel of Christ," we must get rid of every perversion and corruption which originally impaired its efficacy, and obstructed its progress. We must purge out the old leaven of the Pharisees, of the Sadducees, and of Herod—the leaven of superstition, of scepticism, and of worldliness—from our churches, our homes, our hearts, and our lives.

W. F. W.

ART. VII.—*Professor Astié on the Two Theologies.*

Les Deux Théologies Nouvelles dans le Sein du Protestantisme Français. (The Two New Theologies in the Bosom of French Protestantism. An historico-dogmatical Essay.) *Etude historico-dogmatique.* Par J. F. ASTIÉ. Paris: Ch. Meyrueis. 1862.

THIS title is too vague, but we think that the author (a Professor of Philosophy in the Free Church Theological Faculty of Lausanne) means to designate Rationalism and dogmatism, which he envelops under the general name of intellectualism. In the first part of his essay, the professor goes back to what he calls the origin of intellectualism, viz., the *Helvetic Consensus*. Another essay, in which conscience, authority, the supernatural, and subjectivism, are to be treated at length, is intended to appear shortly, to complete that which is at present under review.

The author is a scholar of Vinet, and is favourably known by his work entitled *Espit de Vinet*. In the present work his object is to delineate the alleged or well-founded defects of the orthodox revival, which took its origin from Haldane and his followers, and the perilously erratic course of Schérer and his school, in order to set off as by a foil the paramount claims of Vinet's theology. He sees little beyond Vinet, who is the object of his intense admiration. We give an outline of his book and of his views in what follows.

As to the PAST, he holds that the *Formula Consensus* (composed by J. H. Heidegger, Prof. of Theol. at Zürich, 1655), was a desperate effort to arrest the audacious investigations of Amyraut, La Place, Capellus, &c. It decreed (Art.

II.) that the books of the Old Testament are authentic, "as regards the consonants as well as the vowels," that they are divinely inspired, "as much for the things contained in them as for the expressions." The measures used by the Bernese authorities, the Lords of the *Pays de Vaud*, to procure the adoption of the Consensus, are well known. A *Chamber of Religion* was created. "A student of Lausanne, Frossard, accused of pietism, was dragged to the dungeons of the capital, where he died. The prisons overflowed with captives. A great number of persons were sent to the galleys of Naples and Genoa. The States General of Holland opened their provinces to those who were banished from Switzerland; others were transported to America, others emigrated there in great numbers," (Verdeil Hist. du Canton de Vaud, pp. 474-483). England, Germany, and Prussia protested, in the name of liberty, and the Cantons, with the exception of Berne, ceased to exact the signature of the clergy to the formula. According to M. Astié, this document has been revived in the literal dogmatism which characterised the revival at the beginning of this century. The appearance of M. Gaussen's *Theopneustia* ends this period. Dictated by the best of feelings, this book "only systematises what was in the air. This was the boldest stroke of intellectualism, and the better to assure its success, it was dealt by the hand of a man full of poetry and life."

Having represented the orthodox revival in an invidious light, he next sketches the semi-sceptical tendency of Schérer which he calls the *CRISIS*. M. Scherer is the promoter of it; it dates from his demission of the functions of Professor of Theology at the Free Faculty of Geneva (Dec. 1849). So early as 1839, in his thesis "On the History of the doctrine of Moral Liberty," a determinist and pantheistic tendency can be traced out. "As for the distinction between relative and absolute liberty, we have not made one, because the latter only appears to us really to merit the name of liberty." "Out of this," observes M. Astié, "came the autocracy of the Christian conscience, then of the mere conscience, then of criticism, till, lastly, subjectivism succeeded so well in escaping all control, that, like a new John Lackland, it has found itself in an empty kingdom, in face of an innumerable array of points of interrogation."

All the evolutions through which M. Schérer passed, from the time of the publication of this thesis until the appearance of his *Mélanges* in 1861, would require to be followed in the psychological biography of him given by M. Astié. We can only touch upon its principal features; and, since the author of the thesis did not dare to conclude against liberty, out of respect for the authority of the Scriptures, let us see on what basis he places that authority. We

find this in a book which created a great sensation among the theological youth when published by M. Schérer, in 1843, "The Doctrine of the Reformed Church" (*Prologomènes*). The proof of the authority of the Bible is essentially *objective*. "There must be supposed for the Bible an authority, without which its teaching would not be fixed with certitude, but this authority can only consist in infallibility, and this infallibility can only have its cause in a divine intervention to that effect; it is this intervention which is called *inspiration*. . . . The postulate being absolute, the infallibility, and consequently the inspiration, must be equally absolute." The internal proof is only mentioned in passing. "The proof of Christianity is to be found essentially in its power, and its power in its adaptation to the spiritual wants it undertakes to satisfy. The aim of the miracles and prophecy is not primarily an apologetic one, and can only be adapted to this in a subsidiary manner." Inspiration is plenary, and as to the manner of it, while M. Gausson believes in an immediate inspiration of the writings, without regard to the relation of the writers to this action, his colleague believes that the divine action lays hold of the spirit of the writer. "The canon is a matter of faith, not of science, and any reserve or distinction in this respect ignores this fact, and deals a blow at the conscience of the church, and the faith of individuals."

We must now pass over seven years, and contrast this sound belief with what is taught in the tract of demission, *Criticism and Faith*. Speculation would appear to have undermined the soil, and, after much resistance, the professor only yields when he has come to see "that biblicism is not only a theological error, but, above all, a scourge to the church."

M. Astié here seems to fall into a paradox in affirming that M. Schérer has not changed his ground, and that, in fact, it is still in the waters of intellectualism that he is steering his bark. "Where should we be," asks M. Astié, "if, in order to gain admittance into the kingdom of heaven, we required either to bow down before the authority or else to obtain a pass, countersigned by a critical faith, appreciating everything before admitting it? But has M. Schérer made the experience of this proof? Is he on the ground of facts or ideas? Does he fight *pro aris et focis*? M. Schérer is essentially a man of a *speculative* mind, a bold, logical thinker, who goes fast and far. We may add that he is born a demolisher, and for this reason the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti* must, in its turn, pass by the scalpel of his logic, or, if you prefer it, of his religious conscience, which he has been erecting into an autocrat. I say an autocrat, for the religious conscience has, like the moral conscience, an absolute *à priori*,

in virtue of which it declares false everything that appears hurtful to it. Autocrat, I repeat, for the new oracle not only 'does not admit any doctrine which does not agree with its idea of the divine perfections, but it determines what is religious and what is not, and it is of its essence to oppose itself to every attempt made to impose upon it, in the name of religion, what it does not recognise as such. Whatever does not awaken consent in the soul cannot be an object of faith for that soul, and so far from being bound to admit a doctrine foreign to it, it conforms to a sacred instinct in rejecting it."

We cannot follow M. Astié in his criticism of the theology of Messrs Colani, Réville, and Pécaut, nor even touch upon his judgment of a book written in quite a different direction—the canon of M. Gaussen. We prefer to complete his appreciation of M. Schérer. How then are we to explain these successive evolutions of his? Schérer himself explains the mystery in the picture he traces of a theologian, under the fictive name of *Montaign*.

"The central point round which the other elements of character, in the spiritual nature of Montaign, organise themselves, appears to me to be the longing after the ideal; I mean by that, the longing to bring every thing back to the abstract and absolute type. . . . I know vaguely that he has been the martyr of his idealistic conceptions. I suspect, too, that under diverse forms, religion for Montaign never was anything else than an idolatry of the truth. The true always was for him the absolute *par excellence*, and, so to speak, the absolute of the absolute, the ideal of the ideal. . . Who would believe it? His love of the true has been the destruction of Montaign. The true, in all things, is the fact; but the fact only gives the relative, and this is how our thinker has come to see only the relative side of things, the good in the evil, the evil in the good, truth and error in everything, simple formulas in the most important doctrines, images in the fundamental notions of religion. In his mind the absolute had devoured itself. He was a sceptic, for either I am much mistaken, or I have been describing one of the forms of this disastrous malady. Montaign is still haunted by the longing after the true, but this longing now manifests itself in the thirst after knowledge, and above all, in the longing to see clear."*

* We may also quote a few sentences from Vinet, in which he describes a mind come to the same state in which M. Schérer apparently is: "It is hardly possible to admit that, from the first, such a man saw in religion only an object of philosophic speculation; doubtless his first design was to appropriate it to his soul, and to submit his life to it, but this impression was superficial and fugitive; thought, vividly seized, threw itself upon this rich prey and turned it entirely to its own profit. Each gain of the intellect was a loss for the soul, which, thrown ever more and more out of action, lost its spring in idleness. This man having contracted the habit of seizing everything in its intellectual aspect, became by degrees incapable of seizing them under any other. Strange to say, he

When Professor Astié comes to discuss the theology which he would put in the room of the other two, we meet only a warm but scarcely discriminating recommendation of Vinet. It is Vinet now who sits before him ; it is his tendency that ought to be followed by a sound theology. Vinet did not like the intellectualism of the revival, "that curious mixture of humility and pride," although he respected the principle of the revival and blessed its origin. His preaching was essentially apologetic and subjective. Vinet claims strongly the rights of the individual, of the conscience, the only foundation that religion can obtain. "This is not to say, that religion is only conscience, but it must be so at first ; and this is what we see it to be at the present time wherever the Spirit of God does his work." Vinet continues : "This inexplicable, internal, individual feeling is the basis of morals. Without conscience, man would not believe and would not be effectively bound to anything." But this moral feeling does not alone suffice, it must have the support of religion. "In the long run its witness is not sufficient, it is precious only in so far as it certifies to us that a judge, of whom our conscience is only the representative, is equally satisfied ; we need an approver, and we need that that approver should be a person ; we do not want to be simply the servants, the friends, the children of an idea, we want to attach ourselves to something more living than moral order, to a being, to a soul in which our life may find an echo. What is the conscience without God ? What is conscience but the organ and the *resident minister* of God within us ?" Thus, according to Vinet, as well as M. Astié, conscience is not a simple faculty of approval or disapproval, it is the point of contact between God and us, the uniting cord which attaches us to him. Thus understood, conscience has a right to put itself above human law when the latter enters

was ever excelling in describing the effects of the truth upon a soul, and ever becoming more incapable of feeling them himself. . . . He felt the evil and became alarmed ; he wished to try and make of that religion, which had been so long his *study*, an *affair*, and *his* affair. He endeavoured to place himself under the action and in dependence upon the truth, but through the force of habit, his intellect each time put itself in the place of conscience. . . . In his anguish he wished to forget, to ignore all ; he envied the credulity of the simple, of children ; he would have given all his science for a single one of their sighs, and all his knowledge in exchange for their hearts, for his had ceased to beat ; his was become intellect. . . . Vain desires ! The lost eye cannot be restored, faith (the eye of the soul) cannot be given back. Singular state, in which a man believes and does not believe. . . . State of light, but of a light which only serves to render darkness visible. Ignorance in knowledge, error in the truth, unbelief in faith, a curse under the form of a blessing, contradictory, maddening condition, with which we would reproach the divine power as a cruel sport, *did not the evidence constrain us to impute it to ourselves.*"—(Esprit d' Alexander Vinet, t. ii. p. 125).

into conflict with it. - "The truth which is without us," says Vinet, "must always be measured and compared with the truth which is within us." In so saying, Vinet shews plainly that he believes in a harmony between the conscience and the gospel. The gospel is hidden in the depths of the conscience. "Do you remember the customs of ancient hospitality? When bidding farewell to the stranger, the host, breaking a clay seal on which certain characters were engraven, gave him one half and preserved the other. After many years, these two fragments, brought once more together and joined, recognised each other, that is, operated the recognition of those who presented them to each other, and, while attesting their former connection, they formed a new one. Thus in the book of our soul, their divine complement is rejoined to lines already begun; thus our soul does not discover, but recognises the truth; thus it judges that a meeting impossible by chance, impossible by any calculation, is the secret work of God, and it is only then that we truly believe."

At the same time let it be fully understood, that Vinet does not in any way mean a conscience separated from God, from that God who alone "gives us a basis, who alone attaches the chain to a fixed point." It would, he assures us, be gross infatuation to preserve the words, conscience, morals, obligation, and give up the idea of God.

It is therefore a calumny to say that Vinet made light of the objective element in Christianity. "Conscience is only the enduring and ineffaceable impress of a powerful hand, which, after having grasped, has withdrawn from us, or rather, from which a strong foe has torn us; the hand is absent, the impress remains; this mysterious impress, which we have not made ourselves, brings every thinking man back to the idea of God. It may make him conclude and seek for the absent hand, but alone it cannot enable him to find it again." This conscience leads to repentance, which, in its turn, leads to love. If properly consulted, conscience does not hesitate to welcome this exigence, for "its voice tells man that he needs pardon. Do not believe the disdainful, indifferent airs of certain people, they hide their secret anguish from you; their deathbed will perhaps tell it you. But had they even succeeded in freeing themselves from the terrors of the vulgar, still they needed to free themselves. And how? In avoiding the thoughts of it. They are not afraid, you think, of what terrifies you; but they are afraid of being afraid; it is just the same."

Vinet believes in the fall without losing himself in speculations which threaten to compromise its moral side, and he leads the soul directly to Jesus the Saviour, rather than to

Christianity. "Let us," he says, "prefer Jesus Christ to history, to the system, to Christianity. Let us be Christians by an immediate contact with Jesus Christ, instead of confining ourselves to being so in familiarising ourselves with the doctrine and science which relate to him." But what is Jesus Christ for Vinet? Certainly not a product of the historical development of mankind, nor a manifestation of the moral perfections of God. He is the God-man; and, far from giving himself up to speculations which he calls "withering and destructive," he bows before the mystery of the incarnation! It is in the same spirit that he approaches the Saviour's work of redemption and atonement, of which he proclaims the necessity. "Jesus, as a victim, was to accredit to man Jesus as a teacher; the priest was to introduce the prophet." As to the bearing of the atonement, Vinet holds to the gospel; that is, says M. Astié, "he does not reduce the work of redemption merely to the sufferings of the cross; he refuses to weigh in the balance the Saviour's sufferings; he does not go counting the drops which fall from the cross, and asking himself if they were the price equivalent to the sinner's ransom. He does not hesitate to say that Jesus Christ could not have suffered tantamount to the suffering which ought to fall upon sinners, "since hatred, envy, confusion, remorse, remained foreign to his holy soul; but he suffered what no son of man can suffer, at least in the same degree, since the sight of evil could not make the same impression on any one as upon him who is of purer eyes than to behold it, since no one ever did, nor ever can experience such revolting injustice, since no one can be the object of such odious ingratitude."

There is one other important point to notice in Vinet's theological system—it is his idea of divine justice. He is far from drowning it in love, and thus producing with the doctors of the present day a flavourless Christianity. "Justice," he writes, "has something apart and in itself, and, though it cannot be accomplished but through charity, it is not charity. Love is not the beginning of the law. Justice is its first word. Justice has a reality, a substance independent of love, and it would not only be wrong, but perilous to forget it." Whence it follows that the sacrifice of Jesus Christ is at once a manifestation of justice and of love. "God," he says, "wishing to make true love, which is the foretaste and pledge of eternal life, spring up within us, began by speaking to us of justice. He has awakened the idea of it in our minds, with the feeling of our own injustice, by the injunctions and the threatenings of the law. He has educated our consciences anew. In the unmerited and voluntary sufferings of his Son, he has shewn the inviolability of moral order, and, filled with these ideas, we are

led to grace, which, as grace is a consecration of the law, and it is at the foot of that same cross where justice is taught us, that we learn what love ought to be."

This theology of Vinet is that which M. Astié follows, and strongly recommends. Not that he thinks it complete. It is wanting in historical and exegetical labour as to doctrine, and it requires to go further in order to complete its work of organisation, of positive and negative criticism. We may also note that Vinet's mysticism is still too philosophical, but still the future is safe. Intellectualism, whether it present itself under the form of pure deism, semitheist naturalism, pantheism, or whether it turn pietist, is dead or dying. As for those who are only wounded in the war which is going on, their wounds must be dressed, and we must carry them on to a new future. As for the dead, we must bury them with all the honour their rank demands, but without mercy.

M. Astié cannot as yet hail the appearance of the man who is to complete the labours of Vinet. In the mean time, let us frankly accept the annoying position in which our theology of transition, our abortive revolution, is at present. Let us not throw ourselves either into absolutism or into radicalism. Let us comprehend the conditions of the development of a semi-normal theology. Let us gather up all the vital forces which are still in existence, in order to reunite the historical link with the past, and let us go forward resolutely to meet the future, without taking heed to those who have gone beyond the aim, or to those who think that the wisest plan is to recede.

Such is Professor Astié's book. It is not to be expected that we should lengthen out this article by making a formal criticism of his theology. Let it suffice to say that the author does not do justice to the continental revival, we do not mean in regard to what it has done in saving souls (this was not perhaps the place for appreciating that blessed work), but in regard to what it has done for their sanctification. We have only to open the sermons of Pyt, Scholl, Bonnet, Manuel, Rochat, Burnier, Grandpierre, &c., and even those of Malan, the dogmatiser *par excellence*, &c. (we only quote a few of those who wrote before the appearance of *La Mystique*), and we shall see if M. Astié is not unjust in attacking the theology of those servants of Christ in *such terms*, that we might think they had "crucified afresh the Lord of glory." In short, if the intellectualism of these men be a "monster which must be run down," "a virus," &c., by what name shall we call the rationalism of the Chenevières and the Coquerels, which is still as insipid as it was thirty years ago? No; it is not loyal to envelop under one and the same designation two theologies so diametrically opposed to each other. M. Astié had already shewn, as early as

1854, this partiality, to the prejudice of the orthodox party, and in favour of M. Schérer, whose errors he can now point out so clearly. We have not forgotten that, eight years ago, the famous treatise published by M. Schérer, in which he gave his demission ("La Critique et la Foi"), contained "fertile elements, which, by their combination and their ponderation, were to land us in new dogmatic formulas," (M. Schérer, his Disciples, &c., p. 33). And when M. Schérer spoke to us of his historical Christ," when he declared that the Scriptures "hold a principal place in the life of the church and of believers, so that, in order to see the Lord himself, we must have recourse to the biblical writings," M. Astié, completely reassured, asked the orthodox party, "Is that not enough?" And when M. Schérer wrote "that inspiration was not something mechanical, supernatural, as it is generally conceived to be, and that the action of the Holy Spirit on the apostles was not of a different nature from what every believer has the right to expect, and ought to desire," M. Astié saw in this theory "*not the absolute rejection of inspiration, but only of M. Gaussen's theory of plenary inspiration,*" (p. 32). And again, he coolly asked the orthodox, "What more do you want?"

Let us therefore be on our guard with an author whose judgment has already belied him in such a degree (and his new book contains the avowal of it), and let neither the talent with which he expounds his subject, nor his raciness, nor his imagination (particularly in the use of military terms), nor his independence of thought, deceive us regarding his conclusions. At the same time, let us recognise that if, like every other good and perfect gift, the revival of the beginning of the century came down from the Father of lights, the golden-headed image had clay feet. Thus let us recognise with Adolphe Monod, that the Reformation "is truly the epoch of the written word, and in a less degree that of the living Word, not "that the Holy Spirit and the person of Jesus Christ were not contemplated and proclaimed by the Reformers, but they were not in the same degree as the authority of the Scriptures," (La Parole Vivante, p. 50). As for the revival, let us repeat, with Dr Bonnet of Frankfort, that "at the beginning the revival threw itself into a very excusable opposition,—into a dogmatism evidently too narrow to embrace the whole of divine truth, too superficial to reach down into the depths of the soul, too exclusive not to require assent to certain formulas as the absolute condition of salvation." But let us also repeat, with the same writer, that the revival has had "men of God, courageous witnesses for the truth, who have suffered for their faith, and that the church of God loves and reveres them," (La Parole et la Foi, p. 6).

C. D. F.

ART. VIII.—*The Controversy on the Alleged Platonism of the Fathers.**

FIRST DIVISION :

SOUVERAIN'S EXPOSURE OF THE PLATONISM OF THE FATHERS.

THE author of these pages, in the course of inquiries which bore reference to the influence of Plato, his system, and his school, on after times, was led among other things to investigate somewhat more accurately the literature, dating chiefly from the 17th and 18th centuries, occasioned by the well-known controversy regarding the alleged Platonism of the fathers. In the following article he will attempt to give a historico-critical review of the substance of this literature, which is highly remarkable in more than one respect : believing that he may assume, at the outset, that this literature has not merely a scientific value and importance generally, but that a more exact knowledge of it must have a high interest in the present state of science respecting it.

The investigation into the influence, which an important philosophical system has often exercised long after the epoch of its first appearance, may certainly be regarded, in most cases, as a task highly thankworthy and instructive ; and in the case of no second philosopher whatever can such an undertaking claim so intense an interest, as in the case of Plato. In Plato's case, again, the whole history of his indirect influence furnishes no second chapter which, in many ways, would be at once so instructive and interesting, as that of his relation to the Fathers. The reason of this is the historical importance of the two parties in question—the Fathers and the Platonic ideas,—especially considering the abundance of writings which have compared the two together, to shew sometimes their agreement, sometimes their divergence.

Again, in this department of literature, the writings which sprung from the controversy referred to occupy a peculiar place. They differ in a most important respect from most of the previous works on the same subject in this respect, that they owe their origin to an attempt, which, not content with establishing the agreement between Platonic and patristic thoughts, though this had been most fully done, thought

* This article, translated from the *Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie*, is from the pen of Dr Von Stein, Lecturer on the History of Philosophy at Göttingen.—Ed. B. & F. E. K.

that a real relation of dependence between the two parties, a dependence of the fathers on Platonism, could be historically demonstrated in the boldest way. This dependence was alleged to have extended not merely to subordinate sides of the patristic thoughts, but also in a particular manner to their deepest foundations. This alleged dependence, therefore, affected not the fathers alone, but the Christian Church in general; and not the science of theologians alone, but the Christian faith itself directly. No wonder, therefore, that such an assertion was taken up with the liveliest zeal by friend and foe. It seemed certainly to throw quite a new light both upon the first beginnings of the history of the Christian Church, and upon its relation to Platonism in particular. At all events, men were thus removed, as by a stroke, from the study of the earlier comparisons, all more or less fruitless and idle, and placed in the midst of a controversy breaking out with the greatest energy, the intense form of which one would easily comprehend of itself, even had there not been certain contemporaneous tendencies which co-operated to whet the interests concerned in it: for example, the humanistic efforts at its commencement, and the anti-trinitarian efforts subsequently. By the combined action of such influences, there necessarily ensued a very keen controversial development, which had a corresponding extensive and manifold literature. It belonged to the scribbling and controversial character of these times, indeed, that men often returned to the discussion of our question when it was not absolutely necessary, and hastened to give their decision regarding it in works of the most diverse kind, in histories of doctrine and in systematic theologies, in expositions of Plato, of Holy Scripture, and of the fathers, in histories of the old and of the Christian philosophy, and finally, in histories of civilization, and in histories of the Jewish people, which at that time made their appearance in great numbers.

The phenomenon in more modern literature, on the other hand, the entire casting into the background of the subject formerly discussed with so much diligence, cannot quite speak in favour of modern science. In most of the writings relating to this subject, there are still paraded the names of that older literature, but without gaining any proper influence on the representation itself. That the most of these writings are rather named than known by many of the more recent writers, is shewn by the general allusions, stiffened almost to standing formulæ, referring to that older literature. And even the subject discussed has been commonly neglected more than is right. If the question respecting the alleged Platonism of the fathers was formerly discussed with an unmistakeable prefer-

ence, a considerable dislike of entering upon the question not unfrequently now betrays itself; and it is almost as if the difficulties of this question were seen for the first time in their full extent, and men were afraid of undertaking a task, for the accomplishment of which they do not feel themselves qualified at all points. We cannot otherwise, at least, explain the strange circumstance, that at present he who seeks information often finds himself carried round in a circle, referred from one department to another, from one writer to another. Thus, for example, the history of ancient philosophy in many a writer hands over the question to the history of Christian philosophy; this again leaves the task to the history of doctrines, which, again, not unfrequently points out the histories of philosophy as the place where a clearing-up of Plato's relation to the fathers is to be sought. Even on the part of writers, with whom this fault, at least, does not occur, the treatment is often, for other reasons, not more satisfactory. Moreover, apart from all other circumstances, there has been a hindrance partly in the real advances of scientific development itself, on account of which our question has not always been regarded, in recent times, according to its due. Of this last category, which is unquestionably the most important of all, we may be allowed to mention but two particulars, and these belonging directly to the history of philosophy only, to which, however, analogies may easily be added from other departments, which come under consideration in our question.

In the history of Christian philosophy, then, it cannot be mistaken, that among other things there have been two steps of progress made in its domain, which have contributed to the diminished consideration of the relation between Plato and the fathers. Men have now begun to grasp the idea of patristic philosophy far more fully, more profoundly, more independently than formerly; and they are now inclined to assign to the Stoa a peculiar relation to the self-developing Christian science. Now, both things must in themselves be unquestionably considered as an advance, as compared with the twofold one-sidedness, according to which the history of Christian philosophy was formerly understood, as mainly but the consideration of the influences alleged to be exercised by the ancient philosophy upon the Christian world; and we were still further inclined to trace back these influences to but the one source of Platonism. Nevertheless these two steps of progress have been gained not unfrequently by nothing but misapprehensions in the entire direction in which our question lies. Since the time when men were accustomed to look on the Christian philosophy not merely as an indirect influence of the ancient philosophy reaching over into the Christian world, but rather as a formation which had

in a certain sense grown indigenously on Christian soil, our question necessarily lost somewhat of its old significance. It appeared henceforth as but a question of mere external significance, while formerly it had betokened really the principal matter with which the historian of patristic philosophy had to do. And under this supposition the second thing might easily happen. Men might ask with a certain fondness after influences of the Stoa on the Christian world, without considering how deeply the Platonic influences have penetrated, and how Platonic elements not unfrequently obtained a footing for themselves through the medium of Stoic influences. We mean, it was natural that men should come just to new half-truths as opposed to the two earlier one-sided opinions. Nevertheless, it is clear on the other side, that in this way they did injury both to the truth in general, and to the subject itself. For they would have been able to place on a far firmer footing the definition of the idea of the patristic philosophy as well as the estimate of the Stoic influence, if they had not at the same time neglected to image to themselves the influence of the Platonic philosophy on the Christian world in its whole extent.

The hints just given will suffice to shew the chief motives at least, why the author has considered it not a work of supererogation to recal attention to that old, and in many respects antiquated, literature. Let him be permitted to say only further a brief word on the ARRANGEMENT of the following essay. It is one determined BY MATTER, and not chronologically conducted. It is only by the first method that unavoidable repetitions are to be avoided. With this view the author has put at the head of his inquiry the discussion of a book, which certainly has to be regarded as by no means the very earliest book in the literature of the controversy, but which is well fitted in a twofold point of view to introduce us to the first bearings of the controversy.

The book with which we are to make a beginning in the following investigations is the well-known, or rather notorious work of Nic. Souverain, which bears the title, *le Platonisme dévoilé, ou essai touchant le verbe Platonicien Divisé en deux parties*, printed professedly à Cologne chez Pierre Marteau, MDCC., but in reality at Amsterdam, and which, besides appearing in French, appeared likewise in an English edition. The book was at the time of its appearance loaded by its opponents with the bitterest censure, and circulated by its friends with astonishing rapidity over the widest area. Though it was usually reckoned even in Brucker's time among the rarer books, and though it might thus for a good while have been little enough read, towards the conclusion of last century the revival of tendencies akin to Souverain's stand-point gave occasion to a translation of it by

Löffler, the General Superintendent at Gotha, which reached two editions, quickly following each other.*

The author, whose name appears neither in the original French edition, nor upon the title-page of the English one which appeared contemporaneously, was not alive when his work was published. He would hardly have sent it forth in the form now before us. For his design was, in addition to the two sections of his investigation, which alone have been communicated to us, to have subjoined a *third*, as a reply to the decisive question, *What is the divinity which the Holy Scriptures ascribe to Jesus Christ?*

As to the authorship of this book, which made so much noise, people remained in the dark for some considerable time after its appearance. As it appeared from the advertisement of his French editor, that he himself was no longer living, literary curiosity soon confined itself to the wish to ascertain the person of the latter. In some quarters the guess fell with tolerable confidence on Clericus; but as Clericus was in a position to throw off this suspicion from himself with convincing reasons, people generally were never able to discover the person of the editor. Instead of this, Clericus first, then Bayle and Prosper Marchand, assigned as the author of it, Souverain, a preacher, a native of Lower Languedoc, who had been stationed in the province of Poitou, and who had been deposed because of his openly avowed Arminian tendencies, and then had gone to Holland and England to obtain finally, an appointment in the Episcopal Church, to which meanwhile he had gone over. This is all that we know with certainty about Souverain. With respect to his personal character, testimony is certainly borne to him by the enthusiastic praise which his French editor has awarded to him in his advertisement; but considering the thoroughly partial character of the latter, it would be unjustifiable to pretend to build anything upon it. In a literary way, Souverain has not made himself further known; for it is an error widespread indeed, yet often refuted formerly, to hold Souverain as the author of another book which appeared in 1706 under the title, *Les raisons des Scripturaires*, the object and spirit of which were of a character very much akin to Souverain.

First of all, the CONTENTS of the book easily explain the sensation produced by it. For it promised proof of this point,

* An Essay on the Platonism of the Fathers, (*Versuch über den Platonismus der Kirchenväter*, &c.), translated from the French, and accompanied by a Preface and Remarks, by J. F. C. Löffler. Züllichan & Freystadt. 1st edition, 1782; 2d edition, supplemented by a Treatise, which contains a short representation of the way in which the doctrine of the Trinity originated, 1792.

that some of the most essential elements of positive revelation have unfairly gained a place in the system of the church-teachers, and thus won their way into the general faith of Christians. "Error is the mother of mysteries," is an axiom of the author, to which indeed he gives expression only once, and then only by the way, but it must be designated as properly the ultimate point of view.*

The proper GROUND-THOUGHTS OF GENUINE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE are alleged to have been the two following: First of all, with reference to the Trinity, the author remarks, that nothing else, nothing deeper or more significant, can be meant by the Word or by the Spirit, both of which are mentioned in Holy Scripture in reference to *God*, than a distinct ECONOMY of God; that by the one is meant his outward mode of revelation and manifestation, and by the other his inward communication. And then he remarks, secondly, in reference to CHRIST, that the latter is called God by genuine Christians in no other sense than with respect either to his birth or his dignity; i. e., as the author explains it more precisely, either because he was conceived in a supernatural way by the Holy Ghost, and born of a virgin, or because, after his life and death, he was exalted by God to be a Lord over all.

Christ was born in a supernatural way, and Christ was exalted to be a Lord over all. These are the two points on which the author lays a strong emphasis, and which he seems to have regarded as simply inalienable from a Christian consciousness. But beyond these two points he certainly is not inclined to extend, as he calls it, the Godhead of Christ one hairbreadth. Nay, as he declaims most violently against those who had distinguished several persons in the Godhead, he declaims not less strongly against every theology which had attributed Godhead to Christ in any other way than in the twofold respect just alleged. According to this view he finds the true orthodoxy of the Christians of primitive times standing exactly between two extremes equally reprehensible and heretical—that which made Christ a mere man, though ever so holy, and that which made him the Supreme God absolutely. And it is this orthodoxy, as the author thinks, which will be found expressed in the most sublime and ancient monument of the Christian Church—the apostles' creed; inasmuch as it calls Christ the only begotten Son of God, for this reason that he was conceived of the Virgin Mary through the Holy Ghost. His birth is consequently here described as making him God; and he is described as made our Lord because he has risen from

* We omit here the delineation of Souverain's laboured and desperate attempts to establish his Arian or Socinian views from Scripture.—ED. B. & F. E. E.

the dead and ascended to heaven, from whence he will come again as judge : his obedience and his virtue are thus alleged to have exalted him to this high dignity. These are the two fundamental articles in which, he alleges, the proper Christology of the ancients consisted, so far as it was genuine. Between these articles, however, the author makes a not important distinction. He assigns, for his own part, a far greater value to the second of these two articles than to the first, to the Godhead "acquired" by Christ, than to the Godhead "born with him." Christ never appealed to his supernatural birth, but only to the miracles which he did. Just as little did the apostles do so ; but, instead of it, gave prominence to the resurrection and redemption of Christ. Not once has Paul done so, in the many passages in which he insists on faith in the redemption of Christ as a thing necessary to our salvation. "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth that Jesus is Lord, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." On this last article, accordingly, as its most important article, the true theology of the ancients turns.

It is in the PROOF here subjoined that the weakness of the author's undertaking becomes specially manifest. Under cover of an extraneous authority, he only ventures to bring forward his own view ; that is, on the basis of a remark made by Pearson, yet in such a way that he insensibly changes it into a quite different sense from that in which its author had originally understood it. The latter had, on the occasion of his well-known investigations respecting the age of the Ignatian epistles, attempted a pretty sharply-marked antithesis between the character of the oldest development of doctrine in the Christian Church, and that of a somewhat later epoch, with no other design in view than to obtain a firm resting-place for fixing the age of the Ignatian epistles. And it is this remark of Pearson's which the author adduces with so much parade, as an irrefragable support and authority for a part of his views. "Ignatius," so Pearson had expressed himself (*Vindic. Ignat.* p. ii., cap. 1.), "belongs to those who called Jesus Christ God (*qui theologon*), as the Catholics of this time did, inasmuch as, according to Pliny's report, they sang hymns to Jesus as a God, and, according to the remark of an eminent writer (apud *Euseb. Hist. Eccl.* 5, 28), celebrated the praise of Jesus Christ, the Logos of God, by ascribing Godhead to him. But after the doctrine of Plato was received into the church, the writers of the second and third century were no longer accustomed to speak so simply of Christ, *i. e.*, to call him God simply. This mode of speaking of Jesus Christ savours, therefore, quite of the century of Ignatius, because he calls him God simply. Photius makes it a reproach against Clemens Romanus, that

he has not given to Jesus Christ this sublime title, which so rightly belongs to him. And hence it is evident, that this learned critic believed that the custom of calling Jesus Christ God was peculiar to the first age of the church. Consequently the name God ascribed to Jesus Christ, which Ignatius so often repeats, and without any of those definitions of which his successors made use, and quite nakedly and simply, is a proof for the antiquity of his writings. He imitates throughout the epistles of Paul, which were accepted generally by all churches from the very beginning. There is nothing in his letters which savours of heathen learning, nothing which would be unworthy the simplicity of an apostolic man, and of the purity of the gospel. The writers that followed were accustomed to borrow thoughts from the heathen, and to mix their doctrines sometimes with the Christian religion. In this every one followed the principles, the philosophy, in which he had been instructed before the reception of Christianity, as, *e. g.*, Tertullian. Ignatius, on the contrary, was a bishop long before, and had gone over to Christianity at a time when as yet few heathen men of learning had become Christians. We have thus in him a pure Christian, a Christian who was not educated in the schools, who had skimmed over no libraries, who was not instructed in the dogmas of the Academy, or of the Stoa."

One may doubt whether the way in which Souverain alleges this remark of Pearson, in order to play behind its shelter his own quite different game, can be regarded as within the limits of scientific honesty and truthfulness. For he first assumes the appearance of thoroughly coinciding with Pearson, and only asserting what the latter has already taught before him. He calls the remark of Pearson a beautiful and correct one, the correct thought of a learned Trinitarian. But the addition, "He has therein spoken the truth, without himself reflecting on it," forms the easy transition to a piece of conduct on the part of the author, in which he outwardly maintains Pearson's authority, yet deviates from him in almost all single points. We do not dwell on the fact that Souverain obviously drops entirely the ultimate and proper point of view from which Pearson had been originally led to his remark. Pearson had sought to make that characteristic distinction between separate epochs of the church's progress, merely with a view to arrive at a resting-place in determining the age of the Ignatian epistles. The author, while transferring Pearson's remark into a connection different from its original one, has partly altered and partly abandoned its meaning. Pearson thought he saw a distinction betwixt the earlier and the later Christians, in the fact that the one party called Christ God simply, while

the other (from the force of preconceived opinions brought with them from heathenism) would have done this only with Platonizing restrictions and definitions. But we find that the author endeavours to twist this well-defined relationship into the very opposite. He wishes, indeed, to have a distinction betwixt an earlier and a later epoch in the doctrinal conception of Christ recognised. But, according to him, it is not to lie in the fact that the earlier Christians had attributed Godhead to Christ in a more unlimited, and the later in a more restricted, way. On the contrary, the old and genuine Christianity, he alleges, rather consisted in the fact that they made Christ God merely in the two respects mentioned ; while the later Platonists among the Christians, on the contrary, as he alleges, believed they were not able to go far enough in their deifying conceptions of Christ. The difference between Pearson's assertion and that of the author is thus real enough ; and yet the author endeavours to substitute the one for the other. And that difference between these two conceptions cannot at all be concealed in detail, as soon as the author comes to carry out his view respecting the separate points. For while Pearson approves of the observation made by Photius, that the more ancient period called Christ God simply, and while Photius's censure of Clement, on the ground of this remark, seems to have been approved by Pearson, Souverain rather opposes Pearson's views in both respects. He defends Clement in spite of the fact, that he concedes that the latter spoke of Christ only "as a God," but not as God himself. Or rather this latter circumstance is just what leads him to his defence of Clement against Photius. He rejects, moreover, the assertion, that it was the usage of ancient times to call Christ God simply ; and although he cannot deny that Ignatius speaks in this way of Christ, he sees in this nothing but a fully isolated peculiarity of that time. He rejects, consequently, the testimony of Pliny too, to which Pearson had also appealed. And thus the author proceeds from one thing to another, rejecting the separate parts and grounds of Pearson's assertion, until the reader, utterly confounded, at length asks himself, why he still continues in apparent agreement with Pearson's view, while in reality, in almost all points, he deviates from it. The riddle, however, is solved, as soon as we think of the last part of Pearson's assertion. The somewhat exaggerated attack which Pearson makes on the later times, accusing them of having mingled the heathen dogma with the Christian religion, is the reason why he will not give up the authority of Pearson, however much he deviates from it in detail. For in that he has before him the proper ground-thesis of his whole work ; and no wonder, therefore, if he will not part with an authoritative testimony so respectable in regard to it. Accordingly he pro-

nounces, in regard to Pearson's passage: "We have here a confession, which frees the heretics once for all from the fearful authority of the Platonic fathers, with which they were continually assailed. The fathers who have written since Ignatius, says Pearson, the teachers of the second century, are accustomed to borrow their thoughts from the heathen, and to commingle their dogmas with the Christian religion itself." "And what follows from this? This namely, that the fathers of the second and third century,—a Justin, an Athenagoras, a Theophilus, an Irenæus, a Clement of Alexandria, a Tertullian, an Origen, &c., all the fathers, in a word, who have written after Ignatius, have mingled the heathen dogma with the Christian religion; and, consequently, these fathers cannot be listened to as upright witnesses of the Christian faith. Thus these fathers cannot be regarded otherwise than as half heathens. Thus the heretics cannot be beaten with their authority; and hence one must bring back the controversy respecting the Godhead of Christ to the conception which the fathers of the first century give of it, because these had not skimmed over libraries, because they were not instructed in the principles of the Academy and of the Stoa. In short, everything that is removed from the simplicity and purity of this first century must be regarded as a heathen dogma."

This, we now see, was the real interest which bound the author to the passage of Pearson, on which he founded. He exaggerates it still more in some respects, and then uses it as a shield, behind which he supposes he may with impunity direct his accusation of Platonism against the later Christian writers. And an attack of this kind against the primitive church itself, is hazarded only because he aims to ward off, by means of it, an attack on himself as immediately at hand. The heretics who in any way controvert or diminish the Godhead of Christ, are no longer to be beaten, and can no longer be beaten by the authority of the fathers. This is the proper and real application which the author makes of that remark of Pearson. To be able to do this, at his expense, the author adheres so obstinately to his authority, however many may be the ways in which he deviates from his view in detail.

The author subjoins, indeed, to that appeal to Pearson which we have been noticing, some independent observation, by means of which he thinks he can justify and establish those more restricted conceptions respecting the Godhead of Christ, which he has brought before us in what has been already noticed. But in reality they no more prove what Souverain wishes to prove by them, than they enter into the proper course of our special inquiry. They are all brought forward to some extent under the protection of the previous mark of Pearson;

so that their best support is already withdrawn, as soon as one has disposed of that. On this account we may here state with all brevity, that the author's additional arguments for this thesis, that Christ was called God only in the two respects specified, and specially for the reference to his exaltation, have been taken for the most part from discussions on the Christological expressions of the apostolic fathers, the meaning of the oldest creeds, and the confessions of the martyrs. Besides this, however, the author reflects still farther on the rejection with which the church is said to have visited not only those who wished to hold Christ to be a mere man, but those too who identified him at once with the supreme God. But with all these arguments he appears to have served his cause no better, than with that opening appeal to Pearson. Everywhere we miss the justification of that decisive *only*, on which, however, everything depends. That Christ was called God by the ancient Christians *only* on account of the two considerations specified, that is the point for which we have to demand proof from the author, a debt which he has yet to pay.

When we pass to the *second point*, the *character of the Platonic system* given by the author, we must first of all prefix a threefold objection to the whole. In part it is the same as that which must be adduced against the author's work in general, as to the want of arrangement of materials; in part it refers to the incompleteness with which he is chargeable in his representation; thirdly, to the complete absence of what can be called an independent investigation of sources. For first, as to the passages of his confusedly arranged book, in which he advances his views respecting Plato, we are at once referred to sects. 5-7, 9, and 12, of the first book; but we cannot suppose his whole view represented by these, as a series of separate observations scattered over the author's whole work must be taken along with us for its more precise explanation, and yet these are often much fitted to afford us a deeper insight into his proper tendencies. Then if we examine the completeness of the explanations thus adduced generally, and apply to this examination the measure of the Platonic system authentically ascertained, we are surprised that few elements of the latter have been taken into consideration by the author. For, to speak more definitely, it is really only a single doctrine of the Platonic theology, with the consequences immediately derived from it, on which the author lays stress, in the interest of his aim. Plato's so called doctrine of the three principles, and his Logos doctrine, which is alleged to be the favourite doctrine of the philosopher, are the only two points closely connected with each other to which the author in his proofs constantly returns. And although he takes occasion to designate the exposition of

these two points as a "development of the Platonic system," yet he is far from bringing forward the system in its true organic connection, and he only in some measure gives a review of it. Instead of this he always works with those two completely isolated parts. Even these, and this is the third point, to which we wished from the beginning to draw attention, he seems scarcely to have drawn from an independent view of the Platonic dialogues, as he always appeals as often as he quotes them, only to sources of a derived kind, at second and third hand; *i. e.*, for the most part only to the fathers, referring occasionally to Plato; and for the latter frequently only to the learned representations which have Plato or the fathers for their subject. That the author had ever examined a single dialogue of Plato itself, could hardly be proved from his own work. On this account not a few of his assertions fall to pieces of themselves, as soon as they are compared with the authentic sources of the Platonic philosophy. In part they could not possibly have existed without the confusion and displacement which must befall the Platonic ideas by such a way of passing from hand to hand. It is only in this way, *i. e.*, as mixed by the medium of transmission on the one hand, and as rent from the connection properly belonging to them on the other, that they could be adduced generally for the object to which the author has applied them.

Souverain begins his *expositions of Platonism* by naming the ultimate and only source of knowledge, from which, as he will have it, not only Plato, but the ancient philosophers generally must have drawn. It has been said, he remarks, of the most celebrated philosophers of antiquity, that they had heard the voice of God in nature; and on this point Clement once directly ventured on the expression, that the ancient philosophers in their view of the universe, had listened to Moses himself as their teacher. According to the author's exposition both statements mean nothing but this, that they were able to philosophise correctly on it, in the way of mere rational knowledge, and without participation in any other revelation than that afforded (Rom. i. 20) by the works of creation. There is therefore, says he, no sufficient warrant for placing the ancient philosophers, though it has been often done, in any relation whatever to the sources of the positive revelation of the old covenant. It was not by tradition, but merely by their own reflection that they must be supposed to have arrived at the possession of their results. And while the author repeats the observation of Graverol, (from his "*Moses vindicatus*," p. 89), that "everything that is said respecting the origin of philosophy among the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Greeks, is a very uncertain tradition;" he draws from the remark this inference, that

everything which we meet in the Grecian philosophy is the fruit of its own speculation and experience. Hence, at the beginning he holds a supposition which must prove itself as highly decisive in the farther course of his investigation; a supposition which might perhaps be regarded by most in our time as self-evident, but of which the same thing cannot be said in the author's time. We cannot mistake the fact too in regard to the author himself, that he could scarce do otherwise agreeably to all his other designs, than take up his position to this one supposition in the way specified. This whole undertaking goes in the very opposite direction from that taken by all who thought of referring Plato's philosophy in particular, and the ancient philosophy generally, to the sources of the old covenant. For while the latter attempt to claim back, as it were, the deeper and greater truths of the Platonic philosophy, and assign them to positive revelation, the other, on the contrary, aims to resolve the integral parts of positive revelation into the results of philosophic speculation. Souverain's immediate task in such circumstances can therefore only consist in shewing by what natural and easily intelligible transitions, according to him, it must have come to this development, that the ancient philosophers were brought to teach "a certain kind of trinity," in their doctrine of the three principles.

For this object the author remarks, in the first place, that there would be no other question, so soon as men began to philosophise at all, which would be so natural to the mind as just the question, Whether the world always existed, or whether it came into being? Next came eventually the second question, How and by whom was the world made? In regard to both questions there must therefore have been framed comparatively soon an answer which would harmonise at least generally. For although some few, agreeably to the system of Ocellus Lucanus, believed in an eternal world, the majority and the more enlightened, on the other hand, asserted with Timæus of Locris the coming into being (*Gewordensein*) of the world. With equal harmony men soon arrived at the opinion that the world could not possibly be the work of chance or of a blind principle, and not the product of the universal reason, or of an animating spirit shed abroad upon it. To this view Thales, Hermetismus, and Anaxagoras already rose, as they recognised a spirit who arranges matter, and clothes it with its various forms. Socrates next went a step farther, as he would have the Spirit ruling the world to be regarded as only the Son of the Supreme God, and distinguished the latter again from the former. And finally, Plato gave to this system its greatest possible perfection, by the fact that he described the world with all impressiveness as the product of infinite goodness and wisdom and

power, and accordingly spoke of a God, who is supremely good. One he called the Father, supremely wise; another he called the Reason or the Word, and supremely powerful; another he called the Spirit or the Soul of the world; and in this way the whole system had reached its complete compass, its most finished character, and that degree of completeness which could not be overstepped and carried farther but at the expense of the subject itself. For if the problem were to reckon up these fundamental attributes of the divine nature, which would be the ruling and descriptive one for its relation to the world, these were exhausted by the three specified. By these the whole idea of God, drawn from creation and with respect to the creation, is absolutely complete, and a sound speculation and philosophy therefore could make no correct addition to what had already been observed on the stand-point represented by Plato. But, on the other hand, the germ of error and of misunderstanding which subsequently arose from it lay from the first in Platonism itself, or at least in the mode of representation of which it availed itself. For instead of speaking of the three attributes of the divine nature, through whose association the world was said to be produced, Plato had found it necessary to introduce three separate divine persons, three separate Gods; nay, aiming to explain the definite relation of these three to one another, he had skilfully devised a sort of divine genealogy, a Father, and a Son begotten by him, and a third sprung from them both, so that his whole cosmogony, under such circumstances, had insensibly been transformed into a complete theogony. Plato, either because he feared the fate of Socrates, and had not the courage to set himself in opposition to the manifest error of the established religion, accommodated himself to the then prevalent fashionable philosophy, which made a separate God out of every attribute, virtue, passion, or perhaps from pedagogic condescension, because he had the good intention of causing the people insensibly to make an exchange so advantageous for themselves, that is, of substituting in the room of gross polytheism the separate attributes of the true and supreme God—from one of these motives, or perhaps from both combined, Plato had been induced to give to his doctrine of the three divine attributes a personifying garb, and thus to envelop the great truths discovered by him in a cloud of fictions and enigmas, which might all too easily become a snare to his disciples. The latter soon took in a proper sense what he would have understood only as allegorical fiction. They understood simply as three distinct persons what Plato had originally meant as three attributes of one and the same person, and as factors of one common influence. They therefore made a further separation of these three

persons from one another, assuming, first of all, a supreme God, to whom the two others owe homage and obedience, because he is their Father and Creator; next, a visible servant of the invisible God, or Creator of the world of sense; thirdly, the world itself, or the soul animating the world, to which some assign the name of Demon. From this change it is at once seen how much the author aims from the first to frame what he remarks respecting the Platonic teachers to be as analogous as possible to what comes afterwards to be considered in regard to the Christian teachers.*

However, the proper POINT OF CONTACT which *Plato's doctrine*, according to the author, must have had with CHRISTIAN THOUGHT is not yet exhibited in the foregoing statement. It comes to light rather in the LOGOS DOCTRINE of Plato, which is directly developed from the foregoing theory. By the Logos, Plato understands his second God, of whom we have already heard that he is described as the visible servant of the invisible God, who creates the world, and is elsewhere called the Word, the Understanding, the Reason of God. But we have not yet heard that in regard to this λόγος Plato again makes a highly important distinction, a distinction which has always a retrospective reference to God, but at one time it is in a far more indirect way than at another. Either he understands by this Logos the sum-total, comprised in God's bosom from eternity, of all the perfections, ideas, and forms of created things, and this Logos the later Platonists called the inner, spiritual, the eternal, and hence the derived, Logos; or he understands by it the so-called derived and more outward Logos, i. e., that substance and material which God produced and generated from his bosom when he was about to make the world. From this we evidently see that the Logos on the two occasions appears in a really different character. At one time it means the world of ideas present in the understanding of God; at another time, the matter of the actual world. On both occasions, as will be granted with the greatest readiness on this supposition, it has as little in common with the Johannine

* It may here be noticed, in passing, that the author thinks he is able to extract from the right conception of the Socratic demon an essential confirmation of his views. Behind it he descries nothing else but the proper genius of Socrates himself, reason attentively consulted and nature rightly understood. Making these suppositions, the Socratic demon may therefore appear also as a manifest instance of the fact that the ancients must have treated the commonest things theologically, i. e., have found gods everywhere. "The philosophers use a mysterious and theological language: we must not be misled by such high-sounding words, and make a venerable mystery of a mere allegory." Thus the author expresses himself generally, even at page 55, and fully at page 190, with special reference to Plato: "One will be a good Platonist generally only when we do not forget that Plato is to be understood allegorically."

Logos as two things can have which bear the same name. The Johannine *λόγος* means the revelation of God most perfectly made in Christ; the Platonic Logos means either the ideal world, according to which the second God made the actual world, or the matter out of which he made it. And yet it is just at this point that the Platonic thoughts are said to have been transferred to the Christian world. Yet men have allowed themselves, it is alleged, to be deceived by the apparent similarity of the one word *λόγος*, to interweave with each other circles of thought which had radically nothing in common with each other.

Before we proceed farther on the road thus indicated, it will be appropriate first to take a view of that summary in which the author has collected all that is to be gathered from the writings of the Platonists important for this later age. He gives it at p. 110, starting from the thought that from the first the thoughts of the Platonists have many ways fallen into confusion and misunderstanding with each other. *ORIGINALLY three systems of this philosophy*, really separated from each other, may be distinguished, having mainly but this in common, that they all teach the Trinity taught by them in regard to the creation, and for the rest may be characterised as the theological, the allegorical, and the physical systems. The first of these three systems distinguishes the first God as Father, or the divine Understanding begetting the ideas from the world of ideas designated as the Son, which is the *λόγος* immediately begotten by the Father, and internal to the Father, and from the sensible and visible world, or rather from the spirit and soul of the latter, which may be regarded as a creation produced from the other two, because the visible world receives its form from ideas, and its life from God. The allegorical system, on the other hand, conceives in the second God, or in the Logos, a trinity of attributes in regard to the creation, inasmuch as the Logos is regarded as the sum-total of that supreme Goodness, and marvellous Wisdom, and infinite Power, by the common co-operation of which the universe is said to have been made. The third system, designated the physical, distinguishes, in regard to the world, first an efficient Cause, *i. e.*, a Creator and Father, who is also called the inner Logos; then, secondly, matter, which has subsisted from eternity in that first Originator, and is said to have proceeded from him by means of a *προβολή*, or emanation, as the derived Logos; thirdly, a derived form, or the animated world, which is the result of the foregoing two. In this way we have before us from the first three varieties, distinct in character from one another, of one and the same ground thought. That God made the world of mere goodness, with wisdom and power, forming it out of

matter according to the pattern of the ideal world, is the simple Platonic kernel, which has parted into the three directions specified, just as the expression *λογος* was taken differently, or the three prominent factors were counted in the one way or the other. But even that multiplicity of conceptions thus obtained was formed again into a larger number by combinations, and for a double reason, viz., as it was attempted to carry out one of these three systems purely by itself, or to combine it with the other two; or, again, as men gave themselves up to the grosser or to the more refined Platonism, i. e., either took the personifications, meant to be only allegorical, in the proper sense or not. From all these combinations we see distinctly enough that, according to the author's representation, Platonism is thought to have been a dark and immensely ambiguous mass, out of which we may suppose much might be drawn, into which much might be put. It is to him the unknown factor with which he works, and which he needs in right earnest, if it is to be explained how he could frequently reach results so totally different from the ordinary representation.

After having thus far developed the manner in which the author represents to himself genuine Christianity on the one hand, and original Platonism on the other, while the two had not yet come in contact with each other, we proceed now to the proper *central point* of our whole inquiry, to shew, *thirdly*, according to the author's statements, the precise way in which the *contact of the two* took place, and the *results* to which it is said to have led. As to this point, we shall be in a position most advantageously to arrange and exhibit the material adduced by the author, and scattered over his whole work, if we distribute it under the *three* following points of view: the *time* at which the author supposes that fatal irruption of Platonism on the Christian world to have taken place; the *inner cause* which facilitated it; the *dogmatic results* said to have been reached in this way. In all these points of view, we are compelled to notice soon enough, first, the daring assertions of the author taken generally; their comprehensive and far-reaching nature; and next, their slender foundation. Platonism is said to have forced its way into the Christian world from the earliest times downward, it is said to have carried the greatest desolations in its train, and to have placed the church in a really lamentable condition. Its poison is said to have touched by far the larger majority of the fathers, to have thoroughly infected some, and to have left absolutely few untouched. Thus there is ascribed to Platonism an important part in universal history, a decisive influence on the dogmatic formation of the Christian Church, such as has never perhaps again been asserted for Platonism to the same extent.

There have been, doubtless, more extravagant, and in words, more enthusiastic, examples of *πλατωνισμῶς*; but rarely has an absolute enthusiasm for Plato so attempted to discover itself in cold blood, and to move entirely under the mask of historic objectivity, as in this case. It is true this overestimate of Plato really asserts but the second place in the interest of the author; it is but a means to an end in the agitation directed against the ecclesiastical conception of the doctrine of the Trinity. In this way he knows how to spread over his unmeasured assertions as to the influence conceded to Plato, an appearance of objective calmness and impartiality, which essentially distinguishes it from the otherwise cognate conceptions of a Ficinus, a Mirandola, and others. How little this appearance rests, however, on the basis of a really cautious, moderate, and correct historical view, we shall soon have an opportunity of convincing ourselves.

For, at the very outset, and with reference to the *first* of the three points which we have specified, this fact in the author's deduction necessarily surprises us, that he can scarce assign an early enough point of time at which the corruption is alleged to have forced its way into the Christian Church. According to his shewing, it has exactly the appearance as if the church of Christ had just got footing in the world, when forthwith the corruption through Platonism, if it did not take place, was decidedly prepared. He seems not to have ventured to extend his accusation to the holy Scripture itself, to the doctrine of Jesus Christ and his apostles contained in it, and to the very oldest creeds of the church drawn up according to the apostolic theology. For the rest, there are left very few among the other parts of Christian doctrinal development, which he would not somehow, though indirectly, place in connection with the Platonising degeneracy of Christianity. First, he designates more than once the age of Hadrian as the turning-point, when Platonism first got the upper hand within the Christian world. He appeals to the expulsion of the Jews and Jewish Christians from Palestine, which took place at this time, and to the contemporaneous filling of the place of the Nazarene bishops, and of such as had come from the school of St James in the metropolitan church of Jerusalem, with men who had come from the heathen Christians. And he reckons both circumstances important enough fully to explain the fact, that just at that time heathen, and especially Platonising thoughts, found admission more readily than ever before into the Christian Church. Accordingly the author fixes the age of Hadrian as that unfortunate epoch when the apostolic tradition was everywhere lost, when the Christian Church lost her virginity, and when the Platonic mischief, instead of apostolic simplicity, forced its way

into her. But if we were perhaps to expect, that he would consider the pre-Hadrianic productions of Christian literature as pure documents of faith in its simplicity, it is by no means so. Rather, as his mention of the Hadrian epoch was meant as but an approximate boundary line, it by no means excludes the existence of *individual examples* of a Platonising Christianity, and of preparations for it, *within the earlier epoch itself*. Ignatius is in this respect the decisive example which we meet in the author's representation. His time is certainly somewhat earlier than that of Hadrian; yet the author thinks himself entitled to charge Ignatius with Platonism, not of the grosser, open, and proper character, but of a refined, latent, and indirect sort. But apart from this single example, the author knows besides a more general characteristic in the earlier Christians themselves, which he brings out as at least a preparation for the Platonising degeneracy which first made its appearance afterwards. This is the prevalence of the allegorical method of exposition, with which we shall afterwards become acquainted, as one of the most essential bridges on which the Platonising spirit was to force its way into Christianity. As far back as allegory among Christians, the author seems willing to suppose a certain predisposition to Platonising among Christians. Barnabas, Hermas, Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp, to whom the author gives the designation, "scholars of the apostles," which is specially intended to contrast these fathers with the later ones as the disciples of Plato, all allegorised, and by means of allegories lost the simplicity of original Christianity, building a bridge for the irruption of Platonism which afterwards took place. It is therefore quite consistent on the author's part, when he does not let these very scholars of the apostles pass wholly without censure, since he reserves for their later followers the so-called disciples of Plato, a censure so unbounded. At all events, we learn from his discussions that there can be but an incomparably small period in his eyes, within which he acknowledges the old genuine Christianity purely held. With the apostles the absolutely pure doctrine was carried to the grave, and immediately after their death that germ of confusion and disturbance is said to exist, which afterwards found its broadest development in a supposed unconditional surrender to Platonism on the part of the fathers. The view which the author has of the history of the ancient church, is thus to be regarded as the worst possible. He names the age of Hadrian as the proper crisis, in which the evil of Platonism came out plain, direct, and in the widest extent; but he will not perhaps have it said that we are not to assume as existing even earlier among Christians, if not the evil itself, yet a decisive preparation for it.

The second question was the INNER CAUSE and the more precise MODE of the production and propagation of the corruption in general. In regard to this it will not be difficult, from what has been already said, to bring out the points which must be treated here. They are clearly in the doctrine of the Trinity and in Christology, according to the author's representations of them both. For according to his opinion, this is the error which must have been committed in reference to the first of the two doctrines: that out of the twofold economy of God, out of his revelation in the word, and his communication through the Holy Ghost, two persons have been made. And further, the error in reference to the second of the two doctrines is said to have consisted in the fact that men were too much occupied with asserting the Godhead of Christ; more precisely, that they were more occupied with the Godhead accruing to Christ through his birth, than with that imparted to him by his exaltation on account of his obedience. Thus they laboured in some measure from two opposite sides towards one common goal; they by degrees accustomed themselves to introduce into the one essence of God a certain plurality of persons, and could only assume as the second of the three persons thus introduced that Christ, about whose supernatural birth they had formerly devoted themselves to excessive speculation. From the concurrence of two errors and exaggerations, thoroughly independent of each other, there followed the whole peculiar form of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity generally, and the belief of the two natures in Christ in particular. And this result could not have been reached thus easily, had there not been a sort of precedent for it in Platonism in a quite analogous way. For in regard to this point, some Platonists had been accustomed long before, to make three divine persons out of three principles or attributes of God, and to take the word *λόγος* in an ambiguous sense, as it were, parallel to the two natures attributed to Christ. Here as there, on the side of Platonism, and on the side of Christianity, the same process in the development of thought had to some extent taken place, and an erroneous development of thought. And as soon as the two sides came in contact with each other generally, they could not fail to strengthen each other in their mutual tendencies, and at length unite. But they could more easily come into contact with each other, as on both sides they used the method of allegory, which was therefore fitted in some measure to be a connecting bond around heathen and Christian thoughts.

We have thus explained briefly the author's plan of operations. And considered generally, no one will venture to withhold the testimony, that it is one not unskilfully contrived, and at all events that it is well considered. Even its complicated

form must not absolutely be made an objection to it, as the separate parts of which it consists are very well connected and calculated for each other. The whole arrangement of the doctrines mentioned, both on the side of the Christian faith and on the side of Platonism, has been so considerably chosen, that the alleged parallel form of the two may appear from the first to be as evident as possible. Christianity teaches one God, in whom revelation and communication may be distinguished from each other as two distinct sides of his economy. Platonism likewise teaches one God, in regard to whom either three divine principles or three divine attributes may be distinguished from each other. Platonism teaches farther a Logos, but has no intention and no ability to go beyond a fatal ambiguity in more closely defining him. And so Christianity endeavours to exhibit him whom she wishes to have understood as identical with the Logos, as uniting in himself a double nature. No wonder then that these two doctrines, outwardly so much the same, should afterwards have really merged into one another. The latter fact is the less surprising, however striking, as Platonism and the Christian faith are alleged to have been misunderstood generally from the first, and in the very same way, by personification too literally understood; and as the allegory used in common is said to have extended over both sides as an intermediate bond, I would almost say, of indefiniteness and ambiguity. In this remark the author indicates what he calls, by technical expressions specially selected for this purpose, the theologising, the *politising* (or *economising*) the allegorising, and the philosophic speculation of the fathers generally, as the links by which the dogmatic results of the later doctrines of the Trinity and the Logos were completed. In the gradual course of these doctrines, each of the activities attributed to the fathers is said to have played its part. To be able to examine the author's views thoroughly, it will therefore be indispensable to trace *all these points in detail*.

The author's disquisition on the use of *allegory* occupies the first place; because allegory is the first common territory on which the author makes Platonism and Christianity meet, and because he has expressed himself more fully and more connectedly on this point than on the others. Allegory is, without question, one of the most important levers with which the author works, because it does not refuse its services to him for the most apparently opposite uses. To unite what appears to him connected, and to separate what he wishes to have parted, he applies the supposition of the allegorical mode of representation, and it suffices for both. If he has either to elevate the thoughts of a party generally, as, *e.g.*, the Gnostics, or to advance them nearer to the mind of the church, allegory discloses,

in the doctrines of this party, a higher sense than originally seemed to be in them. If, on the other hand, he has to detract from the usual authority of a church teacher, he points out the presence of allegory in his writings, the meaning of which, he endeavours to shew, is either extremely doubtful, or else an extremely trivial view. And we cannot be surprised, in fact, that allegory, in the author's hand, can work in this way, when we consider that, at the outset, he takes the idea of allegory in so wide a sense that its application to very heterogeneous objects appears to lie in the very idea of it. "Allegory," as he defines it, with Hugo Grotius, "means every figure of speech, according to which another than the literal sense is connected with any form of expression." This may occur with a double intent; either as a writer wishes, by a higher sense substituted, to conceal the meanness of what is concealed in the expression; or as he thinks he can, by means of the simplicity of the words, reveal more widely a much higher sense. This last kind of allegory may also be called the parable, or mythological statement; and it is that which Christ specially uses, and by the use of which he is said to have facilitated the preaching of his gospel to the poor and to little ones, and to have adapted the highest mysteries to the apprehension of the simple. Just so Pythagoras, for example, made use of it among the heathen; and his doctrine of the transmigration of souls was, according to the author's opinion mentioned once before, nothing but an allegory on the multiform variableness of matter, and on the Spirit shed abroad upon it, and, as it were, pervading it. As distinguished from this, the peculiar situation of the fathers was essentially different. What led to the application of allegory among them, was not that they had wished to exhibit a deeper sense in the simplest possible form. Rather the reverse, that they aimed to lend to a simpler form of expression the appearance of a higher sense. They were, he alleges, ashamed of the cross of their Lord, and took offence at the meanness of the contents of both Testaments, and, above all, of the contents of the gospel. Assailed by the heathen because of their religion, they laid hold of a very fatal means, when they aimed to uphold its dignity by interpretations which they thought they could not make sufficiently sublime and beautiful, profound and mysterious; just as the heathen, before this, to escape from the assaults of the Christians, had endeavoured to transform their whole mythology into physical, theological, and moral allegory. This second kind of allegory, however, took shape among the Christians in more than one way. First of all, they aimed simply to accommodate and to connect the two Testaments to each other, as far as possible. In this the Christians

only continued, in some measure, what the writers of the New Testament had already begun, just as the latter again had only followed the customary usage of their people since the Babylonish captivity. This first kind of allegory then appearing among Christians the author designated the Oriental or Chaldaic. If the Jews formerly used it in such a way that they referred everything in all their allegories to the law as the mystical sense, the Christians originally did something similar with regard to Christ and the gospel. But very soon this original character of allegorizing was altered not merely by boundless excess, but also and not less by the different meaning and purport which they sought to diffuse by allegories. For allegory was no longer laid hold of merely for the purpose of elucidating some passage of holy Scripture, but was frequently connected in a very arbitrary way with some favourite form of expression, merely to vend a sense ingenious and striking, or pregnant and profound. And this sense became by degrees different from the earlier one, inasmuch as, from the time that allegory came, in a larger measure, into the hands of Christians Platonically disposed, the aim was increasingly, not so much to shew that the higher sense of the Old Testament, as that the higher sense of the Platonic philosophy, was fulfilled in the gospel of Christ. Thus the use of allegory changed not merely in the degree of its application, but also in the nature of it. They no longer sought the Old Testament in the New, and the latter again in the former, but thought that they had the same right generally in regard to the Platonic philosophy and the holy Scripture.

The application of allegory was but one step, though the first and most important step, which the Christians were to take in the path of incipient corruption and interference with the original simplicity of the faith. Allegory, so to speak, only opened the gate through which foreign thoughts could force their way into Christianity. That the thoughts which thus forced their way in were really Platonising thoughts, was caused by the application of two other methods practised by the fathers, and which are thought by the author inseparable from each other, and from allegory. These are what the author calls *theologising* on the one hand, and *politising* or *economising* on the other, expressions not understood in the same sense which others meant by them in reference to the fathers, and as the latter themselves understood them. "*Theologising*" means, according to the author's definition, "to speak of one in expressions which are used of God." And the theological language, in this sense, cannot therefore be used by any in a quite proper sense. For as plainly no one can theologise (deify) God, as he is already God in and of himself, so, on the other hand, it is obvious that no one can use theological

language of any other in a quite proper sense. The latter is therefore but a strong and emphatic metaphor to designate extraordinary and wonderful things. If one is born in a wonderful way he is said to have come down from heaven. If he improves mankind, he is said to have created the world. If God raises him to an extraordinary dignity, God is said to have begotten him. In itself, therefore, nothing can be more reasonable, says the author, than to express one's self in this theologising language, and this language the Christians are thought to have used from the beginning—only we must beware of taking this hyperbolical phraseology too literally, and in a proper sense.

However, as the use of allegory directly explains the possibility of introducing new thoughts into the Christian religion, so the theologising explains the fact that the new thoughts took precedence in an excessive exaggeration of the sense attached to them. And hence there was need of a *third* factor to reach the result aimed at by the author. This he points out to us as the *economy* or *policy* of the fathers. By these expressions he defines the artful conduct of the fathers at times, the sort of pious fraud of which they are said to have been guilty, with a view to commend the gospel by high ideas put into it, and by concealed interpretations, to the taste of those whom they had at any time to gain. They became all things to all men, that they might gain them to Christ. They acted according to the likings and dislikings of those whom they thought to convert. They thus placed themselves, in a certain measure, on a level with the judgment of those whom they had immediately to address. To please them they stated and withheld as appeared suitable to the occasion. And among all the points which made the heathen take offence at the gospel, there were hardly two others which involved the catechumens in such perplexity as the mean birth and shameful death of the Saviour. In this direction, therefore, the policy of the fathers was very soon exerted; and along with their theologising and allegorising philosophical speculation generally went hand in hand. The death itself they could not, indeed, conceal from the catechumens, as perhaps in the mysteries of Ceres. Hence they devised another accommodation to lessen this reproach, or if not just that, to make amends for it by the honour of an alleged pre-existence. Hence they assumed in Christ another nature with nothing mortal in it, made this similar to the nature of the Platonic Logos, and alleged that there is betwixt the doctrine of St John and that of the philosopher the most exact resemblance. This *argumentum ad hominem* appeared to them to be immensely stronger for the satisfying of their disciples than the other, which they might have derived from

the exaltation of Jesus Christ. The latter appeared to them of too dangerous consequence on account of the deification of the false gods. And this is the reason why they seldom availed themselves of this argument, and almost constantly used the first. In this way the last step is said to have been completed, which carried in its train the complete transformation (merging in each other) of Platonic and Christian thoughts. Regard for the heathen world, and for the offence which it was accustomed to take at individual parts of the gospel; prejudice and preference for such conceptions as in their ultimate origin belonged only to the heathen world; and finally, aversion to such a representation and emphasising of the Jewish standpoint as took place, among the Ebionites; these are said to have been the three motives pre-eminently which gave inner occasion to the process just described. Attention was therefore specially directed to the wonderful birth of Christ, instead of its being directed at the same time to his exaltation. Hence they theologised in regard to the former with an emphasis, whereby the thought of Christ's wonderful birth was capable of being changed into his eternal pre-existence. Along with this there was also the identification of the Johannine Logos with the Platonic, and a wide door was opened generally for the invasion of Platonic ideas.

Having explained in the above remarks the alleged time and cause of the invasion of Platonism, according to the author's assertion, it remains only that we further give a short review of the extent of the *corruption* caused by this means, and of the *result* alleged to be produced by it. We have thus to figure to ourselves at least in its chief epochs, the order of development of those who seem to come under the author's accusation of Platonism, in which again his audacity of assertion will appear.

Ignatius marks out the critical situation within the church, in which the full, pure stand-point of the ancient church is said to have still been represented on the one hand, and the first mild beginnings of the corruption which subsequently became so great, are said to have been stirring. However, it will first be necessary to cast a glance at the way in which the author, in the interest of his views, appeals to some of the more ancient heretics, and particularly to Cerinthus, and the Gnostics generally. As these Gnostic parties are said not merely to have allegorised in general, and to have allegorised on precisely the same ideas, from which, in the author's opinion, the church dogmas afterwards arose; and as these were demonstrably determined by Platonic ideas; they are very fitly adapted to be the proper links by which Platonism was transferred into Christianity. Perhaps it might be ex-

pected that Philo would have been claimed as playing a similar part in this direction. However, if we carefully measure what he states respecting him, it is clear that this is mostly in a different and almost opposite direction. Unmistakably Souverain, in his delineation of Philo, opposes the extravagant view which advances him too near to Plato, or too near to the Christian world. The bond of allegory surrounds Philo indeed, in common with the Christian world, and we know the significance which this has for the whole connection of the author's deductions. Yet he contends earnestly against those who, like Clericus, had not been disinclined to reckon Philo among the class to whom the mystery of three persons in the God-head "was not unknown." And not less earnestly does he contend against those who, like Cudworth, seemed to have gone too far in approximating the Platonizing Philo to Plato. So far indeed did Philo Platonize, according to Souverain, that he called the world of sense the beloved, the only, the perfect Son of God; and the ideal world, on the other hand, a second God. Beyond this, he is alleged not to have spoken of the world of sense as of a third God, and of the ideal world, as of a son of God. Rather he is thought to have been under the necessity of abstaining from both statements under the influence of his Jewish preconceptions; from the one, because he saw in the world of sense nothing but a creature; from the other, because he saw in the ideal world nothing really distinct from God, from his understanding, from the idea of the world in his understanding. From these observations of the author, defining Philo's peculiarity in both sides, we see that he has no thought of making Philo appear as a proper forerunner of the Platonizing Christians.

It is certainly different in this respect with the *Gnostic* parties above mentioned. The author assumes that they are closely connected with Platonism. And to make them appear as forerunners of the Platonizing Christians, he needs nothing beyond approximating them as near as possible to the church itself. This again he can easily do by appealing to the allegory which they also employed. When we call to mind that the Gnostics unmistakably allegorised, their strange thoughts lose the guise which prejudices us against them. The thirty æons also of the Valentinians, the author thinks, were not more foolish perhaps than many other theories which the fathers derived from the Bible. We must only allow them the same justice of exposition which we use toward the latter; and many of their ideas will be found not worse than those represented by the church. But it is particularly in the case of Cerinthus, the Basilidians, and the Valentinian Marcus, that he mentions individual points as of decisive importance for

the further development within the church. Cerinthus is described as the proper originator of that Platonic fanaticism, because he first taught the economy or accommodation generally, and first taught the allegory in the form of excessive extravagance which afterwards spread more and more widely. As he distinguished Jesus the Son of Mary from the heavenly Christ, he is said first to have been the cause that the church adopted the idea of the two natures united in Christ. Next, in the case of the Valentinian Marcus, he thinks he can shew from a single allegory, that the whole doctrine of the Logos, applied to Christ, was originally nothing but an exaggerated allegorical speculation on the heavenly power, which came down upon the Virgin at the conception of the Lord. And lastly, he finds in the Basilidians, the whole Platonically formed Trinity of the Christians. Here it is alleged to have been already complete, and the device of a secret mode of teaching by which, he thinks, it was introduced and secretly maintained among the Christians, he alleges to have been already in use among the Basilidians.

In this way the Gnostics are said to have made a commencement of defending the Christian dogma in a way of policy, of exaggerating it by theologising, of altering it by allegory, and of fully corrupting it by Platonism. What the Gnostics began outside the church next found *inside the church* the most numerous representatives. For are not most of the church authorities and of the Christian writers generally to be reckoned but among the Platonizing dreamers, and to be regarded as Gnostics? who, according to the author, entertained a great contempt for the sensuous gospel and faith, and were wont to value nothing but their own speculations (p. 70); who started with the supposition, that Christianity was only a new philosophical sect, which enclosed under mean and common figures the most hidden sense and the deepest mysteries of all kinds of natural and divine science (p. 73); who would not let it be said that they have been to no purpose in the school of Plato, in which they had certainly made so fine a figure (p. 86); who in consequence of this had resolved to diffuse by the aid of allegory the sublimest doctrine of the Platonic school, when they lighted on any insignificant expression, that they might thus persuade the heathen, that in their philosophy there is nothing important which is not concealed under such expressions of holy Scripture as seem to us very common and least mysterious (p. 76); who are alleged to have come to the point of explaining holy Scripture, not so much as expositors, but as contemplative philosophers and sophists (p. 73)? Nay, are they not men who not only cannot be regarded as good expositors of holy Scripture, but as not even credible witnesses for the faith

of their century, because they inextricably confounded apostolic doctrine and Platonic speculation with one another (p. 78) ?

The author thus concludes his train of thought : " Let us unhesitatingly reckon all these lovers of so beautiful a speculation, old and new, among the Gnostics ! " " Let me be shewn," says he again in a second passage (p. 166), " a single writer who had spoken of the Trinity merely from the principles of religion, without intermingling the prejudices of philosophy. Platonism was rather the only rule by which, in these times, and during several centuries afterwards, they decided on truth and error." Finally, in a third passage, the author's exaggerating rhetoric mounts still higher, when, counting up a considerable list of Christian writers, he rises to the emphatic exclamation : " Heavens ! what sort of writers ! they breathe nothing but Platonism." *

And who are those writers, viewed singly, of whom he says, they breathe nothing but the Platonism ? The author names the following in the last quoted passage :—" Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Arnobius, Lactantius. But the author's list of accusations is still by no means exhausted with these. Nay, it embraces, not to mention other unimportant names, Augustine in particular, as a counterpart to Origen. For as the one drew the East into his opinions, so the other drew the West, and thus into the Platonizing errors. Farther, he points repeatedly to the circumstance, that the whole controversy betwixt Arians and Athanasians rests on nothing but the original ambiguity from the first inherent in the Platonic doctrine of the Logos ; so that, as this controversy must appear as something quite unjustifiable, so the whole ecclesiastical development from the days of Ignatius onwards must appear as one taking place within Platonic error. No part of it has remained quite free from this error ; many individuals, it is alleged, have been thoroughly infected with it.

Such is the notorious accusation of Platonism, that is, of idle, foolish, and heathenish philosophy, which Souverain thought himself entitled to bring against the greatest number of the fathers. If we hear it with its unmeasured assertions, we involuntarily ask ourselves a twofold question : " How is it possible that such a view originated, and could venture to assert that it is a historical result ? " " And what acceptance did such an accusation find in the learned world, when once it did arise in it ? "

* The turn with which (p. 255) he closes his portraiture of their diligence in dealing with catechumens at the time of the Platonizing church, and in contrast with the earlier, is highly characteristic. He says, *Tantæ molis erat, Platonis condere egentem.*

To both questions we may be allowed to reserve our answer for a second division, which will attempt a review of the earlier and later way of handling the matters discussed by Souverain, and which will have to shew, in regard to the one that the earlier times were not free from a share in the guilt as to the errors committed by Souverain; and in regard to the other, that later times were nevertheless soon able with perfect justice to regard Souverain's accusation as disposed of. The book of Souverain, at its first appearance, produced a sort of panic-terror. But men soon smiled at the terror. For the ghost vanished as soon as one took heart to close with it; that is, as soon as one,—no matter from what side,—knew how to subject the artificial and fine-spun argumentations of Souverain to criticism, and to shew that the ecclesiastical belief in the Trinity is something more, and far other than a misunderstood Platonism; which moulded the heart and life of the church from the philosophic schools of the heathen.

ART. IX.—*The Three Generations of Puritanism.*

Marsden's History of the Early and Later Puritans.

Stoughton's Church and State Two Hundred Years Ago.

Stanford's Joseph Alleine.

Coleman's Two Thousand Confessors.

Nichol's Series of Puritan Divines (Goodwin, Adams, Ward, Sibbes).

PURITANISM has not yet found a historian equal to the importance and merit of the subject. The volumes of Neal are eminently useful as a repertory of facts. The two works of Mr Marsden of Birmingham are very candid, devout, and informing. The works, some of which are referred to above, on branches of the subject, are generally worthy of consultation. But in an age when history has been so generally cultivated, when the traditional renown of Gibbon, Hume, and Robertson, has been thrown into the shade by a galaxy of eminent contemporary names, it is to be regretted that, as yet, the history of the Three Generations of Puritans, from the accession of Elizabeth to the Bartholomew Day (1558–1662), should not have been undertaken on a scale, and with a preparation, suitable to the weight of the theme. All the books on Puritanism we have consulted labour under the defect of imperfect acquaintance with the literature of Puritanism itself. That literature is, indeed, a wide one; but no one can be considered fully com-

petent to write the annals of Nonconformity, who has not made himself fully master of it.

The general historians of our country cannot be expected to supply the want. Puritanism was but one of the many influences in the construction of our modern England, of which they have to take account. And the mere contact of Puritanism with power, or its collision with it, is but one of the many aspects of that religious system. It is greatly to be regretted that our latest and most popular historian should have given so inaccurate and wrongly coloured an estimate of evangelical Nonconformity. The sketch of Puritanism which Macaulay gave in one of his early essays in the *Edinburgh Review*, might have been allowed, perhaps to pass, as flavoured with the exaggeration of youthful period-painting. But the description which he has given in his chief work—that on which his fame was designed to rest—cannot be viewed so leniently. Where in his history he mentions the Puritans, either of an earlier or a later date (i. 83–85, 166–170),* he brings charges against them which apply only to a small section of them. This we are told without any authority for it, that it was a crime “to read the *Fairy Queen*.” So also in the passage (vii. 80) where he introduces the profligate Duke of Wharton to our notice, we are told that “poems” were prescribed by the “saintly family,” of which that licentious peer was the unworthy representative. We find constantly in the writings of the Puritan divines, from first to last, quotations from the Latin and Greek poets. And are we to believe on the strength of Lord Macaulay’s theory, that men who saw no evil in quoting Ovid or Aristophanes, would deem it a sin to read poetry, when written in English? What was in the *pure* poetry of the later Tudor or earlier Stuart era, in the *Mirroure for Magistrates*, the *Poly-Olbion*, the *Purple Island*, or the *Fairy Queen*, that any of these should be interdicted in a Puritan dwelling? It is true these works of imagination are not quoted by the Puritans. It was not the custom. And the writings of Jeremy Taylor, of Hammond, of Sanderson, of Andrews, of the whole high church school, will be searched in vain for references to the polite literature of their time. Sir W. Scott, in making his Puritan squire in “*Woodstock*” quote Milton’s *Comus*, was more fair than Macaulay.

But worse than the charge of indifference or hostility to literature is the accusation of Puritanism producing the immorality of the Restoration era. Both generally, and with special reference to Wharton, is the indictment made. It is the “emancipated precisian” (vii. 81) that is foremost in wicked-

* We quote the post octavo edition, in eight volumes.

ness. Now Lord Macaulay was charged by his friend Sydney Smith with being "a book in breeches." But he had surely sufficient knowledge of the world in which he lived, to be aware that the Puritanism of the nineteenth century did not usually produce such results. And human nature is the same in essentials at all times. How few (if any) of the younger branches of the families of that "Clapham Sect," in which the historian himself was brought up, ever became immoral! And besides, was Macaulay forgetful of the character of the court before Puritanism swayed the Commonwealth era? Both Somerset and the elder Buckingham, the two favourites of James I., were profligate men, and the court followed their example. Jeremy Taylor married, for second wife, a natural daughter of "the royal martyr." The sermons, not of provincial Puritans, but of such preachers before the court as Bishops Andrews and Hall, are full of allusions to prevailing looseness of morals. And was not the temper of the Royalist army in the civil war alone evidence, that before the Commonwealth time the cavaliers were too generally of lax character? Again, was not the immorality of the period of the Fronde in France, when the Royalists were exiles there, to be largely taken into account in estimating the character borne by them when they returned? Some restraint had been practised by the Huguenots when they were stronger, as before the battle of Contras (the first that turned the tide against the League). Henry of Navarre and others confessed their sins in this respect, and promised amendment. But French Protestantism had sunk into comparative weakness, and profligacy reigned, with scarce a check among those with whom the exiled Royalists chiefly associated. Profligate while they fought, associating with the debauched after their defeat had driven them into banishment, do we need any further explanation of the fact, that the Restoration found them and kept them of loose character? Macaulay has not adverted to this striking circumstance, that the Puritans, as a church within a church, were the chief means of preserving a minority among the nobility and squirearchy, not only of pure morals, but of decidedly religious character. And no finer specimens of the Christian lady and gentleman have ever been given in our land, than those who kept the persecuted Puritans as chaplains, and gave them the shelter of their castles, or manor-houses, when driven from more public usefulness as parish ministers or as lecturers. Puritanism reckoned all classes, from the noblest to the humblest, among its intelligent and attached adherents. One would, *e.g.*, suppose from Macaulay's caricature, that the Sir W. Mildmay, who founded the Puritan College of Emanuel at Cambridge, was an acred boor, who spoke through his nose!

Not only was Macaulay disqualified by want of evangelical sympathy from writing adequately of the Puritans, he had no thorough knowledge of their writings. Among the charges, true or false, brought against him, that of concealment of his reading has never been one. And if we are to judge both from internal evidence, and from the references he gives, his acquaintance with the literature of Puritanism was limited indeed. It appears to have embraced only the last of the three generations, and even in that to have been of the scantiest character. The funeral sermons of Howe and Bates on Queen Mary II., some of the most popular writings of John Bunyan, these are about all that he quotes. In one passage of his history, he tells us of the thousands of pamphlets of the period which he had read. It would not have been either aside from or beneath the honouring of his theme, if he had made himself acquainted with, at all events, the chief works of the greatest era of theology in his native land. He might thus have found cause for questioning, whether he did right in raising what Bishop Heber called "the dull good sense" of Tillotson to supremacy over all the divines of his age.

The two former generations of Puritans have been cast into the shade not unnaturally, and yet not justly by the last. The men of 1662, the last Puritans who occupied parish churches and tenanted rectories or vicarages in England, have too much put their predecessors out of court, yet they merely inherited the Puritanism which their forerunners made. That Puritanism was from the first thoroughly Calvinist in creed. Baxter and a very few others of the last generation were, in some respects, at variance with Calvinism; but none of the first or second generations were. They were Calvinists, believing that the articles were thoroughly so, and that the reformers intended none but Calvinists to occupy the pulpits of the English Church.

It is also to be observed, that from first to last the Puritans, though acquiescing in most of the Book of Common Prayer, never preferred a liturgy to free prayer. They deemed a liturgy lawful—the English liturgy—for the most part allowable. But they had no preference for a liturgy. This has not been remarked upon as it ought. The issue of Puritanism was to be freedom from liturgical constraint. And this might, perhaps, have been, to some extent, foreseen from the beginning.

Puritanism, from the beginning, was strong in London and in Cambridge. It is perhaps rather strongly put by one of the best Puritan scholars of our day—the late Professor Campbell of London—that "whatever of Protestantism England possesses, it owes to Cambridge."* But, though Oxford had a

* Article on the Anglican Reformation, *Presbyterian Review*, Jan. 1848.

good proportion of Puritans all along, undoubtedly Cambridge was the more Puritan institution of the two as at an earlier era it had been the more Protestant.

It was in London that the chief Puritan pulpit orator, in Cambridge the chief Puritan divine of the Elizabethan era—Henry Smith and William Perkins—flourished. These men have, in church histories, been cast into the shade by Rainolds, Cartwright, and Travers, who came more prominently forward in public matters. But the contemporary fame of Smith and Perkins far outstripped that of the others. Of Smith, Thomas Fuller remarks, "Bred in Oxford, and afterwards became that famous preacher at St Clement-Dane's in London, commonly called the silver-tongued Smith, being but one metal, in price and purity, beneath St Chrysostom himself. Yea, whereas generally the sermons of those days are now grown out of fashion (such is our age's minority and affectation of novelty), Smith's sermons keep up their constant credit, as appears by their daily impressions, calculated for all times, places, and persons, so solid, the learned may partly admire, so plain, the unlearned may perfectly understand them," (Ch. Hist. of Brit., b. ix.) Both Smith and Perkins, like Greenham, Hieron, and various other Puritan worthies, died in the prime of life.

Perkins has, in the *History of Theological Opinion*, obtained a place beyond our island and its language through his Latin work, one of his shorter treatises, on Predestination, a reply to which is the most elaborate of the writings of Arminius. In Latin also was originally written his *Art of Prophecy*, which, with his two sermons on the Ministry, are most useful to those engaged in the sacred office. In these we find the chord struck, from which Puritanism never deviated, a thorough setting forth of the whole counsel of God in preaching. Lecturing has fallen, for the most part, into disuse in England in modern times, greatly to the injury of religion. But the exposition, as well as the sermon, was, from first to last, a Puritan institution. The "Propheesyings," against which Elizabeth exercised her royal authority, and in defence of which Archbishop Grindal lifted up so noble a testimony in a letter to her, gave an occasion, much needed then and for long afterwards, of exercising ministerial gifts in the opening up and applying the word. It is the complaint of godly prelates like Bishop Hall, how few thoroughly qualified ministers there were even in his time in England. It is the constant charge of the Puritans, till they got the ascendancy in the Civil War, how many obstacles were by most of the bishops thrown in the way of a preaching ministry? From the long and elaborate dialogue between Epaphras and Nymphas, "The Preacher's Plea," in Hieron's works, we get a vivid idea how widely spread over the

land was popular indifference, and even aversion, to a teaching pastorate. A man who could read the prayers and administer the sacraments was with too many considered quite sufficient. The effect of this may be seen in the deplorable picture of the common people drawn in the preface to Perkins's Catechism,

"The foundation of Christian Religion Gathered into Six Principles." How little truth there is in the charge that Puritanism was indifferent to Christian ethics may be seen in Perkins's elaborate "Cases of Conscience," well worthy the careful study of all ministers.

Puritanism was, in its every stage, a thorough defender of the moral obligation of the Sabbath. The earliest book in our language on that question proceeded from a Puritan pen, that of Richard Greenham. Of the great influence and popularity of his "Treatise of the Sabbath," Bishop Hall writes—

"While Greenham writeth of the Sabbath rest,
His soul enjoys that which his pen exprest;
His work enjoys not what itself doth say,
For it shall never find one resting day."

As yet the High Church resting the observance of "Sunday" on mere church authority, and, in consequence, relaxing the practical keeping of it, did not exist. That was reserved for the school of Andrews and Laud. It is against the objections of Papists and Antinomians only that Greenham argues. Without disparaging more modern treatises, we may remark, that for weight of argument in the polemical, and Christian earnestness in the practical part, the work of Greenham has not been surpassed. A much less voluminous writer than Perkins, the works of Greenham are comprised in one not very large folio. His chief contribution to the exposition of Scripture is a commentary, briefer on the earlier, more expanded on the later, part of the 119th Psalm.

Romanism was very busy during the reign of Elizabeth. Partly deriving emissaries from the ranks of those who had become recusants after undergoing the training of the English universities, partly from those trained in the recently established foreign colleges of Douay, St Omer, and others (to which none contributed more than Philip II. of Spain), every effort by voice or pen was used to reclaim England to the yoke of Rome. The Conformist portion of the English Church was worthily represented in the contest with Rome by such men as Whittaker and Fulke, whose works have in our day received a revived acceptance by being reprinted for the Parker Society. But Puritanism produced two champions of Protestantism at least equal to any Conformist contemporaries. Though only going over a limited part of the controversy, 'the sum of the conference between John Rainolds and John Hart touching

the Head and the faith of the church," proves, on the part of the Puritan professor (who was considered the most learned Englishman of his time), how consummate was his mastery of the points at issue. More largely involved in the Puritan controversy than his Oxonian brother, Cartwright was equally at home with Rainolds in the conflict with Rome; and Cambridge sent forth, in his "Confutation of the Rhemist New Testament," a most successful reply to all the sophistries of the foreign version. The thick double-columned quarto, which, entitled "*Harmonia Evangelica*," comprises Cartwright's Commentary on the Four Gospels, gives proof how well, for other than polemical purposes, he had studied the inspired record of our Lord's discourses and actions.

But Rome tried other than controversial ways to regain the heart of England. The century which elapsed from the foundation of the Jesuit order was one of unwearied toil and zeal for the recovery of lost ground. Macaulay, in his well-known article on Ranke's Lives of the Popes, has given full prominence to that series of efforts, so far as they were practised by the Jesuits. But that society formed only one branch of the exertions of Rome. Borromeo and Philip Neri, St Theresa and the other Spanish mystics, Francis de Sales, with the French Oratorians and Lazarists, the Jansenists, and, to some extent, the Benedictines, all represent, in one form or another, the revived zeal of Romanism. The Romish presses were incessantly at work in the production, not only of controversial works in the still universal language, Latin, or in the different modern tongues, but of works on devotion and practical religion. That there was much good in detail mingled with the doctrinal errors of these works, need not be denied; and we find that when such books had fallen in their way, none of the Puritans ever scruple to refer to them or extract from them. But the good obviously made the evil in them the more dangerous for the unwary or the ill-grounded. And it is expressly stated that the too great acceptance which these Popish works were getting was one reason for publishing such works as the "Seven Treatises" on Christian Practice, by Richard Rogers, who, as the Puritans were careful not to take the names of rector or vicar, styles himself "preacher of the word of God" at Wethersfield, Essex. In the first of these treatises, thoroughly evangelical principles, as the foundation of Christian practice, are laid down. A folio of nearly 700 pages would be considered a somewhat bulky tome for ordinary Christians to make daily use of now, but it was not so considered then. What is rare with the Puritans, the book is closed by a hymn, in which the subject-matter of the volume is summed up, with more piety, however, than poetry.

Of the first era of Puritans, none was more esteemed than Samuel Hieron, and he may be considered as having largely contributed to lay the foundation of that Devonshire Puritanism to which, in other times, Howe, Flavel, and others were to make such large contributions. Hieron was very popular as a preacher, and his general acceptance made, after his death, not unacceptable the dedication of the second volume of his works to (of course an evangelical prelate) John Bishop of Chester. Hieron, as "pastor" of Modbury, took his share in the week-day lecture established by some Devonshire gentlemen in the neighbouring town of Plympton, and there we find that discourses as solid and thoughtful as any Sabbath ones were delivered by him, as is proved by his "Bargain of Salt" and "Dignity of Preaching." He gave to the world a curious proof of his versifying (the subject hardly admitted of poetic) powers in his Protestant Answer to a Popish Rhyme, in which, in a style popularly telling, he answers the ordinary objections to Protestantism. No production of his pen, we dare say, was more widely circulated, or, in its way, more useful than this.*

The strength of the Puritan cause was brought out in the Millenary Petition on the accession of James I., and the closely following Hampton Court Conference proved how little the Nonconformists could reckon on royal favour, or even toleration. During the second era, embracing the time between the accession of the Stuarts and the breaking out of the Civil War, some of the Puritans found refuge in Holland, some in the beginning colonisation of New England. From both places of exile various of them returned, when the change of affairs made it safe. But the great majority remained in their native country, suffering more or less according to the temper of the diocesan and the spirit of the neighbourhood. The more candid of High Church writers, such as Mr Soames, are ashamed of the spirit shewn both by the king and the prelates at the Hampton Court Conference; but that unhappy colloquy determined the way in which most of the church rulers were to act during the reign both of James and his son. In Archbishop Abbot, indeed, the Puritans found a successor to their friend Grindal; and in such prelates as the primate's brother Robert, Carleton, Davenant, and a few others, they gladly recognised Christian men, who sought to prevent the breach from widening, and would gladly have further reformed the church. But in other respects the horizon was only getting darker. In such a writer as Bishop Andrews, we see the influence of the

* To Biblical exposition Hieron contributed a most valuable series of thirty lectures on the 51st Psalm, entitled "Penance for Sin," and forming the chief part of his second volume.

fathers used, not as helps, but as authorities. In his series of Whitsunday sermons, the work of the Holy Spirit in conversion is never mentioned, and the prelate who preached his funeral sermon ascribes his getting to heaven to his good works! Andrews was the favourite preacher of Charles I., and was undoubtedly the ablest of the High Church writers of his day. We see from the cases of John Hales, Thomas Jackson, and others, how the influence of the times carried away not a few of those younger divines who had started with evangelical views. Without denying, then, the existence and usefulness of a Conformist evangelical party in the English Church, without forgetting that of the three great works of the seventeenth century on justification, those of Davenant, Dowman, and Owen, the two former were composed by bishops, we must ascribe, under God, the maintenance of pure religion in England at this time chiefly to the Puritans.

They still possessed some posts of great importance. Dr Sibbes was preacher at Gray's Inn, Dr Preston at Lincoln's Inn, and both of these chiefs of Puritanism were heads of Houses at Cambridge. The former was one of the twelve "seoffees" to buy in impropriations (an anticipation in Puritan times of Charles Simeon's trustees), to establish an evangelical ministry in the dark places of the land. This design was soon crushed by the influence of Laud. Sibbes is not a writer of foremost mental power. But his sweetness, his unction, his homely illustrative powers, have made his writings, as they doubtless rendered his preaching, popular with spiritually-minded readers. Preston was in every sense a thorough divine. Though most of his writings have had the disadvantage of being published after his death, yet his "Golden Sceptre," his "Soul's Qualification," his "Saint's Daily Exercise," and other works, form a series of interesting, solid, instructive works, full of gospel truth, and replete with practical application.

The London Puritan pulpit of this period had no worthier representative than Dr Thomas Taylor, who filled that charge of Aldermanbury from which the elder Calamy was ejected in 1662. From his pen we have a Commentary on Titus, full of the usual Puritan array of "doctrines and uses," and valuable for all who may expound any part of that epistle. The author of the brief notice of Dr Taylor, prefixed to this Commentary, informs us that "there were many young ministers who acknowledged that under his ministry they did grow up in knowledge and sanctifying graces, and made a great proficiency by the advantage of his acquaintance and example."

Of no writer of this period are the practical works oftener referred to by the authors of the next age, than those of William Fenner, minister at Rochford, Essex. His chief work is on the

epistle to the church at Sardis, and is entitled, "Christ's Alarm to Drowsy Saints." His "Spiritual Man's Directory" is a catechism in 185 questions and answers on the Creed, Ten Commandments, and Lord's Prayer. Fenner appears to have been an especial favourite with Baxter, though a most decided and systematic Calvinist.

Not much known even to Puritan students by his works, but of the highest influence during his lifetime, was John Dod, who, after being twice driven from other cures for nonconformity, died, at ninety-five years of age, minister of Faustly, in Northamptonshire. His work on the Ten Commandments is that most frequently referred to in the religious literature of that century. Of him we are told that "his eminency was in frequency, aptness, freeness, and largeness of godly discourse, in which respect it may be said of him, that in the country where he lived, none were known who therein were equal to him" (Gillies's Historical Collection).

The Puritan period is deficient in epistolary writings. We would gladly have had handed down from that era, such a historical series from an English pen as we have from the Scottish pen of Baillie; such a course of correspondence with learned men, within and without the realm, as we have subjoined to Parr's Life of Archbishop Usher; such a *vade-mecum* of the range of Christian experience, as we have from the fertile, gracious, and winning soul of Samuel Rutherford. One of the few contributions to this branch of composition is the small volume of Godly Letters by Paul Bayne. He was the successor of Perkins in St Andrew's Church at Cambridge, and though not standing in the foremost class of divines like his predecessor, was, in soundness of doctrine and edifyingness of preaching, suited to carry on the good work that Perkins had begun. His chief work is an exposition of Ephesians, of the usual solid Puritan stamp. Of him Dr Sibbes remarks, in prefacing that posthumous work: "He was a man fit for this task,—a man of much communion with God, and acquaintance with his own heart,—observing the daily passages of his life, and exercised much with spiritual conflicts; though his meditations were of a higher strain than ordinary, yet he had a good dexterity, furthered by his love to do good, in explaining dark points with lightsome similitudes."

To the same period belongs the Exposition of the Colossians by Nicholas Byfield of Chester, delivered as week-day lectures, and deserving of study, from its insight into the meaning of the apostle's words. The nearly contemporaneous comment of perhaps the greatest Conformist theologian of that age, Bishop Davenant, on the same Epistle, has somewhat thrown the work of Byfield into the shade. But the latter is as thoroughly

suitable for an ordinary, as that of Davenant was for its original destination—a university, audience. Congregations who on week-days listened to such lectures as those of Byfield, must have been thoroughly trained in the comprehensive understanding of the portion of the word opened up.

Of the four folios which comprehend the works of Robert Bolton, the treatise most popular and useful in his time, was his "Instructions for Right Comforting Afflicted Consciences." The long course of spiritual darkness which preceded his own conversion, made him the better fitted for administering consolation to others. For upwards of twenty years he was minister of Broughton, Northamptonshire, and during his last illness there, he had those meditations afterwards published by the title of "The Four Lost Things." By this little treatise readers of the nineteenth century know him best.

None of the Puritans of this period suffered more for non-conformity than Arthur Hildersham, who followed another sufferer in the cause, Anthony Gilby, at Ashby-de-la-Zouch. His connection with the royal house, the patronage of the noble family of Huntingdon, were as little able as his great talents, learning, and piety, to shelter him from the fury of narrow-minded prelates. A few months of quiet, however, he at last obtained before his death, which was nearly contemporary with that of Bolton (1631). He has left us two massive folios of exposition—108 lectures on the fourth chapter of John's Gospel, and 152 on the fifty-first Psalm. From these we see how well he deserved his usual character of "an excellent textuary."

Of Daniel Dyke, of John Ball, of William Ames, and numbers of others of the second era of Puritanism, we have no room to speak. Let it suffice to remark that, when the third generation of Puritanism was, so to speak, inaugurated by the civil war, it might seem as if, to the full, these church reformers had taken advantage of the mighty scope given them by their being the first after the Reformation to press practical religion upon the hearts of the English people. Scarcely could any topic be mentioned—conversion, affliction, the daily Christian life, preparation for death, or any other,—scarcely could any book or specially-important chapter of either Old Testament or New be specified, but Puritanism had already treated solidly, plainly, interestingly, effectively of it. But the era then commencing was still to outstrip, in all these respects, the two that had gone before.

An attempt, just before the two parties had taken up their position of mortal strife, was made to avert the outbreak, by working the church by good bishops. Such evangelical Conformists as Brownrigg and Prideaux were raised to vacant sees

and Joseph Hall was translated from Exeter to Norwich. But this was at best a mere palliation ; it was too late, and, like Stuart concessions in general, it may be feared it was not sincere. The contemporary reforming efforts of the evangelical members of Convocation equally ended in nothing.

An interesting chapter of church history has yet to be written, upon the mutual influences of English and Scottish theology at the time of the Covenant. A good deal of light is thrown upon that matter by Baillie's Letters. It is, however, not borne out by the facts of the case, that (as has often been asserted) it was Scottish influence that procured the introduction of an entirely new series of ecclesiastical authoritative standards at the period of the Westminster Assembly. That body, composed of representatives of the south and centre of England (for the north was, till the time of the battle of Marston Moor, in the hands of the king's troops), gave expression to wants long accumulating in the minds of the Puritans. The experience of the two Stuart reigns had shewn that the Thirty-Nine Articles were ineffective as a safeguard of the evangelical theology, which the reformers, one and all, maintained. From the unevangelical High Church party, all the Puritans had more or less suffered ; and though not as yet so manifest in operation, such men as Hales, and Hammond, and Jeremy Taylor, were laying the foundation of a Broad Church section of Anglicanism. The "Liberty of Prophecy" is a thoroughly latitudinarian work. It was not, indeed, published when the Assembly sat down ; but it was the manifesto of opinions previously existing. The High Churchmen got their anti-Calvinism from the fathers, especially those of the Eastern Church ; the Broad Churchmen got theirs from the Dutch Remonstrants.

The Westminster Confession of Faith was designed and thoroughly fitted to exclude all non-evangelical men, of whatever type, from the ministry of the Church of England. The solidity and precision which mark it, and both the Catechisms, which follow it in the volume of Presbyterian Standards, shew the thorough grasp of mind, the comprehensive theological training, of the men who composed the great Puritan Synod. The prolocutor or president of that court, Dr Twisse, minister of Newbury, was considered the best controversial divine of his day. His "Riches of God's Love" is not an abler work than that of Davenant on the same subject, but it enters more fully into the various bearings of the Arminian controversy, and is indeed an exhaustive treatise on that subject. The more portable character of the bishop's book will, however, cause it to be the more generally read of the two.

A person who wishes to have a good view of the last Puritan era at a moderate expenditure of time, cannot do better than

peruse the six goodly octavos of the Morning Exercises at Cripplegate, St-Giles-in-the-Fields, and Southwark. With the exception of Thomas Goodwin, scarcely one of the great names of that generation is absent from it, and there are several of the writers who, otherwise unknown, gave here thorough proof of great pulpit power. The Southwark Exercise, in twenty-five lectures, goes over the whole range of the controversy with Rome; the remainder of the volumes are occupied with topics of practical godliness. First in the fourth volume is that discourse by Thomas Doolittle, on "Eyeing Eternity," to which, in his "Earnest Ministry," Mr James has given the praise of being the most solemn sermon in the English language. And there is not one that is unworthy to form part of the collection where Doolittle bore his share. It is usual to speak of Owen, Baxter, and Howe, as the three greatest of the ejected of 1662; but perhaps this is a point not quite so readily to be determined. There are some half-dozen others—Manton, Goodwin, Charnock, Clarkson, Bates, Brooks—to whom, in some points, the precedence may by some be awarded. Is Baxter to be classed in expository power with Manton? or in fertility of illustration with Brooks? or in massive solidity of thought with Charnock or Clarkson? or in relative accuracy of speech with Bates? Again, does Howe open up the word like several of those just referred to? and do you get from him as uniformly a repaying and exhaustive treatment of his theme, as from more than one already named? Perhaps in ready popularity of illustration, and enforcement of gospel truth, there is none more distinguished than William Bridge, of whom, however, too much has been published. There is a sameness in his works, when read through and through. But respecting Owen's right to rank as one of the first three—and, take him all in all, foremost of them—we entertain no doubt. He has not the solemn, pressing pathos of Baxter, or Doolittle, or Thomas Vincent, or Joseph Alleine, or John Flavel. He is everywhere the doctor quite as much, or more than, the pastor. But no writer of that age—no writer of any age—will give to the attentive reader a better view of the difference between vital godliness and any, even the most plausible and imposing, of its counterfeits. His style, indeed, is a great drawback. Great as is the difference between the mental range of Augustine and Thomas à Kempis—the bishop of Hippo and the monk of Zwol have this in common—an eminently arresting and impressive style. Hence none who read them at all, ever read them but with pleasure. It is otherwise with Owen. From his most to his least elaborate works—from the treatises on Justification and on the Spirit, and his Exposition of the Hebrews, to his short essays on Indwelling Sin and the Mortification of Sin, it is the solid

excellence of the thought that carries you over the cumbrousness of the style. No Christian, however mature, will ever get beyond profiting by Owen ; but into a young person's hands, put any other Puritan almost rather than him.

Coming in the wake of the leaders of the ejected host, are a number of writers still worthy of attentive study. Steele, with his *Husbandman's Calling* ; Shaw, with his *Welcome to the Plague, and Farewell to Life* ; Corbet of Chichester, with his *Defence of Nonconformity* (a model of dignified and temperate pleading), and his *Self-Employment in Secret* ; Thomas Watson, with his *Heaven taken by Storm, and Divine Contentment* ; Dr Thomas Jacomb, one of the scores ejected in the metropolis, with his *Sermons on the Eighth of Romans* ; Thomas Case, with his work on *Affliction* ; Robert Asty of Norwich, with his *Rejoicings in the Lord Jesus* ; Oliver Heywood of Halifax, with those volumes of *Discourses* which still attest his title to be called "the Apostle of the West Riding," the Grimshaw of an earlier age ; and numbers more. It was from no want of names worthy to be classed with Noah, Abraham, and Moses, that in the *Eleventh of Hebrews* the apostle ends with a general enumeration ; and it is from no want of matter largely to expand this article, that we now draw towards a close.

Of biography of the two earlier eras of Puritanism, we have very little ; of the last we have more, but far less than we would wish. Samuel Clark, of Benet Fink, one of the two thousand ejected, performed a good service to the cause of Christ in his collection of *Lives*. He thus rescued from oblivion a number of particulars respecting Puritan worthies, about whom tradition had not had time to be vague or dubious. But much had already perished, and no one collector could go near to exhaust what was then to be obtained. Puritanism has bequeathed to us no general church history—not even a history of itself. The collections of Philip Nye on that subject have been lost. We owe to a Broad Churchman like Thomas Fuller, to High Churchmen as Heylin and Jeremy Collier, the record of the eventful century after the Reformation. The nearest approach to a history, and it is, of course, only for the latter part of the period, is Baxter's *Autobiography*, of which the cream has been selected by Orme in his *Life of Baxter*.

Puritanism has given us what is still the best Commentary for everybody's everyday use—that of Matthew Henry. He was not indeed a Puritan, but he was the son of one. He was familiar with the last survivors of the noble band of the ejected. He was an attentive student of the works of those who had lately or long before departed ; and in his *Exposition* he may be said to have gathered up the best of the comments of the three generations of the Puritans. If we have the occasional

quaintness, the occasional lengthiness, the occasional missing, not truth, gospel truth, central truth, but the very truth of the passage, from which the best Puritan expositors are by no means free, we have always in him the thorough reverence for God speaking in his word,—the filial delight in God's dealings and ways,—the carefulness to improve providences,—the assiduity of calling upon God,—the holy strictness of life,—the consecrated love of neighbourhood and country, as well as family and friends,—the feeling of being entrusted with the name of Christ,—the solemn responsibilities of sorrow,—the humble confidence in Christ only,—the joyous dependence on the Spirit,—the glad looking forward to a better country,—yet the earnest taking care for better and yet better inward evidences of going thither,—which, from the beginning to the end, characterised Puritanism.

That Puritan era was in Germany the time of Paul Gerhardt, the mightiest master of the Lutheran lyre. The Christian song of the fatherland, in the seventeenth century, yet stands unrivalled by succeeding ages there, or perhaps elsewhere. Puritanism had its heroes, its saints, its confessors, its martyrs. But its "sweet singers" we look for in vain. We have a few solemn and touching stanzas from Baxter, such as those beginning—

"Lord, it belongs not to my share
Whether I die or live."

But there is nothing to be put in the balance with Bishop Hall, or Giles Fletcher, or Crashaw, or George Herbert. The British evangelism of succeeding times has, from Watts and Doddridge downwards, sufficiently vindicated itself from all suspicion of being unpoetical or antipoetical; but it certainly does seem singular, that from Perkins to Howe, upwards of a century should have rolled by, and not called forth a single sacred poet from ranks illustrious in every other walk of Christian authorship. The attentive reader is greatly struck with the absence in the vast range of patristic and mediæval quotation to be found in the Puritan writings, all reference to the hymns of the earlier church, eastern or western. These were not, indeed, then as we have them now, in accessible collections like those of Daniel, and Mone, and Trench. But most of them were printed; and even not looking beyond what of them might be found in that strange medley of good and evil, the Roman Breviary, it is remarkable that the happy thoughts, felicitous images, pat and curt, even when not perhaps poetical expressions of Christian sentiment, to be found in the best of those old hymns, should not have struck their attention as fit material for memory or for commonplace book.

Vast was the gap which was made by the event of August 1662. A century afterwards, William Romaine was the only evangelical clergyman in London, where a hundred pulpits had proclaimed the pure gospel in the latest Puritan times. Well might the author of "*The Whole Duty of Man*," write a book some few years after, on "*The Decay of Christian Piety*," and put as frontispiece the emblem of old St Paul's in flames, with motto, "*Etiam perire ruinae*." The fire of 1665 had not more annihilated the city of Elizabeth and Cromwell, than the ejections of 1662 had, for the time, destroyed the influence of evangelism in the establishment. And the book in operation, serious and well intentioned as it is, shews how little its author (or authoress) knew of that gospel, by which alone piety can be prevented, or rescued, from decay. In his famous Third Chapter, Macaulay has given us a list of the chief London divines at the accession of James II.; but however distinguished as scholars or famous as preachers, from none of these, except Beveridge, could the appeals or invitations of the gospel be heard. Well was it for England, that beyond the pale of the Establishment, though for nearly thirty years amidst every suffering short of the actual stake or scaffold, the pure truth "as it is in Jesus" was faithfully preached. How little was the influence of that gospel understood by even the most liberal of the established clergy of those times, we see from the anticipation of Bishop Burnet, that after the last of the ejected were gathered to their fathers, dissent could be extinguished. With, in most cases, far humbler acquirements than those possessed by their university-bred predecessors, the following generations of evangelical dissenters still maintained their testimony for truth, grace, and duty. Some might, indeed, cease to be evangelical, in one denomination by rationalism, in another by antinomianism. But in the worst part of the last century, the successors of the ejected could still aver with truth, that the doctrines of the gospel were, to a much larger extent, adhered to by them than by the clergy or the membership of the church which had cast the Puritans out.

No class lost more by 1662 than the aristocracy. The dedications of the Puritan authorship of the three generations have preserved to us, and we learn indeed from other sources, the names of the peers or squires, and their ladies, who were friends to the Puritan cause. After the Bartholomew Day, a Countess of Exeter or a Lord Wharton might still retain their Puritan chaplain. But the century saw this remnant of old family usages swept away. An aristocracy will, it seems, only be religious in an established form. And if in England the gospel be unknown in the Establishment, the aristocracy remain ignorant of the truth. The middle class and the work-

ing class have no objections to be served by the ministry of dissenters. But the highest class objected. The Puritans ceased to belong to an Established church ; and consequently, until our own age, when the Church of England has experienced an evangelical revival, the aristocracy were an irreligious class. It was a wonder in Cowper's time, the

" One who wears a coronet and prays."

It may be questioned, whether after all the movement among the highest class, especially during the last three years, there be so much vital godliness among them as might have been seen before August 1662. The class to which our legislators belong drove out the Puritans. The spiritual blight of a couple of centuries in their class has punished the crime.

The handsome and carefully edited series of Mr Nichol is a very great boon to students and younger ministers. They here get their start of Puritan theology to begin, and never, at so cheap a rate, or in so portable a form, could they before do so.

X.—FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL REVIEWS.

DUTCH REVIEWS.

Protestantische Bladen.

From this periodical we give the following sketch by a Lutheran divine of the Dutch Reformed Church, its schools and theological parties :—

The Liberal Schools.—While in Germany almost all the newer theological schools have more or less broken with rationalism, the old faith in Holland finds support chiefly among a large proportion of the people. Of the ministers above three-fourths belong to the various liberal parties.

We do no injustice when we affirm of the great representatives of the earlier period of Dutch theology in general, that they produced, and wished to produce, a biblical theology alone. If the one party named itself more SUPERNATURALISTIC, because it accepted a REVELATION, which yet could not be contrary to reason, and the other more RATIONALISTIC, because with their reason it developed conceptions which frequently were in accordance with Scripture, almost all agreed in giving their assent to the Scriptures alone. There stood at the head of this period men whose influence in the Netherlands was most blessed. A *Van der Palm*, equally distinguished as a professor, preacher, and writer, born with a poetical temperament which reminds one of Herder to popularise theology, is a true representative of that supernaturalism which, in the exposition of the miracles, makes such peculiar concessions to the newer theology. His translation of the Bible, and his Bible for the young, clearly evince, however, the scriptural ground on which he stood.

Heringa, with his greater influence, both in a theological and practical respect, whose scholars (so have the times changed !) approached very near to orthodoxy, but at first were regarded as more heretical than Groningen and Leyden are now, proposed a theology more biblical than ecclesiastical ; but his extreme caution in the treatment of the church doctrine has cost him of late more than one severe reproach. Further, a *Muntinghe*, whose History of Man according to the Bible, and Exposition of the Psalms, are not yet antiquated ; a *Clarisse*, a man of extraordinary encyclopædial acquirements, who gave chief prominence to the practical ethical side of Christianity ; and not less the philosopher *Hensde*, whose Platonic Dialectics exercised so much influence upon theology, from whose teaching the later Groningen theology has sprung : these, and others besides them, expound to us the peculiar Dutch type of a mild supernaturalism, which effected great things in its time, but which was not fitted for the arduous problems of a later time. These writers were animated by a truly forbearing spirit. Other champions belonged more to Rationalism, e.g., the president of the Synod, *Donker Curtius* and *Van der Willigen*, whose distinguished work on the Essence of Christianity, with its two Supplements, was the last production of that school of which Meyboom may now be regarded as the nearest exponent. The well known Church History of *Ipey* and *Dermout* may serve as an example of at least a strongly flavoured Arminianism.

Such was the spirit of Dutch theology thirty years ago, and even later. But at that time a voice was heard against the contempt in which the church faith was held, which called into life, a little later, not only the Separatists, but the Church-Orthodox party ; and the Groningen school, animated with the elements of new life, was shortly to dispute much ground with the prevailing theology, which as yet scarce knew the name of Schleiermacher. One party after another has since been formed, and though none of these can, of course, be without influence on the others, their representatives are easily recognised. They manifest themselves in different shades, according as they have been more attached to the one school or the other. The different relations in which they stand to the "modern theology" we can reduce to two classes. The older *Huet* and *Jorissen* are representatives of the school which is uncompromisingly opposed to the *moderns*, and which thinks of no peace with them. Among their distinguished preachers, and also among many of the lay members of the church, we have often found the greatest dissatisfaction with the newer theology ; and we have heard from them, more bitterly than even from the orthodox, the complaint that arbitrariness in the exposition of doctrine has produced the fatal consequence that doctrines diametrically opposite have, on the same day, been proclaimed from the same pulpit. They cannot, and will not, however, become orthodox, and are unfaithful, therefore, to their own liberal principles. But their number is small and unimportant.

From these must be distinguished the MODERATELY LIBERAL SCHOOL, disposed to enter into negotiations with the modern theology, *a priori* recognising principles of the latter, but holding fast by the idea of revelation, which the *moderns* have surrendered. We could mention here distinguished writers and celebrated preachers who have treated, with the utmost zeal, all branches of practical Christianity, who aspire after the free development of scientific theology, without being carried away, like the new race, with every new sys-

tem that presents itself. This section, the only one to which we are not willing to give the name of "*party*," is characterised by moderation and charitable judgment. It has recently, too, shewn a new sign of life, though not, indeed, of much importance, in the publication of the pamphlet "*The Liberal Theology*," announced as the first of a series of publications which shall combine "faith and science." It may be of use to us in more accurately defining the position of the school.

As the earlier liberals contended against the orthodox on the ground of the right of private judgment, so the present moderate liberals contend against the modern theology, on the ground of the rights of the people, and of simple Christian faith. They would gladly accept of plainly proved results, but disapprove of the unlimited application of the empirical method to theology. They defend the right of criticism, but demand of the critic not only a knowledge of nature, philosophy, and history, but also a capacity for the things of the higher life, and a reverence for the faith of eighteen centuries. Their philosophy, starting with the idea of a personal God, is equally opposed to Deism and Pantheism, and believes in God's providence, even when it does not understand it; for they will not, in general, sacrifice the impression of a subject as a whole to an atomic anatomy. They acknowledge history, the contents of which are sacred, and the central point of which they find in the person of the Saviour.

Agreeing on this point with Chantepie, they are also at one with him in their conception of a miracle, since they cannot concede the position that it is *a priori* impossible, although they do not regard it as a *vital* question in the history of Christianity. Faith and science are to them equally dear; but science is valuable to them only with a view to the practical wants of the church. A rabbinical school-theology which can never satisfy the hunger of the soul for eternity, a knowledge of religion without religion, and without reverence for child-like faith, they cannot desire, but consider themselves bound to contend against. Such is their peculiar characteristic. Whether it shall give rise to a new school of theology we cannot determine beforehand.

To the *Groningen School* we must now proceed. Shortly after the Separatistic movement, *Hofstede de Groote* attracted the greatest attention by his treatment of the symbol question. While the ruling party evidently wished to preserve the authority of the symbols, he stood up against their obligation, and the principles enunciated by him gave the chief feature to the school which shortly afterwards formed a freer but not a confessional theology. Another feature manifested itself from the commencement, a zealous practical activity in every branch of the Christian life. We should not err in asserting that the religious revival mentioned above is to be ascribed in great measure to the influence of the Groningen School. For while the new school was, in many points, inclined to view theological subjects in a manner which was reckoned heretical, and paid homage to the liberal views of a Neander and Ullmann, it at the same time manifested a practical zeal which reminded one of the *pietism* of Spener, their favourite model being "the brothers of the common life," and above all, John Wessel. Evidences of this may be found in the numerous articles contributed by it to the periodical begun in 1837, "*Waarheid in Liefde*" (Truth in Love), which, however, has, since 1857, regarded the *practical* as its province. Besides, the Groningen

professors have published a series of Compendia, written with scientific care. Such was the mutual agreement subsisting among them. *Hofstede de Groote*, *Paraau*, and *Van Oordt* were the leading founders of the new school, though for a long time they refused to be denominated a particular school.

The new element of life infused from Groningen into the Dutch theology consisted in the important step that it no longer propounded a doctrine, but placed THE PERSON OF CHRIST AS THE CENTRAL POINT OF ITS THEOLOGY. To this every other separate point in the Groningen system stands related; its dogmatics even begin with Christology, and it always gives prominence to his whole manifestation, connecting his doctrine with his life, his miracles with his words, his resurrection with his death. In embracing a whole Christ it finds the salvation of man effected by him, which is the central point in the divine plan of revelation. But as it regards revelation as an educating of man on the part of God, it weakens the IDEA OF SIN (!); it still regards man's real nature as on the whole good (!); it arrives, therefore, at a theory of the ATONEMENT wholly different from the orthodox view. The satisfaction of Christ consists not only in his sufferings and death, but in his life and resurrection as well, in his walk with God upon earth, and in his glorification in heaven; and his death, made necessary by sin, has been permitted by God only that men might thus be enabled to know sin, be convinced of God's grace, and feel their need of fellowship with Christ, in order to be delivered from the dominion of sin. If the new school thus separated itself by its Christology from the older path, it gave currency also to new views of Scripture. It was the first to distinguish between the Bible and God's word, the Old from the New Testament, and accepted a freedom from error but not INFALLIBILITY on the part of the apostles. But its favourite doctrine is that of the PRESENT REIGN OF CHRIST; and in the exposition of his personal union with the Father there appears the mystic element which has been laid to its charge, and is indeed a characteristic feature of the school.

The controversy to which this school gave rise on the part both of the ruling and the orthodox theology was keen, though, on the part of the latter, unfortunately not carried on in a really scientific manner. The Groningen School has now fallen rather into the background before the new movement from Leyden, and its controversy with Scholten's determinism, as well as with the newer empirical theology, has in general been crowned with no happy result. Its defects, in a theological point of view, have been summed up by Sepp as follows: The school lacks the indispensable confessional principle; it makes no distinction between biblical theology and ecclesiastical dogmatics; its starting-point, Christology, is not very clear, since it cannot be understood without a previous *theology* and *anthropology*; its notion of Christ is absolutely docetic, since it is not *above*, but *without* humanity; besides which, in its development of God's revelation to Israel, it overlooks the circumstance that Christ was an Israelite; its idea of God is incomplete; and lastly, it has no definite philosophical method.

In spite of its defects in detail, however, the Groningen School has, in a theological point of view, produced much that is of permanent value. Next to the founders of the school mentioned above, we recall to memory the authors of many useful works, and the general activity of a *Zaalberg* and *Janssenius*, both of whom, in particular, have waged so important a contest

against Rome; *Drist Lorgion*, who attempted to show that the possibility of miracles was not inconsistent with the results of natural science, and who did homage to Melancthon as the most evangelical of the reformers; *Mayboom* too, who, however, has remained by the older rationalism of *Van der Willigen*. The most important work in the most recent period has been the Practical Theology of Professor *Muurling*, the field, indeed, where the chief services of Groningen have been achieved. For, as in the public lectures, attention is always paid to the necessities of the church, and theological science is pursued with a regard to its practical application, so in practice all the branches of Christian and ecclesiastical life are indebted to the Groningen preachers; and they may confidently, their keenest opponents being judges, place themselves on a level with the disciples of Heringa.

Directly opposite to the Groningen School stands the LEYDEN THEOLOGY, which acknowledges J. H. Scholten as its head. Its province is purely scientific; its starting-point is neither humanitarian nor generally evangelical, but what is distinctively Reformed. Whatever judgment may be formed of Scholten's system, friend and foe will alike acknowledge that he is the most distinguished theologian which Holland in our day can name; that every divine who really devotes himself to theological science must, as the German does with Schleiermacher, make himself acquainted with Scholten, and take a position towards him. But while Scholten's works, and the publications on the opposite side which these works have called forth, compose a literature of their own, hardly any notice has yet been taken in Germany of the Leyden theology. It is impossible to give a tolerably full account here of the numberless works which lie before us, and of their contents. Of a system like that of Scholten, it would be a caricature, in a single page, to give an explanation; we hope, therefore, to do this more particularly soon, and will refer here briefly to its history only.

When J. H. Scholten was promoted, in 1836, to the D. Th., his dissertation "On the Love of God towards Man as the Cardinal Point of the Christian Religion," exhibits Christianity as the revelation of a certain true religion, which, existing in the mind of man as an original divine image, and prepared and proclaimed among the Israelitish nation, was realized to its fullest extent in Jesus Christ. Defending with the weapons of recent science the absolute existence of Christianity, he embraced it at the same time in his own inmost being. This was further developed in his inaugural lecture as professor at Franeker (1840), in which he treated of the incumbent duty of theological science to avoid every kind of dectism, and laid down those fundamental principles by which he afterwards deduced the divine Sonship of Christ from his inner oneness with the Father, and not from the miraculous assumption of human nature, which he leaves untouched as a fact, but which he lays down as a point not essential to the preaching of Christ. Still more clearly was his theological system developed when, in 1843, being called from Franeker to Leyden, he commenced his work with an inaugural lecture "On the Manner in which the Christian Religion Proves its Divinity in the Mind of Man." Like Van Oostersee, he accepted the immediate *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* as the starting-point, but found in this merely the proof of the original sense of truth, sanctified by religion, inherent in every man. The fundamental idea that OUR FAITH IS INDEPENDENT OF ANY QUE-

tion or criticism and its solution, is still the central point of his system. No external fact, not even the resurrection of the Lord, may, according to the modern system, furnish the ground of faith in Christ. Faith must therefore be defended in another manner. The question of historical facts must accordingly be severed, and treated of by itself.

The scientific defence of the Christian faith accepted by the Reformed Church Scholten furnishes in his celebrated work, "*The Doctrine of the Reformed Church*" (1st ed. 1848, 2d 1851, 3d 1855, 4th 1861). Starting from a deep study of the old Reformed dogmatics, he deems it his task to place the old doctrine of the church in its true light, but not to defend it unconditionally. He first draws a sharp line of distinction between the fundamental principle and the separate dogmata, and develops the former according to the present state of theological science. The *own* fundamental principle of the Reformed Church, however, the unconditional sovereignty of God, and foreordination in relation to man, becomes with him an ethical fatalism, which can find its necessary consequence only in the restitution of all things (*ἀποκατάστασις*). The distinction which Scholten makes, therefore, between the general and the particular, the objective and subjective revelation (*φανέρωσις* and *ἀποκάλυψις*) is of importance with respect to the manner in which faith is communicated. The general revelation (*φανέρωσις*) is, according to him, not an external communication of God to man, separated from him by a great gulf; it lies in God's very being to manifest himself. This general manifestation becomes revelation when the covering or veil (*κάλυμμα*) of sin is removed by faith, and thus all becomes to the eye of faith *divine revelation*. But here lies man's destiny, that while sin is the defect, the imperfection of the spiritual life, and the greatest misfortune, happiness consists in the development of the spiritual life of man. This is the fulfilling of his destiny, and real freedom is deliverance from all moral evil, the ordinary manner of regarding the freedom of the will being nothing more than fancy. This destiny of man, however, can, it is evident, be reached only by faith in Christ Jesus, in whom the perfect religion is realised.

Such are some of the most prominent points in Scholten's system. The fatalism developed from predestination by the application of the "causal" idea has not only been made prominent in his "*Doctrine of the Reformed Church*," but been defended against assailants in a separate and not less important work on "Free Will" (1859).

That the Groningen School especially should assail the placing of the Confessional principle on the foreground was to be anticipated. Besides Hofstede, Pareau in particular has opposed Scholten on this point. A definite answer to the objection that the church doctrine has been chosen as the starting-point instead of the gospel, is to be found in the preface to the second volume of the second edition of the "*Doctrines of the Reformed Church*," in which Scholten at the same time replies to other assertions, such as that his Christology was other than a revelation of the divine in the person of Jesus of Nazareth; that he limited the kingly office of Christ to the time of his appearance upon earth; that he treated of the doctrine of God's sovereignty at the expense of man's liberty. That the attacks on separate parts of his system were too far pressed, may be seen at once. In the preface to the fourth edition he has placed the *in consequences* of De Groote in the strongest light,

The orthodox party, especially Van Oostersee and Groen Van Prinsterer, opposed the distinction between fundamental principle and dogma. In a separate reply to the former, he has shewn that his opponents have by no means remained true to the old reformed doctrine, that the distinction made by him is as justifiable as defining the systems of a Peter, Paul, and John. In the controversy with Groen, he points out in the first preface to the second edition, the *Catholic* tendency of his (Groen's) opinions. He gives a severe answer to Da Costa, who in a popular manner had attacked the heretical side of Scholten's system and then in a separate small publication.

The attacks on the part of the dissenters, as also by the Baptists Gorter, Visscher, Hoekstra, and Van Tideman, the last of whom defended Remonstrantism as the peculiar theology of the Dutch Reformed Church, we pass over in order to make more particular mention of La Saussaye's opposition, carried on during and the whole time of the issue of the *Ernst und Vrede*. Besides many separate articles, such as those against the *Apokatastase* and against Scholten's idea of revelation, De la Saussaye directed his attacks particularly against the *idealistic* tendency of his system, the propounding of an idea as true independently of any fact, thus conceiving of a church as a mere SCHOOL OF INQUIRY and not as a TESTIFYING community. It was to be anticipated that Scholten, who followed out his premises with the strictest logic into all their consequences, would not be induced to give up his system by the mediating tendency of De la Saussaye. On the contrary, he points out, in the preface to the fourth edition, several principles of his system to which De la Saussaye had given his assent; at the same time, he has in that fourth edition paid more particular deference to some of De la Saussaye's observations.

In thus glancing at the controversy raised by the dogmatics of Scholten, we are obliged, to our regret, to pass over many separate replies to Scholten (such as that of James to the distinction he has drawn between Scripture and God's word, and of Douwes against his "determinism," or fatalism, as also a *general critique* of Gorter); but we must not forget the repeated controversies between Scholten and Opzoomer. So early as 1847, after Opzoomer's attempt to treat of the atonement as a philosophical question, Scholten protested against ignoring the province of philosophy; and this controversy induced him to treat in his academical oration of 1847, "Of the cessation of the conflict between Theology and Philosophy by the proper limitation of each." Opzoomer had, on his part, a year earlier, attacked Scholten's production, "On the Causes of Materialism," to which Scholten replied by a criticism on the stand-point, as a critic, of his philosophical opponent. All these controversies are of the highest interest, and might be of much importance in the decision of many questions which have presented themselves too in German theology.

The influence of Scholten is, however, by no means confined to the department of dogmatics. We must also mention his mode of handling the Holy Scriptures, his criticism and exegesis, although in this department his distinguished scholar *Abr. Kuenen* deserves the most attention. The formal principle of Protestantism (the authority of Scripture) is defined by Scholten according to the distinction propounded by him between Scripture and God's word. God's word, or God's revelation, is contained in Scripture, but that

communication of it which Scripture conveys, must certainly not be confounded with the revelation itself; and although even the reformers and other divines confounded the two in theory, yet in practice they treated them as distinct, which the newer theology must certainly do. Of Scholten's own study of the Scriptures, his "*Introduction to the New Testament*," and his "*History of the Christian Theology during the period of the New Testament*," are examples. Whilst in the last work he attempts in a happy manner to produce a biblical theology in contradiction to an ecclesiastical dogmatics, particular attention must be paid to the positive results of his studies. He holds only the Second Epistle of Peter and the Greek of Matthew (besides several interpolations) as not genuine; and it is interesting for the present state of evangelical criticism, that he, with Ritschl, regards Mark as the oldest evangelist, whose book, united to the "*Logia*," spoken of by Papias, forms the groundwork of the present gospel of Matthew, which in its turn, with certain other traditions, furnished the materials of our gospel by Luke.

But we must take leave of Scholten's influence, which is highly stimulating, to cast a hasty glance at the spirit of the Leyden faculty in general. Scholten is its father; by his side stands worthily his pupil Abr. Kuenen. He has already, in his inaugural oration, "*On the study of Hebrew Antiquities*," and in his "*Introduction to Criticism and Exegesis*," given proofs of extraordinary learning and research, and still more is expected from his "*Introduction to the Old Testament*," now passing through the press. *Rauwenhoff*, lately called to be Professor of Church History in the room of Kist, has acquired an uncommon reputation. Among the Leyden doctoral dissertations, we find able pieces. In proof of this, we may mention that of *Belle*, "*On the idea of Revelation*;" of *Berlage*, "*On the notion of Faith*;" of *Koch*, "*On the Petrine theology*;" and of *Matthes*, "*On Hebrew prophecy*."

Such is the school of Scholten. The issue of the contest to which it has given rise we pretend not to announce, because that contest belongs to the present day, and we could not consider it consistent with our vocation to determine beforehand what the consequence will be. A more difficult task, however, is before us, in proceeding now to give a sketch of the so-called *modern theology*, because it is the movement of the moment to which no reflecting Dutch theologians, who keeps pace with his time, can remain a stranger. Here, accordingly, we cannot allow ourselves any such brevity as might lead to our being misunderstood, if we really mean to place ourselves in a position to judge of the present ecclesiastical state of Holland. Rather in order to be able calmly and impartially to judge, we must form a clear conception of the various causes which have contributed to the formation of this directly *naturalistic* school, as these are to be found in the remarkable connection of Opzoomer and Scholten with the Strasburg and Tübingen schools.

When Kohler, in 1856, wrote his account of the Netherlands, he hesitated to speak of a separate EMPIRICO-CRITICAL SCHOOL of theology, since he could merely point to Opzoomer as its only founder. But his system, or rather his method, he minutely describes. According to Opzoomer, the "*exegesis*" of experience, of empiricism, is the path which all science must pursue in order to come, as in natural science, to certain results. It is the duty of theology, therefore, to institute an empirico-critical inquiry into Christianity, and it is.

not a collection of dogmas, but this critical method, which it has to adopt from philosophy. We regret that we cannot speak more particularly of the philosophy of Opzoomer; but we recall the fact, that immediately on his appearance before the public, he overthrew by means of his attack the *EXPERIMENTAL* evidence of Van Oostersee, and shewed that the latter could neither convince unbelief, nor obviate the doubts of science. Already in this controversy he drew a line of distinction between the ideas of religion and the facts of Christianity, and he saw in philosophy the only competent arbiter of Christian truth, inasmuch as the question turns not upon facts but ideas. Still more severe was his attack on the central-point of Christianity, when he made the famous assertion, that philosophy reconciled man with himself. In the subsequent controversy between him and Scholten, though frequently corrected by the latter, he adhered the more firmly to empiricism as the only true path to the attainment of knowledge. His "inquiry," which sees in natural science the true model of all knowledge, and which ignores the fact, that there are questions which lie beyond the reach of the empirical method, labours under this defect, that he regards as possible, not the Christ of the evangelists, but only an ideal Christ.

This philosopher, favoured in no small measure by the unscientific position which Utrecht had for a long time maintained, and by the fact that after a long scientific sleep, a Dutch philosopher had again risen up in Opzoomer, has made a deep impression on many of the younger theologians. Of this we have already the important results before us. It was reserved for *Dr Pierson*, a man highly esteemed for his extraordinary scientific capacity, and for a piety at one time of the orthodox hue and inclining to mysticism, to exhibit the results of this school in casting away not only all theological, but all religious dogmas hitherto received. In a brilliant publication, "*Speculative Authority and Experience*" (1855), he shewed, that in the department of science and of art, of morals and religion, the speculative method was insecure, and that authority was merely a standard of uniformity. He proposed experience as the only path to arrive at certainty. A series of profoundly elaborate articles succeeded this first publication, shewing the effects of this method upon theology, the chief being the unconditional rejection of miracles. Pierson lays down the position that natural science is irreconcilably inconsistent with the belief in miracles (!), so that either the philosophy demanded by natural science, or the system which flows from a belief in miracles, must be unconditionally false. Grant that both are hypotheses, then he defends the first by the ever-increasing scientifically established proofs of experience, while the latter is defended by some narratives from a hoary past (!). His choice is therefore not doubtful. The well-known shift of some, that the miracles are not in opposition to nature, but take place in accordance with higher laws unknown to us, he refutes by saying, that they are then only natural, although strange appearances, and can have an importance to the physical inquirer, but not to the theologian. Branding every kind of supernaturalism as unscientific, and refuting with a keen logic all the arguments in support of it, his empiricism terminates in this result, that our faith must depend not upon the truth of external facts, but on the necessary decision of our sense of truth, which must recognise in Jesus Christ the Son of God. No party denies to him an earnest, real search for truth. The

method of his search he describes himself in his preface to the work of Schwarz, shewing how Lessing represents the sceptical in opposition to the critical stand-point. *Consistent, honest orthodoxy in contradistinction to an ambiguous middle position he highly esteems.*

Such is the manner in which the disciples of Opzoomer reason, and if one may with truth regard pantheism as the necessary consequence of "*determinism*," and the rejection of miracles as flowing from the divorcing of facts from ideas, then we may discover in the writings of Huët, who agrees with Pierson's results, the direct influence of the Leyden theology. This brilliant and talented writer, belonging like Pierson to the Walloon Church, gives an outline in popular language of the results of biblical criticism. From the fact, which no one denies, that in Holland, in the interpretation of Scripture, there is a gulf between ministers and people, he came to the resolution no longer to withhold from the congregation the results of criticism. This decision, which appeared to him to be a duty which he owed to conscience, no one will perhaps condemn; but yet he gives practically, not the results of a really unprejudiced inquiry, but rather the arbitrary hypothesis of Strauss, though his book holds in the highest esteem the ethical element of the Scriptures, and, in particular, the person of Christ.

We must agree with Scholten, however, when (in the preface to the fourth edition of his chief work) he says, with respect to this high reverence for the person of the Saviour, that it testifies to the real existence of a Christianity which, elevated above the doubts of historical criticism, cannot be clouded by human power; for the publications issued by Huët, and speedily become classical, give proofs not only of a Christian spirit, but of a rich practical experience, and are so much distinguished from a superficial rationalism, that they regard the Christian's life-task as consisting in a contest against known sin in all its sad meaning. The other writings of Huët, *e.g.*, his critique of Dutch "edifying" literature, and of his theological and literary articles, we can only mention in passing.

Reville, too, occupies the *empirical* stand-point, while, as an important representative of the Strasburg school, he stands forward in the Netherlands in its defence. We must here, in passing, notice the remarkable preface to his "*Essais de critique religieuse*" (1860), which attempts, by the aid of history, to remove the antagonism between science and religion, which, according to him, is undeniable, but which, since human nature is *one* in its essence, has no valid grounds. It is unnecessary to draw attention to the scientific value of the articles in these *Essays* on the church of the first two centuries, on the Epistle of Clemens Romanus, on the Lamentations, and other separate pieces, as they are not written in Dutch, and have already become known in Germany.

But along with this, there is going on an ever-increasing transference of the results of the *Tübingen* school to Dutch soil, and as this is now taking place for the first time, it will not appear strange to any student of history, that the results of Baur, and still more those of Strauss perhaps, are transferred, and nothing more. The miracle-rejecting empiricism found its best allies in the *Tübingen* criticism. The writer adds: "Shall we characterize the modern theology as infidel, as unchristian? Many may do this; we cannot. On the contrary, we must characterize its chief object as a doing battle

against infidelity." "We must at the same time say *a priori*, that such an exhibition of Christianity as forms the chief aim of the modern theology, and which in order to convert infidelity repels the really Christian circles, cannot be of the right sort. It is forgotten, too, that the world, according to the Saviour's own prediction, will always be opposed to him and his cause. If it is wrong to shut one's self up among pietistic and orthodox circles, it is still worse to repel those who are really Christian, in order perhaps to gain some that are unchristian."

This ignoring of practical duty proceeds from a theoretical over-appreciation of the philosophic stand-point, which, while setting itself up as the absolute truth, despises and rejects every other. It is necessary for the theologian to study the philosophical systems, and it is one of the saddest traits of many a German university at present, that all study of philosophy seems to have fallen into a slumber; but it is certain, too, that he who is conversant with the history of German philosophical systems, will not feel surprised that every new school lays claim to being absolute truth, and that especially in a land where, after a long interval, a philosopher for the first time has arisen, his method should pass as the source of all wisdom. But it is equally certain, that every philosophical system is only temporary, and that there exists but *one* eternal and absolute truth, that of the divine word. They who see in the empiricism of Opzoomer the only road to truth, must bear in mind that Opzoomer himself must only clear the field for a stronger party; and whether the result of all the philosophies which have appeared since Kant and Fichte be, that we are brought back to Bacon, is a question which few philosophers, at least among those who believe in a regular progress of philosophy, will answer in the affirmative.

On the critical stand-point we must pronounce the same judgment as on the philosophical basis of the modern theology. Liberty of scientific criticism is a life-question for the prosperity of theology and of religion itself.

Every critical inquirer must indeed take cognisance of the immense studies of the Tübingen school, and even pursue somewhat farther the path first traversed by them. But he needs to keep in his eye likewise, the advance which has taken place from Strauss to Baur, and from Baur to Ritschl, as to primitive Christianity. And in the name of German theology, we must protest against confounding the present results of its researches with those of an earlier transition state. As the modern theology in the Netherlands attaches itself to the Tübingen school, it must not take it ill of us if we apply to it the judgment which it has itself pronounced on all the earlier schools in the Netherlands, viz., that in spite of its name, it is, in its turn, still several *lustre* behind Germany.

The empirical school proceeds indeed with Strauss, on the assumption that miracles are impossible; we find in its attitude towards the Scriptures the explanation of its results. In a word, it points the infidelity of our age, which has become estranged because of miracles, to *ideas* which it considers as still weightier than facts; and though we cannot pronounce as irreligion a mode of thinking as to historical facts which differs from ours, yet when they regard all belief in miracles as superstition, with all respect for them, we cannot but call its fundamental principle highly one-sided, a principle which measures the divine self-consciousness of the Son of God, the faith of the

apostles and prophets, by the results of a science whose inquiries respect what is created out of dust and returns to dust again. Even if the belief in miracles were not a necessary element of the Christian life, yet such a belief is nothing more than faith in God's word, a faith with which the modern theology deals with the utmost arbitrariness. In examining Scripture, we may recognise the achievements of rationalism, and, in particular, that it has brought into prominence the HUMAN aspect of Scripture. But if we will understand, and remain faithful to the progress of history, we may not lose sight of the fundamental elements of orthodoxy and pietism, or say that the DIVINE aspect of Scripture rendered prominent by them is not of infinitely higher value than the human. The human origin of the Scriptures may be inquired into with all possible freedom, but it must not be forgotten, that the Scriptures contain for us the word of God, which we must not criticise, but before which we must bow.

XI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

APOLOGETICS.

The Canon of the Holy Scriptures from the double point of view of Science and Faith. By L. GAUSSSEN, D.D. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

The author of this important work upon the Canon is already favourably known to the English public by his work on Inspiration. The present is a natural sequel to it; and the author remarks, that the former volume would be incomplete unless accompanied by a treatise on the Canon. Both works owed their origin to the Scherer movement, which proved so unsettling to the minds of many in Geneva, and to French Protestantism generally. Though the present work is equally valuable with the former in apologetics, it can scarcely be expected to find the same place in our literature, because, happily, no attempt has been made among us, and no attempt would find much success if it were made, to unsettle the convictions generally entertained by all the churches of this country on the subject of the Canon. Though lax statements have been made among us upon the subject of inspiration, no man has had the audacity as yet to call in question the received Canon of Scripture. But as the one paves the way for the other, we hail this volume in an English dress as well fitted to preoccupy the ground.

In the first part the author proposes to demonstrate by argument, purely historical, the authenticity of all the Scriptures of the New Testament, as might be done if the question concerned only purely a human book. This is done very successfully and ably. We cannot but regret, however, that the discussion has become so minute and lengthy as unduly to swell this part of the volume, and we should much prefer to see him throw a number of the references and quotations into notes appended to the volume. The plan, too, adopted by the author of never appealing to any doctor without noticing his character, his principal writings, and his place in history, has tended to make the work much more bulky and less interesting than it might have been. He calls this division the scientific view-point, a word which we would rather avoid. His whole aim is to shew that the sacred writings were simply accepted by the church as emanating from the apostles, the organs of Christ's

revelation to the world. He thus stands on identically the same ground with Thiersch, who has rendered such important service on the whole question of the New Testament Canon, viz., that all depends on the reception of these books as apostolic documents by the Christian Church of the earliest times.

The second part of the volume, bringing out the inward criterion (the *testimonium spiritus sancti*) which goes to establish the Canon, is by far the best part. We regret that the reader has to read through more than 400 pages before he comes to this point, which is the most conclusive, though it is by no means the only evidence that goes to establish the New Testament Canon. Gausseen correctly proceeds upon the ground, that the evidence which establishes the Canon of the New Testament, establishes at the same time that of the Old.

We set a very high value on this noble work, so replete with a truly Christian spirit, and so correct in every opinion formed and in every judgment given; while the learning which the work evinces is ample, varied, and many-sided. We trust, in an apologetical respect, it will accomplish much important service in the church of Christ generally, as well as among French Protestantism.

S.

THE EXEGETICAL.

A Compendious Introduction to the study of the Bible, originally written by the late Rev. T. Hartwell Horne, and now revised and edited by the Rev. JOHN AYRE, M.A., Cambridge. Tenth Edition. London: Longman. 1862.

This is an abridgment of Horne's Introduction, a work of standard excellence, and long known to all biblical students. It was a difficult task to compress the four thick octavos into one pocket volume, and the consequence is, that we can only expect results and conclusions without the discussions of the larger work. To general readers, for whom the work is mainly planned, this will be no disadvantage. Of course it will not satisfy scholars, nor is it meant to do so, but to introduce them to something deeper. The Rev. Mr Ayre, who so successfully edited the volume of the large work which Dr Davidson so presumptuously disfigured and adulterated, is here equally successful. Though he has at times introduced arguments and illustrations not found in the larger work, he has followed its order, often given its words, and produced a compend that can be safely commended to general readers. The perusal of it will lead many to seek further information on biblical subjects. We may add, that it was approved by Mr Horne himself, who, however, died as the sheets were passing through the press.

The New Testament translated from Griesbach's Text. By SAMUEL SHARPE, author of "The History of Egypt." Fifth Edition. London: J. R. Smith. 1862.

This translation of the New Testament deserves our high commendation. Though we cannot say of it as a whole that it is equal to the felicity and beauty of the authorised English version, it aims to be exact and faithful in the minute details of translation, and it is so in a large measure. In a considerable number of passages where our version has missed the force of prepositions, particles, and tenses, Mr Sharpe is rigidly accurate. But while we have much to commend, we also miss not a little. He forfeits not a little of that which lends a charm to our present version, its tone and colour, and archaic garb, and he has too servilely adopted Griesbach's readings. The great advantage of our authorised version is, that the forty-seven scholars to whom it was committed in King James's days had but a limited discretion in the way of change, and were so distributed in committees, that they each lent their share to give smoothness and polish, as well as accuracy, to the whole; and they have produced a work which has been of the utmost service to the

language and religion of our country. We are none of those, however, who will have no change, and who will have something like a sacred Vulgate when we call to mind that a translation is but a human work. S.

CHURCH HISTORY.

The History of the Church of Christ, with a special view to the Delineation of Christian Faith and Life. (From A.D. 1 to A.D. 313.) By the Rev. ISLAY BURNS, M.A., Dundee.

The story of the early Christian Church, if properly told, should be one of intense interest. As regards marvellous rapidity of growth, the steady rise, amidst opposition of unparalleled severity, of a new power on the earth, the unveiling of the deepest and most powerful springs of human thought and feeling, innumerable scenes of suffering and working, there is nothing to be found anywhere at all to be compared to it. Yet this story, possessing such elements of interest as those, has hitherto been almost neglected by general readers. Except by students, little is known about it. The cause of this neglect and ignorance will be found to lie in the bulky and unreadable character of many of our works on church history. Even those works to which these characteristics cannot be applied, having been drawn up as scientific manuals rather than as popular treatises, have contributed little to interest the general reader. Mr Burns's work is, we trust, the first of a series of treatises on the history of the church, widely different from any that have hitherto appeared. It displays good research on the part of the author, very considerable literary ability, skill in selecting and grouping illustrative details, and great power of graphic description of localities, scenes, and characters. We expect that it will soon become a very popular book with the young, and that it may even be used as a class or text-book in some of our educational institutions.

It abounds with matter fitted to be of eminent use in connection with the present religious awakening. The outpouring of the Holy Spirit which has been witnessed in our day, great and glorious as it has been, was infinitely surpassed by what the church enjoyed in the infancy of its being, both as regards local extent, and the number of converts. The variety, too, of conversions in those early days, as regards inward experience, was very great. "Some approached the faith primarily through the understanding, some through the conscience, and some through the heart. One, for instance, who has been stirred before with inward thirstings after truth, and has sought satisfaction for those cravings, now in one school of philosophy, now in another, at last finds in the true light the resolution of all his doubts, and a sure resting-place for his feet. Another, oppressed in conscience by the remembrance of bygone crimes, and haunted with nameless fears and forebodings of coming woe, welcomes with joy the proclamation of divine redemption and peace, and loses his burden at the foot of the cross. Another, of a far different class, finds in the new doctrine at first not so much the healing of the soul as the discovery of its deadly malady. Of comparatively pure moral life and high aspirings, he seemed even in his heathen state not far from the kingdom of God, and deemed himself, and was deemed by others, rich, and increased in goods, and having need of nothing. But the shining in of the celestial light makes manifest the great darkness. Arrested by the matchless image of divine purity and holy love in the person and words of Jesus, he is at once smitten with a sense of his own worthlessness and need of transforming grace." Never, too, were converts so tried, and never did the trial of faith result in such blessed issues. Whether seen

conflicting with the doubts of scepticism, or suffering amidst the tortures of martyrdom, or brightening with the graces of the Spirit, amid many discouragements, their heathen homes, the countless multitudes of the early Christian converts shine with a lustre all their own. Of cases illustrative of these remarks the volume before us is full. We refer especially to the biographical sketches of the fathers of the martyr age, contained in the fourth chapter of period second, and to the view of the Roman catacombs and the delineation of Christian life contained respectively in the third and fifth chapters of the same period.

With so much that pleases us, it may seem invidious to speak of faults or deficiencies. We regard the introduction, in so far as it attempts to deal with the *final* causes of the history of the human race, as unsatisfactory. The materials are wanting, and probably will always be wanting, in our present state for any discussion on this great and mysterious subject. The author would, we think, have done better had he confined himself in his introductory remarks to a historical view of the existing circumstances in the state of the world at the death of Christ, which were favourable to the spread of the gospel. In some passages of his work the author is unnecessarily favourable to the Baptists. He speaks as if it were universally admitted that baptism by immersion was the only form of the administration of that ordinance known in ancient times. We wish that the author, in sketching the doctrines and teaching of the early church, had more fully exhibited the early recognition of the atonement, and of the righteousness of Christ. No doubt these doctrines are not taught largely and explicitly in the writings of the early Christian fathers; but they are taught with sufficient fulness and explicitness at least in the epistles of Paul. And though the author admits that they may have been, or were taken for granted, and silently acted on, we would have liked to have seen this brought out in a tangible manner, and in actual instances, as for instance in the striking epistle to Diognetus, so close upon the apostolic age. It is well to give its due place to the work of the Holy Spirit, "that strange mysterious influence like the breathing of life from above which accompanied the new doctrine;" and it is well also to give us a view of Christianity in all its *breadth*, "as speaking at once" to man's *heart*, to his *conscience*, to his *reason*, his *will* and immortal *hopes* and *fears*,—bringing to the heart consolation and sympathy, to the conscience redemption, to the bewildered reason the needful support of authoritative teaching, to the feeble will strength, to the wistful spirit dreaming of immortality, and groping after it, the sure and certain hope of immortality, and that, too, not in a mere system, but embodied and enshrined in the living person of Christ—at once the Comforter, the Redeemer, the Teacher, the King, the Resurrection and the Life. But it would have been better if, in addition to all this, the author had shewn us somewhat more fully than he has done that the underlying cause and spring of all the life, and faith, and power, of the early Christians lay in the doctrines of the cross, in that blood which brings peace to the troubled conscience, and joy to the desponding heart, and in that righteousness which is the *power* of God, and the *wisdom* of God unto salvation.

T.

Storia dell' Origine dello Scisma Greco. Di LUIGI TOSCI. Firenze: Le Monnier.

In his "Cure for Church Divisions," Baxter remarks, "It is the contending of Rome and Constantinople for the supremacy, which hath made the greatest schisms that the Christian world hath known." Recent events have, especially on the Continent, brought the Greek Church into fresh notice. The increased connection between the West and the East will,

doubtless, develop many good results to the latter. The recent able work of Canon Stanley on the Eastern Church, will have directed not a few to make themselves better acquainted with the ecclesiastical past of that communion. The two volumes before us are not only interesting, as shewing renewed intellectual activity in a country where, from Baronius to Ballerini, so much had, within the permitted range of Romanism, been effected for history or controversy, but as presenting in a portable compass, and a very readable form, the story of the separation of the two communions. The author has somewhat based his style on French examples, and the vice of antithesis in excess is not absent from his pages. He has, however, not a little of the French power of compressing into a well-grouped picture. As an instance of this, we would refer to the description of St Sophia (I. 341-4). It is briefer than, and equally comprehensive with, that of Gibbon in his 40th chapter. The author's portraits of Augustine, Leo I., and Photius are done with great spirit. As the work of a comparatively temperate Romanist of our time, we commend the work to those of our readers who take an interest in the church history of the remote past. H.

PRACTICAL RELIGION.

Heart Religion; or, Living Belief in the Truth. By the Rev. ALEX. LEITCH author of "The Unity of the Faith," "Christian Errors Infidel Arguments," "The Gospel and the Great Apostasy." Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 15 Prince's Street. 1862.

The author, in his preface, objects to the common run of books on practical religion, on the ground that they are generally too much an appeal to the emotional, and too little to the rational, part of our nature; that they apparently proceed on the erroneous assumption that the affections form the seat and stronghold of a man's religion, and not the conscience. "Accordingly," he says, "we do not sail on the same tack with those religious writers who labour to produce effect, rather than afford instruction,—who strive to display eloquence, rather than to deal wisely with facts and arguments,—who would rather immediately secure impression of some sort, than wait for impression of the right sort." In accordance with the position which he has taken, the author sets forth the claims of Christianity in a calm philosophic manner, addressing the educated mind and the man with some degree of moral earnestness about him, more than any other class of readers. Mr Leitch's eloquence is at the farthest possible remove from the strained. Such a writer is peculiarly adapted to a class of readers which has scarcely been touched by the religious literature of the present day,—not so much because of their opposition to the truth, as because of their disdain of the too common mode of presenting the truth.

The present forms a very appropriate sequel to Mr Leitch's previous works. This work is divided into three sections, entitled, "Preliminary," "Man Seeking God," and "Man Finding God." The first consists of four chapters, entitled, 1. "Self-Knowledge Possible;" 2. "Practice and Speculation;" 3. "The Nature of Guilt;" 4. "Religious Neutrality Impossible." In chap. iii. there are some excellent remarks on the connection between guilt and belief, setting forth the truth on this subject in a clear, and forcible, and original manner. In chap. iv. the sinner is chased from one to another of his loved refuges, each by a searching analysis being proved but "a refuge of lies,"—brought at last to the cross, and there taught that the refusal of allegiance to Him who hung thereon, is alike a crime of the greatest magnitude and an act of the greatest folly.

In Section II. there are three chapters: 1. "Man's Dependence upon

God;" 2. "Man's Distance from God;" 3. "Man's Duty to God." There are some pertinent remarks on a subject which it appears his mission to place, with special emphasis and clearness, before the minds of Christian people—viz., the dignity of conscience, the solemn duty of being "faithful in that which is least" of her requirements, as well as that which is greatest, and the fact that a position of error cannot be reached in any other way, than by turning a deaf ear to her warning voice. He remarks:—"The want of honesty in the formation of our opinions is obviously the support, not only of all idolatry and coarse superstition, but of every mistaken sentiment that is injurious to society, and of every false interpretation of the Bible which rends the church of Christ. But for this lax and culpable habit of mind, heresy on the vital doctrines of the gospel would never have blighted, as with mildew, the beauties of the garden of the Lord, and divisions and schisms on subordinate, yet important, topics would have been nipped in their early buddings."

In Section III. the following subjects are discussed in a masterly and original manner (the author "endeavouring," as he says, "to find a short and satisfactory pathway to truth, unencumbered with learned folios, and unobscured with philosophic mist") :—chap. i., The Divine Message : its Import, Authenticity, and Record ; chap. ii., Man's Reception of the Message : 1. Perception of its Meaning, or Knowledge ; 2. Correction of its Truth, or Unfeigned Belief ; 3. Acceptance of its Proposal, or Living Faith ; chap. iii. The Results of this Reception,—Godly Sorrow, Peace with God, and a Holy Life ; and there is a concluding chapter on the Presence and Power of the Promised Paraclete.

Such is an outline of a work which is obviously the fruit of a vigorous mind, associated with a heart in thorough harmony with the truths discussed. We heartily commend it to the thoughtful reader. The writer has shewn that principles previously investigated by him in other works have a very close relation to life, and that we do wrong both to human life and to philosophical speculation, if we make any severance between them. Our author has no sympathy with the doctrine that there is an esoteric truth for the learned, and an exoteric truth for the people. He has shewn that truth is the common heritage of all. Each truth which has not usurped the sacred name, may be brought from the sphere of the schools to the sphere of common life. It may perhaps have to leave behind it the philosophical jargon by which it has been surrounded. If properly presented, it will be as welcome, as highly appreciated, and as deeply loved in the one scene as in the other. The author aims at a religion in which reason and faith have assigned to them their proper places and their proper work,—which keeps the *via media* between that sentimental piety which would exclude reason from its province, and that cold intellectualism which cannot abide the fervid and earnest presence of a living faith. Our author pursues a course of thought, in which he establishes the truths of Christianity for the conviction of the intellect, and by the same process of reasoning, impresses them with practical power upon the heart, that the religious man may rise to a higher platform of spiritual life. He takes a wider range ; and prompted, no doubt, by his former experience as a missionary in India, as well as by the native bent of his mind, he views the human mind placed in the most disadvantageous circumstances—even in the midst of the heathen world—seeking after God. Applying the principle according to which all spiritual blessings are bestowed (embodied in that text, "To him that hath shall be given, and he shall have more abundantly"), he traces the experience of one thus found "afar off," onwards and upwards, till he is brought nigh "by the blood of sprinkling," and raised to heights of holiness by the possession of those blessings which are purchased by that blood.

We believe it to be the main design of the author of "Heart Religion,"

to shew that there needed never to have been that divorce between speculative truth and practical religion, which has to too large an extent prevailed in works on these subjects; but that they ought to be closely united, both in the investigation of those who write upon, and in the practice of those who seek to live out, these high and holy truths. They stand as correlates, the one to the other; the latter needs the former for stability, and the former the latter for an opportunity of bearing fruit. Mr Leitch proceeds upon the assumption that those act foolishly who try to persuade men that they may become solid Christians without the expenditure of much thought, and that a high-toned Christianity can be attained in any other way than by a thorough grappling with, and mastery of, the relation to each other of these great truths which lie at the foundation of the Christian life. The religion inculcated by our author is thus one of deep thoughtfulness and of high-toned spirituality. T.

The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ: an Introduction to the History of Christianity. From the German of John J. J. Döllinger, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Munich. By N. DARNELL, M.A., late Fellow of New College, Oxford. In 2 vols. London: Longman. 1862.

These interesting volumes, from the pen of one of the best known Roman Catholic professors in Germany, will, we have little doubt, be well received in this country. As their somewhat quaint title indicates, they are designed to describe the relations which Paganism and Judaism bore to Christianity, and to shew the favourable and unfavourable conditions under which Christianity was promulgated, as well as the relative strength of the combatant principles. It proposes to shew how every combination of the principles with which the genius of pagan antiquity essayed to satisfy the religious necessities of mankind were found wanting. In short, it covers very much the same field as Pressensé's recent *Introduction to the History of the First Three Centuries of the Church*. Starting with these premises, Döllinger proceeds to give a detailed account of the various religious systems with which Christianity came in contact, and of their working, passing in review successively the Hellenic, those of Asia minor, Syria, Persia, Egypt, Etruria, Gaul, Germany, and Rome. Particularly interesting are his chapters on the relations borne by the Greek and Roman literatures to their respective mythologies. He then proceeds to give an account of the historical development of Judaism down to Christ's day, describes minutely the religious state of Jewish society at that period, next follows Jewish history and the development of Jewish thought at Alexandria and elsewhere. After the purpose of Judaism in history had been attained, and Judaism had become of as little avail to the world as the pagan religions existing by its side, he follows it down to the tragic close of the existence of the Jews as a nation.

Such is the course which Döllinger takes, and while recognising the width of the horizon he surveys, and the vigour of his historical pencil, we can scarcely assign these volumes the high polemical value their author claims for them. This aim, indeed, was probably a second thought on the part of the author, otherwise he could scarcely have failed to see that the importance he attaches to his view, that Græco-Roman Paganism continued their historical development down to the period of the Antonines is proportionately damaging to the fact he wishes latterly to render so prominent. If his work professed simply to be an objective narrative of the religious history of the world before Christ, it would occupy a very much higher place, though in a different class of works. As it is, its very elaborateness and comprehensiveness remind one of a general's forgetting, in the numerical strength of his forces, the strategical weakness of their position. Though these volumes are scarcely fitted to fill the breach against opponents, and though any very new or remarkable

excavation in the field of ancient religious history are not to be looked for, yet their comprehensiveness of view and literary art entitle them to an extensive circle of general readers. The translation, we should add, is excellent.

Civilising Mountain Men, or Sketches of Mission Work among the Karens.
By Mrs MASON of Burmah. London : Nisbet & Co. 1862.

One of the most remarkable instances of missionary success, and of the power of the gospel, is to be found in the work of God among the Karens ; and we wish those who throw away time in tales of fiction would only peruse such works as the present, and see how much stronger truth is. Mrs Mason of Burmah has sketched her husband's work and her own among the Karens with graphic power and thrilling interest.

From the Cradle to the Crown ; or, Days with Jesus. By the Rev. JOHN HUNTER, late of Halifax, N. S. London : Nisbet & Co. 1862.

This little work is a touching and well-executed sketch of Christ's life, replete with sound doctrine and Christian sentiment. These days with Jesus will be useful to many in carrying on life's conflict, and furnish many hints to Christian minds.

The Heavenward Path ; or, Progress and Perfection in the Life of Faith.
By Rev. WILLIAM WILSON, Free Church, Monkton, author of "Popular Preachers of the Ancient Church." Edinburgh : Nimmo. London : Nisbet.

A work by one of our younger ministers, thoughtful and fresh in its matter, fine and polished in its style, laying hold of us at once, and tightening its grasp on our sympathies the longer we read. The author has great power of exegetical analysis, and no lack of skill of application, though occasionally his allusions are rather recondite, and his diction somewhat laboured. He has the acuteness of thought and precision of expression which constitute the natural exegete ; and in the department of grammatical exposition would, without doubt, achieve decided success. The present work, in which, even unwittingly, great exegetical ability frequently displays itself, consists of discourses on the Second Epistle of Peter, so connected as to afford almost a continuous commentary ; and though laying hold mainly of the great principles, yet bringing in, and generally with real success and power, the subordinate elements, to illustrate and vivify the greater. The author states his aim to have been to produce a volume which might be especially suitable for youth, as a guide to the knowledge of the gospel, especially in its relation to the development of Christian character and the whole life ; and we can confidently recommend the work to such as eminently safe and judicious, as well as living and attractive, and admirably fitted both to encourage entrants on the "Heavenward Path," and to counsel those already entered. Interesting and weighty, because coming from practical familiarity with every element in the epistle, is the testimony incidentally borne by the author to the Petrine composition of the Epistle.

D.

